Amnesty Hearings

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr van Rensburg you have before you your amnesty application as it appears on page 1 of volume 1, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: On page 1 is there anything else you want to add?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Nothing.

MR BOOYENS: Page 2?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: On page 3 you refer to this matter for which you are applying for amnesty, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr van Rensburg you have heard Mr du Plessis' evidence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then as far as he had referred to your involvement do you differ from him in any respect?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: So you confirm his evidence and incorporate that in your evidence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were you with the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth when this incident took place, you were second in charge?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I was.

MR BOOYENS: And General Erasmus was the commanding officer?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis was also one of the more senior officers there.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: He said he was third in charge, but was Colonel Harold Snyman not there also?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He was fourth person in charge.

MR BOOYENS: Were you aware of the fact that Mr Kondile was detained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I was.

MR BOOYENS: Were you involved in his interrogation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Were Mr Kondile's activities within the desk for which you were responsible?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes to a lesser degree. You know the struggle during that time had various branches. It was not only the ANC per se it was also the trade unions and other organisations.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage you were tasked with trade unions amongst others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You heard Mr du Plessis' evidence and let me ask you first of all. You have heard Mr du Plessis' evidence that at a certain stage he believed that he had turned Mr Kondile to become a police informer. Can you remember whether you've heard about that, even informally?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can remember that he told me about it.

MR BOOYENS: Right. He also says, at a later stage after he had found a note from which he drew the inference that Mr Kondile was not really going to work with you that he discussed the matter with you.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was a good relationship between members of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth and especially a good relationship between you and Mr du Plessis.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What was Mr du Plessis' attitude or how did he feel about the fact that now that the man he thought he had recruited he did not succeed in doing that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He was very disappointed with it and he told me that he was disappointed in the whole situation. He was sure that his plans were going to succeed and now he was disappointed.

MR BOOYENS: Let me put it in this way, did he mention to you that in this process of recruiting Mr Kondile, or not in a process of recruiting but after he was supposedly recruited certain information was made available to Mr Kondile regarding how he had to convey his information to a principal agent in Lesotho etc?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes at that stage when he discussed this with me he said that things went wrong, did not work out.

MR BOOYENS: Ja, it did not work out.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: According to you Mr van Rensburg how important was the Lesotho network? I am referring to the Intelligence network in Lesotho.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think without such a network the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth would have been like a puppet without any life in it. It was of cardinal importance that there should be such an Intelligence network.

MR BOOYENS: From where were the activities of the liberation movement managed from the Eastern Cape, where was their foreign machinery?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: In Lesotho.

MR BOOYENS: And Mr Chris Hani was he a prominent figure during that time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was he also there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was he involved in the Eastern Cape operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And according to what was told to you Mr Kondile was a person who was near Chris Hani?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that was conveyed to me.

MR BOOYENS: So the fact that the principal agent, the identity of the principal agent was disclosed to Kondile, he knew who this person was, and you yourself, what do you think, what was the situation according to you regarding the Security Intelligence network?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I saw it like this. If the agent was disclosed to the ANC certainly 90% of our capabilities to get information from Lesotho regarding the ANC would not succeed.

MR BOOYENS: One of the most important aspects was that you have contact with the United Nations Refugee organisation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And was it also one of the components which would suffer?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis discussed this matter with you as a colleague, a senior colleague?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: After he had told you what had happened, what the dilemma was you, both of you went to Colonel Erasmus who was the commanding officer. Was this matter then discussed at great length there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And was it also sketched to Erasmus what the problem was?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You've heard the evidence that various alternatives were considered?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And from the discussion what was the conclusion you drew?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We came to the conclusion to save the position so that we would still have the capability to perform our task. There was no other option but to eliminate this person.

MR BOOYENS: Mr van Rensburg why, what was the task of the Security Police specifically in 1981, what was the primary task?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Shortly, our task was the gathering of intelligence and to prevent that the Communist onslaught against the previous government would be successful.

MR BOOYENS: And you've already told us that you would be a puppet without an Intelligence network?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You also said that you've decided that this person had to be eliminated.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was no legislation who authorised you to do this, it would have been unlawful to eliminate him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did you - why did you consider this alternative? Why did you decide to do this? What was the unwritten policy regarding the elimination of the enemy?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman during my career in the police service and in the Security Police per se I became aware of the continuous resistance initiated through South Africa against the Communist onslaught to prevent this onslaught.

MR BOOYENS: If you refer to violent onslaught you refer to situations where people from the other side were killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: Excuse me - yes you wanted to say something.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: In that regard I can refer to the wars in Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia.

MR BOOYENS: Those were outside the border.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Also internally there were also problems.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is also so.

MR BOOYENS: The language use, the feeling which came through was there really a difference in the struggle outside the borders and inside the country?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not according to me, no.

MR BOOYENS: In your later years, in your later career you as a senior officer you retired as a general you were at Security headquarters. While you were there did you get the impression there that the covert struggle internally where people lost their lives, that there was no authorisation for that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I never got the impression.

MR BOOYENS: What was your impression then? Was it accepted as being essential?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was my impression.

MR BOOYENS: And during those days, we refer to 1981, what was the rank of the commanding officer of the Security Branch at that time, as far as you can remember?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: 1981 it was a Brigadier.

MR BOOYENS: And the divisional commanding officer was one rank lower, a colonel, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: In charge of your division was a very senior officer.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr van Rensburg you have heard that Mr du Plessis testified that Mr Erasmus had told him that he had to put in writing what he had conveyed to him and the whole matter would be reconsidered, is that what you remember?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At a later stage General Erasmus called you back again and finally gave his permission to go ahead with the elimination of Mr Kondile.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How and what, to whom was that left over to decide?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr du Plessis and I had to decide about it.

MR BOOYENS: What did you propose then? How would you do that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If I can remember correctly Mr Erasmus asked how are you going to do it and I proposed that I could contact Mr Coetzee at Vlakplaas near Pretoria because I knew him and we were also involved in the same operation in Swaziland. Those were during the earlier years. And I think he would have the capability to assist us with this operation. I would approach him to determine whether he would be able to assist us.

MR BOOYENS: I am sorry to interrupt you. Did you meet Mr Coetzee in order to speak to him before this operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ja.

MR BOOYENS: Were was that?

MR DE JAGER: Sorry Mr Booyens there is one or other disturbance on the system, can you do something about it? Can you do anything about it?

MR BOOYENS: I have a problem with it, it seems to me it's outside. It's outside that something is making a noise. I have a problem to concentrate. We can't do anything about that.

CHAIRPERSON: We will make enquiries about what is happening outside. If we can stop it we will do so.

MR BOOYENS: I doubt whether you will succeed Mr Chairman. I think it is a truck removing - rubbish removal truck downstairs. It sounds like something hydraulic or something going on.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: I think I've asked you, did you meet Dirk Coetzee after he had taken command of Vlakplaas, can you just expand on that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I can remember that I visited him in Pretoria. I went to Vlakplaas. I asked him what their task was at Vlakplaas and he told me that their primary task was to identify trained terrorists and to arrest them or to eliminate them.

MR BOOYENS: When was that when you visited Vlakplaas?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I am not sure but I suspect it might have been during the first half of 1981, but I can't remember precisely.

MR BOOYENS: What did you want to know?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well I just asked him, I just asked him what their tasks were.

MR BOOYENS: If you can just give us a bit of background. Before you went to the Eastern Cape you were the commanding officer of Security in the Easter Transvaal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No of the branch at Ermelo.

MR BOOYENS: It was in the section Eastern Transvaal which fell under Brigadier van der Hoven, correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's right.

MR BOOYENS: And Dirk Coetzee was initially at Volksrust as a station commanding officer?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Volksrust falls under section Eastern Transvaal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: He then became the commanding officer of the border post Oshoek, am I correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's right.

MR BOOYENS: Under which security district did Oshoek fall?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ermelo.

MR BOOYENS: Did you know Coetzee even in the days that he was at Volksrust?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I didn't know him when he was at Volkrust. I met him at Volksrust for the first time but I did not know him before that.

MR BOOYENS: So you got to know him at Volksrust?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: When he was a Security policeman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In that process did you and Dirk Coetzee get to know one another well and see one another socially?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is that the reason why later you were in Pretoria and you knew that he was in Vlakplaas that you went to visit him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: So the discussion that you had with him was that for a specific purpose or purely as two colleagues meeting one another, what was the position? MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: No, which one of the two now? Did you go to Vlakplaas in an official capacity or was it just a matter of fact that you were in Pretoria on business and you just went to visit an old colleague?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I merely went to visit him as an ex-colleague.

MR BOOYENS: And did discussion take place as to what they were doing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You mentioned that regarding your previous discussion with Coetzee that they were doing such things and then did you contact Coetzee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I did.

MR BOOYENS: And did you sketch your problem to him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did.

MR BOOYENS: How much detail did you give him, can you remember?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot remember exactly, I just gave him sufficient detail so that he understood our problem.

MR BOOYENS: You spoke on an open telephone line?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Would you have been to the point and asked him to assist you in eliminating somebody or would you have been more subtle which the uniformed would not have known had he been listening in?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is how we would have spoken, that the two of us would understand but the uninformed would not understand.

MR BOOYENS: What was Dirk's reaction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He was quite positive, he said yes he would gladly assist us, and that I should give him a chance and that he would make the necessary arrangements and then inform me when we were to come.

MR BOOYENS: Did he contact you at a later stage?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And was it arranged on that occasion - well in the first place that it was to happen at Komatipoort where did the idea come from, from you or from Dirk?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My idea was that we should take this man, or if we had eliminated him we should have tried to get rid of the body so that it would not be found in the RSA, that it would be found somewhere else and then not be able to be identified and my suggestion was Mozambique because at that stage the authorities did not cooperate with the South African police on the borders and my feeling was that they would not have made enquiries and therefore I suggested the Mozambique border in the vicinity of Komatipoort.

MR BOOYENS: And did Dirk back you on this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He did.

MR BOOYENS: And did you reach an agreement to meet at Komatipoort?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: There are Occurrence Book entries which were handed in which seems that the deceased on the 10th of August was so-called released from Jeffrey’s Bay where he was detained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: How long after Herman du Plessis discussed his problem with you the first time until when you departed did you leave for the Eastern Transvaal and to Komatipoort?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot say exactly, but if I have to estimate it would be approximately a week, a week and a half.

MR BOOYENS: So seven to ten days more-or-less?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: It has been suggested apparently after a problem arose because the man sustained brain injuries he was apparently concealed or hidden for a period of the first half of August, September and October, a period of two-and-a-half months, could there have been such a long period of time between when du Plessis discussed his problems with you and when you left for Komatipoort, approximately two and a half months?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: You say that it's impossible for you to recall a date, that's what you told me, but you heard that Mr du Plessis said that that's the date he found in the documentation that was given when the man was released, are you aware of the documentation that was sent up to head office?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I am.

MR BOOYENS: And when after the apparent release and the request that he be released did you depart with Mr Kondile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I am aware the day that he was released was the same day that we left with him.

MR BOOYENS: Did you arrange a specific date with Dirk Coetzee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And the apparent release and the date were they close together?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Let us also deal with something else regarding Dirk Coetzee's evidence. How much did you have to do with Mr Kondile's interrogation, if anything at all?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I had nothing to do with it.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether you ever spoke to Mr Kondile or visited him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot recall such a thing. I am actually convinced that I saw him the first time the day that we left here with him.

MR BOOYENS: So you had nothing to do with his interrogation, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Herman du Plessis' reporting duty was not to you he had to report elsewhere?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You worked at different desks?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall, according to the Occurrence Book he was apparently released about 10 o'clock that morning. Mr du Plessis' evidence is that he drove from Jeffrey's Bay to Port Elizabeth where he picked you up, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ja.

MR BOOYENS: That's him and Mr Raath?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Approximately what time did you leave Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it was in the afternoon, I am not quite sure.

MR BOOYENS: You left for Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was it still daylight when you arrived in Bloemfontein or was it evening?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No it was evening already.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know whether it was late or early, what was your impression?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If I have to guess it was more-or-less nine thirty, ten o'clock.

MR BOOYENS: What was the purpose of stopping at Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The vehicle with which he entered South Africa was still there.

MR BOOYENS: Who told you that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr du Plessis.

MR BOOYENS: Did you at any stage have anything to do with Kondile's vehicle?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: In the testimony of Dirk Coetzee in his application was that Kondile's vehicle was parked in Jeffrey's Bay and that on occasion he visited you there and he saw the vehicle, that he also saw Kondile where he was handcuffed to a bed, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Let us just break this up, as far as you know was Kondile's car ever in Jeffrey's Bay?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No as far as my knowledge goes, not.

MR BOOYENS: Did Dirk Coetzee ever - were you and he ever together at Jeffrey's Bay before the death of Kondile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not as far as I can recall, I do not know of such a case.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know that Dirk Coetzee was in the Eastern Cape at one stage?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ja.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know when it was? Before or after the incident?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was after the Kondile incident as far as I can remember.

MR BOOYENS: You met Dirk Coetzee at Komatipoort was he alone?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. He was there together with Roy Otto.

MR BOOYENS: Did you know Roy Otto?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did know him but not well. Before the occasion I had only seen him most probably about twice.

MR BOOYENS: But were you told this is Roy Otto or did you know it was him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I knew it was him.

MR BOOYENS: Are you satisfied that it was Roy Otto?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you see Archie Flemington there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have anything to do with the personnel stationed at Ermelo, Deetlefs and Rorich?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Okay so it's you yourself, the testimony of Mr du Plessis is that Sergeant Raath was there as well, du Plessis, Kondile, Dirk Coetzee, Roy Otto, who, if anybody, was still there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was only the persons that you have now mentioned.

MR BOOYENS: So it's the five of you and the deceased?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you at any stage - were there any other members present?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: It has been suggested by my learned friend Mr Jansen that Coetzee is under the impression that you stopped over at Ermelo that evening.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I heard that.

MR BOOYENS: Did you drive through Ermelo?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes we did.

MR BOOYENS: Did you stop there, sleep over at people or anything like that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No we did not.

MR BOOYENS: Would it have been the normal route to go via Ermelo to the Eastern Transvaal, that's from Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it is the route that I knew.

MR BOOYENS: Because you were stationed in the Eastern Transvaal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any contact with anybody from the Security Branch at Ermelo?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Did anybody know that you were there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember if you stopped there, not to put in petrol but for any other reason?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: When you arrived at Komatipoort you met Dirk Coetzee and Roy Otto, tell us what happened then?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: They drove ahead of us and we followed. I didn't actually know that part and I cannot remember whether we drove for approximately half an hour when we turned off onto a gravel road we came to a bushy area, a forest area and that's where we stopped.

MR BOOYENS: What happened then?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We got out of the cars, I explained to Coetzee and Otto once again what the problem was and what my suggestion was and we had to eliminate the man and whether it was possible to get the body to the Mozambique side of the border and so forth and Mr Coetzee then made the suggestion that if we did not want the body to be found then he suggested that we burnt the body. They had wood and a great deal of wood was available and that we should rather burn the body and they would ensure that the remains would be thrown in the Komati River where it would drift away to Mozambique.

MR BOOYENS: From where you were could you see the river?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: What happened then? If you can just tell us what happened there.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I agreed with Mr Coetzee's suggestion and Mr Coetzee also mentioned to me that he had a sleeping drug and whether it would be necessary for him to give this to the man so that he could fall asleep so that we could eliminate him while he was asleep and not while he was awake, and I said yes, I thought that was a very good suggestion, and that he could go ahead.

We braai'ed some meat and we ate. This man sat close to us with his back against the tree trunk, his arms were cuffed in front of him. He was also given some meat which he ate. I did not see Mr Coetzee put anything in his drink. Mr Coetzee gave him something to drink, I don't know whether it was cool drink or a beer and he drank it, and approximately, I will have to guess, but approximately half an hour after that the man started swaying slowly. His head lurched and he went to lie on his side. And then somebody then said that we should now finish off.

MR BOOYENS: Who was this person?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am not sure.

MR BOOYENS: Could it have been you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes it could have been me, but I am not sure. While I was still sitting there Mr Otto jumped up and the next moment I saw what I suspected was his official firearm, he bent over the man and fired a shot. I am not quite sure whether he shot him in the temple or behind the ear, I suspect that it was one of those two places. Some of us helped to carry the wood and to pile it on top of one another and somebody lit the wood, the fire and this way he was burnt the whole evening and wood was added until the early morning hours, until the body had been incinerated.

MR BOOYENS: And did you leave?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, then we left.

MR BOOYENS: I have just missed something. Did you get Kondile's car in Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes we did.

MR BOOYENS: Who drove it from there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Raaths drove it.

MR BOOYENS: What happened to this car?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think that we left the car somewhere between Badplaas and Barberton, but I would say closer to Barberton. We drove it off the road among the bushes.

MR BOOYENS: And then Mr Raath drove with you from there on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you leave there that morning?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you go directly back to Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: You confirm therefore with what you've already said orally as appears on page 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, do you confirm what you have said that you lied to the Harms Commission?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the evidence as set out on these pages of your application?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I confirm this.

MR BOOYENS: You have already mentioned, or Mr du Plessis mentioned that there was co-operation on high levels between the Defence Force and the police, were you also aware of this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I was.

MR BOOYENS: And later when you were at head office, did you also have knowledge of the fact that on high level they were working actively at the successful combating or fighting of this war?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I was aware of it.

MR BOOYENS: When some of these things were investigated, when there were enquiries etc, you are an experienced policeman what was your impression regarding the standard of those investigations? Were they enthusiastic about investigating the disappearance of possible activists or people who were murdered?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, most cases that I can remember, the specific section asked for a report.

MR BOOYENS: So no real attempts were ever made to investigate this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You deal with your political objectives on page 10 and 11 although it's also interwoven in the rest of your application, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Perhaps just to summarise, what in your opinion, I am now speaking about '81 when the Kondile incident took place, what in your opinion was the function of the Security Police, why were you there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We were there to combat the revolutionary Communist onslaught directed at the country in order to oppose the ANC Communist alliance, to prevent them from succeeding in overthrowing the government of the country and paralysing the government.

MR BOOYENS: And what was spelt out to you, what was your role in this regard as Security police, what did the politicians, head office and your senior officers tell you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That we had to oppose this with everything that we had at our disposal. We had to do everything in our power to prevent the country from being overthrown, or the government from being overthrown.

MR BOOYENS: You said that you did not know Mr Kondile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You became involved in his murder?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Why? What is a personal thing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. I became involved because in my opinion at that stage this man was being a threat to our safety and....

MR BOOYENS: Were you also aware of the fact that Mr Kondile was a trained ANC cadre?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes Mr du Plessis told me this.

MR BOOYENS: Did you - you have already said that you did not know him personally, did you have anything personally against him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No not at all.

MR BOOYENS: Let me put it in a different way. Had it not been for the fact that there was a political - armed struggle against the National Party forces on the one hand and the ANC with their various military wings on the other side, I am talking about the security forces on the one hand and the Umkhonto people on the other side, as well as the armed cadres, if it had not been for this would this incident have taken place?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No it would not.

I can just mention that there was no personal feeling from my side against Mr Kondile. The feeling was one of danger that he held to our country and our people and the fact that he was a trained man, he was an enemy and that is how I regarded him. He was the enemy in the political sense of the word.

MR BOOYENS: Enemy of the country?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: He was part of the enemy forces?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you were part of the government forces?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: As far as you are concerned personally was there any difference between if you were to be involved in a cross-border fight or if you had an arms cache somewhere that had been blown up where people had been killed, or whether you eliminated one of the enemy forces internally, is there any difference?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, because as I've already said the struggle for me had already come over across the borders of the Republic and the normal rules of policing could no longer have stopped us.

MR BOOYENS: What was the situation in the Eastern Cape in those days regarding the political and the security situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: At that stage it had already built-up, that there was large-scale boycotts, the schools - then it was this and then it was that, stayaway actions, different things that happened in order to make the country ungovernable, to overthrow the system, make it ungovernable, I think that this was taking place in a very high level in Port Elizabeth and it just intensified.

MR BOOYENS: We have already, thanks to my colleague Mr Jansen, heard that shortly before the death of Mr Kondile there was also an explosion in Port Elizabeth so that these bomb attacks had already taken place there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Elsewhere as well - let's just make this clear. In the Eastern Cape as well as on the border area there were bomb attacks?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did normal policing still work, could you succeed in catching these people, all of them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No we could not, it was impossible to catch them all. We could not catch them before they had done the damage.

MR BOOYENS: We were not all in the Intelligence community, just as an explanation I think a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the importance of an informer network, the whole clandestine policing is this usually just based on information that you obtained from people you have caught or from informers or perhaps from tapping telephones?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: If you have to give an opinion let us suppose that your network was disclosed in Lesotho, how long, if ever, would it have taken you to establish a reasonable network in Lesotho again that could have given you the information you needed for your work?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would speak in terms of years. It could not have been done within months. I wonder if one would be able to do this in three years. MR BOOYENS: And then one wouldn't even know whether you could replace all the sources.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No it wouldn't have been accepted as such.

MR BOOYENS: Criticism has been levelled that you are an experienced policeman and Mr du Plessis has been criticised as having disclosed the identity of the principal agent to his source, Mr Kondile, was there anything abnormal in the fact that sources reported to a principal agent who in turn gave the information, or passed it on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No not at all. In my time I made use of the same methods. It is not so easy in a neighbouring state to obtain information of this nature, it is difficult.

MR BOOYENS: It seems to me as though there have been references to what one sees in espionage films and books about this kind of - the sophisticated men with hats and umbrellas and letters which are put down, does the real world of Intelligence-gathering work in this way, spy versus spy stories?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not in my career with this type of work.

MR BOOYENS: Reference is also made to the so-called de-briefing and then the final using of informers by a panel of experts, you heard what my colleague Mr Jansen suggested to Mr du Plessis, regardless what the books said did it work like this in practice?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I do not know which books refer to this ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: No I didn't say books, you didn't say books, I said so.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it did not work in this way, not in practice.

MR BOOYENS: If you can just briefly tell us in general if for argument's sake you get a man who has been caught and you work with him and you decide that there's possible potential in order to use him as an informer, how would this have worked in practice?

In the first place is it not true that as few as possible people should know about the identity of an informer?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as far as it's possible, that's the best to do it in this way.

MR BOOYENS: How many people in that case in your experience, how many people worked with a man to prepare him before he was thrown into the other side again to work as informer?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The method that I used and which was used by most of our colleagues of which I am aware, normally not more than two people.

MR BOOYENS: And these two would then deal with him but with a foreign source he would have worked through an agent?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, if he was spying abroad then that's how it would have worked.

MR BOOYENS: Today 17 years later Mr van Rensburg, we are here, this is after a young man has been killed, how do you feel today about the struggle so long ago, how do you feel about what happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: At the stage when this incident took place I was a patriotic citizen, that's how I regarded myself. At that stage I did what I felt that I couldn't allow a Communist dispensation to arise here. This would have meant the end of me and of my children. Now after all the years and the fights which have taken place, and people who have lost their lives ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: On both sides?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, on both sides, and I see how politics has progressed and I want to say how naive politics is. I want to say this in hindsight. I am now convinced that it is a pity that those of us who were in the forces, and I am including MK and the ANC's military wing and the PAC and other organisations as well, those based at grassroots level as well as those on higher levels that we were placed in the middle of two political streams, let's call it the previous government or the National Party and then the ANC on the other side and that we ended up in this stream and found ourselves in these dilemmas.

And that I want to go so far as to say that the politicians on the side of the previous government they wanted to stay in power by using these forces and today I am sorry that I became involved and I wish I could change things; and that negotiations had been taken place many years ago, then all this pain and suffering and the position in which my colleagues and I find ourselves from - I feel very sorry for all of this.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, no thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Moosa.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOOSA: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr van Rensburg you were here when Mr du Plessis gave his evidence yesterday and this morning, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: One of the things we heard was the statement generated after there was a meeting in Pretoria, did you hear that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I heard it, yes.

MR MOOSA: Were you there at that meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I was not there, I was ill.

MR MOOSA: Was there any discussion with you by any of the other applicants before you made your statement?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes there was.

MR MOOSA: When was that discussion, plus/minus?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it was more-or-less during November 1996, it was more-or-less then when we decided to apply for amnesty.

MR MOOSA: And could you let us have an insight into what made you reluctant to apply for amnesty before that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman in general, I am just talking on behalf of myself, in discussions with other colleagues we were uncertain how exactly the TRC would function and specifically the Amnesty Committee, and whether we should have a just trial, who would serve on the committees, etc, etc, and we were uncertain whether we should apply for amnesty or not, whether it would be the right thing to do.

Afterwards it became clear to us and many of us felt right we've done, it had happened under certain circumstances, let's state our point of view.

MR MOOSA: And where and when was the meeting held that you are referring to?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I had discussions with old colleagues in Port Elizabeth regarding this matter.

MR MOOSA: And who was present at the meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can remember it was Mr Roelofse amongst others, that was initially, and later we gathered in the Free State and discussed these matters again and there amongst others were Mr du Plessis, Erasmus, Mr Sakkie van Zyl and a few others. I can't remember their names now. And there we finally decided, or we can put it in that way, those who did not want to apply for amnesty should not stay behind those who wanted to apply for amnesty. We are going to do that. We decided that we were going to our legal counsel to get legal advice and after I've made my statement to my attorney we would fax a copy to Mr du Plessis, for example, in Pretoria, so that they also had insight in our documents, and would be able to indicate where we had wrong facts. For example things might have been forgotten. And this is how it happened.

MR MOOSA: Can you remember from the people who were present at these meetings who indicated that they were not prepared to apply for amnesty?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not one, as far as I know.

MR MOOSA: And of course what you have told us is there was a meeting in Pretoria where you were not present, another meeting in Port Elizabeth and another meeting in the Free State?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: And this meeting in the Free State, when was that - plus/minus?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was round about during November 1996, it was before the 12th or the 14th of December of 1997 in any case, rather 1996.

MR MOOSA: I notice your statement is made in May 1997, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Did you make any kind of decision about - or did you discuss specific incidents in these meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, we had to tell one-another, I you and they were involved in this or that incident. I am going to apply for amnesty, what do you say about it? And then another would say, yes, we are going to go for it. We are going to apply. That's how it worked, basically.

MR MOOSA: And what happens when somebody said look, I was not involved in that particular incident, what would happen there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well I don't know, it did not happen like that. There was not a case like that.

MR MOOSA: You of course discussed as one of the incidents, the one we are busy with now, the incident of Sizwe Kondile, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: And of course there's a history to this one in that as early as the Harms Commission these allegations were made?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And they were made in particular by a person called Dirk Coetzee, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: In all these meetings that you have spoken about was there discussion about this gentleman, Dirk Coetzee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, except that there were parts of his evidence we did not agree with.

MR MOOSA: And what was the feeling about Dirk Coetzee and earlier Almond Nofomela having blown the lid, having exposed certain things?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Are you referring when they did it, or are you referring to when we decided to apply for amnesty? When are you referring to?

MR MOOSA: I am referring to the meetings and up to now what is the feelings towards Dirk Coetzee in particular? Let's talk about you, what's your feelings towards Coetzee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I don't feel anything about Mr Coetzee. I've already decided that I will have no hate, I won't have hate in my heart and I am not going to continue living like that, whatever happens. And I can assure you that it will be a glad day for me when Mr Coetzee also be granted amnesty, so that what we have done wrong that we can disclose that. We can say that was a certain stage in the South African history, it had happened, but let's forget about all this hate and let's go forward together. This is how I feel about him. I can honestly tell you I do not wish, from my side, that anything should happen to him, that anything bad should happen to him, should he be granted amnesty I would be glad about it.

JUDGE PILLAY: Mr van Rensburg would you have made this application if Mr Coetzee had not said what he had said?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I am convinced I would have because I became tired of this thing in me, if I can put it like that. The Harms Commission has already referred to this and at that stage there was no other opportunity such as the Amnesty Committee to apply for amnesty.

I think the time was not ripe because of politics. This is how I felt.

JUDGE PILLAY: If he did not say what he had said what would your position have been?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It's difficult to say at this stage, it's very difficult to give you an honest answer on that question.

MR MOOSA: We'd agree all of us that what was said by you and others at the Harms Commission was not true, it was lies, isn't that so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: And it now emerges that a large part of what Mr Coetzee had to say about this incident turns out to be the truth using as our measure what you and the other applicants in this set of applications are saying?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes to a greater extent, yes, that is true what he has said.

MR MOOSA: Amongst the things which he said which are true is that the body of this young man Mr Kondile was burnt in the Komatipoort area.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: But there are certain differences. One of them is about the car which we learn is Mr Chris Hani's car.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: Now you maintain that that car was at all times in Bloemfontein, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: Talking about Bloemfontein, is there anyone going to come to support your amnesty application to tell us what happened with Mr Kondile in Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not as far as I know, no, I don't think so.

MR MOOSA: Help us a little bit then. Who were the people involved, do you know, who were involved with Mr Kondile in the Bloemfontein area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know first hand, but I think from documents reference is made to Mr Prinsloo, if I can remember correctly. He was one of the persons who was involved with Mr Kondile in Bloemfontein. I don't know about anybody else. I don't know, I can't tell you, if there were others who they were.

MR MOOSA: This Mr Prinsloo is he someone we can find?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes as far as I know.

MR MOOSA: Where is he now, do you know?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know.

MR MOOSA: As soon as Mr Kondile was arrested did the news come to you in Port Elizabeth that this gentleman has in fact been arrested?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I suppose so. I did not handle with this directly I don't know whether Bloemfontein informed Mr Erasmus or Mr du Plessis by telephone but he did not inform me personally. I had no telephone contact with him regarding this matter. I could have seen it by means of encoded messages provided me this information on my desk.

MR MOOSA: I know it was a long time ago but it would have been a very significant event for the Eastern Cape area, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would classify it like that.

MR MOOSA: And you would be eager in the Eastern Cape to get Mr Kondile in your hands as soon as possible to interrogate him and get information as soon as possible, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is so, yes, but Mr Chairman the normal practice was that if the Free State had arrested such a person they would interrogate him first of all to establish what information he had about the Free State. And if he could tell them anything about the Free State and said I have intelligence about the Eastern Cape then they would notify us. And then we would be anxious to discuss things with this person. But the people who arrested him initially in my whole career in the police it was like that that they would first establish whether he had information regarding their area. That was number one priority and then they would investigate other areas.

I want to expand on that. If they find that this person can't tell us anything more, he has more intelligence for the Eastern Cape that would have been the correct procedure to transfer him to the Eastern Cape.

MR MOOSA: Now even before Mr du Plessis came to you to explain his problems he would have come to you to say that Mr Kondile is now in detention in the Eastern Cape and is being interrogated, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I accept that.

MR MOOSA: And you - would I be right in saying you would get fairly regular reports of how progress is going and for example that he has been transferred from Humansdorp to Jeffrey's Bay?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not necessarily. What usually happened in such a case was that Mr du Plessis would inform me if he felt that there was anything necessary for the area in which we operated. He would not necessarily have told me that he had transferred the person from Jeffrey's Bay, he could have done it, but it was not necessary for him to do that. It was not some or other rule or instruction to do it in that way.

MR MOOSA: I understand that but very significant for Mr du Plessis and for all of you then would be the breakthrough that Mr Kondile had agreed to work for you, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, yes that is true.

MR MOOSA: I take it, it would be inevitable that Mr du Plessis would not only tell you about it but that he would have been elated, excited about that development in the investigation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes it is like that.

MR MOOSA: And did he tell you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he told me about it.

MR MOOSA: Now you were in fact in charge of Mr du Plessis, you were his senior, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I was his senior officer.

MR MOOSA: Were you concerned to make sure that Mr Kondile's apparent willingness to work for the Security Branch was genuine?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't want to comment on that, but I just wanted to describe the structure. Mr du Plessis was the head of certain desk. His desk or his unit then had certain tasks. I was in charge of another desk with other duties. It was just by coincidence that I was his senior. Regarding certain matters we co-operated horizontally but his main liaison person was directly to the commanding officer in charge. I hope that explains the situation.

MR MOOSA: Yes, it is of some assistance, but neither you nor Mr du Plessis nor for that matter Mr Erasmus were rookies or greenhorns in this business am I right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No you are correct.

MR MOOSA: There is no way that such sensitive information as is described in the statement of Mr du Plessis and also described in your statement, you could easily take the chance of giving it to somebody who was coming directly from the ANC and was a trained activist.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am sorry I did not follow what you were asking me.

MR MOOSA: I am sorry, maybe I wasn't too clear, let me try again.

You have a trained activist coming directly from the ANC and someone who is close to Mr Chris Hani, this is Mr Kondile, am I right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: And in a short time, after two weeks of interrogation, plus/minus in the Eastern Cape he shows a willingness to work for you in the Security Branch.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: I take it that you'd be very careful about the information that you give him, that you wouldn't entrust him with sensitive information which would make him a potential danger to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I was not in the position that I recruited or talked to this person myself, but this specific person, Mr Kondile, I've worked with many trained people during my career, or with liberation fighters, freedom fighters, and I can assure you it differs from person to person. In the one instance you have no problems with the person right from the beginning. He provides the information immediately he co-operates. You recruit him easily. And then you find others would never be recruited, never, ever. So it differs from person to person.

It is not strange that it happens in that way. Taking into regard that he had been in Bloemfontein for a while and he had provided them with information there also, important information according to me. And that he came to the Eastern Cape to provide further information. According to my experience in the Security Branch the person who provides information so quickly can be bought and can be recruited easily.

MR MOOSA: I wasn't talking about the information he allegedly provided to you, I am talking about the information you allegedly provided to him.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that just be more specific, I don't think there is any evidence that he provided information.

MR MOOSA: No I am talking about you in the plural.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now you see du Plessis had provided information. This man had nothing to do with it.

MR MOOSA: Yes Mr Chairman. What I am talking about there is a report that comes to him from Mr du Plessis and I am going to come immediately to the reaction that he had to that report. Did that surprise you that Mr du Plessis had given this young such sensitive information about the operations in the Eastern Cape?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No not at all. During my career I also had cross-border agents. I handled them and at certain instances I also had to decide quickly whether I would expose this information or not; whether I was going to trust this person or not. It was an option you had to consider. You could make a mistake.

MR MOOSA: And if you made a mistake what would the option be if you discover that the person was a double agent?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well it depends, it depends on what the consequences would be.

MR MOOSA: Now it wasn't just the question of the principal agent, as I understand both your statement and Mr du Plessis', there was other very sensitive information that was already in Mr Kondile's hands, isn't it so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know of any other sensitive information. What I was told is that the name of the principal agent was told to him and he had to cooperate with this person. That was the type of information provided to him.

MR MOOSA: So it was just the identity of the principal agent that he would know, would I be right about that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Just explain to me because you did an assessment together with Mr Erasmus of the situation, how that would endanger all covert operations in the Eastern Cape?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I think Mr du Plessis had already explained it to you. This agent does not handle only one informer. In other words if I can give you an example, if Mr Kondile for example would get reach the ANC he could tell them who the agent was. If they put this agent under observation by the MK Intelligence people they could determine precisely who the other informers were handled by this agent. Or they could abduct him, they could torture him till he provided that information.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence was that they disclosed the network as well, some portion of the network apart from the principal agent.

MR MOOSA: That is what I thought Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you've got that evidence.

MR MOOSA: Taking the cue from your counsel who was telling me about Lesotho, I think he meant that I should have asked about Lesotho, it seems to me though that your statement and Mr du Plessis' statement really emphasises the security situation in the Eastern Cape with particular reference to the Transkei or am I wrong?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so.

MR MOOSA: And that this morning when Mr du Plessis really emphasised Lesotho, that was a different tack on your statements, I didn't understand the statement in quite that way. What's your comment on that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't understand, I really don't understand what you are trying to ask me.

MR MOOSA: Let me do it again. This morning Mr du Plessis gave evidence that what was really important was the situation in Lesotho and that was what was in fact going to be endangered by Mr Kondile still being alive, not being eliminated, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes the withdrawal of information from Lesotho, the destroying of that Intelligence network, yes.

MR MOOSA: And would it be right to say that the security network in Lesotho was quite sophisticated but where you emphasised gaps in your information is particularly in the Transkei area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is so, that is correct.

MR MOOSA: Which it, more-or-less together with the Border region be in your particular interests of the Eastern Cape and Border regions, would that be right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ja, but the Transkei and the Ciskei were also of great importance to us. But if there was no information available about the Transkei and the Ciskei regarding the infiltration of Freedom Fighters etc, we wouldn't know that those people were already in Transkei or Ciskei. It was also of importance for us what were their movements, what is the Intelligence about Transkei and Ciskei.

MR MOOSA: This note that was found allegedly by Mr du Plessis, did he actually show it to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No he did not.

MR MOOSA: Did he say what had happened to that note by the time he spoke to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he said that he had left the note there.

MR MOOSA: Now Mr Chairman I notice it is almost one o'clock.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman just before we adjourn, something you yourself just mentioned Mr Chairman and I think it is something I will have to correct at some stage. I have been listening to the direct sound and I've been listening to either English or Afrikaans, and my recollection of the evidence that was given was not that du Plessis' evidence was that they said they disclosed part of the network to them as well, he said they disclosed the principal agent to them and then part of the network could be disclosed in other words. So I think, I am not sure what got through to you Mr Chairman, but that is certainly my recollection of Mr du Plessis' evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: We will put that right. Thank you. We will now adjourn and resume at two o'clock.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOOSA: (cont)

Mr van Rensburg I would like you to look at page 5 of volume 1 of the documents, that is your statement, also page 5 of it. Look at the first paragraph there. I wonder if you could read out the first sentence to us.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: "Die...." ...(intervention)

MR MOOSA: Sorry the paragraph beginning "Kapt du Plessis".

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay.

"Captain du Plessis expressed the fear that if Kondile were to be released he would be able to harm the whole Security branch with the information he had and his task as well as his knowledge of communication and handlers".

MR DE JAGER: I will read the second sentence that is in my document, and I ask yesterday that we assure that we have the correct pieces in front of us.

"Captain du Plessis informed us further that this attempt to recruit Kondile was successful and that they continued to inform him with regard to the execution of his task".

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am sorry, I don't know whether I now read the wrong sentence but I understood what this man meant was that I should read paragraph 1 page 5. I my humble opinion it starts ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Oh you read the second paragraph and not the second sentence. I understood that you had to read the second sentence.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I understood that I had to read the first sentence of the second paragraph.

MR MOOSA: Ah let me confess to be the one doing this damage. It is the sentence beginning "Kapt du Plessis", that's at the bottom of page 5. I apologise if there was ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Both sentences being with "Kapt du Plessis".

MR MOOSA: "Kapt du Plessis het sy vrees uitgespreek..."

"Captain du Plessis expressed his fear..."

that's the one.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's the one that I read.

MR MOOSA: And if I understand your evidence just before lunch correctly, what you are telling us is that what Mr Kondile knew was the name of the principal agent and this is what would have caused this damage, am I right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: I also put it to you that it seems to me that you have now begun to accept certain aspects of the evidence of Mr Coetzee which goes back some way around about 1989 when he made these allegations about Mr Kondile's case for the first time, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't follow you now.

MR MOOSA: Well for one thing we now know that the car which Mr Coetzee says he saw and the description of the car is basically correct, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. I cannot say anything about the colour of the car but what Mr Coetzee says that it was a Datsun car that's correct, yes.

MR MOOSA: Also that, and this emerged for the first time yesterday, that Mr Kondile was held in White single quarters in Jeffrey's Bay.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: For a period of time, yes.

MR MOOSA: And that he was guarded and we now know that he was guarded by Ginotry Danster.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes amongst others.

MR MOOSA: Which others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: According to what I understood, this is what I was told, Mr Raath also guarded the man.

MR MOOSA: I see. Were you told who interrogated the man?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I was not informed who interrogated him, I accepted that Mr du Plessis was doing the interrogation.

MR MOOSA: From your evidence-in-chief I gather that you knew at this stage Mr Coetzee very well?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I did know him very well.

MR MOOSA: Now Mr Coetzee stated that he came to the Eastern Cape and saw you and this is how he gathered this information, in fact he was taken with you to these white single quarters in Jeffrey's Bay.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is not correct.

MR MOOSA: Is Mr Coetzee lying to us about that aspect?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know if he has his facts wrong or whether he is telling a lie, I don't know.

MR MOOSA: To get it clear there was never a time that he went with you to the white single quarters and saw Mr Kondile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, never.

MR MOOSA: He also says that there was a discussion with you where you said that this threatened to be a second Biko case because this young man Mr Kondile had sustained serious brain injuries?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's not true.

MR MOOSA: And that it was then that it was decided that this young man had to be eliminated and Mr Coetzee would be of some assistance in this.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Nothing of the kind was ever discussed at that stage. We did not speak to him about the man at that stage, in the case that you are sketching for us.

MR MOOSA: But certainly when you had to think of someone to be of assistance it was Mr Coetzee that you contacted?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: And it was pre-arranged that this would be at Komatipoort, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: From all the statements before us in these applications it was felt that you, Mr Erasmus and Mr du Plessis were acting in this matter pro-actively, in relation to Mr Kondile in the situation before you, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not quite understand what you mean by pro-actively.

MR MOOSA: Well please look at your statement, at page 6, it's both page 6 of your statement and page 6 of the bundle which has Volume 1.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: Read out to us in the statement, in the first paragraph, first sentence in the paragraph right at the bottom and I am going to be clear about it this time, "ons het besluit om hierdie...." "we decided in this case...."

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Right, now I understand what you asked, yes that's true, to act pro-actively.

MR MOOSA: Now it's your statement, tell us what you mean by "pro-actively" here?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To act pro-actively is to prevent, to act in such a way that you prevent this person become a traitor and betraying us and destroying our network in this way and that is why we decided to act proactively in order to prevent this from happening.

MR MOOSA: So you acted pro-actively actually in reaction to the situation you were faced with but to prevent further dangers, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR MOOSA: And from what I gather there were a number of meetings and discussions of what alternatives you had. This was together with Mr Erasmus and Mr du Plessis.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Tell us what were the alternatives?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The alternatives which were mentioned were, did we have to or could we detain him longer in isolation, in other words in terms of Section 6 of the detention of that time; or could we de-activate the agent, principal agent - those were basically the two options that we had.

MR MOOSA: And it was felt that it was not feasible to deactivate the principal agent, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's correct.

MR MOOSA: Tell us why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well for the same reason that would have destroyed our network in any case.

MR MOOSA: Once the decision was taken - sorry, you had a number of meetings, can you tell us how many these were?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot be precise, perhaps we met on three occasions.

MR MOOSA: And these were on different days or on the same day?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think on one day we met in the morning and then the afternoon late again. I recall that Mr Erasmus said that afternoon that we left that we should think very seriously about this, about these options that we were faced with.

MR MOOSA: Now once it was determined that the option was to eliminate Mr Kondile I noticed that your instruction was that you also had to be present when this was done, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: And what was the reason for that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not know exactly, I cannot recall the exact reason for that whether Mr Erasmus felt that he wanted a senior man to be in control of the operation, I think that that was the reason but I am not sure.

MR MOOSA: But in any event you were in control of the operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: When exactly was it when you found Mr Coetzee? Was it after the last discussion when you saw no other alternative and the three of you agreed and reached a consensus position?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: I am going to put it to you that it's in the highest degree improbable that Mr Coetzee's version is false, that there is no other way that he would have got this information except the way he says, that is about Mr Kondile and the vehicle and seeing Mr Kondile being guarded.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know why you are saying this, but what I am telling you is that Mr Coetzee and I never saw this man together at Jeffrey's Bay and that Mr Kondile's car, as far as my knowledge went, was never at Jeffrey's Bay.

MR MOOSA: And I also put it to you that it's in the highest degree unlikely that another man, quite independently, Mr Danster, comes with the story of there's going to be another Biko incident.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know where Mr Danster gets this information, I cannot comment on it. He could have read this in the newspapers during the Harms Commission I don't know, I cannot comment.

MR MOOSA: I also put it to you that the vehicle was very likely in the area of Jeffrey's Bay and in the Eastern Cape and you left with Mr Kondile's vehicle, if your version is correct.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We did not leave Port Elizabeth with Mr Kondile's vehicle, we got the car at Bloemfontein.

MR MOOSA: Did all of you then go in one vehicle and Mr Raath, as I understand it, drove Mr Kondile's vehicle from Bloemfontein, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Was it you that gave the order for this vehicle, Mr Kondile's vehicle to be left in the Barberton area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think that Mr du Plessis and I decided together that we were going to leave the vehicle somewhere there.

MR MOOSA: And was there discussion from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein about how this operation was to be executed between the two of you or the three of you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, we did not talk about it much in the car. We knew that we were going to take the man to Komatipoort where we would meet Mr Coetzee and the man would be eliminated. That is basically what we had decided on. We did not talk much about it in the car.

MR MOOSA: In fact Mr Kondile was with you in the car and as far as he was concerned he was now working for you, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: Was he handcuffed in the vehicle?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes he was.

MR MOOSA: And once he was freed, at least theoretically, in Bloemfontein, was he still handcuffed or was he left ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: No I think - I don't think it's - my learned friend said Bloemfontein, it wasn't the evidence I think ....

MR MOOSA: Sorry. Mr Kondile was freed, where was that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: At Jeffrey's Bay.

MR MOOSA: And what was the situation as far as Mr Kondile himself was concerned? Was he made to feel that he was re-arrested or what explanation was given to him of what had happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I gave him no explanation, Mr du Plessis would have spoken to him, what he said to him I am not aware of, I am not sure.

MR MOOSA: Was there much discussion with Mr Kondile in this trip, from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR MOOSA: And was it you who gave the instruction about disposing of the Kondile vehicle leaving it in the Barberton area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think that Mr du Plessis and I made that decision together, that the vehicle should be left there.

MR MOOSA: Any particular reason for Barberton?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, as I have already said before we said Barberton, it was somewhere outside Barberton, I cannot remember how far, the only reason was that it should be as close as possible to the border.

MR GCABASHE: Mr Moosa if I might just interrupt, could I ask Mr van Rensburg, you travelled in convoy from Bloemfontein to Barberton?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR GCABASHE: With Mr Raath driving Sizwe Kondile's car behind you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR GCABASHE: Was Sizwe Kondile not curious about where his car was being taken to?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No he was not. He did not want to know. We did not actually talk about it.

MR GCABASHE: And when you left the car by the side of the road at Barberton again he didn't ask any questions?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No he did not.

MR GCABASHE: But he was conscious of everything you were doing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can't - yes, I cannot remember, at certain stages during our journey he slept, I don't know whether he slept at that stage. I do not know what Mr du Plessis had told him, I told him nothing.

MR GCABASHE: And when he was travelling with you in the car was he wearing a balaclava?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes he did.

MR GCABASHE: What was the purpose of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it was to protect his identity.

MR GCABASHE: You were travelling at night?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, we travelled a while during the day as well. I cannot - for how long he had the balaclava on I can't remember.

MR GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR MOOSA: This was a pretty long journey, how was it broken, did you stop somewhere to stay over?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the term "stay over", we just stopped alongside the road and rested and then continued on our journey and rested again. But we did not overnight in an hotel or something to that effect, or at a guest house or wherever.

MR MOOSA: You didn't do any of the driving did you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, no, I cannot remember that I drove myself.

MR MOOSA: Can you remember where the stops were that you made? ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is this detail really relevant Mr Moosa?

MR MOOSA: Not quite Mr Chairman - there were some ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... the essentials.

MR MOOSA: Sure, there was some statement put to him that the stop was in Ermelo.

CHAIRPERSON: It didn't matter. At the end of the day this is a matter that won't be of much concern, surely.

MR MOOSA: Ultimately, no. Now coming to Komatipoort, any reason for that choice of area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As I have already said the idea was that once we had eliminated this person that we would try to get the body to Mozambique. In other words we had to choose a place as close as possible to the Mozambique border. That is why we decided that specific place.

MR MOOSA: I am going to put it to you that it's most likely that in this situation that Archie Flemington would have been contacted before you do anything in his area.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I would not contact him. I asked Mr Coetzee to make the arrangements - as to where to meet him and where it was to be done, I left that to him.

MR MOOSA: The situation described by Mr Coetzee where he says that Mr Flemington and others were present during this incident, I take it you deny that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I deny that.

MR MOOSA: I put it to you that there would be no reason for Mr Coetzee to lie and make his situation actually worse than what it was from the time that he gave this story?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot comment on that. I do not know what Mr Coetzee's agenda is. I do not know whether his memory fails him sometimes, I don't know.

MR MOOSA: The fire that was made eventually, the pyre of wood that was used to burn Mr Kondile, where was the wood obtained from?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The wood that was already there I do not know where that came from. It's a forest area there is a great deal of wood available, it's very easy to get hold of wood. It's no problem.

MR MOOSA: Well you were there, did the people actually get hold of the wood and make the fire at the time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: There was wood and after this wood had been set alight with the body on top of it more wood was gathered and added throughout the night.

MR MOOSA: And do you recall what was used to re-light the fire?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I am not sure. It could possibly have been petrol or diesel, but I cannot say exactly, I cannot recall exactly what it was. I think it was.

MR GCABASHE: If - I am sorry Mr Moosa, if you could just clarify one small point. The wooden pyre was already there when you arrived or the wood was - it was set up while you were there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The wood was there but then it was piled up while we were there and then the body was placed on top of it.

MR GCABASHE: But then was it piled up before Kondile was shot or after he was shot?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think after he was shot.

MR MOOSA: I put it to you that it is convenient that you name Sergeant Otto, a person who is now deceased, as the one who shot Mr Kondile.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know what you are suggesting. Sergeant Otto was the man who was there and the man who shot him. That's all I can tell you.

MR MOOSA: There was a discussion between you and Mr Coetzee about the knock-out drops which were used to lace the drinks, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Could you tell us about that discussion, what did Mr Coetzee actually tell you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Coetzee told me that he possessed - I cannot recall whether he said it was a sleeping drug or drops, but it boiled down to the fact that it would make a person fall asleep and he suggested that they ask the man if he wanted something to drink and that this sleeping drug would be added to the drink because he felt that it was better to shoot a person if he was asleep than to shoot him while he was still awake.

MR MOOSA: In fact you said in your evidence-in-chief that you thought it was a good idea that the person be shot while he is asleep, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR MOOSA: That's not how it happened eventually, is it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is exactly how it happened.

MR MOOSA: Now I am going to put it to you that the version of Mr Coetzee is far more probable than your version including about how the wood and tyres, on his version, for the pyre that was made were obtained, that it was brought by Mr Flemington and his men.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't agree. I deny that those people were even there, or that there were such people.

MR MOOSA: I also put it to you that there was no need for you to eliminate Mr Kondile in this barbaric fashion that was done.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's your opinion. At that stage I was convinced that this was the only way to solve the problem.

MR MOOSA: It is my instructions that there was nothing political about your actions at all and that in fact it goes way beyond the bounds of what is acceptable even in a war situation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not agree with you....

MR MOOSA: Are you still wanting to say something?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, no.

MR MOOSA: There was a picnic atmosphere around the killing of Mr Kondile, drinks were had and you ate meat while the young man's body was burnt, is that right?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is not true. We did braai meat before Mr Kondile was shot and we ate before he was shot.

MR MOOSA: And after he was shot what happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Some of this wood was taken and packed up, not very high, his body was placed on top of this and this was set alight if I recall correctly and then the other wood was added and this is how the fire was kept going throughout.

MR MOOSA: The truth of the situation is though that if Mr Kondile went on his knees and begged you not to kill him it would have not stopped any of you, you would have killed him.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: And today you want forgiveness and understanding for your actions.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well I personally believe that I cannot expect anything from somebody, I can only expect forgiveness from God. I can apologise but I cannot expect anybody to forgive me. I cannot expect that.

MR MOOSA: I finally put it to you Mr van Rensburg that your behaviour and the behaviour of your fellow policemen exceeded the bounds of decency and that you are not entitled to amnesty for these actions.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I have no comment on that. I think that's for the Committee to decide, it's not in my hands.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOOSA

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NYOKA: I will take literally less than two minutes Mr Chairperson.

Mr van Rensburg when Mr du Plessis about the Kondile dilemma, in particular about that note, did you not ask him about its whereabouts because it was going to form the basis of a discussion between you, Mr van Rensburg and Mr Erasmus, did you not ask him where is this note?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I did not ask him.

MR NYOKA: Why not, because it was very essential?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did not doubt Mr du Plessis' word regarding this note. As far as I remember I did not ask him but he mentioned that he had left the note there because he did not want Mr Kondile to know that he had found out.

MR NYOKA: Maybe if you had asked him he could have read the message out of context and it could have been corrected that what he thought it meant did not mean it. So it was essential to find out about this note before an ultimate decision was taken, don't you think so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, as I have already said I know Mr du Plessis was an experienced person. He had done more during his career and he's taken more cases to court than anybody and I did not doubt his abilities regarding this matter.

MR NYOKA: And I correct to conclude that you acted out of faith or trust in Mr du Plessis because you had not seen the deceased, you never interrogated him, you never verified the truthfulness of the facts against him, not so, you just acted out of blind faith for Mr du Plessis, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I won't say in blind faith in Mr du Plessis. That was why Mr Erasmus, if I remember correctly asked Mr du Plessis to put everything that he had told us also in writing, or rather to put it in writing for Erasmus to make the final decision. I had no reason to doubt Mr du Plessis.

MR NYOKA: But you did not interrogate the man, you did not verify the facts on your own, so it was a one-sided thing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I did not interrogate Mr Kondile.

MR NYOKA: How can you therefore justify your actions as being politically motivated when you did not even talk to the man to confirm, but take a very drastic action? Would you argue with me if I say that your actions were criminally motivated rather than politically motivated?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't agree. I can't believe that Mr du Plessis would have come to me with something so ludicrous. That was such a serious case.

MR NYOKA: And how would you describe your relations with Mr du Plessis at the time? Were you comrades, if you can pardon me using that term, were you comradely in your relations? Or let me put it in a manner that you will understand, were you friendly?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No there were no bad feelings between me and Mr du Plessis.

MR NYOKA: What puzzles me is why is it that when a big fish is caught you are not told the very first time that he was arrested at Bloemfontein or at worst during the early days at Humansdorp by your comrade or friend, why are you not told that we have arrested a big fish, we are going to make a breakthrough? There are many possibilities. Even the possible elimination of Chris Hani because he was close to him, why were you not told by your friend?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't say at which stage Mr du Plessis had told me about this. He did tell me, I knew at a certain stage he told me that they were going to East London or Transkei, he was going to point out certain things, but you know Mr du Plessis and his colleagues were very busy. I was involved in my tasks. It was not a case that we sat there discussing things all day long. Yes from time to time he did convey certain information to me but I did not visit him every day or every few hours to ask him what was going on, what was happening, it does not work like that. You are involved with your own task, you are inquisitive but you expect that the person will inform you in his own good time.

MR NYOKA: Do you agree with me that you could easily have walked out of this because the people that mattered were Mr du Plessis and Mr Erasmus, you were never involved in the Kondile matter, you could easily have opted for the easy or Christian option of, with throwing and not being involved in the actual killing, but just referring Mr du Plessis to Mr Erasmus and then remove yourself, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR NYOKA: Why did you not do that, as a Christian?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well if you mentioned it now and with reference to the circumstances we have today this is what I should have done. But I have already told you that Mr du Plessis trusted me, he trusted me in discussing this with me. We discussed it with Erasmus and I did not want to break this trust.

JUDGE PILLAY: But Mr van Rensburg if I listen to your evidence Mr Erasmus instructed you to be in charge of the whole operation, as from the minute you made the decision?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

JUDGE PILLAY: As I understand it, Mr Erasmus did not agree to leave Mr du Plessis in charge of this operation. He rather wanted to put you in command of the operation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's true.

JUDGE PILLAY: Why did you then say that Mr du Plessis had told you in the light of the fact that you are in control of this, why did you say that was the correct position?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: What do you mean Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Why did you not verify the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I did not do that. I can't say why not. I just accepted that what Mr du Plessis had said Mr Erasmus gave me an instruction that ...(intervention)

JUDGE PILLAY: There is a suggestion that at a certain stage that Mr Kondile sustained brain damage, I don't know whether it's true or not, but is it not possible that that was the reason why you could not talk to him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No Mr Chairman. No I talked to him, yes.

JUDGE PILLAY: Thank you.

MR NYOKA: You heard Mr du Plessis describing Mr Kondile as a very intelligent person?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I did.

MR NYOKA: Would an intelligent person not ask on the way to Komatipoort, gentlemen what has happened to the co-operation agreement between you and me, me and you, because now I am being handcuffed, I am being taken to a strange place, I am having a balaclava on my face and no one is saying anything. If that is correct why would he not say that if he was intelligent?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know. When Mr du Plessis and Mr Raath picked him up from Jeffrey's Bay what Mr du Plessis or he and Mr Raath had told me Kondile. They picked me up on their way at Port Elizabeth. I suspect I probably asked Mr du Plessis is this person calm, is he satisfied, and Mr du Plessis could have told me, yes I shouldn't worry about that, this is what I think happened. But during our journey to Komatipoort I had the impression that this person did not suspect anything.

MR NYOKA: You were born on the 23rd of July 1940, and during that crucial week of the Kondile dilemma you were celebrating your birthday, the 23rd of July 1981, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes if you put it like that, yes.

MR NYOKA: You must have felt very badly when you had to do something contrary to the spirit of celebrating birth by considering death, not so? It must have felt very badly. Here you are celebrating your birthday but you still you are considering death for the first time, your first operation, not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know whether at that stage we've already decided by the 23rd of July, I can't say whether we’ve already decided then. I've previously said yes at that stage I believed that I had to assist them. We had to bring this political dilemma under control, I had to assist them in doing that in solving the problem. About when, I can't remember the precise date when we made this decision, but yes, if I think back, it's all a big pity now.

MR NYOKA: Ja, in closing I just want to say whilst you felt badly during that period you will feel badly for the rest of your life. Thank you.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: My attention has been drawn that I am required to adjourn for a very short while. Some message is being conveyed to me, so we will adjourn for just a very short while.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

MR JANSEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I trust it won't be the ground that we've already covered with the last witness?

MR JANSEN: Well Mr Chairman I would certainly wish to not to repeat too many things which I think is in the nature of merely stating my clients version which is a matter of very clear record, I accept that, but unfortunately I am told during adjournments by my learned friends that they will be holding - or more specifically my learned friend Mr Visser, that he is going to be holding me very closely to what I put and whether I do not put certain material portions to his witnesses. Now I think that is inappropriate for this forum, but I just want to explain ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You have the assurance that that is improper for this forum, but do carry on.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr van Rensburg, just a bit of background. You were station commander at Ermelo from 1974 to 1980, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR JANSEN: And you will also agree whilst from 1974 to 1977, for a period of three years, you were station commander at Oshoek, that's a border post.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I accept that.

MR JANSEN: And Mr Coetzee's access to the security police was as station commander at Oshoek, that was the first time you started co-operating with security police?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR JANSEN: And furthermore you were the commanding officer of the C-Division of Headquarters till 1989 when Mr Coetzee Mr Coetzee made all these reservations and the Harms Commission followed. You were central in the planning of the police's strategy under which denials would be made, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is not correct.

MR JANSEN: Were there ever any meetings where the people got together and where they were told which version they had to give?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.

MR JANSEN: One should then accept that the version provided by the other policeman was just by coincidence, although they were versions they had discussed when you were not involved in the planning thereof.

MR JANSEN: I don't know what you are saying. I don't understand the statement you are making. What I can tell you is when Mr Coetzee and Nofomela, how can I put it, all these confessions basically amounted to the fact that people who were mentioned by them were told that there would be legal representation for them and those people had to arrange their own legal representatives had to do it by themselves and the allegations against people should be discussed with his legal advisor whether it is like that or not and then make their necessary submission. That's what happened there.

MR JANSEN: So you were not part or heading some or other orchestrated attempt to mislead?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR JANSEN: In other words people placed that on record are lying.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: ...(indistinct)

MR JANSEN: Good. Now when you decided to make use of Mr Coetzee's services for the purposes of Mr Kondile's murder, would it not have been correct protocol for you or Mr Erasmus to contact Brigadier Schoon, Mr Coetzee's commanding officer, to contact him.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, Mr Erasmus gave me an instruction and I accepted that if he wanted or had to clear it with Brigadier Schoon he would have done that.

MR JANSEN: You certainly did not think it was necessary because you accepted that Coetzee would clear it out with Schoon if he thought it necessary?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's what I thought.

MR JANSEN: You know Mr Coetzee's version in that regard, namely that Brigadier Schoon told him to meet him in Komatipoort?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I've read that.

MR JANSEN: So that means only one thing, Mr Coetzee said that either you or Erasmus had contact with Schoon?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes you can draw that inference yes.

MR JANSEN: Is he making a mistake or is he lying?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know Mr Chairman, I really don't know. I did not contact Mr Schoon, that's all I can tell you.

MR JANSEN: A year before this incident, you were still the commanding officer of at Evander?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR JANSEN: And you're telling us now at this committee that on your way back to Komatipoort or on your way back to Port Elizabeth you never went to your former colleagues in Ermelo, you didn't visit them there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I didn't.

MR JANSEN: You are also aware of Mr Coetzee's version in this regard, namely that Rorich and Deetlefs from Ermelo were involved in taking Kondile's car away.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I read something like that, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: If I put it to you that your version or the present version is the result offered is that you do not want to incriminate Rorich or Deetlefs because they are going to apply for amnesty?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It's not like that, they were not involved, they had nothing to do with the vehicle. MR JANSEN: Do you know whether Deetlefs or Rorich have applied for amnesty?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I know they didn't apply for amnesty for this case but for others.

MR JANSEN: In any case would you agree with the following statement? Should Mr Coetzee have informed Schoon at that stage, Schoon would not have found it strange because of the culture in the Security Police?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I agree with that.

MR JANSEN: And if Erasmus had felt he wanted to inform Erasmus that he was going to use Coetzee he would have done that? It's not like it was a secret for Schoon.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know. I can't speak on behalf of Mr Erasmus, I accept that.

MR JANSEN: One of your primary tasks was that you were involved in the trade unions amongst others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I was a unit commander of which labour unrest was one of our tasks.

MR JANSEN: And this was related to monitoring the trade union leader's?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: You are also aware that Mr Coetzee is applying for amnesty for stealing two trade union vehicles, a combi and an Audi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I heard about that, and officially they Audi had to do with the Kondile case. MR JANSEN: You yourself were you involved in this Audi matter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR JANSEN: You deny Mr Coetzee's version in this regard?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I deny it yes.

MR JANSEN: Regarding the combi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I deny it.

MR JANSEN: When the question was posed you regarding the differences in this Kondile matter, whether it had anything to do with the dispute with Mr Coetzee and you said no it didn't have anything to do with it and you are also denying that you asked Mr Coetzee to steal an Audi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct, I am denying that.

MR JANSEN: Can you answer then why on earth did Mr Coetzee know which trade union leader in Port Elizabeth or where a trade union leader lived in P E who had a car where it could be towed in without you knowing about it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't comment on that. As far as I know during the time they were in Port Elizabeth, they made contact with various of my staff members, they exchanged information and surely these people could have told them where they could find places where terrorists were and I wasn't the only person who contacted Coetzee.

MR JANSEN: You're still clinging to that basic, or your version is still based on the fact that Mr Coetzee was a rogue policeman who from under your nose committed a lot of offences?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I'm not saying that.

MR JANSEN: It's already been put to you but I'm going to put to you again, how would Mr Coetzee have known that Mr Kondile was detained in single quarters?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't give you an answer to that, I can speculate about it but I can't give you a key fitting to that. I did not take Mr Coetzee there, I don't know whether anyone else had taken him there, whether he had heard it from somebody.

MR JANSEN: Did it not bother you that Mr Coetzee was mislead so relatively easily by Kondile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I had similar experiences during earlier years. If you play this kind of game, somebody said you give and you take when there are risks involved. There is no way, for example that's why I - world-wide are sometimes arrested, there's no way in which it can be sure that this thing won't boomerang.

MR JANSEN: During your career it was also said during evidence there were no sophisticated debriefings by various expert panels.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No Mr Chairman. I have no knowledge of these specialised debriefing units.

MR JANSEN: There was the head of the C-Division at Headquarters? Mr van Rensburg.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR JANSEN: Explain to me what C-2 was.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes you will find it strange but I can't remember if you asked me what C-1, C-2, C-3 were.

MR JANSEN: C-2.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I suspect that you are referring to the unit specialising more in interrogation of suspects in order to obtain information from where tourist camps were across the borders where the terrorists, how their movements were, etc, if you are referring to that.

MR JANSEN: I am just refreshing your memory. I am referring that to your own division. There was only a C-1 and a C-2, would you agree with me?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I don't doubt that.

MR JANSEN: C-2 specialised in interrogation, amongst debriefing, was that C-2?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes on their level regarding the intelligence they required which was more geared towards external information; overseas information regarding where certain camps were situated; where overseas certain terrorists were moving; which camps they were moving to; also intelligence regarding identification of photo albums.

MR JANSEN: All I am putting to you is that you are acutely aware that there were specialised interrogators in the security forces. Was interrogation a specialised function, you are aware of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I regard it as specialised.

MR JANSEN: You are misleading the Committee ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Were there trained psychologists?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know of trained psychologists, I don't have any knowledge of psychologists. If there were psychologists I don't know about them. That was during the time I was involved with Security Police.

MR JANSEN: I don't want to carry this too far but at least there were people who had specialised knowledge regarding specific aspects of the enemy?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Good. You will also concede that if you look at your application, if you read through it and if you read Mr du Plessis' application that there are certain parts which agree?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I won't deny that.

MR JANSEN: The statements that were signed on the 2nd of May 1997, correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR JANSEN: So you waited until the very end?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, my application was handed in to my legal representative before the 14th of December 1996, and I can't remember, I think the period was extended, I can't remember the correct facts why it only arrived there then.

MR JANSEN: I also want to put it to you that the political motive as you have explained it here, and as Mr du Plessis has explained is exaggerated and that the truth is probably closer to what Mr Coetzee says you told him.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No that is not true.

MR JANSEN: If I read the section dealing with the political motive it reminds me a lot about what you said with regard to the Motherwell incident, in other words people who had the knowledge, the total network of the Security police that they were endangering this whole network.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: You know what I said and you are seeing what I am saying here.

MR JANSEN: Because I want to tell you it seems to me as if there is a pattern in your applications and those of a few of your colleagues that your political motives are exaggerated and that you incriminate people who have either applied for amnesty or have already died. Do you have any comment on that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I suppose you will say that on behalf of your client.

MR JANSEN: You also deny that you had any contact with Mr Flemington?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I deny that.

MR JANSEN: Did you know Mr Flemington well?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I knew him quite well. I did not have a great deal of contact with him.

MR JANSEN: The point where Mr Kondile was murdered is very close to the Lebombo border post?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I do not know exactly how far, but it's not far.

MR JANSEN: Mr Coetzee says five kilometres, could that be correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know, I thought it was further. I did not measure so I do not know.

MR DE JAGER: Is that the same post where Otto was stationed before he went to Evander?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR JANSEN: I just want to rectify this, the place where you met the cross-roads was five kilometres from the Lebombo border and the place he was burnt is a further ten kilometres from there.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I won't doubt that.

MR JANSEN: Did you know Mr Otto?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I did.

MR JANSEN: And you are also aware of the rest of Mr Coetzee's version as to who was there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it's not always clear to me whether I always understand correctly when Mr Coetzee says who were all there, I think that somewhere I read that he said there was a Mr van Dyk as well and the two people from Ermelo ...(intervention)

MR JANSEN: From Lebombo.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: But from Ermelo there were two as well. We can get the exact detail of Deetlef's and Rorich's involvement, we can check that, but your version and Mr Coetzee's they don't agree. And you can, with reasonable confidence say that Mr Coetzee must be telling lies?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR JANSEN: You are not making a mistake regarding so many differences or..

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR JANSEN: Mr Coetzee also says that there can be no doubt that the so-called sleeping drug would have been discussed that evening.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I said that Mr Coetzee approached me about it.

MR JANSEN: Yes but did your curiosity not lead you to ask him what exactly it was?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He said it was a sleeping drug. I accepted that it was an ordinary sleeping drug that one could buy at the chemist which was in drop form. I cannot recall whether he said it was drops or a sleeping drug as such. At that stage I was a person who had never used a sleeping drug so I didn't know which form it took.

MR JANSEN: In any case Mr Coetzee also says that there can be little doubt that during the course of such a discussion he would also have told you the origin thereof, that it came from General Neethling's laboratory. What is your comment on this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's totally untrue.

MR JANSEN: How do you know that it's untrue?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I'm saying it's untrue that Mr Coetzee would have told me that.

MR JANSEN: Was it your idea that the car be left at the Barberton border?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It could have been my idea, it could have been that Mr du Plessis and I took the decision together.

MR JANSEN: But you knew that area very well?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not that specific area. I wouldn't say that I knew it very well, I knew how the roads went but I did not know the area. I didn't work in that area when I was stationed at Ermelo.

MR JANSEN: Yes but du Plessis knew nothing about the area.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. According to what I understood it was a strange part of the country to him.

MR JANSEN: If there had been somebody who knew more or less where the border was then it was only you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct. But I am talking about the decision that it should be close to the Swaziland border. I think we more or less agreed upon that but it is possible that I would have said yes, close to Barberton is the right place more or less.

MR JANSEN: Which security branches were responsible for Swaziland?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ermelo.

MR JANSEN: And is it not so that Ermelo was responsible for the largest part of the Swaziland border?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: From a little way above Oshoek until at Gugelel, yes.

MR JANSEN: That is the greatest part of the Swaziland border?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I think so; I did not measure it, I cannot tell you exactly. I think that it is most probably the greater part.

MR JANSEN: We are getting away from the point again but what - you say that you did not know that area so well, you as head of a security branch such as Ermelo should surely have had intimate knowledge of well-known existing crossing points of ANC insurgents in the...(intervention)

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not in the area where I worked.

MR JANSEN: In any case Barberton was not part of this area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: And it can only be that stage the plan was to get rid of Mr Kondile's body.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: You say the plan was to throw it over the Mozambican border?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Don't you think that that was possibly not a very good plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I must acknowledge if I think back that it was not such a good plan.

MR JANSEN: Mr Coetzee also says that the fire on which Mr Kondile's body was burned consisted of amongst others large tree trunks and then also the tyres and that these things were moved and carried to the fire by Flemington and his men who had 4X4 vehicles.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not know anything about that. I was not there when that wood was brought there.

MR JANSEN: I also want to put it to you that I find it very strange that you as second in command together with the person who was doing investigations into bomb attacks, go to Komatipoort on the 10th of August while a bomb exploded in Port Elizabeth on the 8th of August.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Just to correct your statement, I was third in command. The next point is that I did not visit the scenes of bomb explosions, it was not part of my task.

MR JANSEN: You will accept that Mr du Plessis did do that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes he did but he also had senior and experienced men on his personnel who did it on his behalf. He definitely could not have done everything himself during those years; there were times when other people had to take his place.

MR JANSEN: Turn to page 3 of volume 4. I know that factually it is easy for you to deny what I have put to you recently but if you read that second paragraph in that report

"At the same time police from all towns in the border area have been called in for a massive manhunt for two gunmen",

Do you really now think that at that stage there was also a large scale manhunt for two insurgents. Can you recall that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I can vaguely remember something. I did not read the whole article, just the paragraph that you referred to but it seems to refer to an incident of people who shot at the police at Ugie or Maclear or at a train or something.

MR JANSEN: Yes it refers to an incident of a group...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask here, what is the relevance of this? I wish you'd put the purpose of your questions and make it clear to me.

MR JANSEN: Yes basically Mr Chairman I can sum it up as follows, that is if I can just put the question, it will be the final one on this.

I find it highly improbable that in those circumstances, due to the immediate security situation in the Eastern Cape, that you and Mr du Plessis would go to Komatipoort with a person who was suspected of being involved in earlier bomb attacks.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not find it strange, it was also a crises and it had probably arranged with Mr Coetzee for that date and we kept to that date.

MR JANSEN: In that same report reference is made to Brigadier J H du Plessis.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is true.

MR JANSEN: That's not you is it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I'm van Rensburg.

MR JANSEN: The previous Mr du Plessis, it's not him either?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR JANSEN: No here they are referring to a Brigadier du Plessis who in the old dispensation was the divisional commissioner in the division border when the police still consisted of sections or divisions. I accept further that you deny Mr Coetzee's testimony where he speaks about the discussions you held with him in the Eastern Cape about Kondile and that Kondile had been injured and the potential danger, etc.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I deny that.

MR JANSEN: So you deny Mr Danster’s testimony in this regard as well? Possibly you can assist me; in some of these reports mention is also made of a Brigadier E H J van Rensburg.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If I'm correct that was the divisional commissioner for the division Eastern Province, it was not me, it was another person with the surname of van Rensburg. He was the divisional commissioner Eastern Province and his office was in Port Elizabeth.

MR JANSEN: Just for purposes of record, on page 26 of bundle four, reference is made to this van Rensburg. I also want to put it to you that the real reason for your applications for amnesty must be seen in the light of the fact that at the end of 1996, Eugene de Kock's trial had already passed, the Motherwell trial was over, you were implicated in both those matters, the noose was tightening around your neck, and that this was the reason why you came forward.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No you are not correct. That's not the reason.

MR DE JAGER: If it was Mr Jansen, I think that everyone who applies has committed crimes, they are murderers, here is an opportunity for them to possibly stay out of jail. Surely that's the motive of everybody who applies, to stay out of jail?

MR JANSEN: I accept that completely; it's to do with the fact that where there are differences I will argue at the end of the day that where there are differences between Mr Coetzee's version and that of this witness, Mr Coetzee testified in a totally different context where amnesty criteria were not mentioned, while these witnesses are testifying in a totally different context and that is why there are differences and that due to the fact that they felt that they are in danger and the only way they can get out of this danger of being prosecuted is by adapting their amnesty applications that they succeed in this, this is my argument. I will take it no further than this question in any case, but I think it can be allowed on that basis.

I also want it placed on record if you have any comments Mr van Rensburg. You are well aware of Mr Coetzee’s version in the Harms Commission and possibly in the Neethling trial and how you are implicated.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I think I am.

MR JANSEN: It's not necessary for me to put every small detail to you, to deny it. You're aware of it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

MR DE JAGER: Mr Jansen with reference to your last question, whether he denies it or not are you saying that this is evidence before us?

MR JANSEN: No Mr Chairman, I'm not saying it's evidence before you, I said in as far as Mr Coetzee would possibly testify, I don't know whether it's been agreed to. Should he testify one would accept that the version as it stands, where these versions differ, that these people will stick to their own versions and they should not be turned around and say why was this not stated or that not stated in every small detail as was done during the Harms Commission. I think there's a justifiable reflection of Mr Coetzee's version, I don't to get busy with cross-examination for three days, I'm sire we appreciate that sincerely.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS

MR BOOYENS: Possibly to clear something up; reference is made in reports Ugie Maclear in Elliot, was under Division Eastern Province or Border?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was Division Border.

MR BOOYENS: Which refers to East London basically.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: No further questions thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you very much, you're excused.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG IS EXCUSED

MR VISSER: I believe it is my turn Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I call Gerrit Nicholis Erasmus. While he's on his way to the witness stand may I deal with some householding matters Mr Chairman? At a previous amnesty application in regard to Mr Mthimkulu a formal application was moved on behalf of this witness to amend his application formas in paragraph 7 A and B, therefore the remarks made by Commissioner de Jager regarding your formas of equal applicability to that of Mr Erasmus, I see that that has not been changed. We will certainly see to it that in future applications if any, that will be taken care of. In the mean time Mr Chairman could I ask you please at page 30 of volume 1 to just make a note at paragraph 7A of the amendment that had already been granted to say in 7A, National Party, 7B, supporter. Thank you Mr Chairman.

GERRIT NICHOLIS ERASMUS: (sworn states)

MR VISSER: Are you G-e-r-r-i-t N-i-c-h-o-l-i-s, Erasmus? Mr Erasmus, in front of you you have page 30 of Volume 1. This is an abstract from your amnesty application. I have it yes Mr Chairman and in this application you are going to refer to page 31 where you’ve applied regarding the elimination of Mr Sizwe Kondile.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 32 we have pages here, on page 32, paragraph 10.A and 10.B where you've been asked to describe your political motives. On page 32 it says, see paragraph 10 A on page 5, or unfortunately because this is an extract that has not been included, we have made photocopies which we submit Mr Chairman, can conveniently be added to your papers as page 30 A, B, C and D for this applicant and I believe you have received them already.

Mr Erasmus if you look at page 30 to 30.B, do you confirm the contents of the application as it is in front of you in your evidence under oath?

MR ERASMUS: I confirm this Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Can we just look at some background, go through it quite quickly and perhaps finish today with a general background. In your application you referred to certain documentation which you have requested should be added and should be regarded as part of your application.

In paragraph 10.A on page 30.D you have referred to a document with the title: The Establishment for Equality before the Law. This document has already been presented to the Amnesty Committee as an exhibit marked Exhibit P.45. You refer under 10.B to a submission of the 21st of October 1996 by van der Merwe and that exhibit number is P.46. And attached to that exhibit, P.46 there was also a statement by various generals to which you are also referring and that will be P.47. You are asking the Amnesty Committee to regard it as part of your amnesty application?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct yes.

MR STEENKAMP: If I just can add, the documents are available, a bundle of documents consisting of more or less 250 pages and I didn't deem it necessary to make a fourth bundle, fifth bundle, the documents are available, if you do need them.

CHAIRPERSON: .....to the extent that they are referred to, the portions of them that are referred to, we'll have copies made if it is necessary to do so.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman I'm indebted to my learned friend as well as to yourself. The idea is that this is not to be dragged up before you again, I think you've seen enough of those documents. If there's anything that crops up we will certainly refer you to it but the main purpose of incorporating it now is that in argument as we've stated before, reference will be made to certain aspects and if there's any issue as to the admissibility thereof we will refer to those exhibits and that's only for that purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand, thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus under oath you also gave evidence in the Mthimkulu matter where you also applied for amnesty.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct your Honour.

MR VISSER: And as far as it is relevant to this application you are also asking that that evidence should be considered in regard with this amnesty application.

Lastly you've listened to the evidence of Mr Herman

du Plessis who testified here especially about the background and the circumstances which gave rise to the decision to eliminate Mr Kondile. Do you agree in principle that the evidence he gave here is the same as the information he provided to you when you decided upon that?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If we can come then to your career in the South African Police. In Volume 3 on page 207 to 211, in this Mthimkulu Trial you've given an overview of your career, you've presented it to the committee and this is on page 207 in Volume 3. I'm not going to ask you, I've done this previously, you've read this into the record during the previous trial, but with the chairman's permission, I would like to suggest that I'm going to give you a summary and you can confirm it. Or if there's something you want to change it, you can do that.

MR DE JAGER: Can't you confirm the whole thing?

MR VISSER: The summary is in front of you but I promise you I will be quick.

Mr Erasmus, please stop me if I say something which is wrong. I'm going to read it slowly so that it can be interpreted.

'On the 3rd of January 1957 you were attested. In 1958 you successfully completed a detective course and you were placed in Marshall Plein in Johannesburg.'

I wonder whether I could ask the interpreter to give me a signal or is that fine? Thank you.

'Then of because of your father's illness, on request you were transferred to Cape Town and in January 1959 you were transferred to Caledon Plain in Cape Town. Then you did not do your promotional exam because of the unrest in 1960, but later on in 1960, you were appointed as branch officer in Umzimkhulu in Griqualand West and were promoted to sergeant. In the first half of 1961, the district commander of Kokstad instructed you to go to Pondoland as a detective and to assist there with unrest related investigations'.

I want to ask you now, during that stage Mr Erasmus, you told me, you for the first time in 1961 had to do with a certain phenomena, what was that?

MR ERASMUS: That phenomena was the insurgence from the side of the black population, the insurgence against the dispensation.

MR VISSER: Were those signs of intimidation at that stage?

MR ERASMUS: There were not only signs of intimidation, there were incidents of murder, arson..

MR VISSER: In other words, if I can say that by 1981 you've already had 21 years of experience, experiencing the extent of intimidation?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: At the beginning of 1962 you were transferred to Inkobo as branch officer and in the same year you were transferred to Rosebank in Johannesburg as a detective, and in in 1963 you went to the security branch at Intergraze(?) and there you were involved in investigating matters, you were part of the investigative team because of your detective experience. From 1963 therefore you were associated with the security branch of the South African Police and you investigated various cases, some of which were very important matters, controversial matters. You for example had to do with the Rivonia Trial.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With the station bomb, that is the Harris bomb explosion at the Park Station in Johannesburg and there you had certain experiences which left certain impressions on you.

MR ERASMUS: Yes the day of that explosion at the station, we were called there. What I saw there made a lasting impression on me. The body of the person, the woman that was killed in that explosion had already been removed but everywhere on the platform where the people were waiting for trains, there was only blood, glass and pieces of cement. It was a gruesome situation to walk there and see all this blood and glass.

MR VISSER: And the purpose, like you, how did you understand that.

MR ERASMUS: It was a political explosion, definitely. It was done by the African Resistance Movement.

MR VISSER: If we can continue, in December 1965 you were promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and in 1966 you were liaison officer between the uniform clerk and the security branch.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: During that time, that is 1966, did you have to do with any specific aspects regarding terrorism

MR ERASMUS: We worked in Ovamboland and the biggest part of South West Africa to combat the infiltration and at that time I was intensely involved with trained Swapo terrorists.

MR VISSER: And you remained there until 1986 with certain interruptions?

MR ERASMUS: It was not a continuous service, it was three months, two months, four months, it varied all the time.

MR VISSER: By the end of 1971 you were transferred to Rundu in South West Africa and you were in charge of that branch when you did security work, unit in January 1977 you were transferred back to the Republic of South Africa and then you went to Pietermaritzburg, as second in charge of the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You handled very important cases there but in 1977 you were promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and from the end of 1979 you were transferred to Port Elizabeth where you replaced Dreyer as Divisional Commander. That was the end of 1979, the beginning of 1980.

You were in Port Elizabeth as from December 1979 to December 1983.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were the divisional commander of the security branch in Port Elizabeth.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I will give some more details regarding that now. Then you were promoted to the rank of colonel and in December 1983 you were transferred to Johannesburg as the divisional commander of the security branch, Witwatersrand.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And there you started service in January 1984 and in the same year you were promoted to the rank of brigadier.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: From the 12th of January 1984, up till December 1988, you were a divisional commander of the security branch in Johannesburg?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And as from January 1988 till May 1989, for a short period you served as the head of the intelligence unit of the security branch. I've already nearly finished. In May 1989 you became Divisional Commander Witwatersrand and from 1990 to 1992 you were the regional commissioner and you were promoted to major general.

Just to put something right, in 1989, Divisional Commissioner. That means it was in the Uniform Branch. And then the last word about that is you resigned from the South African Police on the 30th of December 1992, you retired then.

Mr Chairman I'm going on to - perhaps I can finish one more aspect which I might be able to finish briefly.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes alright.

MR VISSER: I'm going to read this and you must correct me if I'm wrong. This has to do with the administrative dispensation of the police in the Eastern Cape. Regarding that area you told me, regarding the geographic area, the division Eastern Cape or the Eastern Province as my learned friend would say, it did not include the following. It did not include East London, it did not include Transkei, it did not include the Ciskei, neither Lesotho. Is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: The security branch offices from where the security activities were done, one was in Grahamstown, one in Uitenhage, one in Cradock, one in Fort Beaufort and then there was branch office at Port Elizabeth, but the provincial office was also in Port Elizabeth.

MR ERASMUS: Yes Mr Chairman, they were managed jointly. There were only desks at the divisional office, it was not managed as a separate office.

MR VISSER: Regarding the security branch component in Port Elizabeth, the divisional commander was yourself as from 1980 or from 1979. Second in charge was Harold Snyman.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: His rank?

MR ERASMUS: He was a major.

MR VISSER: And the branch commanders in Grahamstown? I don't know if this is necessary Mr Chairman. I'm going to the divisional commanders in Port Elizabeth. The administrative section commander was Mr van Greunen, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And of the so-called white matters, who was that?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Siebert.

MR VISSER: Black matters?

MR ERASMUS: H B du Plessis, that was one of the previous witnesses.

MR VISSER: And Mr du Plessis was he also involved in something else?

MR ERASMUS: He was also responsible for terrorist manners and court related investigations and Mr Nick van Rensburg the previous witness, was responsible for trade unions but is already giving evidence how he fits into this matter. He was also responsible for coloured matters.

Mr Chairman is this an opportune time to adjourn?

CHAIRPERSON: It is our intention to commence at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning, I'm now adjourning and we will resume at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

HEARING ADJOURNS