Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: You can remove your jacket if you wish, Mr Burger, in fact anybody who wants to remove their jacket, may do so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if we can just get the opportunity to arrange all the documents here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly Mr du Plessis. Mr Burger's application is on page 130 of Bundle A.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis?

EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Burger, is it correct that you are the applicant in this matter, applying for amnesty for four matters? Is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That is in terms of the Act 34 of 1995. The four matters for which you are applying for amnesty are arranged in order as they are in the application, it is the Athlone Early Learning Centre bomb incident; the Gavin Evans matter; Dullah Omar matter and the incident relating to the baboon foetus at the house of Desmond Tutu, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This application of yours is dated 2 December 1996, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It is based on an earlier application of yours in terms of previous legislation dated 28 March 1991, as corroborated by an affidavit made or signed on the same date in 1991, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At this stage, I am not going to refer specifically to the documentation, I will get back to that later, but at this stage I would like you to tell us in your own words what the circumstances were surrounding these events for which you are applying for amnesty.

Just by way of background firstly, I would like you to place on record when you joined the CCB.

MR BURGER: I joined officially on the 1st of June 1988.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then briefly background before you joined the CCB, where were you, where were you employed before then?

MR BURGER: I was employed at the Brixton Murder and Robbery of the South African Police, in the capacity as Officer, second in command and later Officer in Charge.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Your rank was Colonel?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now just briefly, I would like you to sketch for the Committee what the background was, the circumstances under which you were transferred from the South African Police to the CCB?

MR BURGER: Chair, at the beginning of 1988, there was a difference of opinion which arose between myself and Gen Schutte, who was the Detective Head of Brixton, and it revolved around the involvement of members of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, they were involved in a murder or murders of drug smugglers, and they were later convicted.

As a result of this event, Headquarters thought it fit to bring about a change at Murder and Robbery and the structure there as a whole, and I was not happy with that, because the members involved had acted entirely on their own initiative and my submission to the General was that it actually effected the integrity of the other members, if we were transferred under this cloud of suspicion, namely that we were involved.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In any event you then decided to follow other career opportunities?

MR BURGER: Yes, I pursued other career paths. I investigated other career opportunities, and amongst these was a transfer to the South African Defence Force, Special Forces. The reason for that being that I knew Col Joe Verster from my childhood, we were at primary school and high school together, we were friends there, and after that he went to the Defence Force and I went to the South African Police.

We lost contact with each other, until the time that I started showing an interest in going to Special Forces.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you approached Verster in this regard?

MR BURGER: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And to sum it up, it arose from your social contact with Verster?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In the sense that you knew him from your childhood days, correct?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now briefly if you could tell us or describe to us, how it came about that you were eventually appointed to the CCB?

MR BURGER: I contacted Mr Verster, and as a result of this contact, an arrangement was made for a meeting, I met him in Johannesburg, and I disclosed my intentions to him that I wanted to be transferred to Special Forces.

He told me that there was indeed such a possibility and that the reason why he was meeting me in Johannesburg, in the Ponte block of flats, and why he was dressed in civilian dress, is that it was a civil section of Special Forces in which I was to become involved.

We discussed my rank and how it would adapt, how it would be adapted to Special Forces, the civilian structure and he told me that it would be a civilian appointment, but that the level of the post and the salary, etc, would relate more or less to what it would be in the Officers' core.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you officially apply for a post thereafter?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you completed the necessary documentation?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you later got feedback that the application was successful?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage, were any of the other members who were also involved, Maree, van Zyl and Botha, were they involved in any way in your investigating other career opportunities?

MR BURGER: No, not at the stage when I negotiated with him initially, that is with Mr Verster, but he told me, after my application was successful, after he told me that it was successful, that there would be vacancies and that I could make certain proposals to him for the further posts which were still vacant.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At the stage when you applied for the position, after your first interview with Verster, did you know, did you have detailed knowledge of what your position at the CCB would entail?

MR BURGER: No, no, I didn't. I didn't have a detailed knowledge. What was conveyed to me was that I shouldn't talk about this matter to anybody, with anybody and that I should regard it as a secret and that we would work in that way as well.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So what you did know was that you would not work in uniform, but you would work in a covert capacity?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you told in broad detail, why this appointment to the CCB was necessary?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you told in any way what your function would be?

MR BURGER: Yes - I don't really understand your question, later, in 1989 we were told during the induction course, we were told what the rules and so forth were, but yes, we were told that we would be utilised against the enemies of the State which at that stage were waging a war against the South African Security Forces, in a civilian form.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So in broad detail, you knew what the prospects were and what kind of work you would do?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After your appointment had been approved, did you then in terms of Botha, Maree and van Zyl, you approached them?

MR BURGER: Yes. Yes, I recruited all three of them, and I also arranged for interviews with the Chairperson, and I arranged for their contracts of service.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And they were also, they formally applied then on the same basis? They then formally applied for a post at the CCB on the same basis?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If I understand correctly, your appointment at the CCB was approved whilst you were still in fact in the employ of the South African Police, and more particular as the Commander of Brixton Murder and Robbery?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You then resigned to start on the 1st of June 1988, to start your service with the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes, my official starting date with the CCB is 1 June 1988, but we only formally resigned from the South African Police on the 7th of June 1988.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Your appointment at the CCB, if I understand you correctly, was actually a secret, you didn't reveal this?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: From the 7th of June 1988, it is on record, and I don't want to labour the point here, but it is on record that there was a period during which, a period of approximately six months during which you were not active, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Apparently the Heads, or there was an agreement between the South African Police and the South African Defence Force in respect of the transfer of personnel, there was some activity surrounding that?

MR BURGER: Yes. We were told to ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry Mr Chairman, I just want to draw my client's attention not to disturb the microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Burger, when did you actually physically leave the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad?

MR BURGER: On the 7th of June 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: And what did you tell your colleagues that you were going onto the street now, or what was the situation?

MR BURGER: No, that we were all going to Matthysen Bus Transport, it is the owner of the Matthysen Bus Transport company, located close to Escom offices in Megawatt Park, and that he employed all of us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Why did you do that?

MR BURGER: It was a request from Gen Joubert, through Joe Verster, that we in this period of transfer from Brixton to the CCB, that we would lay low and that we would have a low profile so that if there were any questions about our transfer, or about our leaving the service, it would be said that we were working in a private service.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So this, was this your initiative, your employment at Matthysen Bus?

MR BURGER: Yes, he is also a former friend of mine.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And as stated on record, Mr Matthysen was aware of the fact that you did not work for him?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I it was only a smokescreen?

MR BURGER: Yes, he knew that we worked for a safety and security company, but he did not know the details.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And he had no financial profit, he made no financial gain?

MR BURGER: No, not as far as I know.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you. Now during this six month period in 1988, where you had to lay low and you were not active, did you have any contact with the structures of the CCB?

MR BURGER: During that period, Chairman, our Co-ordinator, Mr Wouter Basson, he visited us on a monthly basis and later more frequently.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So your contact was Mr Wouter Basson?

MR BURGER: Yes, the Co-ordinator.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The name he was known under was?

MR BURGER: Christo Britz.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This contact existed, but it was a more or less briefing of what you would have to do?

MR BURGER: Yes, he, on an informal basis, he briefed us about the modus operandi of the CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. It is also on record, so I don't want to waste any more time, there were instructions that each one of you would have to establish a so-called blue plan, which was ...

MR BURGER: Yes, but that was only in 1989.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. So if we move to 1989, were you then officially informed from January 1989 that you would be operational, that you would have to become active?

MR BURGER: Yes. January 1989 was the induction course where we were briefed in detail about our activities.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The aims of the organisation, that is also on record, the maximal disruption, the different methods of disruption of the enemies of the South African Republic. This course was presented somewhere on a farm?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now, just for more clarity, the induction course, that was presented by members of the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes, the Managing Director, Mr Joe Verster, Heiner Muller, a person called Jaco Black and the logistic person, I will remember his name just now, but they were all administrative, a person Barries. I don't know what their real identities were, except for Heiner Muller, later I learnt that his name is Dawid Fourie.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In any case, these people were all formally involved with the CCB?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now, we already heard evidence about what was briefed to you, what your functions would have been, the maximum disruption of the enemy. Whose enemy would that be?

MR BURGER: The enemies of the Republic of South Africa, were identified as the ANC, the SACP alliance with the front organisations, the structures of the ANC, the UDF and all its front organisations like the FFF, Jodac, etc.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were these identified to you as enemies of the Republic of South Africa?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And they had to be maximally disrupted?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I just want confirmation on your part, this maximum disruption, what did it entail in its worst form if you want?

MR BURGER: The elimination of individuals, it is about, that is the maximum form of disruption.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You have already placed on record that would have been used internally?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you knew that the maximum disruption of the enemy would happen within the borders of the Republic of South Africa and were subject to the jurisdiction of this country?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now, on this induction course, were you told in which manner these actions had to be executed in order to ensure that you would not be linked to them, or that it would not be revealed that you were involved?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairman, the cycles according to which the projects had to be executed, it was a prescribed method, and the main target of covertness would be that they could not trace it back to you, so your actions had to be executed indirectly, so that you as member did not have to be directly involved in the action.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So to explain, it means that the members of Region 6 were not to gain anything from the - they would not be identified with the murder of a person, it would have to be done through unknown agents, and they would not be able to be traced?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If there were any mention, let's say in the unlikely event that you were involved, would you be protected by the State?

MR BURGER: Chairman, I heard evidence this week of members in front of me, it was told to me that we act fairly according to the South African Defence Force, against enemies of the Republic of South Africa, but from my experience, I knew that such acts were illegal and the question was asked what would happen to us and it was explained to us that because of the mechanisms in place, in the whole State structure, that we did not have to worry, because we would be protected by the State structures, but I was not given the word indemnity in the technical term.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You didn't understand it as a legal term?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You understood it in terms of influence to protect you?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now let us get to the events you apply for amnesty for. Did you establish your own blue plan?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairman, I found a company for myself and established a blue plan.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was that?

MR BURGER: I established a small security company.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Under which name?

MR BURGER: Under the name Staal Burger & Associates.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage, in the eyes of the public, you resigned at Matthysen Bus Transport, you didn't work there any more?

MR BURGER: That was after the Matthysen Bus Transport period.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So for the rest of your colleagues, who were involved at Brixton Murder and Robbery, they were told that you had left Matthysen Bus and now you had your own security company?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that was your blue plan? From where did you operate it?

MR BURGER: I operated from the Park Lane Hotel in Hillbrow which belonged to Mr Alec Guvuras.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And why did you operate from there, did you have any link with the hotel?

MR BURGER: Yes, I was appointed by Mr Guvuras as General Manager of the Park Lane Hotel, but he was informed about the fact that I had my own company and I led my investigations from those offices.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you had a second employment, that was General Manager of the Park Lane Hotel?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you remunerated?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So it was in the eyes of the public, you had a decent employment?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was Mr Guvuras informed of the fact that you worked for a State structure in the Security Force?

MR BURGER: No Chairman.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you also operated your company from the hotel where you were the General Manager?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: For the establishment of the blue plan, did you receive financial assistance from the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Would it be for the hire of offices, equipment, etc?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you received such monies?

MR BURGER: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The other members were also established during this period and they established their blue plans?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr du Plessis, just one little question, did the CCB and in particular Mr Verster or your General, know about the fact that you also had other employment in the hotel?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: As a General Manager?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that permitted?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I can understand setting up a company as a cover, which was part of your operation, but having a second, conventional, job, is strictly against code conduct, isn't it? I never knew a member of the Army or the Military ...

MR BURGER: No, it was discussed with Mr Joe Verster and he had no problem with that. I think some members here are aware of the fact that Mr Guvuras is a well known figure in Johannesburg.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You can tell us in which, why?

MR BURGER: He is known as somebody who is involved in drugs and such substances, but I don't know if he had been found guilty, but he had many contacts with the underworld. We made use of this opportunity to make contacts in this underworld of Mr Guvuras.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. At this point, if you could explain to us the whole situation around your establishment in the CCB and the fact that the internal Region 6 became operational. Was that a short term, urgent situation, was it a long term situation, or how were you briefed?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, the impression I get here as applicant, is that we are in the year 2000, excuse me, Mr Lax also mentioned ...

CHAIRPERSON: That is a correct impression.

MR BURGER: And we are busy to delve into the 1980's and our actions in that period, and the context have changed quite a bit since then.

I am now like Mr Bizos yesterday, I just want to ask, what was the question?

MR P DU PLESSIS: I ask about the vision around Region 6, was it long term or short term?

MR BURGER: In contrast with the impression I got here, is that CCB Region 6, and my impressions and information to my members, was that we had to establish an acceptable cover, the so-called blue plan, and members who were involved with the Forces for years, to go out and to create the impression with all the other Security Branches involved in the country at that time, that we had no link to any information or intelligence community externally that requires a lot of conviction and credibility. And that was a long term project, because if you were identified, that it was a bluff, that this was just a scam, then you were in danger of losing your job because you would compromise your whole organisation.

So we spent a lot of time on that, more than you think or believe. It was very important to us. Covert does not mean - covert actions, maximum disruptions, all these ugly words of the old war regime sound harsh in your ears, but in our context, in the 1980's, it was the normal words we used.

In that capacity, we acted and established our blue plans. We were not expected to operate within six or seven months, as we explain here today.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage you also did not have the vision, that the circumstances in the land would change dramatically after launching the Region 6 operation?

MR BURGER: No, I did not.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Let's continue. The blue plans are established, you worked on it at the beginning of 1989. Did you pay any attention to the so-called red plans, i.e. the functions and actions within the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And in that context, did you have contact with the Managing Director Mr Joe Verster, and the Co-ordinator, Mr Britz, alias Wouter Basson?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Could you shortly tell us about what led to the activation of Region 6 at the beginning of 1989 and what led to the projects around Mr Dullah Omar and Mr Gavin Evans?

MR BURGER: At one of the meetings with Mr Joe Verster, the Co-ordinator, Mr Basson, had the order to, at the intelligence structure of the CCB, to get information from them, and to convey it to Region 6 which focused internally and, so that we could get aid from them, to move into a certain direction.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That would mean information that you could work from?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Persons you could pay attention to?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You talk about the Co-ordinator that had to do that at the intelligence section. They told you that there was such an Intelligence Centre and that you could use these services?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have any direct access to such an intelligence structure?

MR BURGER: Mr Chairman, I think to explain more clearly, I was a known figure because of Brixton Murder and Robbery, I had a high profile. It was difficult to be involved in a covert operation at CCB and to pretend that I was somebody else.

Because of that, those reasons, Mr Verster thought it was good not to allow me to the meetings of the Regional Managers, and not to allow me to physically pay a visit to any administrative and intelligence structures of the CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So he did not allow you in the inner circle, you were not involved in the inner circle?

MR BURGER: I think the inner circle was higher than the Regional Manager level, we as Regional Managers. I was allowed later in 1989, but at the beginning, during the first six months of 1989, if I remember correctly, I was not allowed to enter these structures, and I had no access to intelligence structures.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you were never introduced to the Intelligence Officer who was the channel for Mr Wouter Basson?

MR BURGER: No, I do not know this person Derek, I do not know him.

MR SIBANYONI: Sorry, while you are talking about that, your employment with Park Lane Hotel, didn't it cause some suspicion, because you were the Commander of Brixton Murder and Robbery or are you saying that your employment there was not in a way a secret to be employed by Park Lane Hotel?

MR BURGER: Mr Sibanyoni, Mr Commissioner, before that time, I was known to Mr Guvuras, from Brixton Murder and Robbery days, I arrested him and detained him and at one stage, he went to Zambia and when he returned, he came to Brixton offices and we checked if they were looking for him in the country, and I think the Commercial Branch was looking for him and I delivered him to them. Later on, we had a policeman, we had an amicable relationship.

So my involvement at Park Lane was not strange in the eyes of the members of the Police, they knew that I knew Mr Guvuras.

MR SIBANYONI: But were you not supposed to be laying low in so far as the public was concerned?

MR BURGER: This period of laying low, was then over in 1989. Instead of working all four under one cover at Matthysen, we terminated that period of laying low and all the members and myself, we all established our own blue plans.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr du Plessis, just quickly, are you saying Mr Burger, that within the CCB in that period, let's say early 1989, you were only known to be a member of the CCB, by Mr Verster, Gen Joubert, Mr Basson and the three people, Messrs Maree, Botha and van Zyl?

MR BURGER: And then of course ...

CHAIRPERSON: And maybe the higher people in the Defence Force?

MR BURGER: Gen Joubert as you have said, and then the persons who were at the induction course, Heiner Muller and those people.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and what about the finance man? Did you have dealings with him in your capacity at that stage, as Manager, Regional Manager?

MR BURGER: No, I dealt through the Co-ordinator.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Mr du Plessis?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Burger, just to go back to Guvuras. Can he be described as a kind of informant?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. Let's go back to where we were with regard to the activation. You told us that there were certain kinds of information made available to you, you worked from that, and we know that there were certain regional divisions, within Region 6, in terms of areas where the cell members worked. Could you please briefly explain to us how it happened and why and who did it?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I at one stage, I thought it would be good that some of the members would concentrate on certain provinces, although as I explained to them, the Republic of South Africa was our responsibility.

His involvement in the Cape, or Mr van Zyl's involvement in the Cape, and Mr Maree in Natal, whatever the case may be, did not mean that he would have to stay within the borders of that province. Those were the provinces I wanted him to concentrate on, but he had - the freedom of movement of each member meant the Republic of South Africa.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So they could be deployed anywhere?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But each member had to be, had to establish his structure within a specific country?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And it is on record that Mr Slang van Zyl...

CHAIRPERSON: I think the interpretation said country, specific province?

MR BURGER: Please repeat.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the interpretation said each member, it spoke about countries, you are speaking about provinces, so I think where it says countries ...

MR BURGER: Provinces.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Provinces within the RSA? It is on record that Mr Slang van Zyl had infrastructure in the Western Cape, specifically in the Western Cape?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: He established it in the Western Cape and you were informed about that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And any of these unknown members, he recruited, did you meet any of them?

MR BURGER: Yes, I met Peaches.

MR P DU PLESSIS: His real identity was not revealed and the reason why he was recruited?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Emerging from van Zyl's infrastructure, specifically Peaches, you acquired certain information through that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And it was with regard to Mr Dullah Omar?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The information about Mr Gavin Evans, if I understand you correctly, it did not come from the infrastructure, but from the Intelligence structures from the CCB specifically?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Your information with regard to the intelligence structure of the CCB, what was that? What did it entail? What did you have access to in terms of this structure.

MR BURGER: The CCB Intelligence structure?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, that Wouter Basson had access to?

MR BURGER: Mr Chairman, I assumed that the intelligence structure of the CCB in spite of its own intelligence acquiring, had access to the structures within the Defence Force as Gen Webb testified and maybe also structures within the National Intelligence and police Security Branches.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Briefly, were you satisfied that the Intelligence structure the CCB had access to, was sophisticated and reliable and it comprised the State Intelligence Service?

MR BURGER: That is absolutely so.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I think we now have to continue, this information which was conveyed to you, came to you from van Zyl and Basson, inter alia, these two so-called red plan projects which you were busy with in the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now there were other matters, for which for certain reasons, amnesty was not applied for, such as for instance the burning of a certain printing press in Cape Town and that was information which came from van Zyl, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: A minibus was also burnt?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That formed part of the flow of information to you, from van Zyl, which was then processed further and out of which certain projects arose?

MR BURGER: Yes, whether from the top or from the bottom.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Right, let us deal now specifically with the matters for which you have applied for amnesty and perhaps it will be a good idea if we start with Mr Dullah Omar's case.

I don't want you to tell us each and every little step, but just in a concise way, to sort of summarise for us, who approved the project and how it was carried out from then onwards.

MR BURGER: Chairperson, as far as my memory serves me, firstly, if I may, I would like to before dealing with the project, I would like to say this, I have met Mrs Omar for the first time and members of the family, I see that they are here in the audience today, and I would like to, at the outset, and in advance say, that there was nothing personal, there was nothing personal aimed at the individuals concerned, and I will continue to say that the information which I received from members on the ground regarding Mr Omar, was that his person on the ground came to him and identified Mr Omar as a prominent member of the UDF, or which was the front organisation of the ANC in the country at that stage and which was also an identified enemy of the Republic of South Africa and the Security Forces.

The UDF and its front organisations, were according to our information in those years, actively involved in agitation and the fermenting of violence and Mr Omar was an element or formed part of the structure of those organisations.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You said a prominent member?

MR BURGER: Yes, a prominent member. The consequence is that he was regarded and identified as a prominent target. The information was conveyed to Mr Verster by myself and the Co-ordinator, he listened to it and he said he would contact us again. We went back and after some time, he contacted us, Mr Verster that is, and told us that we should instruct Mr van Zyl to do a preliminary study.

MR P DU PLESSIS: A preliminary study for what?

MR BURGER: A p preliminary study for the elimination of Mr Omar.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You are referring to the information from van Zyl, was only that information submitted to Verster?

MR BURGER: Just before Mr Verster gave us this information, at the stage ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you talking about Verster or van Zyl?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon, van Zyl, Mr Basson and I went to Verster, as I said. Mr Basson told Mr Verster that that information as conveyed to us by Mr van Zyl, that he had verified this information with our other intelligence structures, in other words the information came from van Zyl on the ground, and it fitted with the information which we got from the intelligence structures.

He subsequently contacted us at a later stage and asked us to give Mr van Zyl this order, instruction to do a preliminary study with a view to eliminating Mr Omar.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was that order given?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did Mr van Zyl do such a preliminary study?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This preliminary study, was it submitted to the, your Co-ordinator and Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You say this happened during a meeting, was that done at the offices of the CCB or where did it take place?

MR BURGER: No, all these meetings took place in various hotel rooms, of course with false ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Burger, did you have any role to play at all in the compilation of that pre-study, in other words did Mr van Zyl, when he was compiling the pre-study come to you, sit down and ask for your advice, or did you get it after its completion, at a meeting?

MR BURGER: After the completion, there were him and myself and the Chairperson and Mr Basson, the Co-ordinator were all present, that is where the preliminary study which was done in writing ...

CHAIRPERSON: You say the Chairperson, is that Gen Webb?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon, the Managing Director, Mr Verster, where the four of us were all present, the preliminary study was submitted there and guidelines were given from the Chairperson to myself.

CHAIRPERSON: You say Chairperson again?

MR BURGER: Yes, I beg your pardon, it was Mr Verster. Yes, we discussed the matter as a whole and would then come up with the best plan, ultimately decide on the best plan and go to Mr Verster and say "look, we think this and this and this, those are the aspects" and he would then say "right", he is first now going to take the information and come back to us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So the answer to this Chairperson's answer ultimately is that yes, you could give certain input?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After the pre-study had been done, and that was in writing?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After the study had been done, the Managing Director took the study and did certain work on it?

MR BURGER: Yes, he took it, took it away and at a later stage he would then say right, he wants to see us again for an "in-house".

MR P DU PLESSIS: Why, why would he want to see you, what happened in the interim?

MR BURGER: Well, Mr Verster would go away and do his own I think, a sort of a, well, I think he just studied the plan and the assumption was that he would then discuss the matter with the Chairperson and then give us the feedback.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is that how you understood it, is that the way it was done?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is what he told us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That the project had been approved, and that you could continue with an "in-house"?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The "in-house" being a practical demonstration of how the project was to be carried out?

MR BURGER: Yes, with the accompanying budget, etc.

MR P DU PLESSIS: A lot of the elements of the preliminary study would also be contained and repeated in the "in-house"?

MR BURGER: That is correct. I just want to mention to the Committee that it wasn't as if there were only one or two "in-houses", there could be an "in-house" at any stage when information came to the knowledge of the command structure or came up from the lower ranks or from the ground when a situation changed, an "in-house" could be called to review the matter, to cancel it perhaps, to amend.

MR P DU PLESSIS: An "in-house" in other words is just another word for a meeting aimed at the execution of a task?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That is when you are entering into the execution phase of the operation?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And there could be as many meetings as necessary?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR LAX: Are you saying that the impression that we have gained so far that there was a fairly structured process of first "in-house", second "in-house", Director to Chairman, back, and so forth, that wasn't at all structured in that way, it wasn't something that was, let's say, a procedure that had to be followed?

MR BURGER: It was a procedure Mr Lax.

MR LAX: What I mean is, it wasn't a fixed procedure?

MR BURGER: No, it wasn't a rigid procedure.

MR LAX: That required certain steps to be followed and only after each step was followed rigidly, could the matter be regarded as approved?

MR BURGER: Yes, it had to go through certain stages and then the authorisation had to be given.

MR LAX: Yes, but for example, yesterday when for example Mr Martini was putting questions to Gen Webb, he was in a sense saying "well, we had to go through the first 'in-house', then it came back, then it went to the second 'in-house', then it had to go after that, to the Chairman". Now the way you are putting it, it might have gone only through one "in-house" and then be approved?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR LAX: It wasn't standard that it had to go through each stage?

MR BURGER: No. No, the procedure was as follows: a preliminary study had to be done whether the information came from the top or from the bottom, a pre-study had to be done for the Managing Director. The Managing Director then went away with that study or submission and he goes back to his own structures. He then comes back to us and says "continue" or "stop", or whatever the case may be.

MR LAX: I am sorry to butt in here, but you were the Regional Manager?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR LAX: Did you have the authority to, at your level, say "this pre-study is not good enough" or "it is clear from this pre-study that this is not a great idea, laugh it off"?

MR BURGER: The pre-study, at one stage, is done with the Co-ordinator, the Managing Director and myself, submitted in one process. Now, if I did not agree with the plan, then I could of course give my opinion.

MR LAX: So there wasn't a prior stage at which you and the operative, as the Regional Manager, would have discussed the pre-study in a way, before it got to the next echelon, the Co-ordinator and the Managing Director? Did it ever happen like that?

MR BURGER: It could be that I had discussed the matter, the submission, with my member beforehand. His information he would formulate in a written document.

MR LAX: You see the impression that we have got, is that there was a first "in-house", at that first "in-house" only you and the person whose project it was, and sometimes Wouter Basson might have been there, sometimes he might not have been there, but it was at that level. The second "in-house" where we have been led to understand so far at any rate, that is my perception, then entailed the Managing Director and it was only after that level, that it then went up to the Chairman.

Now, you have debunked that perception in the sense that you have said "well, it didn't quite work, it wasn't as rigid as that", but the point I am trying to understand is, did you exercise a qualitative discretion in the sense that you could stop it before it went to an "in-house"?

MR BURGER: No. The pre-study had already been done, and then your impression isn't entirely correct, the pre-study is submitted or presented to the Co-ordinator by the member, the "in-house" which follows would involve the same four people, they would all be present again.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just say my impression of the evidence so far was in fact that it was testified by Mr van Zyl, that a pre-study would be presented to the Managing Director, maybe Mr Lax misunderstood that, but my view is that that is the evidence on record.

MR LAX: As I said, I might easily be confused, but that is why I am clarifying it.

CHAIRPERSON: The pre-study, Mr Burger has just this minute said, was presented to Mr Basson?

MR BURGER: The pre-study?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BURGER: No, it was presented to the Managing Director, Verster.

CHAIRPERSON: Verster?

MR BURGER: Verster, Basson and myself, by the member.

CHAIRPERSON: It was presented to the Managing Director in your presence and Mr Basson's presence?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Burger, perhaps the question put here, wasn't clearly answered. Before the pre-study was presented in its written form, I am sure you would have had contact still with people like van Zyl and you could make your contributions and give input?

MR BURGER: Yes, he could come and discuss the matter with me too.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In the case of Mr Omar, we have now reached the stage where you have said that the pre-study had been done and it had been presented to the Managing Director, and he gave the order that there should be a presentation, a so-called "in-house" for the elimination of Mr Omar?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that is the order which you received from the Managing Director, Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And if I understand correctly, according to the procedures as you understood it, you then assumed at that stage, you assumed that he had already given the approval and that was also conveyed to you?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then to continue, that particular "in-house" was done and the plan as it was to be executed, was on the table, along with the budget?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What happened physically as from that point onwards, after the "in-house"?

MR BURGER: After the "in-house" the matter was executed, it was carried out.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, but at what stage, immediately afterwards, or did Mr Verster first come back to you or what?

MR BURGER: No, Mr Verster would come back to me and say "all right, the order has been approved, we can proceed", the order given from the Chairperson. And then Mr van Zyl would be briefed accordingly, and he would activate his people to carry out the plan.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This submission at the first "in-house", the presentation, is done by the member in your presence and the Co-ordinator’s presence, to Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And he would then later come back to you and say "right, it has been approved, the order is now continue, go ahead"?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What happens in-between the first "in-house" and the order to continue according to your perception?

MR BURGER: The Managing Director would get the approval from the Chairperson, he would speak to the Chairperson and come back to us. That is how it was regarded in our vernacular. The Managing Director spoke to the Chairperson, came back to me with the approval and say "proceed".

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, you spoke to the Chairperson and that was the so-called second "in-house" which we understand from Mr van Zyl's evidence? There you were not present?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then the order was then conveyed that Mr van Zyl should carry on with the carrying out of the order?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We know that in this case a Makarov pistol with its ammunition and a silencer was involved, was used?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you responsible for acquiring this weapon?

MR BURGER: The Co-ordinator, Mr Basson, handed me the weapon and the silencer, the Makarov, he also gave me the ammunition for it, and I in turn gave it to Mr van Zyl.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, we have Mr van Zyl's evidence in respect of the fact that this project was actually not carried out, due to certain problems encountered along the way. You can confirm that the project actually was delayed, it wasn't carried out, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We also know from van Zyl's evidence that Barnard was utilised by him in some point, as he described it, to monitor apparently Mr Omar and Peaches. Were you aware of that?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So your approval was not obtained for that?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At some stage the plan, as approved, namely the elimination by means of a machine pistol, a Makarov, it was amended, it was changed, can you tell us about that?

MR BURGER: Just for the record, it was an automatic pistol, not a machine pistol, the Makarov, it was an automatic pistol.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, just tell us when the plan was changed?

MR BURGER: At some point Mr van Zyl reported back to me that the carrying out of the plan as proposed, with the pistol, was very difficult to carry out, and that Peaches had told him that he had access to Mr Omar's home, by means of the domestic servants, and that Mr Omar used medication for his heart, heart tablets and that we could actually substitute those tablets, that we could replace them with some chemical medicine or a drug which would cause him to die of a heart attack.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this proposal taken to the Managing Director, Mr Joe Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes. I made this proposal to the Chairperson, myself.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry you say you made it to the Chairperson?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon, it was the Managing Director.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I think for practical reasons, maybe we should use names, rather than the titles, so that we can avoid confusion.

MR BURGER: Very well.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, so you relayed this to Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes. There are quite a few Chairpersons here, so I will have to qualify. Chairperson, at that stage, Mr Wouter Basson was my Co-ordinator of Region 6 and he was busy with some other mission, and they gave me another Co-ordinator by the name of Nick, he joined my group. Later it became known to me that his name was Tilly Smit and we then gave this information to Mr Verster.

Mr Verster, at a later stage, came back to us and said that we should try and get some of that so-called medication. The request was conveyed to Mr van Zyl, Mr van Zyl did it, he came back and at a meeting where Nick, Theo Otto were also present.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is Theo Otto, is that his correct name or is it a pseudonym?

MR BURGER: It is a pseudonym. His real name also later became known to me as Verni Lange. I don't know what his background was, but he also fitted in along with the Co-ordinator, Nick.

They then took the tablets and they left with these tablets to go and do the swop of the tablets, swop it from a heart medication to a toxic substance.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now apart from your immediate contact with the Co-ordinator, which in this case was Nick and the person, Theo, did you have any access to the CCB's support structures, such as for instance the place where the toxic substances was manufactured?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps we can call it directly by name, as we have now heard from various bits of evidence, Dr Basson's case as well, it became known that there were certain facilities at the disposal of the Defence Force, where certain chemical things were, substances were manufactured. Did you ever have direct access to any of those facilities, or have contact with the people in responsible positions there?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So your only channel of contact was via the Co-ordinator and the person, Theo who was present at the meeting?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. Was this toxic substance later delivered?

MR BURGER: Yes, the toxic substance was received by Mr van Zyl, not in my presence, no.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it reported to you that that had happened?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was the order from Mr Verster, that the project should continue on that basis?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it your impression that the necessary approval had been obtained?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The project, as we have it on record now, did fortunately not proceed, it wasn't carried out?

MR BURGER: No. Mr van Zyl came to me at some stage and said to me that he had problems with Peaches in the sense that he couldn't trust him and that he suspected that Peaches could be a double-agent, he could be playing more than a double role in fact, and that he was pretending to be part of the infrastructure along with him, but he could also at the same time, perhaps, have been favouring Mr Omar and the other forces.

On those grounds the project was aborted.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Once again, was it your decision?

MR BURGER: No, I went to the Managing Director, I briefed him.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That is Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes. I briefed him as to what was happening regarding the shooting of the Makarov, which was not successful and the poison and the problem with Peaches and his order to me was to report back to Mr van Zyl, that the project had to be halted and that it would be reconsidered at a later stage and that Mr van Zyl should be requested to try and destroy the poison and the Makarov pistol.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you convey this order to Mr van Zyl?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you get any feedback from Mr van Zyl, as to which these steps had been taken to halt the project?

MR BURGER: Yes. Yes, the project came to a halt.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any reason why the Makarov pistol should have been destroyed, wasn't it some sort of asset for the CCB, wouldn't it have been booked out of some armoury?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, at that stage, there were quite a few of that weapons, that type of weapons were available, and I actually also requested Mr van Zyl to break off all contact with Peaches from that point forward and told him that there should be less contact with him from that point onward. I told him to break off the contact and sort out the matters and destroy those things.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, the point is that your order was to destroy or have destroyed, this poison, the tablets or whatever and the Makarov pistol. Did the initiative come from Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes, it was Mr Verster's order which I conveyed to van Zyl.

MR LAX: Sorry, just on the question of this weapon, he had to destroy it himself, did van Zyl have to destroy it himself?

MR BURGER: He had to use his discretion, either to, perhaps he could take it from Peaches himself and destroy it, yes, that would have been the best.

MR LAX: Because he wouldn't have trusted Peaches?

MR BURGER: Because in any other way, you wouldn't know if it had ever been done or not?

MR LAX: Yes, so he would have had to take possession of it? You couldn't trust Peaches with it?

MR BURGER: No.

MR LAX: That is self-evident in the situation?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR LAX: And if he was going to get it back, why destroy it, why not return it?

MR BURGER: The order was that it had to be destroyed.

MR LAX: So no one questioned the order, it was just carried out?

MR BURGER: You know, you don't always know why, how easily a thing can be traced back, and in his position it could land up, so I think to destroy it was perhaps better in a covert set-up.

CHAIRPERSON: But normally, if it had been used to kill somebody, you don't want to trace back, those sort of circumstances you throw it in the sea or the river or whatever, but it hadn't been used?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I received the order from Mr Verster and to spell it out in that way exactly to Mr van Zyl, and with hindsight, I could say yes, but at that stage, it was better for us to say "destroy the thing" so that it could not be traced back in any way.

I don't know to whom Peaches had already shown these things and what stories he had told about the weapon, etc. I also thought it was a good idea for this order to be conveyed in such a way.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Of course you also would have had the logistic problem that you had to bring it back all the way from Cape Town, that of course had its own risks inherent in it?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. This is a convenient time, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a 20 minute tea adjournment, thank you.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

DANIEL F. DU TOIT BURGER: (s.u.o)

MR SIBANYONI: Can I just ask one question, when you were naming the enemies of the State, you named the UDF, you named the ANC and you didn't talk about the PAC. Was the PAC not regarded as an enemy of the State?

MR BURGER: Yes, they were.

MR SIBANYONI: But you as well as the other applicants, don't talk about it, why?

MR BURGER: I think I spoke about Mr Omar within the context of the ANC, as far as I am concerned, Mr Omar was not a member of the PAC.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR BURGER: But the PAC, APLA, ANC, UDF, Umkhonto weSizwe, etc, they were the enemies of the Republic of South Africa.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words you are looking at all those organisations?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: (Cont))

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Burger, I don't want you to give a long list of all the enemies of the State, it could have been much wider than the names you mentioned?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: There were also talk about Trade Unions?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Anybody who undermined the authority of the State?

MR BURGER: That is correct, the sovereignty of the State.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I think we went into enough detail with the project around Mr Dullah Omar. Let's continue with the case of Mr Evans.

Maybe you can make it clear that these projects were not one following on the other, they were intermingled, they happened simultaneously?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In a certain way?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. You have already mentioned that the information around Mr Gavin Evans did not come from the ground, for example from Mr van Zyl or Botha, but from the information structures of the CCB itself?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairperson.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who gave you that information?

MR BURGER: The Co-ordinator, Mr Wouter Basson came to me with that information. There were various names on those lists, amongst others that of Mr Evans and it was conveyed to Mr Maree.

MR P DU PLESSIS: As far as the chronology is concerned, could you make it clear. You acquired information from Mr Basson about Mr Gavin Evans, was that discussed between the two of you?

MR BURGER: Yes. The information around Mr Evans was that he was the Chairman of the ECC and that his involvement with the ECC was aimed at creating division amongst the members of the Defence Force, to lower the morale of the Defence Force and to influence the youth of South Africa, not to join the Defence Force, to do the service.

CHAIRPERSON: Just for record purposes, is that the End Conscription Campaign?

MR BURGER: End Conscription Campaign. He was an affiliate of the UDF and that was an affiliate of the ANC. He was also according to our information, involved in the FFF, the Five Freedom Forum and Jodac and he was very active according to our information, around the erosion of the morale. That information came from the information structure, by Mr Wouter Basson, and it was handed to us on the orders of Mr Verster, and we had to appoint a member to concentrate on Mr Evans, around his home, his links with other persons, individuals, meeting places.

MR P DU PLESSIS: His physical movements?

MR BURGER: Yes, his movements.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You say that you got the order from Mr Verster, just to make it clear, you got the information from Basson, you discussed it and it was submitted to Verster?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now his order was, Verster's order at that time was to find him and to monitor him? To whom was that order given?

MR BURGER: It was given to Leon Maree.

MR LAX: Sorry, could I just be clear on something? When did the order come from Verster, or did it come via Basson?

MR BURGER: Yes, Mr Basson came with the information from the information structure, with the order of Mr Verster, that the members, to activate the members who could not rise from ground-level, and in that way, we arrived at Mr Maree and asked him to use his infrastructure to use this information about Mr Evans, to follow it through. Because there were no physical addresses available, to try to find his home, to find him and to see whom he dealt with.

MR LAX: Okay, it is just that the way it was put to you now, was subtly different to that in that you got the instruction to monitor, you reported back and then Verster gave you the order to go ahead, so I was just clarifying that. In fact the order to monitor came from Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Lax. All right, please continue. Did you get results from Mr Maree with regard to the address of Mr Evans?

MR BURGER: Yes, it took a while before Mr Maree came forward with an address. I may mention that at that stage, Mr Maree, as far as I can remember, he was busy with external matters, and at one stage, we considered to deploy him externally, but he gave me the information with they physical address of Mr Evans, but he told me that he could not monitor his movements, apparently Mr Evans moved a lot, or he was rarely at home and that was that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was, did he make any eye contact with Mr Evans, in the sense that he found him and physically identified him?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So he could only give you the address?

MR BURGER: Yes, just the address.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, what did you do after that?

MR BURGER: At one point, myself and Mr Basson, the Co-ordinator, went to Mr Verster and we told him "all right, this person is according to our knowledge, he lives at such and such an address", we did not have any further information about his movements, but as far as his profile is concerned, the structure seen in the light of the so-called enemies of the Republic of South Africa, he is a prominent figure.

Myself and Mr Basson, informed him about our feelings with regard to Mr Evans, about his activities as an enemy of the Republic of South Africa. Mr Verster took the information from Mr Basson and he left.

At a later stage he came to us and told us that it is correct, the information, there is further information existing about Mr Evans that he had acquired, namely that he was involved with weapons and explosives and such kind of matters.

He was moving with that in and out of the country, and that he also had contact with Mr Heinz Grösskopff, who was seen as a terrorist at that stage and that we should act.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Maybe just for the record, Mr Grösskopff, there were all sorts of allegations that he was responsible for a number of bomb explosions where people died?

MR BURGER: Yes, that was the assumption at that point.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did Verster give you any further orders in this regard?

MR BURGER: I don't know if it was on the same day or afterwards, or it happened afterwards, we saw him afterwards about Mr Evans and yes, it was conveyed to him that Maree was not at that point, he was not able, he didn't have the capacity.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Capacity to do what?

MR BURGER: The capacity to acquire more information because he spent too much time out of South Africa. He was establishing an infrastructure in Natal and then Mr Verster asked that there should be a preliminary study carried out, around the elimination of Evans.

With all the information, that same day, between t he information structure and the information Mr Verster had, Mr Basson and myself, we made a preliminary study to him and Mr Basson was the, he made the proposals and the suggestions and he wrote them down and placed them in the project file.

The suggestions around Mr Evans were that we use Mr van Zyl and his infrastructure, because Mr van Zyl had already established part of his infrastructure at that point, and that he would use them to await Evans at his house, and to attack him with a knife, which would create the impression that Mr Evans had been burgled and robbed, and was fatally wounded during the robbery.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What happened after that? Was this suggestion approved?

MR BURGER: Yes. We informed Mr van Zyl about the preliminary study that had been carried out. I don't know whether he was under the impression that Mr Maree carried out the preliminary study, but it is not true, it was us, it was on a need to know basis.

At a later stage, Mr Verster came back to us and said "right, are the people in place", he spoke to the Chairman and the operation had to be carried out. Mr van Zyl made his people come from Cape Town, the address was given to him, from the Cape and after a day or two, he reported back to me that the address was wrong, in the sense that Mr Evans was not living there any more, or did not live there any more, I cannot remember.

We said that he must just make sure, and it took about five or six days till the project was aborted, because we could make no progress with Mr Evans' movements.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was impossible to carry out that project?

MR BURGER: At that stage, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Whose ordered that to be aborted?

MR BURGER: I went back to Mr Verster, I reported back to him, as I have told the Commission, and he told me "in that case, abort, because these people are from the Cape, they don't know it, they are standing in the street corners, send them back".

MR P DU PLESSIS: If you talk about them, who was sent back, were they van Zyl's operatives?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And the project was aborted at that stage?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, in any case, the whole aim was that, the approval was that Mr Evans be eliminated but because of practical problems, it couldn't be carried out?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. The third aspect, as far as the third aspect is concerned, maybe just before we get to that, there was evidence by Mr van Zyl, with regard to other projects launched in the Western Cape, with regard to the burning of a printing press and about a minibus of a SWAPO member. Were these projects also, did they also move through the same channels as you said with the necessary approval?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is true. The minibus that was burnt out, was coupled to the SWAPO members. That information came from the information structures, if I remember correctly.

The printing press was information that came from the ground, and it was verified through our information structure. It also got approval from this channels of the preliminary study and the order was given to Mr van Zyl.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. There was also, maybe before we come to the Athlone bombing, at the Early Learning Centre, maybe to put it in the correct order, you already said that Maree had to establish an infrastructure in Natal, he had other things to do as well, and he went out of South Africa for that. Botha was in the Transvaal area, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes, as far as I can remember.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And it is on record that he also got the order to monitor a certain Roland White?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You confirm that it was an official order of the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes. It came through Mr Verster, from Mr Verster, from the Co-ordinator.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Let's not go into too much detail, there will be questions asked, but there were problems and because of that Mr Botha was so-called place on ice, because he was compromised and Barnard, also one of the applicants here, was seen where he carried out the monitoring.

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you part of the process of putting him on ice?

MR BURGER: Yes, putting on ice, yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, it was also mentioned that there was for example the monitoring of Mr Lubowski of SWAPO, when he was in the country, and that that was also an official order of the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes, Mr Verster ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: So the order came from Mr Verster to you, you don't know the origin of the order?

MR BURGER: No, I don't know.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. These aspects happened throughout 1989, say from August, September and there was also information coming from Mr van Zyl, from his infrastructure with regard to Region 6, the Early Learning Centre, which led to the bombing of this centre, early in August 1989. Could you please shortly tell us about this project?

MR BURGER: Mr van Zyl came to me at one point, during the handling of this Region's different projects and he informed me and the Co-ordinator about the activities of a movement called Kewtown Movement in Athlone at the Early Learning Centre, and that this Movement was responsible for certain bombings. I am not sure if it was the post office and the police station or the post office and something else, but they also aimed to disrupt the elections which had to take place on the 6th of September with their activities.

The information was then taken to Mr Verster. Mr Verster at one point came back to us and I cannot remember if there had been a preliminary study by Mr van Zyl, because at one point, things happened very quickly around this project.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In any case, the information was submitted to Mr Verster. What was Mr Verster's order in this regard?

MR BURGER: Mr Verster at one point came to me and said that he had spoken to the Chairman and that the suggestion that Mr van Zyl, he had suggested that this place be exploded with a limpet mine.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who is that?

MR BURGER: Mr Verster.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was there an order in that regard?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The preliminary study?

MR BURGER: Yes, I cannot remember specifically.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But in terms of the procedures?

MR BURGER: In terms of the procedures, I think that is how it would have happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Burger, sorry Mr du Plessis, can you give an indication of the time period, from the time when Mr van Zyl first approached you and Mr Basson with information relating to the Kewtown Youth until the time that Mr Verster came to you with the order to go ahead and use a limpet mine?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I was present here when Mr van Zyl gave his evidence. I heard that he said that it was about a period of a month, but with my preparation for this Commission, I read nobody else's evidence, and I rely on my memory and what I experienced, and that is why I don't want to be influenced. I cannot remember these things, but I would say it must have been about 14 days, three weeks.

And then during the last week, aiming the meeting that would have been held then, the authorisation came from the Chairman to the Managing Director, to me, to the operative, in a matter of two days.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAX: The thing that I just wanted to follow up was, I didn't hear you clearly and I didn't hear the translation that clearly, I just want to clarify, you said that Verster spoke to the Chairman and then you said that he suggested that the place be blown up with a limpet mine. I wasn't clear in my own mind whether you were referring to the Chairman who suggested that, or whether it was Verster's suggestion?

MR BURGER: It was Mr Verster's suggestion to blow up the place.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well, please continue. What was the rest of the procedure, you say that at one point Mr Verster told you that the project had been approved by the Chairman and then things had to happen very quickly in view of the meeting that was going to take place.

MR BURGER: Yes. In this time, I knew the Co-ordinator and myself, Mr Wouter Basson, we were at Mr Verster and Mr Verster told him that he had to get a limpet mine.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That was Mr Basson?

MR BURGER: That was Mr Basson. And afterwards, the Co-ordinator told us that we must get together for the execution of the task, and the training of the members to show them how the limpet had to be activated and handled.

As far as I know, Mr van Zyl and Mr Maree and myself, we had no knowledge about explosives, we are no experts on explosives and we have no experience in that regard. We had a meeting at the Protea Garden Hotel in Berea where myself and Mr van Zyl were present.

Mr Basson came and that Nick person was also there, as far as I can remember, but I cannot remember, between the two of them, who came with the box with the limpet mine, but I think it was the Co-ordinator, Mr Basson, because that was the order of Mr Verster.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was Mr Verster also present?

MR BURGER: No, I cannot remember. Then Mr Basson explained to Mr van Zyl, how the mechanisms work, how he had to detonate with a remote control and how to explain that to his infrastructure, so that they would not harm themselves.

I want to mention that Mr Verster's order around the blowing up of the property was coupled with the order that there had to be no loss of life and that as far as possible, it had to be prevented that innocent people would die, meaning not only the Kewtown Movement who had to leave the premises without any loss of life, but also other individuals.

At that stage at the hotel with the explanation of the mechanisms, Mr van Zyl told us quite clearly that he was uncomfortable and he didn't feel capable to handle this thing with the explosives. I contacted the Chairman, sorry the Managing Director, Mr Verster, and I told him that my suggestion to him was to involve Mr Calla Botha, because Mr Botha had reasonable knowledge, and he was more at ease with the handling of explosives.

In this way I contacted Mr Botha and asked him to come to our premises at the Protea Gardens. Mr Botha joined us and the procedure was explained to him very briefly. He had to convey this to Gakkie, and explain to him how the mechanism worked and how to detonate it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this the first meeting where Botha was present?

MR BURGER: This is the first time, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I hear the evidence and you said that things moved very quickly because the Kewtown Youth Movement had a meeting on the 31st of August, what was the relevance of the meeting towards the blow up of the building? Why was it linked, why couldn't it happen at another point?

MR BURGER: The relevance was that we, as soon as the meeting adjourned, and the building was considered empty, to detonate the bomb as soon as possible after the meeting, so that the impact of this explosion, the effect would carry over the correct meaning.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The physical effect or the emotional effect?

MR BURGER: No, the emotional effect, the effect of confusion amongst themselves, the different ideas that might come from their own managing members, because it was an unknown explosive, it was used to create the impression not only with the police, but also among themselves that it could be one of their own systems that detonated through bad control, bad management, bad handling, to mislead the police investigating the premises afterwards and to make them aware of these members and what their motives were and what, the influence that such an explosion would have on the community.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It seems from the ex post facto that there was some confusion?

MR BURGER: I learnt that Mr Williams told somebody that there was kind of division in the community.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We can come back to that later, let's continue with the physical execution. Botha and van Zyl left with the detonation mechanism, they went to the Cape to execute the project?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You heard how the execution took place practically, on ground-level. It doesn't sound to me as if it happened according to plan, in that the two members were personally involved in the detonation?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, the guidelines of the CCB as covert organisation were, especially from Mr Verster, were very clear and very pertinent, and he is still like that, even today, that there had to be cut off points, in that you could, nothing could be traced back to you, there must not even be the idea that you might be directly involved, in other words everything had to be done indirectly so that you and the organisation and his connections with the South African Defence Force and the National Party, would not be revealed.

Unfortunately in this case, Mr van Zyl was not trained with explosives, Mr Botha went with him as observer to see that Gakkie handled the thing correctly. In the sense of the execution of orders, I would say that Mr van Zyl, he contravened the rule, but not in the sense of blow up the place and the main target of the disruption action of this project.

There he executed the order. The only problem I have with it, is that they executed it themselves, but on the ground, in any organisation, even in a covert organisation, there are exceptions that arise where the member as far as I believe, his order was very clear, "you make sure there is no loss of life".

If Mr Verster would have said, "and if there is another bomb that explode, you are responsible", I don't know.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But in the light of that, the project still happened, but he contravened the discipline. Later it was reported back to you that the project was successful?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that the operatives on the ground were remunerated accordingly?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We heard that Mr van Zyl's Section 29 statement, that contained the fact that you took R5 000-00 of that money for yourself, that you stole it, you appropriated it for yourself and that he repeated that here in his evidence, is that correct?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you appropriate any of those funds for yourself?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you reserve R5 000-00 for yourself?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps on this point, we can link up with the Omar project where Mr van Zyl's evidence was that he, in respect of the funds to be utilised for the project, paid some of it over to Mr Barnard for expenses which he had incurred. Did you hear that evidence?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it ever discussed with you?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you in any way aware of the utilisation of the funds in that way?

MR BURGER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Burger, did you actually, just on this point being dealt with by Mr du Plessis, did you actually hand over to Mr van Zyl?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Cash?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: How much did you hand over to him, can you recall?

MR BURGER: No, but it must have been the prescribed amount.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. After the finalisation of the project, there was feedback and report back of what exactly happened?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it reported back to you what happened as far as the practical carrying out of the project was concerned, and what happened, the way in which it was done?

MR BURGER: No, it was simply reported that the project had been carried out successfully as prescribed and that nobody had been killed or injured at that stage.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, at a later stage you did become aware of the fact that there were some minor injuries, as you also described in your application?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that information was not available at that, earlier?

MR BURGER: No, that is true.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I think we can now move to the next issue, perhaps before we get to the "Operation 'Apie'", the baboon foetus project, as far as Calla Botha was concerned, I have already mentioned the White incident and we have already heard evidence about a certain Roskam who was the Chairperson of the student organisation at Wits, whose vehicle had been burnt, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes. Mr Botha came with the information and it was taken by the Co-ordinator to the information structures and verified and a pre-study was done by Mr Botha and an "in-house" took place afterwards and the order came that we should burn his vehicle.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, so that was an approved CCB project?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And Mr Botha there acted completely lawfully, in the sense that it was an order from the CCB, in that limited sense? You did not apply for amnesty for that aspect?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Why not?

MR BURGER: I don't regard that as one of the Commission's briefs to, I don't regard it as a gross violation of human rights.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was that the legal opinion which you got on the point?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That was in 1991?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then to continue, the so-called "Project 'Apie'", where did the order come from in that case, to you?

MR BURGER: The order came from Mr Verster to myself.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So this was not information obtained by Mr Basson or which came from the ground-level?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You say it came from Mr Verster, was it simply an order or were pre-studies also done and "in-houses" conducted, etc?

MR BURGER: No. At that stage, I cannot recall the date, but in any event, at that stage, I had been introduced, or I had already been pulled into the Regional Manager's structure and there, particularly their weekly meeting, and Mr Verster, at one of those meetings told me when he discussed his Region's things with me, because each Regional Manager discussed his matters with me separately, he came to me and said "I have the capacity in my Region to help Region 9 with the carrying out of a project".

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who was Region 9?

MR BURGER: Region 9 was handled by a man called Anton.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is that a code name?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Do you know what his real name is?

MR BURGER: No, I think I heard it or read it somewhere afterwards, but I think I have forgotten that, but I think his name is known. He was known to me as Anton.

When Mr Verster told me that I should get a bottle from Anton containing the foetus of a baboon, well, I wasn't actually sure whether he was serious or not. But he was.

He requested me to take this foetus and a number of so-called treated sharp nails and take it Archbishop Tutu's home and we had to utilise these nails, we had to hammer them in a prescribed way and we had to hang this foetus somewhere and he asked if we could assist in this matter. He didn't ask us, he simply said I should use Mr van Zyl and his infrastructure to do this.

I then approached Mr van Zyl, I told him about this, and this was a direct order from above, no pre-study, no "in-house", nothing, apparently the matter was dealt with on some other level. I was simply told "take the foetus, the baboon foetus, hand it over and hang it up." That was that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is that how you conveyed it to Mr van Zyl?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now we have learnt here that there was evidence from Mr van Zyl, that he himself and Barnard jumped over the wall and actually carried out the project and that he therefore did not utilise his infrastructure as suggested, as proposed. Are you aware of Mr Barnard's involvement?

MR BURGER: I was not so aware.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you at any stage aware of any of your cell members having used Mr Barnard's services when they actually were supposed to use the so-called unwitting or non-aware members?

MR BURGER: No, I wasn't, except when Mr Botha and Mr Barnard were seen with Mr White, in respect of the monitoring of Mr White.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr du Plessis, what was Mr Barnard's connection, if any, with the CCB? Was he a member?

MR BURGER: I didn't know Chairperson. I only later heard that Mr Barnard was known to the structure, he was also known to Mr Verster and Lafras Luitingh, I don't even know Lafras Luitingh myself.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you personally know Mr Barnard at that stage?

MR BURGER: I know Mr Barnard, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. The question is actually, at that stage, did you already know Mr Barnard?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is that now from the Brixton days?

MR BURGER: Yes. Mr Barnard was also in the Police earlier.

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just check something with regard to Barnard. We heard earlier that you actually told van Zyl that under no circumstances should he use Barnard, but you say you didn't even know Barnard was being used?

MR BURGER: No, I was never aware that Mr van Zyl had used Barnard, so I wouldn't have told him that.

MR LAX: So you could never have given him any explicit instruction not to use Barnard, because you didn't know Barnard was even involved at all at that stage?

MR BURGER: That is right, but after Mr Botha and Mr Barnard had been involved in the White monitoring, and they had been identified, it was in any event clear to Mr van Zyl and all the other members that Mr Barnard should not, they should not work with him, they should not have contact with him in the work sense.

MR LAX: The question is, did you specifically say that to them?

MR BURGER: To who?

MR LAX: To van Zyl and the others?

MR BURGER: No.

MR LAX: Were they just to infer that from the fact that as a result of that Botha had been put on ice?

MR BURGER: Yes. I didn't specifically tell Mr van Zyl, previously or prior to that, as far as I can recall, I said "you may not use Mr Ferdi Barnard". I would like to answer the question later, if I may just refresh my memory perhaps, and - because as far as I can recall, no, it was only after Mr van Zyl's statement was disclosed, that it came to my attention that he had used Mr Barnard.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps ...

MR LAX: If you are able to refresh your memory or have a clearer recollection in due course, obviously feel free to let us know.

MR BURGER: Thank you.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps just on this point, we should clarify and try and contextualise things chronologically. During May, there was the incident regarding Dr Webster, he had been killed, he had been murdered?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then there was the incident of White's monitoring, that took place thereafter in June, and Mr Botha and Mr Barnard were compromised there?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you are also aware of the enquiries which were directed in relation to the death of Dr Webster, directed to the CCB immediately after the incident, I think it was on the 1st of May 1989?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And also that there was speculation regarding Mr Barnard's involvement?

MR BURGER: Yes, if I am correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So in that context, Mr Barnard's name would also have been mentioned and then later, he was found along with Mr Botha, in the White monitoring case? Is it possible that in that sense, there had been discussions regarding the desirability of contact with Mr Barnard?

MR BURGER: No, no, I cannot recall that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well, whilst we are still on that point, the question will obviously be asked, the whole situation revolving around Webster's death, was the CCB to your knowledge and specifically Region 6 which you were the Regional Manager, were they in any way involved in that?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right. Then, on this point, I could also place it on record, that it is so that the CCB was involved in the monitoring of Mr Lubowski who, if I remember, was killed on the 12th of September 1989 in Windhoek in the then South-West Africa?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You have already confirmed that his monitoring was a formal order received from higher authority, from Mr Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that it was carried out by Mr van Zyl, on your instructions?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then the same question relating to Webster, was Region 6, to your knowledge, in any way involved in the death of Mr Lubowski?

MR BURGER: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you denying any personal involvement in his death?

MR BURGER: Yes, I have and I have done it before as well.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You are on record over the years, as having maintained that position?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: All right, that then concludes the four aspects, regarding Mr Dullah Omar, Gavin Evans, the bomb in Athlone and the "Project 'Apie'" in respect of which you are applying for amnesty. That concludes the physical carrying out of those projects.

Before I turn to your motives in this regard, I just want to deal briefly with the running down of the CCB and the dissolution. After Mr F.W. de Klerk became the Head of State, certain incidents took place around the arrest of Mr van Zyl, Botha, Barnard, etc, did the activities of the CCB and specifically Region 6, I think we should limit ourselves to Region 6 and its activities, did that continue after September of 1989, after the Athlone bomb?

MR BURGER: No. As far as I can recall, Mr Verster said specifically that all CCB projects had to be rationalised, and the internal Region's activities should be halted totally, operational projects should be halted.

This was at the time of the appointment of F.W. de Klerk as the State President and that was our order.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did Region 6 thereafter carry on operationally?

MR BURGER: No. Not as Region 6, I have no knowledge of any members under my command got instructions from myself or from higher authority to proceed with other actions.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So obviously you would not be able to testify about any of the other Regions and all the external projects outside of the country, as far as the CCB was concerned?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. Subsequent to this order that all operational projects should be halted, you were however still in the employ of the CCB, you were still paid by the State?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you give us an idea until when that situation continued, until the final disbanding of the CCB?

MR BURGER: It was the beginning of 1991, I think March 1991.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So what happened during the course of 1990, which includes the activities of the Harms Commission, you were still in the service of the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Until an agreement was reached in terms of which you resigned?

MR BURGER: Yes. I was actually retrenched.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Retrenched? You took a package, a so-called package, you were retrenched and your package included certain benefits which were negotiated with the State?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then just also for record purposes, your activities thereafter, were you still attached to any other State Security bodies, after that point?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairperson, I got an appointment at the Directorate Covert Intelligence which was a subsidiary of Military Intelligence.

MR P DU PLESSIS: When did you finally leave the employ of the State?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember, the end of 1993. The end of 1993.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And subsequent to that, just to complete the picture, you re-entered private employment and you became a farmer?

MR BURGER: Yes, if I may just qualify perhaps my previous statement, the dates are a bit vague in my mind, but after I ended my service with DCI, it could have been the end of 1992, it might have been the end of 1992, I am not certain of the dates, in 1993, I uncoupled myself completely.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And thereafter you went into private business?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And currently you are a sugar farmer in Natal, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I noticed that there was an article in Friday's edition of the Mail & Guardian in which the apartheid bastards and their whereabouts and their activities are addressed, and a photograph of yourself on the front page, in a wig, I am sure you saw that? It said also that you are currently a successful sugar farmer who has now been given two awards for successful sugar farming?

MR BURGER: Cheap sugar at Illovo. No, that is true. I don't have a sugar farm as such, but I have premises, 60 plus hectares of sugar cane under irrigation, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. I won't ask you whether the sugar has now sweetened you, let us leave the matter there and let us not be flippant.

Now I want to turn to the issue of motivation, the motives behind your actions as described here, and specifically the actions for which you are applying for amnesty.

Maybe just to place the matter in its proper perspective, it is not a secret that you are Afrikaans speaking, and that is the culture in which you grew up?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What were your ideas, your political sentiments, and your ideological views at the time when you joined the CCB in 1988 and where did that come from, where did that arise from, if you can just give us a bit of background?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I was raised as an Afrikaner boy on the land and in the Afrikaner culture, and Afrikaner ideologies of the Afrikaner people, the Christian national ideologies and way of thinking, we believed in a system of separate development, or apartheid as it became known.

We believed that you have to retain control of your country, your own land, your culture, your ways, methods of education and politically speaking, you were of a nationalist orientation.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you talking about the National Party here?

MR BURGER: Yes. Yes, to sum up, you were a product of the political mindset of the period from 1948 until 1994 and in that sense, it was my own political convictions actually, were in line with those of the government and the constitutional structures of the day in the country.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps we can just place it on record, you are 57 years old, so you were born roundabout 1943 and you grew up just after the National Party took over in 1948? I am sorry to reveal your age, but you look a bit younger than 57?

MR BURGER: Yes, I also have my bad side. Yes, that is correct yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So what you are saying in brief is that the, your ideological education was all part of the educational system of the Afrikaner?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And the sovereignty of the Afrikaner and his State, the then Republic of South Africa, from 1961, was that also part of your views?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The sovereignty of that State, is that what you protected at the stage when you joined the CCB?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: How did these views and convictions of yours, how did that manifest itself during the later years, how did that also influence your views and your political views in respect of the commission of these acts before this Commission today?

MR BURGER: Mr Chairperson, the evidence is already on record, there was a State of Emergency in the country, it had been officially declared by the State President. All powers were fully utilised from higher authority in order to maximally disrupt the enemy and to destabilise them.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, at that stage the State President was Mr P.W. Botha?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you operated under the myth of the total onslaught, if we can call it that, at this stage?

MR BURGER: The total onslaught, the undeclared civil war, which the ANC and its front organisations were waging in the country, and they were committing acts of terror, they were fermenting violence, agitation, that was the climate of the situation.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you can also mention, were you aware of acts of violence committed by your enemies, the ANC or Umkhonto weSizwe, violence, bomb explosions, etc, in which your people, colleagues, I am talking it in the broader sense of the word, were killed?

MR BURGER: Yes, I am.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What then was your motivation or the motivation with which you committed these acts, you already said that you were aware of the fact that it could not be described as nothing other than crimes actually.

What was your political objective and what motivation did you have?

MR BURGER: As I tried to explain to the Chairperson, it was in line with all my political convictions. I don't really understand the question.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What did you seek to achieve by means of these acts?

MR BURGER: I simply wanted to prevent the sovereignty of the State being eroded and scuppered.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The State was actually the white people in control of the country and specifically the Afrikaners?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps one can conclude by looking at the types of acts which you committed. The "Apie Project", let us rather limit ourselves to the bomb incident, the explosion. You will agree it was a serious act of violence?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you also said that the possibly of death and injuries could not be excluded?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And further it is probably also as it has been put here, it is pure luck or providence that Mr Dullah Omar and Mr Gavin Evans were not killed, because the capacity and the intent was there to kill them?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were these acts directed against the person as such, in other words against the individuals concerned, Mr Evans and Mr Dullah Omar, or the members of the Kewtown Youth Movement?

MR BURGER: No, I have already said and tried to explain that it was aimed at the structures of which they formed a part.

MR P DU PLESSIS: According to your information?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you would also concede that you cannot vouch for the accuracy of the intelligence, on which you operated?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you say it was directed at the structures of which they formed a part? What did you seek to achieve?

MR BURGER: To destabilise those structures.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Them, referring to ...

MR BURGER: To the organisation, to actually damage the organisation, not the person as such, although that might happen and he might sacrifice himself in that way.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Having said that, are you saying thereby that the people like Mr Evans, Mr Omar and the members of the Kewtown Youth Movement, you did not, you had no personal grievance against them, or problem with them?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And currently, what are your feelings?

MR BURGER: I have no personal feelings against them, actions against them.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now with hindsight, and benefit of that hindsight, and when you look at the matter in the tranquillity of a new dispensation, a new democratic dispensation, when you look back with this new wisdom, what would you comments be in respect of that period? How do you feel about that?

MR BURGER: Mr Chairperson, it is unfortunate that we have to answer questions like these, because we are on the road of reconciliation and truth and for that reason I will try to answer that question in such a way that I make my intention clear.

The ANC/PAC and their alliances on the one hand and the State and the whole constitutional dispensation and structures on the other hand, the one was fighting apartheid, against it, and the other was fighting for apartheid and separate development, which later led to talks, negotiations and the ANC was asked to stop the violence and to have talks.

In the light of the fact that crime fights crime, I would say to you today and to everybody who suffered under that, and including ourselves, we are sorry. But I was a soldier, and I have integrity and I have pride, and I believe that you and your cadres, felt the same, and you feel the same, and I would never expect of any MK APLA cadre, soldier, who carried his role as a soldier, who carried out his instructions to the letter, never expect of him to say to me that he is sorry in the sense that he actually fought against me, because I fought against him too. We fought against each other.

But I want to say this that I hope and I trust that the future will never see a repetition of that, and that it will never be necessary in future.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, you mentioned crime fights crime, you are not trying to say by that that two wrongs make a right?

MR BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You concede that what happened, and the types of techniques which were used, that was wrong, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis. Mr Wessels, do you have any questions, you would like to put to the applicant?

MR WESSELS: I have no questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions that you would like to put to the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR H DU PLESSIS: Just certain aspects, Chairperson. Mr Burger, you were never present when a submission was made to the Chairman, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR H DU PLESSIS: So if you say that the Chairman approved something, it is an assumption which you make, or it is hearsay, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR H DU PLESSIS: You have heard Gen Webb testified that the Omar project and the Evans project was never submitted to him for approval, you cannot contest that?

MR BURGER: I cannot contest that.

CHAIRPERSON: Seeing that the pre-study was in writing, and you had this procedure, were orders ever given in writing?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In any of these instances that you have spoken about, the four instances, Messrs Evans, Omar, the ELC and the baboon instance, was the order given in writing?

MR BURGER: As far as the Athlone bombing is concerned, Chairperson, I know everything was approved in writing. I don't know how the Managing Director, how he got his approval from the Managing Director, but it was there in writing, I can recall that, it was on the project file.

I will not tell the truth if I say that I saw the Chairman's signature there, I cannot recall that.

CHAIRPERSON: But in each instance, you saw a written approval?

MR BURGER: Yes, except with the baboon project, I did not see a written submission.

MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you. Mr Burger, am I understanding correctly that the written approval that you saw, was the written approval from the Managing Director?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR H DU PLESSIS: You also heard that Gen Webb testified that the project to detonate the bomb at the Early Learning Centre, was submitted to him on the 30th of August, you cannot contest that?

MR BURGER: No, I cannot.

MR H DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR H DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini, do you have any questions that you would like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTINI: Just one question Mr Chairperson. Mr Burger, earlier I heard, I am not sure if it was the translation, but dealing with the taxi, the way I understood the evidence, the taxi and for that matter, the printing press, were never burnt? Was it your information that the taxi and the printing press were actually burnt down?

MR BURGER: Yes, that was the impression that I had.

MR MARTINI: Mr van Zyl's evidence is that in fact the taxi and the printing press were never burnt?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think Mr van Zyl's evidence, Mr Martini, as far as I can recall it, it was that one stage he believed that it had been burnt, and only some time later, that he learnt that he had been duped?

MR MARTINI: Correct.

MR LAX: He also did also say Mr Martini, as far as I recall, subject to correction, but my recollection is that he said he wouldn't have told Burger the fact that in fact they hadn't been burnt down, because he didn't want to create the impression that he was being misled in this sort of way.

MR MARTINI: One more question Chairperson ...

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that, when did you first learn that the taxi and the printing press were never burnt down, you yourself personally, when did you first get that knowledge?

MR BURGER: It was quite a while afterwards. I cannot recall, but I don't know if it was during the Harms Commission or afterwards.

MR MARTINI: Thank you Chair. Mr Burger, you as the Regional Manager who gave the instructions, and I am talking now specifically in respect of Mr van Zyl, my client, as far as you are concerned, you gave instructions to execute the projects, would you accept, or is it correct that the only projects in which Mr van Zyl was involved in, would be "Apie", Min Omar, the Early Learning Centre, Gavin Evans, monitoring of Mr Lubowski, the SWAPO so-called taxi and the printing press? Would those be the only projects that Mr van Zyl was involved, to your knowledge as Regional Manager?

MR BURGER: That is all.

MR MARTINI: You as the Regional Manager, so to speak, in control of Mr van Zyl, have no knowledge of any other projects that Mr van Zyl might be involved in under Region 6?

MR BURGER: No.

MR MARTINI: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Martini. Mr van Eck?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN ECK: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Burger, I don't want to go through Mr Botha's whole history and evidence, but I want to clarify certain points.

You met him at Brixton?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: You were his Commanding Officer?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: Am I correct if I say that at Brixton at that point, there was quite a lot of discipline?

MR BURGER: I didn't hear you?

MR VAN ECK: There was quite, the discipline was quite harsh, an Officer was an Officer and an Sergeant listened to him?

MR BURGER: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN ECK: The choice you had when you went to the CCB, how did you decide which members you were to approach to join you?

MR BURGER: I can remember that there were several members, to tell the truth, I heard Mr van Zyl's evidence and he was also transferred to Natal or Pietermaritzburg, I know Mr Maree had to be transferred, I cannot recall if Mr Botha was also being transferred, but I approached him and asked him if he wanted to come to Special Forces.

MR VAN ECK: In that first period where you were with Matthysen, will it be correct to say if you were still called Colonel, addressed as Colonel?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: The salaries in the beginning, you were paid in cash, the members were paid in cash?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: After you were established and the members established their blue plans, you became involved in real CCB workings, were there names provided out of the structure of the CCB to members?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: And to Botha was given the names of Frank Chikane and Bruce White?

MR BURGER: I can only remember Roland, Bruce, well we thought it was Bruce White, but Roland White is the correct name. That is the name that was given to him by Mr Basson.

MR VAN ECK: His evidence will be that the name Frank Chikane was also given to him, but he never did anything about it, or couldn't do anything about it?

MR BURGER: Yes, you see it is possible Chairperson, because even within your own ranks, and if Mr Basson for example got the information from the information structure of the CCB, then he would not pull only one name for protection of the cut off points in a covert organisation, so that the person who is at information structure, if something would happen to Mr White, or to Mr Chikane, or to other people, there had to be several names. If you pull one name and something would happen to the person, that information person, who handled it, he would know that Mr Basson at least, knew about it, so therefore it is possible that there was more than one name given to a person.

MR VAN ECK: And he would also say that afterwards he leant that the name of Frank Chikane was given to somebody else to handle, before he could do anything about it? Do you know anything about that?

MR BURGER: No, I have no knowledge about actions or operations involving Mr Chikane.

MR VAN ECK: In the pre-studies held with you, in the several projects, say for example the Early Learning in the beginning, were there any members allowed to be present, to listen to what was going on?

MR BURGER: No.

MR VAN ECK: Was it on a confidential basis, the so-called need to know basis?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: After you learnt that the police found Mr Botha and Barnard where they observed and monitored Mr White, apparently you were upset about this matter and this led to that Mr Botha at that stage, was placed on ice? What according to you, what did it mean in CCB terms to be put on ice?

MR BURGER: That his activities were suspended.

MR VAN ECK: And who would take that decision?

MR BURGER: Mr Verster.

MR VAN ECK: Would you also have any input in that?

MR BURGER: Yes, I may.

MR VAN ECK: That would mean that he was not included in any activities or executions?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR VAN ECK: The decision to contact him to help van Zyl, whose decision was that?

MR BURGER: It was my suggestion to the Chairman, sorry to the Managing Director, Verster.

MR VAN ECK: And you phoned him, Botha?

MR BURGER: After discussing it with Verster, I phoned Botha.

MR VAN ECK: Can one accept that before this contact, or this call, there was no contact between you and him?

MR BURGER: I think so, yes.

MR VAN ECK: You mentioned that you called him because he had reasonable knowledge of explosives? Were you aware of the fact that he was an explosives expert, trained, when he was in the Security Branch?

MR BURGER: I don't know what his qualifications are, but I knew that he was involved with the bomb disposal unit.

MR VAN ECK: Yes, he was an explosives expert. I don't want the perception to exist that he, in his spare time, he trained himself with explosives?

MR BURGER: He was trained in the Police Force.

MR VAN ECK: With regard to the happenings at the Early Learning Centre, the planning, was he, he was not briefed by you or anybody else about what had to be done, about the aims, etc?

MR BURGER: No.

MR VAN ECK: The only matter where there was an "in-house" from Botha's side, at the CCB, that was at Roskam?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And that is the one where the advise was that it should not be seen as a gross violation of human rights?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Do you know how Botha was distanced at the end from the CCB or released from the CCB?

MR BURGER: Released? I think at that stage, we all got the message from Verster that everything was stopped.

MR VAN ECK: And to conclude, was there during the time that the CCB was getting active, were there clashes, personal clashes between you and Botha?

MR BURGER: What time?

MR VAN ECK: After the first cooling down period, where you worked at Matthysen and afterwards, were there at times any personal clashes between you and Botha?

MR BURGER: No, I cannot recall anyone.

MR VAN ECK: Of such a nature that at one time, he was pushed out?

MR BURGER: No, he was pushed out because of the aspect as explained.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ECK

CHAIRPERSON: Did that deteriorate into an argument, did you have a personal clash about that?

MR BURGER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Some bosses take things personally when they happen at work, and others are more objective?

MR BURGER: No, not that I can recall Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I have no questions. I would just like to place on record that the fact that I do not question him on behalf of Barnard, must not seem that I agree with everything that is testified, but that aspect, I will handle in his application, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, just before my learned friends on the other side proceed, there is just one aspect I admitted to deal with.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly Mr du Plessis.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Burger, I just want to refer shortly to your application for indemnity, your first application was in terms of the 1990 Act and the date is 28 March 1991 and it was an affidavit and you were advised by Adv Flip Hattingh, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And Havengas, the Instructing Attorneys?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And afterwards there was a second Act implemented in terms whereof you were informed that this 1990 application was referred to two Judges, who heard the application through your legal representatives on 9 December 1993?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And afterwards there was a third Act, Act 34 of 1995, according to that, your application was submitted, according to the prescribed form, Form 1 and it was completed and whereby the original application, the 1991 application was annexed hereto, as motivation, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This, the last application of the 2nd of December 1996, that is only the form that was completed, the affidavit is still the original one? Is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: On this form, you show the four cases for which you apply for amnesty, and amongst others, you are asked on page 3 of the form, "state whether any person was injured, killed or suffered any damage to property as a result of such acts, omissions or offences", the answer is "no". That is not accurate, is that true, that there was no damage or injuries?

MR BURGER: No, that specific answer is incorrect Chairperson, and I blame my legal team for that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, we accept the responsibility, you are correct, for a change. Sorry. May I refer you to the original affidavit dated 28 March 1991, there you refer specifically to the bombing incident on page, and injuries, on page 143 of Bundle A, the middle paragraph you say specifically in the 1991 statement

"... there were other people in other parts of the building, and as far as you know, one or two persons sustained light injuries."

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It doesn't make any sense if you read this together with the form, I referred to, and of course the whole meaning was that the building should be damaged, and that would be handled on the same level?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I am not going to handle the original statement, we went through that, and there are a few inaccuracies in the document, I can for example show you where it is said that on page 144, in the process of the monitoring of Mr Evans, you learnt that he had connections with Mr Heinz Grösskopff which according to information, was responsible for more than one bombing attack in the Republic of South Africa, that is not accurate.

That that information was gained through monitoring, that information came from the intelligence structure?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And in conclusion, I just want to ask you the last aspect, you will admit that during the Harms Commission, there were attempts to cover up?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And it was your order that from the side of General staff, there were attempts to convince you to reveal as little facts as possible, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, any questions?

MR WESSELS: No questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR H DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini?

MR MARTINI: No, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Eck?

MR VAN ECK: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ECK

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: No questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee, I noted what you informed me about, that you are not putting any questions, but if there are any serious discrepancies that exist between the evidence of Mr Burger and what Mr Barnard might say, the fact that you have informed me that you are not going to cross-examine that doesn't mean that you are making any admissions, won't take away, might not in any way affect the rights of anybody else to argue that because it wasn't put, less weight must be attached to it, I just want to place that on record. I cannot force anybody to cross-examine.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Commissioner, it is not something I pulled from the air, this is after proper consideration that I have made that decision.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. I think this might be a convenient time, before you start Mr Bizos, I see it is one o'clock now, we will take the lunch adjournment now, thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos, do you have any questions you would like to put to the applicant?

MR BIZOS: Mr Kahanovitz ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, in 1989, approximately how many days did you spend in South-West Africa?

MR BURGER: Approximately one day, I few in the morning, and in the afternoon, out again.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It was the only time you went to South-West Africa in the whole of 1989?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I will come back to that. Can you tell us about any projects that were proposed to you by the members of Region 6, that were rejected?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So every single idea put forward by Mr van Zyl, Mr Botha and Maree, every single idea that one of them came up with, was in fact adopted?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I don't think the evidence was van Zyl and them put ideas.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what I understood there, Mr Kahanovitz, certainly in some instances is that information obtained from the ground, was relayed, like just a name, and then there would be background study and then there was an instruction to do a pre-study.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, the witness said there were two possibilities. The one is where the information from the ground ...

CHAIRPERSON: One from the infrastructure and one from the ground?

MR KAHANOVITZ: And then there was another one where the information might come through Mr Basson and they might be given a name.

MR MARTINI: Mr Chairperson, but (indistinct), is Mr Kahanovitz suggesting that the idea for example to eliminate Mr Omar, or to blow up the Early Learning Centre, came from operatives on the ground?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can I ask the questions?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Thank you. What I am trying to ascertain Mr Burger, is the following, let's take any example, it doesn't matter where the name comes from, you get given a name of someone who is a potential target and forget about whether it comes through Mr Basson or whether it comes from van Zyl, Botha or Maree, all right, are you with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you ever attend any meeting where it was suggested that Mr X or Mr Y had been identified as a potential target, the matter was discussed and for one or other reason, it was decided that that project would not be adopted?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I will try and answer the question as follows: the information which came from the members themselves, and was brought to my attention, would be taken by the Co-ordinator to the intelligence structure and the proposals of the member who brought the information, Mr Verster in his capacity, would then discuss it with his intelligence structures, and then come back with an order.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It doesn't appear, can I put something to you that appears to me to be a logical proposition? Take the UDF Executive for instance, there is a fairly long list of names of people besides Mr Omar, who your information structures could have given you, right? They could have said Trevor Manual is on the UDF Executive, Cheryl Carolus is on the UDF Executive, Allan Boesak is on the UDF Executive, and so on and so forth?

Was there any process that you had engaged in to say "look, of these people, why Adv Omar as opposed to the others??

MR BURGER: We did not concentrate on the individuals as such. If the information was that he was part of the structures of the enemies of the country, and participated in their activities, irrespective of whether he actually pulled the trigger himself or detonated the bomb, but the intelligence was that he formed part of this banned organisation, then in that context, it would be seen in that context.

We for instance, did not say that there are some priority targets, but in this case, it was Mr Omar.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see what I don't understand about your evidence is that you tell us that in broad terms you had a definition of the enemy, the ANC, the UDF, South African Communist Party, PAC and so on and so forth, do you agree?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Obviously you are not going to kill everybody who is attached to one of those organisations or who are promoting the aims and objects?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, some or other process would have to be gone through where you sit down and you discuss "look, of the people on the UDF Executive, if we are going to maximally disrupt the enemy, in the best possible way, it makes more sense to target Adv Omar as opposed to Cheryl Carolus". Surely one would have to engage in those kinds of discussions for the objectives of your organisation to make any sense?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But I haven't heard anything in your evidence about any discussions along those lines, ever having taken place, about any proposal having been put forward that for instance, Cheryl Carolus should be targeted for the following reasons, "we decided that she is not a person who we should select", that is why I come back to my question, what names were put forward, but for one or other reason, rejected as being unsuitable targets?

MR BURGER: I can only say Chairperson, that nothing was not approved, nothing was rejected in respect of other names. It was never submitted to me, and I would like, well, I can understand Mr Kahanovitz' logic, unfortunately that is not the way it happened, other names were not supplied to me or submitted to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, I can understand Mr van Zyl as a mere member of Region 6 saying "all I did was I collected information from Gakkie, I passed it upstairs, what happened to it afterwards, I am not really sure", I can understand him saying that in his capacity.

You, as the Regional Manager, one would expect that in some way you would be involved in a filtering process so that the objectives of Region 6 could be maximised, does that make sense to you, "burn Mr Roskam's car, don't burn Mr Evans' car. Kill Mr Evans, but burn Mr Roskam's car", where were you discussing these objectives, how was it taking place?

MR BURGER: Yes, those aspects were discussed and I conceded that I did make my contributions. I did give input.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It must be inevitable then that a name linked to some or other project, would have been put forward and rejected for one or other reason?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Never?

MR BURGER: Not as far as I can remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you are saying that in so far as you provided input, all the input that you provided, was input in support of every single proposal that was put forward?

MR BURGER: Yes, the information would come, final decisions were taken upstairs, I would give my recommendations or my input, whatever, I would add that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but it flows, I am not talking about a hypothetical proposition, from what you are saying now, the input that you put in, was never negative, it was always positive?

MR BURGER: Yes, in so far as the carrying out of the project was concerned.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And the selection of the target?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, you say that you did not apply for amnesty in respect of the burning of Anton Roskam's car, because that wasn't a gross violation of human rights, is that your evidence?

MR BURGER: At that stage.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you claiming that you received legal advise that you only apply for amnesty in respect of incidents involving gross violations of human rights, are you saying that is what your lawyer told you?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Which lawyer was that?

MR BURGER: Mr Hattingh.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, so let's go through this process. It must follow then that you are claiming that "Project Apie" was a gross violation of human rights?

MR BURGER: It was regarded as a gross violation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Would you care to explain to me why?

MR BURGER: We assumed that the briefing we got from our legal representatives were correct, that we must apply and that it might be a crimen injuria case against the character of Desmond Tutu.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You are not answering my question, I am asking you, I am not asking whether it is a crime, I am asking you why you are saying it a gross violation of human rights?

MR BURGER: That was the advise I got.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they actually talking about gross human rights violations at that stage?

MR BURGER: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In 1991?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: What is your understanding of what gross violation of human rights was under the Act?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon?

MR KAHANOVITZ: What was your understanding of what a gross violation of human rights was, what was your understanding at the time as a lay person?

MR BURGER: I would say where you were involved in crimes of violence, potential violence. I think that is about the best I can do, how I can put it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, burning someone's car, you don't regard as violence, an act of violence?

MR BURGER: Not towards a person.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But hanging a monkey foetus in their tree, is?

MR BURGER: That was my advice.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you seriously suggesting that you told your Advocate, you divulged to him the details of your involvement in the burning of Mr Roskam's car, this notwithstanding he advised you that it is not necessary to make any mention of that incident in your application, is that what you are saying?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, even as a lay person, reading that form, you will recall that there are questions for instance ...

CHAIRPERSON: The 1991 form now, the present form?

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, I am talking about the present form. Let's look at your form at pages 130 to 136.

CHAIRPERSON: It is Bundle A.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Look at page 132. As I understood your evidence in chief, your current Attorney says he wishes to accept responsibility for the fact that the word "no" was inserted under the question "state whether any person was injured, killed or suffered any damage to property" as a result of such acts, omissions or offences", are you with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So I infer from that that the Attorney sitting next to you, is the person who was giving you advice at the time that you filled in this form?

MR BURGER: Mr du Plessis referred us to Adv Swiegelaar.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Excuse me?

MR BURGER: Adv Swiegelaar assisted us with these forms.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who is he?

MR BURGER: It is a she?

MR KAHANOVITZ: She?

MR BURGER: Cecile Swiegelaar, Adv Cecile Swiegelaar, Johannesburg Bar.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, and are you saying you went to her office and she gave you advice to enable you to fill in this form?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And that the Attorney who attended on that occasion, was who?

MR BURGER: Mr du Plessis gave us the instruction.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr du Plessis was the Instructing Attorney?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Kahanovitz wants to know was he there at the consultation?

MR BURGER: No, he was not present.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the form was prepared at your Advocate's chambers?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you subsequently swore an oath that what was contained in that, was true and correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Where did that happen, at the Advocate's chambers?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You cannot remember?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who was the Commissioner of Oaths?

MR BURGER: Mr du Plessis.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is Pieter Jacobus du Plessis your Attorney sitting next to you?

MR BURGER: I only know him as Piet du Plessis, I don't know if he is Jacobus as well?

MR KAHANOVITZ: He seems to indicate that he is. I would infer from that, that you took this form back to his office if he wasn't at the Advocate's chambers and you swore an oath on the 2nd of December 1996, that what was contained in this form, was true and correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And why is it that your Attorney is claiming that it is his fault that the form was filled in in such a way that where it said that no property was damaged or anybody was injured, why is he saying that it is his fault if there is such a mistake in the form?

Maybe I should preface it by pointing out you did initial each page and signed the end, are you with me?

MR BURGER: Yes, I did.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why should it be his fault?

MR BURGER: I think sir, the responsibility to fill in the forms and check them properly, was the responsibility of my legal representative to do that, and I wouldn't attach my statement to that form, in which I then state exactly the opposite.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, I am going to put it to you that there is no prospect that any competent lawyer who you told about the Roskam incident, would have told you that you cannot apply for amnesty for that, because it is not a gross violation of human rights.

MR BURGER: Well, that was the advice given to me at the time of my application. I accepted it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you also tell your Advocate and your Attorney that you lied under oath at the Harms Commission and the Webster Commission?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You did tell them?

MR BURGER: Yes, I told this Mr du Plessis.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you sought advice from them as to whether or not maybe you should apply for amnesty for perjury?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You didn't? Now, I am going to put it to you that the reason you didn't apply for amnesty in respect of the Roskam incident, has got nothing to do with the version that you are putting forward now, that you received legal advice of the sort that you claim, when you and the other members of the CCB, who are applying for amnesty here, filled out the forms and attached the statements, your approach was to only apply for amnesty for those things that you were aware of, that other people already knew about. You were only prepared to talk about those things that were already out in the public domain, by and large as a consequence of what happened during the Harms Commission?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying Mr Kahanovitz, that that could be linked to the applicants?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

MR BURGER: No Mr Chairperson. I was aware of Roskam, I was aware of the bus, I was aware of the printing press and I did not apply for those.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Kahanovitz is saying is, not what you were aware of, but that were in the public domain, that might be linked to you? I mean certainly, I think somebody must have known about the burning of Mr Roskam's car, even if it was only Mr Roskam, he must have known of it, but maybe there wasn't any, maybe you didn't believe that anybody could link the burning of that vehicle, to yourself, whereas the ELC, you had a feeling, might be able to be linked to you, the Omar and Evans and Tutu?

MR BURGER: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember whether Mr Botha or who dealt with it, testified about that before the Harms Commission, and I simply, I requested the privilege against self-incrimination, not because I didn't want to apply for indemnity, I simply didn't regard it as a gross violation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I am also putting it to you that the reason that you know that you can no longer claim ignorance about the burning of Anton Roskam's car and Region 6's involvement in that, is that you are now aware that it was found in the trial against Ferdi Barnard, that that was a Region 6 project and that Mr Burger and Mr Botha were responsible, sorry Mr Barnard and Botha were responsible?

MR BURGER: No, I was always aware that Mr Botha had been involved. I didn't know about Mr Barnard.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you tell the Harms Commission that the burning of Mr Roskam's car was a Region 6 project?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And why might that be so?

MR BURGER: I concealed it for some reason or other.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, I just want to deal with the administrative names used by the people in Region 6. Your administrative name was Bert Brummer, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It is also so that both you and other members of Region 6, used other alias' apart from your administrative names, when making contact with for instance what you have referred to as the structures, for example Mr van Zyl told one of the gangsters in the Western Cape that his name was Tinus le Roux?

MR BURGER: Yes. De Wet?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it was de Wet.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Sorry de Wet, yes, Tinus de Wet. Do I understand the procedure that when you were giving instructions or conversing with potential unaware members, that you weren't using your administrative names, but a further set of false names, is that correct?

MR BURGER: When we did what?

MR KAHANOVITZ: If you went down to the Western Cape and you met with Peaches, you would just make up a name?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is possible.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You wouldn’t' use your official administrative name such as Bert Brummer?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. For instance in your case, one of the names that you went by was Nick Verbeeck, correct? One of the names that you used, do you deny that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you spell that surname please?

MR KAHANOVITZ: V-e-r-b-e-e-c-k. I am not sure if it is "ck" or "k".

Mr van Zyl's administrative name was Andries Rossouw, correct?

MR BURGER: I think so yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Chappie Maree's administrative name was Stephan le Roux, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Calla Botha's administrative name was Deon Calitz?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Joe Verster's administrative name was Jack van Staden?

MR BURGER: Jack, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Van Staden, correct?

MR BURGER: I think so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Now, I think we all are still trying to understand the procedures that were followed in relation to the approval of projects. If I understand your evidence correctly, you and Mr van Zyl, differ quite considerably as to the process that was supposed to be followed in relation to obtaining approval and preparing projects.

I just want to refer you to the stages that he refers to in his application for amnesty and just establish from you what it is that you have to say about his version.

He says, well, it is at pages 88 and 89 of Bundle A, paragraph 28. He is dealing here with what happened at the, what they were taught during the training project. You will see at the beginning of paragraph 28, he divides it up in stages, he says that an aware member were to gather information in which he would mention who was the target and he would provide full information regarding the motivation.

This was called a pre-study, do you agree with that thus far?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. He says that the pre-study would contain a budget, containing, referring to the approximate amount of money that would be needed, do you agree with that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that the aware member motivating the project, would sign it and it would be given to the Co-ordinator who would hand it on to you, do you agree with that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If you approved the project, you would sign it and hand it on to Joe Verster for his recommendation, do you agree with that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If Joe Verster accepted it, then there would be the so-called "in-house", attended by you and Joe Verster, do you agree with that?

MR BURGER: Yes, the Co-ordinator as well, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right, you, Basson, Verster and the aware member would be present, the four of you, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Would the Co-ordinator make an oral presentation during such a meeting?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Everyone would then discuss the matter?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Joe Verster would then take the project to Gen Webb, is that correct?

MR BURGER: That was the supposition yes, how it should be done.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You are saying that was the theory, but not necessary the practice, is that what you are saying?

MR BURGER: Well, I believed it was.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you see, you would be the very person that would be in a position to know most clearly whether this had in fact happened, because what one would expect is that at the end of one of these meetings, Mr Verster would not be in a position to indicate to you whether the project had or had not received final approval? That is the theory at least, did that accord with the practice?

MR BURGER: Yes, at the preliminary study and the "in-house" Verster did not give the order. The approval for the continuation of the project and the elimination, that exists, but the order for the execution is got from the Chairman and then it is carried out.

MR KAHANOVITZ: From what you are saying one would logically assume that after the "in-house" had been held, Verster would come back to you and say words to the effect of "I have spoken to Gen Webb, Gen Webb has given the go ahead for this project"?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you are saying that in respect of, I am leaving out "Project Apie", in respect of the other projects, that is exactly what happened?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In other words if he hadn't gone to see Gen Webb, to obtain Gen Webb's approval, on your version, we would have a strange situation where he would come to you and made up a story that he had in fact been to see Gen Webb, whereas in truth and in fact, he did not?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I believed bona fide that Mr Verster with the seniority and the rank which he held, that he followed these guidelines unconditionally.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can I just clarify, this what Mr van Zyl refers to as the second "in-house", was your understanding that the Co-ordinator would attend those meetings? This is what Mr van Zyl says? You see, he says here at the second "in-house", in other words he says Verster, Basson and Webb would attend that meeting?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Could we just get the page number please?

MR BURGER: I can only answer by saying that it was possibly Mr van Zyl's, his supposition and the assumption he made during his training. I think Mr Basson would be able to give a better answer to this question, because I was not once present at such an "in-house" with the Chairman for authorisation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Sorry, carry on, you hadn't finished your sentence.

MR BURGER: Therefore I cannot give a clear answer and say "yes, the Co-ordinator was present", because as far as I am concerned, the authorisations which were given, were in most cases a discussion between the Chairman and the Managing Director and from the Managing Director, to myself.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, I don't recall any one of the lawyers representing Gen Webb or Col Verster, putting to Mr van Zyl, after he gave his evidence, that his description of what happens at the second "in-house", is wrong?

If what he says is correct, then obviously Mr Basson can tell us exactly what happened at those meetings?

MR BURGER: I think he can. I was not present where the Chairman was present.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But surely you would have some recollection as to what was happening on the ground at the time, because if the question had arisen "well, what was Webb's attitude to the Early Learning Centre", you could have asked that question of either Basson or of Verster if both of them went to that meeting, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, did you ever discuss with Mr ...

MR BURGER: I don't understand the question, could you please rephrase the question?

MR KAHANOVITZ: If both Basson and Verster went to meetings with the Chairman to hear whether final approval had been obtained, you would have been in a position to ask either Basson or Verster what had transpired at those meetings, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes, but I don't know if Basson was there or not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if I may just intervene. Did you ever have occasion while you were at the CCB, of ever talking of doing business with the Chairperson?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, on one occasion, I think it was in January 1989 or February, early February, it was just after Gen Webb took command from Gen Joubert, I informed him on an occasion about Region 6, what Region 6 consisted of and at that stage I explained our blue plans to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, when it came to recruiting some of your former colleagues from Brixton Murder and Robbery into the CCB, the sequence of events as I understand, was that, maybe you can clarify it, did you apply to join Special Forces or did Special Forces ask you to join them?

MR BURGER: I applied.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were then approached by Verster and this is before contact has been made with van Zyl et al, and he asked you whether you are interested in becoming involved in the CCB, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Who?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Verster? Joe Verster?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He approached you?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He didn't?

MR BURGER: No, I approached him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You approached him and asked him if you could join the CCB?

MR BURGER: No, Special Forces.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right, but when was the issue of the CCB first raised?

MR BURGER: At the meeting afterwards, with Verster.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. And what did he tell you? What did he tell you about the CCB? He could hardly tell you about what the CCB does, until he has had some indication from you as to whether you were sufficiently interested in joining?

MR BURGER: He knew that I was serious, because from March 1988 I started discussing with him, and it was only in June 1988 that I joined officially.

So there were several discussions between Verster and myself. At one stage he informed me about the secret organisation and that I must not talk about it, it was a covert operation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You will agree with me that as regards recruiting other former policemen to join the CCB, you could hardly bring somebody along to the training course, explain to them what the CCB does, and then have the situation where that person turns around and says to you "well, now that I have heard what it is that you do, I am not interested any more"? You would have to be fairly certain that the person was willing to do this kind of work? Correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: On what basis did you form the impression that van Zyl, Botha and Maree were suitable candidates?

MR BURGER: I knew them respectively on a work basis.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right, and you would agree with me that it would be fairly useless to recruit somebody who would not be willing to kill?

MR BURGER: No Mr Chairperson, on their records as police officers and investigation officers and their ability to work well, they did very well under the intelligence structures, I did not chose them on the basis that this guy has the ability to kill somebody. We worked indirectly at the CCB, you don't do it yourself.

If like you mention, I did not need somebody who had the ability to kill. As long as he had the ability to plan and think clearly and that we could trust him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, you would agree with me, there are people who are not prepared to commit crimes?

MR BURGER: One hundred percent.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You could hardly have someone go along to the training course, be told what the CCB is going to do and then that person says "well, actually, I am not the kind of person who is willing to commit a crime"?

MR BURGER: You see, I think this goes with my previous explanation, people I chose were people who might have had the same patriotic feelings about the Afrikaner, the State, the protection of the security of the whites, the Afrikaner. That was important to them.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, I hope you are not seriously suggesting that every single patriotic Afrikaner at that time, was the kind of person who was willing to commit crimes?

MR BURGER: No, you asked me why I chose them.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, and you gave me an answer to say well, they had a similar background to you, and in your evidence-in-chief you stressed that your background was that which led you to become a patriotic Afrikaner nationalist, which is why I put the question to you in that form.

MR BURGER: Yes, and of course because they worked with me at Brixton Murder and Robbery.

MR KAHANOVITZ: One might have hoped you would have inferred from the fact that people were policemen, that they might be the kind of people who would in fact obey the law, and not break it?

MR BURGER: Well, with hindsight, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just on this issue of "we must understand the times". You will recall in your evidence you said that "look, we must remember what it was like at that time. At that time there was a State of Emergency going on, the State had to fight fire with fire", is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You will no doubt recall that at that time, the State was not particularly reticent when it came to killing its enemies, you will know that one of the reasons why the Amnesty Committee of the Truth Commission have been as busy as they are, is that various agencies of the State were at that time engaged in killing the people they perceived to be the enemies of the State? Do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: That very ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Several State agencies were involved in the period of the State of Emergency, in killing, murdering, assassinating, destroying the property of people who they perceived to be the enemies of the State?

MR BURGER: Yes, if I remember correctly, the police hit-squads they wrote about in the press and other similar cases of terrorism from the ANC, so, yes, there were dirty tricks on both sides.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you will agree with me that as far as the Security Forces were concerned, if they believed that somebody was a legitimate target, who for that reason deserved to die, they would do just that, they would kill them?

MR BURGER: I have missed the starting of your question, the last part ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: At that time, if one of the State agencies that was involved in the killing of people, came to the conclusion that a person was a legitimate target, they were not shy, they were not reticent about making a decision to eliminate that person?

MR BURGER: That is so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: Correct, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And in that context, there was no reason for the CCB to be shy or reticent about killing alleged terrorists? Do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And in that context ...

MR BURGER: Excuse me. Chairman, could you just tell me what is the translation of reticent?

INTERPRETER: "Terughoudend" of "nie huiwerig nie".

MR BURGER: "Terughoudend"?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, where you had clear information that a particular group of people are involved in blowing up buildings in support of the ANC, at that time, there was no reason to be reticent about making a decision to kill people like that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, I want to deal briefly with your appearance at the inquest into the death of David Webster, you gave evidence, did you not?

MR BURGER: Yes, I did.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, Mr Chairman, if I can avoid it, I am not going to hand in more paper, I am just going to put a few submissions to the witness, which he will hopefully readily agree to, as regards what he testified to.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and if they want to see it afterwards, whatever, you can make it available to the Attorney or the applicants themselves.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, you have already heard the evidence of certainly Gen Webb that an attempt was made to protect the Defence Force and the government by putting forward a version at Harms that Region 6 of the CCB was by and large only involved in the collection of intelligence inside of South Africa, but the rider was added that Region 6 did not engage in offensive activities, within the borders of South Africa, do you recall that?

MR BURGER: Yes, except for what we asked for our privilege against self-incrimination.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I am not certain what that has got to do with what I was putting to you? You are aware that Mr van Zyl for example went to Harms and said "we were involved in the Omar project, the Evans project, so on and so forth" and the general tenure of his evidence was that Region 6 was involved in offensive activities within the borders of South Africa, correct?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You on the other hand, decided to go with that version that said that Region 6 was not involved in offensive activities within the borders of the Republic of South Africa?

MR BURGER: I agree with you, except the cases where we asked for privilege.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I don't understand your answer, maybe you can explain that.

MR BURGER: At the Harms Commission, we mainly gave evidence about the collection of intelligence and the execution of the projects which followed on that, outside of South Africa, and then said that we asked about the Omar and the Evans, and the bomb and the "Apie", we asked for privilege against self-incrimination.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But Mr Burger, it is obviously not as simple as that, because if you are telling the Commission or an inquiry that Region 6 does not engage in offensive activities within the Republic of South Africa, anybody hearing that evidence must infer from what you are saying, that it follows that it would not have been possible for Region 6 to for instance plan to assassinate Dullah Omar within the borders of the Republic, do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the purpose of that evidence was to create the impression of the minds of Judge Harms that Region 6, it was not within Region 6 mandate to kill people within the borders of the Republic and accordingly, they would not have formulated plans to kill people like Omar and Evans, correct?

MR BURGER: That is true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You carried on with that version at the time of the Webster inquest, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes, I did.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why?

MR BURGER: Because I was still employed by the South African Defence Force.

MR KAHANOVITZ: By the way, you were no longer working for the CCB, but at that stage you were working for the Directorate of Covert Collections, isn't that so?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what was your job at DCC?

MR BURGER: At DCC? At DCC I was appointed, it is an organisation which operate only on information and I was appointed to - my areas were Mozambique, Madagascar and there was another foreign region, I cannot remember. There were three regions I was responsible for.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were asked questions as the Webster inquest about Roland or Bruce White and you claimed privilege, you refused to answer questions on the basis of your privilege against self-incrimination, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You will agree with me, you can only claim privilege where you believe that the evidence that you would give, might implicate you in a crime?

MR BURGER: It might?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Implicate you in the commission of a criminal act?

MR BURGER: No Mr Chairperson. I there applied for privilege, for some obscure reason, maybe because I could get away with it, except that the monitoring of Roland White, there was nothing else.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the point of claiming privilege from something that isn't going to incriminate you in a crime?

MR BURGER: I have told you I think there I took a chance to see if I could escape from cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Tactical move in those proceedings?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You are claiming then you had absolutely no discussions with your Counsel about this matter, because I would expect a competent lawyer would want to know from his client on what basis he claims privilege, so that he can advise his client?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember, I think Mr Peet Coetzee was our Advocate at that point, and I cannot remember the reasons.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But whose suggestion was it that one would just claim privilege as a (indistinct) to avoid cross-examination?

MR BURGER: I must have been my own.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Oh, you came up with that yourself? Really, what you are telling us, that you are the kind of witness where one would never really know when you are telling the truth or not?

MR BURGER: It is not the reason why I am here today, I admit that I made mistakes in the past and I ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why didn't you, when you gave your evidence-in-chief, why didn't you tell the Committee that you lied at Webster and you lied at Harms?

MR BURGER: I cannot think of the reason why I did it, but it will come up, it comes out now.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, is it your evidence that you had no contact whatsoever with Ferdi Barnard while he was a member of the CCB, sorry, while you were a member of the CCB?

MR BURGER: No, I never had contact with him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: When Calla Botha got into trouble about the Roland White incident, didn't you launch an enquiry to establish who he had been working with at the time that White was being monitored?

MR BURGER: No, at that point, at the stage where he had the order to monitor White, I was under the impression that he used his infrastructure members, because you had to work indirectly. You don't do the monitoring yourself, it had to be done indirectly.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But Mr Burger, the man has compromised your security, the police have found him sitting in a motor car with another person, surely you would want to know "excuse me, Mr Botha, your security has been compromised, who was in the car with you at the time"?

MR BURGER: Of course yes, I will get to that, I asked him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, and what did he tell you?

MR BURGER: He didn't need to tell me, he and Mr Barnard were picked up by Brixton.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He told you Mr Barnard was with him?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what was Mr Barnard's status at that time?

MR BURGER: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Apart from ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think if you could just be a little bit more clear about what status is, you know, whether he is single, married, or whatever, if you could just ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, according to your understanding, was Mr Botha entitled to be working with Mr Barnard?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So did Mr Botha get into trouble for having done this monitoring together with Mr Barnard?

MR BURGER: We put him on ice.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why, because he was working with Mr Barnard or because Brixton Murder and Robbery noticed him watching Mr White?

MR BURGER: No, because he did not obey the guidelines. It was a disciplinary step.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Which guidelines are we talking about?

MR BURGER: We are talking about Calla Botha?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but which guidelines did he break?

MR BURGER: Firstly, the indirect modus operandi, he had to use a non-aware member to do the monitoring, not himself. That is the first point.

Secondly that he used Ferdi Barnard where, and he knew he wasn't supposed to do that, and because of this method, his activities were summarily suspended. And when I asked him why, he said he monitored him himself and that day he asked Ferdi to go with him, one person would have been more visible than two people, while they are talking and sitting.

But it was not approved.

CHAIRPERSON: Why couldn't he use Ferdi Barnard? If Mr van Zyl could use Peaches and Isgak who were gangsters, why couldn't Mr Botha use Mr Barnard?

MR BURGER: I cannot recall all the facts, but what I do remember, they were aware of the fact that the use of Ferdi Barnard was out of order, it was not allowed, they could not use him.

CHAIRPERSON: But why?

MR BURGER: Because he was discredited at the CCB.

MR LAX: How did that come about?

MR BURGER: Joe Verster told me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I take it that you would have expressed yourself in the strongest possible terms at the time, that using Ferdi Barnard was so unacceptable that Mr Botha had to be placed on ice and I take it that the other members of Region 6 was aware of what had happened? In other words Mr Maree and Mr van Zyl knew what had happened to Mr Botha?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Strange thing is that after you have now taken these stern disciplinary measures against Mr Botha for using Mr Barnard, Mr van Zyl then goes ahead and he uses Mr Barnard on the Omar project, he uses him to monitor Lubowski, he uses him on "Project Apie"?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what do you have to say about that?

MR BURGER: Well, I was not aware of that. It was out of order, he was not allowed to do that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But here you are, trying to run a disciplined unit, but the people who are falling under your command, to me, it would seem, aren't taking your orders seriously?

MR BURGER: Well, at that stage, it was Botha and van Zyl who used Barnard without authorisation, or without letting me know.

CHAIRPERSON: The use of Mr Barnard by Mr van Zyl, was not a matter of just easy convenience, he had to fly him across the country to use him, incur costs as well, it wasn't just that he happened to be available, call him in for the next hour or so, it was flying him down to Cape Town, paying the airfare, putting him in the hotel, that sort of thing?

MR BURGER: That is true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what is more, Mr Burger, Mr van Zyl must have had to lie to you on countless occasions because he would need to report back to you as to what had happened in respect of these projects, correct?

MR BURGER: He did.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So for instance when he is telling you that he's got people monitoring Omar or he's got people monitoring Lubowski and these people are saying this, that and the other, on each occasion that he is relaying that information to you, he is not telling you that the person that he is using, is Barnard, correct?

MR BURGER: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Moreover, what he then has to do, he's got to pay Barnard, because Barnard doesn't do this for free? In order to pay Barnard, he's got to use money that is allocated to him by the CCB for other purposes, because he cannot ask for money to pay Barnard, do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: No, he cannot.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I want to place in front of you certain pages from the diary of Wouter Basson. Mr Chairman, Mr Basson hasn't been called yet, but in other cases, he has already given evidence that this is his diary and that this is the diary that he used in his official capacity as the Co-ordinator.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was referred to when Mr Verster was giving evidence as well, there was mention made of it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It won't be in dispute that it is his diary and that he did use it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. This we will call Exhibit N. Oh, yes, wait, I think it is Exhibit M, because we were going to have Exhibit M, we changed it to Bundle M or Bundle something else, so it is Exhibit M. We can call it an exhibit, it is just one thing. We will call it Exhibit M, I don't think it makes much difference.

EXTRACTS FROM WOUTER BASSON'S DIARY HANDED IN AS EXHIBIT M

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax has just mentioned to me, didn't we get a typed copy somewhere along the line, of this?

MR KAHANOVITZ: ... the typed copy, in the first place, there are a number of typographical errors in that and in the second place, you actually don't get the flavour of the document.

CHAIRPERSON: I see the writing is fairly neat and legible.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, it is fairly, and you need to see the entries in relation to other entries and in the original handwriting, to actually understand the impact.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, all right.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, also just to put it in its context, I don't know, Mr Burger, if you are aware of the circumstances under which this diary came to be discovered, but I am sure your lawyer will be able to confirm that the investigators from the Harms Commission attended on the CCB offices, they found very little. One of the few things that they did find was this diary.

Are you aware of that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, let's look at page 1. I am just going to ask you to note as we go along, I am going to refer you to several entries concerning the procurement of ammunition, handgrenades, limpet mines and when I get to the end, I am going to ask you to add up all of those together and ask you a question about it, but just keep a record if you like, as we go along, as to the number of occasions on which hardware, if that is the right word, is procured.

Mr Chairman, I also just want to confirm, this is in fact, it is a 1989 diary.

CHAIRPERSON: The ...

MS COLERIDGE: At the bottom.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I think the other thing I should point out, and I will deal with this when Mr Basson gives his evidence, but that pages were torn out of this diary at, the dates are in close proximity to the Early Learning Centre and the assassination of Lubowski, so there are, the diary is not complete. There were also certain pages where portions of the pages were cut out.

All right, then looking at page 1, you will note on top it says -

"... Organise ammunition, Region 6, .45 and 9mm",

do you agree?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Turn the page, I should just place on record I suppose, those are calibres of ammunition, correct, .45 and 9mm?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Turn the page to page 2, entry for the 20th of January says

"... Pick up ammo at ET,"

looks like, correct? Do you have any idea what the words ET refer to?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Then the 23rd of January, three days later

"... Organise ammo, Region 6 ..."

correct, top of the page?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Then on the 22nd of January ...

MR LAX: Sorry, can I just stop you, seeing as we are going chronologically? If you look in the first column on the page 20 January, it looks like "get bombs Region 6" or "ry bomme", or something.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It may well be "by bome", maybe we can ask the ...

MR LAX: Oh, fair enough.

MR KAHANOVITZ: We will ask Mr Basson that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, would you say that is "bome", trees?

MR BURGER: It looks, fortunately it looks like trees, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, maybe Mr Basson will be able to explain.

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR BIZOS: It is "bome", one "m" or two "m's"?

MR KAHANOVITZ: "Bomme" is two "m's", "bome" is one "m". All right, if you could go to page - the administrative names of the four members of Region 6 appear there under the heading "salary" and for instance next to your name, Bert, it records that you received R4 978-96 and then you appear to have signed for that, using your administrative name, is that correct?

MR BURGER: It is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So that is the false signature that you were using?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: To collect your salary?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And are these your accounting records?

MR BURGER: No sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: These are not your accounting records? Because this would appear to be the receipts for payment of salary?

MR BURGER: No, I don't know why, I cannot remember, but we did sign for it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You would obviously be asked to sign so that there was some record that you had received it?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You didn't sign any other document in receipt of your salary, or did you?

MR BURGER: Yes, I think we did.

MR KAHANOVITZ: On the following page, page 5, entry of the 30th of January, and Mr Chairman, also just not to confuse matters too much, I should point out that Mr Basson was not only the Co-ordinator of Region 6, when the evidence is led, it will be that he co-ordinated other Regions as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think we have already had that information.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I think so, all right. Then, 30th of January you will see it says

"... organise ammo, 9mm and .22."

Again those are calibres of ammunition?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right, then it says, the next entry

"... NB. Talk to Jack about Bert about tomorrow about master plan."

Now, Jack is Joe Verster, you are Bert, what is the master plan that is being referred to?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, I am trying to recall all the terms, I am not au fait with Defence Force terms, but the master plan was the overall plan and aims leading to the master plan, in totality I would say the strategies and methods that had to be applied to destabilise the enemy overhead.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you just assuming that, thinking back now, or are you saying that you know that as a fact?

MR BURGER: I cannot state it as a fact, I am trying to formulate it as such.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did this suggest that there was going to be a meeting where you were going to discuss the master plan? You will also see in the bottom left hand corner of that page, under the heading

"... Priorities - master plan suggestions ..."

MR BURGER: To win the war.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Win, etc, etc. Can you just tell us briefly what was the master plan? Can't remember?

MR BURGER: No, I cannot specify but I think the aim would be to destabilise the enemy and to hurt where you can.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Okay. Then page 6, the 3rd of February you will see more ammunition, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes, ammo.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Ammo. Then page 7, the 7th of February, there is a reference to the ECC, which I take it is a reference to the End Conscription Campaign?

MR BURGER: Yes, it could be.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Were you particularly interested in the End Conscription Campaign at that stage?

MR BURGER: yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It says

"... ECC detail where (it looks like wherefrom) ..."

did you attend any meetings where the ECC was discussed?

MR BURGER: Yes, we discussed the ECC at my regional level.

MR KAHANOVITZ: At which level?

MR BURGER: On regional level.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what was said?

MR BURGER: That apart from the information we got from the information table, from the information structure from the CCB itself, we must concentrate on obtaining more access to the ECC.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You want to infiltrate them?

MR BURGER: Infiltrate ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: But what sort of information were you looking for?

MR BURGER: We wanted to identify our targets by getting the information from inside, to learn when there would be special meetings, who would be involved in the undermining.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And did you manage the infiltration?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That might explain some of the evidence that you gave about Gavin Evans, but I will get to that later.

Now, the 10th of February, page 8, the second line from the top, you will see more ammunition, ammo?

MR BURGER: Yes, just ammo.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Then 14th of February, the next page, page 9, you will see there is a block there on the original diary, that is in fact one of those "post-it" stickers, these kinds of stickers. Now, I am not sure whether, were you involved in any of the activities that Mr Basson was involved in in Zimbabwe?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, the reference to "Mugabe dood", you cannot help us with that?

MR BURGER: He is still alive today. No, I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Maybe he is lucky? So the following page also, there is a number of references to projects in Zimbabwe. I mustn't ask you about those?

MR BURGER: No. I have no knowledge.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right, the following page, page 11, the 14th of March, under the "things to do" heading, about in the middle, you will see it says

"... Derek, internal list of targets."

MR BURGER: I see that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What do you know about the internal target list?

MR BURGER: As I have already said, I didn't have access to that information structure, and I don't know about an internal target list. I would say that there were prominent figures, priority figures identified within the structures.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but who were these priority figures that were identified, what names can you remember?

MR BURGER: Mr Omar ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Apart from the ones that we know about already in respect of the applications which you have made.

MR BURGER: I think the entire top structure of the ANC.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And the ECC?

MR BURGER: And the ECC.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right, and you were also involved in investigating the Natal Indian Congress, isn't that correct, NIC?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You cannot remember? COSATU?

MR BURGER: We did try to investigate COSATU.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were interested amongst others, in Jay Naidoo?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, not Jay Naidoo, I will get to that later.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, who was Derek, do you know?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, today I know that they are referring to the person who dealt with the intelligence structure at the CCB, but I never knew him, I never had any meetings with him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, do I understand your evidence correctly that what we are really talking about is that there was a list in existence that contained the names of the type of people that Region 6 of the CCB might want to focus their attention on?

MR BURGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not the usual, or my understanding of a target list, is a list where, which contains the names of people who are targets, not people how might become targets, like a hit-list?

MR BURGER: No. I understand what you say, I take your point.

CHAIRPERSON: Because otherwise you could have just had a list that is pages and pages long of names, if it is potential targets? It could have been thousands of names on it? It is not much point in having a list of that nature?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Let's take an example, you have a member of Region 6 who has been allocated a province, you are dealing with a person that of themselves, has little or no understanding of who is who and what is what in the ANC, the UDF, the ECC and so on and so forth, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: To ask Mr Calla Botha, at the time that he came out of Brixton Murder and Robbery "tell me, give me names of who the people are that you should concentrate on", he would not himself know, he doesn't have that kind of political training and understanding, correct?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So he would need to be told "you go and follow this person"?

MR BURGER: Yes. And he was also supposed to use his infrastructure as soon as it was established, he must try and gather his intelligence through those structures.

MR KAHANOVITZ: As I understood your evidence-in-chief, Mr Botha and Mr Maree in fact to some extent, built up their own structures, is that correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: For instance, let's take Mr Maree. Did Mr Maree develop a network of non-aware members who were going to assist him?

MR BURGER: He was supposed to do that and as far as I can remember, he didn't really succeed in doing that. He did try to recruit people in Natal and furthermore he was also utilised abroad, outside of the Republic.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, on Mr van Zyl's version, he makes one phone call to I cannot remember if it was his brother or his brother-in-law, he says "I am looking for someone with a criminal background, give me a name", he goes and meets that person and within the process of a week, he's got his first unaware member? Are you telling us that in Maree's case, after months and months and months, he cannot manage to recruit one unaware member in Natal?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, as I have tried to explain, I cannot remember whether he perhaps succeeded in that. It may be that he succeeded in having one or two in the recruitment stage. It sounds very simple to simply pick up the phone and then you have it, but in practice it doesn't work that easily.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I can understand that, but after several months, doesn't it strike you as strange?

MR BURGER: Mr Maree, part of his tasks were aimed externally.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, now we are starting to get somewhere, because Maree was mainly working in Namibia, isn’t that so, which is why he wasn't busy developing contacts in Natal?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No or yes?

MR BURGER: No, he didn't primarily work in Namibia.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, where, what other countries was he working in outside of the country?

MR BURGER: Foreign projects those, and I don't know if I should answer the question.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You have to answer the question.

MR BURGER: No, I don't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you refusing to answer the question?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You are refusing the answer the question?

MR BURGER: When it comes to external things?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes? Why are you refusing to answer the question?

MR BURGER: Because I don't think that falls within the Commission's ambit.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you have come to tell us what the people in Region 6 were doing, and now you are telling us "sorry, as soon as somebody from Region 6 leaves the country, I am not willing to tell you what they were doing"?

MR BURGER: No, I am not going to.

MR KAHANOVITZ: How is the Committee supposed to know then what the activities of Region 6 of the CCB were?

MR BURGER: Because we also operated internally, mainly within the borders, and also externally. As far as the foreign projects are concerned, I think we have a lot of to-ing and fro-ing and that is the stance which the Defence Force is sticking to.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But as you pointed out, Region 6 was not only, or let me put this another way, Region 6 members were certainly not only operating within South Africa?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In fact, in the case of Mr Maree, his main focus was outside of South Africa?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, Mr Botha, what success or otherwise did he have in the development of his infrastructure?

MR BURGER: According to the briefings he gave me, there were certain people who he had recruited. I don't know whether it was one or two, I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is this in the Transvaal?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did I understand your evidence-in-chief to be that he is working on the Roland White project, he gets into trouble, gets put on ice, months and months pass until he gets a call on his pager to come to this meeting concerned with the Early Learning Centre, and between those events, he does nothing?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And in fact, after the Early Learning Centre, he does nothing as well?

MR BURGER: That is also correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He literally spends then a few hours, or a handful of days, let's rather say, working for Region 6? The rest of the time he is at home, drawing a salary?

MR BURGER: That is the way it sounds now, but in practice that is not the way it was, I don't know. It is difficult to say how he spent his time.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did he tell you about the contacts that he cultivated?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon?

MR KAHANOVITZ: The unaware members that he had managed to recruit, what did he tell you about them?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember what he told me about them, except that he could use them.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You, as the man in charge, don't sound like you were particularly interested in how productive or otherwise, Mr Botha was being?

MR BURGER: Mr Botha and all the rest of us, we were still busy establishing ourselves properly.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But he could hardly be establishing himself on ice?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon? No, I am talking about before then.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Oh, I see. Please turn the page over to page 12, the 15th of March. You will see the third line under "things to do", it says

"WPN (which I take it is short for 'wapen') for Deon."

Deon is Calla Botha? You are with me?

MR BURGER: Yes, I see that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, what is Calla Botha going to be doing with this weapon?

MR BURGER: I cannot answer that question, because as far as I was concerned, I will have to draw inferences.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, draw some inferences.

MR BURGER: It may be that he asked for the issue of a pistol for him, for his own private use which ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Private use?

MR BURGER: For private use yes, or it might have been a different Deon, I am not sure.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Is it correct that those of you who were travelling out of the country, were given false passports?

MR BURGER: On the need to know basis on which we worked, I didn't travel on a false passport. I assume that it was at members' disposal.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Let me put the question to you in another way. Certainly Mr Basson was in the business of obtaining false identity documents and false passports, are you aware of that?

MR BURGER: That is possible.

MR LAX: Sorry, just in terms of your last answer, were you aware of that or weren't you? It is possible, doesn't say whether you were aware of it, all it says is that it is possible that he did that? Do you know whether he ...

MR BURGER: I don't know whether he did it, but the facility was available.

MR LAX: And you knew about the facility?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What identity did you use when you travelled to Namibia or then South-West Africa?

MR BURGER: I used my own passport.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Your own passport?

CHAIRPERSON: Did you need passports at that time?

MR BURGER: By plane. It is an interesting question, I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You cannot remember, now that I ask you?

MR BURGER: No, you asked me in whose name, I went under my own name.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But if you are flying to a foreign country, and do something there, the very first thing they are going to look at, is who has flown in and who has flown out in the recent past? It wouldn't really make sense to make use of your own identity, would it?

MR BURGER: I didn't go there to do anything illegal.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I am putting that to you as a general proposition regarding the nature of the CCB's work, forget about yourself.

MR BURGER: I understand what you mean, but at that stage I travelled under my own name.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Then on that same page it say

"...NB, phone Hekkies."

Now, my understanding of the evidence has been that you phone Hekkies when you need things like bombs and so on and so forth, correct?

MR BURGER: I don't know Hekkies.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You don't know who Hekkies van Heerden is?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Nobody told you where they got the limpet mine from for the Early Learning Centre?

MR BURGER: No. As I have told Mr Lax now, I was aware of the facility, but I didn't know the people and I never visited the premises.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Turn to page 14 please, the 19th of April. Once again, the second line

"... more ammunition for Region 6"

Correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Then further down the page it says

"... Bert (which is a reference to you) computer viruses tape ..."

what is that about?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You can't quite remember?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It doesn't ring any bells?

MR BURGER: No, you will have to ask Mr Basson to tell you, I really don't have any idea. I know very little, if anything, about computers.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, you are going to see when we go through other entries in this diary, that certainly as regards those things that we know, when a person's name appears and then there is a dash and then there is a mention made of an event or a project, that relates back to that person. You, to the very best of your knowledge, were not involved in any project or event concerning computer viruses?

MR BURGER: Not that I can remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Not that you can remember, all right. Then you will turn the page, might I just ask you, what is your understanding of what a dummy handgrenade is?

MR BURGER: Of a what?

MR KAHANOVITZ: A dummy handgrenade? What do you call a handgrenade that explodes in the person's hand when they try to activate it?

MR BURGER: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You know what I am referring to, when you doctor a handgrenade so that the person who uses is, blows themselves up?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is that not called a dummy handgrenade?

MR BURGER: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You don't know, all right? Look at the top of the page, once again it says

"... Phone Hekkies, dets for handgrenade ..."

it appears to be a reference to detonators for handgrenades?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you know anything about that?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You are not aware of any project involving Region 6 that involved the use of handgrenades?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. Then turn the page, 25 April, and it is page 16. Look at the entries for Region 6 for the salaries. You will see Chappie Maree has received R6 452-00, are you with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Whereas if you turn back to page 4, you will see in that month, his salary was R3 805-00. Now, why was Mr le Roux being paid, sorry Mr Maree, being paid so much money at the end of April?

MR BURGER: Once again, I would have to draw an inference.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Isn't it a bonus?

MR BURGER: No. I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why should he get paid more than you?

MR BURGER: I don't think he ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: Excuse me?

MR BURGER: I don't think he would have received a bonus on his record as at that date.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, that is based on what you are telling us?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I am just asking you to give us a logical explanation for why he is being paid so much money.

CHAIRPERSON: I think he said he doesn't know, he said he doesn't know. It might be back-pay, we don't know, he said he can only infer.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Look at the top of that page, next to the entry "ten o'clock", it says

"... Region 6, Nico Bessenger ..."

that appears to be an entry for a meeting of Region 6 concerning Nico Bessenger, do you agree with me?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, Nico Bessenger is a person who was high up in SWAPO, correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you attend that meeting?

MR BURGER: I suppose I must have been there, I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger, there is other evidence that ...

MR BURGER: What it says here is

"... Region 6, Nico Bessenger"

MR KAHANOVITZ: But there is other evidence that the CCB was working on a project relating to Nico Bessenger, are you aware of that?

MR BURGER: Yes, it is possible.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You cannot recall?

MR BURGER: I think I have to say that it is an external Region, I cannot discuss it any further.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Okay. Then, the following page, might I just put it to you the reason that you don't want to give me an answer to that question is because you are aware that Region 6 was working on a project encompassing the possible assassination of Nico Bessenger?

MR BURGER: Is that an assumption that you are making?

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, I am putting that to you that that is why you are giving the answers that you are giving.

MR BURGER: No. No, that is not so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Page 17, 28th of April, once again, two entries in roundabout the middle of "things to do", once again

"... phone Hekkies ...",

and once again -

"... ammunition for Region 6"

MR BURGER: I see it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You will also see the last entry,

"... passport and ID photographs for S. le Roux (who is Chappie Maree)"

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, are you prepared to comment on what that passport was being obtained for?

MR BURGER: Inference, external.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right, that seems to be a logical inference. If you could turn the page, page 18, the 9th of May.

You will see the entry at one o'clock, it says -

"... Region 6 (appointment time and under 'things to do' it says) pre-study on priority targets."

All right, so we infer that there was to be a meeting of Region 6 concerning the preparatory studies on the priority targets. Does that sound fair to you?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right, then you look at the bottom left hand page, sorry the bottom left hand corner of the page, you will see the names of the four people attached to Region 6 appear in the left hand column, and in the right hand column reference is made to the targets that they are working on. Andries, we know, is Slang van Zyl, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: We know that he was working on Omar, which is what appears from that entry, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: The reference to SWAPO, what is that a reference to?

MR BURGER: I am assuming it was the incident with the bus, the minibus.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you don't really know?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Then there is a reference to Deon which is a reference to Calla Botha? It says he is working on Two and he is working on Bruce White? Who is Two?

MR BURGER: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: We will get to, it comes up again later. Stephan, is Chappie Maree?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Evans? Which accords with the evidence here, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Bert is you? And that entry is a reference to Von Vinkelstein?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were working on Von Vinkelstein, correct?

MR BURGER: I was supposed to work on him, but I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was Von Vinkelstein?

MR BURGER: He was a person who lived in Namibia.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He was a white member of SWAPO, correct?

MR BURGER: That is correct, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You say you were supposed to be working on him, well, what happened to the project?

MR BURGER: Well, we never actually worked on it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But why, if it says that Slang will work on Omar, and Deon will work on White and Evans will be worked on by Maree and we know that all of those things happened, why would yours not be processed?

MR BURGER: It wasn't done.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That is all you are going to tell us?

MR BURGER: I don't know what more to tell you.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It appears that he is a priority target, correct?

MR BURGER: Well, it is clear that Von Vinkelstein was allocated to me, that I was told to monitor him or get some information about him, but there were no projects or anything on him, although it is external and I don't have to answer any questions.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who assigned him to you?

MR BURGER: The information came from the Co-ordinator, via the Managing Director.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right, so you would then have to travel to Namibia to go and monitor him or get someone to do that job for you?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What did you do?

MR BURGER: Nothing.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You, just of your own accord, decided to drop him?

MR BURGER: No. There were other things that I was busy with.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Namely?

MR BURGER: I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Oh, you can't, all right. Turn the page, the 30th of May, page 19. You will see that the salaries that everyone is getting there, have now jumped rather dramatically.

CHAIRPERSON: At least three or four fold in some cases?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, would you care to explain that?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: I just said to Mr Kahanovitz, once you are asking, that it wasn't a Christmas bonus because it was during May.

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR MARTINI: Chairperson, nowhere on this diary does it say that is a salary. The other ones we have seen "salaris" on the top.

CHAIRPERSON: No, that point is taken, Mr Martini, it doesn't say salary, but perhaps the question can be asked what were these payments, Mr Burger?

MR BURGER: Chairperson, it is definitely not a salary adjustment. For whatever reason there must have been a bonus paid out or - I can't remember. We were barely settled into the Region at that stage, I don't know what it represented, but it must have been some kind of bonus.

CHAIRPERSON: And that ...

MR BURGER: But not based on production.

CHAIRPERSON: I see there are two figures against each name, one is a large amount in the R9 000-00's, in your case in

R11 000-00's, which may or may not incorporate salary, seeing it is the 30th of the month, plus some other money, and then each one has an amount of R701-40, a very particular amount. Do you know what that might have been for?

MR BURGER: I think we were paid a car allowance, but I think Mr Basson will be able to give you a clearer picture, whether it was a car allowance, we also had pager allowances as well. I don't know what it would represent, but there was such an amount, R701-40 which we got additionally.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Kahanovitz, these, all these monies received, that would have been cash, you confirmed that?

MR BURGER: Everything in cash, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Next page 20, the 2nd of June. Now, "Project Maxi", was one of your projects, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes, that is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What was "Project Maxi"?

MR BURGER: It was a foreign project.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That is all you are telling us?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the entry

"... Get Goldie Maxi Makarov bullets ...",

are you prepared to explain that to us?

MR BURGER: I don't know if those two lines form one sentence.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why were you getting bullets for a Makarov?

MR BURGER: I beg your pardon, Makarov?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes? What project does this relate to?

MR BURGER: It could refer to the project of Mr Omar.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you are guessing there?

MR BURGER: Well, because it says Goldie and Goldie was Mr van Zyl's project, his project file, and Makarov bullets, that is the association that I make that it might be for that project.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But this is not, I will show you others, this is not the only reference in this diary to obtaining Makarov ammunition. You will see also on the left hand side of the page it says firstly that you must be picked up at 12H30, do you see that?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And then it says that there is a presentation, Region 6, to the Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it might be, sorry Mr Kahanovitz, it might be introduction, because wasn't this your second day of work? Didn't you say you started on the 1st of ...

MR BURGER: This is 1989 Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, 1989.

MR BURGER: Could you please repeat the question, Mr Kahanovitz?

MR KAHANOVITZ: It says there, it appears to say

"... presentation, Region 6, to the Chairman",

right? Or it could be "aanb", I am just trying to ascertain from you whether you can remember what projects would be presented to the Chairman on the 2nd of June 1989?

MR BURGER: It can only be one of Omar or Evans.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you assuming, you see, we have the strange situation here where you are working on all these external projects that you don't, won't tell us about. Are we to assume that everyone of the external projects that you were working on, was never approved by Gen Webb?

MR BURGER: No, because no project of mine was carried out, externally.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Okay, you won't tell us any of the details, but you are willing to tell us that you were flying all over the place in circumstances where you were dealing with projects that had never received Gen Webb's authorisation?

MR BURGER: You create the impression for the Commission, Mr Kahanovitz, that I went all over. I went to Namibia once.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Turn the page. You will see on the 26th of June, page 21, now under the heading "Koord", item 3

"... pre-studies must be stopped and finalised on file (it seems like)"

Do you know anything about on the 22nd of June about pre-studies being stopped, and why?

MR BURGER: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What was "koord"?

MR BURGER: Co-ordination, co-ordinating.

MR KAHANOVITZ: The following page, page 22, the 28th of June it says, it is a reference to training for Region 6, 21 August to 26 August, does this ring a bell"

MR BURGER: I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But surely if you went on a training course for a week, you would remember?

MR BURGER: No, I cannot remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You cannot remember?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because we have only been told about one training course?

MR BURGER: That is right.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That is the only one you recall?

MR BURGER: Yes. In all honesty, I cannot remember this.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Turn the following page, page 23. There is a reference which appears to suggest that Joe Verster was going to spend some time in Europe, are you aware of him going to Europe?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No? Mr Chairman, I don't know if you want me, I am not going to finish this diary before we, before the close of today.

CHAIRPERSON: We can go on for another 15 minutes, would that ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: We are happy Mr Chairman.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Page 24, the 10th of July. Now, you should read the 10th and the 11th of July, the entries together. You are aware that Region 8 was Namibia?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, Mr Basson has already testified in previous proceedings that a meeting was held where a decision was made to divert the focus of a number of CCB regions to the forthcoming elections that were then scheduled for Namibia, did you attend that meeting?

MR BURGER: I was aware of the attention that had to be paid to Region 8.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you will see for instance at the bottom of the page, he makes certain notations

"... to not burn the place down; election date not to be postponed; disrupt SWAPO meetings; disrupt SWAPO loudspeakers; get snakes",

etc, etc. Do you recall going to a meeting where that was discussed?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You don't? Are you aware of, there are two entries in relation to "spread illness in camps". Are you aware that there is a charge pending against Dr Wouter Basson, concerning the, a CCB project to spread cholera bacteria in the water supply of refugee camps in Namibia at this time?

MR BURGER: I don't know what the charge against Dr Basson is about, but it is possible.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you aware that there was a project in existence at that time, of the CCB, to infect water supplies with cholera bacteria?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: On page 25, you will see, it says Bert (which is you) and it says

"... stop and direct to Region 8 ..."

which appears to indicate that you must focus your attentions on the Namibian region?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is that so?

MR BURGER: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What were you told?

MR BURGER: To disrupt SWAPO supporters.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And how were you going to do that?

MR BURGER: I know what was suggested to us, what to do, they had, our people had to, taxis and buses transporting SWAPO supporters, had to be sabotaged and burnt down.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you were making use of an unaware operative in Windhoek who was going to carry out certain of these tasks for you, correct?

MR BURGER: I think now we are moving to external projects.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, I am just putting it to you that evidence was already led in the Lubowski inquest, where you were identified by somebody by the name of Charles Neelsie, he was known by the alias Taxi, that you were involved in handing certain instructions to him, in relation to disruption of the SWAPO election campaign.

MR BURGER: I don't know him at all.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I see. Do you know who Johan Niemoller is?

MR BURGER: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Verster's relative?

MR BURGER: I heard about him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who gave you the instructions in relation to the destabilisation of the SWAPO election campaign, where did you get them from?

MR BURGER: From Verster.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Gen Webb must have been involved in such a big campaign?

MR BURGER: I assume so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I mean there is no way that the CCB would be able to divert the focus of various regions that were not supposed to be working on Namibia, without his permission?

MR BURGER: No, I will accept that this was not only Region 6 directed towards Region 8, it was the totality of CCB towards Region 8. Such a decision, Mr Verster, would not be able to take on his own, so I assume that Gen Webb would have been aware of it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Are you aware of a project where oil, motor vehicle oil was doctored with acid and the hope was that that oil would be used by certain vehicles that SWAPO was making use of?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: This, where it says

"... direct pro SWAPO social events ..."

what is that about?

MR BURGER: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All right. Just turn the following page, page 26, 14th of July. Maybe we can just start at the bottom of the page, where it says, under item 5

"... look at drinking places in order to use medicines ..."

what do you think the word "medicine" refers to there, in the context of the CCB?

MR BURGER: I don't think I would have wanted some of that, but it probably refers to toxic substances.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, Frik was the Head of Region 8, correct?

MR BURGER: Frik? Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: The, this

"... oil, grease, acid burn holes ..."

and so on and so forth, that is what we have been discussing, the doctoring of the oil, correct?

MR BURGER: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: There are a number of options that are discussed here, arson, it says don't cause explosions, because if you cause explosions, there will be retaliation, and so on, these are notes taken in a meeting, correct?

MR BURGER: Sir, I think this is external, it had nothing to do with my Region.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, with all due respect also, as far as my respectful submission is that, all this may be very interesting, but is it really relevant to what we are doing here and to this inquiry, and in view of the time constraints, I would submit that if it is really not relevant, we should not deal with this at all.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, with respect, it is of great relevance, because we are going to argue that you haven't, at the end of these proceedings, that you haven't even begun to hear what members of Region 6, the applicants that are applying for amnesty, what they were doing. This is directly relevant to just that submission.

I understand obviously, it is a bit ponderous, and it is a bit tedious, but it is the only way to deal with these issues.

MR BURGER: But Mr Chairperson, I have repeated time and again that I will not answer any questions about external projects. I think we must just pass the external aspects.

MR KAHANOVITZ: These meetings were held in South-Africa, correct?

MR BURGER: I am not going to answer.

MR MARTINI: Sorry Chairperson, I just want to get one thing clear, I thought Mr Kahanovitz said Frik is a member of Region 8.

CHAIRPERSON: No, the manager of Region 8.

MR MARTINI: Well, then what is the relevance to Region 6?

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Kahanovitz is saying is that members of Region 6 were involving themselves in Region 8 affairs?

MR MARTINI: Sure, I can accept his saying that, but factually, let's deal with relevant facts.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I am not, it has already been conceded, that is exactly what was happening.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we shall adjourn now for the day, I see that quarter of an hour has gone passed, and Mr Kahanovitz, if you can perhaps think of a speedy way, than going through each and every, we might be here for another three or four days with Mr Burger. Just try to think of a way of getting through it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand the difficulty, but we, you know, to take each entry, it might take very, very long time.

Thank you, we will adjourn now until nine o'clock tomorrow morning, at the same venue.

MS COLERIDGE: Eleven o'clock Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, thank you Ms Coleridge. I forgot, tomorrow morning, there is a memorial service to be held for the late Chief Justice at the High Court which many of the legal representatives here, if not all of them together with us, will be attending, which is starting at ten o'clock in the morning. It has been agreed between us all, that we will start tomorrow or so soon thereafter as is possible, we don't know exactly how long that service will be, but we don't anticipate that it will be too long, because they usually don't last more than an hour. Thank you, so we will adjourn here to this venue, tomorrow at eleven o'clock or so soon thereafter as we may be able to start.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS