Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Morning ladies and gentlemen. Before we start this morning, I'd kindly request us all to stand as a mark of respect for the late Chief Justice, Ismail Mohammed, who passed away over the weekend. He was a great man, whose demise constitutes a huge loss, not only for the judiciary of this country, but for the country as a whole.

HEARING RISES AS A MARK OF RESPECT

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, as the senior person present, I believe that I'm speaking on behalf of all our colleagues here, that we associate ourselves with the remarks made by you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. We'll proceed with the hearing now, and I believe that the next applicant who will be testifying will be Gen Webb. Is that correct, Mr du Plessis?

MR H DU PLESSIS: That's correct, Chairperson.

EDWARD WEBB: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: The application of Gen Webb is in bundle A, is it? Page 195 etcetera.

EXAMINATION BY MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chair.

General, you were appointed as the Commanding General of Special Forces from 1 January 1989, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: The CCB was a sub-section of Special Forces, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: If you look at the total set-up of Special Forces, the CCB, was it a small or a big section of that? Special Forces.

GEN WEBB: It was a smaller sub-section.

MR H DU PLESSIS: There were two projects for which you're applying for amnesty, correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: The first project, if I can call it that, was the baboon foetus placed at Archbishop Tutu's house, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm the contents of that application as true and correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: The second project for which you apply for amnesty, concerns the bomb explosion at the Early Learning Centre in Athlone, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Can you just read that application into the record?

GEN WEBB

"On the 30th of August 1989, certain information came to my knowledge from one, Col Joe Verster, Managing Director of the CCB ..."

...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I know that it is done, but I submit that it doesn't mean that it is correctly done. That a witness who has to rely on his memory in giving evidence in relation to a transaction, cannot be given the same credence if he reads a document out than if he speaks out of memory. And where we have a person who is legally represented, who with the assistance of a legal representative has produced a document, his credibility cannot be as easily tested if he merely reads a document out, particularly as it was not made at the time such as we had in relation to Mr van Zyl, who made the statement in 1990, when the matters were still fresh in his memory, but when a document is produced specially for this purpose, for him to merely read out his statement is not the best way of assessing his credibility. I would suggest with the greatest respect, that you should direct that he should give viva voce evidence on what he remembers about the things that he says happened, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, all the previous applicants read in their applications and Mr Bizos didn't object to our modus operandi then. If he has an objection, then perhaps my client can just confirm his application and then he can be cross-examined.

CHAIRPERSON: From what document is he reading, Mr du Plessis?

MR H DU PLESSIS: From his amnesty application which forms part of the record.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that on page ...

MR H DU PLESSIS: Page 195 of bundle A.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to find the place.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, maybe I can assist. General Webb's application has been broken into two portions and is in two separate bundles for reasons unknown. The one concerning the ape foetus is in bundle A and the one concerning the Early Learning Centre, is in bundle D. The document the witness was referring to now appears at bundle D, page 19.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Kahanovitz. Yes, well if we have it before us, do you confirm the contents of this statement, General?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: You're not making any amendments to it?

GEN WEBB: No, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Well then perhaps, Mr du Plessis, we have it before us, perhaps you could just lead the General on the incidents.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, you will recall at the beginning of these proceedings, Mr Bizos was the one who asked that these things be read into the record for purposes of the members of the public who attend the hearing, who don't have the knowledge of what is contained in the bundles, but I have no objection.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Is there anything you wish to add?

MR LAX: Sorry, could you just bear in mind, the translator's just asked us whether you could slow down a little bit please.

GEN WEBB: Chair, I request you and the Committee, with respect, to, in respect of the amnesty applications of my previous subordinates which have been heard here and will still be heard, to please not consider this in isolation, but also to bear in mind that some of our previous enemies and operators also launched attacks on their own initiatives. Unfortunately it was an unconventional struggle and in such a struggle there isn't always control right down to the lowest levels as a result probably of too much enthusiasm or impatience, even a weakening of discipline, a feeling of revenge which could lead to action on own initiative. Thank you.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Is that you wish to add?

GEN WEBB: Yes, that's all, thank you.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: General, what role - if you could just tell us in your own words, did you play in the ELC, Early Learning Centre incident?

GEN WEBB: I approved the project, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that at an in-house meeting?

GEN WEBB: Yes, between myself and the Managing Director.

CHAIRPERSON: That's Mr Verster.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: At that in-house meeting, could you just explain what occurred at the in-house meeting, what was the procedure, were documents presented or was it a casual sort of discussion in a hotel room somewhere? If you could just explain the circumstances.

GEN WEBB: I met Col Verster at an office from which he operated and there was no written submission, it was an oral submission which was made, it was on the 30th of August and according to the submission certain elements were busy planning acts of terror in the Cape and they were to meet on the 31st. In other words, we had to act as soon as possible against these elements.

CHAIRPERSON: So approximately how many days prior to the 31st did this take place?

GEN WEBB: It took place on the 30th, the day before the 31st. That is why I also described it in my amnesty application as an occasional target, because it's something which we had a submission on the 30th and the people who were supposed to meet on the 31st were involved and that's why we had to decide whether we're going to act or not.

CHAIRPERSON: And at that meeting, what sort of depth did one go into? Were you just told what was going to happen or were you given a plan, or was there a budget?

GEN WEBB: No, there was no budget at that stage, it all happened so quickly. Reasons were given why we had to act, by Col Verster to myself, to enable me to make a decision whether we were going to do something or not. The suggestion was then to plant a limpet mine and to cause it to explode in the building, the recommendation was also that there should be no casualties.

There was a request that we should use a remote control device, that we should obtain such a remote control device and it had to be found as soon as possible because the people who were supposed to be involved had to come from Pretoria that very same night. From Pretoria to Cape Town.

I then fetched this remote control device through means of Hekkies van Heerden. I didn't physically go and fetch it, I did it through his mediation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, who's Hekkies van Heerden?

GEN WEBB: He was my Engineering Officer at Special Forces, Head Office.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you get at that meeting, details as to who the operatives involved in the operation were, the people on the ground?

GEN WEBB: No, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: And thereafter, was there any sort of formal report-back?

GEN WEBB: Yes, on the first occasion afterwards when I saw Col Verster, I can't remember exactly when, it wasn't long after the 31st, he informed me that the operation had been completed successfully and according to his information at that stage, there had been no casualties.

CHAIRPERSON: And, General, you've said that you're applying for amnesty in respect of the Early Learning Centre and the incident that took place at Bishop Tutu's house. We're also hearing amnesty applications here concerning the Dullah Omar and Gavin Evans incidents, is there any reason why you're not applying for amnesty in respect of those two matters?

GEN WEBB: Because I didn't approve those projects, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: The system in the CCB, of which you were the Managing Director, for the approval of projects, was it such that some projects could be approved at a lower level and only certain projects went up to you, or were they all meant to come to you? How did it come about that you approved some projects but not others?

GEN WEBB: I just want to correct something, I wasn't the Managing Director, I was the Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, sorry, the Chairperson. Sorry, it's my mistake, Mr Verster was the Managing Director.

GEN WEBB: There were certain delegated powers which the Managing Director had and in respect of the appointment of certain people it wasn't necessary to come to me as the Chairperson. For instance if vehicles had to be purchased, it wasn't necessary to come to me and the establishment of the profession of certain members of the CCB, known members of the CCB, it wasn't necessary to come to me and when it came to the monitoring of a person, it was also not necessary to obtain my permission. But where we were planning operations, such as for instance, the Dullah Omar incident, then it would definitely have been necessary to come to me for authorisation.

MR LAX: To be specific, are you talking about elimination of people?

GEN WEBB: Yes, it could be elimination of people.

MR LAX: Because we've heard that in both the Omar and the Evans matter, they were going to kill them.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And General, when you were Chairman of the CCB, was that your sole function or were you still busy with other aspects of Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: The CCB was a small sub-section of Special Forces, so I still had all the other regiments under me.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so you didn't devote your full time to this?

GEN WEBB: No, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any further questions?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Just one aspect.

General Webb, you've heard what Col Joe Verster testified about the Omar project and the Evans project.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Do you want to comment on that in any way?

GEN WEBB: As I said, I didn't approve those projects.

MR H DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR H DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General, what is the extent of Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: It was to launch special operations which could not be done by other parts of the Defence Force, plus in the case of the CCB, the maximal disruption of the enemy.

MR WESSELS: What did Special Forces do, occupy themselves with during 1989 primarily? What were they busy doing?

GEN WEBB: Well to wage the counter-insurgency struggle against the enemies of South Africa.

MR WESSELS: How was that done?

GEN WEBB: Firstly, there was a certain foreign aspect, aspects which related to things outside our borders, I'm not prepared to talk about that, and then there was this bomb incident in Athlone.

MR WESSELS: General, you said that the regiments of Special Forces also fell under your command, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Are those all the regiments?

GEN WEBB: Yes, all the regiments.

MR WESSELS: So the whole of Special Forces operations, that fell under your command?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR WESSELS: How big a part of your daily functions was taken up by CCB activities as distinct to the Special Forces activities?

GEN WEBB: Col Verster and I met once a week for about an hour.

MR WESSELS: And did you discuss all CCB matters?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR WESSELS: You said that the Athlone incident, there you gave an oral command, or authorisation.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR WESSELS: Was it possible therefore, to give an oral authorisation for a certain operation?

GEN WEBB: In this case, yes.

MR WESSELS: You heard that there was evidence about the fact that Mr Omar and Mr Evans, that they were monitored.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And money was also used in that regard.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR WESSELS: It wasn't necessary that your permission be gained for that?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Now Mr Verster testified that the projects regarding the elimination of Mr Omar and Mr Evans, that he discussed these with you. He couldn't recall the details, but he said that it was discussed with you and that he got your approval, according to him. You say you didn't give such an approval.

GEN WEBB: I didn't give such approval, no.

MR WESSELS: Is it possible that there's a misunderstanding between the two of you, that you thought he was talking about monitoring and he thought he was discussing the authorisation of elimination?

GEN WEBB: Well I think it would be quite difficult to have a misunderstanding between eliminating and monitoring.

MR WESSELS: If Mr Verster had come to you with the information that these people were active supporters of the enemy of the day and were contributing to the struggle against the government and he asked you the authority for a project to eliminate them, would you have authorised such a project?

GEN WEBB: I would have taken such a project to higher authority for authorisation.

MR WESSELS: Would you have recommended it?

GEN WEBB: According to the facts which I've now heard, I probably would have authorised it, but I would have taken it to higher authority to get that authority.

MR WESSELS: Thank you, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. General, you've already placed it on record that your function in this particular period related to the Defence Force and that in terms of the CCB itself, I want to get certain information from you.

You've testified that a project such as Omar and Evans would theoretically speaking, have been approved by yourself, or could have been approved by yourself. Do I understand the position correctly that the type of situation in which people were to be eliminated within the borders of the country, where it was possibly necessary to eliminate such people, that it actually was envisaged when the CCB or the internal wing of it, was established.

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, during the Webster judicial inquest and during the Harms Commission proceedings, I placed great emphasis on the fact that we, Special Forces, and therefore CCB, and in particular the CCB, we could only act outside the borders of the country. That was not the complete truth. Special Forces and elements of the CCB, not Region 6, it was before Region 6 was established, were already involved in activities within the country. And here I specifically recall the Ribeiro incident. Then Region 6 was founded and it was called the domestic or internal region, plus the fact that Region 6 were able to act in a covert fashion. In other words that its actions would not be traceable back to Special Forces and to the Defence Force, it amounted to a region having been established which had the potential to act within the borders of the country.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You were appointed as the Commanding General of Special Forces after the CCB was established, is that correct? The CCB already existed when you took over?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And at the stage when you took over as the Commanding General of Special Forces, had you been aware of the CCB before then?

GEN WEBB: Not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you informed of the existence of the CCB upon you taking over command?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage the internal wing, Region 6, had already been established when you took over.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who was your predecessor, just for the record.

GEN WEBB: Gen Joop Joubert.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So the information regarding the existence of the CCB as such and the internal Region 6, that information you got from Gen Joubert?

GEN WEBB: Yes, that's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you tell us when you took over this command?

GEN WEBB: If I remember correctly, it was in 1988. No, it was in 1989, but in December '88, I was already at Special Forces Head Office and then the submission took place from my predecessor to myself and on 1 January '89, I officially took over the command.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It is on record that as far as the internal region is concerned, that the appointments of Region 6's staff, the Regional Manager for instance and various members of the cell, Maree, Botha, van Zyl, that that took place during 1988.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that during 1988, for six months after their appointment and due to an agreement between the Police and the Defence Force, these people were inactive. Is that the information which you got when you were given a briefing?

GEN WEBB: Yes, they were only to become operative on the 1st of January '89.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you were informed of that aspect?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now this region would only have become active under your command, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you told whether any internal operations had taken place before you took over command?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Your answer is perhaps slightly ambiguous, were you informed that there had been no such operations, operations of the internal Region 6 before your taking over the command?

GEN WEBB: Well they couldn't have launched any operations, they only became active on the 1st of January '89.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You mentioned that Special Forces or the CCB, I'm not quite sure and I want you to clarify that for us, that they had already launched certain operations within the country before Region 6 was established. Do I understand that correctly?

GEN WEBB: That is correct, although my predecessor did not inform me about those operations. As a result of the structure he wouldn't have informed me about it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you talking about the fact that there was secrecy?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you were aware of the fact that internally the CCB or Special Forces had already launched certain actions or operations against the then enemies of the State?

GEN WEBB: I wasn't aware of it, but you hear things here and there and, that is in your position as Head of Special Forces, or in Special Forces, and the Ribeiro thing sounded to me as if Special Forces could have been involved. Afterwards of course, the matter was revealed.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you saying it was confirmed that Special Forces had been involved?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But General, upon your taking over command, the forces and the powers and functions of the Commanding General of Special Forces, must have been spelt out to you, is that not so?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And if Special Forces had acted against the enemy of the State, within the country, those powers and functions must also have been spelt out to you most clearly.

GEN WEBB: As I tried to explain just now, Chair, as a result of the establishment of Region 6 and by calling it an internal or domestic region, plus its capacity to act in a covert manner, it followed logically from those facts that we in fact had the capacity to act within the country. My predecessor didn't spell out certain operations that took place within the borders of the country.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But if you're talking about a capacity to act internally, capacity means that you could do it, you had the capacity, you had the fire power, you had the staff, access to weaponry etcetera, to act within the country. You agree with me?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But a capacity to act is one thing, it has to go hand in hand with the authority to act, correct?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that power or authority to act, that was part of your job description. It must have been.

GEN WEBB: It was never put in writing, but my capacity and my powers and functions, if I remember correctly, would have included the fact that if I approved of an operation and there was a loss of life, then it would have had to go to a higher authority to be authorised. If there was no loss of life envisaged, then I could authorise it myself. But this was never put in writing, that "You had the power to act within the country.? And even if it was mentioned, it would never have been reduced to writing.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well exactly, General, as a result of this covert nature of the structure that these things were never put down black on white.

GEN WEBB: That is what I'm saying, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you were told orally by your predecessor what your powers and functions were to be?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now I heard you say that you are not prepared to talk about projects outside of the country and I respect that, but the point remains that it must have been general knowledge that the South African Defence Force, via its covert structures, were acting against the enemies of the then State, in neighbouring countries for instance, to try and destabilise them, is that not so?

GEN WEBB: Overtly and covertly?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, overtly - well, there were well known operations which took place, there was also - as you've just said, there were certain covert actions against the enemies and situations where the South African Defence Force did not want to reveal its involvement for public knowledge.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: As far as the internal or domestic section or region is concerned, to get back to that for a moment, was it your instruction or orders that in the same way as it was possible to act in a cover way against the enemies of the State abroad, that this could also be done within the country in order to destabilise the enemies of the State?

GEN WEBB: I think the word that you're using, "order", is not correct because it was conveyed to me from an equal rank, what could be done and what couldn't be done. So it couldn't have been an order.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Alright. Your equal rank predecessor, Gen Joubert, you took over his post, right?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you should have been informed as to your powers and functions and orders, not so?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And was one of your orders as a result also of the establishment of Region 6, to destabilise the enemies of the then State within the borders of the country?

GEN WEBB: The order was maximal disruption of the enemy, under which you can include within the country if there was an appropriate target, but it could also be done outside of the country where there was an appropriate target.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The destabilisation of the enemy outside of the country, that you've placed on record, but General, your predecessor must surely have described to you in so many words that Region 6 was specifically established for purposes of the maximal destabilisation and disruption of the enemies of the State, internally, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes, but in very concealed terms, but I understood that one had the capacity to act internally, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What my clients or their position, my clients being Burger, Basson and Maree, as far as they're concerned there is on record on other forums, which also forms part of the documentation before this Truth Commission, it's been placed on record that there was a very specific briefing from official quarters, from the Defence Force and they were informed that part of their duties was the maximal destabilisation and disruption of the enemies of the Republic, within the country.

GEN WEBB: I wasn't part of that briefing session.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But that briefing which they received, General, you will agree with me that that would have been in line with the perception, at least, which you had regarding the powers and functions of Region 6 of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Yes, with the perception, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If therefore you had been formally told by the Managing Director, Joe Verster, that a briefing session had taken place and that he had told the members of Region 6 that their job description was to be in the following terms, namely the maximal disruption of the enemy of the Republic of South Africa and of the State, with the country, you wouldn't have disputed that?

GEN WEBB: No, I wouldn't, but such a briefing never took place between myself and Col Verster.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But the point is, if your approval was sought you would have given it because that was your perception as well, that that was the powers and functions of Region 6?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And if at that briefing it was for instance said that that disruption could take place, for instance by burning vehicles, damaging buildings etcetera, that would still according to your perception, have been correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And if those members had been informed that part of their job descriptions and powers and functions would be the death in certain cases, appropriate cases of certain people within the borders of the country, that would also have been correct in terms of your perception and specifically in terms of the capacity of the CCB's internal wing?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: As far as the approval for these acts are concerned, you say that - and here I'm referring to the worse case scenario of conduct action against the enemy, namely the death of a person. Was there in any way a written authorisation for such acts, from say, the Head of the Defence Force?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was there any written prescriptions regarding the procedures to be followed in those cases?

GEN WEBB: There was a procedural prescription or order, as to how to go about to have an operation approved, but it was described as an operation, it wasn't said that if you want to eliminate a person, you have to follow this procedure.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If I understand you correctly, then there was no official procedure laid down for the internal conduct and action of Region 6.

GEN WEBB: They had their plans, but there were no orders. They had their plans, but you would also not find it anywhere in writing with them, that they were there to eliminate people.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, no I think we have already passed that particular point. You agree with me that it was your perception that they could do so and that you would not have been surprised if that had been the perception of the footsoldier, van Zyl for instance, in his cell at Region 6? You wouldn't have been surprised if that was his perception?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already said that ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: There is an element of common cause among our friends across the table, the evidence of the witness is that he doesn't know Mr van Zyl, nor did he authorise him. He's being led into a situation where we can deny each other's version, but let's try and reconcile, and on that basis it is put to him that Mr van Zyl must have had this perception and the witness obliges with an affirmative answer. I submit that this is not a permissible way of leading evidence. The evidence thusfar from Mr Verster is not that he was under an incorrect perception, he says that this witness authorised the two conspiracies or attempted murders. That is the evidence that must be put to him. And as far as the last question, it's completely impermissible to ask a witness about what the perception of an operative that he does not know, he doesn't know what discussions there were, he doesn't know him at all, yet a favourable answer, so that they can have an argument about perceptions at the end of this hearing. I submit that the question should be disallowed.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry Mr Chairman, may I just say that I totally disagree, my view, with respect, is there's nothing improper about my questioning, I did not lead this witness, what I've done now is to just summarise what has been said by him up to this stage. I did not ask him what the perception of van Zyl, for instance, was, I asked him whether he would be surprised if that was said to have been his perception. There's a total difference there.

CHAIRPERSON: But whatever Gen Webb might think what Mr van Zyl or any other operative's perception was is of very little value to us because he doesn't know them and he doesn't know what they were briefed, he said he wasn't at the briefing. So it's of no value really.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, the situation is that if this witness were to say that it was totally against the policy of the South African Defence Force and the CCB as such, that people could be eliminated, then obviously that would be virtually the end of the inquiry as far as my clients are concerned, but that is not his evidence and that is what I'm getting on record.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you can proceed, but we don't have to get Gen Webb's - you keep asking him what his opinions are about something that he really has no knowledge about.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General, what I'm trying to get to is due the lack of documentation in this case. I want to get to the procedure which would have been followed, with the approval or otherwise, of operations of Region 6, the CCB. Can I ask you directly, was the procedure and levels of authorisation for operations, such as for instance, the elimination of somebody, let's say specifically relating to the elimination of a person, specifically between yourself and the Managing Director, was that discussed between yourselves? Or was it just left hanging in the air?

GEN WEBB: Well the Managing Director was a founder member of the CCB and he would have known about the procedures which were to be followed, so I assume that he would know that if somebody had to be eliminated, then authorisation had to be got from me.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You see - well, do I understand your answer to be that it was never discussed, because my question was actually, was it or was it not discussed? Yes or no?

GEN WEBB: I will accept that it was discussed, but I can't recall a specific incident where it was discussed, but it is possible.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, with the greatest respect, Mr van Zyl clearly stated what the procedure was, Mr Verster clearly stated what the procedure was, none of them were challenged in relation to what that procedure was. Mr Verster said that he got permission from Gen Webb. These hypotheses that are begin put are not based on the evidence. If hypotheses are to be put, they must be put on the evidence and no attempts should be made in order to reconcile irreconcilable differences. The differences on the evidence are irreconcilable, Mr Chairman, and an attempt is being made - and I will read a passage from a judgment in relation to the CCB, from another Court, as to what has happened in other proceedings. We are here to try and prevent the same thing from happened here, Mr Chairman.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I really don't understand Mr Bizos' objection at all, I'm trying to establish facts from this witness and if the witness doesn't know the answer, or if he cannot remember, he can say so. But the question is simple, did you or did you not discuss the procedure? And the answer is either yes or no or "I can't remember." Now what is the objection about?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'll allow the question because as you say it does relate to a question of fact, whether they discussed or not, or whether Gen Webb merely assumed that Mr Verster knew what the procedure was.

Did you discuss with Verster, the procedure relating to the elimination of people, or projects involving the elimination of people?

GEN WEBB: I can't recall that we spoke about elimination but the procedure was laid down. As I explained earlier on, the powers that he had as Managing Director, or he had certain powers and others he did not have, and I've explained that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes General, I'm sorry, the answer is still not clear to me. Can you recall specifically that as to the powers and functions of the Managing Director, whether you discussed it specifically with him, yes or no? Can you recall that or can't you?

GEN WEBB: There must have been such a discussion, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But what Mr du Plessis is asking you is, as you sit here now, can you remember such a discussion? - not what ought to have happened.

GEN WEBB: Not specifically, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Can you just repeat your answer, I couldn't hear it.

GEN WEBB: Not specifically, Mr Chairman.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You mentioned, General, that Mr Joe Verster was a founder member of the CCB, and if I understand you correctly, you therefore assumed that he was familiar with the procedure?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you, if that was your perception that he as a founder member of the CCB who'd already been involved in it for quite a while, that he must have been familiar with the procedures and functions, is it not possible then that you did not specifically discuss it with him?

GEN WEBB: I can't remember a specific example or instance where we sat and discussed the procedure but the two of us had a very clear understanding as to what he could approve and what he couldn't approve.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And what do you base that on?

GEN WEBB: They had their administrative plan which contained certain functions, which - well, certain things that Verster could approve, appointment of staff, purchasing of motorcars, certain administrative things which he could approve. Then there was a procedure laid down for the two of us approving certain things jointly, certain operational things.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In other words, executive actions of the CCB relating to destabilisation of the enemy in the country?

GEN WEBB: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry General, before you got involved with Special Forces, what was your position?

GEN WEBB: I was the Commanding Officer at the Infantry School at Luhatla, the Army Combat School in Luhatla, which is a completely conventional form of warfare as opposed to the Special Forces which was totally unconventional.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already told us that in the case of certain projects you would have had to obtain authorisation from your superiors, was that specifically spelt out as to what actions against the enemy that would relate to?

GEN WEBB: No, apart from that distinction of, people would not be killed or casualties were not expected and would casualties be expected. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who laid down that distinction?

GEN WEBB: It was conveyed to me by Gen Joubert.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So what it amounted to was - well to put it directly, actions within the country which were actually illegal and which had to be carried out against the enemy and in which there were not casualties envisaged, those you could authorise?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So the dividing line, the distinction made between what you could and couldn't authorise, would be physical injuries to people described as enemies of the State? For those kinds of operations you would have to get authorisation from your superiors.

GEN WEBB: Casualties, Chairperson. If casualties were expected, in other words, loss of human life.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Loss of life. So you would be able to give approval where injuries were expected, but not necessarily casualties or loss of life?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this was made clear to you and spelt out to you by your predecessor, Gen Joubert?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, who was your higher authority?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, if I wanted to launch certain actions or if Special Forces wanted to launch actions against the ANC, Umkhonto weSizwe, then it was the Chief of the Army who at that stage was Gen Liebenberg. If these were actions envisaged against any other enemies of the State, the PAC for instance, then it would be the Chief of Staff Defence Force, who was Gen Gleeson and then Gen Bishoff.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That would also apply to actions within the borders of the country against these banned organisations?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Gen Gleeson and thereafter Gen Bishoff.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I'm sorry ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Did you have any meetings with these people to give them information, your superiors I'm referring to, relating to these projects to be launched?

GEN WEBB: I am not quite with you, what projects are you referring to?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well I'm not referring to specific projects, but you were informed as to what the line of command would be, for instance in the case where you wanted to launch actions against Umkhonto weSizwe. Now did you from time to time have briefing sessions with these Commanding Generals for instance, the Chief of the Army? - in general.

GEN WEBB: Yes, I think once or twice I spoke to these Generals.

MR P DU PLESSIS: During these discussions between yourself and your superiors, was it discussed that you had these powers which Gen Joubert told you you had?

GEN WEBB: No, the only briefing which I received, which I got regarding my powers and non-powers, came from Gen Joubert.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I understand that, but let's refer to your discussions with your superior officers. Did it in those discussions with your superior officers, also become clear that these people were also aware of your powers and functions as Commanding General Special Forces? Specifically relating to internal affairs?

GEN WEBB: No, no, it was just not an issue.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was your information which you got from Gen Joubert that your superior Generals, to refer to them in that way, that they were aware of your job description and powers and functions?

GEN WEBB: He never told it to me in those words but I accepted that my higher authorities knew what my powers were.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you assumed that to be the case?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just for the record I want to touch on something very briefly and that is the situation within the Republic during '88, specifically '89. What was the situation relating to the onslaught by the enemies of the State against the State, in 1989, according to your perception?

GEN WEBB: The onslaught was very severe and that one can infer from the fact that a State of Emergency was in existence countrywide.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You're talking about a State of Emergency, that of course was within the borders of the Republic of South Africa at that stage?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: General, you are on record and if necessary I can refer to it, as that you referred to the internal situation as a situation of war.

GEN WEBB: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was not officially declared a war in the normal sense of the word.

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This view of the war within the borders of the country in 1989 as being a situation of war, was that conveyed to the people under your command?

GEN WEBB: I would say yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this view of the domestic situation also conveyed by your superior officers to yourself? I'm talking for instance of the Chief of the Army, was that perception also the perception of the Head of the Army or Defence Force? Namely that we were dealing with a war situation.

GEN WEBB: Yes, of course that was the perception. It was not a case of anyone calling you and telling you that, because we grew up in the war, we had been soldiers for a long time and this war just grew and grew and grew. So it really wasn't necessary for anybody to tell me, look this is an internal problem, we knew that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you - what I'm referring to is whether specific talks, even informal talks, were held in which the situation was described as such? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

GEN WEBB: Yes, informally.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Between yourself and your superior officers and Generals?

GEN WEBB: I can't remember specific places, but normally you would talk about the war and the counter-measures when you talk to your superiors.

MR P DU PLESSIS: May I just have a moment, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Martini, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTINI: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few questions.

General Verster - sorry, General Webb, as a member of the South African Defence Force, the Special Forces Unit, the other members, cell members, the other applicants here, Mr van Zyl for example, as my client, were also employed by the South African Defence Force, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: And as members, would you fall - as General, would you know this knowledge as a General, would you all fall within the scope of the Defence Force Act?

GEN WEBB: For me, yes.

MR MARTINI: Now General Webb, just a few further questions on the issue of the authority. Would you accept, from my understanding of the evidence, is that the CCB's function was the total disruption of the enemy, is that correct? Enemies of the State.

GEN WEBB: Not totally, maximally.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Martini, just before I forget, you've moved onto another point ...

You say that everybody fell under the ambit of the Defence Force Act?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So for instance if there was a disciplinary problem involving, let's say Mr van Zyl or any of the other applicants, would that lead to a court martial?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And they were treated as soldiers?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Martini.

Sorry General Webb. So it was the maximum disruption of the enemy of the State, was the principle that the CCB used to operate under?

GEN WEBB: That was their order, yes.

MR MARTINI: Now Mr van Zyl gave evidence that they attended an "opleidings kursus" and there they were told that one of the functions in this "maksimale" disruption of the State was anything from the breaking of a window to the elimination of a person, would you accept that?

GEN WEBB: I was not present at this meeting but according to the evidence it's possible.

MR MARTINI: Well would you dispute that one of their duties or part of their duties and functions included breaking of a window, up to the elimination of a person?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: You will not dispute that.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: You heard the evidence that according to Mr van Zyl, their knowledge of the procedures, an instruction was given to Mr van Zyl, for example, to come up with a plan to eliminate Dullah Omar, thereafter we heard that there was to be an "in-huis" involved in this plan, does that accord with your knowledge of the procedures of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair.

MR MARTINI: And we also heard from Mr van Zyl's understanding of the procedures, thereafter the Managing Director, Verster was to then have a "tweede in-huis" further up with yourself. Is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Whether it was a second in-house or a third in-house, but Col Verster and myself did discuss the operation.

MR MARTINI: Did you discuss the Omar operation?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: So am I misunderstanding you, what you're saying is you accept that there would be a "tweede in-huis" between Verster and yourself on a particular project, in general?

GEN WEBB: Call it a second in-house, yes, what the name is actually doesn't matter, but between Verster and myself we would have to sit down and discuss the matter.

MR MARTINI: And a decision would then be taken and would you then accept that the Managing Director, Mr Verster, would then convey that decision down the line to - the Regional Manager would then go on to, let's call them the footsoldiers, Mr van Zyl ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Have we now moved from the specific of the Omar incident to the general procedure, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think because ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Well as long as we understand that we've moved from the specific ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That was my understanding, Mr Bizos, because the witness said that there wasn't an in-house relating to the Omar incident.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, I'm sorry for interrupting.

CHAIRPERSON: But just let's say for example, the Early Learning Centre, which the General has said that there was such a discussion.

MR MARTINI: General, all I'm trying to do is understand these procedures. According to, let's call them the footsoldiers, the persons on the lower ground, the aware members of the cell, for example like Mr van Zyl, according to their evidence they understood the procedures to be that ultimately when they came up with a plan, for example, the blowing up of the Early Learning Centre or to eliminate Minister Omar, that plan after the first in-house was then going to be discussed between the Managing Director and the Chairman, which would have been yourself. Is that a correct understanding of, for example by Mr van Zyl that that was how the procedure should operate?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: And therefore, generally speaking, would the procedure then be, after you had met with the Managing Director and a decision taken, the Managing Director would then convey the decision down the line?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: To either Mr Staal Burger, the Regional Manager who would in turn convey the decisions to the relevant cell members down the line, depending on the project. Is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Well Col Verster would have gone to the Regional Manager and the Regional Manager would have conveyed it to the footsoldiers.

MR MARTINI: Correct. So would you accept then that if the footsoldiers were told to carry out an elimination, that the footsoldier, so to speak, believed he had authority within the structure to carry out this project?

GEN WEBB: If his Regional Manager had given him an order, yes, he could accept that it had been cleared with the higher command.

MR MARTINI: That's my point. The footsoldier could accept that there was authority within the structure to carry out the particular project which he believed had been discussed between the Chairman and the Managing Director, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: I think I've just answered that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't expect the footsoldier to telephone you or communicate with you to confirm whether approval had been given or not?

GEN WEBB: Definitely not, I didn't even know them.

MR MARTINI: So if Mr Verster had told the Regional Manager, who had in turn informed, for example Mr van Zyl, "Go ahead with the project to eliminate Minister Omar, Mr van Zyl was correct and was entitled to accept that he had authority from the top, so to speak, to carry out this project?

GEN WEBB: That he had authority to do the project, yes.

MR MARTINI: Which would have included the elimination of Minister Omar.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: And the same would have applied to the Gavin Evans conspiracy.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Martini. Mr van Eck, do you have any questions?

MR VAN ECK: I've got no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ECK

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, do you have any questions that you would like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE: General Webb, the members of Region 6, did you know them? Do you know who they were, all the members of Region 6?

GEN WEBB: No, I only knew the Regional Manager, I only had met him.

MR COETZEE: The discipline of those members, you've already testified that that would have resorted under the Defence Act, was there a procedure relating to the placing on ice of a member?

GEN WEBB: Are you talking about Martial Law?

MR COETZEE: No, that's what I want to know, was there ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: No, but you're asking me whether it's under the Defence Act?

MR COETZEE: Yes, yes, in the military legal situation.

GEN WEBB: No, but a Commanding Officer can do a thing like that.

MR COETZEE: What is it, what does it mean to place a person on ice?

GEN WEBB: My understanding is that such a person is then placed in the cooler so that he can't do anything.

MR COETZEE: Yes, but that does not make him a lesser member of the Defence Force, he's still a member of the Defence Force until such time as there's a disciplinary action against him.

GEN WEBB: He's not being fired, he's just being placed one side and placed in a cooler and he can't do anything. He's not fired.

MR COETZEE: And the people placing him on ice also have the right to draw him back in again, so there isn't any real procedure once a person has been placed on ice, as to when and how he comes back?

GEN WEBB: Definitely not.

MR COETZEE: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Bizos, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: General, I'm going to read to you a passage from the judgment of His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman, in the Webb Inquest - Webster - it was because I was looking at the document, I didn't intend to be disrespectful to you, Mr Webb - in the Webster Inquest, at page 118 of the finding I want to read to you the following. I want you to listen carefully because my question is going to be "Does His Lordship's judgment of the credibility of the members of the CCB, apply to you, and is the same happening here?" Listen carefully.

"At this point I digress to observe that I have at various stages of this Inquest, had occasion to realise that several of the witnesses are trained, skilled and experienced in the art of deception. They are, to put it bluntly, professional liars. They make their living out of deception. This is certainly true of Verster and the pseudo ...(indistinct) Luitingh and of Barnard. Indeed it must be true to a great extent, of everyone who has worked as an operative for the CCB. They have all been required to appear to have one occupation, the so-called front, whilst their main concerns have been their covert activities. They are all aware of the need for apparently independent corroboration of whatever untruthful proposition they wish to have accepted for the truth, and they plan accordingly. The so-called corroboration becomes as suspect as the proposition itself. They are accomplished in the art of secret conspiracy. When conflicts emerged between them, as happened in some instances, they showed themselves ...(indistinct) resourceful in falling back on other propositions which may themselves be nothing more than even more deeply laid conspiracies of falsehood. In their world conflicting allegations by no means to be assumed to be conflicts between the truth and falsehood. They just as easily could be conflicting falsehoods. The truth lies very deeply buried and the task of those engaged in trying to expose it to view, is no easy one. So it is with regard to the reasons why and the purposes for which Verster recruited Barnard to the outer circle of the CCB. Of the various versions I have been given, I doubt whether any reveals the whole truth. None of those versions touch on Barnard's character."

...(intervention)

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, sorry I have to interrupt here, I'm sorry, but Mr Bizos was objecting to my questions on the basis that I was seeking an opinion from the General, and what Mr Bizos is now doing, he is putting the opinion of a Judge and it's nothing more because the Judge formed his conclusions from evidence given over months before him. That evidence is not before this Commission. Now Mr Bizos is reading this out on record and I submit that this is actually highly improper and aimed at influencing this Commission, and this Commission, remember, has not got the evidence in the Webster Inquest before it, it's not part of the evidence, and now this opinion of the Judge, Stegman, is put forward to this witness for his opinion on what the Judge said. So I have to object at this stage.

MR BIZOS: With due respect, Mr Chairman, the witness gave evidence before the Judge and a credibility finding in relation to a transaction in relation to an overall conspiracy of which this witness was the Head, is admissible. What I asked the witness is whether it refers to him or whether this has been his modus operandi, and I will proceed to show what he did in other proceedings, Mr Chairman. I submit that the question in relation to the credibility finding by another Tribunal is relevant and the question should go to the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'll allow the question.

MR BIZOS: Does the opinion of the Judge of the modus operandi of the CCB operatives or all those connected with it, apply to you, Sir?

GEN WEBB: Chair, I gave evidence during that trial, what does the Judge say about me in that report, in his opinion?

MR BIZOS: Well he says that everyone that is connected with the CCB is tarred with the same brush ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: No, that is not correct, Mr Chairman, that is not what Mr Bizos has read out. Perhaps he should read that out again before he puts that to the witness. He spoke about the operatives ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR SIBANYONI: Your mike, Mr Bizos.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, the ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Let me ask you this. You gave evidence before His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman. Don't nod your head, say yes. Please.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And did you tell him the truth or did you lie to him?

GEN WEBB: I have already told the Chair this morning that in respect of my evidence for the Webster Inquest, I made a point at all times saying that we could not act within the borders of the country. I told the Chairperson that that was not the full truth and I - I'm still answering, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Yes, complete your answer, but try to actually answer my question, namely whether you lied to the Judge or not.

MR H DU PLESSIS: He's busy answering the question, Chair.

MR BIZOS: Are you admitting that you did it? That you did not tell the truth to the Judge.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, can Mr Bizos just give the witness time to answer, he's still busy answering.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think he's already said that.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.

MR BIZOS: So on your admission, whether the Judge had you specifically in mind or not, on your admission you were untruthful at the Webster Inquest.

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson, and that is why we are here today.

MR BIZOS: Oh. And did you put up your hand as confidently as you did this morning and say that you speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you cross your fingers on both occasions when you said that?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, it's not necessary for Mr Bizos to descend to those levels and to make certain insinuations to say that my client is lying blatantly to the Commission. I object most strenuously.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think the crossing of fingers would nullify the taking of the oath in ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: I'm sure that it wouldn't, but for superstitious people it might, Mr Chairman, and we'll come to the superstitions that were attributed to Bishop Tutu.

But let us - is that the only time that you lied under oath, or did you lie to His Lordship, Mr Justice Harms?

GEN WEBB: At the Harms Commission of Inquiry I also told a lie.

MR BIZOS: Just one?

GEN WEBB: There it was also regarding the internal/external situation, which I've tried to explain it, plus at one stage they asked me what my powers were and I testified that even if a vehicle was to be burnt, I would go to higher authority to get approval. Which is totally ridiculous and I have no excuse for that.

MR BIZOS: But you also made a statement on oath before you gave evidence, that you lie in that statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that a written statement, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: A written statement, yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, can Mr Bizos please tell my witness what he is referring to specifically.

GEN WEBB: Before the Harms Commission?

MR BIZOS: Did you make a statement before you entered the witness box in the Harms Commission?

GEN WEBB: I read out my statement before the Harms Commission.

MR BIZOS: So you must have made a statement?

GEN WEBB: That's what I'm saying, I read it, so I must have made it.

MR BIZOS: Did you take the oath in your statement?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And were there lies in that statement?

GEN WEBB: You'll have to give me an opportunity to read through the statement.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: You'll have to give me the opportunity now to read through that statement.

MR BIZOS: Well don't you remember whether you told the truth or not in your statement?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, with all due respect, if Mr Bizos can refer the witness specifically to what he's talking about, then the witness may have an opportunity to answer. If he wants the witness to tell you whether that statement which he made at that stage was correct in all aspects, you'll have to adjourn so that he can read it and then come and tell you in what aspects it's not correct.

MR BIZOS: I don't want to have any kicks for touch. The evidence that you gave to the Commission was the reading out of a statement. You've already told us that the evidence that you gave, that is reading out that statement, contained falsehoods. Does it not follow that the statement that you read out of, contained the same falsehoods?

GEN WEBB: Can I just hear the question again please.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was that you testified here that you lied when giving evidence before the Harms Commission.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And you also testified that when you were giving evidence before the Harms Commission you read from your statement. Now the question from Mr Bizos is, does it not follow therefore, that the statement contained lies?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I can't remember, but I remember during cross-examination before the Harms Commission, I told a lie and I think as far as my statement is concerned I can only recall the internal/external aspect. I am not sure.

MR BIZOS: Yes. We'll come to greater detail later, but I want to ask you, Sir, that you were a much decorated General, I think that you were awarded at least half a dozen high medals for the excellent work that you did in the Army.

GEN WEBB: All my medals I received before I became the Commanding Officer Special Forces, nothing afterwards.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I accept that and it's relevant to my question, my next questions. What was the motive, your motive, for being untruthful to a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court as he was then called, like Judge Harms, and being untruthful to a Judge of the High Court who was investigating the death of David Webster, what was the motivation, why did you lie?

GEN WEBB: In respect of what my powers were, I have no excuse, it was stupid of me. I don't know whether I was tired of Mr Bertelsman's cross-examination or what the position was, but as far as the internal/external thing, I was trying to protect the Defence Force and the Army.

MR BIZOS: Now I want to take you back to '89/'90 in order to throw some light as to what the reason for this was. Do you recall the allegations made that State terrorism existed, that is that the State had hit squads that killed people? Do you remember those allegations being made?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you remember that President de Klerk and his predecessor, President Botha hotly denied, that the Security Forces had absolutely nothing to do with deaths, either inside or outside the country? Do you recall that?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And when I mean deaths, I mean assassinations. It was not the business of these honourable South African Security Forces to assassinate people, that was the lie.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And the story that was given out to the public in South Africa and the world was that there may be a few rotten apples who act independently and the politicians and the leaders of the Army are blameless for these acts. Was that the answer that was given to the public?

GEN WEBB: I think that was the impression created for the benefit of the public.

MR BIZOS: And wouldn't it have been an absolute negation of that assertion if Generals admitted to being in the barrel of rotten apples?

GEN WEBB: Butt his General was not involved in any killings, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

GEN WEBB: You're talking generally. Let us look at my application please.

MR BIZOS: No, no, no, please we'll come to - we'll firstly talk about it in general and then come ...(indistinct) particular, you can rest assured about this. But is the proposition correct, that it would be a sorry sight if Generals appear to be mixed up in the barrel of rotten apples?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And do you agree that under public pressure, President de Klerk appointed the Harms Commission in order to investigate these allegations, hoping, I suppose, that all these allegations would be dispelled?

GEN WEBB: The Harms Commission investigated alleged murders.

MR BIZOS: Assassinations or murders, yes. Now the evidence of Mr Barnard, or rather the statements of Mr Barnard and thereafter Mr van Zyl, if true at the time, would have brought about to public knowledge that the Head of the Army - well taken with other documents, they would show that there was State involvement at least in attempted murders. Would you agree with that?

GEN WEBB: Are you talking about the Head of the Army?

MR BIZOS: No, no, I've withdrawn that part ...(intervention

GEN WEBB: Then just give me the question again please.

MR BIZOS: Ja, we'll take it step by step, that if those statements were true, it would show that there were elements in the Army which were responsible for at least unsuccessful attempts at assassination.

GEN WEBB: Not in the Army, but in Special Forces.

MR BIZOS: Well isn't that a portion of the Army?

GEN WEBB: No, it's part of the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Oh I see, alright, it's a distinction that we will bear in mind.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, sorry, when it's a convenient time we'll take the tea adjournment, I see it's ten past eleven.

MR BIZOS: It may be now, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a twenty minute tea adjournment, thank you.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

You told us that one of the reasons why you lied to Judge Harms, was to protect the Army or the Defence Force.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair.

MR BIZOS: Did it not occur to you that you may be defeating the ends of justice in trying to protect the interests of the Defence Force or the Army?

GEN WEBB: No, Chair, because the acts which the CCB had committed were all revealed at the Harms Commission Inquiry. The level on which it was approved, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And why did you lie to Justice Stegman in the Webster Inquest?

GEN WEBB: For the same reason.

MR BIZOS: To protect the Army?

GEN WEBB: To protect the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: But hadn't the Army's role in covert activities been exposed after the Harms Commission?

GEN WEBB: Yes, but there had been as yet no court case or evidence had not yet been tested.

MR BIZOS: Oh, we'll come to that. But now let's just stay with the Harms Commission for a moment. Who were your counsel?

GEN WEBB: Adv Hattingh and with him was Adv Wessels.

MR BIZOS: And who was your attorney?

GEN WEBB: Havenga.

MR BIZOS: The State Attorney's office?

GEN WEBB: No, I don't know from which office. I think it was a private company.

MR BIZOS: Mr Havenga. Yes. And who were the legal representatives of Mr Verster?

GEN WEBB: The same people.

MR BIZOS: Were you the only General that the represented or were there other Generals?

GEN WEBB: I was the only one, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Verster had the same legal team?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was there any attempt to reconcile the versions that were going to be given to the Commission by Mr Verster on the one hand and you on the other, so that you could present a united front to the Commission, the two of you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was it just an accident that you denied that you knew anything about Omar and Evans and Mr Verster claimed privilege for those events, so that there would not be any apparent contradictions between the two of you, so that you could retain the same legal team?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was there any discussion at any stage, by you or your fellow officers, your fellow Generals, that there must be a cut-off point, that no senior Army officer should be involved, "If there was rot to come out, let's put the blame on those who had come from the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad", who were not members of the Defence Force or the Army and in any event they did not enjoy the reputation that the officers and gentlemen of the Army enjoyed? Was there any such conscious decision made, that there should be a cut-off point in relation to internal assassinations?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You see the role of the Army was documented in a document, which was suppressed at the time by you and your fellow Generals - who was the Head of the Army at that stage?

GEN WEBB: Gen Liebenberg.

MR BIZOS: Who was it?

GEN WEBB: Gen Liebenberg.

MR BIZOS: And before him?

GEN WEBB: Gen Geldenhuys.

MR BIZOS: And who was the Head of the Army on the 28th of April 1987?

GEN WEBB: '87?

MR BIZOS: Yes. Three years before, or a year before you were made the Head of CCB.

GEN WEBB: I think it was Gen Geldenhuys.

MR BIZOS: And Gen Joubert was your predecessor in the CCB's chairmanship?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was there a trust between you and Gen Joubert? General to General, so to speak.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: He would not have kept any secrets from you.

GEN WEBB: In Special Forces it happens that you don't talk about what happened in the past.

MR BIZOS: No, but you know, he surely wouldn't have had any secrets from you in relation to what I might describe as the Constitution of the CCB", the kernel document as to what it was supposed to do? He would have had no reason to hide that fact from you.

GEN WEBB: He didn't tell me about any prior operations.

MR BIZOS: No, no, no, we're not talking about operations, we are talking about what the CCB was supposed to do and what the attitude of the Army was to killing people in South Africa. He had no reason to hide that from you.

GEN WEBB: He never discussed anything of that nature with me.

MR BIZOS: Did he have any reason, wouldn't you have considered un-comradely conduct, so to speak, or un-general conduct, for him to keep from you what the real purpose of the Army was? - of the CCB was, which was a creature of the Army or the Defence Force, have it as you will.

GEN WEBB: He didn't discuss any previous operation with me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Bizos is asking you is, he's established first of all, that you and Gen Joubert trusted each other, was there any reason why he should not tell you everything about what the purpose of the CCB was? What it was there for.

GEN WEBB: There was no reason for that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. 'Cause you were coming into the Security Forces cold, as it were, I mean you were coming from the Infantry School, Combat School, conventional warfare into a completely different sphere of operation, unconventional.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you have expected Gen Joubert to have fully briefed you about the purposes of Special Forces and the CCB in particular?

GEN WEBB: Yes, but once again, he didn't tell me anything about operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) on operations, you are not answering the question, I will ask it for the last time. Would there have been any reason for Gen Joubert to hide from you what the purpose of the CCB was in relation to internal assassinations?

GEN WEBB: He never discussed internal murders, assassinations, with me.

MR BIZOS: Was there a period during which you were in office and Gen Joubert was going to go out of office, in which, you know, you were sort of the Chairman-in-waiting, so to speak, and working in close contact with Gen Joubert?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: For how long did that last?

GEN WEBB: Just a little bit less than a month.

MR BIZOS: Well a couple of weeks should surely be enough to say that this is our objective in relation to external operations, these are our objectives in relation to internal operations and this is the line of authority and this is the General Manager's function and this is the Chairman's function. Did any such discussion take place between you and Joubert during the period?

GEN WEBB: In broad detail, yes.

MR BIZOS: How broad must the detail be not to address the issue of whether a creature of the South African Defence Force is going to take into its embrace assassins? How detailed - what sort of detail was that? Wasn't it a fundamental issue in which one would have expected one General handing over to another General, to make full disclosure?

GEN WEBB: He didn't make any full disclosures to me.

MR BIZOS: I see. Did he have any reason to mislead you?

GEN WEBB: From the very nature of Special Forces' activities and because the CCB was a covert operation, he gave me no detail or operational aspects.

MR BIZOS: We're not talking about detail of operations already done, we are talking about one General handing over to another and not talking to him about what the policy of the Army's creature was in relation to internal assassinations. You know, I want to sound a note of warning if I may, General, that we are going to argue that if you persist in withholding information, in our view, in the manner in which you are doing now, that we will argue that you are not making full disclosure as you are obliged to in these proceedings. I'll ask the question again. Are you asking the Committee to believe that one General handed over to another without disclosing to the latter what the policy of the CCB was in relation to internal assassinations? You're asking the Committee to believe that?

GEN WEBB: He never discussed internal assassinations with me. Region 6 had been established as an internal region with a covert potential, which gave us the potential and the capacity to act internally, but he didn't discuss these aspects which you mentioned, with me.

MR BIZOS: This ability to act, did that include assassination?

GEN WEBB: The objective of the CCB was a maximal disruption of the enemy.

MR BIZOS: You know, General, the other thing is that we are accustomed to the euphemisms and the other nice words that are used, please answer the question, assassination is assassination. Please answer the question.

GEN WEBB: I have answered it, he never discussed assassination with me.

MR LAX: You see - sorry, you seem to be missing something here, or I don't know what's going on, but you're being asked did he discuss the policy about assassination, you're not asked whether he discussed projects ...

GEN WEBB: No, we did not discuss a policy of assassination, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: General, you've come from the conventional side of the Army, you know nothing or very little about Special Forces, on the conventional side of the Army where you were in the Infantry School, Combat School, assassinations weren't part of your conduct.

GEN WEBB: No, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you're still in the Army, you're still a General, you've come across to Special Forces, and you've talked here about if somebody had to be killed or assassinated, you would only give authority once you got authority from above, what made you assume that assassinations were part of the brief of Security Forces, if it was never mentioned to you?

GEN WEBB: I never approved any assassinations. I got the impression ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But you've told us that as far as you were concerned, assassinations were part of the power, the jurisdiction, the functions of the CCB, because you said that if there was to be a project involving assassinations you would have to go to higher authority, so there was the possibility of an operation conducted by CCB which would involve the assassination of an individual. Now what I'm asking you is, taking into account your background, coming from the conventional side of the Army where such a policy didn't exist, what made you believe that it was part of the function of CCB even to contemplate the assassination of an individual? If you weren't told this by Gen Joubert in the hand-over period, why did you think it was possible?

GEN WEBB: Because we were fighting this battle against our enemies. If I can explain somewhat further, Gen Joubert had a contact in the South African Police, when I took over from him there was no contact in the South African Police. Now with hindsight, if I think about it, I got the impression that Special Forces came up to a certain level, a new Commander came and then certain things were eliminated or cut away. But Gen Joubert never informed me that I could authorise murders internally. What I did answer Adv Wessels, if such a thing was submitted to me I would have no reason to keep it back, I would have taken it to higher authorities.

MR BIZOS: Did he say that you could authorise assassinations externally?

GEN WEBB: I'm not talking about external operations.

MR BIZOS: No, you know I'm not asking you to deal with any specific operation, even though I believe that you haven't got the right to do that, the question is, what was your mandate as the Chairman of the CCB? Which is - the mandate of the CCB and the modus operandi of the CCB is one of the issues which is properly to be examined, we submit, before this Committee. Did he say that you had the authority to authorise assassinations outside the country?

GEN WEBB: Not specifically, no.

MR BIZOS: No. So as far as you were concerned there was no difference between internal and external mandate? Are you saying that?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: So you had no authority or it was never discussed with you to assassinate anybody, inside or outside the country?

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But then I want to return to the Chairman's question, why did you have to go either to the - well, to the Head of the Army in order to authorise an assassination, if assassination was not discussed at all?

GEN WEBB: According to information, well the information we got would determine what kind of operation we were to carry out and if it was an assassination then I would go to higher authority, if it was some other kind of operation it would go to higher authority, it wouldn't be spelt out ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: Who told you that if there's to be an assassination you must go to higher authority? Who told you that?

GEN WEBB: It wasn't told to me, it's simple logic.

MR BIZOS: Who contemplated assassinations to your knowledge, or who did you come - when did it come to your ears that there was a possibility that in your new job you may have to discuss assassinations?

GEN WEBB: I never became aware of that.

MR BIZOS: So this attempt that you tried to make, a distinction between the matter of outside an inside being different, was a fiction.

GEN WEBB: There's no difference between internal and external as far as my channel of authorisation is concerned, it was the same channel.

MR BIZOS: You tell us that there was no mention of what was to happen inside in relation to assassinations, I ask you whether you were told anything about what the line of authority was if there were to be outside assassinations and what I ask you is, on your present evidence there was no need whatsoever for anyone to discuss assassinations with you.

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I'm going to try and explain. The information would determine what kind of operation was to be conducted. If it was necessary to assassinate somebody, then I would have taken that information further to see whether the operation could be approved or not. So the information determined the operation.

MR BIZOS: There was a, what the politicians and theoreticians call "a qualitative difference" between your job as an honourable member of the Police Force to a covert operation - I beg your pardon, the Defence Force, to an operation by operatives who were going to lie, who were going to cheat, who were going to commit crimes within the country, all of which are inconsistent with an officer's and a gentleman's upbringing, is that not right? There was a difference what you had been doing up to then and what you were asked to undertake.

GEN WEBB: Yes, there was a difference, yes, from conventional to unconventional.

MR BIZOS: And the unconventional part of it was that crimes would be committed, crimes in accordance with the law of South Africa.

GEN WEBB: That's why an organisation, a covert organisation was established.

MR BIZOS: To commit crimes against the law of South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: But if the acting against the enemy included -just as a question of an example, the assassination of a person, that would be against the law of the country?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now once there was going to be this fundamental change of your function, did you not ask Gen Joubert or the Head of the Army, "What am I supposed to do here, am I supposed to aid and abet criminals to commit crimes, and how far can I go?"?

GEN WEBB: I never asked from the Head of the Defence Force or the Army.

MR BIZOS: And not Gen Joubert either?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR BIZOS: Was it because you neither wanted to hear nor see evil that you deliberately remained ignorant?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well you see, there was no longer any need to protect the Army, the noble cause for which you committed perjury before Judge Hiemstra ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Harms.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, sorry. Judge Harms. ... at the time that you came to give evidence before His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman. Was there?

GEN WEBB: No, but my perjury was not committed before Stegman ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes, didn't you, you said you lied. If you lie under oath, it's perjury, if you lie under oath in the Commission of Harms, it's perjury. Second count of perjury, you lied before Judge Stegman, why did you lie before Stegman J?

GEN WEBB: It concerned the internal/external thing. We did have the capacity to act internally.

MR BIZOS: You see what I'm putting to you is that the circumstances had changed by the time you came to give evidence in the Webster Inquest, because the Army's role in covert assassinations had already been exposed, had it not?

GEN WEBB: Yes, not assassinations, but covert actions, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well you know, Gen Joubert made an affidavit to the assistant of the Attorney-General of the Eastern Province Provincial Division, and it was handed in as an exhibit and it had an annexure to it and it was made public in the Goniwe Inquest, for the whole of South Africa to read. Didn't that come to your notice in relation to the internal policy of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, I didn't read it.

MR BIZOS: Where were you in '92/'93?

GEN WEBB: In South Africa.

MR BIZOS: And if there was wide publicity about the affidavit made by Gen Joubert and which was handed in as an exhibit and accepted as correct, how could you have missed the revelations of a fellow General on such an important point?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, with all due respect, in all fairness to this witness, Mr Bizos isn't saying where this thing appeared and he's telling it was widely published, we don't know where it was published, which newspaper or whether it was on television and whether Gen Webb ever had access to that. It's unfair to put it to him on that basis.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) those things, we will prove them if need be and we'll argue ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Bizos, are you saying it was in the public media?

MR BIZOS: It was in the public media, yes.

MR BIZOS: But now ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if I could just, while you're on that point.

Did you sit in at the Webster Inquest to listen to other evidence?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But you sat through the evidence of most of the evidence(sic) in the Harms Commission, according to your evidence.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And you were there when Mr Verster gave evidence.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But now I ask for leave to hand in the Minute of a number of Generals, including the Head of the Army, Mr Chairman, of the 28th of April '87.

CHAIRPERSON: What is this, Mr Bizos? What do we describe the document as? A Minute or ...

MR BIZOS: Well let me give you the heading

"Presentation CCB to the Head of the South African Defence Force."

CHAIRPERSON: Presentation of CCB to Head of Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if you could just push the button.

MR BIZOS: ... Gen Joubert. The affidavit also indicated, Mr Chairman, the General's and other senior officers who were present. Unfortunately we haven't got a copy readily available but it is a matter or record and we will get a copy of the affidavit and hand it in in due course.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, Mr Bizos, as far I can recall this is Exhibit L. I think the plan of the Early Learning Centre was K, so this will be Exhibit L.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, before my learned friend starts asking questions about the document, I just want to place it on record that during the pre-trial before these proceedings started, it was agreed that documents to be used be handed in to all legal representatives beforehand and in the past two weeks in which we've sat here it has happened repeatedly that Mr Bizos suddenly comes with additional documentation which wasn't made available beforehand to us, which was not made available to the parties and it then, at the eleventh hour it's given to a witness who is then asked to comment on it. So I want to place it on record that it's extremely unfair and I don't think it's the correct way of doing it and I'm requesting Mr Bizos that if he has more documents, to make it available to us. And I would also now ask that we have a short adjournment so that my client can have a look at the document before he answers questions.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I got this document this morning but I did know about it before, but as a result of what happened here I ask for ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I can ...

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) to be made available. We can't foresee what we ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I was just going to say I can understand that in proceedings such as this which involve lots of documents, that documents might come to hand during the course of it, but I understand what you say, Mr du Plessis, and I think it would be fair to have a short adjournment to enable you and the witness, the applicant, to take a look at this document before questions are asked. We'll take a short adjournment and then if you could let us know as soon as you are ready.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

ALL RISE

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Bizos, before you proceed, could I just ask a couple of questions just to clear up a bit of the jargon that exists in this?

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Mr Webb, BGSM, is that Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: Special Forces, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then if you take a look at paragraph 2, AMI, is that Military Intelligence?

GEN WEBB: Department Military Information - Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

GEN WEBB: Department of Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: And Admiral Putter, what was his connection with Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: At that stage, Chairperson, he was the Chief of Staff Intelligence. He was the Head of Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And then if you turn to paragraph 10.4, "OG Lede", what is that?

GEN WEBB: Auditor-General.

CHAIRPERSON: Auditor-General. And then paragraph 15.5, KAMOPS, what was KAMOPS?

GEN WEBB: KOMOPS.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, is it K-O ...

GEN WEBB: Communication Operations, psychological warfare.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. And then finally, C A J Meerholtz, who was he, the person who signed this document?

GEN WEBB: He was at that stage a member of the CCB, afterwards he became the Commanding Officer in Phalaborwa. He was killed in a car accident, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Chairperson, before my learned friend asks questions I just want to place it on record that this document which has now been handed to us, the affidavit to which this is an annexure, is not available to us, so we can't actually see what the content is in which this is being placed before the Committee. I have asked Mr Bizos, he said he will do his best to get that affidavit for us, but at this stage it's not available. It also appears from this document that there must have been previous documentation, prior to this. So one should just bear that in mind.

CHAIRPERSON: And also subsequent documentation. When one reads this one would sort of get an interest in seeing what happened on the 12th of May. But Mr Bizos, you may proceed now with questions.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I may indicate we were not favoured with the May meeting, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, before Mr Bizos starts, I have organised for Gen Webb ...

MR BIZOS: Sorry, I merely stated that we did not have the Minute so far, of the May meeting that is referred to in here.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webb, are you having a difficulty with the ...

MR H DU PLESSIS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

You've had an opportunity of reading this document?

GEN WEBB: Yes, I have.

MR BIZOS: And I want you to please assume that it is a genuine document which was produced by Gen Joubert, in the manner in which I have indicated and there is an affidavit by him which we will place before the Committee, which is - if my memory serves me correctly, who was present at this meeting. Now this is '87, I want you to please read into the record paragraph 9. "Internal Actions.

Chief of the Defence Force confirms that Special Forces have received instructions to double the internal capacity. The following further points are made by Chief of the South African Defence Force ..."

...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: That's enough. Now would you please go back to paragraph 7.

GEN WEBB

"Methods to be Utilised.

Chief of the Defence sees these actions not as "murder" and defines it as follows:

An attack on individuals (enemy) targets with non-standard issue weapons ..."

I think the translation is not up to standard.

"... in an unconventional way, so as not to affect innocent civilians."

MR BIZOS: Yes. And this is what the Head of the Army said?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You said you're not happy with the translation ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, how would you translate it, General?

GEN WEBB: I think it was just written badly. An attack on a "individue", it should be"

"... an individual hostile or enemy target with non-standard issue weapons, in an unconventional way so as not to involved innocent people."

CHAIRPERSON: Oh so it wasn't so much the translation that's worrying you, but the way it was written here by using the word "individue", the plural for individuals as opposed to the singular.

MR BIZOS: But it's meaning is clear, is it not, that the Head of the Army was busy redefining murder for the purposes of the CCB, for the persons present?

GEN WEBB: According to the document, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And I'm going to suggest to you as a high-ranking soldier, a reason why the Head of the Army found it necessary to redefine murder for the purposes of the persons present, and that is that the Army or the Defence Force has a proud tradition of not indulging in the killing of unarmed people, they are not accustomed to being assassins, they consider war a necessary but honourable profession. Am I summarising the position correctly?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I've never seen this document before. I was not present or represented when these aspects were discussed. The Chief of the Defence Force never discussed this redefining of murder with me.

MR BIZOS: What I am asking you is that, that for a professional soldier it would an insult would it not, to poison a person who's suffered from a heart attack, in order to kill him by substituting his pills? No honourable soldier would want to be mixed up with that, would one?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I think this question should be put to the Chief of the South African Defence Force, so that we can determine what the context was in which this was said. It's not for me to try and unravel the interpretation given to these words by the Defence Force, that is an answer which only the Chief of the South African Defence Force can give, not by me.

MR BIZOS: Let me change the question. Would you be a party to substituting the pills of a man who had suffered a heart attack, in order to accelerate his death? You as a soldier, would you do that?

GEN WEBB: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: You would do it. And would you throw poison over his food, as a General, a soldier and a gentleman?

GEN WEBB: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: I don't understand what this "moontlik" means, but anyway we have your answer and we will argue on that basis. But let me return to my previous question, Sir. Was it not necessary for the Head of the Army to redefine murder in order to placate some of the senior officers who would not be prepared to poison people, who were not prepared to blow up people, who would not be prepared to indulge in superstitious nonsense against the Archbishop of one of the mainline churches? He merely wanted to reassure them that provided they killed in the manner in which he suggests, that it wouldn't be murder. Is that the reason for it? Let me ask you, were there, as far as you know, people in the Army who were not prepared to descend to the manner as described in another document emanating from your quarters, like alley cats?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I'm not prepared to comment on the Chief of the Defence Force. He never gave me this definition, he never discussed it with me, it's the first time that I've seen this definition.

MR BIZOS: What was the policy as far as you understood it, about the operatives using criminals, gangsters, murderers, as their agents to commit murder and other offences?

GEN WEBB: I would choose that those kind of people must have been recruited for actions externally and not within the country, because it could only improve the covert section of the CCB.

MR BIZOS: Let's deal with the internal situation, why would you not have used gangsters?

GEN WEBB: As far as I'm concerned, gangsters would be totally unreliable, gangsters are notorious and they're known to the South African Police, it's not logical to use gangsters if you wanted to act within the country, whereas if you acted externally, then it will be alright if the police caught him, you didn't have to protect him.

MR BIZOS: On any operation which you approved or you were asked to approve, was any disclosure made to you that the primary information came from gangsters?

GEN WEBB: No, Chair.

MR BIZOS: Would you have relied on any information which primarily came from gangsters?

GEN WEBB: I wouldn't know whether it came from gangsters or not.

MR BIZOS: Would you have expected the people who furnished you with the information, to disclose to you that the information came primarily from gangsters?

GEN WEBB: Definitely not, CCB did not operate in that way.

MR BIZOS: You would have expected your operatives to have disclosed that fact because it was outside the policy of the CCB and their failure to do so was contrary to the procedures as you understood them?

GEN WEBB: Do I understand the question correctly, that the operators would have said the information came from gangsters?

MR BIZOS: Did they say that?

GEN WEBB: No, I'm asking if I'm understanding the question correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, would you have expected them to have disclosed that? If they were performing an operation and all the information relied on for the conducting of that operation, was sourced from a gangster, would you expect that to be disclosed?

GEN WEBB: No, not to me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

GEN WEBB: CCB didn't operate in that way, information was given on a certain level between Joe Verster and myself, he wouldn't tell me it came from A, B, C or D.

MR LAX: Just while we're on this if you'll allow me, Mr Bizos, sorry.

How did you know that particular intelligence or information had been verified or - what were you told?

GEN WEBB: If it was submitted to me by the Managing Director, I assumed that it had already gone through the channels and through the process and that it was confirmed as information. I of course also had other sources of intelligence.

MR LAX: These are your own sources?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR LAX: Did you use those sources to verify any of these two - either of these two operations that we're talking about here?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR BIZOS: So your authorisation of the Early Learning Centre, you depended entirely on the information that was furnished to you without making any independent enquiries yourself?

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chair.

MR BIZOS: Just by the way, did you make any notes of what was reported to you?

GEN WEBB: I assume that I made certain notes.

MR BIZOS: What happened to them?

GEN WEBB: They were no longer in existence.

MR BIZOS: I can understand that, but what I can't understand is how you could in May 1997, remember what was placed before you.

GEN WEBB: It's not difficult, Chair.

MR BIZOS: Well we'll come to that specific thing, I'm merely ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: This is my third application for amnesty, the first was done in 1990, and no ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Where is a copy of that?

GEN WEBB: Somewhere with the Truth Commission, wherever those applications went.

MR BIZOS: In '99 there was no ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: 1990. The Indemnity Act number 35, Mr Bizos, in 1990, and we requested indemnity at that stage.

MR BIZOS: There was no Commission at that stage, Sir.

GEN WEBB: "Daarna het daar weer 'n ...(onduidelik) gekom, in '92." My application has never changed, so that is where the detail comes from, from my first application which stems from 1990.

MR BIZOS: Well you say that it's with the Commission, the Commission wasn't in existence then, but we'll try and find it and we'll see. But anyway, we'll come to the specifics. Let's stay with Exhibit L please. Do you see that the Head of the Army, in paragraph 11 and in a couple of other paragraphs, but particularly in paragraph 11, was concerned that there should be some control over the work of the CCB. Would you agree in general terms that this is what all these requirements are there for?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chair, but it was not the Chief of the Army, it's the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Yes, forgive me, the common practice is to equate the two, but I'll try and remember that it's the Defence Force and not the Army. The Army is a very substantial part of the Defence Force, is it not?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But do you agree that the Head of the Defence Force was anxious that there should be control and he ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: I don't know where the word "anxious" comes in, but he ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think the interpretation is that the Head of the Defence Force desires professional conduct based on sound doctrine.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well whether he was anxious about it or insisted on it, this is what he desired.

GEN WEBB: A doctrine had to be developed in terms of which people could act.

MR BIZOS: Well and other matters. And also there was going to be a follow-up meeting in order that other aspects of the CCB could be formalised. Do you agree with that?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: So if anyone were to suggest that the CCB was a loose cannon that could do whatever it wanted, would not be correct.

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well we'll come back to this when the affidavit of Gen Joubert becomes available.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, something has struck me, ...(indistinct) a spanner in the wheels now, but if I remember it all correctly, if a person is to be incriminated in these proceedings, he should receive notice of it. Well to me this seems rather incriminating of Gen Geldenhuys and I was just wondering what is to happen in that regard. Is the matter going to - are we carrying on on this or we going to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The Act provides for persons who are implicated during the course of a hearing to be given notice and the usual practice, certainly as far as Panels that I've been involved in, what happens is, a notice is issued in terms of that Section, I think it's Section 30(4) - Section 30(2), together with the relevant extract of the testimony and then that person can exercise his rights as contained in the Act.

MR WESSELS: I follow.

CHAIRPERSON: So if ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: So we needn't stop now?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no.

MR WESSELS: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sure Ms Coleridge is - if she's of the opinion that there is an implicated person, then such notice will go out.

MS COLERIDGE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now in relation to whether murder was ... or assassination was authorised within the borders of not, I want to ask you, have you had an opportunity of looking at Exhibit D? That's the extract of the report of the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: This document, have you got it Mr du Plessis? It's got this dark ... It's fairly thick. Mr Bizos, which page will you be referring to?

MR BIZOS: The last page.

CHAIRPERSON: The last page.

MR BIZOS: Will you please read paragraph 418 out?

GEN WEBB

"Projects Imperial, Maagd and Maxi each involved the collection of information in other African countries.

The Commission finds that the CCB was a creation of the SADF, and an integral part of South Africa's counter-insurgency system which, in the course of its operations, perpetrated gross violations of human rights, including killings against both South African and non-South African citizens. The Commission finds that activities of the CCB constituted a systematic pattern of abuse which entailed deliberate planning on the part of the leadership of the CCB and the SADF. The Commission finds these institutions and their members accountable for the aforesaid gross violations of human rights."

MR BIZOS: Do you agree with that conclusion of the Commission?

GEN WEBB: No, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Which part of it do you not agree with?

GEN WEBB: Where's this "gross human violations"? Where did we participate in murder?

MR BIZOS: Gross human rights violations, I think when they use the term here, General Webb, they use it as it's been defined in the Act, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act number 34/95. There's a definition in Section 1 which defines it as any killing, abduction, torture, other severe injury, or any conspiracy or attempt. That is what a gross human rights violation is, as used, I'm sure, in this context rather than just a little translation of it. So it would include any conspiracy and attempt to, for instance, murder or abduct.

GEN WEBB: The only case during my time was the Athlone bomb incident.

MR BIZOS: Please turn to paragraph 405, read out paragraphs 405, 406 and 407.

GEN WEBB

"Nonetheless, the CCB did kill some opponents of the government and tried to kill others. There is evidence that the CCB was involved in the killings of Mr David Webster, Mr Anton Lubowski, Ms Dulcie September, Mr Jacob Boy Molekwane, Mr Matsela Polokela in Botswana and Ms Tsitsi Chiliza in Harare. (This last was an operation that went wrong: the intended target was Mr Jacob Zuma in Maputo.

It also attempted, or conspired to kill others. Amnesty applications have been filed by CCB operatives Joe Verster, Wouter Basson, 'Staal' Burger and 'Slang' van Zyl for the plots to kill Dullah Omar and Mr Gavin Evans.

Other information available to the Commission, has linked the CCB to the killings of Ms Florence Ribeiro, Dr Fabian Ribeiro and Mr Piet Ntuli, the attempted killings of Mr Godfrey Motsepe in Brussels, Mr Jeremy Brickhill in Harare, Mr Albie Sachs in Maputo, Comrade Che Ogara, (MK nom-de-guerre) in Botswana and Mr Frank Chikane, the plans to kill Mr Joe Slovo in London in the mid-1980s, Mr Oliver Tambo in Harare in 1987, Ms Gwen Lister, Mr Daniel Tjongarero, Mr Hidipo Hamutenya in South West Africa, as well as Mr Jay Naidoo, Mr Roland White and Mr Kwenza Mhlaba, in South Africa."

MR BIZOS: Now do you agree that the work of the CCB, as evidenced in Exhibit L, as evidenced by the evidence of Mr Verster, as evidenced by the evidence of Mr van Zyl, was a conspiracy amongst its members to commit crimes, including murder?

GEN WEBB: Are you asking me to comment on these documents?

MR BIZOS: No, listen to my question. Do you agree that on the evidence of Exhibit L, the evidence of Mr Verster and the evidence of Mr van Zyl, that the CCB was an organisation put together for the purposes of committing crimes, both within and outside South Africa?

GEN WEBB: The word "crimes", I don't agree with that.

MR BIZOS: Well what is killing, what is bombing a building, what is burning a vehicle, what is - you name it? Do you want to redefine crime and make useless all the books that we have all been brought up on?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If they were not crimes that were being committed, is there any reason why such lengths should have been gone to as to distance the projects of the CCB from the Defence Force as such? In other words, to have these people not on the payroll, they're private operatives, to issue them with non-issue weapons, I think it was said, that sort of thing - I mean if they were caught, then the Defence Force wouldn't be blamed? I mean these are the lengths that were went to, front companies, front operations. Why would they do that if they weren't realising that they were committing crimes?

GEN WEBB: Yes, I think it's perhaps the word "crime" which is difficult for me to accept, because we believed in what we did, we had a bona fide belief in what we did and we thought it was necessary to carry out our task. With hindsight, I suppose you can say that it was crime.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, please take it in retrospect if you like, that in retrospect you agree that crime was the business of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And for what period were you the Head of that organisation?

GEN WEBB: Officially from 1 January 1989, to early in 1990.

MR BIZOS: Until January 1990 when you came together to prepare your statement for the Harms Commission?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, it's not acceptable to me to say that we got together to prepare our statements, that was when we saw our legal representatives.

MR BIZOS: Yes, very well, right. Now the Commission says that the persons that took part in that organisation are responsible for the acts, now would you accept responsibility for the offences - maybe that's a better word, that will sound better in your ears, for the offences that were committed during your period of stewardship, being the leader of that organisation? Do you take personal responsibility for that?

GEN WEBB: These two incidents in respect of the foetus and the bomb at Athlone, those are the two for which I take responsibility.

MR BIZOS: What about the people that the Commission says were killed by the CCB during your stewardship of the CCB?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, with respect, I don't think the things to which Mr Bizos is referring don't have any dates. As far as I can see, each incident mentioned here is not linked to a specific time at which he specifically was the Chair of the CCB. So it's then unfair to say that the Commission mentions these incidents, are incidents when he was the Head of the CCB. If we give dates and say for instance that it was in January 1989, whilst he was the Chairperson, Mr X was eliminated or whatever, then the witness can comment, but if there's no specific date furnished then he can't say whether it was during the time that he was the Chairperson of the CCB or not.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think what Mr Bizos put was, during - the questions was, during the period of his stewardship, from the 1st of January 1989 through to when it terminated early in 1990, does he as the leader of the CCB, as the main person in the CCB, the Chairman, accept accountability for the projects of the CCB, in his capacity as the Chairman, that were carried out? Now we know that he's applied for the two but we've also heard evidence that there were others, like the Dullah Omar and the Gavin Evans operation, does he accept responsibility for the operations or the projects carried out by the CCB, that were carried out during his period of stewardship. I think that's a straightforward question, I don't think all of these were meant to fall in that last year, that were read out in paragraphs ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) is now made ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR DU PLESSIS: Formulated like you have just done, I have no problem with it.

MR BIZOS: Do you accept personal responsibility for what happened during your Chairmanship of the activities of the CCB

GEN WEBB: I accept the responsibility, the full responsibility for those aspects which I approved, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But you know, a General is appointed to a top position, I would suggest for the express purpose of keeping control of the "manne", so to speak. Not so? Otherwise what is he there for?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Was there anyone in the management structures of the CCB who was a convicted criminal?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I was aware.

MR BIZOS: Who was Theunis Kruger?

GEN WEBB: I have no idea.

MR BIZOS: He had an important post, he was in charge of finances of the CCB.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I don't want to object constantly, but which period is Mr Bizos referring to? For which period was Mr Theunis Kruger in charge of the finances of the CCB? Is it for the period which Webb was the Chairperson, or not?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know. Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Well he was a co-accused, I am told, - no, he was not a co-accused, but a cell mate of Mr Barnard when he was serving his term of imprisonment.

GEN WEBB: So what?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chair, Mr Bizos isn't answering my objection. I'm asking once again, when is Mr Theunis Kruger alleged to have been in charge of finance?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: But the answer is that you don't know a Mr Theunis Kruger?

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I also put on record that Mr Bizos must find out his facts and say who is going to come and give that evidence, because he finds evidence of anyone to come and say that Theuns Kruger was in charge finances, I'll buy him lunch wherever he wants to go, here in Cape Town, because there won't be such evidence. I know that's a fact. I know that the Commission has made that finding. I also know from previous evidence given in many other proceedings, that that is incorrect, Theuns Kruger was never in charge of finances of the CCB. Those are also my instructions.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) by telling us what he was doing, Mr Chairman.

MR WESSELS: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: Perhaps you could be so good as to tell us what he was doing, if he was not in charge of finances.

MR WESSELS: He was someone of the lower echelons, I don't know what he did, but he was not - there was another person by the name of Jaco Black who was the Financial Manager.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, your button please.

MR BIZOS: I'm indebted to my learned friend for the information, but how could you as Chairman not know that two persons, whatever their position was, were recruited into the CCB, who had criminal records?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I knew Joe Verster ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Once again Chairperson, Mr Bizos is referring to two people who had criminal records, when were they employed? Was it at the stage when this witness was the Chairperson, or Commanding General of Special Forces, or had they already been employed when he took over as Commanding General?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) both in the CCB whilst he was the Chairman, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would just like to know, Chairperson, were they appointed before he took over as Commanding General, or afterwards?

MR BIZOS: Whilst you were Chairman, were there two people with criminal records in the CCB?

GEN WEBB: My answer, as before, is not as far as I was aware.

MR BIZOS: Oh.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, when it's a convenient time we'll take the ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes, I'll just put the final question on this issue.

How can it be kept away from the Chairman that people who had the task of gathering information and sometimes called upon to execute the acts of the CCB that may have involved life and death, be kept on the CCB whilst you were Chairman?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, it's very clear that Mr Bizos has no idea how a covert operation conducts itself. I knew Joe Verster and the one Regional Manager, Staal Burger, I met him, the other Regional Manager with the nickname of "Hymer" I met. Those are the people I knew were in the CCB. That's how the structure worked.

MR BIZOS: Maybe you are right that I don't know anything about how secret organisations work, and don't apologise for that, but what I want to know from you is, why were you there other than to exercise overall control, as the Head of the Army was apparently expecting people involved to behave?

GEN WEBB: I had to carry out my functions and duties on my level, between myself and Col Verster.

MR BIZOS: You see, on this business of need-to-know is a useful thing about parallel office bearers, but surely the Head must know everything, otherwise what's he the Head for?

GEN WEBB: My appointment was to be the Chairman, the Managing Director knew everything, not me as the Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Would you have expected your Managing Director to inform you in relation to all the relevant factors, including those enumerated by the Head of the Army?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The title Chairman denotes to me at least, somebody who presides over some sort of Board, that you are the Chairman at meetings and normally if you have a Chairman, there are other members of the Board, otherwise you might use a different term to denote who the Head of an organisation is. Did you have a Board as such, did you ever meet with the Chairman and the Managing Director and other Board members, to discuss the affairs, produce annual reports or whatever? Where does this word "Chairman" come from?

GEN WEBB: It is a word which the CCB used, a Chairperson, a Managing Director, and if it came out, if it was revealed, then those words would actually help to strengthen our cover. I was never a Chairman of a Board in that sense.

MR BIZOS: I'm going to return to a previous question, Mr Chairman, ...(indistinct - no microphone) but it may be a convenient stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Only if it is a convenient stage, I didn't mean to side-track you to that extent.

MR BIZOS: No, no, I was side-tracked a few questions ago, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. We'll take the lunch adjournment now until 2 o'clock, thank you.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Thank you.

Now I was asking you about paragraph 418, about the extent of the activities of the CCB and the findings of the Commission. Now I want to ask you, what was Project Crawler, during your stewardship?

GEN WEBB: If I remember correctly it was a project out of the country ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes, and what was it about?

GEN WEBB: ... and I am not prepared to talk about these foreign projects.

MR BIZOS: Why not? Why are you not prepared to talk about it?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, it has been discussed on numerous occasions before this Commission and the objection was made. They are not prepared to testify about external operations because this Commission cannot give indemnity or amnesty in respect of external projects. My client is not prepared to give any information about external projects.

MR BIZOS: We submit, Mr Chairman, that that is a specious argument in order to avoid the extent of the activities of the CCB. Let me ask some questions before I take the matter any further, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if you could just repeat the name of that operation.

MR BIZOS: Crawler.

CHAIRPERSON: C-r-a-w-l-e-r?

MR BIZOS: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Now you were the Head of the CCB, correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Could anyone without your authority spend for instance, according to the evidence of Mr Basson, also known as Britz, R265 014, 38 on a project without you knowing about it?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: So are we to assume that you knew about that project?

GEN WEBB: As I have said my recollection is that it was an external project and I'm not talking about those.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you know, Sir, you are under a duty if you are to get amnesty, to make full disclosure, do you think that you are making full disclosure if you are not prepared to speak about acts of the CCB, which will show the nature of that organisation and its activities?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, a full disclosure relates to the deeds for which the applicant applies for amnesty, it does not apply generally. The legislation did not intend absurd results, because if you take for instance, if I may just take an example to illustrate, if there are 10 incidents for which this applicant is asking for amnesty and you hear only about the one incident, you can't afterwards say that he didn't make full disclosure because he didn't testify about the other nine incidents in which he was involved. Full disclosure relates specifically to the incident or incidents for which he's asking for amnesty.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the answer is ...(indistinct)

MR LAX: Sorry, your mike please.

MR BIZOS: ... the easy one in law. There is a difference between a policeman who in the exercise of his police activities as a policeman, committed separate acts, some of which he might decide to ask for amnesty and some of which he may decide not to ask for amnesty, it does not apply where crimes are committed within the ambit of a general conspiracy by the Head of that conspiracy, Mr Chairman. There is - the offence is, Mr Chairman, being a party to that conspiracy and the way you prove that conspiracy is what he did in pursuance of that conspiracy.

And this business that you cannot give amnesty, Mr Chairman, to outside countries, is perhaps a practical matter for people who committed crimes within South Africa, who may want to travel. That is their concern, Mr Chairman. It is no reason, it is no reason for not asking a witness to say what he has done as the Head of that conspiracy, Mr Chairman, and we persist in asking questions, Mr Chairman. The Act says, what happened within and without the Republic of South Africa. The terms of reference of the Harms Commission were different, they said only what happened within South Africa. There is no distinction. And I would submit, Mr Chairman, that we are entitled to ask the questions. The witness can refuse to answer if he so desires, but we are doing it, having given full notice that unless he answers these questions he will not have satisfied the provisions of the Act, Mr Chairman.

Do you understand the position ...

CHAIRPERSON: I personally, and I might be wrong, don't fully agree with the decision of the Appellate Court in the Veenendal decision, particularly the last part of that decision. I agree with the reasoning which they relied on and to find that the applications or the incidents to which those people, it was Veenendal and I've forgotten who the other - Stopforth, were applying for, was not part of our struggle, it was part of Untag and the Namibian struggle at that time, but the decision after that, the arbiter dictum to the effect that the legislature could not have contemplated giving this Committee jurisdiction greater than the Courts, I personally don't agree with and I think it is arbiter and I think it's clear from the intention of the Act, that the amnesty process was to look at all sorts of matters that occurred, not only within the country. But we do know that if amnesty is granted in respect of an event which took place overseas, the granting of amnesty in this country will not in any way hamper the authorities in the country in which the event took place. So in that sense the granting of amnesty has no effect in such other country.

I'm prepared to allow the ...(indistinct), but we're also on the other hand, not the question on a matter of relevance, interested in receiving details of incidents that are not the subject matter of the applications here.

R BIZOS: The reason why we are asking the questions, Mr Chairman, is in order to show the nature and extent of the conspiracy without going into detail.

CHAIRPERSON: Without going into details.

MR BIZOS: And also, we're confining ourselves to matters in respect of which the people before the Committee have given or are able to give evidence, Mr Chairman, so that the matter can be tested. So that I would submit with respect, that although you may not have the power to compel a witness to answer if he so desires, I think that, with respect, he should be forewarned that by us - you don't have to decide that at this stage, but us, that we are going to argue that the law is that if he does not give evidence of the acts committed in the furtherance of the same conspiracy, he has not made full disclosure.

We've made out opposition clear, General, do you still persist in not answering the question?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Very well. Now in relation to the project set out in paragraph 417 of Exhibit D, we were told by Mr Basson that that R386 804,37 was spent and that this figure was approved by you, is that correct? Oh, I beg your pardon, it was by Gen Joubert. Did it ever come to your notice? The one on paragraph 418.

GEN WEBB: 418?

CHAIRPERSON: 418, if you'll take a look Mr Bizos, 416 is Crawler.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: 417 is Project Direksie and 418 is Projects Imperial, Maagd and Maxi.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that is the one that apparently costs almost R5½-million.

Are you prepared to answer any questions about these and what you know about it?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, may I just ask for a moment's indulgence, my client just wants my advice as to whether he should answer or not?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION

GEN WEBB: I had heard of these projects.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and what do you say about it? Did you approve any portion of it, or did you approve a portion of what - even thought it may have been originally authorised by your predecessor, did it carry on under stewardship?

GEN WEBB: It did continue, but not under my command, it was taken away and given to somebody else to deal with.

MR BIZOS: Who was it given to?

GEN WEBB: Brig Roos.

MR BIZOS: Why?

GEN WEBB: He was familiar with the law and he could deal with these negotiations.

MR BIZOS: Was that a, the 418, was that in Zimbabwe?

CHAIRPERSON: There's three in 418, or is that one? There's Projects Imperial, Maagd and Maxi.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, 417.

CHAIRPERSON: Direksie?

MR BIZOS: Project Direksie, yes. Direksie, was that one in Zimbabwe?

GEN WEBB: Yes, these people were detained in Zimbabwe.

MR BIZOS: And was the plan to spring him from the Zimbabwean prison?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I knew.

MR BIZOS: What was it about?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I knew.

MR BIZOS: Well what did you know about it if it isn't what I say?

GEN WEBB: That these people were in detention and that attempts had been made by means of negotiations, to obtain their release. That was what I knew.

MR BIZOS: Well, from a reported decision of the Conjwayo vs Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs reported, Mr Chairman, in 1992 SA56 in the Zimbabwe Supreme Court.

MR LAX: What volume was it, that 1992?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) ... I to C and J at pages 58 and 59.

"On the 18th of November 1988, the applicant and his co-accused, Kevin John Woods and Michael Anthony Smith were convicted in the High Court of the crime of murder and sentenced to their ultimate punishment. It was found that they with others had conspired to kill by means of a Renault 5 motor vehicle, booby-trapped with explosives, six persons believed by them to be members of the military wing of the African National Congress of South Africa who happened to be residing at 16 Jungle Road, Trenance, Bulawayo. The plan was put into operation on the 11th of January 1988. The deceased Obed Muanza, an unemployed person who was engaged for reward to drive the Renault 5 alone to the address in question. He was totally unaware that it had been primed with a powerful explosive device. Upon arrival at the front of the premises he sounded the hooter and then drove to the rear. When the hooter was blown for the second time, there was a huge explosion. It resulted in the instantaneous death of Muanza, whose body was mutilated beyond recognition and one of the residents sustaining the loss of an eye. Their house was extensively damaged. Adjacent to it was a crater about 2½m in diameter and 20cm deep. Pieces of the bodywork of the Renault 5, as well as remains of the human flesh and clothing worn by the deceased, was scattered over a radius of 50m."

Now the relevant - this is what happened:

"The situation altered drastically however, following up on the conviction of ...(indistinct) Charles Beenen(?) on the 28th of June '89. He was found guilty of having conspired with others to forcibly effect the release from lawful custody of Woods, Smith and the applicant and remove them from Zimbabwe."

That was a CCB project, was it not?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I knew. I've already said that all I knew about was that Mr Roos was appointed to continue with negotiations to be able to have these people released.

MR BIZOS: Who paid for it?

GEN WEBB: The South African Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: The CCB?

GEN WEBB: The South African Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Not the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Not the CCB.

MR BIZOS: Basson says that the R5½-million came from the CCB. Is that incorrect? Or didn't you know how R5½-million got out of the CCB account?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, when was that R5½-million approved?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, maybe if I could just try to clear up something. As far as you were concerned, was the CCB part of the South African Defence Force?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you say it was paid by the Defence Force, you're not necessarily excluding the CCB?

GEN WEBB: No, no, no, look funds were allocated to Special Forces, under which fell the CCB, to which funds also went.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now the question was, do you know whether those funds, that R5½-million, whether that went through CCB books?

GEN WEBB: Well that's why I'm asking on what date it was approved, because the budget was approved a year ahead of time. It could be that my predecessor had already approved that amount of money.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) fees being paid whilst you were in office?

GEN WEBB: Funds for what?

GEN WEBB: For the person that you wanted to release, if not by negotiation, springing him from the prison.

GEN WEBB: I repeat, I don't have any knowledge of the arrangement of any release or springing from jail.

MR BIZOS: ... deal with the Joubert matter because the affidavit was faxed to us, Mr Chairman. It's in handwriting because, if I remember correctly, it was taken - and it's a bad copy, Mr Chairman, I don't know whether ... But anyway, this is it. Perhaps we will ask somebody to transcribe it. I'd better do it that way, otherwise we will waste a lot of time trying to figure out what the words are. But my learned friends can have it, the Committee can have it and we'll come back. We'll try overnight to decipher it, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And we'll call it - I think perhaps if we could change the last exhibit to L1 and we'll call this L, seeing as it was an annexure.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So we'll call the hand-written affidavit, the affidavit L and then if you could just change the last digit number, which was L, to L1, that is the annexure signed by Meerholtz, which apparently referred to ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: L1 and this will be L2?

CHAIRPERSON: No, this will be L and the annexure L1.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, yes. Well we'll try and get - I think it was read into the record and perhaps we'll try - I'm sorry I didn't know that it would come out so badly, but we'll deal with it.

Now in relation to the extent of the activities of the CCB, you told us that you had weekly meetings with Mr Verster.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You must have had approximately 50 meetings with him.

GEN WEBB: Except for the times when we were on leave, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well making allowances for all that, you must have spent over 40 hours with him during your period of Chairmanship of the CCB.

GEN WEBB: It's quite possible, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Very well. And also, did you see him informally from time to time?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was he a - you had to authorise the expenditure, whatever it may have been used for, didn't you?

GEN WEBB: Except as I said this morning, where it wasn't necessary.

MR BIZOS: No, but the expenditure, could they spend millions on damaging a kombi, or did you have control over the expenditure, how much money was spent?

GEN WEBB: For operations, yes.

MR BIZOS: You had authority in relation to the expenditure of every operation?

GEN WEBB: All approved operations, yes.

MR BIZOS: And monitoring somebody would be an operation because you needed money to monitor people.

GEN WEBB: No, but that was one of the things which was delegated to the Managing Director. As far as monitoring was concerned he didn't have to inform me, he could proceed.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but what about the money that you spent?

GEN WEBB: Money was budgeted each and every year to provide for these things, so that he could for instance, draw the money without having my signature.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now internally Section 6 was operating from the time of its appointment to the time of the bursting of the bubble at the beginning of 1990, it was in existence for over a year.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And are you saying that throughout this period the only times you were approached by Mr Verster, was in relation to Bishop Tutu and the Early Learning Centre?

GEN WEBB: No, that's not what I'm saying.

MR BIZOS: What are you saying?

GEN WEBB: There were other operations launched by the CCB, not Region 6, which were external operations.

MR BIZOS: I'm talking about Section 6.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Those are the only two?

GEN WEBB: Correct.

MR BIZOS: You didn't discuss Section 6 with him at any other time?

GEN WEBB: In respect of what?

MR BIZOS: About anything. What are they doing? What are they busy with? Where are the results? What am I paying all this money for?

GEN WEBB: We had a weekly meeting.

MR BIZOS: Except for those two projects that you have applied amnesty for, did you discuss any other activity of Section 6 with Mr Verster?

GEN WEBB: There was the monitoring of Anton Lubowski that was done internally.

MR BIZOS: Why was that discussed with you?

GEN WEBB: Because he was such a high profile person.

MR BIZOS: Did you have to authorise money for it?

GEN WEBB: No, Verster proceeded.

MR BIZOS: And why was he more high a profile than Dullah Omar?

GEN WEBB: We all at one stage or another found ourselves in South West and we all fought SWAPO and he was an important figure there.

MR BIZOS: Was there anyone else that was discussed with you, or any other project that was discussed with you besides Lubowski?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I can recall in Region 6.

MR BIZOS: Right. So as far as you were concerned, for a period of a year, Section 6 did the operation "Apie" and did the operation in relation to the Early Learning Centre and you heard in passing about the monitoring of Lubowski, nothing else.

GEN WEBB: No, there was the establishment of people, the establishing of each member in Region 6, in his so-called "Blue Plan."

MR BIZOS: But you know those are administrative matters, what did they do when they were appointed, what did they do? How many of them were there? Six in Section 6, were there?

GEN WEBB: At that stage I didn't know how many people there were, but there were very few.

MR BIZOS: In Section 6?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: How much was Section 6 costing the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I can't recall.

MR BIZOS: Well Region 6. I'm trying to avoid "district" that you use in Afrikaans, because "district" and 6 for the people of Cape Town, have different connotations.

GEN WEBB: We use the word "Region" in Afrikaans.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it's Region.

GEN WEBB: Region.

MR BIZOS: Yes. How much was it costing you a year?

GEN WEBB: For Region 6?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

GEN WEBB: I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Well let's try and work it out, about six motorcars, I suppose at about R30 000 each, about R3 000 in salary, motor expenses, opening offices expenses, setting them up in business, production bonuses for these two projects and one mentioned in passing. Are you saying that you are telling the Committee everything that you knew as a result of the meetings that you had with Mr Verster and that you've made full disclosure? Is that what you want the Committee to believe?

GEN WEBB: In respect of Region 6, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry General, we've heard that Region 6 was actually established before you got there, that certain people were employed, they were set up, established, I think they used the word ...(intervention)

GEN WEBB: The blue plan.

CHAIRPERSON: ... and now you're starting with a new region. Can you explain why there wasn't any more enthusiasm, why they were so inactive in their first year of operation after having spent about eight months getting their feet settled under the desk, type of thing? Why would there only have been these two operations? Wouldn't that have been a concern to you as the Chairman, of them being under productive?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, this Region 6 was a long term project, they became active on 1 January '89, but some of them were still busy with their blue plans, they were trying to establish themselves. It was a long term project, not something which could be done overnight. For them to still build up their contacts and to recruit members who were not aware etcetera, that simply is a long term thing. It wasn't a matter of, "Look, there's an enemy on the other side of the fence, let's attack him."

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) what we were told by Verster, was a budgeted amount for ...(indistinct). If you didn't know about it, where did the money come from?

GEN WEBB: I can only explain it by saying that these funds went where they were not entitled to go. I don't know how exactly it was done. The budget was approved or drafted a year ago in advance, funds were allocated for certain things that might or might not happen, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: The Judge was told that the CCB cost R27-million a year, can you tell us what portion of that went into Region 6?

GEN WEBB: No, I can't, but I'm sure it will be a smaller amount.

MR BIZOS: You can't say how many millions?

GEN WEBB: No, I can't.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you think of any reason why Mr Verster should not have approached you in respect of the Omar and Evans projects?

GEN WEBB: I can't.

MR BIZOS: No you see, this is what you say, but now let me ask you a few questions about what one or other of the members of Region 6 say. Did anyone ever discuss Frank Chikane with you?

GEN WEBB: Not with me, no.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that Frank Chikane was a high profile person?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Just for the record, was he the Chairperson of the South African Council of Churches?

GEN WEBB: I'm not sure.

MR BIZOS: He was the General Secretary. I beg your pardon, General Secretary. Yes the South African Council of Churches was one of the enemies of the apartheid State, was it not?

GEN WEBB: Well they certainly weren't friends.

MR BIZOS: Well I suppose if you - Archbishop Tutu had been the General Secretary, had he not, before Chikane had taken over? It's a high profile position.

GEN WEBB: Yes, high profile.

MR BIZOS: Now according to Botha, and according to Barnard, there was a plan according to the one, of monitoring him and the other, a plan to murder him. Now this is contained in documents before this Committee, in B 4 and B121. I will not read the passages out Mr Chairman, I'm going to give you the references. Now if he was monitored, for what purpose would Region 6 monitor him?

GEN WEBB: Are you talking about Archbishop Tutu?

MR BIZOS: No, no, no, Frank Chikane.

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of the fact that he was monitored, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: No, the question was - but you know, you're the Head of the CCB, you've got to take some vicarious responsibility for what your men say they did. The one says that he was being monitored and the other one says that he was being monitored for the purposes of being murdered. Assume that that evidence is repeated here because it's in these documents, if that is so, what were the men under you doing, monitoring firstly or monitoring for the purposes of murdering Frank Chikane?

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of the monitoring of Frank Chikane, I can't answer you. Ask them.

MR BIZOS: If that did happen, is this another instance of Verster not having come to you?

GEN WEBB: He didn't have to come to me for monitoring, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: In order to murder Chikane?

GEN WEBB: If it was murder, yes.

MR BIZOS: But now for what purpose would the CCB monitor high profile enemies of the apartheid State, other than for the purposes of doing them some harm? If not murdering them, breaking their windows or poisoning their clothing or doing them - for what purpose would the CCB monitor somebody?

GEN WEBB: I don't know anything about the monitoring of Frank Chikane, so I can't answer you.

MR BIZOS: The people in Region 6 were mainly people from Brixton Murder and Robbery and we were told by van Zyl that they had no experience in information gathering and if anything, information had to be gathered by another structure in order for decisions to be made. I ask you again, as Chairman of the CCB, why would people of the CCB be monitoring Frank Chikane, for what purpose?

GEN WEBB: Once again I'm saying, ask that question to the members who had their order to do the monitoring, ask them why they had to do it.

MR BIZOS: I want you to presuppose this, that ...(intervention)

MR H DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, with respect, it's unfair to this witness to ask him to answer these questions. You must bear in mind that when he was appointed as Commanding General of Special Forces, those people had already been appointed, he didn't even know who they were. He knew who the Regional Manager was, in other words Staal Burger, but he didn't know that Slang van Zyl, Kalla Botha, Chappie Maree etcetera, etcetera, had been appointed and to now expect him to comment on the whys and wherefores is simply unfair, he wasn't there when they were appointed.

MR BIZOS: Despite the objection I will rephrase the question, Mr Chairman.

We know what the main function of the CCB was on the evidence, and that was to destabilise or kill or both. Now for what other purpose, whether it was van Zyl or whether it was Burger or whether it was Britz or it was Botha or whether it was Barnard, for what purpose would any of them be monitoring any high profile enemy of the State?

GEN WEBB: Ask the question of those people who said that they had the orders to do the monitoring.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, General, what Mr Bizos is getting at is, we've heard from evidence given before us here, that the CCB was to perform certain operations not undertaken by the Defence Force normally, right? I think it was when Mr van Zyl was giving evidence he said that they weren't working together with the Police. Now if the CCB - and you are aware that they did monitor people, I mean whether it - you might not know who the individuals were, but you knew that one of the activities of the CCB was to monitor people and you knew specifically of Mr Lubowski's monitoring and I'm sure you are aware that other people were monitored, because Verster had this power to order people to be monitored. Now if you were going to monitor somebody and find out what his movements are and now he's breaking the law - we know that the CCB wasn't monitoring people to supply information to the Police so that that person could then be arrested and charged for whatever he was doing, that wasn't the function, the monitoring of any person by the CCB was for the CCB's own information or use. Now the question is, for what purpose would somebody be monitored by the CCB, anybody, by the CCB other than to cause that person, other than to get information with the ultimate aim of causing that persons some harm?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, to gather intelligence about that person and then the decision would have to be taken at a later stage whether he was to be harmed or not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: That's doesn't accord with the evidence of Mr van Zyl, but let us leave that aside for one moment. You say that Verster told you that Lubowski was being monitored, why was Lubowski being monitored?

GEN WEBB: To see who he made contact with in South Africa.

MR BIZOS: Why was he being monitored, to what end?

GEN WEBB: To gather information regarding his contacts.

MR BIZOS: But I thought that it was said quite clearly that the CCB was not an information-gathering organisation, there was the National Intelligence, there was the Military Intelligence, there were all sorts of other people monitoring, why would the CCB be monitoring Lubowski?

GEN WEBB: The CCB also had a duty to gather information and intelligence for us.

MR BIZOS: Special Forces had its own intelligence unit, had it not?

GEN WEBB: Which didn't cooperate and work with the CCB on the ground, the CCB had their own systems.

MR BIZOS: No, just answer the question. Did the Special Forces have their own information-gathering operation?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Why didn't you tell Verster, "What is the CCB following Lubowski for, why didn't the Special Forces Intelligence Service do it?"? Were you the Head of that as well?

GEN WEBB: Yes. Special Forces concentrated mostly outside of the country, not internally.

MR BIZOS: Why didn't you say, "But it's not their business, you are poaching onto territory under my jurisdiction under another hat"?

GEN WEBB: But I just told you Special Forces, their intelligence gathering was directed at outside the borders of the country, the CCB operated within the borders of the country.

MR BIZOS: Information gathering, for the sake of information and not for the purposes of following it up by dealing with the people that in the opinion of one or other in the hierarchy, needed to be dealt with.

GEN WEBB: After the gathering of information, then at a later stage a decision was taken as to what action would be taken.

MR BIZOS: Did you hear that the Reverend Chikane's, Frank Chikane's clothing had been interfered with in his baggage whilst he was on his way out of South Africa?

GEN WEBB: I read it in the newspaper.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now did the CCB have contacts with Wouter Basson's facility to manufacture deadly poisons?

GEN WEBB: Doctor Wouter Basson was not at Special Forces Headquarters while I was there.

MR BIZOS: No, the question was, did the CCB have contact with Dr Basson's poisons set-up?

GEN WEBB: Not to my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, while it's still in my mind.

Did you work a 40-hour week?

GEN WEBB: Well possibly more than that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: More than that. And you spent an hour a week with Mr Verster, was that your only contact with the CCB, or did you do other - did you involve yourself with the CCB in any way directly other than through Mr Verster?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, only by means of Mr Verster.

CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, your involvement with the CCB - if you worked a 40-hour week, you were spending one hour with Mr Verster, is that right?

GEN WEBB: That's about it.

CHAIRPERSON: And the rest was ...

GEN WEBB: With Special Forces.

MR LAX: Just before you go on, Mr Bizos.

You've said to us before this was an average of one hour, were there times when you saw him more than once a week?

GEN WEBB: No, it was about once a week, maybe for longer than an hour, but on average about once a week for an hour.

MR LAX: So this was a standard meeting in your diary that you'd have?

GEN WEBB: Yes, I tried to make it a standard thing in my diary.

MR LAX: Unless exceptional circumstances came up?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAX: And - sorry, if you'd just allow me this. Just that meeting, did you break it up into - was it a fairly structured meeting? Did you have a business plan for how you conducted the meeting, well there are certain decisions that need approval, certain "voorleggings" would be presented to you and so on and then you had other matters that you needed to ... standard reporting? I mean you're a General, you're not some halfwit running some cafe, you must have structured it in a way that you could make best use of that time.

GEN WEBB: There was an open discussion between him and him, if there was a submission to be made he would do that, if I had any queries I directed it at them. It was structured in that sense, but there was no, for instance, no minutes taken, no record kept of the meeting.

MR LAX: Yes, but in your head you'd say well, we've got seven districts, seven regions operating, you'd probably want a breakdown of each of the seven, you'd have a sense of what the budget was and how that was going, surely you'd ask those questions?

GEN WEBB: No, the budget was presented after three months. It was approved a year in advance and during my time, after three months the budget was presented again and again after three months. So the budget was a point for discussion all by itself and if something cropped up in that week and we had to change something, then we could do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Some very intelligent people run cafes as well.

MR LAX: Yes, sorry, sorry, I don't mean to be disparaging in that sense at all.

What I'm trying to say is it doesn't seem like you had a particularly businesslike plan though, whatever happened to be coming up on the day, that's what you discussed. It doesn't seem like you had a particular order of discussion or a ...

GEN WEBB: Yes, we wouldn't like start the meeting in a formal way and say the meeting is now open, it was simply a discussion between Verster and myself. There would be certain things which he wanted to discuss and likewise from my side.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't keep minutes or records?

GEN WEBB: If we kept some form of record it would just have been in a short abbreviated form for your own purposes, no minutes were kept as such.

CHAIRPERSON: Just personal notes?

GEN WEBB: Yes, personal notes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Now if Frank Chikane was an enemy of the State and he was said to have been seriously ill by the poisoning of his clothing - do you recall that it was speculation that it was the dirty tricks department of the South African Security Forces that must have been responsible?

GEN WEBB: I don't recall there was a dirty tricks department in the South African Security Forces, there were simply allegations made.

MR BIZOS: Yes, yes. Well I use the expression for the sake of shorthand. Now did you - were you not interested who your partner might have been outside the CCB, trying to get rid of such a high profile enemy, and did you not ask Verster, "Hey, what's going on here, is someone else doing it or is this our project?"

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

GEN WEBB: Why should I, I didn't even know that Chikane was being monitored, I read his name in the paper for the first time, why should I concern myself with him?

MR BIZOS: I see. So you never asked any questions in relation to Mr Chikane.

GEN WEBB: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Let's go to the next one. Did anyone ever approach you in relation to Mr Roland White?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who was Mr Roland White, do you know?

GEN WEBB: I have no idea.

MR BIZOS: I would have thought that as a General in the Army, he would have been high up on your list of would-be acquaintances. He was the top man in the End Conscription Campaign - he was high up I'm told - I'm sorry, I correct it, high up on the End Conscription Campaign, the person who was really trying to get the would-be soldiers in your army not to join up. Never heard of him?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now you see, the evidence before the Committee is that Botha and Barnard - you'll find that in B4, Mr Chairman, Botha and Barnard were monitoring him and Mr White being an observant and law abiding citizen, went and reported to the police that two men were shadowing him and the two were arrested, the two CCB operatives were arrested and there had to be some creative thinking on their part as to what they were doing, in order to avoid their being exposed. Isn't that the sort of thing that Verster would have wanted to report to his Chairman, in relation to the lack of ...(indistinct) by two of his operatives as well?

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, I didn't know the operators, why would Verster report such things to me when I didn't even know the operators, because I wasn't going to pay him a production bonus or make a merit assessment of him, it had nothing to do with me.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think whether you knew the operatives or not is of any importance, but the mere fact that somebody in the employ of the CCB had been arrested, wouldn't you as Chairman have expected that to have been reported to you, taking into account the covert nature of the whole operation? I mean, you got very close to being exposed, wouldn't you have expected that? Whether you knew of the person or not, if you're a General in the Army and a soldier commits an offence by going AWOL or seriously assaulting another soldier, you would expect to hear of it as Commander, not because you knew that soldier personally.

GEN WEBB: That only came to my attention later, Verster didn't report that directly to me. I think that came out later at the Harms Commission, that these two had been detained or had been arrested by the police.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was never reported to you by Verster at one of your weekly meetings?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson. Because it was of a covert nature, Verster would first have checked to see what happened, was the CCB implicated or not, was there a red light flashing or not, and only then if there were to be some problems, Verster would have reported to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Because one would imagine if somebody was arrested then even if nothing happened to them in relation to them being charged or whatever, the police would have their names.

GEN WEBB: Yes, definitely.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) Hamutenya mean anything to you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: No, you must be careful about that. Perhaps I should remind you, you are credited of having played an important role in the SWAPO/MPLA/Savimbi conflict. Did you?

GEN WEBB: Who credited me?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: Who gave me that credit?

MR BIZOS: Never mind. Is it true?

GEN WEBB: I spent time in the South African war, South West African war, yes.

MR BIZOS: And Savimbi occupied Angola.

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: SWAPO was the enemy of Savimbi as much as the enemy of the MPLA.

GEN WEBB: Not SWAPO, their military wing was, SWAPO was a political organisation in South Africa, not banned.

MR BIZOS: You're quite right, yes, I know about that, but their military wing was. And the view, the view of the South African Security Forces and the Army was that there was close liaison between SWAPO and their military wing.

GEN WEBB: I suppose so.

MR BIZOS: Ja. And you say who gave you credit? You are credited of actually having formalised the informal Army of Savimbi into an efficient fighting force. Were you not credited with that? Don't laugh.

GEN WEBB: I have no idea what Mr Bizos is referring to, none whatsoever.

MR BIZOS: No, is it true, did you organise Savimbi's Army?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR BIZOS: No? Well then perhaps you'd better look into your own history. But anyway, let's leave Savimbi out of it for the time being. Wasn't the third person that I have mentioned to you, Hidipo Hamutenya, a very - one of the top people in SWAPO?

GEN WEBB: That's possible.

MR BIZOS: Was he being monitored by Mr Botha?

GEN WEBB: Not as far as I knew, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was it ever reported to you that one of the CCB operatives was monitoring a Namibian?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was the CCB to confine itself in the activities within the Republic, or could they go outside in '89?

CHAIRPERSON: I think you're talking Region 6.

MR BIZOS: Region 6, yes.

Could they go outside?

GEN WEBB: If the information was to that effect, I suppose you could use them, yes.

MR BIZOS: Why would they be monitoring a high profile SWAPO politician?

GEN WEBB: I've just said, I don't know about that monitoring.

MR LAX: Could I just clarify something?

Why would they work outside the country if their information pointed that way?

GEN WEBB: Depending on what forces you had at your disposal, depending on what kind of operation, you must decide what forces you had and how you were going to do the operation. If you didn't have that capacity, maybe you had some other capacity. You had different capacities from which you could choose what you were going to use for Special Forces.

MR LAX: Yes, but as I understood it, you had different regions and those regions were responsible for specific areas, like Namibia would have been a particular area with others. If there was information that required something to be done in Namibia, why wouldn't you use those people to do it, why send and expose your Region 6 people externally?

GEN WEBB: They possibly had too much work and they needed assistance. It wasn't a rigid organisation, it was quite flexible.

MR BIZOS: Now do you know Pieter Botes?

GEN WEBB: Pieter Botes, if that is the person fired by Mr Verster, yes, then I know him.

MR BIZOS: Because he is on record saying that Botha was monitoring - yes, I'm sorry, leave Botha out of it, Pieter Botha(sic) says that there was a plan to kill the South West African SWAPO person that we are talking about, Hamutenya.

GEN WEBB: I don't have any knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: If it was going to be done by the CCB, Region 6, this would have required your authority?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Or any region, it would have required your authority?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now is Nico Bessenger(?) known to you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was there any plan mentioned to you by any region to murder him?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Is there any reason why his name should appear in Mr Basson's diary that was produced at the Harms Commission?

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: Was it reported to you by anyone at any stage that there was a plan to kill him?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you know whether or not he was also from Namibia/South West Africa, as it was then called?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Do you know Daniel Tjongarero?

GEN WEBB: Yes, his name is familiar to me.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone report to you that he was being monitored by Botha and Barnard?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You'll find that, Mr Chairman, in B9 and B122.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Now these three persons Hamutenya, Bessenger and Tjongarero are all SWAPO people, why should the CCB be monitoring four people? Those three and Anton Lubowski? What business was it of the CCB to monitor four people from Namibia, other than killing them? And they certainly succeeded in killing one of them. Why should they be monitoring them?

GEN WEBB: I only know about the monitoring of Anton Lubowski. That was done in South Africa. If there had been other plans, he might have been monitored in Windhoek. I don't have any knowledge about the other three members, so how can I answer you?

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you know as Head of the CCB, having regard to its aims and objectives and having such knowledge as a leader should have and must have had, you might be able to furnish an innocent explanation as to why the CCB members were monitoring them, other than for the purpose of killing them or doing them serious harm. Can you think of any reason why these four Namibians should have been monitored?

GEN WEBB: I repeat, Anton Lubowski was monitored to see who his contacts were within the Republic of South Africa. That's a nice innocent reason, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Well except for this. We don't know what the innocent reason might have been but we do know that he was murdered. So you know, there is a sort of presumption of continuity of sorts that we lawyers speak about. So can you think of any lawful reason why the four Namibians were being monitored at about the same time and one of them died an unnatural death, after they had received this innocent attention from the CCB? You see, the Committee has to work on probabilities and you are the Chairman, you should be able to tell us. Each one of these facts standing on its own may not tell a story, but if you analyse them the way we do, they do tell a story, don't they General? Even for a General you know, that has to make a plan, he's got to take the facts in front of him and see what pattern there is. Have you got any innocent explanation why four, according to their own versions, four of the CCB people were monitored at or about the same time and one of them were shot dead?

CHAIRPERSON: Four of the SWAPO people were monitored.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, SWAPO members.

GEN WEBB: I repeat, Chairperson, three of those people, I had no knowledge that they were being monitored and I didn't realise that to monitor somebody was unlawful. Mr Lubowski was monitored within the Republic of South Africa so that we could find out who his contacts were.

MR BIZOS: Who were Mr Lubowski's contacts in South Africa?

GEN WEBB: The report-back which we got, nothing, no information could be gathered.

MR BIZOS: So it was a wasted effort?

GEN WEBB: A wasted effort.

MR BIZOS: And where the other three also a wasted effort? But what was the motive?

GEN WEBB: I don't know ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: What was the innocent motive?

GEN WEBB: How can you ask me when I keep telling you that I don't even know that those people were being monitored?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) Did anyone mention the name of Trevor Tutu to you?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: In connection with what?

GEN WEBB: That we wanted to go and place this baboon foetus at his home.

MR BIZOS: Trevor Tutu.

GEN WEBB: Sorry, no, I thought you meant Archbishop Tutu.

CHAIRPERSON: This is Trevor Tutu. The question was, did anyone ever mention Trevor Tutu to you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Which region had this project?

CHAIRPERSON: The Apie project?

MR BIZOS: The Apie project, the Tutu.

GEN WEBB: Currently I know that it was Region 6, when I approved it I didn't know it was Region 6.

MR BIZOS: Are you sure that it was 6 and not 9?

GEN WEBB: Slang carried it out and he was Region 6.

MR BIZOS: No, but he says that he was just asked to sort of fill in, but I'll tell you why we're asking this. According to charge 59 of Mr Wouter Basson, the following is stated ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is this Dr Wouter Basson's current trial?

MR BIZOS: Current trial, on page 243 of Summary of Substantial Facts.

Perhaps you would like to read paragraphs 1 and 2. Please read that out into the record. We won't put it in as an exhibit but I would merely like the witness to read it out into record so that there is no misunderstanding because of my imperfect Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that charge 59, paragraphs 1 and 2?

MR BIZOS: Charge 59.

Read it aloud please, into the record.

GEN WEBB: Paragraph 1

"A Durandt vs S du Toit van der Walt, Co-ordinator of Region 9 of the CCB, had a project named Project Apie. That entailed that there had to be a certain kind of a spell placed on Archbishop Tutu in a very visible way, so that his supporters had to withdraw their support as a result and that fitted in with the general objectives of the CCB, namely the maximal disruption of the enemy. This project, like the normal projects of CCB, was handled in the same way as the normal projects of the CCB, as set out above. After approval, a baboon foetus was required for this project.

Paragraph 2:

"Accused had made this request to RNL, to the laboratories there, that a baboon foetus was necessary for the project. Dr S Wandrag did a caesarean section on a pregnant baboon and removed two foetuses."

MR BIZOS: What do you say about the evidence upon which that charge is laid against Dr Basson, that it was a Region 9?

GEN WEBB: When I approved a project I didn't know whether it was Region 6 or Region 9 who was to carry it out.

MR BIZOS: So it's possible that it was 9, without your knowledge?

GEN WEBB: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: Now whilst we are on this, Mr Barnard - at B93, Mr Chairman, says that this was the third of the five steps and you will recall because you mentioned Mr van Zyl's evidence, that if I remember correctly Mr van Zyl told us that he didn't know what one and two were, he was merely asked to do this one, three.

MR MARTINI: No, Chairperson, Mr van Zyl said that he didn't know of any other steps, all he knew was that he was told to go and place this foetus. He knew of no other steps in this so-called plan which Mr Kahanovitz had put to him at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he just had a sort of ad hoc involvement in it.

MR BIZOS: He came in the middle so to speak, he didn't know what happened - if this was number three, he did not know what one and two were. But Mr Botha says - I beg your pardon, Mr Barnard says in B93, Mr Chairman, that step number four would have been the hanging up of dead hyena and step number five would have been the killing by poison of Mr Trevor Tutu. Now was that approach made to you?

GEN WEBB: I only know of one step and that is the baboon foetus which was put in the garden, I don't know about the steps one to five.

MR BIZOS: We'll come back to this and what the purpose of this was, when we deal with the Tutu matter, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: If I could just ask a question, Mr Bizos, sorry to interrupt.

You've said that you wouldn't dispute that this was a Region 9 project. Now when Region 6 was established, my understanding was that Region would deal with internal matters and the other regions that existed, their business was out of the country, how could it then come about or why should it ever come about that Region 9 would then involved itself in an internal matter, would dip into Region 6's jurisdiction?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson, I really can't answer you on that. Maybe they needed help, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes because it would see that that whole project relating to Bishop Tutu would have been local, I mean national, inside South Africa.

GEN WEBB: It should have been local.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you.

MR BIZOS: Bear with me for a moment.

Did you know Lawrie Nathan?

GEN WEBB: Excuse me?

MR BIZOS: Did you know or heard of Lawrie Nathan?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: He's also an ECC person, a prominent ECC person, also a person that would have deserved special attention from a General. You'd never heard of him?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever discuss the End Conscription Campaign with Verster or anyone else?

GEN WEBB: It's possible, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: What does that mean?

GEN WEBB: It's possible that perhaps we said that we didn't like it, it was affecting our military powers, it keeps some recruits away from our Forces. So it's quite possible.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't it a burning issue for a General?

GEN WEBB: No, it was not a burning issue, we still had enough recruits for Special Forces.

MR BIZOS: But if my memory serves me correctly, by '89 this campaign had really taken off, there were meetings at various places quite openly declaring "We will not join the Army" and they were burning their call-up papers publicly and they were making rude remarks about the Minister of Defence and the Generals. It wasn't a small secret organisation, it went public. Was it not a matter of grave concern to you and didn't you discuss it with Verster?

GEN WEBB: Once again I say It's possible that we discussed it in general.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but now ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Can you recall discussing it?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, but it would have been somewhere, perhaps not with Verster, perhaps I discussed it with somebody else because the End Conscription Campaign, we didn't like them.

MR BIZOS: Well and you know that the Cape Provincial Division not far away from here, made a finding that your Army was running a campaign of dirty tricks against the ECC people out of the Castle here in Cape Town, do you recall that?

GEN WEBB: It's possible, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You don't recall it?

GEN WEBB: Special Forces weren't involved.

MR BIZOS: Well we'll have to look at the report whether they identify which section of the Army it was.

GEN WEBB: Yes, I agree.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now why would Peaches, a unaware member of the CCB, be monitoring Mr Lawrie Nathan?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Well we know why Mr Peaches monitored other people, any reason to believe that he would have monitored Mr Lawrie Nathan for any other reason?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Peaches it's common cause, was a gangster, is he the sort of person that you would have allowed to gather intelligence for your CCB?

GEN WEBB: That question has already been answered this morning. No.

MR BIZOS: The reference to Peaches monitoring Mr Nathan, Mr Chairman, you will find in B194.

Ever heard of Jay Naidoo?

GEN WEBB: Yes, well we know who he is now, but not at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Oh. At that time he was perhaps doing a much more prominent job than he's doing now, he was the Head of Cosatu, or if he was not the Head, he was one of the big guns in Cosatu. Now was that an enemy of the apartheid State?

GEN WEBB: They were certainly a thorn in our flesh.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and what do you do with thorns in your flesh at the time, what did you do with them? You sent Mr Barnard for the purposes of murdering him.

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: Which you will find in B121, Mr Chairman.

Why would Mr Barnard go to Mr Jay Naidoo? For what innocent purpose would he monitor him other than for the purposes of murdering him?

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: You know Mr Essa Moosa?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well he's now a Judge of the Court in this division, but at the time he was a prominent attorney, closely associated with Mr Dullah Omar and he was involved in what you would have called terrorism trials. Why was Peaches monitoring Mr Essa Moosa?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Can you think of any innocent purpose, having regard to what Mr Peaches was engaged to do, as to why he should be monitoring Mr Essa Moosa?

GEN WEBB: I can't comment because I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: You heard at that time of Andrew Boraine?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did I give you the reference, Mr Chairman, of Essa Moosa? Sorry. B196, paragraph 22.

I'm sorry, I didn't hear your answer about ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, he doesn't know Andrew Boraine.

CHAIRPERSON: He doesn't know. Wasn't he one of the leader of the UDF?

GEN WEBB: I told you I didn't know him, so how can I tell you what his position was.

MR BIZOS: Why would he be monitored by Peaches on the instructions of van Zyl?

GEN WEBB: As Slang van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: We have - and he said he was monitoring him, if we remember correctly, so that he could put forward as to whether he was a suitable project for elimination or not.

GEN WEBB: But then you have the answer.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but now you see what I want to know from you and what the Committee will want to know from you, I would submit, is whether you are telling the truth that these and another ten or so instances that I'm going to put to you, were kept a secret from you if the purpose of the monitoring was to eliminate them. In any event, can you think of any reason why the CCB should be monitoring Andrew Boraine and why van Zyl should have spent good money on Peaches who was getting an allowance, bonuses and things and promises of larger sums to monitor Andrew Boraine?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You can't. You will find, Mr Chairman, the Andrew Boraine reference is B199 to 200, and in Exhibit G, the State vs Barnard, at pages 1853 line 15, to 1854 line 15. That's Exhibit G, Mr Chairman.

And what about Mr Allan Boesak, had you heard of him?

GEN WEBB: Yes, he was known to me.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And he was certainly more high profile than Frank Chikane or Lubowski or any other of the people on our list, he was a high profile UDF leader, correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Also a thorn in your flesh?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And a prominent one?

GEN WEBB: Yes, a thorn in the flesh.

MR BIZOS: And why would he be monitoring, why would Peaches be monitoring on the instructions of Mr van Zyl, Allan Boesak?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I suppose it's to gather intelligence.

MR MARTINI: Sorry, Chairperson, I don't think that was Mr van Zyl's evidence. You see, Chairperson, it's very ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: It's Peaches' version.

MR MARTINI: Oh, but not Mr van Zyl's version. We don't want to interrupt all the time, but I've got the impression that sometimes Mr Bizos does get it incorrect because he's trying to repeat evidence, so the fact that I might not object does not mean that we accept the version that Mr Bizos is putting that my client, Mr van Zyl may have stated it, 'cause we'll be here ages arguing.

MR BIZOS: ...(no microphone) that insofar as I may get it wrong, but I do believe that I get it right most of the time. I stand to be corrected and I will correct it, Mr Chairman. This is why I'm giving you the references, so that you can check them, so that there is this - Mr Martini can check them as well. And in relation to Allan Boesak you will also find that Mr Chairman, in Barnard, in Exhibit G again, 1853, line 15 to 18354(sic), line 15. It's the same - they're coupled together, Mr Chairman. I'm sorry, the Barnard is in relation to the previous one, it doesn't relate to this one. It's only Peaches, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Let me just repeat that reference please, Mr Bizos.

CHAIRPERSON: So Exhibit G doesn't apply to ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR BIZOS: B206. Peaches, ...(indistinct) to Peaches in the case of Boesak on the instructions of Mr van Zyl. And I may say Mr Chairman, in response to the objection by Mr Martini, that the mere fact that information for these purposes is hearsay because the person is no longer among the living, doesn't make it inadmissible in terms of our law of evidence. But we will argue about that later, Mr Chairman.

You know Trevor Manuel?

GEN WEBB: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you know him at the time?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't he as high a profile UDF leader as Dullah Omar?

GEN WEBB: If I didn't know him, how would I know what kind of profile he had.

MR BIZOS: Yes. For what purpose would Trevor Manuel be monitored?

GEN WEBB: I have no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: By Barnard - by Peaches, I'm sorry. According to my information, van Zyl's evidence in State vs Barnard, Exhibit G, also at 1853 line 15 to 1854 line 15.

Now did you ever hear of the name of Mhlaba, spelt M-h-l-a-b-a?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: Mr Bizos is referring to Exhibit G, it is not Exhibit G, it's bundle G. There's a difference. Exhibit G is just for the sake of ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Coetzee. So wherever I've written or anybody else had written exhibit, we'll call it bundle G.

MR BIZOS: Bundle G. Thank you for drawing our attention to that. I'm sorry.

Now in relation to Mr - did you read the Harms Commission report?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You were not interested?

GEN WEBB: I read what was in the newspapers, I didn't read the report itself.

MR BIZOS: Yes, a pity, but let me read to you. Bundle D, page 41, this is the Commission' report. Listen in the words of His Lordship what your CCB did, General Webb.

"Mr Mhlaba is an attorney in Durban. A member of the CCB who operated in Swaziland and Mozambique, alleges that he obtained information that Mr Mhlaba was controlling finances for the ANC, besides which he was procuring weapons for the ANC. Precisely what happened is not clear. What is certain however, is that on the 4th of March 1989, Du Plooy was preparing a document dealing with the elimination of Mr Mhlaba by means of poisoning. The poison was to be administered on the 13th of March 1989.

The reasons for the elimination, as set forth in the document, are that Mhlaba is a senior ANC member in this country, that he has secret means of communication with members abroad, that he recruits couriers, that he supplies military members with funds for operations, is involved with the UDF. The document is incomplete and apparently there was an alternative to shoot Mhlaba. Nothing came of these plans. The reason why is doubtful in the light of the evidence. Who was responsible for proposing and evaluating the elimination is also doubtful. What is certain however is, a member of an external region was involved in the possible elimination of a citizen of the RSA within the borders of the country.

The grounds for ...(indistinct) are appalling since the intended victim, if convicted in a court of law, would have received a sentence of imprisonment for his actions. The factual basis underlying the reasons for his elimination is extremely shaky and suspect. The problem regarding this document is that it may be indicative of an attempted conspiracy to murder. As the three persons alleged to be involved are all untrustworthy witnesses, it is impossible to make any further factual findings concerning these events."

Now what is clear in the first part of the statement that I read out to you, is that it was a member of the CCB who was not named by the Judge because at that time not all members were named, is that correct?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But later he says that it was Du Plooy. Was Du Plooy a member of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Now you attended the CCB hearings before Judge Harms regularly, didn't you?

GEN WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now ...(no - microphone)

MR LAX: But Bizos, he also names the others there, in a footnote, in footnote 11 on that page 42. ...(no microphone)

MR BIZOS: Now were you approached for this?

GEN WEBB: Approached for what?

MR BIZOS: In relation to this action?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Is this another example of Verster not taking you into his confidence?

MR WESSELS: With respect, Mr Chairman, Mr Bizos must read the evidence given in the Harms Commission before he makes a statement like that. Verster testified there that he was not aware of a project to eliminate Mhlaba.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but if there was a project to eliminate Mhlaba, on your testimony General, he should have gone through you?

GEN WEBB: Yes, if there was such a project.

CHAIRPERSON: If it was during March 1989.

GEN WEBB: Yes, if there was such a project, yes Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Do you know anything about this Mr du Plooy, who he is?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: At the time, how did such a serious allegation and such a serious and deplorable finding by the Judge, irrespective of the fact that he couldn't rely on the other CCB witnesses like Verster and others - were you not concerned to find out what happened behind your back? How could you have missed this?

GEN WEBB: Mr Verster said himself that he knew nothing about the project.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you as the Head of the CCB, did you go up to Du Plooy and say, "Hey what is going on here behind my back, were you a member of the CCB?"

GEN WEBB: Chairperson, some of the people were disguised for the Harms Commission when they testified, so you didn't meet people in privacy, there was simply never that possibility.

MR BIZOS: Were you disguised by the way?

GEN WEBB: No.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean disguised, with false beards and balaclavas, that sort of thing?

GEN WEBB: Well mainly false beards.

CHAIRPERSON: And also, if there was this operation to kill Mr Mhlaba in Durban, wouldn't you, if there was such an operation, have expected that to be a Region 6 operation?

GEN WEBB: If I approve a thing like that or if I had approved a thing like that, I wouldn't know which region was to carry it out.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I'm still a bit confused as to why Region 6 was established then, if other regions were doing operations in South Africa, like for instance the Mhlaba one we spoke about one a moment ago, that was carried out by Region 9.

GEN WEBB: All I can imagine is that if something like that happened, then it means that the people needed help. Perhaps they had a shortage of manpower or whatever and then they would ask another unit for help with their work. That's the only thing I can think of.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it would seem, and I might be wrong, but it would seem that many of the operatives in Region 6 were sort of kicking heels at that stage, they weren't running operations. It seems the most active person was Mr van Zyl, but besides that the others were still trying to find contacts and cut-off people and that sort of thing.

GEN WEBB: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So it seems strange that they weren't utilised in these operations.

GEN WEBB: I agree, they ought to have been used. Those are the people who ought to have been used, or ought to have had non-aware members. Whether they actually had then or not, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: But you know this business of their being disguised, they had lawyers, you had lawyers, here is the good name of the CCB being mentioned as somebody that initiated the death of an attorney, where a Judge says it was hardly justified, why not go to your legal representative and say, "Please tell us who this man is"? "I'm the Head of the CCB and look what he's saying about us."

GEN WEBB: Mr Verster told me that he didn't even know about the operation, now people are jumping out everywhere making all kinds of allegations. Why would I make further enquiries if he said he didn't know about it?

MR BIZOS: ... the organisation which you headed. About the organisation that you headed. Anyway, let's carry on with this list about which people you knew nothing about. Did you know Mr Anton Roskam, R-o-s-k-a-m.

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: No. Now his vehicle was burnt according to Mr Barnard and Mr Botha, found by Judge Els in G 92 to 95 and 230. Bundle G. Now this never came to your notice?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Should it have?

GEN WEBB: Well to burn a vehicle, possibly, yes.

MR BIZOS: Why would it have been kept away from you?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos, what that during 1989?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman. Mr Barnard are the indications, Mr Chairman, that it was during this period.

Then of course we have the case of David Webster, in which Mr Barnard was involved. I think we have enough evidence in relation to that. But what I want to ask you is this. Allegations were made that this was a CCB operation.

GEN WEBB: There were enquiries made, yes.

MR BIZOS: And did you take part in any discussions as to whether this was so or not?

GEN WEBB: The then Chief of the Detective Service, Gen Jaap Joubert, made certain enquiries and I went to Col Verster and I directed certain enquiries to him and the answer was no, the CCB was not involved.

MR BIZOS: If the CCB was not involved as they publicly contend, who were Botha and Barnard working for at the time of Webster's death?

GEN WEBB: I think Mr Verster had already testified that Barnard at that stage was no longer a member of the CCB and Kalla Botha I'm not sure about.

MR BIZOS: Did you conduct an enquiry as to what Botha and Barnard were doing together and what the status of Barnard was at that time?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You neither wanted to see nor hear any evil, or have any evil explained to you?

GEN WEBB: I wasn't even aware that Barnard could have been a non-aware member. I didn't know the individual, I didn't have any knowledge about it, so why would I make enquiries about somebody I didn't know?

MR BIZOS: But the Head of the Detective Services came to you and said, "we have information that this is a CCB operation", what did you do about it?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson, who said that he said that they had information like that?

MR BIZOS: What did he say?

GEN WEBB: That's not what he said. If I recall his words, and I can't remember the detail, but he said "Is it possible that your people are involved in the Webster murder?" And enquiries were made and the answer was no, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Whom did you ask?

GEN WEBB: Joe Verster.

MR BIZOS: Why should the Head of the Detective Branch come to you?

GEN WEBB: No, I went to him.

MR BIZOS: You went to him?

GEN WEBB: Ja. He called me to his office.

MR BIZOS: Well why should he have invited you to his place?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask him, "Why do you ask me?"?

GEN WEBB: He asked me, "Please make enquiries, are you involved, yes or no."

MR BIZOS: If you knew nothing about it didn't you ask him why did you come - presume that he - did he come to you as Head of the CCB, or as the Head of Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: Excuse me?

MR BIZOS: Did he come to you as Head of the CCB ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, this is General Jaap Joubert of the Detective ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, but when he came to make the enquiry.

CHAIRPERSON: It's not the same Joop Joubert.

MR BIZOS: No, no, but when the Head of the Detective Service came to you or asked you to go to his office, did he ask you in your capacity as the Head of the CCB, or as a person in the Special Forces?

GEN WEBB: I think as Head of Special Forces.

MR BIZOS: Now did he tell you what he wanted to see you about before you went there?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And did you ask him what made him think that you would have any information about Mr Barnard's doings?

GEN WEBB: The General asked me to make enquiries. He first asked me, "Are you involved?" And I said, "No". Then he asked me could I make enquiries and I said yes, I would and that's what I then did.

CHAIRPERSON: General, were you completely ignorant of the identity of the operatives in the CCB?

GEN WEBB: Absolutely, Chairperson. As I said earlier, I knew two Regional Managers and Joe Verster.

CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't have, in your capacity as Chairperson, records like Mr van Zyl, he's going to be working in the Western Cape, Mr Botha's going to be working in Transvaal, that sort of thing?

GEN WEBB: Not at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you didn't ever get Mr Verster coming and saying "Well look this member's doing well and this member's not doing so well", any sort of feedback about personnel, at all?

GEN WEBB: Yes, once there was a person who had retired, we gave him a gift and some kind of a commendation and then there was another member of staff, I think it was Botes who had been dismissed by Verster because he caused certain problems.

CHAIRPERSON: But wouldn't you have got information to say "Well look you know, these people are now establishing their covers, Mr van Zyl he's just formed a little company called Incom, or whatever it was called, and Mr Botha he's moving in this direction and we've given him money to start a little operation", didn't you get that sort of information?

GEN WEBB: Never names.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: You know Mr Lafras Luitingh?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't he a member of the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I only learnt that later, or the allegations that he was a member. His name only came out later.

MR BIZOS: Is he a professional soldier?

GEN WEBB: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: According to the evidence before Mr Justice Els, we'll give a reference later, Mr Chairman, Barnard admitted to Lafras Luitingh, that he had murdered Webster, the day after, almost immediately afterwards. Now if he was a member of the CCB, didn't he owe a duty to the CCB to report that?

GEN WEBB: Are you saying that something was reported to me?

MR BIZOS: Whomever.

GEN WEBB: But nothing was reported to me, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Who would he have had to report to?

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I don't know where he fitted in. If Lafras Luitingh was a member then he would have had to report to his superior. I don't know.

MR BIZOS: He was Ferdi Barnard's handler in the CCB. Would you not have known about that?

GEN WEBB: I didn't know those people, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: We have evidence that Mr Barnard was either suspended or put on ice, insofar as there may be a difference, for breach of discipline. Would that not have been a matter which would have had to be reported to you by Mr Verster?

GEN WEBB: No, that's something which only came out much later.

MR LAX: That wasn't the question, the question was, wasn't that kind of thing the sort of thing which should have been reported to you?

GEN WEBB: No, that wasn't necessary, you didn't know the people who worked on operator level. If he committed some wrong down the way and the CCB wasn't threatened as such, there would be no reason to report to me ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Except that he might be getting a salary for doing nothing. I mean it might have had a financial implication.

GEN WEBB: Yes, but Mr Verster could appoint people without me making a contribution or input into the matter.

MR BIZOS: The fact that he was involved in internal assassinations, if your evidence is correct, threatened the very existence, the very reputation of the CCB and completely contrary to all orders and plans of the CCB.

GEN WEBB: When was Mr Barnard arrested?

MR BIZOS: No, much later, we're talking about the time after, the day after when he admitted to a member of the CCB that he had done it. That's the relevant time that we are talking about.

GEN WEBB: I made enquiries in that time or just after, after the General had approached me and the answer was "No, we're not involved."

MR BIZOS: Didn't you want to know who the suspect was? You know when the Head of Security - the Head of Detective Services comes along and says "Did you have anything to do with this?", you must take the enquiry seriously.

GEN WEBB: It was taken seriously.

MR BIZOS: And how did you take this enquiry seriously? What did you do?

GEN WEBB: Well I immediately knew that Special Forces couldn't have been involved, so I went to the CCB and said "Men, please Joe, find out what's going on, are we involved, yes or no", and he came back to me and he said "No."

MR BIZOS: Did you ask the Head of the Detective Services "Who is the suspect"?

GEN WEBB: No.

MR LAX: Can I just ask a question. Why did you immediately know Special Forces wasn't involved?

GEN WEBB: Because they were direct at operations outside the country.

MR LAX: But they weren't always directed at operations outside the country, we've already heard about the Ribeiros, we've heard about other things. So how could you be so sure?

GEN WEBB: Yes, but the Ribeiros were CCB.

MR LAX: And there were some Special Forces people there as well. We know that.

GEN WEBB: Ja, it could have been a combination.

MR LAX: So I mean the fact of the matter is that you couldn't be sure and if you didn't know who the operative was, who the prime suspect might be. You see, earlier I was interrupted when I wanted to ask you this question. When this General comes to you, or this Head of Investigations, this chap Joubert comes to you, doesn't he say to you "Hey, we've got a problem here, are any of your people involved"? Surely you discuss it confidentially as two members of the Security Forces, that's why he comes to you. He doesn't go and arrest your man first and then send an instruction through you.

GEN WEBB: No, I don't think you should think in terms of us trying to discuss something, the General was higher in rank than myself, so we weren't on an equal level and he directed an enquiry at me "Were you involved or not?" And I don't know whether he as the Head of the Detective Branch perhaps had any knowledge of Ribeiro or not. He just asked me "Are your people involved, yes or no?" And that's when I made the enquiry. It wasn't a discussion between people of equal rank, he was of a higher rank than myself.

MR LAX: The point I'm trying to get to is, he wouldn't have just said to you "Are your people involved", you could have asked you that over the phone. He wouldn't have called you to his office to say that, he would have had a discussion with you, he would have tried to explain the context, how important it was.

GEN WEBB: I don't know, I don't think any detail was discussed, for me the important thing was that he directed an enquiry at me. Perhaps he wanted to look me in the eye when he asked me this, perhaps he didn't want to mention it on the phone. He summoned me to his office and I went.

MR LAX: Besides Verster, who else did you ask about it?

GEN WEBB: Only Verster.

MR LAX: Why didn't you ask your other intelligence channels whether they knew? You had a whole intelligence system at your disposal.

GEN WEBB: After Dr Webster had been shot, the next day everything was in the papers, if other information had come through it would have gone through the normal channels and I specifically had to enquire from us, from the CCB.

MR LAX: You see the whole important reason here is not so much that these people are being paid money by you and they're not doing their jobs properly, but it's the whole - suddenly I can only think in Afrikaans, "die ontbloting" of this entire operation. That's the crucial issue. If I was in your shoes, that's what I would be really worried about.

GEN WEBB: To expose us?

MR LAX: Yes.

GEN WEBB: Yes, but by making enquiries about Webster, we're not disclosing anything.

MR LAX: Here the police are asking you, "Are your people involved?" How does he even know about the CCB? Here's a General in the Police, how does he even know about the CCB?

GEN WEBB: I don't know whether he knew about the CCB, he didn't say CCB, he said to me Special Forces, as I testified just now.

MR LAX: Yes, but how would he even know Special Forces were involved internally?

GEN WEBB: As I said, perhaps he as Head of the Detective Branch knew about previous incidents like the Ribeiro incident, I don't know. I didn't question him, I ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Precisely, precisely, but in your mind the issue would then have been this, "Good gracious, what does this man know that I don't know? How much does he know that I've got to be worried about?" And then surely you'd go to your own sources, besides Verster.

GEN WEBB: Perhaps it flashed through my mind, but I simply directed the enquiry to Verster, nothing further.

MR LAX: So you clearly weren't that concerned.

GEN WEBB: I was convinced that we weren't involved.

MR LAX: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: When was the enquiry made? You say after the first day of the murder?

GEN WEBB: No, I didn't say that.

MR BIZOS: Shortly after.

GEN WEBB: Shortly afterwards, yes, a week maybe, I'm not sure.

MR BIZOS: Now we know that Mr Verster, according to you, is not telling the truth about Omar and Evans. As you're sitting there, should you have believed Verster if you knew what you know now?

GEN WEBB: On what I know now?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

GEN WEBB: No, I suppose I wouldn't have believed him, but then I didn't know that.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I'm going on to a new topic, I don't know whether ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, this might be a ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: I just want to put a ...

You see we have dealt with sixteen instances of attention being paid by Region 6 to various people, this would explain would it not, what it is that they were busy doing and - would it not? That they were doing very much more than you say you knew about, do you agree with that?

GEN WEBB: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: Well their evidence is that this is what they say they did, never mind what the purpose was, we'll argue that, but they seem to be busy with at least another sixteen suspects. If their evidence - it's mainly from their evidence that this information has come, that would explain what they were busy doing and that they were not as inactive as you say and thought they were. Would you agree with that?

GEN WEBB: It's possible.

MR BIZOS: Yes you know this "moontlik" isn't very helpful, as His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman said, the Committee is not interested in the remote possibilities but in probabilities which you have to show that you have made full disclosure about. "Dis moontlik" is not helpful. What I'm putting to you is, do you concede that this is what they must have been doing if they say so and either you are not telling us the truth about how much you knew, or there was a deliberate hiding of relevant information from you. Can you think of any other explanation?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think that Verster had full confidence in you? Why I ask this is, he was a Special Forces man through and through and you were a new person coming green as it were, into the world of the Security Force, thinking back now, do you think that might be a reason why he might not have taken you into his confidence, or ...?

GEN WEBB: It's a possibility, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Again this possibility which doesn't mean much, what do you expect the Committee to do with that possibility? Did he ever show any hostility towards you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did he ever show that he did not trust you by not answering your questions directly and immediately?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: By not doing what you asked him to do?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: By withholding information from you which you asked him to give you?

GEN WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Yes, so your possibility doesn't mean very much, does it?

GEN WEBB: I'm not worried about your thoughts, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

GEN WEBB: I said I'm not worried about your thoughts.

MR BIZOS: Are you not?

GEN WEBB: I'm worried about the Chairman's thoughts.

MR BIZOS: Oh well, we hope to guide the Chairman as to what he ought to think.

CHAIRPERSON: Please don't put too much on my shoulders, I'm just one of three people sitting here.

MR SIBANYONI: May I ask you one question, General Webb. As the Chair of the CCB, what were you supposed to do with the information you were getting from the Regional Managers?

GEN WEBB: No, I never got information from the Regional Managers, they would send information - are you talking about intelligence?

MR SIBANYONI: Yes.

GEN WEBB: Intelligence they would send through a certain channel. If you talk about an operation that had to be approved, it would come to me.

MR SIBANYONI: Were you required to report to any upper structure?

GEN WEBB: Depending on the type of operation, if lives were to be lost or foreseen to be lost or not foreseen to be lost.

MR SIBANYONI: You have said that in so far as the budget is concerned, certain powers were delegated to the Regional Managers ...

GEN WEBB: No, no, to Col Verster.

MR SIBANYONI: Yes, I'm referring to him. Was he supposed to account to you, for example after he has spent any of the budget?

GEN WEBB: No, there was an accounting system and that was done by the Defence Force Accountants and his own Accountant.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Will this be a convenient time to take the adjournment? I think so. We'll take the adjournment now and resume tomorrow morning at half past nine, same venue.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS