Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Morning everybody. We'll continue with Mr Botha's evidence this morning.

CARL CASTELING BOTHA: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (Cont)

Mr Botha, whilst you were in detention in November/December '89, did you know that Mr van Zyl and Mr Hardien were also detained under Section 29?

MR BOTHA: Just for the record I must just state that I have an old rugby injury in my left ear, I'm struggling to hear and I have a bit of a post-nasal drip, which means that I have a bit of a hearing problem at the moment, so with respect, Mr Bizos, I'm just struggling to hear you. I apologise for that, but I did hear your question.

MR BIZOS: I'll raise my voice so that we can get on.

MR LAX: Can I just say, if you put one of these one it's very helpful. The reason I put it on is not because I'm not listening to you in your language, but because from these years of experience I know that these things really help.

MR BOTHA: I appreciate it, Mr Lax, I'm just not used to it, so I would prefer to continue without it for a while.

Mr Bizos, if my memory serves me correctly, I believe that Mr van Zyl, or at least I was in detention and just a few days before my release, Mr van Zyl was arrested. As far as I can recall, I don't believe that they told me that he had been arrested. I cannot recall that.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible - no microphone)

MR BOTHA: Also not. Definitely not him. I definitely wasn't informed regarding that.

MR BIZOS: Did you expect the detention before it took place?

MR BOTHA: Brixton investigated the matter as such that they viewed it as a very high profile security type matter, so they didn't share those particulars with me.

MR BIZOS: No, in your mind, did you believe that you may be detained and you may be called upon to make a statement about what you had done?

MR BOTHA: It was possible, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you and Mr van Zyl discuss the possibility of your detentions?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: Not at all?

MR BOTHA: No. It was just as big a surprise to me and I didn't have the opportunity to communicate with Mr van Zyl in any way.

MR BIZOS: Now when you made that statement you told us yesterday you wanted to say things that would exculpate you, will make you not guilty, or less guilty as possible.

MR BOTHA: At the time of the affidavit I reasoned as such primarily to assist the police within a specific framework and also because I didn't want to compromise the organisation to such an extent that they would not be willing to assist me.

MR BIZOS: In that state of mind you no doubt told them that the bomb at the Early Learning Centre was merely for the purpose of frightening people and that you didn't intend to kill anybody.

MR BOTHA: I gave the facts regarding the bomb as best as I could recall.

MR BIZOS: No, answer the specific question, which is: one of the best serving statements that you could have made to your interrogators in relation to the Early Learning Centre incident, would have been: "We did not intend to injure anybody, we merely wanted to frighten them." That would have been the most self-serving statement you could possibly have made.

MR BOTHA: In the way that you have stated it, yes, but I have told you what my experience was at that point.

MR BIZOS: Do you say that you told your interrogators what the purpose of the bomb at the Early Learning Centre was?

MR BOTHA: As the facts were known to me at that point.

MR BIZOS: You told them.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And did they record those facts?

MR BOTHA: They did.

MR BIZOS: As you told them?

MR BOTHA: Yes, they did.

MR BIZOS: And did they express satisfaction that they accepted that portion of your story?

MR BOTHA: I don't think these were facts which were known to them, so yes.

MR BIZOS: And they were pleased to hear that the purpose was not to kill anybody but merely to frighten them.

MR BOTHA: I cannot say that they were pleased to hear that.

MR BIZOS: In any event you have a very clear recollection that you told them what the purpose was?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And that was recorded in your statement and you signed it.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Now you see, would you please have a look at that statement and try and find where in that statement you told your interrogators that the purpose was merely to frighten people and not to kill them.

CHAIRPERSON: The statement's in bundle B, pages 1 and following through to 10.

MR BIZOS: Please take your time ...

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR BIZOS: Please take your time and just show us the page and the lines where you say what the purpose of the bomb was.

MR BOTHA: I state quite clearly there that

"Shortly afterwards we heard a bang"

It's as I've stated previously.

MR BIZOS: No, no, just listen please. Show us where you say what the purpose of the bomb was.

MR BOTHA: I do not see it the way that you want it at the moment, I have simply stated it as I saw it and I cannot explain it any differently to you.

MR BIZOS: Would you accept from me that having read your statement very carefully again over night, that that exculpatory or partly exculpatory statement nowhere appears in your statement?

MR BOTHA: I simply see the fact that the bomb had to be set off.

MR BIZOS: No, we're not talking about letting the bomb off, please credit us with a little intelligence and try to, or rather, stop trying to avoid the kernel of the question. Do you agree that on a very careful reading of the whole of this statement, nowhere therein do you say what the purpose of the bomb was?

MR BOTHA: I will answer again if you will give me the opportunity. I stated to the investigating team that I had to detonate the bomb and that is what I've stated.

MR BIZOS: Do you think that you've answered the question?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Well let's leave the rest for argument on this particular point. You see, you told the Committee a short while ago that you had a distinct recollection that you told them what the purpose of the bomb was to ...(indistinct) that is was not to kill anybody, but merely to frighten them. Did you or did you not say that a short while ago?

MR BOTHA: Then I should just rephrase, perhaps I conveyed it incorrectly.

MR BIZOS: No, let's - do you agree that that is what you said?

MR BOTHA: Possibly I meant that I had to detonate the bomb.

MR BIZOS: No, I'm not asking you what you meant, do you agree that that is what you said?

MR BOTHA: Possibly I stated it as such but I did not mean it as such.

MR BIZOS: Not "moontlik", do you agree - you know this "moontlik" has already been discredited by His Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman in the Webster Inquiry, here "moontlik" doesn't cut much ice. Do you agree or disagree that this is what you said?

MR BOTHA: If I stated it as such, I request the opportunity to rectify it ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Right, now just before we go further ....

MR BOTHA: May I also have the opportunity please? I stated that I had to detonate the bomb, that was my primary task. I was there to detonate the bomb. Bottom line.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the bottom line is, did you speak the truth or did you lie to the Committee when you said that you told the investigators that the purpose of the bomb was not to injure anybody, but in order to frighten?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I possibly said that to the investigating team, I was in a Section 29 situation. If I stated it, I ask you once again for the opportunity to amend it by saying that I told them that my exclusive purpose at the scene was to detonate the bomb.

MR BIZOS: You did not, in answer to my question previously, say it is possible, you said that you had a definite recollection that this is what you told the investigating officers. You see, it's no good answering "dis moontlik", I will not accept that as an answer for the things that you have specifically said.

MR BOTHA: If I stated it and they did not embody it within my affidavit, it cannot not hold water. I was under pressure, I signed what was given to me and that is the matter.

MR BIZOS: Oh, are you now saying that things were omitted from your statement, material things were omitted from your statement and you signed it in ignorance of that omission? Is that what you are now saying?

MR BOTHA: No, that's not what I said.

MR BIZOS: Well what are you saying?

MR BOTHA: I say that I told the investigating team that my share in the entire project was merely to detonate the bomb, to ensure that the bomb went off.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, if I could just ask a question.

This statement here, Mr Botha, under what circumstances was it made? I know it was in Section 29, but were you sitting across the table from the investigating officer or were you given a piece of paper and told to go into your cell and write it? Did it take three weeks to write, did it take half an hour to write? If you could just give us ...

MR BOTHA: Honourable Chairperson, I'm not precisely certain how long it took to write it, they used various methods, among others, they came to interrogate me and then made notes, they also asked me to put certain things in writing in the privacy of my cell and upon another occasion I sat with them and sat across the investigating officer, where he was also taking notes.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, so it was taken over a period of time, some of it was written by yourself privately, some of it was in response to answers given to questions?

MR BOTHA: That is how I recall it.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Well you see what I'm going to put to you is the fact that it does not appear is clear that you didn't tell them. Would you accept that as a general proposition? You couldn't have told them, because it isn't there. Would you accept that?

MR BOTHA: I will stand by the fact that it was a Section 29 statement which was made under pressure, and I wasn't certain of what I said to them regarding this.

MR BIZOS: Well why didn't you say that earlier when I asked you whether you had told them what the purpose of the bomb was? Why didn't you say that: "I don't remember, I was under pressure, it was Section 29, I don't remember"? Why do you change your evidence when the ridiculous nature of your evidence comes home to you when the document is shown to you?

MR BOTHA: It was not my intention, I must have expressed myself incorrectly.

MR BIZOS: Expressing oneself incorrectly may be in relation to a phrase, may be in relation to a time, may be in relation to some other minor aspects, how can one express oneself incorrectly in relation to the very important issue as to what the purpose of the bomb was?

MR BOTHA: My objective with the bomb was to detonate it, that was my objective.

MR BIZOS: Well I won't repeat the question, it's obvious that you don't want to answer it.

Now may I suggest to you that the reason why there is nothing in it, is because you didn't know what the other participants of this crime were going to say, you didn't know what Van Zyl had said or might say and you did not know what Hardien had said or might say and this is why you kept quiet on this very issue. What do you say to that?

MR BOTHA: It didn't matter to me what they said, I knew according to what was said to me, what I was supposed to do and it didn't matter to me what Mr van Zyl or Mr Hardien said.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that your case would have been substantially more favourably viewed if the intention was not to injure or kill anybody? Would you agree with that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, but that's debatable.

MR BIZOS: Well why is the obvious so debatable?

MR BOTHA: I don't view it as the obvious, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: In your capacity as a policeman, didn't you ask people: "Why did you shoot, why did you pull the knife, why did this happen or why did that happen"? Isn't that an obvious question to ask?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it must be.

MR BIZOS: And isn't it obvious for people to give a less serious intent for doing what they would have to admit they did than a more serious one? Is that not obvious?

MR BOTHA: I don't think that this is less serious, but the point of the matter is that I had an SPM Russian manufactured limpet mine in my possession, I set off a bomb in an urban area, I was part of a project which was aimed at detonating a bomb in a residential area, so I cannot think that it was less serious. It's all the same to me. To my knowledge this was what I knew, I was supposed to detonate the bomb, I was to ensure that the bomb went off. Any one of those.

MR BIZOS: Well you made yourself guilty of the explosion of a bomb, you made yourself guilty of the laws that Parliament had passed and by a government to which you were so loyal, that would be tantamount to an act of terrorism. Would you agree with that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now wouldn't it have been the obvious things to say: "But we never intended to injure anybody, we only wanted to frighten them"?

MR BOTHA: That is why the answer in my statement states expressly that I was a member of a State organisation which authorised it and within our framework legalised it.

MR BIZOS: But you know, this is nonsense that you thought that it was lawful, why did you want to keep it away from the police? Why did you lie, why did you defeat the ends of justice, why did Gen Krappies Engelbrecht tell you that he would use his good offices in order to defeat the ends of justice? What nonsense is this about legality?

MR BOTHA: It is fear, fear brings about that one doesn't talk about this class of thing. There were two different structures within the State, the Defence Force and the Police, who at times would be one another's arch enemies.

MR BIZOS: You say that you were merely employed to push the button, to provide the - to take the bomb and press the button, is that what your function was going to be?

MR BOTHA: No, that is not what I have said.

MR BIZOS: What was your function?

MR BOTHA: Within my framework my function was to accompany Mr van Zyl and to ensure that the limpet mine would safely reach its destination, to activate it, to arm it, as I said yesterday, to prepare it for the final phase before it's detonation.

MR BIZOS: Let me put it in your own words. Do you agree that arming the bomb is rendering assistance to the person who commits the crime or exploding a bomb, that you were his accomplice?

MR BOTHA: Yes, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: And did you exercise any personal discretion as to whether this act should be committed against this property for one reason or another, or did you merely blindly follow what Staal Burger had told you and what Van Zyl was going to do?

MR BOTHA: "Blindly follow" is a bit strongly put, I was in an organisation where one would receive an instruction and I carried out the instruction.

MR BIZOS: Were you to obey orders without questioning the why-fore? If go an order to put a bomb in a nursery school to kill the nursery school children, would you have done it?

MR BOTHA: At this point I just want to make use of the opportunity just to put maximum disruption within context for you. Maximum disruption was not regarded as the most severe form of action, it was the most severe form of disruption within the context of the project, within the context of the person who had to be disrupted. So if maximum disruption meant that we would have to destroy the building, then that is how I regarded maximum disruption. I served within a State dispensation within a Defence Force set-up, where my primary function was to carry out orders and that is what I did.

MR BIZOS: Mr Botha, I didn't ask you about a double-talk of the CCB and its articulated policy in slogans, I asked you a simple question. If you were asked to arm a bomb in order to kill a group of nursery school children, would you have done it without any exercising any sort of discretion?

MR BOTHA: I cannot see that such an instruction would have been given, but the point of the matter is that if an instruction was given to me which had been approved on the level that I believed it would be approved on, I had no other choice but to carry out the instruction.

MR BIZOS: Please answer the question in relation to the specific facts that I put to you, because I want to establish whether you as an individual thought that you had to exercise a discretion in relation to the crimes that you were committing. Yes, or no. Would you have armed the bomb in order to kill a group of nursery school children?

MR BOTHA: That is too hypothetical, it didn't happen and I'm not going to commit myself to that. I'm not prepared to answer yes or no.

MR BIZOS: But we want to test how you viewed your position. You say that if an order was given you had to act, we are trying to test from you by taking it to its extreme limits, whether you had a discretion or not. If you don't want to answer the question, say so, please do not try to waylay me by double CCB talk.

MR BOTHA: It's not double CCB talk. I am just telling you my experience of it.

MR LAX: Can I just interpose for one second.

Mr Botha, really, the question's a very simple one, did you apply discretion or didn't you? Did you simply follow orders or did you have any discretion in the matter? Yes or no.

MR BOTHA: Mr Lax, I carried out my instructions, that is what I did.

MR LAX: And therefore in the context of Mr Bizos' question - and you've already answered it in relation to this particular incident, if the instruction had been to kill those people, you would have done so.

MR BOTHA: That's correct. I have stated this previously.

MR LAX: You didn't question that? Or did you?

MR BOTHA: I didn't question it because it was never said to me, I was simply told that the bomb had to be detonated. At a later stage during our journey to Cape Town, I was told what the purpose of the bomb was and I continued. And I must emphasise again that it wasn't my project, so I didn't know more than what was said to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: In your amnesty application you say in paragraph 1.3, that everything contained in Mr van Zyl's affidavit is true and correct and that you associate yourself in particular to Van Zyl's version on the Early Learning Centre.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: The reference Mr Chairman, is pages 33 to 34 of bundle A ...(indistinct) paragraphs on page - page 11, paragraph 1.3 and the reference to Van Zyl are contained on pages 33 to 43 of Van Zyl's affidavit, which I believe are contained on page 107 to 114, according to my note, of bundle A. Now do you adhere to that to this day?

MR BOTHA: I would just have to read the content, it is a statement which was undersigned a number of years ago by me. I see what you have referred to.

MR BIZOS: Yes, you made a statement under oath in paragraph 1.3, do you stick to it or do you want to amend it, qualify it, correct it, dispute it? What do you want to do about it?

MR BOTHA: I signed the statement as such. I would have to study the document for its content once again, there are many documents that I have signed including this one. I see what you have referred to, is there anything specific that you would like to ask me about?

MR BIZOS: You also say in your ... on page A11, paragraph 2, that your evidence at the Harms Commission was truthful, do you want to stand by that?

MR BOTHA: By nature of the situation there were certain things that I did not state before the Harms Commission, so there are matters regarding which I did not testify completely open-heartedly before the Harms Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: But those matters that you did testify to, were they truthful?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall my evidence before the Harms Commission. I know that at the time of the evidence before the Harms Commission we were instructed not to speak about certain things and to speak about other things. So I'm not entirely familiar with the content of my evidence before the Harms Commission.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) old-fashioned fundamentals. You swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, to Judge Harms.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Did you or didn't you?

MR BOTHA: As I have stated, I cannot recall what was said. I also undersigned a Section 29 statement, so I cannot tell you with one hundred percent certainty that I said everything before the Harms Commission as I was supposed to. I stated my evidence according to my instructions from the higher levels of the hierarchy.

MR BIZOS: When did you become uncertain as to whether you told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth to the Harms Commission?

MR BOTHA: What I am saying to you is if I could have the opportunity to study my Harms Commission evidence, I might be able to answer your question with greater clarity. I'm not certain whether I spoke the truth about everything.

MR BIZOS: But did you in your application for amnesty before this Committee, if you had those doubts about your evidence, why did you say that you gave evidence honestly before the Harms Commission? Why didn't you have those reservations then and only now when you know that you may be opposed to not having told the truth?

MR BOTHA: Mr Bizos, that's not what I'm saying. I have various statements before me, I would just like the opportunity to reacquaint myself with the content of my evidence, then I will be able to answer your question.

MR BIZOS: At the time that you took an oath in your application for amnesty you said that you gave honest and truthful evidence before the Commission, why did you not have your present doubts about whether you had done so before the Harms Commission? Why didn't you express them then and why do you express them now?

MR BOTHA: I'm trying to tell you if I stated that then I stated it. I'm just asking you because I'm in front of you and a Commission today, I'm asking for the opportunity to re-examine my evidence before the Harms Commission, so I can give you a more comprehensive answer.

MR BIZOS: But I'd like an honest answer to the question that I have already asked before I accept your invitation. Why did you not have these reservations about whether or not you told the truth to the Commission at the time that you said that you did honestly tell the truth to the Commission? Why didn't you have those reservations at that time? Please answer that question.

MR BOTHA: I am before the Commission to tell the whole truth, that is why I am asking you to allow me the opportunity to reacquaint myself with the full truth.

MR BIZOS: Well I can't do more than ask you the same question three or four times, we will proceed without you having answered that question effectively.

Now did you tell the Commission that you were not aware of any project involving the elimination of Adv Omar and moreover, that you were not aware of any project at all where assassination was contemplated? Did you say that?

MR BOTHA: Contemplated on Mr Omar?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR BOTHA: Are you saying contemplated in general, or contemplated with regard to Mr Omar?

MR BIZOS: Well Omar and generally.

MR BOTHA: Definitely not Mr Omar and regarding Webster, I have already testified before the Commission.

MR BIZOS: Just let me repeat. "He told the Commission that he were not aware of any project involving the elimination of Omar", did you say that?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Was that the truth that you were not aware of it?

MR BOTHA: That is the truth.

MR BIZOS: You didn't know anything about it as a result of reports made to you by Ferdi Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard never told me that he was supposed to kill Mr Omar.

MR BIZOS: He never said that to you?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: When did you learn that for the first time?

MR BOTHA: Throughout 11 years things were spoken of and things were said, I didn't know what the scope of Mr van Zyl's projects was.

MR BIZOS: And did you say that you were not aware of any project at all where an assassination was contemplated?

MR BOTHA: When, Mr Bizos, when did I say this?

MR BIZOS: When you gave evidence before the Commission, at pages G2134 to 5.

MR BOTHA: Before the Harms Commission?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR BOTHA: I stated that.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, it's F and not G, Mr Chairman.

Now you've already told us you were deliberately untruthful to Judge Harms, first of all because of the Webster killing.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And what about all this so-called monitoring, what was the purpose of all the monitoring that you did?

MR BOTHA: I have said before that the purpose of the monitoring is first of all to get additional information with the plan to launch a project.

MR BIZOS: There has been evidence from Mr Verster and others that the CCB was not an intelligence gathering organisation, it was to execute the orders given in relation to the harm to individuals and property. Do you agree or disagree with that evidence?

MR BOTHA: I agree to an extent. In the second part of my answer I will say to you that with the planning of a project means that you cannot launch it if you have limited information, the monitoring could lead to a future project.

MR BIZOS: Now is it not correct that such monitoring that may have been done was in order to determine how to kill or disrupt people?

MR BOTHA: It is so to an extent, but you have to add "if", "how or if" somebody must be killed or damage be done.

MR BIZOS: Yes but you see if you were monitoring someone as to how best to kill him, if somebody decided to kill him, is really helping in the commission of a crime for the purposes of killing him.

MR BOTHA: Sir, that is why I'm saying it to you now it is the pre-study, the run-up to a potential project. If, hypothetically, I monitor Bruce White and he turned and he's a firm believer now of the National Party, hypothetically I will not continue with the project. If I can see that he is what we think he is and I get a profile and I make a presentation or a submission and on the basis of my idea of this person a project will follow.

MR BIZOS: A short while ago I asked you whether you were aware of any plans to kill Adv Omar and I asked you whether Mr Ferdi Barnard had ever told you about it, do you remember what your answer was? That: "It's 11 years ago, I don't remember when someone may or may not have.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: When you were giving evidence before the Harms Commission did you know that attempts had to been made to kill Adv Omar?

MR BOTHA: I was personally involved with it, but they could possibly have said at that stage that there was a project for the elimination of Mr Omar.

MR BIZOS: Leave out the word "moontlik", I told you that it doesn't cut any ice here, because that doesn't mean anything. When something is "moontlik" it's not evidence. You cannot avoid my questions by that manner. When you were giving evidence before the Harms Commission, were you aware that there were steps that had been taken to kill Omar, or not?

MR BOTHA: Will "miskien" suit you better? "Miskien", that suit you better than "moontlik"?

MR BIZOS: No Sir, answer the question. Did you know at the time that you gave evidence at the Harms Commission that plans had been set afoot in order to kill Omar, yes or no? "Maybe" is not an answer in this situation, because you either had knowledge or you did not have knowledge, it's not something that is outside your own experience. Please answer the question.

MR BOTHA: I heard that Mr van Zyl had a project going with specific reference to Adv Omar. What the project entailed I was not quite sure about.

MR BIZOS: Were you asked at the Harms Commission whether you knew of any plan to kill Adv Omar?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: Well if I assure you that at page 2134 you were asked by Mr Luitingh(?)

"Up until the beginning of the end of last year you were brought under the impression that there was also a project with regard to the elimination of Omar"

and the answer was:

"No."

Do you recall that?

MR BOTHA: If it is stated here, yes. You will also see at the top of the page

"You were told about the Omar project."

"The last time I heard that there was a project. What the nature of the project was I cannot say."

MR BIZOS: Very well, take that as well because it doesn't make any difference for the ... You did say those things, the record is correct about this?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Would you please contrast that with page 6 of bundle A, the third paragraph. Please read it out.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 6, bundle A - may page 6 ...

MR BIZOS: Bundle B ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle B, page 6, third paragraph.

MR BIZOS: Just read it out aloud please.

MR BOTHA

"Nick then gave Van Zyl a bottle with pills. This pill was intended for Omar, an attorney in Cape Town. Peaches, an informer of Van Zyl had to smuggle this to Omar in order to give him a heart attack. I did not know much about this. At a later stage I heard from Ferdi that he was approached by Van Zyl in order to get information on Omar."

CHAIRPERSON: I think just on the interpretation, "to kill him, to assassinate him".

INTERPRETER: The Interpreter apologises.

MR LAX: Well just read further on, carry on reading.

MR BOTHA

"Van Zyl then continued with his leave"

MR LAX: Oh sorry, that's ...

MR BIZOS: Now do you agree that that evidence in your, or that statement is in direct conflict with what you told the Commission?

CHAIRPERSON: When you're talking of Commission, you're talking of Harms?

MR BIZOS: Harms.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think if you could just mention the name Harms, because sometimes we'll get confused with what's said here and there.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that page 6 of bundle B, paragraph 3 is in direct conflict to what is contained at page 2134 of the Harms Commission, yes or no?

MR BOTHA: Sir, that is why I told you at a previous opportunity ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, start off by answering the question directly, yes or no?

MR BOTHA: Mr Bizos, I once again do not want to enter into an argument with you, I cannot answer it on a yes or no, I will answer it in the way in which I can.

MR BIZOS: Try to do it your way.

MR BOTHA: This is my style, this is the way in which I answer questions, that is why I told you I was under Section 29 detention, there was confusion concerning the Harms Commission. You heard evidence in this regard. It was over a period of 11 years that certain things - and I have to state this for the record, that certain things I wanted to forget and certain things that I could not forget, that is why I take the opportunity to sit in front of this Commission to make a full disclosure and to give you the answers to your questions. What is stated here is true, I cannot deny it or dispute it, but I can also say that I made this to give as much as possible to the investigative team and also to give them as little as possible. So in front of the Harms Commission, I want you to see that in the light of the circumstances under which I made this statement. I can see the discrepancies concerning my evidence in front of the Harms Commission, and as you pointed out, I did say in front of the Harms Commission that at a later stage I became aware of a project. Once again it was not my project, I did not do research on this project ... was Omar supposed to fall ill because of the pill or was he supposed to be killed using this tablet or pill? That is why I'm not applying for amnesty for the Omar incident, because it was not my project. All these questions, and this is my submission, you had to ask of Van Zyl. I cannot answer for him. I cannot see the relevance of it.

MR BIZOS: May I remind you that the substance of your answer in relation to a passage of time is completely irrelevant to these two documents. You signed the document in December 1989 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: 1990.

MR BIZOS: 1989, the statement.

CHAIRPERSON: '89, sorry, thank you.

MR BIZOS: You were giving evidence in 1990 and your state of mind couldn't possibly have suffered by the passage of so little a period of time about such a dramatic event as to whether or not Adv Omar was going to be killed or not, or whether you had knowledge that Adv Omar was going to be killed or not.

MR BOTHA: I will highlight two factors, the one was uncertainty, the second one was fear. Together with that there were elements within our structure and also from the higher hierarchy who worked emotionally on the conscious members in a cell in Region 6, and based on those influences I made certain statements, right or wrong.

MR LAX: May I just interpose, Mr Bizos, may I just ask something?

MR BIZOS: Yes, certainly.

MR LAX: You've said it again now and you've said it earlier and I was going to ask you about it but the flow of the questioning moved on, so I was going to reserve it for later, but you said it again now, something about instructions from higher levels at the time of Harms.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes. At that stage there was uncertainty in our cell and I'm going to use a word that is used a lot, will there be backing from the Generals in Staff, will there be backing from the politicians, will the State President distance himself from us? And because of these factors there was a lot of confusion, there was confusion in our cell about what we had to say, what we didn't or must not say. And that was the situation that was at the order of the day.

MR LAX: Yes, that's a state of confusion, I want to know what your instructions were from the higher levels.

MR BOTHA: As far as I can recall we had to talk about things that were known within certain guidelines.

MR LAX: Does that mean you had to withhold the truth as long as you thought it wasn't known?

MR BOTHA: I accepted that is what was said.

MR LAX: And who were the higher levels, individuals that spoke to you?

MR BOTHA: That was the message that came through and I assume it came from Verster to our Co-ordinator to our Regional Manager. That's the impression that I had.

MR LAX: Yes, but the question is, who told you that this was the instruction?

MR BOTHA: Sir, it had to come right through from the Generals to Verster, because Verster was - there was an argument between Verster and the Generals and that is the assumption that was made.

MR LAX: No, you're not answering my question.

MR BOTHA: I can't mention a specific person, Sir.

MR LAX: No I'm saying, who told you this? Somebody must have sat you down in a meeting or in a group and said: "Look guys, this is the instruction from above." I'm not asking you to assume that ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: I accept it was Mr Burger.

MR LAX: Thank you. Sorry Mr Bizos, please continue.

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't the simple answer to my questions have been that: "We in the CCB decided not to disclose to the Harms Commission that there were any killings within the borders of South Africa, nor any conspiracies or attempts to kill within the borders of South Africa"? Isn't that what the decision was and weren't you carrying out that instruction deliberately before Harms?

MR BOTHA: That specific instruction was not given to me. My involvement in the Webster incident, I worked independently or I decided independently with Mr Barnard not to talk about it. They never told me not to talk about other potential murders, because I never had such a project. I never had a project where there would be the loss of life or the result would have been the loss of life.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that if the proposition that I put to you is correct, that there was such a decision, it would cover the contradiction between your Section 29 statement and your evidence before the Commission?

MR BOTHA: You can read it like that, yes. It is not how I saw it though.

MR LAX: Sorry, are you saying you didn't know at that stage of any project that involved the killing of someone internally?

MR BOTHA: Except for the project that Mr Verster approved, this is the project of Mr Barnard where we decided we will not talk about it. Concerning Adv Omar, my memory is a bit vague concerning that. I know that there was a project and I spoke within the framework of what I knew at that stage, I did not think it was my place to talk about another individual's project.

MR LAX: You see my difficulty with your answer is this, at the time you testified at Harms you'd already made that statement, that Section 29 statement.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, but I also told the Commission yesterday what my view was concerning the Section 29 meeting.

MR LAX: Yes, but regardless of your mental condition and the affects of being incarcerated, the fact is that you told them the truth in that statement with regard to the pills and all that stuff and it's explicitly said in there that you knew that Omar was to be eliminated. So if that is the case, how could you say that when you testified before Harms, you didn't know of any plan to kill anybody other than Webster? Do you see the problem?

MR BOTHA: I do. As you've said I knew, I could not have known one hundred percent because I was never involved in the pre-study or the approval with regard to the project.

CHAIRPERSON: Because in that statement at page 4 you say

"He further told me that Peaches was tasked to shoot Omar"

So now we know that you weren't part of the project, but I mean if your colleagues start talking, was there any reason to - you obviously had no reason to doubt that, otherwise you wouldn't have put it in the statement.

MR BOTHA: I beg your pardon, Mr Chairperson, are you talking about page 6 or 4?

CHAIRPERSON: Page 4 and it's just the one line paragraph, fourth from the bottom.

"He further told me that Peaches was tasked to shoot Omar"

and then you carry on after that and you talk about the heart attack pills, on page 6.

MR BOTHA: This is what Ferdi told me, Mr Chairperson. It was not his project, so I could not say with certainty that this is how it was.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I mean I can understand that because you weren't there. I also can't say many things for certainty because I didn't see them personally, but I accept them because I've been told that they've happened. You know if I come home from my work and my wife tells me what she did, I accept that, I don't have to say "Well I'm not certain that she did that." There's certain things that people tell you that you accept, specially if you're going to repeat them in a statement.

MR BOTHA: I understand what you're saying.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean you can't say you didn't - obviously we all know you can't say for certainty about what other people did if you weren't there, but then why repeat what they tell you in a statement if you're not satisfied that that was the situation?

MR BOTHA: That was the state of mind in which I was when I made this statement.

MR LAX: You see it wasn't just any old person that told you this, it was your close friend who told you this.

MR BOTHA: I accept it so, yes.

MR LAX: And you would generally accept what he told you to generally be the truth, he wasn't going to lie to you.

MR BOTHA: I hear what you're saying.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, for that reference.

But even more startling is at the end of that paragraph 3 on page 6 you say:

"An offer was made by Van Zyl to Ferdi for R50 000 to kill Omar."

Now where did you get that information?

MR BOTHA: It was mentioned at a stage, I cannot say exactly when.

MR BIZOS: From whom did you get that information?

MR BOTHA: It was very obvious that it came from Mr Barnard.

MR BIZOS: And nothing could have been clearer, that there was a plan to kill internally, wasn't there?

MR BOTHA: Somewhere in another statement I also stated that Mr Barnard said that he was not quite sure if Mr van Zyl was serious or not.

MR BIZOS: Now in relation to the Early Learning Centre you did mention it in your statement under Section 29, did you speak about it before the Commission, the Harms Commission?

MR BOTHA: About what, Sir?

MR BIZOS: About your role in the Early Learning Centre bomb incident.

MR BOTHA: I presume I did, I'm not hundred percent clear on that. I'm sure I did.

MR BIZOS: You're sure you did?

MR BOTHA: In all probability, yes.

MR BIZOS: You didn't have any problem about speaking about it?

MR BOTHA: Can I look at my statement?

MR BIZOS: Yes, well ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think that Mr Bizos is talking about the evidence given at the Harms Commission.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR LAX: Sorry, your microphone Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) any difficulty?

MR BOTHA: Not that I'm aware of, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Not that you're aware of.

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: Was there a statement sanitised - you know what I mean by that, made more favourable by your legal advisers at the time to put into the Harms Commission's record and not the one that appears in bundle B of the 29th - of 12th of December '89? Was there another statement?

MR BOTHA: Not that I'm aware of, I'm not sure Sir.

MR BIZOS: You're not sure.

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone advise you to claim privilege in relation to the Early Learning Centre before the Harms Commission?

MR BOTHA: There were a few cases where we had to plead, I'm not sure if this was one of them.

MR BIZOS: Was that advice given to you?

MR BOTHA: Sir, it was the acceptable norm that where the result would be self-incrimination we had to plead.

MR BIZOS: But by that stage when you came to give evidence, didn't you know that Van Zyl had spoken about it?

MR BOTHA: I possibly knew, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you claim privilege in relation to Rosscam's car?

MR BOTHA: I think I did.

MR BIZOS: And was that on advice?

MR BOTHA: I accept it was.

MR BIZOS: Now do you agree that the person that was supposed to burn the car, burn out the car, didn't exist?

MR BOTHA: No, I will not admit that.

MR BIZOS: Well if he did exist he wasn't used for the purposes of burning the car.

MR BOTHA: That I would agree on. He did exist.

MR BIZOS: But nevertheless you and who else shared the sum of money and held out to your superiors that the money was given to this person?

MR BOTHA: Me and Mr Barnard more specifically, yes.

MR BIZOS: I thought that you were doing these things for the love of the fatherland and country.

MR BOTHA: That is precisely the way it was.

MR BIZOS: Including the misappropriation of your country's funds?

MR BOTHA: No, it was a meagre R5½-thousand.

MR BIZOS: Some people have to work for a year to earn that.

MR BOTHA: Those persons didn't place themselves in a position where they had to burn out a vehicle for the purposes of the organisation's objectives.

MR BIZOS: So patriotism is a relative thing, it can be betrayed for a small sum of money.

MR BOTHA: No, it was part of it. I could not not have put a claim in, then it would have been clear that Geoffrey had not burnt out the car, so I had to follow through with the entire progress and claim money for the Coloured man by the name of Geoffrey.

MR BIZOS: Now in your application for amnesty you refer to Van Zyl's affidavit.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 1.3 as far as I can recall.

MR BIZOS: Did you read that affidavit carefully before you incorporated it into your statement as the truth?

CHAIRPERSON: Page 11.

MR BOTHA: I did read it possibly, I don't know how carefully but I did read it.

MR BIZOS: Now do you agree that there are contradictions between your evidence, your statements and the statements of Van Zyl and the evidence of Van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: Regarding my Section 29 statement and his statement?

MR BIZOS: Yes, and also in relation to the evidence.

MR BOTHA: With regard to my Section 29 statement and his statement, yes.

MR BIZOS: Why did you unreservedly confirm the correctness of Van Zyl's affidavit when you knew that there were differences between you?

MR BOTHA: Those were the differences, as I stated, were in my Section 29 statement, which I accept as having been incorrect.

MR BIZOS: Now we will argue about those differences, that they are material differences and that the reason for these differences is that statements were made originally at a time when the one did not know what the other one had said.

MR BOTHA: Once again I will tell you briefly, perhaps I haven't made my point clear, the fact of the matter is that I simply went along to detonate the bomb. Everything that you have said is possible and all other matters related to that possibility, but my primary purposes was to assist Mr van Zyl, due to my expertise regarding explosives and more specifically the SPM limpet mine.

MR BIZOS: Well let's deal with a number of the issues from you. Were you or were you not in the car when the bomb was activated?

MR BOTHA: I was in the car.

MR BIZOS: Insofar as anyone may have said that you were not in the car at that time was untrue?

MR BOTHA: You have asked me and I said I was in the car.

MR BIZOS: Did you press the button or did someone else press the button?

MR BOTHA: I pressed the button.

MR BIZOS: If anyone says that someone else pressed the button, that evidence isn't correct.

MR BOTHA: Once again, I have told you I pressed the button.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone try to press the button before you did?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Who?

MR BOTHA: Mr Abram van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: And before Mr van Zyl, did anyone attempt to let the bomb go off?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Did you change the batteries?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: If anyone says that the batteries were changed and that was the reason why there was this delay in letting the bomb off, will that evidence be correct or incorrect?

MR BOTHA: My response is that I did not exchange the batteries.

CHAIRPERSON: Were the batteries changed?

MR BOTHA: Not as far as I know.

MR BIZOS: Was there anything wrong with the remote?

MR BOTHA: The remote stalled in detonating the bomb, I examined it, there were various possible factors, such as the safety or a contact point which didn't make the connection. It took me a number of seconds to examine the device and then I activated it.

MR BIZOS: Was there any plan at any stage that Hardien would press the button in your and Van Zyl's absence?

MR BOTHA: I think that was part of the pre-study. I think it was part of the initial plan.

MR BIZOS: Were you and Van Zyl dropped away from the vicinity of the centre shortly before the button was triggered?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: If anyone says that was so, would that be untrue?

MR BOTHA: My answer is no.

MR BIZOS: You're not prepared to comment on why this conflicting evidence was given, conflicting between you and Hardien, Hardien and Van Zyl and you and Van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: You asked me a question and I gave you an answer.

MR MARTINI: Chairperson, I've missed all that, something went wrong with ...

CHAIRPERSON: How long have you been ...

MR MARTINI: Just now, the last issue about ...(no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, would you mind just repeating. I think just go back to about where you were asking about the contradictions in the evidence, if you could just repeat that for us please.

MR BIZOS: Are you able to explain why in such a simple transaction as pressing the button for a bomb to go off, there would be contradictions between you and Hardien, Hardien and Van Zyl, you and Van Zyl? Can you explain why those contradictions may have come about?

MR BOTHA: I have given you my version which I accept as the correct version.

MR BIZOS: Did you yourself ever say that you and Van Zyl were dropped off some distance away from the centre?

MR BOTHA: I did say that at a certain stage.

MR BIZOS: Now what was the purpose of that untruth? If your present evidence is correct.

MR BOTHA: I will once again refer you to my Section 29 statement and everything that went along with that. I do not see the necessity to elaborate on this yet again, I've explained the reason to you at the time of deposing my Section 29 statement.

MR BIZOS: Was there any discussion with you that it was a Coloured woman that was going to place the bomb in the hall?

MR BOTHA: I suspect that I also stated it as such in my Section 29 statement.

MR BIZOS: But what is the purpose of that untruth? Am I to understand that there was no such discussion?

MR BOTHA: It is a possible inference that I drew due to a discussion that I heard between Van Zyl and Hardien and everything that went along with that. As I've said, I cannot say for certainty where it comes from.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

Just to get back to that last one about being dropped off, you're saying you were definitely not dropped off.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You stayed in the vehicle the whole time.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: For what possible purpose? If you want to make up facts to mislead the investigator or whatever, what can you achieve by saying that you got out of the car? Nothing turned around whether you were in the car the whole time or if you got out of for a short while, so why should it even come into your mind at all to say it, if it's such an insignificant little detail that has no consequence at all?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, my only answer is merely because I was completely uncertain of what to say during my Section 29 statement, because I didn't know what, where, how, what I was supposed to say. It was my only motivation at that point.

MR BIZOS: The passage about being left some distance behind, the sixth paragraph on page 5 of B, Mr Chairman. Now was the mechanism, the calculator ever handed to Hardien?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone - did you hear anyone say that it was?

MR BOTHA: No, except that I think I stated it in my 29.

MR BIZOS: You actually said so under oath?

MR BOTHA: In my 29, most probably yes.

MR BIZOS: What was the purpose of that?

MR BOTHA: I explained to you yesterday how I would investigate a matter as a detective and I wanted to distance myself from the scene in as far as it was possible.

MR BIZOS: So this was not - far from this being said as a result of any confusion or any pressure, it was for the purposes of exculpating yourself?

MR BOTHA: Amongst others, Sir. I told you there was numerous reasons for me acting the way I did.

MR BIZOS: Let's deal with this one, the specific reason for this one, that you were well enough to - I can think only of the Afrikaans, of the investigating officers "om die bos to lei".

MR BOTHA: I made my entire statement to mislead them.

MR BIZOS: I see. Have you got any yardstick by which the Committee can measure when you are telling the truth and when you are lying?

MR BOTHA: All I have to offer you is my integrity which I have tried to illustrate to you in conjunction with the fact that I'm here to speak the truth, as well as the fact that I have no need to mislead the Committee, and simultaneously, there would be no sense to it.

MR BIZOS: Are you a religious man, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: Are you a religious man?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I am.

MR BIZOS: We've heard that you offered a prayer before this bomb was exploded.

MR BOTHA: I will explain my Christianity to you briefly. I am a Christian in the true sense of the word, I believe in the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost and the eternal life which is attached to that. Since I can remember, since childhood I would practise religion every evening of my life and everyone who knows me would be able to tell you this unequivocally, including Mr Burger, Mr Barnard and Mr van Zyl. And whenever there was a function people would make use of me to lead them in prayer during such a function, being the opening of a place or a birthday function or whatever the case may be. Mr van Zyl and I practised religion that evening, not specifically for the purposes of detonating the bomb, it was a regular ritual that we practised. I happened to be in the same place with him at that time and we held our religion together.

MR BIZOS: He said that you prayed for the success of your project.

MR BOTHA: We asked for the Lord's will to preside.

MR BIZOS: Well perhaps the Lord's will was that the bomb ...(inaudible)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR BOTHA: Well the mere fact that it went off shows to me that it was the will of God. That is my interpretation of it.

MR BIZOS: And you were doing God's work on this night.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I was part of a dispensation where God offered me the opportunity, it was not for me to question whether it was his will or not. The bomb went off. I asked for his will to be done and the bomb went off.

MR BIZOS: Do you remember the Lord when you raise your hand and say to speak the whole truth and you lie?

MR BOTHA: I remember doing that and speaking the truth.

MR BIZOS: Well, I'll leave it at that.

MR BOTHA: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: You tell us that your affidavit that was placed before the Commission is annexed, we haven't been able to find it anywhere, do you know or perhaps our learned friend knows what affidavit is referred to.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman, if I can come in on this one here. We took over this matter from, I think the beginning of last year and since we noticed that we've endeavoured to get hold of that statement. I've approached Ms Coleridge a few times to see if we can't get hold of it, we've been to the Harms Commission to try to get hold of it, unfortunately up to now we were not able to trace it at all. I can't say what happened to it. We have tried everything that's possible to get it but unfortunately we couldn't get hold of it.

MR BIZOS: Very well Mr Chairman, I accept that and will try and proceed on the basis thereof.

MS COLERIDGE: I also just want to confirm from the Commission's side, Chairperson, we were never in possession of that statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. It seems that it's unfortunately not available.

MR BIZOS: Why was your presence as a bomb expert needed merely to press the button?

MR BOTHA: Sir, my presence as I interpreted it, was to bring the limpet mine into its final stage of preparation for detonation.

MR BIZOS: Did you hear what Mr Barnard said about this matter? That you were really surprised that you were asked to take part in this, because you could teach a chimpanzee in 10 minutes how to do it.

MR BOTHA: I heard his evidence, yes.

MR BIZOS: What do you say, was he telling the truth or not?

MR BOTHA: I don't believe I would have used those precise words ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Well leaving aside the colourful language that Mr Barnard uses, did you use words to that effect?

MR BOTHA: Not that I can recall.

MR BIZOS: Can you explain why Mr Barnard may have wanted to say what he said, if you had not uttered words to that effect?

MR BOTHA: Perhaps I used other words. I cannot think that Mr Barnard would recall my precise choice of words.

MR BIZOS: Well do you concede that you used words to that effect?

MR BOTHA: I have told you upon a previous occasion that the contrary is also true, that I was actually relieved to return to the system no matter what the method.

MR BIZOS: On page 5 of your statement, of the bundle - sorry, B, you say

"Later that week we gathered at a hotel. There I heard that the R100 000 had been approved for this project."

Did you say that?

MR BOTHA: This in my statement here, however it is false.

MR BIZOS: Why did you sign it, for what purpose was this falsehood put in there?

MR BOTHA: Once again I will have to tell you the state of mind that I was in meant that I didn't reason rationally. I considered a number of options at that stage and perhaps I coloured it as such in order to oblige the organisation to become involved, to give this whole matter unnecessary colour or unnecessary meat. I cannot say any more than that. They same aspect pertains to this part of my statement, it is false.

MR BIZOS: Were you visited by a Magistrate?

MR BOTHA: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: Were you visited by a Magistrate when you were detained?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR BIZOS: Are you sure?

MR BOTHA: I was not.

MR BIZOS: You've got to be careful about being sure about that. Were you visited by a doctor?

MR BOTHA: I was.

MR BIZOS: Did you complain to the doctor that you were disorientated and you didn't know what you were talking about?

MR BOTHA: I lost 12 kilograms in 25 days, so I think it's fairly obvious.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it may be that "I lost weight", but I ask you, did you tell the doctor that you were disorientated and that you didn't know what you were talking about?

MR BOTHA: I did not state it in such specific words possibly, but from his examination a doctor could clearly see that I wasn't myself.

MR BIZOS: Alright. Leaving aside this R100 000, let's try and determine what the price of a human life was for the CCB. You only got R5 000 for helping Barnard to kill Webster.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR BIZOS: He only got R10 000 for killing him, that's correct?

CHAIRPERSON: I think just to be fair Mr Bizos, there was a salary as well. This was a performance bonus I think.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Over and above your salaries.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: This was the bonus. Now we know that Peaches had a salary, we don't know for certain whether Hardien had a salary, but let us assume that he didn't, we have heard that he was promised R30 000 for placing that bomb. Are you in a position to dispute that?

MR BOTHA: I didn't promise it to him.

MR BIZOS: No, no, you were part of an organisation. We have heard that R30 000 - would you accept that there is evidence that he was promised R30 000?

MR BOTHA: I heard from the evidence here that that was the amount.

MR BIZOS: And we also know that he was actually short-changed by R12 000. Now we don't know the purpose of the reduction, it may be because the bomb didn't succeed in its purpose, but even at the R18 000, why should some unemployed person who is described as a gangster, be paid R18 000 for merely placing a bomb to frighten people? And others, including Peaches, including Barnard, including others, should be called upon to kill people for less? Can you explain that at all?

MR BOTHA: I cannot.

MR BIZOS: Is it possible that the R12 000 was deducted and used for another purpose or purposes, because the main objective of the bomb did not materialise?

MR BOTHA: I cannot say that.

MR BIZOS: If you knew what the average rate for a murder was, why did you choose to speak about R100 000 in your statement?

MR BOTHA: How should I know what the average amount for a murder would be?

MR BIZOS: From your experience.

MR BOTHA: The 15 is not necessarily an average amount. If you want to refer to Dr Webster.

MR BIZOS: No, we know of a R5 000, we know of R10 000, we know R15 000 for Peaches, we know what was promised in relation to Gavin Evans ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think even if you didn't know those other amounts, but at the time that you did the statement you knew that Mr Barnard got R15 000 for the assassination of Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Which was a high-profile operation. The question asked by Mr Bizos is if you knew that R15 000 would be paid for an assassination of that nature, why would you mention the amount of R100 000 in your statement? Because obviously you must have known that R100 000 is a lot higher than the amount paid for the Webster operation.

MR BOTHA: I wish I could give you an answer to that, but I cannot recall my reasoning at the time of it. I must apologise for that, but I cannot tell you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that R100 000 of course, the way it's contained in your statement, R100 000 was approved for the whole project. It doesn't necessarily mean the fee to kill a person, it would have included disbursements, travelling expenses, hotels, etcetera.

MR BIZOS: You in answer to Mr Lax, spoke about indemnity that would be given to you for all your actions because they would be considered legal. Is that - have we understood you correctly?

MR BOTHA: That is approximately what I said, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well, I'm going to put to you that you couldn't have believed that, and eventually the evidence of Mr Verster and Mr Burger was that no such promise of indemnity was made, promises were made that you would try and defeat the ends of justice, but not that you would get indemnity. I know they didn't use the expression "defeat the ends of justice", but that is what it amounts to.

MR BOTHA: I believed unconditionally that I would not be prosecuted. How ever they would orchestrate and execute it was not important to me. The fact of the matter was that I was not supposed to be prosecuted.

MR BIZOS: Tell me, did you ever yourself receive an order, either directly or indirectly down the line, from the Head of the Army, the Minister of Defence, to provide true evidence to the Harms Commission?

MR BOTHA: Not individually. In the media, if I recall correctly, it was stated by among others, the State President that there should be honest evidence during these proceedings.

MR BIZOS: Well did you discuss this with - you know a newspaper report may not have the authority of one of your leaders in the organisation, did you ask whether the State President and the Minister of Defence had ordered that you should provide true evidence to the Harms Commission?

MR BOTHA: With the discussions that took place, these were in our structure, I heard from the discussions which took place what the evidence would be and I abided by that.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever get any orders to the contrary, that you must mislead the Commission?

MR BOTHA: Once again, there was a complex situation between Mr Verster, the Generals in Staff, the Minister of Defence, the State President, with regard to our existence and discussions were led regarding the matter. What the nature and scope of the discussions were, I cannot tell you ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Sir, it was a simple question.

MR BOTHA: But I cannot give you any other answer, I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: Did you receive any order to mislead the Commission?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall it that specifically.

CHAIRPERSON: If not order, any request, any suggestion.

MR BOTHA: What I can tell you is that discussions took place there and I cannot recall one hundred percent of the details and I will have to stand by that.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) correctly you said this morning that there was at least a serious suggestion if not an order, that you should mislead the Commission.

MR BOTHA: I did not use the word "mislead".

MR BIZOS: No, I know, but the effect of that.

MR BOTHA: That is debatable, the word "effect" is debatable.

...(end of side B of tape ... no continuation for Mr Lax's question)

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: And then you decided to abide by that version.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR LAX: So you guys actually got together and worked out a version based on what you knew would be told to the Harms Commission, and you all stuck to that version.

MR BOTHA: In all probability, yes Sir, that is what could have happened.

MR LAX: And you knew full well that that version did not incorporate the full truth.

MR BOTHA: I wouldn't say the full truth, most probably not as elaborate, but ...

MR LAX: No, let's not play games here, it's not about ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: No, Mr Lax, I cannot say.

MR LAX: No, no. You see you've already told me this, you've already told me that you left out certain facts.

MR BOTHA: That is why I'm saying to you no, it was not that elaborate.

MR LAX: So if you left out facts, then it wasn't the full truth.

MR BOTHA: It may not have been the full truth, but a part of the truth.

MR LAX: Well it figures, part of the truth is not the full truth.

MR BOTHA: I accept it so.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, after you detention did you have any contact at all with Gen Krappies Engelbrecht?

MR BOTHA: Not as far as I can recall, I do not think so. No, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: You see in your application for amnesty we can understand that you being confused while under Section 29, in paragraph 7 in your application for amnesty, on page 15 of bundle A - please read it out.

CHAIRPERSON: Right at the bottom of page 15, the last line, bundle A.

MR BOTHA

"I would like to indicate that I saw the higher command of the State President as the upper Commander of the Defence Force, and I would like to say that I also gave my co-operation for the Commission in this regard."

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR BOTHA: You can interpret it in that way. I stated it in the way in which I thought it good and within the framework which I thought was the truth I testified.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR LAX: Just repeat your ...

MR BIZOS: You there go - sorry the previous question?

MR LAX: No, no, just the statement you've been making now didn't come over, so it won't be recorded.

MR BIZOS: You there go further and you say that you distinguish yourself, or you exclude yourself from the general CCB "verneukery" because you in consonance with the State President and the Head of the Army and the Minister of Defence, told the whole truth. That's an outrageous lie. On your own evidence.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I did follow most of the things, I testified in front of the Commission, I did give them my co-operation.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well I won't repeat my questions or argue with you, we know what your attitude is.

Now I'm merely going to put to you, to give you an opportunity to respond to the suggestion that we are going to make in argument, that the terms of your employment, the bonuses that you got, the package that you got, are factors which may properly be described, a view for your motive for committing these crimes was personal gain. Do you wish to say anything in relation to that?

MR BOTHA: At no stage was it to get personal gain.

MR BIZOS: Well we will argue that the facts speak for themselves.

You said that you went to Mr du Toit as your counsel, to ask for advice and you were advised that the Rosscam incident was not a sufficiently serious violation to come within the ambit of the Act. Did you disclose all the facts to Mr du Toit?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: Yes, we know Du Toits as senior counsel, a tall one and a short one, which one did you go to?

MR BOTHA: Etienne du Toit is the one to which I refer.

CHAIRPERSON: The one who writes the books, the Criminal Procedure book?

MR BIZOS: Yes, that was the ex-A-G person, the short one.

Now, did you tell him that you used the money for yourself?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I cannot recall, I told him what occurred during the project. This is what I can remember now.

MR BIZOS: What do you say, in the evidence of Gen Webb and Mr Verster they both deny that they had any knowledge of it or authorised any such project? In fairness to the General, it may not even have been a matter with his province, or that his authority was not required. What do you say to that evidence?

MR BOTHA: I cannot answer that. I've told you what I thought the approval of the project was and how I understood it.

MR BIZOS: Can you advance any reasons why Verster would deny such authority?

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman, if my memory serves me right, it was put to Mr Verster about Rosscam and he also said it was not regarded as a serious violation of human ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: No, no, no, that is not so. He said that he couldn't remember such an instruction, that is all he said.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Wessels, did he not continue to say that it could have been so? I think that was his evidence, that he said it could have been an instruction he gave ....

MR BIZOS: Well the record will speak for itself.

MR VAN ECK: That's exactly what he said, Sir.

MR WESSELS: Ja, in cross-examination I think, Mr van Eck, he said that he couldn't remember but it's possible that it might have happened like that.

MR BIZOS: What was going to happened to the Rev Frank Chikane?

MR BOTHA: Sir, the name was given to me for monitoring and for collecting information ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Monitoring for what reason?

MR BOTHA: For what the reason may be.

MR BIZOS: What does that mean? I don't want slogans of the CCB, what did it mean, what would you do with the monitoring of the Rev Frank Chikane?

MR BOTHA: Mr Bizos, I will explain it as follows. If the information was of such a nature and the Co-ordinator found it satisfying, Mr Verster and the Regional Manager would then present or suggest a project and they would say that I can use a 158 limpet mine, if they wanted it.

MR BIZOS: No, but you see monitoring was not what public statements does he make, what - did you monitor what public statements he made?

MR BOTHA: At the time I did not work on Mr Chikane, I said that so in no uncertain terms quite a few times.

MR BIZOS: Right. Irrespective of what you personally did, your monitoring was not what the person did for the purposes of ascertaining whether or not he should be a target, your monitoring was what car does he drive, what security arrangements are there in the people's homes, what are their habits, what time do they leave for work, what time do they come back from work. Those are not matters - you don't deserve to die or not to die, having regard how you spent your daily routine, from a Security point of view, why were you interested in these things if not for the purposes of eliminating the people that you were monitoring?

MR BOTHA: All the detail that you've just provided us with, I cannot say it in any better way. Seen in the light of the person's profile, they would then eventually possibly become a target.

MR BIZOS: Well let's take the instance of Mr Bruce White, where did the name Bruce come from?

MR BOTHA: It was a name that was given to me by my structure.

MR BIZOS: Yes. We know that his name as Roland, but of what possible importance was to monitor what motor car he used? That would not have been helpful as to whether he deserved to live or die, but rather monitoring as to how best to kill him.

MR BOTHA: Sir, he already had a profile, so the monitoring of what type of vehicle he drives once again led us to a next point which was his address ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: His what?

MR BOTHA: ... which led us to a next point, his residential address. This is now hypothetical, this is not what happened, I'm saying this hypothetically. So from there on various aspects will flow from it and at the end of the day all this information will be combined and then a decision will be made.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) in the diary that has been produced in court?

MR BOTHA: I did not see it personally, the name was just given to me.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR LAX: Mr Bizos, sorry, just one second.

I understood that when you were given a project or the preparatory work for a project, that in fact invariably the suggestion for what kind of action would be taken came from the operative himself. The operative made the suggestion to the Regional Manager or the Co-ordinator. That's what I understand the situation to be.

MR BOTHA: That could possibly well be so, Sir, but that would merely be a suggestion and it would be open for discussion.

MR LAX: But you see, just to pick up on what Mr Bizos was asking you is, if you were going to monitor somebody you'd want to know with what object in mind, because simply to get an address is one thing, to confirm an address for the purposes of maybe launching an attack, you'd want to look at the premises, you'd want to ascertain whether that was a suitable place, you might want to look at his workplace, work out if there was an opportunity there, you'd want to do an evaluation of whether that was a suitable place to launch an attack or a suitable place to break his window or a suitable place to beat him up, not so?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Lax, but we did not have this information ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Just listen to the rest of my question. So in order for you to do that evaluation and monitor him in this way, because you were given an address and you were given a photograph with regard to Mr Chikane, for example.

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: With regard to Mr White you were given a bit more than that I think.

MR BOTHA: An address and ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Also just an address and a photograph?

MR BOTHA: That's right.

MR LAX: Okay. So surely you would have had to say in your mind, okay, what exactly am I doing this for? So that I can be effective and deliver what's expected of me.

MR BOTHA: Can I answer you? That was the beginning phase, it was in such an early phase that I could not say that, we had nothing to work with, so we had to collect additional information before we could form an opinion about what my suggestion would be concerning this person.

MR LAX: Just to follow up, did you know the person's profile already? Had that been determined?

MR BOTHA: I knew that he was busy with left-wing activities, what the nature of it was I cannot really comment on, but he already had a profile that highlighted him as a possible target.

MR LAX: Well according to the diary he was a priority target.

MR BOTHA: That is why they probably gave us the names to see what their movements were and to collect additional information, who he socialised with, who he met and what accompanied that. That's how I saw it.

MR LAX: Yes. And what did you understand by the word "priority target"?

MR BOTHA: I did not know that it was a priority target.

MR LAX: Yes, but knowing now that it was a priority target, what was the difference between an ordinary target and a priority target?

MR BOTHA: The way in which I understood priority target was that you had to specifically work on that person over the shortest period of time, collect as much information as possible and to make a presentation afterwards. That's how I understood priority, it was a priority target.

MR LAX: It wasn't that this was a target for elimination, rather than a target for some other lesser type of action?

MR BOTHA: No, priority target does not necessarily say, or is a reference to the act that will be committed.

MR LAX: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Bizos.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, would it be a convenient time to take the tea adjournment or do you want to finish the point that you made?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR BIZOS: You see, you were known as Deon.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And White is your project in the diary, according to the diary.

MR BOTHA: Very well.

MR BIZOS: But there is /2, who was the other person that you were supposed to monitor in this context?

MR BOTHA: Frank Chikane was the name that was given to me.

MR BIZOS: Can you explain, if you were not seconded to do this, why the diary should mention that?

MR BOTHA: I cannot comment on that.

MR LAX: Just for easy reference, Mr Bizos, could you just give us the page reference of the diary or the date or whatever, it just helps us go back to it later.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) May, Mr Chairman, the bottom left-hand corner.

Is the number 2 there Frank Chikane or do you not know?

MR BOTHA: I don't know, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Well who were the two people that you were seconded to?

MR BOTHA: Bruce White and Frank Chikane.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, might I give you a reference in relation to a disputed matter on the record? The evidence of Mr Verster at page 389 of the record, cross-examined by Mr Hockey

"So you are saying that you have no knowledge of this project"?

"MR VERSTER: No, if I remember correctly I read it in the documentation and I imagine years ago I read it in the newspapers, but it is not a project that was officially authorised by me, there could be an interpretation on regional level, but the Regional Manager can answer that question."

CHAIRPERSON: Was that relating to Rosscam?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) I've shown this passage to my learned friend Mr Wessels, he has a recollection that in cross-examination by another counsel ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Eck.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) be that as it may ...(indistinct - no microphone). Apparently this goes off for some reason or other. Will you please switch off when I am speaking.

CHAIRPERSON: No I think the problem's not so much with that one, it seems to come from when these ones are put on it goes off.

MR BIZOS: Alright, we'll be careful then.

Can you give us a date for Rosscam's car please, a month will do.

MR BOTHA: If I remember correctly it was during September.

MR BIZOS: Before or after your supposed suspension?

MR BOTHA: After.

MR BIZOS: After. How long after the Early Learning Centre?

MR BOTHA: Possibly two weeks.

MR BIZOS: As far as Hamutenya is concerned, you say that it was due to incorrect identification and did you say that this was Staal Burger's project? Staal Burger denies this. Have you any comment to make?

MR BOTHA: No, I do not.

MR BIZOS: Do you stand by your statement that it was Burger who gave you ...

MR BOTHA: These were names that were mentioned and this is an assumption that I made.

MR BIZOS: You say that Hamutenya was Burger's project, where did you get that from?

MR BOTHA: It is maybe during a co-ordinating session that the name was mentioned, I cannot say today.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that in speaking about Hamo, H-a-m-o T-e-n-t-j-a, was an attempt to spell Hamutenya?

MR BOTHA: It's possibly so, yes.

MR BIZOS: Ja, it's the only thing that makes sense. Very well. Why was there panic when Aitchison was arrested?

MR BOTHA: Because of the fact that he was connected to our cell. That was my interpretation.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) chief about it, perhaps we will just argue about it.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: But do you agree that generally speaking, people panic when there is a danger of them being exposed for the wrongs that they've done?

MR BOTHA: Maybe just expose.

MR BIZOS: ... he was merely to monitor, there was nothing to really worry about, was there?

MR BOTHA: I think there was.

MR BIZOS: Were documents destroyed in relation to Aitchison and Lubowski?

MR BOTHA: With specific reference to the book, yes we attempted to get hold of the book at the Royal Ascot Hotel. If it was destroyed afterwards I cannot say with certainty.

MR BIZOS: What was the purpose of it?

MR BOTHA: It was a traceable book with the connection to Mr Maree.

MR BIZOS: Well that's consistent with the CCB wanting to put distance between itself and Aitchison.

MR LAX: Just repeat your question, the Interpreter was still translating what you were saying ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR BIZOS: The whole purpose of it was to put distance between you, the CCB, and Aitchison.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did anybody ever suggest that defeating the ends of justice is a serious crime for which you can go to prison?

MR BOTHA: I have already told you what my viewpoint was concerning prison sentence.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Nobody worried about such niceties.

MR BOTHA: Because we would not go.

MR BIZOS: Now after the killing of Webster - this is the last issue, Mr Chairman, with which I'm going to deal.

After the killing of Webster, was there an enquiry as to what role, if any, the CCB had played?

MR BOTHA: From where, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Mr Verster, the investigating officer, one or other of the Generals.

CHAIRPERSON: And internal enquiry.

MR BOTHA: There was, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well tell us who approached you and what did they say to you and what did you say to them.

MR BOTHA: Sir, during a co-ordinating session enquiries were made concerning Dr Webster, it was mentioned that the request came from Joe Verster. At a certain stage myself and Mr van Zyl informally discussed this. That was approximately the 2nd of May, and that is in chief what I can recall.

MR BIZOS: Well was there anything said about why Verster was interested in this one?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he wanted to find out if Region 6 was involved in it, which was a concern to me because based on what happened he forced me to keep quiet.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry I didn't hear, you say that - did you mention the word "sukses"

MR BOTHA: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: What did you say? I'm sorry I didn't hear.

CHAIRPERSON: Find out if Region 6 was involved.

MR BIZOS: I see. What would have made him think that Region 6 might have been involved?

MR BOTHA: Sir, that was - I did not know that either, it forced me to keep quiet because of the fact that Mr Verster wanted to distance himself completely from a project that he approved of, according to my knowledge.

MR BIZOS: The message to you was that Verster was going to deny what you knew he had done?

MR BOTHA: That's how I interpreted it.

MR BIZOS: What he had authorised.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR BIZOS: He must have suspected that one or other person in Region 6 might have helped Barnard.

MR BOTHA: I wouldn't say so Sir, no I don't know.

MR LAX: What do you mean you don't know? You knew from your discussions with Barnard that he'd authorised it.

MR BOTHA: I'm sorry, could you just repeat.

MR LAX: You knew from your discussions with Barnard that he had authorised it.

MR BOTHA: That's right.

MR LAX: So on the one hand you know he's authorised it, on the other hand you know he's wanting to give the impression that he doesn't know what is going on.

MR BOTHA: That is exactly so.

MR LAX: So the thrust of the question was, why should that happen?

MR BOTHA: To distance himself from the project. I do not know, that was just as strange to me, it was unbelievable.

MR LAX: Precisely. Why should he be asking his own operatives, some of whom would understand that this thing happened inside in Gauteng, a strong possibility Region 6 is involved?

MR BOTHA: I do not know that, I cannot say. I do not know if he wanted to relay the attention from himself or if he wanted to place the fault on another structure, the SAP, whoever. It was just as strange to me.

MR LAX: Was this his style, playing these sort of funny ...(indistinct) type games.

MR BOTHA: His specific style or the CCB style?

MR LAX: Yes, or the CCB style and his style.

MR BOTHA: Yes, the CCB, it was their forte.

MR LAX: So you were constantly conning each other as to what you were involved with?

MR BOTHA: No, not necessarily each other, the community, the ...(intervention)

MR LAX: No, but here you were conning each other.

MR BOTHA: Yes well I do not know if it was his style, I just experienced what he stated.

MR BIZOS: We have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos. We'll take the short tea adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CARL CASTELING BOTHA: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Botha, before you joined the CCB did you commit any crimes of any nature?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: So you were recruited into the CCB with clean hands and you were quite enthusiastic to become part of this organisation, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: It was a new career which beckoned to you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you foresaw that you would spend quite a long time working there.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And according to your blue plan you had to establish yourself in such a way that you would be able to operate for many years in the future without any exposure.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: It was during the middle towards the end of 1988.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You were quite exited regarding this new career of yours.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you attended a training course during which you were given training by the Defence Force and Special Forces staff members.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And among others, members of the CCB which already existed then.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Mr Joe Verster presented lectures to you?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he did address us.

MR WESSELS: He addressed you. And you met him there?

MR BOTHA: No, I had met him previously.

MR WESSELS: You met him previously and he addressed you there. What was the nature of his address?

MR BOTHA: In general terms he simply confirmed what he had said to us upon a previous occasion, during the session that we had after our recruitment, where the organisation would go and he gave us more facts pertaining to this.

MR WESSELS: And I accept that he and other persons emphasised with you that this was an extremely sensitive organisation which would be performing very sensitive work.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Covertly?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: In the sense that nothing which had to be done could be traced back.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: There had to be absolute cut-off points in any operation or in any action whatsoever.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I accept that.

MR WESSELS: So that it could never emerge with those in control or the State.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Who presented the lectures to you regarding security?

MR BOTHA: Mr Wessels, I cannot recall it off the top of my head, my statement will tell you who was present there. I cannot recall the precise presence of persons.

MR WESSELS: Would it be correct to say that your interpretation of the situation was that security was of the highest priority within the organisation?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And this would ensure the continued existence of the organisation and your career?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Indeed Mr Verster and other members who were higher up in the organisation were paranoid about security, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you realised that you were dealing with a professional soldier who believed absolutely in the observation of rules and procedures.

MR BOTHA: A professional soldier which had not functioned in the urban environment, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: So he viewed it in the perspective of the military where rules would be followed to the letter and there would be no deviation from such procedure?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. We were specifically employed to utilise our expertise regarding the urban environment.

MR WESSELS: Yes, subject to the rules and regulations of the organisation and the method of action. This was emphasised to you upon various occasions.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And this was during 1988?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: That is when you begun to achieve your cover and you formulated your blue plan.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: When did you and Mr Barnard become friends again? Was this while you were busy establishing your blue plan towards the end of '88, or was it before that?

MR BOTHA: I think it was probably prior to it, just after his release.

MR WESSELS: Yes. And when did you realise that Mr Barnard was indeed also working for the organisation?

MR BOTHA: During one of our discussions which ensued.

MR WESSELS: And when was this, can you give us some kind of timeframe? Towards the end of '88, the middle of '88?

MR BOTHA: I think it was the middle of '88.

MR WESSELS: And that is when you knew that he was also working for the same organisation?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you and Mr Barnard were very good friends, even in those days already?

MR BOTHA: That is true.

MR WESSELS: One could even say that your relationship at that stage was that of blood-brothers.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: So one should then accept that between you and him there was the greatest measure of openness and honesty?

MR BOTHA: It was limited. I would say to the greatest extent, every person exercised his own discretion regarding what could be said or should be said.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard is the type of person who was known for talking, he like to talk about his activities and what he was doing in life.

MR BOTHA: I think that that is a bit of a generalisation.

MR WESSELS: But he wasn't a secretive person.

MR BOTHA: On the contrary, he could be quite secretive. Some of the things that he said I've only heard here, despite the fact that I have been friends with him for 15, almost 20 years.

MR WESSELS: And did you tell Mr Barnard that you were working in Region 6?

MR BOTHA: I believe I told him that I was involved with the same structure and organisation.

MR WESSELS: The same organisation yes, but didn't he ask you: "Where are you working, what sort of work are you doing?"

MR BOTHA: I may have told him. The inference was rather obvious, because all the South African Police members resigned at the same time and were recruited into Mathyssen at approximately the same time, so I thought that the inference would be obvious.

MR WESSELS: And didn't you ask him in which region he was working and what he was doing?

MR BOTHA: In general terms he explained his working methods to me, which were not entirely in line with ours.

MR WESSELS: What did he explain to you, how did he do his work?

MR BOTHA: In retrospect one of the biggest mistakes and I will say this with regard to our placement, was that we were dealt with in general whereas we should have been handled individually, it would have led to much greater success. Mr Barnard was indeed handled as an individual who had a single person link to the higher authority.

MR WESSELS: And did he tell you that he was working on those terms?

MR BOTHA: In broad terms yes.

MR WESSELS: And did he tell you who his handler was?

MR BOTHA: Not initially but at a later stage he told me the name of the person, who I didn't know.

MR WESSELS: Yes, but when he initially told you that he was also working for the organisation, did he also tell you that he was working on the basis of a handler through to the top?

MR BOTHA: He used mutual words such as in-house, pre-study, handler, Joe Verster, that class of words.

MR WESSELS: But it was exactly the same working method that you followed?

MR BOTHA: Yes, except as I told you, we functioned in a cell, everyone had his own projects but Mr Barnard functioned individually on the ideal basis as I saw it.

MR WESSELS: And you said that the only difference between you and him was that there was more view?

MR BOTHA: No, it was more about the coverage and credibility within the community regarding your involvement with a specific blue plan.

MR WESSELS: I don't understand.

MR BOTHA: Then I will explain to you briefly. The fact that we were part of Mathyssen Bus Service was an initial problem, many questions arose regarding the fact that we were actually working for Mathyssen Bus Services. What emanated from that was the fact that every person had to establish his own blue plan subsequently.

MR WESSELS: And that is when you started working according to the same way that Barnard did?

MR BOTHA: With the exception of the co-ordination sessions which still took place on a collective basis, the salaries were paid out to a region, we had one Co-ordinator who handled all four of us. So there was still differences.

MR WESSELS: Yes, that is what I put to you. His working method was the same as yours, but as far as you understood it he was the only one in that cell in which he operated, while you were fourscore in that cell?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: May I just ask something Mr Wessels, I just want to go back quickly because the same issue arose yesterday and I didn't want to waste time then, but it's happened twice in a row. Can I just clarify this?

You said this is apropos his handler ...

MR BOTHA: Excuse me Mr Lax?

MR LAX: With regard to his handler.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR LAX: You said he mentioned the name of a person and you didn't know this person.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR LAX: What name did he mention to you?

MR BOTHA: Lafras Luitingh.

MR LAX: He used his real name?

MR BOTHA: Yes. He mentioned the name Louis as well, but he said he knew who it was.

MR LAX: Yes and you - well, hang on a second. Did he use his cover name, i.e. Louis, or did he use the name Lafras Luitingh?

MR BOTHA: In all probability he would have said: "My handler is Louis, he uses the codename Louis but I know it is Lafras Luitingh." Something to that effect.

MR LAX: And you didn't know that person at all?

MR BOTHA: Not at all.

MR LAX: Had you not met Louis?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR WESSELS: And this was during 1988?

MR BOTHA: Approximately, yes.

MR WESSELS: In 1988 you were not yet applied operationally, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: In the first quarter of 1989 you were not yet operational.

MR BOTHA: Although in '88 I went to South West. So one could probably also view that as a form of an instruction to visit South West Africa.

MR WESSELS: And what did you do there?

MR BOTHA: I went to examine the situation that was in existence there before the election.

MR WESSELS: But it wasn't an operational project as such, it was aimed at examining the situation there?

MR BOTHA: It was an instruction.

MR WESSELS: And this was in '88. And subsequently you received a few names to work on for the first time in 1989?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: When did you receive those names?

MR BOTHA: Approximately during April.

MR WESSELS: In April 1989. Very well. At the end of 1988 there was a problem between Mr Barnard and Mr Luitingh which had to do with one McQuillan and there was the perception with Mr Luitingh that Mr Barnard had jeopardised the existence of the organisation and his own identity due a leakage of information, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was mentioned to me in general terms.

MR WESSELS: Yes just generally you were informed by Mr Barnard that this was the situation.

MR BOTHA: He said that there was a problem.

MR WESSELS: And that Mr Luitingh had blamed him for this breach of security which had taken place.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And then early in 1989 there was another security breach which once again had to do with Mr McQuillan, where Mr Barnard, despite Mr Luitingh's instruction not to have contact with Mr McQuillan, went ahead and did it and assisted McQuillan with Brig Victor. Did he also tell you about that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I vaguely recall the incident.

MR WESSELS: So you knew that Mr Barnard upon two occasions, had experienced problems regarding security breaches in terms of his conduct, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: Although he justified his conduct, if I think back.

MR WESSELS: Yes, he tried to rationalise it by saying that he thought he had to go and help the man because he needed him and so forth.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that McQuillan contacted him, etcetera.

MR WESSELS: Yes. And after you were at your training course you realised that Mr Verster and Mr Luitingh must have been rather upset regarding this security breach in light of everything that you were taught regarding the CCB and the method of action during the training course, isn't that so, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: Yes, you realised it.

MR BOTHA: I did.

MR WESSELS: Then I would just like to take a leap forward for a while. At the end of the year you were arrested.

MR BOTHA: Yes, in 1989.

MR WESSELS: When were you arrested?

MR BOTHA: Approximately November.

MR WESSELS: Did you expect that you would be arrested or did it come as a shock?

MR BOTHA: It was a shock.

MR WESSELS: And you also testified here earlier that you were very upset, that you believed unconditionally that you would not be prosecuted of anything and that the organisation would support you, because those were the promises which were made to you during the training course.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and you also testified that you were worried about Mr Barnard because he was arrested at approximately the same time.

MR BOTHA: Before me.

MR WESSELS: Oh, he was arrested before you. How long before you was he arrested?

MR BOTHA: I don't recall the dates.

MR WESSELS: Approximately.

MR BOTHA: There were two occasions upon which he picked up problems. Possibly approximately two to three weeks before me.

MR WESSELS: And did you know the reason for his arrest? What did the rumours lead you to believe, why was Mr Barnard being detained in terms of Section 29? Because Section 29 detention would be applied for those who were suspected of involvement with acts of terrorism against the State.

MR BOTHA: My suspicion was that it was about the organisation and more specifically, Dr Webster.

MR WESSELS: And you were quite concerned that Mr Barnard should be taken care of.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you were not prepared to do anything which could place Mr Barnard in a negative light or cast any suspicion upon him, is that correct, although you knew that he was involved with the Webster incident?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: So you would have tried to protect him at all costs.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And the protection that you foresaw for yourself and for Mr Barnard, you could obtain this protection from within the ranks of the organisation.

MR BOTHA: We were in service to the organisation, so by nature of the situation they were our employers and I appealed to them for assistance.

MR WESSELS: Precisely. And you placed your entire future with the organisation, you were promised that they would see to your interests and you performed your instructions within the structure of the organisation and you believed that the same would be of application to Mr Barnard.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry just before you proceed Mr Wessels.

You say that it was a shock that you were detained in terms of Section 29, you've also said that about two weeks before your detention Mr Barnard was detained, did you yourself have any suspicion that your detention might have been a consequence of Mr Barnard having said something to the authorities while he was in detention that might have implicated you?

MR BOTHA: Only after the time. At no stage did I think that Mr Barnard would speak about the incident which had taken place or my involvement with the organisation, given his nature, also the Webster incident.

MR WESSELS: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR WESSELS: You would not have said anything to the police which could have placed Mr Barnard in a negative light?

MR BOTHA: Or the organisation.

MR WESSELS: Or the organisation.

MR BOTHA: Yes, or the organisation.

MR WESSELS: And you attempted in as far as it was possible for you, to maintain the cover of the organisation at all costs?

MR BOTHA: Absolutely.

MR WESSELS: Because you still believed at that point in time, that although you were under arrest things would happen behind the scenes and that the organisation would look after you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Very well. Did Mr Barnard ever tell you that he was discharged from the organisation?

MR BOTHA: Mr Wessels, he mentioned at a stage but he didn't view it as a discharge per se, I think his interpretation was more that he was put on ice. But it was mentioned.

MR WESSELS: Now you were also placed on ice.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And it is rather clear that you were not discharged.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you understood it as such.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: To be placed on ice and to be discharged were totally different things.

MR BOTHA: The modus operandi which was followed by the organisation with Mr Barnard's discharge was similar to putting him on ice, he still kept his vehicle and he enjoyed the benefits of his position. So it didn't appear that he was actually discharged.

MR WESSELS: Yes so you never believed really that he was discharged?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. Although I stated it in my Section 29 statement, I did not understand it that way.

MR WESSELS: But that's precisely what I'm getting at, why do you say on page 4 of bundle B, in approximately the fourth or the fifth paragraph, and this is after you had monitored Bruce White

"At this stage Ferdi was discharged by his Co-ordinator, Louis."

MR BOTHA: I will explain it to you in light of the tempestuous relationship that they had, and that sometimes it would happen that one would say certain things which one would want to take back later and he conveyed it to me as such and I didn't know how to approach this during my detention, should I say that Ferdi was involved or not. Once again it had to do with my state of mind during my 29 detention and I acted in accordance with this.

MR WESSELS: Please Mr Botha, let us not deal too much with your state of mind, you sat in your cell and you made a statement to the police.

MR BOTHA: Let us just struggle with it for a moment once again, because your client spent a few days under Section 29 detention and the reaction that he caused wasn't favourable, so person such as him who was a trained recce with many award, could not even handle that kind of pressure, what not to speak of someone like me who didn't have that much training, who was completely inexperienced when it came to that kind of pressure. The difference in our training comes to mind here, so I would like to place that on record.

MR WESSELS: Yes, it is true, the pressure of that kind of detention is very high and one will talk eventually. They will keep you there until you talk.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you realised that and that's why you made the statement, because you realised that the sooner you spoke the sooner you'd be able to get out of the cell.

MR BOTHA: Partially, yes.

MR WESSELS: And it wasn't that you were in such a state that you didn't really know what you were saying anymore.

MR BOTHA: Emotionally I was very close to that point.

MR WESSELS: Perhaps you were emotionally unstable, but not to the extent that you didn't know exactly what you wanted to say.

MR BOTHA: It did influence my thoughts.

MR WESSELS: So it influenced your thoughts to the extent that you made a false statement, is that what you're trying to say?

MR BOTHA: Once again I didn't know whether I should link him to the organisation or whether I should protect him and say that he wasn't a member of the organisation. I didn't know how to deal with the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that, wouldn't it have been in your interest to have, in that statement, bearing in mind the fact that you assisted Mr Barnard in the assassination of Dr Webster, to have continued to link him to the CCB, in the event that sometime in the future if the Webster bubble had to break, then it could perceived as being a CCB operation and not an operation carried out by an individual who you helped?

MR BOTHA: In retrospect it sounds like the appropriate route to follow, but during my detention I wasn't thinking completely rationally and I have stated that I may have had my own agenda.

MR WESSELS: I beg your pardon?

MR BOTHA: I said that I did not act correctly during the deposition of my statement.

MR WESSELS: Why did you say that you did not act correctly?

MR BOTHA: With regard to certain things that I said regarding the Athlone bomb, the whole idea of saying that Ferdi was definitely discharged, these were things that I should have approached differently.

MR WESSELS: But Mr Botha, the Honourable Chairperson has asked you about the point that I was planning to get to. You stated that you were there and that your good friend, Mr Barnard, was also there and that the only protection that you had lay within the organisation, that you were not prepared to say anything about him that wasn't true and now according to your version you make a false statement about him which breaks the connection with the organisation at a time when he needed the organisation most.

MR BOTHA: Yes but at the same time I must also say the following. Perhaps I distanced myself from him to a certain extent because I saw that he wasn't going to get any protection regarding Webster.

MR WESSELS: How did you see that?

MR BOTHA: Upon a previous occasion I have testified before the Committee. If I just tell you how Mr Verster acted with regard to the enquiries that he made and the fact that it was clear, whether by his own initiation or whatever the motivation was, he was certainly not going to take responsibility for this. That was my inference.

MR WESSELS: When did you realise this, the day after Webster's murder?

MR BOTHA: Among others, yes, and during subsequent meetings.

MR WESSELS: The day after Webster's murder there was a co-ordination meeting during which enquiries were made during this meeting by Staal Burger and the Co-ordinator, I accept, where they said that Joe Verster wanted to know whether any of you were involved with Webster.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR WESSELS: On the grounds that it appeared as if he didn't know?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you realised automatically that it was strange that he was asking these questions because he was the one who issued the order in terms of Mr Barnard.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it was strange because we worked internally and he had the position to be able to say to Mr van Zyl: "If another bomb goes off I'll hold you responsible." In other words, if it were to happen again he could say to Mr van Zyl: "Look I told you, look what's happened." We were under pressure to perform internally and he was getting people from the outside to come and operate in our regions.

MR WESSELS: We are quite far away from the bomb.

MR BOTHA: I'm just trying to assist you.

MR WESSELS: We are dealing with the day after you and Barnard shot Webster dead.

MR BOTHA: I'm using a hypothesis.

MR WESSELS: And then you have this person who comes to the organisation, who was supposed to have given the order to Mr Barnard directly, and he starts making enquiries with your cell members to try to determine who was involved.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I found it strange.

MR WESSELS: It was rather strange, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: What did you think was going on?

MR BOTHA: I didn't know what Mr Verster's objective with such enquiries was, it unnerved me to a great extent.

MR WESSELS: It must have shocked you.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it did.

MR WESSELS: Because now you found yourself involved in a crime for which one could receive capital punishment and this was the first crime that you had committed.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: You were an innocent rookie civilian who became involved with this organisation and the first thing that you did for the organisation was to commit this murder under instruction, allegedly.

MR BOTHA: I was with Brixton Murder and Robbery and the Security Branch where I functioned in State relation and I still regarded my work as State related.

MR WESSELS: Yes, but you didn't commit crimes before this time Mr Botha, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: I did not regard it as a crime per se, this deed pertaining to Dr Webster.

MR WESSELS: No, we are still before that point, before you arrived there you had not committed any crimes, that was your evidence, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And now your first action in the CCB is to commit a murder.

MR BOTHA: Which I did not necessarily interpret as a crime. Yes, my answer is yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, do you really want to say that you didn't know that what you were doing there was a crime? Whether it was an instruction from a State organisation or not, did you really think that the State could not give an order for you to commit a murder which wouldn't be a crime?

MR BOTHA: From the nature of the framework in which I operated, it was stipulated to me that this was part of our activities.

MR WESSELS: But Mr Botha, you functioned within this organisation and you were told that the organisation would protect you and you believed that you would not be prosecuted, that things would happen behind the scenes to prevent that the A-G would prosecute you, but you knew that you were committing a crime.

MR BOTHA: A crime without any prosecution, yes.

MR WESSELS: Yes, nonetheless you knew it was a crime.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, but I have just explained my definition of crime to you, within my own context, from within my own framework.

MR LAX: Just on a point of clarification. The Early Learning Centre was on the 31st of August, Webster was later than that.

MR WESSELS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR LAX: 1st of May, sorry. Thank you, I was just getting confused there.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, the day after the incident you found out what was going on, you must have been extremely concerned regarding what was happening.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I was.

MR WESSELS: Did it not occur to you that perhaps Mr Barnard had lied to you, that this instruction had never come from Joe Verster?

MR BOTHA: I testified yesterday with regard to Mr van Zyl's integrity pertaining to the issue of instructions or the execution of a project, so too I did not doubt Mr Barnard's integrity, I accepted what he told me.

MR WESSELS: My question to you is whether at that stage you didn't doubt or think that Mr Barnard had lied to you.

MR BOTHA: I was doubting many things.

MR WESSELS: Did you consider it as a possibility that Barnard may have lied to you?

MR BOTHA: That as well as the fact that Mr Verster himself initiated the thing and didn't want to link the organisation to it.

MR WESSELS: And now you found yourself between the devil and the deep blue sea, because whatever happened you were being crushed to pieces among these great millstones, because you didn't know if Barnard had lied to you and if he had lied to you, you acted beyond the parameters of the organisation and then you would not enjoy the protection of the organisation, isn't that so Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: The organisation has not protected anybody to this very day, firstly, and secondly, ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha ...

MR BOTHA: Let me just finish because you asked me a question. At the time of the instruction which was given to Mr Barnard, I believed unconditionally that it was indeed the instruction. I had no reason during the execution of the instruction to doubt this at all.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, return the 2nd of May 1989, during a cell meeting you hear that the person who issued the instruction allegedly wants to know who was involved in this crime, this murder.

MR BOTHA: That is correct. Not directly, indirectly.

MR WESSELS: Yes. And you must have started to doubt, or at least to think that "either Mr Verster was busy spinning an awesome web of intrigue or Mr Barnard lied to me."

MR BOTHA: Many options came to mind.

MR WESSELS: Yes, they must have occurred to you. And if Mr Barnard had lied to you, then you would be standing beyond the framework of the organisation and you would have quite a big problem at hand because you wouldn't enjoy the protection of the organisation, isn't that so Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: If you express it as such, then yes.

MR WESSELS: And if it wasn't the case and it was indeed Mr Verster who was busy with some sinister motive and who was no making enquiries, there would also be a rather big problem for you.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: So you must have been a very worried man at that point in time, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And you realised that what you had done went beyond the rules of the organisation, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: I would say that it was beyond the framework which had been presented to me personally, it was not beyond the rules of the organisation, because I saw it as an approved project within the organisation.

MR WESSELS: But you knew that you weren't permitted to be part of it because the organisation had a certain modus operandi, is that so?

MR BOTHA: Yes, but the organisation had also referred to opportunity targets and in light of the same - I'm just struggling to find the word, the same working method and objective that Mr Barnard and I shared, I justified this. It as the same modus operandi.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Wessels is getting at, and we've heard this from other applicants here, that there was always this question of a cut-off and that as far as possible a conscious member should not actively involve himself physically at the scene of an incident. That was a basic general rule. We know that from Mr Barnard's evidence, he was handled differently, he was employed as, according to himself, as a hitman as such, a person to carry out deeds himself, but the others always had to have this cut-off point, and Mr Wessels is saying your physical participation in the murder of Dr Webster, as a co-perpetrator, was in breach of that general rule that you should not be on the scene.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And Mr Botha, when Mr Barnard came to you the first time and said to you that he had been tasked to murder Dr Webster as an opportunity target, and that you were to assist him, you knew immediately that what you were about to do would be completely beyond the rules of the organisation, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: He came to me and he said that he had been given a priority target, that he'd already worked on Dr Webster with regard to the collection of information and the verification of addresses and that he needed me to assist him with the execution of the project. I realised that it was not completely in line with my region's guidelines and rules, but I looked at the overlapping position of the organisation and realised that I could assist him with a project which had been approved from the highest level.

MR WESSELS: It did not agree completely with the rules of the organisation as you knew it, in fact it did not correspond at all with the rules of the organisation as you knew them.

MR BOTHA: I do not agree with you, it corresponded to a great extent.

MR WESSELS: But could a directly conscious member become directly involved in the execution of a murder?

MR BOTHA: The Honourable Chairperson has just said that it was differently adapted or applied and from his situation it appeared to be justifiable.

MR WESSELS: So in your opinion this exception to the rule was justifiable, according to your opinion?

MR BOTHA: He explained the precise process of the submission and the plan in no uncertain terms and he also told me that he had received the instruction from Mr Verster, who told him that it was an approved project.

MR WESSELS: And what happened during the in-house, tell us?

MR BOTHA: I wasn't there.

MR WESSELS: But what did he tell you?

MR BOTHA: Simply that he had conducted the in-house presentation. What precisely he said there would be speculative for me to say. He told me what he said, but it is of no value to me now.

MR WESSELS: But tell us what he told you.

MR BOTHA: He said that he had information at his disposal, that he had conveyed this during a submission on the Board and that certain suggestions were made on how the person should be shot, it was from him and from Mr Verster, and that they had decided to use a shotgun and that Dr Webster should be killed as such.

MR WESSELS: And did you ask him whether he had formulated or discussed a thorough plan with Mr Verster regarding the process of killing Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: He simply told me that he had described the location of the address, that a shortened shotgun would be used and that the plan had to be executed.

MR WESSELS: But you learnt that if there was going to be a task to act against somebody, there had to be a plan, there had to be approval for the plan and its precise execution. You knew that the plan had to explain the cut-off points, the security, the certainty for those involved, the organisation, the escape route and so forth. It was a very detailed programme which had to be compiled, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I accept that he handled it on that basis.

MR WESSELS: And didn't you ask him, Mr Barnard now, didn't you say: "But to go and shoot a man dead is quite a serious thing to do and if one is caught, then that's the end of you"? Didn't you ask him what precisely the plan was, what you were going to do?

MR BOTHA: We drove the route several times, I had no doubt that the escape route as he had stipulated it was foolproof ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: No just a moment, before we get to that let me just take you back, perhaps you misunderstood me. You were still busy talking to him when he told you that he had been tasked to kill Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And that the plan was to shoot him with a shotgun.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And then did you ask him: "How are we going to do this in practise, are we going to drive by, what precisely are we going to do?"

MR BOTHA: He explained it to me and I also drew my own inferences of what would take place at the scene.

MR WESSELS: How did he explain your role?

MR BOTHA: I was simply supposed to drive the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: And did you ask him if he had cleared this with Luitingh and Verster?

MR BOTHA: I accepted that he didn't.

MR WESSELS: He didn't?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: So didn't it appear to be strange to you that he was going to kill someone in a vehicle that was supposed to drive by, and it should have been rather clear to the persons who had given him the order and the approval for the plan that if he was going to be doing the shooting, he would need someone else to drive the vehicle?

MR BOTHA: Not necessarily.

MR WESSELS: Not necessarily?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: How's that?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard was left-handed and he could drive the vehicle and shoot the person at the same time.

MR WESSELS: Well that is possible in theory, but it would require much expertise and skill and it could also shipwreck the entire project, because one small mistake would mean that one could shoot and miss, one wouldn't know how far away the target would be, whether the target would move, how difficult the shot would be. So it would complicate the plan tremendously.

MR BOTHA: Not necessarily. I differ from you, Mr Barnard's skill appeared to be above suspicion to me.

MR WESSELS: Are you saying his skill was above suspicion?

MR BOTHA: Yes. And at the same time it was given as the primary motivation why we were supposed to wait to get the person into the street or to penetrate the person then in order to kill the person.

MR WESSELS: Why do you say that his skill was above suspicion, what did you know about his skill when it came to shotguns?

MR BOTHA: I knew of his police career, that he was very experienced in handling firearms and my logic told me that a left-handed person with a shotgun at short range, ought to hit the target.

MR WESSELS: But one could not foresee precisely how short that distance would be, whether the person would be stationary or whether he would be moving. The target could just be wounded, even with a shotgun at short range.

MR BOTHA: Then I would have accepted that Mr Barnard would have fired the shot and then gotten out and reloaded and fired again. I was placed in that position.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, what I'm asking you is to test how reasonable your action would have been simply to accept that this was an order, in light of probabilities. You see if only one person were to have been involved, say Mr Barnard was involved alone, it would increase the risk of successful completion and escape of this project.

MR BOTHA: I cannot answer to that.

MR WESSELS: But if Mr Barnard had to do the driving himself and shoot with the left hand, possibly while driving by the house, he would have to fire through an open window, he wouldn't be able to aim and wait first, he would have to drive and as soon as the target was in line he would have to shoot precisely at that time. So it would take a very specific time calculation.

MR BOTHA: Yes, with his left hand.

MR WESSELS: And didn't that mean that it was a very risky operation to complete successfully?

MR BOTHA: It was his project, I cannot say.

MR WESSELS: Yes naturally, Mr Botha.

CHAIRPERSON: Why do you think he asked you to assist him?

MR BOTHA: Honourable Chairperson, maybe because he wanted to make sure about the facts that Mr Wessels now highlighted and he thought it would be better concerning the aim, leaving the scene, one of many reasons.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels.

MR LAX: But in essence these were all factors that would reduce the risk of failure.

MR BOTHA: That is correct. To take somebody with, yes.

MR WESSELS: There was a great risk that it could not succeed and if he had to stop and get out and shoot again, somebody could see him, that you could be cut off or he could be cut off at the scene and if he was arrested then the whole organisation would be exposed and the State would be exposed, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Then it surprises one that he did not at that specific time when he received the instruction and made the suggestion, inform Luitingh and Verster: "Look let us get somebody else to assist us, it will improve our chances of success with a hundred percent."

MR BOTHA: Possibly he did say that, I cannot give you an answer if he said it or not.

MR WESSELS: Did you not think that you should ask him: "Listen Ferdi, why don't you suggest, or why didn't you suggest to Verster and Luitingh that I must assist you or somebody else must assist you"?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I did not ask him that. At a previous opportunity I think I told Mr Bizos that certain things I did not ask, you just do not ask certain things, you're asked to assist with an operation and you assist in the way in which, or on the basis of what you believed at that stage.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, it was not that you did not ask questions because there's an instruction and your work was to execute instructions, this was your friend who asked you to commit murder.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Then you do ask.

MR BOTHA: I did ask the question concerning the approval of the operation, I did not ask if there was another person who was tasked to assist and who was not available. I believed that he involved me because he trusted me first of all, and because hypothetically he did not trust the person who he was supposed to take with. I cannot say, I just knew that he trusted me and he asked me to assist him because we believed in the same ideology.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, you realised right from the beginning, as you testified, that you were not authorised to be in that vehicle, that they did not give their approval.

MR BOTHA: The was approval for the project yes, but ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: But not for you to assist.

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: Why did you not tell Mr Barnard: "But listen, get some approval that I assist you or that I can go with you, so that I do not have to act in an unauthorised manner"?

MR BOTHA: Sir, we functioned in two different cell structures and it would have been ridiculous of me to have asked him that.

MR WESSELS: Now you come here and you are in a position, it's the end of March, it's almost April, can you recall when you were informed?

MR BOTHA: It was just before the end of April.

MR WESSELS: Before the end of April?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: How long before the end of April?

MR BOTHA: I would say a week or two weeks, I cannot say.

MR WESSELS: Very well. And you now know that Mr Barnard, according to what he told you, was placed on ice by the organisation because he committed two security breaches. Did you know that?

MR BOTHA: Sir, to be placed on ice they never attach a specific period of time, he could have been placed off the ice or he could have been active again, it could have suspended at that stage.

MR WESSELS: Well we do know that those security breaches - well the first happened in the beginning of the year and the second one early in '89. I think Mr Barnard said it was in March/April that this occurred. Well let us accept it for now, it corresponds with evidence that has been led before and which was not disputed. Well now you know that Mr Barnard was either suspended or discharged or placed on ice, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: I accepted that was so, yes.

MR WESSELS: Exactly in the same period of time when he leaked this - he received this very serious instruction to go alone and kill Webster.

MR BOTHA: It came from his abilities and skills, "die feit dat die teiken hom voorgedoen het en dat hy die vermoë gehad het om die teiken uit te wis."

MR WESSELS: Well there was a long period of time in which he could practise, he could monitor the house and so forth, so it was not that urgent, Mr Botha, this was a planned murder which was planned over a period of time, weeks actually.

MR BOTHA: Well it became a priority and he was then removed and he could become active again. As what happened to me with the Athlone bomb.

MR WESSELS: Let us not think further back, you are now in March. You are told by Mr Barnard that he's tasked to kill Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: It was April.

MR WESSELS: End of March/April, whenever. End of March you said. It doesn't matter, during that time. You know that it was in the same timeframe in which he was in trouble and if he was now discharged from the organisation or if he was placed on ice, it happened in that period of time.

MR BOTHA: Or if it was an argument or not, that is also a possibility.

MR WESSELS: I beg your pardon?

MR BOTHA: Or if it was an argument or not, that's also a possibility.

MR WESSELS: An argument between?

MR BOTHA: Between himself and his Co-ordinator.

MR WESSELS: Yes, between himself and Lafras Luitingh?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: So they don't have a good relationship?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Did you not see it as a contradiction that in the light of his relationship with Luitingh and Verster and in the light of his security breach that he committed which was very serious and placed the organisation which was just established, could result to the exposure of this organisation, that this could not be associated with an instruction that he directly, him of all people received to go and kill Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I cannot comment on that because I do not know what his relationship was with his Regional Manager or his Co-ordinator. I do not know anything about it. I myself was in a position where I had a personality clash with my Regional Manager, but they still applied me. So I do not know what the situation was.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, you do know what the situation was, you already testified about what the situation was. You heard that he had an argument with Luitingh and that his relationship was not very good, you also know that he committed two security breaches of a very serious nature and that there were a lot of problems, that he was placed on ice because of it.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I did not say that, I said there were personalities that immediately after an argument, or whatever the circumstances were of the security breach would put this on ice and say: "No, let us continue, we've sorted this out, accept that you were wrong and let us continue, the organisation was not compromised to such an extent, let us continue with our relationship." I cannot testify about it.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, elementary logic states that in the position in which you found yourself during that time, your first question would have been: "But how do you reconcile this very sensitive and dangerous instruction with the position of Mr Barnard in the organisation after the security breaches and his personality clashes? How do you reconcile that?" It had to come up with you.

MR BOTHA: I will explain it to you. In the light of the instruction I used that logic that you just referred to and my logic was it had to be an authorised project in that Mr Barnard would go and execute it.

MR WESSELS: And the 2nd of May 1989, Mr Verster made certain enquiries, did it not create some concern with you in that you thought back when you believed Barnard: "I innocently thought that he received the instruction, but now indeed it seems that it is possible that he never received that instruction"?

MR BOTHA: You've already asked me before and I said yes, there were a few aspects that bothered me.

MR WESSELS: What did you do to solve these concerns and doubts?

MR BOTHA: I kept quiet.

MR WESSELS: You kept quiet. In the March or the beginning of March you are now beginning with your new career, you are very enthusiastic about it, you want to prove yourself, you want to do your bit which you believed was the right thing to do in the country, to fight the terrorists, and before you became really operational you receive an instruction that you know is illegal and that if it is exposed you will lose your job, is that not true Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I accepted that it will not be exposed, I accepted that it will not be exposed. I accepted that nobody will know about it, it will not be exposed.

MR WESSELS: Well what made you make that inference? I'm not talking about the murder now, the fact that the organisation will find out about it, the fact that you were involved?

MR BOTHA: It can only be confirmed by myself or Mr Barnard. I was prepared not to say anything and I assumed he did that as well.

MR WESSELS: So you were prepared to take that risk at that stage to assist Mr Barnard, against the rules of the organisation?

MR BOTHA: I was prepared to take the risk because I was brainwashed during a course which your client held or held a lecture, it was concerning the sovereignty of this country, South Africa, as well as the ideology that we followed in prevention of internal terrorists and acts of terrorism.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, you were not brainwashed to such an extent that you could not use your own head in terms of following the rules of the organisation, it was the opposite, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: We were brainwashed to execute what we were appointed for.

MR WESSELS: You are then willing to place your career in jeopardy, to go against the rules of the organisation, act with Mr Barnard and you are furthermore willing to place your life in danger, and at that stage we still had the death sentence and if you were caught then you could have received the death sentence, is that true?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, but then you also have to see it in the same context, in that I believed that I will get indemnity, notwithstanding the fact that my exposure with Mr Barnard would come to light. I was convinced that Mr Verster will also then in that type of situation act on my behalf.

MR WESSELS: So you believed with certainty that everything would be alright?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Very well. This is now the beginning of May, you now realise that things are not right, they're not going the way you want them to, you were under the wrong impression, which way doesn't matter, what did you do to solve this very serious situation?

MR BOTHA: Once again I kept quiet, I accepted that nothing said - like we did not even refer to him as Webster, we referred to him as the "W incident".

MR WESSELS: You did not even talk to Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we did by nature of the situation and I told him this is what's happening and he could not believe. I said: "Joe's denying it and he's doing enquiries" and he said: "I cannot believe it." I will not use the words used, but he said he could not believe it that that's how he reacted, and it just proved that by the nature of the situation it created some reserve towards Verster.

MR WESSELS: Whether you did believe Mr Barnard or not, or if you believed that there was not such an instruction, or you realised that Mr Joe Verster was the largest or the biggest fraud in the CCB, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: Both situations that you just sketched to me held water.

MR WESSELS: And if the latter was applicable, then you had to get out of this organisation as soon as possible, because there will be a lot of problems for you because it was clear that Joe Verster was busy framing members of his own organisation in terms of instructions that he gave.

MR BOTHA: Well I will not say that he framed him. Mr Barnard was not found at the scene, Mr Barnard would deny that he was involved in it. How could he frame him?

MR WESSELS: Well this was supposed to be the beginning of a phase that could in the future become a frame, in that Verster was trying to cover his tracks now, in the guilt will be placed on somebody else and not on himself.

MR BOTHA: If you made the necessary precautions on Mr Barnard's side, he would deny it up till today. He would never have been found guilty of this murder.

MR WESSELS: Yes, but you had to have serious doubts concerning the integrity of your Commander.

MR BOTHA: Yes and no. Yes, because he denied it and no, because he initiated a project which he did reasonably well.

MR WESSELS: It is about exposure Mr Botha.

MR BOTHA: I hear what you're saying.

MR WESSELS: You not want to be exposed, you did not want to get into trouble, you did not want to go to jail or get the death sentence.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: But with the risk that you ran by remaining with this organisation under this Commander and another member, you were busy placing yourself in a great risk.

MR BOTHA: I can hear what you say, but I did not interpret it in that way, once again I followed the objectives of this organisation.

MR WESSELS: But what do you do now, you receive the instruction, shortly afterwards you have to go and monitor Bruce White.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you do not know why you have to monitor him, maybe he has to be killed or eliminated, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that was a possibility.

MR WESSELS: And what do you do, you go, you get your good friend Barnard, going against the rules of the organisation, to assist you.

MR BOTHA: Once again it wouldn't have come to light.

MR WESSELS: It wasn't supposed to come to light, Mr Botha, but you were an old Detective, you were even a Sergeant in the Detective Branch, and you know that no crime is supposed to come to light or be exposed, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: But most crimes come to light at a certain stage.

MR BOTHA: Not necessarily all of them.

MR WESSELS: Yes, but a lot of them, Mr Botha, and there's always the risk that a crime will be exposed or come to light.

MR BOTHA: Well we did not commit a crime while we observed Mr Bruce White.

MR WESSELS: No, but you committed a very serious crime when you killed Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: We had already left the scene, there were no ballistic tests to be done. Mr Barnard destroyed all the articles which could incriminate us or associate us with this murder, all that we had to do was to keep quiet. If Mr Barnard kept quiet it was the perfect murder.

MR WESSELS: It's not that simple because now the Commander's doing strange things, he is - or this could lead to the framing of yourself and Mr Barnard. It is a very worrisome idea.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Wessels, if I could just ask one question.

Did you know Brenda Mills?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that she had also been involved in monitoring Dr Webster's house?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know, or do you think that she knew that you were assisting Mr Barnard in the Dr Webster operation?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I don't think so at the time or shortly thereafter, but it came to light at a later stage that she did.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, you knew that you were driving in Brenda Mills' vehicle.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You were in her vehicle at various opportunities while you monitored the house.

MR BOTHA: It was not just her vehicle, there were other vehicles involved as well.

MR WESSELS: Did you ask Mr Barnard if he used Brenda Mills or informed about this instruction?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir.

MR WESSELS: Did you not think that there's a possibility that Mr Barnard would have said too much and could have told Brenda about this instruction that he received?

MR BOTHA: No, I did not think of it.

MR WESSELS: You did not?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: Very well, let us go back to the Bruce White incident. You foresaw that there could have been trouble concerning Bruce White, is that what you are saying?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is possible Sir. It's once again speculation.

MR WESSELS: It's possible that you could receive an instruction to kill him.

MR BOTHA: It is possible.

MR WESSELS: And it was speculation or it was a consideration that you thought of.

MR BOTHA: No, no, you are forcing me to consider it now.

MR WESSELS: Very well. And if you were asked to kill Mr White, you would have done it.

MR BOTHA: Yes, in all probability.

MR WESSELS: Once again an instruction from this organisation?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Once again an instruction from this Commander whom you cannot trust at all.

MR BOTHA: I can hear what you are saying, but I would just like to clarify. He did it maybe with his own reasons, without placing his integrity in doubt.

MR WESSELS: I do not understand what you're saying, what does this mean?

MR BOTHA: I will try and explain it in a different way. Mr Verster possibly had his own agenda where he made certain enquiries in our region, there was a cut-off date given to Mr Barnard and, as Mr Barnard explained to you here, and what Mr Verster's reason was for the enquiries that he made, it may not put his integrity in doubt.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, whatever Mr Verster's objective was and which you could speculate at that stage, could only lead to one conclusion and that is that is was a sinister objective.

MR LAX: Well that's not so, Mr Wessels, please. With the greatest of respect, I've been listening to you saying "sinister" over and over again, he could have been establishing cut-off points in his own organisation. I mean any number of other things, it need not necessarily have been sinister, and I've been listening to you all the time. Earlier you heard me put to this witness other possibilities which he accepted as well. So you know, the question is that it could have actually establishing a cut-off point within his own organisation, so that even the people in Region 6 didn't know what was going on, so that they wouldn't even begin to suspect he'd given the instruction. It's also a probability which is not sinister at all, but which is exactly in line with his paranoia about security. So really, it's not the only possibility and you're putting it to him as if it is the only possibility he could have drawn, and that's not fair.

MR BOTHA: I would like to continue Sir, by saying it could possibly have been a Stratcom operation from Mr Verster, in that it was disinformation that he tried to convey. It is something that I can only speculate about.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, might I point out, there appears to be another problem with this line of cross-examination. On Mr Barnard's version he says he only made the report to Mr Luitingh a few days after the 1st of May, in other words Mr Luitingh only knew then that Barnard had been involved, whereas on Mr Botha's version the meeting that was convened was on the 2nd of May.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say Luitingh only knew then that Botha was involved, wasn't Luitingh involved in the instruction, I mean that Barnard was involved? Wasn't Luitingh involved in the initial meetings before the assassination? Barnard's version.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes but the point is on Mr Botha's version, at the time that this meeting was convened, Barnard had been unable to report to his handler that he'd carried out the shooting because he'd been unable to get hold of his handler.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes because he was reacting to the press reports and the media reports of the death.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes the short point is that there's no evidence here to suggest that at the time the meeting was convened that Verster already knew that Barnard had killed Webster.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes although on Barnard's version he had ordered him to do so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well he could have inferred it obviously.

MR WESSELS: I'll deal with Mr Lax's point, Mr Chairman. With respect Mr Lax, that is not the point that I'm bringing home. In the perception of the witness at that time, Mr Verster was doing something which was sinister, because he knew that Verster had given the instruction and now Verster was making enquiries, why would he make enquiries if he knew what was happening.

MR LAX: To create the impression in Region 6 that he didn't know who gave the instruction ... just let me finish, and so that the rest of Region 6, at their meeting, would actually go away thinking well, this wasn't out operation and not further condone any possible security breach and have a perfect cut-off point then. Because for example, Both didn't know Luitingh when they first started, he only found that out much later, so that was their style. I'm saying that's the one scenario, it's a possible scenario and quite a ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: Yes but if that is so Mr Lax, then it is still an action by Mr Verster which is cause for concern, because Verster knows that this was his instruction and now he's making enquiries as if he is totally ignorant of why Webster was killed.

MR LAX: Absolutely. I'm not saying it's not a cause for concern in this witness, that I'm accepting without doubt, what I'm saying is it's not a sinister or a totally outrageous form of conduct that you would expect from him and therefore to put it to him on that basis, which is how I'm hearing you put it, you're saying this is so unreasonable to expect Verster to behave in that way, that he would be framing his own man. I'm saying he's not framing him, it's equally - maybe we're talking at cross-purposes...

MR WESSELS: I think we're talking at cross-purposes, because I'm not suggesting that, I'm merely referring to what in his mind must have been the reason and nothing further than that.

MR LAX: As long as this is clear then let's proceed on that basis.

MR WESSELS: All that I'm saying to you Mr Botha, is that in your mind strange things were now happening and that the possibility came up in your mind that Verster's busy doing sinister things which could place you in danger and that he would not admit that this was a CCB instruction.

MR BOTHA: Sir, as I have said before it can possibly be that he had in mind to place it before somebody else.

MR WESSELS: I'm talking about other structures, I'm not saying what he had in mind, I'm just trying to find out what was going on in your mind. You probably felt very worried about what Verster was doing.

MR BOTHA: And I said yes and no, yes there may have been method in his madness.

MR WESSELS: Yes but it could also be to your disadvantage.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You do nothing about it, you do not ask anything from anybody or to anyone and you continue with your career in this structure.

MR BOTHA: Who could I have asked?

MR WESSELS: Could you not have discussed it with anybody in the organisation?

MR BOTHA: Can you identify anybody for me?

MR WESSELS: Could you not discuss this with Gen Webb?

MR BOTHA: We had no access to him.

MR WESSELS: For something of this serious nature you could have got access.

MR BOTHA: I had to go through Verster to go to the General, there was no other way, there was no other line of contact.

MR WESSELS: Well you knew that Gen Webb was the Commander, the Chairperson, you knew that Gen Webb is a General in Special Forces.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: You knew that he had a telephone.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: By nature of the situation you could phone him and say: "General, I would like to make an appointment, I've got very sensitive issues that I'd like to discuss with you."

MR BOTHA: I was a footsoldier and the General and Verster walked together, and you are now trying to say to me that I must consider that option, I have to go to the General and discuss an instruction that he possibly does not even know of.

MR WESSELS: You did not think of anybody in the police or another confidant who you could approach, you were prepared to continue.

MR BOTHA: That is also why I ended up in the Section 29 detention, because people spoke about things.

MR WESSELS: You then continued and you now get the instruction to monitor Bruce White and you foresee that there could be a possible instruction at a later stage to eliminate him.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You continue and you involve Mr Barnard, once again against the rules of the organisation.

MR BOTHA: As you say, yes.

MR WESSELS: And did you in this period of time of a month after the Webster murder, think that maybe you should start acting within the rules of the organisation, that you are busy with very serious matters and that you have to follow the rules?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I have said to you before that I was very willing, I wanted to achieve things in this organisation and I did not have a substructure which I could apply to do the monitoring for me. In other words I had to do it myself. I will stand by that.

CHAIRPERSON: What about Geoffrey, when did you get hold of Geoffrey?

MR BOTHA: Sir, it was in the region of April. I could have used him most probably.

MR WESSELS: Why did you not make use of him?

MR BOTHA: Sir, he was in a phase in which I was still - he was still in the Peaches phase, the test phase and I was not ready to apply him in such a project.

MR WESSELS: Mr White was not a priority target or project? MR BOTHA: It was a name that was given to us and we were told that we have to focus on him.

MR WESSELS: Could you not go to your Regional Manager and ask him, tell him that: "Look, I've got a problem, I haven't got anybody that I can apply, we have to wait a while"?

MR BOTHA: Seen in the light of my situation with Staal Burger, it would have been fatal.

MR WESSELS: Why, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: I cannot go to him Sir and show to him that I, or indicate that "I cannot do this now, you have to assist me, I'm not qualified to do it, because you gave me this name and I cannot do anything about it." I couldn't do it.

MR WESSELS: You were rather willing to take the risk of discharge if it came out that you broke the rules?

MR BOTHA: Sir, in retrospect it was not supposed to come out. I did take precautions, a mistake was made and it was not supposed to come out, otherwise it wouldn't have come out.

MR WESSELS: It did come out and you were in a lot of trouble.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, when it's a convenient time we'll take the adjournment. I don't know if it's a convenient time now. We will now take the lunch adjournment until 2 o'clock, thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CARL CASTELING BOTHA: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Wessels.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Botha, you told Mr Bizos that you requested and that you begged for them to look after Barnard, do you recall that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I basically insisted upon it.

MR WESSELS: Who is the "they" or "them"?

MR BOTHA: I took up the matter with Staal Burger, our Regional Manager, as well as Nick Nienaber.

MR WESSELS: And when did you have these discussions?

MR BOTHA: I suspect that it was in September, with the first problems that he picked up. I can't say precisely when it was, it was with his first arrest or detention and the enquiries regarding Lubowski or whatever the case was, I'm not sure. And then there was also a second occasion before my own arrest that I asked for him to be given assistance. I said he needed help.

MR WESSELS: And what was their attitude?

MR BOTHA: It was dual in nature. Firstly, they were initially unwilling to help, to the extent that they were going to turn their backs on him and at a later stage they realised that they had to assist him.

MR WESSELS: And what did you tell them, why should they assist him?

MR BOTHA: I sketched two scenarios for them. Firstly, because he didn't have any contact with his handler or his Co-ordinator, and I simply sent the message through them and then secondly, because he was involved with me.

MR WESSELS: Because he was involved with who?

MR BOTHA: With me.

MR WESSELS: With you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Why didn't he have any contact with his handler?

MR BOTHA: He didn't have any right for legal visitations and I was basically the only way in which we could make use of a channel to get information to him.

MR WESSELS: What did you say to Mr Burger and the other person as a reason why Mr Barnard should be looked after, in what had he been involved?

MR BOTHA: I suggested that he knew about them, that he knew of my involvement with them and that he had indeed recruited Aitchison and as such he knew about the structure and I didn't want to place him in a situation where he would expose us.

MR WESSELS: Didn't you tell them that the organisation should look after Barnard because Barnard could expose the situation and that he didn't have any contact?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Did you tell them that he was still a member of the organisation?

MR BOTHA: Well I said that he was in the organisation, I can't recall my precise words, it was something to that effect.

MR WESSELS: But if he was still in the organisation, why wouldn't his handler have seen to his interests?

MR BOTHA: Because he didn't have any contact with him and I don't think they really knew how to work with money and Brenda's situation regarding her daily existence, and I wanted to create a channel so that they money could be channelled.

MR WESSELS: Very well. So you wanted to keep Mr Barnard in the situation as far as possible, so that he could still enjoy the benefits of whatever protection would be provided?

MR BOTHA: I just gave the facts as they were known to me.

MR WESSELS: Yes. And those facts were to the effect that he was still a member of the organisation and that he didn't have any contact with his handler and that they had to look after him?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR WESSELS: And it was also to Mr Barnard's advantage in as far as you were concerned, that he remain a member of the organisation, that he be regarded as a member of the organisation?

MR BOTHA: If he could, then yes.

MR WESSELS: Yes of course, and your relationship with him was still very favourable at that stage and you believe that he deserved it.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: I want to refer you to your statement after your arrest, in bundle B, page 4. You state there in the third or the fourth paragraph from the top of the page

"At this stage Ferdi was discharged by his Co-ordinator, Louis."

What is your comment on that?

MR BOTHA: I have already given elaborate commentary on this.

MR WESSELS: Were you mistaken?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: What was the position? Was he on ice?

MR BOTHA: I told you I wasn't certain whether he was on ice or whether it was an argument that they had. I'm prepared to concede that I was aware of an argument which took place, there was some discord. Let's keep it at that, there was a measure of discord.

MR WESSELS: So there was some discord between two members, but that wouldn't necessary mean that one of them would be automatically discharged or that the one would no longer be a member of the organisation.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: So you stated it in positive that he was discharged but then you realised you were mistaken?

MR BOTHA: Well I have explained why I stated it as such.

MR WESSELS: Two paragraphs later you refer to your own position and you state that you were put on ice.

MR BOTHA: I don't see it, but if it is like that ...

MR WESSELS: It is in the paragraph

"I reported to Burger what had happened. He was very angry with me. He reported the incident to Joe. I was seriously reprimanded and put on ice."

MR BOTHA: With regard to the Bruce White incident?

MR WESSELS: Yes. So the term "to be put on ice" was clearly understood by you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Just tell me Mr Botha, in which manner was the statement taken, what was the circumstances?

MR BOTHA: More specifically what do you mean?

MR WESSELS: Well you were in the cell.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And then you decided that you would make a statement, because without making a statement you would not be able to find your way out of the cell, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And questions were put to you by the police.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Who were the persons that interrogated you?

MR BOTHA: W/O Rossouw and Detect-W/O Carter.

MR WESSELS: Did they take you to another room for the deposition of the statement?

MR BOTHA: The statement was composed in various manners, they gave me the opportunity to make notes, they took a statement, there was a variety of ways in which they composed the statement.

MR WESSELS: And did they put these questions to you over a period and you give your response to them over a period?

MR BOTHA: I thought about the questions and we discussed them. It wasn't specifically a question and answer format, it didn't happen on that basis.

MR WESSELS: Did it stretch over a number of days?

MR BOTHA: Yes it is possible, this happened 11 years ago, I cannot recall precisely.

MR WESSELS: And after you had given your answers, was it typed up and put in a statement form?

MR BOTHA: I accept that that is what happened.

MR WESSELS: And that it was then presented to you and you studied it and signed it as true and correct?

MR BOTHA: I accept that.

MR WESSELS: Did you take an oath?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: If I could just ask a question, Mr Wessels.

You didn't get any written contract of employment or anything like that, did you?

MR WESSELS: Yes Sir, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And what did that contract state with regard to dismissal? Can you recall? Why I'm asking is, if you were called in and Verster or Burger said: "Look, I don't like the look of your face, you're fired", a wrongful dismissal clearly, would you have gone to court?

MR BOTHA: I didn't have a copy of the contract. It is possible that certain disciplinary steps were set out which I cannot recall, so I cannot tell you with certainty.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, at this stage you still wanted to protect Mr Barnard in as far as it was possible.

MR BOTHA: I just wanted to stick to my version of his position.

MR WESSELS: Well you didn't want to bring him into trouble unnecessarily or you didn't want to prejudice him unnecessarily.

MR BOTHA: I wouldn't have wanted to do that to anybody.

MR WESSELS: You see you continue in this statement and on page 6, in the middle of the page you state

"Before I was put on ice I saw a CV of a person by the name of Roland Aitchison. I obtained this CV from Ferdi, who had obtained it while he was outside of the organisation."

So once again you refer to the fact that Barnard was out of the organisation.

MR BOTHA: Yes I hear what you're saying.

MR WESSELS: I find it odd that under the circumstances where you found yourself, you would give a statement to get out of the cell and in this statement you would make remarks which would have the potential effect of depriving Barnard of this organisational protection.

MR BOTHA: I understand, but then there is a further contradiction with regard to the overtures that I made to my region to relay the message to his region to take care of him. It is just as contradictory with my statement, that is why I would like to appeal to the fact of my Section 29 detention where I wasn't thinking straight and I may have misinterpreted certain things, that Mr Barnard didn't necessarily tell me that he was out of the organisation, that it was my assumption, that perhaps he thought I could send the CV through to his handler. I cannot recall the situation.

MR WESSELS: Were you questioned about Webster?

MR BOTHA: During my detention?

MR WESSELS: Yes.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And you denied everything?

MR BOTHA: Yes I did.

MR WESSELS: On page 7 in the middle of the page you state

"Burger wanted to know from me whether Ferdi knew about the involvement of me and the others. I responded no."

Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes I possibly responded in that way.

MR WESSELS: Why did you respond in this fashion? Why didn't you tell Mr Burger that Ferdi knew about you but that he shouldn't worry about it, that he was also a member of the organisation?

MR BOTHA: Perhaps because I didn't want to place Burger in the position where he could discriminate against me, so to speak, I had already made a mistake and I had been placed on ice as a result of it, I was very hesitant to approach this.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Chairperson, perhaps one should see if this sentence is within the broader context of the statement or whether it only pertains to Aitchison.

CHAIRPERSON: It looks like it may just be referring to the "betrokkenheid" with regard to Aitchison.

MR WESSELS: I don't have a problem with that, Mr Chairman.

And then you proceeded and at the bottom of that page you state that later you again reported to Burger that Ferdi had again been arrested.

"He phoned Joe immediately, Joe assured him that he would speak to the Chairperson and that we should not worry."

Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: But there was tremendous uncertainty with you regarding Mr Barnard's position at that stage, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: Yes there was uncertainty.

MR WESSELS: You were uncertain, you were not sure whether he was involved with Aitchison and Lubowski, isn't that so?

MR BOTHA: I don't know, it may have been.

MR WESSELS: You don't know?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: But you knew that he was involved with Webster?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR WESSELS: And that this was a very prominent matter which was under investigation.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Didn't you think it feasible that at that stage you should start telling the truth to everyone, in order to ensure that the organisation would come to the aid of you and your friend Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Up to that point I had not yet been exposed, in other words, exposed as being involved with Mr Barnard. I accepted that with regard to the remark that was made there that Joe would see to it that everything would be sorted out, that he had realised that there was a problem, that he knew what my involvement with Mr Barnard was and that he would act accordingly.

MR WESSELS: Very well. Later you came out of detention and you swiftly realised that the CCB was not going to be accepting responsibility for Webster, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: What do you mean that I realised swiftly? I saw from the beginning what Mr Verster's attitude was.

MR WESSELS: But shortly after your release the Harms Commission commenced and Slang van Zyl gave evidence there regarding involvement and he testified how Joe Verster had made enquiries about Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You were aware of those activities, you were aware that the CCB denied any involvement with Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Just before we proceed with the history I would like to take you back to the murder of Dr Webster himself. You heard from Mr Barnard that you had to kill Dr Webster, correct?

MR BOTHA: I hear what from Mr Barnard?

MR WESSELS: That you had to kill Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And you were told that it would be by means of a shotgun.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did you ask him precisely how you were going to do it?

MR BOTHA: We must have discussed it. I accepted - yes, I asked him.

MR WESSELS: You asked him?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: What did you ask him?

MR BOTHA: Precisely how we were going to do it, what his plan was.

MR WESSELS: And what did he tell you?

MR BOTHA: He stipulated that I would drive, that he would sit in front on the left and as soon as we had the target in sight within a limited distance, he would fire one shot and kill the person.

MR WESSELS: Was that at the beginning, before you began monitoring him?

MR BOTHA: It must have been during that as well.

MR WESSELS: When you went out with him the first time, did you know that this was the plan?

MR BOTHA: I knew that he had to be killed and then we started our discussion. So I assume that that was the first time. We had to be prepared every time in case we had the target in sight.

MR WESSELS: Did you have the balaclavas in the vehicle every time and were you armed at every time?

MR BOTHA: Yes, with all the occasions that I accompanied him.

MR WESSELS: And on these occasions did you accompany him during the day?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: What sort of shotgun was it?

MR BOTHA: It was a sworn off shotgun.

MR WESSELS: What sort?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall the name.

MR WESSELS: What sort? Automatic, semi-automatic?

MR BOTHA: It was a double-barrel.

MR WESSELS: And did you know that make of shotgun?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: Did you know that it was his shotgun?

MR BOTHA: He said it was a shotgun that he had obtained.

MR WESSELS: Did you ask him from where he had obtained it?

MR BOTHA: As Mr Barnard testified, he had a lot of access to many weapons and I didn't question it.

MR WESSELS: Didn't you think that it was something that the CCB must have provided?

MR BOTHA: I accepted that he suggested to the CCB that he would obtain the firearm.

MR WESSELS: What was the position of Mr Riley?

MR BOTHA: As far as I know there was no position.

MR WESSELS: Now on this particular day, how did the murder take place?

MR BOTHA: After a period of time that we spent there on the 1st of May we saw a white bakkie pass by our vehicle, Mr Barnard identified the bakkie at a distance and saw that it was Dr Webster accompanied by Maggie Freedman, he told me to drive slowly in the direction of Dr Webster, the balaclavas were put over our heads and our faces as we approached the vehicle. Mr Barnard prepared himself in the left of the vehicle with the shotgun which already had a pellet in it.

MR WESSELS: Where was he seated, in front or at the back?

MR BOTHA: In front on the left. We approached the vehicle and I recall that he called out to Webster and that Dr Webster looked around in his direction in surprise and motioned towards the vehicle. I remained dead still and waited for the shot. After he had fired the shot I pulled away.

MR WESSELS: And you drove off?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I drove off.

MR WESSELS: And you were pursued by a vehicle.

MR BOTHA: There was a vehicle. I don't know to which point the vehicle pursued us, but yes there was a vehicle.

MR WESSELS: And did Mr Barnard tell you what he was going to do then with this firearm of his?

MR BOTHA: He said that he would see to its destruction.

MR WESSELS: Did he tell you anything about what he was going to do with regard to his handler?

MR BOTHA: He just said that he would inform him accordingly that the project had been executed.

MR WESSELS: Were you aware that he had paged Mr Luitingh a number of times in subsequent days?

MR BOTHA: He told me at a certain point that he was struggling to get hold of Lafras.

MR WESSELS: And did you tell you that he had managed to get hold of Lafras?

MR BOTHA: At a stage he mentioned that he had spoken to him.

MR WESSELS: And what did he tell you?

MR BOTHA: He told me that a meeting had been arranged and that he wanted me to accompany him to the meeting, which I did.

MR WESSELS: Yes and when did this meeting take place?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall the precise date but I know that it was at the Hyperama.

MR WESSELS: I beg your pardon?

MR BOTHA: I do recall that it was at the Hyperama, but I don't know precisely on what date.

MR WESSELS: How long approximately after the incident?

MR BOTHA: A number of days. I'm not certain how many days.

MR WESSELS: And did you ask him what Verster had said about the instruction which had been successfully executed?

MR BOTHA: At which stage?

MR WESSELS: At any stage.

MR BOTHA: He simply told me that Lafras was impressed, and I left it at that.

MR WESSELS: Did you tell Mr Barnard that on the 2nd of May, the day after the incident, you heard during a cell meeting that Verster was making enquiries of your involvement?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that was my evidence before lunch.

MR WESSELS: And what was Mr Barnard's attitude towards that?

MR BOTHA: As I've said, he couldn't believe it and then we started speculating on the motivation for the denial.

MR WESSELS: Didn't you ask if he asked Luitingh about this aspect?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't.

MR WESSELS: And after the meeting with Luitingh took place, did you still not ask him what Lafras said, why was Joe making enquiries about this incident?

MR BOTHA: No, how would Ferdi have known that Joe was making enquiries, in order to be able to convey this?

MR WESSELS: Well if he heard it he could say: "I heard Joe was making enquiries."

MR BOTHA: Where would he have heard it?

MR WESSELS: From you.

MR BOTHA: But that would have exposed me.

MR WESSELS: Yes, that would have exposed you, so he was trying to protect you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And when you were sitting there in the parking lot, could you see the vehicle in which Luitingh was seated?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I saw a vehicle but I don't know what sort of vehicle it was, I cannot recall, but I saw Ferdi walking over to a person and he stood there talking to him.

MR WESSELS: Did the person remain seated in the vehicle or was he outside?

MR BOTHA: Initially he was inside but then he got out of the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Did you see him, did you know him?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't know him.

MR WESSELS: Could you identify him?

MR BOTHA: By means of Ferdi, yes.

MR WESSELS: Well could you see his appearance?

MR BOTHA: Not really, there were many vehicles passing by in-between us and I lay flat in the vehicle in case he looked in our direction. So I looked very quickly and I didn't have any other involvement in the meeting.

MR WESSELS: What was your involvement in the meeting?

MR BOTHA: Mr Barnard told me that in the light of the allegations which had been made by Mr Verster, he was uncertain and as he stated in his version, he had heard rumours of persons who had executed operations and subsequently the person who was responsible or the informer, would be eliminated and I was there in case there were any problems. And that is what I did partially.

MR WESSELS: What weapon did you have on you?

MR BOTHA: I had a 9mm CZ.

MR WESSELS: And did Mr Luitingh climb out of the vehicle before Mr Barnard arrived there?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall these details precisely.

MR WESSELS: And you lay flat on the seat and peered over?

MR BOTHA: The seat was pulled back.

MR WESSELS: And you peered over to see what was going on?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And then Mr Barnard returned and he told you that he had obtained money.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And he gave you R5 000.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Didn't you think it's extraordinary, given the fact that he was a member of the organisation and he was receiving a salary?

MR BOTHA: I was also aware of the bonus system and I accepted that it was merely a production bonus.

MR WESSELS: Very well. Mr Botha, did you at any stage before 1995, admit to anybody or state to anybody that you or Mr Barnard had been involved in Dr Webster's death?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: So you kept in entirely secret?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And during August 1992, the Webster post-mortem inquiry began.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And during this time evidence was given of Mr Barnard's involvement in it.

MR BOTHA: His suspected involvement.

MR WESSELS: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Among others, evidence was given by Lafras Luitingh that Mr Barnard upon an occasion had come to him and said that he had shot Dr Webster.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: That he told this to Joe Verster and that Joe Verster told the Generals.

MR BOTHA: I believe that was the evidence.

MR WESSELS: And then there was a situation during which it was speculated by everyone on who was responsible for Dr Webster's death, the CCB or Mr Barnard.

MR BOTHA: Yes, there was such speculation.

MR WESSELS: And it was very clear to you at that stage that the blame for Dr Webster's murder would be placed upon Mr Barnard by the CCB.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it appeared to be as such.

MR WESSELS: It wasn't only Mr Luitingh who gave such evidence but there was also evidence from Derek Louw, whose real name is Chris Nel, if I have it correctly.

MR BOTHA: I don't know them at all, but I accept what you have said.

MR WESSELS: And you realised that the incident would be the responsibility of Mr Barnard.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And that you were also at risk as a consequence.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You were aware of the serious consequences of being found guilty of that incident.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: There was already an Amnesty Act on the table.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And according to your beliefs and your own position you believed that you did everything in the interests of the organisation and in the execution of an instruction and that you believed bona fide that this was an act which was committed by the organisation and that the terms of the Amnesty Act which were of importance at that stage, would give you indemnity for it.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Why didn't you apply for amnesty?

MR BOTHA: There are two reasons. Firstly, Mr Barnard and I came into a serious confrontation because we discussed the matter, I asked him what the situation was, I said that perhaps there was an opportunity here, that we should definitely discuss it, but upon various occasions he refused to do so, to the extent that he said that he would rather go to prison instead of putting the others in the cells, and I said: "But you must understand my position", and he said that he didn't tell anybody about my involvement and he wanted to protect Joe at all costs still, because he realised that he wouldn't have Mr Verster's backing. I left it at that.

Secondly, I was not responsible for the project, it was not my project, I didn't want to apply alone for amnesty for a project which wasn't mine to begin with.

MR WESSELS: I find it difficult to understand. You see, by requesting amnesty at that stage or at a later stage, given the fact that Joe and Lafras could also apply for amnesty if they were exposed, no-one would have gone to jail because everybody would have received amnesty, seeing as the act was committed with the objectives which would fall within the ambit of the Act. So no-one would have been prejudiced if you had decided to tell the truth.

MR BOTHA: I'm prepared to go on record by saying that if it wasn't for the fact that there was prima facie evidence that Mr Verster was involved with our projects and had extended approval for these projects, he also wouldn't have requested amnesty. There was no way in which and Luitingh would have requested amnesty for the Webster incident after Barnard had exposed them.

MR WESSELS: Is that your own deduction?

MR BOTHA: Is that your own deduction?

MR BOTHA: No, it is based upon discussions which took place, during which I could see the hesitance with regard to the application for amnesty regarding certain projects.

MR WESSELS: You see Mr Botha, you took a tremendous risk when you realised that evidence was coming from everywhere indicating that you were involved, or at least not you but Mr Barnard was involved with the Webster incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want Mr Botha to comment on that or...

MR WESSELS: ...(indistinct - no microphone). I was passed a note here by Mr Kahanovitz, I just want to read it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I just wanted to clarify the situation in respect of something that was put to the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: He's having difficulty reading your writing, Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It appears so. Just in relation to something that was put to the witness about what was the evidence at the Webster Inquest. I just wanted to point out that at the Webster Inquest it was Luitingh's version that although he had this meeting with Barnard, he actually never passed the information on to Verster. He says - this is in the Finding at pages 137 to 138, Judge Stegman notes that two witnesses, Luitingh and someone by the name of Louw, this is probably the Chris Nel that we've heard of, both said that Barnard had made confessions to them, but he goes on to find that

"Although two members of the inner circle, Luitingh and Louw, now claim that Barnard had already confessed to the murder and that Luitingh had informed Louw of the confession, neither Luitingh nor Louw then passed on what they knew of the matter to Verster. The explanation of this state of affairs is somewhat weak. Firstly, Luitingh and Louw claim to have disbelieved Barnard's alleged confession and secondly, Luitingh testified that if he had revealed Barnard's confession to Verster, he would at the same time have revealed his own breaches of security in failing to make a clean break with Barnard and that as he feared for the consequences of his breach of security, he kept his knowledge of Barnard's confession from Verster."

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Could you just repeat the page numbers please.

MR KAHANOVITZ: 137 to 138. I think Luitingh might have subsequently changed his version.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Kahanovitz.

MR WESSELS: I think Mr Botha, what Mr Verster testified is that at a certain stage he received this information from Mr Luitingh, and it could be at the time when the Generals made the investigations, but I will not speculate it any further. What I'm putting to you is that there's at least two members of the CCB who then involved Mr Barnard in this murder.

MR BOTHA: If you just give me a moment to comment on that extract. Mr Luitingh was a trustee of Mr Verster, so much so that they come from the Defence Force inner circle. He has not got - he cannot discuss this with Mr Verster under oath. Do you now understand why on the basis of what has been said now, I can go to Verster or Webb to discuss things if he under oath states that he as an inner circle member, would not have discussed it with Verster. This is they psychosis of fear that was present concerning Mr Verster and his capability.

MR LAX: Can I just correct the transcript please. The word "trustee" was used instead of confidant. You just spoke about being a confidant of Verster's, rather than a trustee. In other words, a relationship of trust between them.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask one question before you proceed, Mr Wessels.

Do you know at all of the circumstances under which Derek Louw or Chris Nel came to know of Mr Barnard's involvement of Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir, I do not know the person.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But Mr Chairman, according to this Luitingh passed this information on to ...

CHAIRPERSON: To Derek Louw, sorry. Yes, so my question wasn't appropriate.

MR KAHANOVITZ: It's not claimed that Barnard was the direct source.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR WESSELS: Luitingh told Louw about it and then asked him what he had to do. Mr Chairman, let me read from page 1974 from the record, that is the evidence of Louw

"Did Lafras Luitingh make mention of a discussion which he had with Barnard after Dr Webster's death?"

the answer:

"Yes."

"Did he tell you what Ferdi Barnard told him with regards to Webster's death?"

"Yes. The information that I received from Lafras was that Lafras was clearly nervous. I cannot quote the conversation in the way in which we had it, but Lafras was worried and he told me because I was aware of the fact that Joe Verster discharged Barnard, Joe Verster's opinion of Barnard was according to what I heard, hearsay, that he believed Ferdi Barnard was a criminal and that there was no position for somebody like him in the organisation. Lafras asked me and he said that he was worried or concerned that Ferdi Barnard told him something which would put him in a bad position, because if he would he would fire him, which is Lafras. He then asked him about it. He was not willing to talk about it. I realised that he had a problem and Lafras kept quiet or told me to keep quiet and I said that I will not discuss this with anyone, and then he told me that Ferdi Barnard used the English word "claim", in that he floored Webster. These are the words that he used. And this was an attempt to prove to Joe that he was acceptable, that he can be used by the CCB and that he must not be discharged or fired."

Can you recall that evidence?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I can recall it. The words that they used there, that he must not be fired. This is now Mr Lafras Luitingh's words or is it the other party's words?

MR WESSELS: This now Mr Louw who reported about what happened between him and Luitingh.

MR BOTHA: That he must not be fired?

MR WESSELS: Yes.

MR BOTHA: He was therefore not fired.

MR WESSELS: The point that I'm trying to make here is that at that stage you knew that Mr Barnard was accused and evidence was now there that Mr Barnard made a certain admittance and that you were at risk.

MR BOTHA: I did not see this. Mr Barnard had the opportunity to make certain admissions and he did not, so there was no risk for me because I told him to keep quiet about the whole matter.

MR WESSELS: But you now have heard that Lafras Luitingh said that Barnard would have told him this, and this was said in court and Luitingh also testified to that effect, that Barnard would have told him that he shot Webster, and you are now aware that you are at risk.

MR BOTHA: If you see it that way, yes.

MR WESSELS: Did you not mention to for example a legal representative of a higher political person or the Attorney-General, did you not tell them: "I want to talk, I want to tell the truth now and the people who really gave the instructions must take responsibility for what they, for these instructions that they gave"?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I did that at the beginning of last year.

MR WESSELS: The beginning of last year, that was 1999?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: For the first time?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did you contact the Deputy Attorney-General, Dr Pretorius, and tell him about it?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I did.

MR WESSELS: Can you tell us how it happened that you went to go and see him.

MR BOTHA: Sir, accompanied by my legal team I went to go and visit Dr Pretorius concerning a matter and at a certain stage the discussion took a different turn in which they made an offer to me and asked me if I did not want to talk to them about certain incidents. Which I then did.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, don't hold back, tell us why did you go and see Dr Pretorius, was it true that there was a police investigation held against you?

MR BOTHA: It's not relevant to this Commission.

MR WESSELS: It is relevant.

MR BOTHA: It is not at all.

MR WESSELS: You were investigated in - am I correct if I say that there were various factors of fraud, insurance fraud?

MR BOTHA: Not at all, and I'd like it to be removed from the record, because at no stage did this happen. So you are willing to speculate. I'm telling you at no stage first of all, and secondly, it's not relevant.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, I will put it to you that I will argue that the reason why you went was because you were in trouble.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I would just like you to qualify the difficulty, and I'm not threatening you now, but if this results in damage to my person I will give instructions to my legal team.

MR WESSELS: You are welcome to do it.

MR BOTHA: Then I'd like to ask you to make sure about the facts. I'm not speculating, I'm asking you to do the same.

MR WESSELS: Then tell us why did you go to Adv Pretorius?

MR BOTHA: I've just told you it is not relevant to this Commission and it's got nothing to do with insurance or any relevant matter concerning insurance.

MR WESSELS: What was the offer that was made to you?

MR BOTHA: They spoke to me about Dr Webster amongst other things, including other activities of the CCB.

MR WESSELS: And what was told to you concerning Dr Webster?

MR BOTHA: They asked me if I wanted to talk about Dr Webster, the truth as I saw it or knew about it.

MR WESSELS: To share this with the Attorney-General.

MR BOTHA: How do you want me to explain it to you, must I use legal terms?

MR WESSELS: Did you then decide to do it?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: And what would you have then told the A-G?

MR BOTHA: As I've already mentioned.

MR VAN ECK: Chairperson, this point has been dealt with, Mr Wessels asked for documentation, we did take it up and I've already placed it on record that Mr Pretorius them do not want to make known the contents or give the documents. And to ask it now in an oral fashion will not help. We cannot give them the documentation, we also cannot talk about the contents thereof.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, are you not willing to say what you received for the disclosure that you made to Adv Pretorius concerning Webster?

MR BOTHA: I received nothing except the agreement that I will qualify for a 204 if I tell them the truth.

MR WESSELS: And is that everything that happened there?

MR BOTHA: I will repeat it.

MR WESSELS: I beg your pardon?

MR BOTHA: I will repeat it, yes.

MR WESSELS: So that is the full deal that was struck between yourself and the Mr Pretorius?

MR BOTHA: If you see it as a deal, it can be a deal. There was an agreement with the office of the Attorney-General and I agreed with it.

MR WESSELS: And there were no further advantages for you, apart from the fact that you will not be charged with the Webster incident if you tell them the truth?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: No other advantages?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR WESSELS: So you then decided that you were going to tell the truth.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is something that I decided to do.

MR WESSELS: You did not think about it before last year to do something like that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, at a certain stage I did discuss it with Mr Barnard.

MR WESSELS: When did that discussion take place?

MR BOTHA: I cannot give you a date, but at a certain opportunity I did discuss this with him. I think it was over two opportunities that we discussed it.

MR WESSELS: Why didn't you do it then?

MR BOTHA: Sir, because I did not feel satisfied about the fact that this is what I really want to do.

MR WESSELS: Then you made had this agreement with Mr Pretorius and then you made a statement.

MR BOTHA: Yes, then they did it.

MR WESSELS: You went to Mr Barnard and discussed this statement with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I mentioned it to him.

MR WESSELS: Did he look at it and approve?

MR BOTHA: I do not think that I took it with me, I think I just shared it with him. I think I told him this what I'm going to do, I will keep to the facts as he gave it to me and he had no problem with that.

MR WESSELS: I see. And in that statement that you made, did you then associate yourself with the death of Mr Webster? And you came to this Commission or this Committee earlier on in this year and you heard about what happened here and the questions were put concerning the Webster incident.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: And did you decide, what are you going to answer if they ask you questions with regards to Mr Webster?

MR BOTHA: Exactly what I'm doing today, I'm going to tell the truth.

MR WESSELS: You're going to tell the truth?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WESSELS: So you will disclose your role in the death of Dr Webster, everything that came with that, the surrounding circumstances, etcetera?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did you tell this to Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: I think he accepted that I was going to do this.

MR WESSELS: Why do you say you accepted that he was going to do it?

MR BOTHA: Well because I discussed it with him at a certain stage in C-Max in Pretoria.

MR WESSELS: And was this before the matters were heard in March, the beginning of this year?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I think it was probably before that.

MR WESSELS: So before this matter was heard in March this year, you went to go and visit Mr Barnard in C-Max in Pretoria and you told him there that you are going to tell the truth.

MR BOTHA: That is correct. His sentiments were that he was not going to say anything, he's going to stick to what he said before. He was investigated concerning Dr Webster and he was not going to say anything further.

MR WESSELS: So he realised at that stage that you're going to come and implicate Joe Verster and Lafras Luitingh, compromise them with regards to this murder.

MR BOTHA: Well I did not apply for amnesty in this regard, so I'm not quite sure what my feeling would have been, if I would have testified about it or not.

MR WESSELS: But from the first day onwards it was probably very clear to you that Mr Bizos and others will ask questions with regards to Mr Webster.

MR BOTHA: Yes, and I could answer the questions as my advocate just answered your questions on behalf of Dr Torrie Pretorius.

MR WESSELS: No, this is not what it's about, he gave us an answer concerning the statement and what happened there between yourself and Pretorius, but he did not say that you will not come to testify about Verster and Luitingh's alleged involvement.

MR BOTHA: You miss the whole point. I told you if they had asked me that question I would have answered it as follows. I would say that I made a statement with the A-G and I am not authorised to talk about it, I did not apply for amnesty in this regard.

MR WESSELS: Now Mr Botha, that time when you and Mr Pretorius were together and you were offered this deal, did you realise that it's not going to be good enough to say that you were involved in the murder, you also will have to give a reason why Dr Webster was killed.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I kept to the facts as they were known to me, and that's all that can say in this regard.

MR WESSELS: Listen to my question.

MR BOTHA: No, you are using the wrong choice of words, that makes me a bit uncomfortable.

MR WESSELS: Let me choose different words then. When you were with Dr Pretorius, did you know that they were interested in finding out the whole story and this will include the motive and why you were involved in the murder?

MR BOTHA: Yes, the full truth.

MR WESSELS: And you had to give a reason why Dr Webster was killed.

MR BOTHA: Once again, the whole truth.

MR WESSELS: And you went to Barnard, and I will put it to you that you discussed this aspect.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I told him what I was going to do, I said that I was going to talk to Dr Pretorius concerning the Webster incident and that I have to associate myself with the truth and the facts of this matter.

MR WESSELS: When did you hear that Mr Barnard is going to say what he just said here in front of this Commission?

MR BOTHA: It was after the second sitting, Mr Wessels, I told you now for the third time.

MR WESSELS: After the second sitting that was in June.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes. He still could not decide if he must take part in the reconciliation process or not and what happened here did have an emotional influence on him and he did what he thought was the best.

MR WESSELS: When did you find out that he was going to do this?

MR BOTHA: Not long ago, Sir, when he decided finally to do it.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, how long is "not long ago"?

MR BOTHA: A month, two months, I cannot recall. It's irrelevant. I visit him, sometimes it's once a month at the most, if he gives me another visit I'll take another visit. So I cannot attach a time to it, it is 20/30 minutes a month that I can communicate with him.

MR WESSELS: And am I then correct if I say that you knew this before this sitting took place or started last week, you heard this from him in prison?

MR BOTHA: Yes, he told me that he was going to take part in the process and he felt that he owed it to himself and the other parties who were affected by his actions.

MR WESSELS: Did he tell you that he was also going to testify concerning the bomb with the 4 kilograms of nails attached to it?

MR BOTHA: No, he did not say that at any stage.

MR WESSELS: Did you hear about it the first time when he testified about it here in front of the Commission?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did that evidence surprise you, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it did.

MR WESSELS: Why did it surprise you?

MR BOTHA: Because it's not the truth.

MR WESSELS: If you say it's not the truth, what do you mean?

MR BOTHA: With regards to the fact that it happened like that, I was responsible for the limpet mine and I, on record in my testimony, testified that I did not attach nails to this SPM limpet mine and I also did not say this to Mr Barnard at any stage. I concede that if a discussion took place I also described my reaction to this Commission.

MR WESSELS: Did you have a discussion where he told you that Slang van Zyl told him that 4 kilograms of nails were attached to the limpet mine?

MR BOTHA: I've just told you that I do not think that the number 4 was ever mentioned.

MR WESSELS: Was there a discussion where Mr Barnard told you that Mr van Zyl told him, who is Barnard, that there were nails attached to this bomb?

MR BOTHA: I do not think he said nails, because people were not supposed to be killed. He said such a discussion took place, I said I didn't recall it and if the discussion did take place my reaction would have been I cannot understand why Mr van Zyl would have said something like that.

MR WESSELS: You also heard that Mr Barnard testified here that when he told you this you said no, it is not true, the instruction from Gen Webb was that there should not be any loss of life.

MR BOTHA: That was the impression that I had, yes. I was brought under that impression.

MR WESSELS: Yes and that's what you testified about. But what are you saying now, did you say this to him?

MR BOTHA: If the discussion did take place I would have reacted in the same way, I cannot recall the discussion, and this is now for the fourth time that I've said this.

MR WESSELS: Mr Botha, if that discussion had taken place you would not have reacted in this way, you would not have told him the instruction from Gen Webb was that people should not be injured, because you were not involved in an in-house, you had no contact with Gen Webb. What you would have said or stated would be then: "Ferdi, Slang's talking rubbish, I was there, I prepared the bomb, there was no nails."

MR BOTHA: I've just put it to you like that, this is what I've just said. I do not know if you need to adjust the volume, but I've just said that.

MR WESSELS: That is why I'm asking you now, you would not have said what Mr Barnard testified about, about what you said.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I cannot stand in or associate myself with his version or his interpretation of his Afrikaans, I cannot stand in for it. If he wants to make use of the word "chimpanzee" or I use the word "baboon". I would like to make it very clear to you, you are criticising.

MR WESSELS: I'm not criticising your evidence at this stage. MR BOTHA: You are asking me questions if I can agree to it and I cannot.

MR WESSELS: So what I am putting to you now is that Mr Barnard did indeed not tell the truth when he testified about these so-called nails that were used.

MR BOTHA: If there was a discussion between himself and Mr van Zyl and Mr van Zyl, because of some reason, whether it was to satisfy his ego or any other reason, said that, I cannot agree with that. He had such a discussion with me and I denied it.

MR WESSELS: You see Mr Botha, what I would like to put to you is that at a certain time when you were in a lot of trouble and under a lot of pressure you made a deal with the Attorney-General and you do not want to tell us what the surrounding circumstances are.

MR BOTHA: We are back to that point.

MR WESSELS: That information will come out later. You had to find a motive or a reason why Dr Webster had to be killed and it was then decided that the guilt will be placed before Luitingh and Verster, because they are the people in the CCB who were involved and who testified against Mr Barnard.

MR BOTHA: There are also various other people who testified against him.

MR WESSELS: Not with regards to the Webster incident. And they furthermore decided, this is now Mr Barnard, and I'm not saying you decided, but Mr Barnard decided that when he came to testify here that not only is it Joe Verster and Lafras Luitingh who have to be blamed for this, but that Slang van Zyl will also feel some pressure, because he's the one who put him away for 10 years. Then the evidence was led concerning the so-called 4 kilograms of nails which was attached to the limpet mine which Slang then would have said took place, but then at a later stage he realised that you are also going to be incriminated by it and now you've got a very serious problem to get amnesty. Then the evidence was given that: "No, I spoke to Calla about it and Calla then said this is not true, the instruction from Gen Webb was nobody had to be injured or was supposed to be injured." And in that way Slang will be implicated and you, his friend, will get off.

MR BOTHA: Sir, this is your version. I will just give a brief reaction. What Mr van Zyl and Barnard's relationship was, I'm not quite sure. The discussion that took place between the two of them, I cannot say about it. Mr Barnard has not got the ability to influence me that I will incriminate anybody or will see that anybody will be in trouble unnecessarily.

Secondly I would like to say to you that this so-called deal to which you are referring is not applicable just to me, there are also other people who are involved and also went to the A-G for 204s concerning certain aspects of their evidence.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify something, I'm now a bit puzzled based on what your earlier evidence was and I'd just like to clarify it. What is your evidence with regard to this issue of the nails? Were you told by Barnard, or can't you remember whether that discussion took place?

MR BOTHA: I can't remember that the discussion actually took place. What I'm saying is, if there was a conversation regarding this matter, I would have, in no uncertain terms told him that was not my instruction to put any nails or to kill any people at any stage during this execution of this bomb.

MR LAX: In other words, if I understood - and this is what I understood your evidence to be originally, that you denied to Barnard - in fact you confirmed what you told us.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR LAX: That you denied that this was in fact the intention or that anything like that had happened and that your answer is in line with what he says you said.

MR BOTHA: That's right, yes.

MR LAX: I'm just clarifying, is that your evidence now again?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. If I reacted, that's how I would have reacted, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to know, just also out of interest, why were you so adamant that the figure wasn't mentioned?

MR BOTHA: It just sounds ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: If you can't remember the conversation, whether it was 4, 2, 1½, why are you so adamant that the figure 4 wasn't mentioned?

MR BOTHA: I will put it to you like this. A limpet mine weighs one kilogram, to add four kilograms to one kilogram would have resulted in a, or it would have made a large difference in the carrier bag that was used. It sounds absurd to think that the 4 kilograms of nails will be attached to a 1 kilogram limpet mine.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify this. His evidence was that he couldn't remember the exact unit of measure, he thought it might have been 4 pounds or 4 kilograms, that was his evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: 4 pounds would be less than 2 kilograms.

MR BOTHA: Or possibly 4 grams.

MR LAX: Did he used pounds or kilograms?

MR BOTHA: No, Sir, I'm not sure about that.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard(sic), the point is that you prepared the bomb and that there was no singular nail in the bomb.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, any questions?

MR H DU PLESSIS: I've got no further questions, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR H DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE: Mr Botha, there was just one aspect that I want to clear up with you. During the detention of Mr Barnard in terms of Section 29, did he send a message to you at any time while he was there in detention with regard to Ponti House, the apartment building Ponti, where he told you in the message that they were aware of Ponti, and also that he wasn't going to say anything about Webster. Can you recall anything like that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I recall such a message.

MR COETZEE: And you responded by spreading that information.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: And a while afterwards there was a fire in the Ponti building, do you know about that?

MR BOTHA: I heard about the fire through channels.

MR COETZEE: Just for the sake of clarity, being put on ice, you were on ice when you were approached to go and detonate the Athlone bomb.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR COETZEE: It was not the complete isolation and disposal of a member while he was on ice?

MR BOTHA: Briefly one would still be part of the organisation, it was a punitive measure, a cooling off period that they would apply to one.

MR COETZEE: And the money that was received at the Hyperama by Mr Barnard from Mr Luitingh ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Where was that?

MR COETZEE: At the Hyperama, after the Webster incident. ... was this personal money from Mr Luitingh? How did you understand, what was the origin of the money?

MR BOTHA: We were paid in cash in envelopes. This was done according to the same principle.

MR COETZEE: Yes, but where did the money come from?

MR BOTHA: It must have come from the Defence Force, it had to have been State money, that was my inference.

MR COETZEE: Then just another aspect regarding Mr Verster's apparent ignorance regarding who shot Webster and his subsequent enquiry. The idea that was fostered with you during training, was it through possible disinformation that you would be protected if something that you had done were ever to be exposed?

MR BOTHA: It was one of the options which was mentioned.

MR COETZEE: I have nothing further, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Nothing, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTINI: Thank you, Chairperson, a few questions.

Mr Botha I'm not an expert in bombs, I just need to know, once this limpet bomb is activated, does it become a very dangerous object to drive around with or carry around or fiddled with?

MR BOTHA: By nature of the situation, Mr Martini.

MR MARTINI: Sorry, by nature of the situation you mean by activating it?

MR BOTHA: My answer is yes.

MR MARTINI: Now a limpet bomb, is it put together with screws or - are there any screws in a limpet bomb?

MR BOTHA: I think what keeps the mine together is that there are six screws which keep this mine together.

MR MARTINI: Now just when Mr Bizos was cross-examining you he seemed to have a difficulty, your evidence is not that you were meant to go with on this project in order to press the remote control, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Your purpose was really as an expert to activate the mine.

MR BOTHA: To arm it.

MR MARTINI: To arm it.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR MARTINI: Correct. I mean a lay person without any knowledge of bombs, or any person not trained in bombs wouldn't know how to activate that.

MR BOTHA: No, Sir.

MR MARTINI: And would you agree it would be extremely dangerous for somebody that doesn't know much about bombs, to attempt to activate it?

MR BOTHA: Absolutely.

MR MARTINI: Would you also agree that once the bomb has been activated, it would also be dangerous for somebody to fiddle with that mine?

MR BOTHA: Extremely.

MR MARTINI: Now you say you armed the mine, the bomb and once you armed it you put it in Mr Hardien's boot - sorry, forget Hardien's boot, I don't think that was your evidence, you put it in the boot of a car.

CHAIRPERSON: It was put in a sack.

MR LAX: It was put in a bag.

CHAIRPERSON: Or a bag and then into the boot.

MR MARTINI: Thank you, Chairperson.

Sorry, you put it in a bag and then in the boot of a car.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: So were you the last person that dealt with this bomb before it was placed in the boot?

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

MR MARTINI: And once it was placed in the boot, what then happened?

MR BOTHA: At this stage Mr Hardien departed from us in his vehicle with the mine, or the bomb in the back of the boot.

MR MARTINI: He departed alone without you or Mr van Zyl?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: So once he departed, neither you nor Mr van Zyl had any contact with, physical contact with that bomb?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: And your recollection is as the last person who touched it, there were no nails, either 4 pounds or 4 kilograms of nails attached to that bomb.

MR BOTHA: None.

MR MARTINI: Right. Just one more question which I had a similar difficulty as Mr Lax in understanding is, Mr Barnard - just let me understand this discussion, Mr Barnard alleges that Mr van Zyl had told him that he planted 4 kilograms or 4 pounds, I recall kilograms, but let's leave it at the number 4, on this bomb and that according to Mr Barnard, he then discussed this with you, in other words he told you about this discussion which Mr van Zyl had with him. Now do you recall such a discussion, I mean the discussion where Mr Barnard said to you: "Hey, Mr van Zyl says you wanted to put 4 kilograms, he put 4 kilograms of nails on this bomb in order to ensure people were killed"? Do you recall that discussion?

MR BOTHA: Honourable Chairperson, I have said at various times that I cannot recall the discussion. I cannot deny that it did take place, but I cannot recall the discussion.

MR MARTINI: I'll tell you why, correct me if I'm wrong Mr Botha, I made a note here when you were asked earlier and my note is, what I recall you did say you don't recall such a discussion, but if this was your evidence earlier, just correct me if I'm wrong, you said: "If such discussion did take place, I do not believe that Mr van Zyl would have told Barnard that." Is that your evidence?

MR BOTHA: It could be so, yes.

MR MARTINI: That's my note. So when you mean "that", did you mean if such discussion had taken place, you wouldn't have believed that Mr van Zyl would have said to Barnard: "I put 4 kilograms of nails on the bomb"?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: And the reason why you would say you don't believe that, is it because to your knowledge, that is in fact what did not take place?

MR BOTHA: That's right.

MR MARTINI: No further questions, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Martini. Mr Williams, are you going to be asking any questions?

MR WILLIAMS: I've got no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR WILLIAMS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hockey.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HOCKEY: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Botha, is it correct that at an in-house, the in-house is where you discuss the execution of projects, is that right?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: You were not present at the in-house where the Athlone bomb was discussed, is that right?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: At how many in-houses were you present where the execution of your projects were discussed?

MR BOTHA: At one.

MR HOCKEY: And which one was that?

MR BOTHA: The one regarding the Rosscam incident.

MR HOCKEY: Who was present at that in-house?

MR BOTHA: The Regional Manager, Mr Wouter Basson, me and Joe Verster.

MR HOCKEY: Now the reason why I ask you that is because Mr Joe Verster denied that he gave authority for that project.

MR BOTHA: Mr Hockey, we have already clarified that aspect regarding his evidence and what it was, I don't think we need to reiterate it.

MR HOCKEY: I just want confirmation on that. You say that he was present, was authority given for that project at that in-house?

MR BOTHA: It was in-house and as far as I know, that is how it took place.

MR LAX: Sorry, you haven't answered the question, the question was, did authority get given at that in-house?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR HOCKEY: If your evidence in that regard is correct, then Mr Verster lied.

MR BOTHA: Then it is so.

MR HOCKEY: There was also a lot of questions and speculations as to the reasons why Mr Verster at the meeting of the 2nd of May 1989, asked what he asked, so I just want to ask you one or two questions about that. At that time, May '89, did your seniors in the CCB know of your association with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR HOCKEY: There were media reports immediately after the killing of Dr Webster, that there were two people involved in the killing.

MR BOTHA: At a stage they said three, four, they mentioned various numbers.

MR HOCKEY: The media reports?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR HOCKEY: Did some of the members in the CCB know that you were playing rugby with Mr Barnard?

MR BOTHA: They weren't really all that interested in my activities, so I'm not certain, perhaps, perhaps not.

MR HOCKEY: Are you saying there was absolutely no way that they could have known about your association with Ferdi Barnard?

MR BOTHA: That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that they could have known that I was playing rugby with him, I'm not certain. If they could go to the trouble of attending a club rugby match, they would have seen so. Mr Barnard didn't play first team on a regular basis while we were practising together and working together.

MR HOCKEY: Let me just ask you about your Section 29 statement. Is it right that in this statement you twisted the facts a little bit?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: But in essence, the things that you say in this statement, the actual facts is true?

MR BOTHA: Many of those things are true.

MR HOCKEY: For example, well it's obvious that the Athlone bomb incident did take place.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR HOCKEY: But the surrounding circumstances, how you described how it happened is not right.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR HOCKEY: While you were in detention, were you visited by anybody of the CCB?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR HOCKEY: I think you also answered the question yesterday to the effect that you weren't visited by Krappies Engelbrecht.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: No if that is in fact the case, if you were visited by anybody by the CCB, the police who questioned you could have found out whether that is true or correct, is that not so?

MR BOTHA: They could have found out.

MR HOCKEY: Whether in fact you were visited or not by any member of the CCB.

MR BOTHA: Of course.

MR HOCKEY: Because they keep a record of who visits you.

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR HOCKEY: You wouldn't have lied about something like that in your statement, something that they could easily find out?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR HOCKEY: Now in your statement, can I just refer you to page 8 of bundle B, about the middle of the page you said that

"At the time of my detention Brig Engelbrecht, along with Brig van Rensburg paid a visit to me."

then you say further:

"Brig Engelbrecht told me during the visit that I knew that I had to keep quiet. He said that this was the message that he received to convey to me."

Now this "aanhouding" that you're talking about here was your Section 29 "aandhouding", detention.

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

MR HOCKEY: So why would you say that in your statement?

MR BOTHA: Because those are the facts, that's what took place.

MR HOCKEY: So are you saying now that he did visit you?

MR BOTHA: He wasn't involved with the CCB, not one of those persons, I have maintained all the time.

MR HOCKEY: Is this the Krappies Engelbrecht that you were talking about?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR HOCKEY: But you said, Sir, that Krappies Engelbrecht did not visit you while you were in detention.

MR BOTHA: No.

CHAIRPERSON: No, he said he did visit him together with Van Rensburg and then he said that you'll recall the evidence where he indicated he'd been ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR HOCKEY: I beg your pardon.

Who is Marius?

MR BOTHA: I suspect that Marius is the codename for Heiner Müller. I think so. It was a Regional Manager who had a problem with Joe. I think so, I'm speaking under correction.

MR HOCKEY: It's not Pieter Botes?

MR BOTHA: I mean Pieter Botes, I'm sorry, that's what I meant. I beg your pardon.

CHAIRPERSON: And is Pieter Botes a Regional Manager who had a problem with Verster?

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR HOCKEY: And is it correct that his offices were bombed?

MR BOTHA: I basically heard that in the corridors, I suspect that there was an incident like that, yes.

MR HOCKEY: Now who executed that bombing?

MR BOTHA: I speculated.

MR HOCKEY: But it's also a fact that could easily be established, whether it was true or not?

MR BOTHA: Yes, very easily.

MR HOCKEY: And you say in your statement that you, well you insinuate that it's possibly the CCB.

MR BOTHA: I'm insinuating that it could possibly be on the instruction of Mr Verster.

MR HOCKEY: When you were asked to assist with the bombing of the Athlone Early Learning Centre, and you testified that only on your way to Cape Town, while driving to Cape Town did they, did Mr van Zyl really tell you what the purpose behind this project was.

MR BOTHA: He gave a more detailed report to me.

MR HOCKEY: When did Mr van Zyl decide, tell you that you were going to go with to actually detonate the bomb?

MR BOTHA: At no stage did he tell me that.

MR HOCKEY: He must have told you at some stage.

MR BOTHA: I was never supposed to detonate it, it wasn't my job.

MR HOCKEY: He must have told you at some stage that you're going to go with to detonate the bomb.

MR BOTHA: The evidence states expressly that the man tried to activate the bomb, he couldn't succeed, he gave the mechanism to me and I detonated the bomb.

MR HOCKEY: Just listen carefully to what I say. When did Mr van Zyl tell you that you were going to go with, not you specifically, but you're going to go with to see when the bomb was going to be detonated? You were going to go with to the scene where the bomb was going to be detonated?

MR BOTHA: We discussed this during our journey.

CHAIRPERSON: The journey from Jo'burg to Cape Town?

MR BOTHA: But you have asked me two different questions, what was the first?

MR HOCKEY: Maybe you didn't understand me. I think you understand now what I mean.

MR BOTHA: No, you've put two completely different questions.

CHAIRPERSON: The question, correct me if I'm wrong Mr Hockey, is that when did Van Zyl tell you that you will actually go to scene, the Early Learning Centre premises?

MR BOTHA: We decided that during our trip. Mr Hockey actually asked the first question: when was I informed that I was actually going to detonate the mine.

CHAIRPERSON: I think he changed it then to when you decided to go the premises.

MR HOCKEY: Ja, I think we understand each other now.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: I mean when were you informed that you were actually going to the scene. That you say you discussed on the trip.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: Were you always under that impression that that was going to happen?

MR BOTHA: The instruction was initially that Mr Isgak Hardien would detonate the limpet mine independently and would report back to us at a later stage.

MR HOCKEY: ...(indistinct - no microphone) you said that only after Mr van Zyl, or you handed the bomb over to Gakkie, did Mr van Zyl decide to go to the scene to see to the detonation of the bomb.

MR BOTHA: No, it was in the preamble to it, it was discussed, no definite decision had been taken yet. Once the decision had been taken with a hundred percent certainty, I'm not sure when that happened, but he conveyed his fears to me, indicating that he wanted to see where the bomb would be placed, in which room it would be placed. Those were the fears that he shared with me, but the actual decision, he might have taken that decision five minutes before Hardien's departure, I cannot tell you with certainty.

MR HOCKEY: So now you're saying that decision was not made on the trip?

MR BOTHA: I'm saying that it was discussed, it was an option, I wouldn't say that it was one hundred percent definitely decided.

MR HOCKEY: After you gave the bomb to Mr Hardien, he met you again the evening.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR HOCKEY: Initially the plan was just to hand over to him the detonation device.

MR BOTHA: But we had already decided that.

MR HOCKEY: Initially, initially that would have been the plan.

MR BOTHA: Yes, that's correct.

MR HOCKEY: But in the meantime you decided that you were going to go with to the scene.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: Now Adv Bizos asked you, or said that you were trying to make this Section 29 statement as exculpatory as possible and what would have made it lighter for you was if you had said in this statement that you made sure that there were no people in the building at the time, however you did not state that in your statement, in your Section 29 statement.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR HOCKEY: Was there any reason for that?

MR BOTHA: We have debated this point, I said that I told the investigating team that it was my purpose to activate or arm the bomb and the rest of the project was Mr van Zyl's responsibility.

MR HOCKEY: But you certainly had the opportunity to say that you made sure that there were no people in the building.

MR BOTHA: I don't understand why it isn't noted there, I accept that I must have said it to the investigating team, I don't know why it isn't noted.

MR HOCKEY: The factual situation is according to your evidence, that Mr Hardien went inside the building and came back to say that there are no people, or rather, that there are still people in the building.

MR BOTHA: That was after we were busy with the observation and he was picked up at the hotel.

MR HOCKEY: And in your Section 29 statement you said that Mr Hardien left at one stage, but not that he went to go look whether the building was empty, but he went in order to detonate the bomb.

MR BOTHA: I have noted what you have said.

MR HOCKEY: I just find it very strange that it is not categorically stated in your Section 29 statement that Mr Hardien in fact, if this is the truth, Mr Hardien in fact did go and check whether there are people in the building or not.

MR BOTHA: I accept that it has not been noted as such.

MR HOCKEY: Now when Mr Hardien left to go check whether there are people in the building, where in relation to the building were you?

MR BOTHA: I was not with the inspection, it is difficult for me to say precisely. We stood some distance away, a few hundred metres away, after we had dropped him off. I cannot tell you precisely where.

MR HOCKEY: "Aantal honderd meter", what does that mean?

MR BOTHA: Two hundred to three hundred metres, I cannot recall precisely, but we stood quite some distance away after we had dropped him off.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say you stood, what do you mean, in the motor vehicle or did you get out at all?

MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson, we dropped him off and then we held observation on a position which was some distance away from the building.

MR HOCKEY: When he returned to say there are still people in the building ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Correct.

MR HOCKEY: ... what did you do after that?

MR BOTHA: We moved closer so that we could have a better point of observation of the building. I sat in the back of the vehicle and Mr Hardien was in front with Mr van Zyl, and we observed the building.

MR HOCKEY: When this took place did you stand at a particular place or did you drive around?

MR BOTHA: We drove around once more, but we were stationary primarily.

MR HOCKEY: Where did you stand?

MR BOTHA: A few metres away from the building, I cannot tell you precisely where.

MR HOCKEY: What is a "aantal meter"?

MR BOTHA: I don't know, anything between 10 to 30 metres, I don't know, but so much so that we could see a name which we could attach to a face of a person coming out of the building.

MR HOCKEY: That's the reason why I'm asking you this question. You were near enough in order to attach a name to a face.

MR BOTHA: That is why I have answered as such.

MR HOCKEY: In other words you could clearly identify individuals?

MR BOTHA: Not me, Mr Hardien.

MR HOCKEY: But you could also see.

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR HOCKEY: Could you see the faces?

MR BOTHA: I could.

MR HOCKEY: Now you said that people came out of the building, you testified yesterday that people came out of the building and names were attached to faces.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR HOCKEY: You mentioned the name Mr Williams.

MR BOTHA: Among others, as far as I can recall, yes.

MR HOCKEY: Do you actually remember that particular name?

MR BOTHA: A number of names were mentioned, I can recall his name.

MR HOCKEY: You remember his name? Do you remember the name of Mr Chris Ferndale?

MR BOTHA: I think he mentioned that name. I'm referring to something which took place 11 years ago, these are names that I can remember. Possibly I could be mistaken by saying that these were names which were mentioned, names of Committee members and that they do not resemble a face which Mr Hardien saw. I cannot recall precisely.

MR HOCKEY: But now I'm asking you whether that name was mentioned as one of the people that came out of the building.

MR BOTHA: It's possible.

MR HOCKEY: You see we're again sitting with the problem, "dis moontlik".

MR BOTHA: Yes, it is a problem.

MR HOCKEY: It's not really an answer.

MR BOTHA: I accept that, that is why I can tell you that I don't know. I could say definitely, I could use any option, but I cannot recall. I cannot recall is closer to possible.

MR HOCKEY: Besides Chris Ferndale you don't seem to say that "dit is moontlik" that the name Peter Williams was mentioned.

MR BOTHA: There were a number of names. As I've said, I don't know if these are names of Committee members. I can recall that Mr Hardien said that such and such were coming out and leaving in their vehicles.

MR HOCKEY: Mr Botha, yesterday you ...(indistinct) said that Mr Peter Williams was a name that was mentioned.

MR BOTHA: Yes, it is one of the names which were mentioned, I accept that, those are the names that I can recall. That is my recollection.

MR HOCKEY: You see my next question was going - or I was going to state it to you that Mr Chris Ferndale in fact was not at that particular meeting, and it's the only context in which his name could have been mentioned.

MR BOTHA: As a Committee member. The name could have been mentioned to me as a Committee member of the Kewtown Youth Movement.

MR HOCKEY: The other fact is that in 1989, Mr Chris Ferndale was not a Committee member of the Kewtown Youth Movement.

MR BOTHA: Sir, I do not know the name from any other place than my meeting with Hardien and Van Zyl. It was not my project, I never worked on Chris Ferndale, so I do not know where I would have heard about him.

MR HOCKEY: Did you - while you were standing there and these people were coming out of the building, were you facing the building?

MR BOTHA: I think so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean you must have been if you could identify their faces.

MR BOTHA: I may have look in the rear-view mirror or something.

MR LAX: Could you see the parking area?

MR BOTHA: Yes Sir, I could.

MR HOCKEY: I'm asking you this question because Mr van Zyl's evidence was that the vehicle in which you were was facing away from the building.

MR BOTHA: That is why I'm saying to you that I cannot recall. I cannot say with certainty.

MR HOCKEY: You cannot recall?

CHAIRPERSON: But when you said "facing", Mr Hockey, you can sit in a vehicle and turn your neck and look around. Did you mean the vehicle was facing, or they were looking at the building?

MR HOCKEY: If I remember correctly, after the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The vehicle was parked there but that doesn't mean that the people in the vehicle weren't facing the building, because you can turn your head and look.

MR HOCKEY: Sorry, I meant the vehicle, the vehicle was not facing.

CHAIRPERSON: The vehicle, can you remember which way the vehicle was, the front of the vehicle was pointing when you were keeping observation there?

MR BOTHA: I really can't remember.

MR HOCKEY: But the vehicle was stationary at the time?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR HOCKEY: Can you remember whether you reversed at any particular point?

MR BOTHA: No Sir, I cannot recall.

MR HOCKEY: Get closer to the building?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall. It's possible, but I cannot recall.

MR HOCKEY: You testified that Mr van Zyl first tried to detonate the bomb.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR HOCKEY: And there was a problem, you took the detonation device.

MR BOTHA: He handed it over to me.

MR HOCKEY: What did you do to it?

MR BOTHA: I possibly looked at the battery casing, rolled them, or just looked. I do not think I did anything specifically more than that.

MR HOCKEY: So you're saying now that you did look at the batteries?

MR BOTHA: I've said it all the time, I've said it could be that there's some dirt in the connecting points, but I did not change the batteries. I did not change them.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify something.

You say you possibly could have done this, do you remember doing it or don't you?

MR BOTHA: I can recall that I looked at it, maybe I opened it to see if there's some dirt between the contact points of the batteries. I know that I had the mechanism in my hand and I accept that it's possible that I looked at the battery, but I did not change them.

MR LAX: You see again you say "maybe I did this, maybe it's possible I did that", either you have a clear recollection of taking the batteries out, fiddling, cleaning the contacts, putting them back in, checking the pad.

MR BOTHA: I wouldn't have taken the batteries out. What I'm saying is I opened the back of the calculator and just turned the batteries around, in all probability, but I did not take it out.

MR LAX: But you see my problem is, either you remember it or you don't, the rest is speculation. If you don't remember it, then you're saying "well maybe I did this or maybe I did that, anything's possible."

MR BOTHA: Apart from replacing the batteries, that I definitely remember not doing.

MR LAX: Yes, but do you remember opening the back and turning the batteries?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.

MR LAX: So then it's not a question of it's possible that you did that, you did it.

MR BOTHA: I did do it, yes.

MR HOCKEY: What made you to decide that there was nobody in the building? What happened?

MR BOTHA: Could you just repeat your question.

MR HOCKEY: What made you to conclude that there were no people in the building?

MR BOTHA: The fact that Mr Hardien told Mr van Zyl that there were not people in the building and that we could not see any vehicles in the parking lot.

MR HOCKEY: The only thing that happened was, according to you, that you saw people coming out of the building and names were put to faces.

MR BOTHA: That is so.

MR HOCKEY: Now in this regard you testified yesterday that you had to go on the word of Mr Hardien.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR HOCKEY: But now the factual situation is, Mr Botha, that there were people in the building when the bomb was detonated and evidence will be called to that effect.

MR BOTHA: Sir, within my framework, Mr van Zyl took the necessary precautions to ensure that there were not people in the building. If you say that there were people in the building, I will say to you as I've differed from Mr Bizos yesterday, that I cannot dispute it, I'm not in a position to dispute it. I'm saying that I'm basing it on the precautions that were taken by Mr van Zyl and I'll base it on the discussions Mr van Zyl had with Mr Hardien, and his relationship with him worked that Mr van Zyl trusted him in that he conveyed the truth to him and afterwards the bomb was detonated.

MR HOCKEY: Did you see that there are statements amongst these statements that were given to your legal counsel, that there were people inside that building that had nothing to do with any political organisation?

MR BOTHA: I heard it in evidence, yes.

MR HOCKEY: There were people there that attended a soccer meeting.

MR BOTHA: Karate or soccer.

MR HOCKEY: Sorry?

MR BOTHA: Karate or soccer?

MR HOCKEY: A soccer meeting, and these people were inside the building at the time that the bomb was detonated. Are you aware of that?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I heard the evidence in front of the Commission and I'd like to express my regret concerning that, I was not aware of it, but if you say that to me I've got no choice but to accept that it's possibly so.

MR HOCKEY: Do you also accept that members of the Kewtown Youth Movement and of other youth movements in the region were still inside the building when the bomb was detonated? Are you prepared to accept that as well?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I can go on what was told to me, that the Kewtown Youth Movement left the building. That was conveyed to Mr van Zyl. I just listened to this conversation, it was directly mentioned to me.

MR HOCKEY: But I'm asking you whether you're prepared to accept today.

MR BOTHA: If you can give me proof, I cannot deny it.

MR HOCKEY: There are statements to that effect, taken by the police. These statements are all in possession of your counsel, that there's a number of people that were inside the building when the bomb went off, and you're saying you still, you're still looking for evidence to that effect before you accept it.

MR BOTHA: No, I accept what you are saying to me. If you say it's so, I've got no choice but to accept it.

MR HOCKEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HOCKEY

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hockey. Before I get to you, Mr Kahanovitz - Mr Rheede, any questions you'd like to put?

MR RHEEDE: No questions, Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR RHEEDE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: This is an addendum to Mr Bizos, you're not starting fresh?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Most definitely not, no it's arising out of - you don't need to be that worried.

CHAIRPERSON: I also want to give Ms Coleridge a chance. I don't know if you want to do it after her or before. You may as well do it now.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KAHANOVITZ: Now Mr Botha, could you just ask you counsel to give you a copy of Exhibit K, the photographs, and could you just look at photograph number 23.

MS COLERIDGE: It's Exhibit N, for the record.

CHAIRPERSON: It was initially K, remember, we kept changing it and it ended up being Exhibit N, N for Nellie. Photo number?

MR KAHANOVITZ: It's 23. Can I proceed? Mr Chairman, if you could just indicate to me when you've got to the appropriate place so I might proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: I've got the photo here. This is the photo, you can see a curve in the wall?

MR KAHANOVITZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: The big hole in the wall, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Botha, I want to ask you a question now on the assumption that your evidence is correct that this limpet mine was not doctored to add shrapnel, and let's assume for the sake of this question, that this limpet mine was never doctored. Now if you look at the kind of damage that that limpet caused to this wall, I assume you will agree with me that the force of the explosion was certainly capable of killing people?

MR BOTHA: Yes, Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can we take that further and say that the force of that explosion would be capable of killing more than one person?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you'll agree with me if one had wanted to kill people using this particular limpet mine there was no necessity to first doctor that by adding additional shrapnel?

MR BOTHA: That is so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now you've already testified that you were called by pager to come to this meeting in Johannesburg, where you received your instructions to travel to Cape Town with Slang van Zyl, correct?

MR BOTHA: That's right, Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now did Staal Burger say anything to you and to Mr van Zyl after you arrived at that meeting, as to whether loss of life was envisaged?

MR BOTHA: He did not say it to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So he said absolutely nothing, for example, to the effect that: "Look, you must try and make sure that no-one is injured or killed, but if someone is injured or killed by mistake, then that is acceptable to the CCB?

MR BOTHA: The exact details I cannot recall, I understand that he told me that the limpet mine had to be detonated. That was Mr van Zyl's project, the project was approved and that's what I was interested in.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No I'd like you to answer the question, because this isn't vague detail, I'm assuming you would want to be very clear on what the attitude of your superiors was to potential loss of life. Do you agree with me?

MR BOTHA: I was more focused on the fact that we received the instruction to set of the bomb.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, can you please answer the question. You're being taken along as the man with the technical knowledge of the bomb.

MR BOTHA: That's right, Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. If the plan is to ensure that absolutely nobody is injured or killed, your technical knowledge would be important because you would in control of the timing of the explosion.

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you would want to be one hundred percent clear in your own mind what the terms of your mandate was from your superiors.

MR BOTHA: I went on what Mr van Zyl said. I based my opinion on what Mr van Zyl told me, in that there would be no loss of life or there should not be any loss of life.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And did you and Mr van Zyl discuss what the consequence might be if someone was injured or killed by accident?

MR BOTHA: Not as far as I can recall, no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see because we have to accept that, and you'd have to accept this, you're parked outside of a building, you're relying on information that you received from Mr Hardien, so in a sense you have to go on trust and you have to hope that Mr Hardien's observations have been correct, because if they prove to be wrong you must accept that the potential existed to kill or injure someone.

MR BOTHA: That is so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see I just want to put it to you that Mr van Zyl has a very different version to you and I want to read to you from his statement, and although this is one of his Section 29 statements, he confirmed the correctness of this portion. He says what happened was the following - and for purposes of the record this is bundle B, page 40, paragraph 78, he says that you were called to the hotel and that you arrived shortly thereafter and then he says the following happened

"The workings of the limpet mine was explained to Calla Botha by Britz"

Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says

"Calla Botha then became aware of this project. That was also said by Staal Burger, that this project leaves the possibility that people from the Kewtown community can be injured"

Can you recall that?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You can't. Do you dispute Mr van Zyl's evidence in this regard?

MR BOTHA: I am saying I did not hear that, it was not said where I could hear it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Don't you agree with me Mr Botha, if he'd said that, that would most certainly be the kind of thing that you would be likely to remember?

MR BOTHA: That is why I'm saying I did not hear it, I deny that I heard it. I'm saying that it was not said where I was present. It wasn't said in order for me to hear it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You're saying if it was said at the meeting, you were out of earshot?

MR BOTHA: If it was said, that is correct, that's exactly what I said.

MR KAHANOVITZ: How big was this room?

MR BOTHA: It was a normal hotel room.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the prospect is there that if it was said, that you wouldn't have been able to hear it?

MR BOTHA: Sir, percentage-wise I do not know, but the fact of the matter is that I did not hear it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see because if you look at the context of Mr van Zyl's statement, he's explaining what was being explained to you Mr Botha, who'd now just become involved, as to what the project encompassed. He goes on to say that Mr Burger said

"It had to be restricted to the minimum"

and Mr van Zyl gave his evidence, the explanation he gave for what was said was that it had to be accepted that a risk existed that people might be killed even though the CCB was going to attempt to prevent that from happening. Do you accept his evidence?

MR BOTHA: That's Mr van Zyl's version, it's his own personal version.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you don't dispute that Mr Burger said this, because you can't, is that what you're saying?

MR BOTHA: No, that is not what I'm saying.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What are you saying?

MR BOTHA: I'm saying that if he said it, he said it to Van Zyl and not to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but that means you can't dispute that Mr Burger said it.

MR BOTHA: I can dispute the fact that I heard it, I did not hear it. So that results in the fact that I cannot say if he said it or not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: My question is a very simple one, I think you've answered it, you don't or can't dispute that Mr Burger said it.

MR BOTHA: In all probability then I can't, no, because I didn't hear it. Or - ja, I didn't hear it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I also want to put it to you that while you were being asked questions by Mr Hockey and he asked you at what point in time you were told that a decision had been made that you and Mr van Zyl were going to go to the premises, you stated in unequivocal terms that that decision was made during the journey from Johannesburg.

MR BOTHA: I said the discussion took place.

CHAIRPERSON: I think he said it was discussed there and then the decision was made actually later when the bomb was handed over, they kept the device.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'll argue it once we've got the record, I recall it differently.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not saying that he might, I can't recall myself, we can look at the record, but at one stage he did say that when Mr Hockey, maybe not the first time, he did say that they just discussed it on the way down.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well what I wanted to put to him is that he'd in fact changed his version in the course of the questioning and the reason he'd done so was that he's very keen to make sure that his version tallies with Mr van Zyl's.

CHAIRPERSON: You can put it to him.

MR BOTHA: I do not agree with that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because I must put it to you that Mr van Zyl gave a very clear explanation of the time sequence involved which caused that decision to be made. Mr van Zyl's version was that you met with Mr Hardien at DF Malan airport at approximately 1 o'clock in the afternoon, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: I accept that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr van Zyl says at that time the plan was still that neither you nor he was going to go to the Early Learning Centre.

MR BOTHA: "Ek is bereid om dit te aanvaar.".

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you accept that?

MR BOTHA: The words that I used were that we possibly discussed it, or let us leave possible out, we discussed it on our way to Cape Town.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well Mr van Zyl in his evidence doesn't say that, in fact what he says is that after you'd given Mr Hardien the limpet mine to go and place at the Early Learning Centre, it was at that point in time, in the course of the afternoon, that he started to get concerned that Mr Hardien might place the bomb elsewhere. Did he discuss that with you?

MR BOTHA: This is what I just testified.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did he suggest to you that Mr Hardien might go and place this limpet mine in the police station?

MR BOTHA: He said he wanted to make sure what the facts were concerning the placing of the bomb.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now Mr Wessels debated with you issues surrounding the possible placing of ice and/or dismissal of people from the CCB, and I just want to ask you one or two questions about that. Would you say - what would you say the position would be if a person with full knowledge of the activities of CCB, was unfairly dismissed from the CCB, might such a person pose a security risk to the CCB? Staal Burger walks in, he says "I'm dismissing you without notice", you're left out to your own devices, do you think such a person might pose a security risk to the organisation?

MR BOTHA: He might.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were also - the Chairman debated with you the possibility of somebody taking some form of legal action after their dismissal from the CCB, I take it you'll agree with me one could hardly have gone to the Industrial Court to say: "I work for a secret organisation that kills people and I've been unfairly dismissed"?

MR BOTHA: I do not think so, unless you've got facts to substantiate it, facts which will expose people. You could done it then.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Sorry, I'm not sure I understand your answer. I'm putting a very simple question to you, you could hardly have taken legal ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: You have to settle with "hardly". It was an option, but hardly, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes. You will agree with me that even if the CCB had decided that they no longer liked a particular employee, and in an ideal world might want to get rid of them, it may well be that they couldn't afford to get rid of such a person because if they fired them, that disgruntled employee might pose a security risk to the organisation.

MR BOTHA: It's a possibility.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KAHANOVITZ

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Kahanovitz. Ms Coleridge, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Yes, thank you Chairperson.

Mr Botha, just after the Athlone Early Learning Centre you and Mr van Zyl made your way to the airport, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That's correct.

MS COLERIDGE: And then you were met there by Burger. We know that Burger was the Regional Manager of Region 6, is that right?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MS COLERIDGE: Did you discuss this matter with Mr Burger when you arrived at the airport and when he collected you?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we discussed it there.

MS COLERIDGE: And we also know that the person that was with Mr Burger collecting you was Mr Maree, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MS COLERIDGE: So you discussed the Athlone Early Learning Centre in the presence of Mr Maree, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: As far as I can recall, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: So he would know about the incident involving the Athlone Early Learning Centre, that the bomb went off, etcetera, etcetera.

MR BOTHA: Most probably not the detail, but to an extent, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: But obviously you would discuss with Mr Burger ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Mr van Zyl would discuss that, I would not discuss it, Mr van Zyl would be doing that.

MS COLERIDGE: Mr van Zyl also then took you home in Mr Maree's vehicle, is that right?

MR BOTHA: As far as I can remember, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: Okay. We also know that Mr Maree didn't apply for amnesty for the Early Learning Centre.

MR BOTHA: He did not?

MS COLERIDGE: No.

MR BOTHA: Yes I'm not sure about that, I accept that.

MS COLERIDGE: Just in terms of your Section 29 detention, you said that Mr Burger had informed you that Joe Verster had discussed with Webb your Section 29 detention and they were going to take up the matter with Gen Smit and/or Gen Joubert. Now which Gen Joubert are you referring to?

MR BOTHA: Gen Joop Joubert.

MS COLERIDGE: Is it Joop Joubert?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: And Gen Smit, who was he?

MR BOTHA: Where did I - excuse me, can I just ...(intervention)

MS COLERIDGE: Okay, I will refer ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Gen Smit is the Basie Smit of Narcotics, is it?

MS COLERIDGE: Page 7 of bundle B, Chairperson, the second paragraph from the bottom.

You stated:

"Burger further said that he heard from Joe that Gen Webb gave a list of our names to Gen Smit or Joubert."

MR BOTHA: That is correct, it's Gen Basie Smit. I think a list was provided to say who was involved in this organisation.

MS COLERIDGE: And what were they going to do for you, why did you give them the list?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't give them a list.

MS COLERIDGE: Why they give them the list?

MR BOTHA: Possibly to arrange for our release. That's how I interpreted it.

MS COLERIDGE: And they was obviously aware of the CCB activities, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: I accept Gen Smit, or it would have been Brig Smit who knew about it.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just one last question. The Geoffrey you referred to, the person that you handled, what is his name?

MR BOTHA: Geoffrey, his name is Geoffrey.

MR BOTHA: No, but what is his full name?

MR BOTHA: No, I don't have that anymore, I'm sorry.

MS COLERIDGE: You can't recall his name at all and you handled him?

MR BOTHA: Not at all, no.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, I've no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS COLERIDGE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Eck, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN ECK: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Botha, much was made of your Section 29 statement and how it was deposed of and there were certain portions that you wrote yourself and that others were obtained from your questioning and so forth, does this statement follow any chronological order?

MR BOTHA: No, it doesn't.

MR VAN ECK: If we look at the last section, you state there after you stated everything, that you wanted to add something more.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: And it appears that this statement was compiled piece by piece.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Can you recall over what period this was done?

MR BOTHA: No, I cannot recall, I assume that it was for the duration of my detention, a few weeks.

MR VAN ECK: And on page 8 it is stated that Mr Engelbrecht told you to keep quiet and that he told you to keep quiet for about six to seven months.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VAN ECK: Did you take that seriously?

MR BOTHA: Very seriously.

MR VAN ECK: And then with regard to the Athlone incident, did you have any input into the decision making phase, with the exception of the physical handling of the bomb, as such? Did you have any input into the decision of where it would be placed, the next steps to be taken and so forth?

MR BOTHA: None whatsoever.

MR VAN ECK: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN ECK

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr Botha, you were saying Mr Barnard communicated with you while he was in detention, did I understand you correctly?

MR BOTHA: No, I didn't say that, I said that a message was sent through to me. I didn't communicate with him.

MR SIBANYONI: Okay. In what manner was the message sent to you?

MR BOTHA: It may have been a variety of manners, possibly with the police officers who brought my meals to me, but I cannot tell you in which manner it was done.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this an oral message or a written message?

MR BOTHA: No it was simply a message that I received from somebody. It was conveyed to me orally.

MR SIBANYONI: Were these police who were looking after him sympathetic towards him, I suppose to such an extent that they can bring a message to you?

MR BOTHA: Sir, I wouldn't say most probably to an extent sympathetic as well, we were treated like outcasts, so in all probability, yes. But that wouldn't have meant a great deal to them, the Ponti and something like mentioning a name like W. He wouldn't have said the name, he would have said W, something like that. So it would have been a coded message which wouldn't have meant anything to the specific person relating the message to me.

MR SIBANYONI: Now let's come to the making of this statement, your Section 29 statement. Were you ever forced, was any pressure applied ...(intervention)

MR BOTHA: Sir, merely the fact that I had no access to any people from outside or my legal team and the fact that I was in solitary confinement, that was the pressure, the emotional pressure that was applied to me. That's the soul purpose of the Section 29 custody.

MR SIBANYONI: But you were never tortured, no physical force was applied to whatsoever.

MR BOTHA: No, fortunately not.

MR SIBANYONI: And also the time, the period you took in making the statement, it was as you please, nobody was forcing to be quick in making the statement I suppose?

MR BOTHA: Sir, what they would do, they would arrive at my cell saying: "Have you thought about what we asked", and if I subsequently answered: "I've got nothing to say", they would leave me for another week without speaking to me at all. That was they type of pressure that they applied at this moment in time.

MR SIBANYONI: Wouldn't you say therefore that means they were sort of sympathetic, either with the cause the CCB was fighting or that you were previously in the Police Force?

MR BOTHA: No, no, they weren't sympathetic with me, they saw this as a break, a bread in their police - what's the correct word now, during their investigation they would see that as a major break for them in their police career.

MR SIBANYONI: Lastly, whatever you stated in this statement, came from you, nobody suggested that to you?

MR BOTHA: There were certain things that they said to me that they knew of and they said: "Talk to us about this". Basically, they led me regarding certain aspects, and I also asked them, I said: "Do you know about this?" It was almost like a cat and mouse game, if I had to express it as such, the object was to see who knew what, so that I could determine how far to go, what to say, what not to say.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Lax?

MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Botha, just with regard to your blue plan, whatever happened to it? This company Capil that you started.

MR BOTHA: Cabot.

MR LAX: Cabot, I beg your pardon.

MR BOTHA: I did not continue managing the company, the company is dormant.

MR LAX: You said that while you were on "ice", you spent quite a bit of time carrying on with the establishment of that plan, what exactly did you do?

MR BOTHA: I went to the various manufacturers of the products that I was distributing and closed contracts with them and I also tried to determine the market needs for the products that I would be distributing.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you have a structure? You had rented office space, office furniture, that sort of thing?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Honourable Chair.

MR LAX: Did you have partners, people, employees?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR LAX: Did you close any deals to supply any material to anybody?

MR BOTHA: I think that I did conduct singular transactions for embroidery and gifts and promotional items, which I provided to institutions.

MR LAX: Now you conceded to Mr Kahanovitz earlier that this mine that was used was big enough to kill and that no additional doctoring would be required, it was big enough to kill people. As you will recall, I suggested to you that the nature of the explosion was such, from these photographs, why didn't you as an explosives expert say to them: "Chaps, this is just too big man, if you're going to warn people and you don't want to injure people," The idea was never to kill anybody, the idea was to send a warning. I mean surely you as an expert know that the smaller limpet mine is a much better tool to use for this job.

MR BOTHA: No, not necessarily, and I will explain to you on the basis of my statement. If I look at the photos, the project was aimed exclusively at disrupting the structure of the building. Looking at the photos, it would appear to have been successful, it disrupted the structure of the building, it caused significant damage. Such a limpet mine with approximately 340grms of explosives would not have caused the same damage.

MR LAX: But these people could have used any other halls in the community, there are lots of other halls there, there are churches, there are all sorts of things, that couldn't possibly have been the object.

MR BOTHA: I accept what you have said, but my exclusive instruction was to do what I did. I understand what you've said and I respect your opinion, but I cannot tell you more than this. I have noted what you have said, but my exclusive instruction was what it was and I observed it.

MR LAX: Now you've told that you made this Section 29 statement because you realised from the questions that were asked of you by the two policemen who questioned you, it was Rossouw, if I remember correctly, and Carter.

MR BOTHA: That's right, Sir.

MR LAX: You said that from the nature of those questions that they asked you and now from what you've just said to Mr Sibanyoni, your questions to them, you realised how much they knew.

MR BOTHA: That's right, Sir.

MR LAX: Well if I look at this Section 29 Statement, they knew practically everything.

MR BOTHA: I understand what you've said, it was also insightful to me that they identified many of these things themselves from their information sources, whatever they may have been, or whoever they may have been.

MR LAX: Well wasn't it evidence to you from that that there was an enormous security breach within the CCB?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it was rather clear to me.

MR LAX: Well surely that would have been sufficient to tell you that now's the time to come clean, these guys know everything. The game's up.

MR BOTHA: I hear you, Mr Lax, but to who would I say this?

MR LAX: To the police, take your chances, cut a deal with the A-G at that time.

MR BOTHA: In retrospect it was probably an option, but I didn't view it as such.

MR LAX: Thanks Chair, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions that have been put? Mr du Plessis, I see you want to ...

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Actually arising from what Ms Coleridge asked, I just want to ask one question.

Mr Botha, Mr Maree's instructions to me were, and it was also his evidence, that upon your return from Cape Town you had to take his vehicle tot he airport for Mr van Zyl's use. Would you dispute that?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Furthermore his instructions are that he was not physically present during the feedback to Mr Burger, is that also possible?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it is.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you cannot recall specifically that he heard this discussion or the feedback between Van Zyl and Burger?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It would have been contrary to the working method.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: So you're saying that you can't remember whether Mr Maree was there or not at the airport?

MR BOTHA: I cannot recall.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm not putting that he wasn't at the airport, I'm just putting that he wasn't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Oh that he may not have heard a discussion.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes, he wasn't present with the discussion as such.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any questions arising out of questions that have been put by Members of the Panel? Mr Botha, that then concludes your testimony, thank you, you may stand down.

MR BOTHA: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

In conclusion I would like to use the opportunity to express my regret once again regarding the particular persons who were affected by our actions and to offer my unconditional apology and sympathy.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Botha. Mr van Eck, are you going to be calling any further witnesses?

MR COETZEE: No. I beg your pardon Chairperson. At a stage Mr Barnard's cross-examination was standing down with regard to certain documentation which I believe both Mr Wessels and Mr du Plessis ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) to address that. Mr Wessels, do you wish to have Mr Barnard recalled for further questioning?

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, those documents, those two boxes there arrived here in the course of today. I'm told that those contain the evidence of the Barnard trial.

CHAIRPERSON: So at this stage the possibility still remains that Mr Barnard might have to be recalled, depending on what comes out of your reading of that.

MR WESSELS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there going to be any further witnesses called on behalf of any of the applicants? No. Alright, that then brings us to the next stage. Mr Rheede?

MR RHEEDE ADDRESSES: Mr Chairperson, for the convenience of my client I'm just going to continue in Afrikaans. My client has a reasonably serious problem, I must state from the very beginning that he is willing to testify here but he has been approached to make an affidavit in order to facilitate the procedure, but there were two reasons why he will not be making an affidavit. Firstly, he has reading and writing problems and I would not want him to make an affidavit which he will have to read back in the future.

Secondly, it is clear from the evidence that there are certain serious incriminating answers which will be requested. He has not applied for amnesty and he has a certain reputation in the Western Cape, which could have serious problems for his rights and it is my instruction to request, in the light of the fact that the Commission has subpoenaed him in terms of Section 29, that a Section 31 Appeal be made for consultation with the Attorney-General within this jurisdiction or the Chief Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions, before he could actually be requested to answer these questions.

The second point that I would like to offer is that we would like direction regarding who exactly has subpoenaed him as a witness. It would not appear to be the applicants because it appears as if their cases have been dealt with. Would it be persons on behalf of the victims or is it the Committee? This is my respectful submission that this indication will also influence who has the right to cross-examine him, upon which occasions he may be cross-examined. If it is the Committee that has called him, then he should testify in the final instance, as it would be in a courtroom situation. If it is on behalf of those persons who were involved in the Athlone Early Learning Centre, then it would be them who have subpoenaed him and they may cross-examine him and then be satisfied with the answers that he will provide.

Similarly, this applies to the Committee who should be satisfied with the answers that he can provide. It has emerged previously with this sort of application and I think specifically of Pik Botha's evidence that he gave, and this is an aspect to be clarified.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Ms Coleridge, regarding the approach to the Attorney-General, has that been done?

MS COLERIDGE: Yes, Chairperson. I'd just like to inform everybody that Mr Isgak Hardien has been subpoenaed by the Commission. We have taken it up with the A-G, that is Head of Prosecutions, Chairperson, and as it stands there's no formal prosecutions pending against Mr Isgak Hardien to date, and that is basically the position in terms of prosecution, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't express any objection to Mr Hardien testifying?

MS COLERIDGE: I've received absolutely no objection, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I was under the impression that Hardien at one stage, although I'm aware that a subpoena was issued, actually volunteered to give evidence.

MS COLERIDGE: That is correct, Chairperson, Mr Hardien has on a numerous occasions indicated that he was willing to testify, but I just informed him that just to secure his presence and in order to also obtain legal representation which he deserves, we issued the subpoena, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Sorry, just bear with us a moment. So Mr Rheede, what is your client's ...(inaudible) then with regard to testifying? Is he prepared to testify?

MR RHEEDE: As I commenced, he is prepared and willing to testify, the only problem is that he is afraid of prosecution. And I state this as a consequence of his reputation in the Western Cape, there is a strong possibility that something like this may indeed take place. He realises fully that whatever his evidence here, it cannot be used against him in criminal proceedings, but the broad coverage that the proceedings have enjoyed, could plant the seed for prosecution. And the Act does not state anything specific about indemnity to be granted, but it is my submission that the only reason why there should be consultation with the A-G is for the exploration of the possibility of indemnity and that it indeed be granted. Why else would there be consultation with the A-G?

CHAIRPERSON: I think another reason is, because the testimony in a forum like this might affect some trial currently on the go or a proposed trial. But just to deal with that, I'm not arguing with you, is that if there's any possibility of prosecution the seed surely has already been sown by the evidence that has been given by various other people here relating to the activities of Mr Hardien, particularly in relation to the ELC.

MR RHEEDE: That may be so, Chairperson, but we have not yet found ourselves within a position where he himself has sat down under oath and stated precisely what took place. As it has been indicated by my learned colleagues on my right, there are certain differences in the evidence which has been delivered and that may influence the opinion of the A-G. If my client comes forward and states under oath precisely what took place, it may have serious ramifications or could influence the final decision for the instatement of prosecution.

Chairperson, just to add to what my learned colleague has said, my client is not unwilling to testify, he has declared his willingness, however I would like to thank the Committee for the fact that they have obtained legal representation for him. It is clear to me from the past week's consultation that he did not understand everything that is going on. For example, it is my instruction that he didn't understand the meaning of the amnesty application and that he never applied, and this is due to basic ignorance. He is one of the persons here who stands a lot to loose. There could be very grave consequences that he may find himself in, purely because he was subpoenaed as a witness to testify here.

CHAIRPERSON: Although his role, particularly in the ELC incident has been very central, he's not just an implicated person who is on the fringe of matters, so the reason for subpoenaing him is understandable. His evidence could certainly throw a light on events and possibly assist the Commission. Taking that into account and also the fact that he's willing to give evidence, the fact that the Attorney-General has been consulted and the fact, the provisions of the Act which state that the evidence given here shall not be used as evidence in a trial, I believe we should proceed with his evidence. I don't know if he's ready to proceed now, but when we do, who will lead the evidence? Will it be Ms Coleridge, or yourself?

MR RHEEDE: Just before I answer that question, Chairperson, I just want to ascertain whether the Director of Public Prosecutions in the Western Cape has been contacted regarding this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: This is what I heard from Ms Coleridge.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, it's Mr Sonn at the Super A-G's office, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The Super A-G's been consulted.

MR RHEEDE: The reason I asked is because the Act specifically refers to the A-G having jurisdiction and I believe that ....

CHAIRPERSON: Well then perhaps you may have a point and the letter of the Act should be stuck to, but it does - and we have dealt with similar situations, it just relates basically to consultation with that. So it can be done. I think it would probably be wise at this stage to adjourn until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and then in the meantime this afternoon, if you could ...(intervention)

MR MARTINI: Sorry Chairperson, it's four-thirty, I don't think you'll get the opportunity this afternoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Well maybe - well we can try, endeavour to try to consult. I agree with what has been put, we should consult with the authority referred to in the Act, even though the other authority that you have referred to might be senior to that person, but we should stick to it.

MR RHEEDE: Chairperson, there is just one other point which has been brought, the sequence of evidence. It is my submission that the witnesses for the Commission are called last of all. This will influence whether or not we will begin tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock with this witness, or whether there are other witnesses who would object to our commencing tomorrow morning at nine.

CHAIRPERSON: From the Panel's point of view, we have no problems with the order in which witnesses are called. If I may ask Mr Kahanovitz and Mr Williams and Mr Hockey, if there's any intention of calling witnesses and what their views are as to when they should be called, before or after Mr Hardien?

MR WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. We have considered the issue, as to whether we should call witnesses or not. Mr Chairperson, my view is that much will depend on the evidence which emanates from Mr Hardien's testimony. If he makes the necessary concessions, it might not be necessary to call witnesses from our side. So it would make sense and it would also be less time consuming to have testimony first.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz?

MR KAHANOVITZ: I don't have a definitive answer to that at the moment, I'm waiting to see what happens.

CHAIRPERSON: But you don't feel strongly, the order in which any witnesses should be called?

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hockey?

MR HOCKEY: I feel the same way as Mr Williams, I'm certainly under the impression that the Commission has litus contestatio and that the Commission can decide in which order to call witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: There's no fixed practice or procedure in this regard.

MR HOCKEY: I agree with Mr Williams that it might be more time consuming to hear Mr Hardien first and we'll certainly make an assessment after that, whether to call witnesses or not.

MR LAX: You mean timesaving.

MR HOCKEY: Sorry yes, timesaving.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Rheede, I think it would probably be best to call Mr Hardien next. I think we'll adjourn now. Let's adjourn until half-past nine, that will give Ms Coleridge a little bit of breathing space in case the Attorney-General's office has closed its doors at half-past four and no-one's there, that will give you a little bit of extra time.

MR RHEEDE: Chairperson, just to answer the last question that you put regarding who will lead Mr Hardien, it is my knowledge and my instruction that Ms Coleridge will lead him and I will assist him in the delivery of his evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I think that would be the best way to go about it. Thank you.

We'll adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow morning at the same venue. Thank you.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS