Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: (Still under oath).

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, there is one point I would like to raise with you before we commence and that is the question of this video and the alleged statement about a Tokarev pistol or machine gun. If anything is to be made of it, it seems to me it would be desirable that an attempt should be made either to get the evidence of the person alleged to have been in possession of it or to get other policemen to identify the policeman in the video who are speaking about, so we can get their direct evidence as to what they were talking about, rather than asking us to draw inferences from something that appears on a video at a time that is, by no means, certain.

You will all recollect, at least my recollect is that Mr Bellingan's evidence on this aspect was that he knew nothing the video and was not prepared to comment or commit itself which, I think, he is entitled to do, but if you do want to rely on something there, I think we should have, get the police to produce the gentleman, I forget his name for the moment, but his name was given and either have him here or one of the other people who appear in the video.

The second point which I would invite your comments on, and that is that if Mr Mbane is to give evidence and is questioned, it would be desirable that we should have the whole of the statement he made, not an edited version. At the moment paragraphs 36 to 64 are missing from the statement, which may well effect his credibility and it may well be something that people wish to question him about. So, I think that if he is to be called we would like to have the whole of it. Do you agree, gentlemen?

MR BOOYENS: Most certainly, M'Lord. Your Lordship would recall that I, in fact, mentioned the fact of the, of his statement right at the outset of the matter. As far as the name that your Lordship is looking for, the name I recall is Theron.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Pieter Theron.

MR BOOYENS: Pieter Theron.

MS KHAMPEPE: Will that be Trompie, Mr ...?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

I think the question of the affidavit question you raised at the beginning too falls away if he is going to give evidence.

MR BOOYENS: Certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: (...Indistinct) his evidence we will rely on, but his statement was, his witness statement, as it will be then, will still be relevant.

MR BOOYENS: I agree M'Lord.

CHAIRPERSON: ... this morning, are you ready now, Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL

MS PATEL: I am, thank you, honourable Chairperson.

Good morning Mr Bellingan. I realise you have been cross-examined extensively. I will try to keep it to the point and not keep you too long, all right.

MR BELLINGAN: Thank you very much.

MS PATEL: Perhaps, just a bit of general background information regarding the funding of this operation. Could you perhaps explain, generally, how an operation of this nature is funded, who would authorise those funds, what would the motivation for those funds be, is it in writing?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, this operation obtained funds from two sources, if I understand the question correctly. Firstly, there was the open budget, the police budget, and from that the vehicles and the travelling allowances were paid. That was paid from an open budget, there was no direct confidentiality regarding that. Should a secret fund be used, like in this instance, the funds would come from the secret fund and there were certain written down instruction which we, as group leaders, had to follow and send through the channels to Colonel de Kock at the top. This was regarding this vehicle and its fuel.

The answer she wants regarding the claims, regarding the head-money, that was according to certain instructions by the security branch. Head-money would be paid from a secret funds to the so-called askaris and then the Black members being involved in certain operation and the onus would rest on the section head to determine who would receive which monies. That money would come from the secret fund and the Kombi's money came from the secret fund. If I have taken, would send them to certain bars or certain hotels, smuggling hotels, I would obtain money from the secret fund. They would sign receipts and they would account for what they have done and I would report back to Colonel de Kock. There were certain written down instructions. I do not have any documents regarding that, but I hope I have answered your question.

The askaris would be paid, they were registered as police sources and later on when they became Constables they would receive money from the open budget. His salary would come from the open budget, like mine also. I hope I have answered that correctly and sufficiently.

MS PATEL: Could you, perhaps, explain, if you can remember, what motivation, exactly, was given for the funds?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, it depends on what operation it was. For instance, like the operation in Cape Town, you would use the reference and the motivation, namely combatting terrorism. It had a certain reference number referring to a specific region and it would differ from region to region.

MS PATEL: So, in this case, would specific information have been noted down as to the fact that two specific askaris were used, that they were being infiltrated, the monies that was spent regarding their infiltration itself?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. In my report, as group leader, I would refer to the two sources and give fictitious names. We did that, because we did not know who at security head office was responsible for leaks. We would use fictitious names to protect their lives and to keep them out of danger.

MS PATEL: Also to motivate for further funds you would have to give a progress report, not so?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is understandable. I would use a certain amount, say for example, R500,00, R1 000,00 or

R2 000,00 and should my sources become depleted, I would write another report and a motivation to de Kock regarding more money and he will ask certain questions, whether I would, why I need any more money. We had, for example, pay for fuel, etcetera and I had to motivate should I require any more funds.

MS PATEL: All right and the motivation for weapons that may have been used?

MR BELLINGAN: That was separate from the secret funds. It had no relationship to that. Previously in my evidence I said that I wrote a letter of motivation and attached a telex from Cape Town. He would approve that, I would go to Schoon, he would peruse that, he would give his approval, I would go to Drury and then draw the weapons from there, see whether it was in a working condition, I would note that in the register.

MS PATEL: Supposing your infiltrators needed more weapons or ammunition, would the motivation still have to go through to Vlakplaas or would it be done regionally?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it would have gone to Vlakplaas. Say, for arguments sake, I have asked 60 rounds of ammunition and I would only give them 35 and keep 15 back, should ammunition get lost and should I require any more, I would ask headquarters, but this was not necessary in this instance.

MS PATEL: All right. Just in terms of the motivation for further funds, if I can refer you to the "kripto berig" that was sent on the fourth of the third, details are set out extensively as to the alleged activities of the deceased.

MR BELLINGAN: Just one second, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Which one?

MS PATEL: Dated the fourth of the third.

CHAIRPERSON: That is Exhibit C.

MR BOOYENS: Just to make sure, is that the one headed "Berig nommer 0403/86" and then "Terrorist Incident, Guguletu, Cape Town"? Is that the one my learned friend is referring to?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, refer to it another way. Has it got page 439 written in the top corner? Is that the page you are referring to?

MS KHAMPEPE: It is 441.

MS PATEL: No, it is 441.

MR BELLINGAN: Thank you, I have it here.

MS PATEL: May I proceed? May I proceed?

Would this have been the first time that this information would have gone through to Vlakplaas, to the best of your recollection?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I cannot say with certainty, but I think and I think we should ask the TRC, during my Section 29 statement, encoded message was shown to me and it was promised that I would receive that. I have never received that. In that message I used the word "elimination", but I have never received a copy and I think you are referring to that encoded message. I think before the third of March there was an encoded message in which I referred to the specific people who were killed that morning and sketching their backgrounds and the crimes they were involved in.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Sir. You cannot remember offhand, without having insight to that, how long before you had this information?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I cannot say with any certainty.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you.

Just to move onto another point, you stated quite clearly that you accept responsibility for Mr Mbelo's conduct on the scene for the impression with which he was left with after the meeting that was held on the morning of the third. Could you please explain more fully what you mean by accepting responsibility?

MR BELLINGAN: I think because I was the group leader at that stage, I was a senior on that scene, part of the group, the command structure came down from de Kock through me to the people on the ground. In the circumstances we were in today where we want to achieve reconciliation and incorporating all the lies and the mud-slinging, I would say I accept the full responsibility what my staff and, I think, de Kock assumes responsibility for the whole farm and to lighten his load and not to run away, therefore, I also assume full responsibility what happened there, whether I knew about that, whether senior people were on the scene are saying they do not know what happened there, I am asking, on behalf of reconciliation, to accept full responsibility.

MS PATEL: By extension, then, Captain, would you then also accept responsibility for the conduct of the askaris on the scene?

MR BELLINGAN: If the askaris worked within the instructions, with the frame of the instructions I have given them, if they did not do something unresponsible, which they did not convey to me, I would accept responsibility for their conduct.

MS PATEL: Thank you. Captain Bellingan, not wishing to flog a dead horse here, could you, perhaps, just briefly, once again, confirm the instructions that were given to your askaris regarding this specific operation?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, together with Ms, with Liebenberg I gave them the necessary instructions. I told them this is what they had to do in the Western Cape, here were certain addresses. Our primary purposes was, purpose was tracing the so-called liberation fighters. He, they had to identify them, to establish their network, it was not something which could be done in a short time. I told them to gather information, we compiled reports, I kept copies of these reports. Our task was to gather information. These two people had possession of AK47's or one AK47 and a Tokarev and they had a covert vehicle. That was a way of living out a legend.

You cannot live a legend amongst the liberation fighters and if they ask, could I also use this weapon, you could say, no, you cannot, because my group leader has said so, you should also allow him to shoot at targets, but the instruction was clear, do not leave these weapons out of your sight, even if you sleep on them, do not do something which can get you into trouble later on.

One evening I told them, I mentioned it in the Section 29, to develop a legend, for example, one evening three or four of them in the Kombi, to live out your legend, when you see a police Caspar, the Riot Squad at that time was very stressed at that time, shoot at the Caspar, just shoot a few shots so that the liberation fighters who were with you could see and believe in your legend and that you were serious about things. This happened and they got stuck in the sand. The police confiscated the Kombi, I and Liebenberg later took this Kombi from the store, although Liebenberg said he cannot remember that, and then we had to develop a different legend.

We found an AK47 magazine in that Kombi and they thought that there were terrorists in that Kombi. That was my instruction, do not do anything without clearing it out with me. Should you do something wrong, come and tell me so that I can manage that, because these instructions were not a free for all, they were reasonable. Do not just shoot randomly or burn houses. It was not like that.

MS PATEL: I thank you. When you started the operation what specific information did you have at hand?

MR BELLINGAN: As I have said previously, I took an operation over from other members. There was limited information available. I cannot say immediately what that was, but we had information that here were liberation fighters who were trained overseas. After an onslaught in Lesotho there were certain networks which were still here. There were, the information was vague, but there was information.

MS PATEL: Were there any photographs available of (...indistinct).

MR BELLINGAN: If I remember correctly, the Research Desk, C2 there, would provide us photographs of infiltrators in the Western or in the Eastern Cape. In many cases it happened that the liberation fighters from Oudtshoorn were hiding in the Western Cape or vice versa. You would show them photographs of possible terrorists.

MS PATEL: Would you have double checked that with Mr Liebenberg down here?

MR BELLINGAN: Definitely.

MS PATEL: Were any of these photographs shown to the askaris before they infiltrated?

MR BELLINGAN: That was normal practice. What we also did, those same photographs were shown to other branches of the police, like the Detective Branch. I think that was also the case in this instance.

MS PATEL: Can you, perhaps, recall how many photographs there were available of the group that was eventually infiltrated?

MR BELLINGAN: I do not think there were only photographs available of all these people. I am speaking under correction. You had a national photo album kept at headquarters which contained photographs from all over the country. Then you had a local photo album. It is like any good security agent, he compiled his own photo album for all the suspects he got involved with. So, I cannot say with any certainty.

MS PATEL: Would you concede, though, that some photographs may have been available or not? You do not recall?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot remember that.

MS PATEL: No, that is fine, that is fine. When Mr Mbelo was sent in to infiltrate, was the information that you had available then the same information that was then given subsequently to the two askaris that were sent in?

MR BELLINGAN: Because I do not have access to all the records any more and I have listened to Mr Mbelo's application, it could be that the two networks were the same, but I think it could have been like that.

MS PATEL: Okay. Would you have debriefed Mr Mbelo after he came in from the evening that he spent with that particular group?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I and Liebenberg, we saw him sitting in front of the office that same morning and we debriefed him then.

MS PATEL: Okay. Would Mr Mbelo have been involved in the initial instructions to your two askaris before they went in, would he have supplied some information to the askaris?

MR BELLINGAN: It could be. Sometimes I saw them all by myself, sometimes Liebenberg went with and if they said they were involved in the planning, it could have been. After this incident I would have, at least, shown him to one of the askaris or told the information to them.

MS PATEL: All right. Did Mr Mbelo, if you can recall, give a specific address of where the askaris should go or was it a specific area and, if so, which area?

MR BELLINGAN: I think he did give an address, referred to a specific region and we could ask the security branch also the areas were not clearly identified. He had to give them an address.

MS PATEL: Would the askaris have known specifically which person to go and see?

MR BELLINGAN: If we have sent him to a specific person, like what happened in Mbelo's case, we would send him to a specific person, because that incident which he infiltrated, we first kept him in a prison cell with a possible suspect and, perhaps, it happened there. There was a reason for a certain activities.

MS PATEL: All right. After the askaris had ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on. What happened to this suspect who was in the cell with Mbelo?

MR BELLINGAN: I do not know. I think it was a suspect from the previous security branch which was kept in prison. I do not have any reason or background for that.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely you would want to know, because this suspect was kept with your Constable Mbelo. If he had been released the next day or something, he might have arrived at the house and said that this man was in prison with me or something that could have caused great problems?

MR BELLINGAN: I am speaking under correction, I do not know whether it was because of any security legislation, whether it was solitary confinement or whether was it because of security branch positions. I have to clear that out with Liebenberg. I am going to find out in any case.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MS PATEL: Thank you.

After the askaris had been sent in, after how long did you have your first briefing session with them?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot remember a specific date or time. It might be three days, five days or a week. It was never longer than one week. We made an appointment, say, for example, Friday afternoon, two o' clock, you would make an appointment for Saturday afternoon at two o' clock too. If something went on the Friday, they would come on the Sunday. All my reports regarding this specific incident, I have destroyed that. When the farm was disbanded and with the Goldstone Investigation I destroyed all my documentation.

MS PATEL: The askaris when they went in, did they go in with the arms that you had mentioned in your application or did they come back at some later stage for them?

MR BELLINGAN: It may be that they went in with the weapons, but the situation was of such a nature that I believe that they would have gone in or I would have sent them in with the weapons and with the Kombi. There were false panels in the Kombi and we could have hidden the weapons there and kept them safe. So, that could have been so.

MS PATEL: All right. If Mr Mbane says that he did not go in initially with two AK47's, that he went in armed with a Makarov and that Mr Maluleka went in with a Tokarev, what would your comment be on that?

MR BELLINGAN: I did not provide them with a Makarov. It may be that they only went in with a Tokarev. He might be referring to a case where he was, he infiltrated a month before I did it, it might have been with the previous people that dealt with him. I cannot say with clarity.

MS PATEL: Can you recall during which month they infiltrated?

MR BELLINGAN: They came down together with me during the first week in February. I believe it was just after the first of the month, I was on a course in January, but I cannot say exactly when, if it was before this.

MS PATEL: And you are certain that you did not come with them when they first came down?

MR BELLINGAN: No, definitely not. In 1981 with the Koeberg Sabotage case I was in Cape Town and that was the last time. I was not working here during 1985.

MS PATEL: Mr Mbane says that he came down with you and that he was briefed with you from the initial stage before the infiltration took place.

MR BELLINGAN: I will have to go and see if he came, if he was with the previous group, because I hear that he says that Mamasela was together with him. I have no knowledge of this, I cannot vouch for the previous groups. He was not there with me. He was there with me in February. Whether it was the first or the second infiltration, if we had the records we could look at this, because we had a register in Vlakplaas for every month when you were booked out and together with whom you were booked out, which vehicles were involved and weapons involved. Unfortunately, that register no longer exists, so I cannot comment on this.

MS PATEL: He also just, to finish off the point, he says that he came down in January with you, sometime in January, cannot recall exactly when.

MR BELLINGAN: Let me say that if I was on a course in January, these courses would not have started before the third and it was a three week course and it might have been that, we might have been here the 28th, the 30th or the second or the third of February. It is debatable. I do not have a record in front of me to say whether it was the end of February or whenever, but it should have been very late in January.

MS PATEL: Okay. What was your first report from them regarding the group that they infiltrated? What specific information did they give?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot recall exactly, but what would have happened is that they would have told me that the people are here, they are trained people, dangerous people and that they are responsible for certain deeds, but the first was that they were very antagonistic towards the askaris. These people did not just accept you. The freedom front or freedom fighters also worked with structures and you had to launch a very good infiltration to get in. They did not just accept someone from the street. They had their methods and it would not be just a case of walking in and saying we are here with you in the struggle.

MS PATEL: Do you bear knowledge of the kinds of methods the, that people within those groups would have used in order to ascertain whether the people who are entering the group are, indeed, legitimate?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, we did great deal of research at Vlakplaas regarding the liberation fighters modus operandi. That is why we had the Research Desk and as we continued with the investigations and in interviews with freedom fighters we realised that they did not just accept people. They first found out where you came from and your address and they would have enquired about you and you would have had to know what you were doing to convince them. They would even trace you back as far as foreign countries. They would have said, no, you did not come for Botswana, because no freedom fighters were on their way from Botswana to the Cape. They were very good, we can give them credit for that.

MS PATEL: Can you, perhaps, try to be a little bit more specific. Let us assume Jimmy went in, what would be the first thing that he would have to do?

MR BELLINGAN: He had to make contact with the possible freedom fighters or addresses which were given to him and say that he had been sent from Lesotho and that he was here to take over from a person who was eliminated in Lesotho and to continue and then to get into that group. That would have been his first task, was to say that he was waiting for his supplies, he was here to get the political climate correctly. He had to speak like a freedom fighter that had been trained in, abroad.

MS PATEL: To your knowledge, was Mr Mbane trained in Lesotho at some stage?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot remember. I know he was trained in Zambia and Angola. I regarded him as a very good short-term person to use to infiltrate as he could take their minds very quickly. I cannot say whether it was in Lesotho. I think he would have known Lesotho, because I would not have had infiltrate from Lesotho if he had not known the place. So, I would not have used a country which was unknown to him, because if they asked him counter-questions he would be able to have answers for this.

MS PATEL: That is curious, Mr Bellingan, because Mr Mbane denies that he was ever trained in Lesotho?

MR BELLINGAN: As I have just said he might have been there with us, we might have been involved in operation, he might have been there with us, I might have briefed him about something and it might also have been that he, we said that he was replacing the Lesotho terrorist which was eliminated, but that he infiltrates from Botswana. So, this is debatable. Jimmy Mbane and them have reasonable background of all the neighbouring states, so he was not ignorant. You must remember that training is, does not only take place in a camp, also in a house, hand grenade training goes, counts as military training in Lesotho.

MS PATEL: He says, further, that his only previous operation that he was involved in from Vlakplaas was in Swaziland at some stage and that the legend, as you so term it, that he used, did not relate to Lesotho.

MR BELLINGAN: As I say, then we are contradicting one another. I might have said that he is from Lesotho, from Botswana, but just keep to their modus operandi. These were small technical things which one can debate. I do not have any documentation in front of me where I can say that this is what I said point by point. We could have just spoken generally, but in December 1985 and ANC cell was eliminated in Lesotho and we would have used this as a basis from which to say that we are here to replace those men, be it from Botswana or Swaziland. At that stage I did not know whether the ANC came to the Cape directly from Swaziland.

MS PATEL: Is it possible, then, given that you do not have any documentation to refresh your memory and that it happened such a long time ago, that it is possible that Mr Mbane would not have used Lesotho as a source point for him?

MR BELLINGAN: That possibility might exist.

MS PATEL: Did you at any stage during the infiltration supply Mr Mbane with further arms and ammunition?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I did not provide any further arms and weapons, but it might be that after the ANC shooting at the police vehicle that I might have given him five or ten rounds, that might be, in order for him to say to them that he went to fetch it out of his dead letter box, but he has still some more ammunition, but that it was kept in a safe place at the Malmesbury Road, do not be concerned about it, we do have weapons and that this could have been part of the legend, it might have been, but I did not provide them with any possible weapons, but, possibly, with ammunition.

MS PATEL: All right. And you are certain, though, that Mr Mbane would have said to you that this group is a dangerous group and that they have been trained?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I am sure of this and I have also mentioned earlier that at one stage during May, in the SABC programme of Max du Preez, that we saw that the Guguletu 7 freedom fighter got away and he said that he was part of that group, they did not trust the askaris, they were trained better than they were, so they infiltrated an existing group.

MS PATEL: Would they have been trained overseas or out of the country?

MR BELLINGAN: Many of them received training here, but that person that I think was killed in Lesotho, it might be that some of them, regarding the modus operandi, at that stage, when people went to Lesotho for two to three weeks or to Botswana on a so-called holiday with a legitimate passport and then he undergoes training there. So, it could have been that some of them, according to the encoded message, that they might have had training overseas.

MS PATEL: All right, but you are assuming that, you do not know that for sure?

MR BELLINGAN: At that stage, yes, but I cannot say with sureness now.

MS PATEL: Okay. Mr Mbane says, further, that the only person out of this group that was trained was Chris Piet, the rest were not trained at all and that this information was clearly relayed to both yourself and Mr Liebenberg and that was done at a very early stage in the operation.

MR BELLINGAN: I am going to differ with him. If I go back to all those encoded messages and 441, etcetera, I keep to a, I stick to what is written here, I would not have sucked this out of my thumb. Jimmy Mbane would have conveyed this to me, whether he, the identification of the bodies of whatever, I will keep to this. I would not have given a piece of fiction to the Commissioner of Police and sucked this out of my thumb, so I will definitely differ from that.

MS PATEL: Okay. To deal with the point of the information that is on that document. Would you accept that it is part, a normal part of the process of ascertaining whether new persons joining the group are, in fact, legitimate persons, that part of that process entails that the new person coming in initially gives full disclosure as to his background, his family, his history, where he has been trained, by whom and that once he has been accepted into that group, that the reverse then holds true, that the person who has then been accepted into the group then is able, by that same token, to request the same information from the group that he has infiltrated?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, it would have happened like that. A freedom fighter from abroad would have been on a pedestal as opposed to those trained inside and there would have been mutual communication. They drink together at night, they talk to one another, they boast about what they have done, the motivation, the political motivation which has to take place to say that the men from outside say that we must keep the struggle going. This would all have been part of what you have referred to.

MS PATEL: And that information would have been relayed to you as well?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, out of that Jimmy and Eric came to me and I would debrief them and I would put them on a possible tape recorded and then hand in my report after that. It should have taken place like that, yes.

MS PATEL: In order to cross-reference the information that your askari would have been or would have requested from the group, details such as the persons addresses would have been included.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, because there were different monitoring actions which we could launch. You could add another informer, you could have done legal telephone tapping, you can intercept the post and there were different other actions which you could have taken, although that I do not have written proof, but Liebenberg will be able to confirm that we did all possible methods or we, to ensure that that address did belong to the freedom fighters family.

MS PATEL: This information, then, given that Mr Mbane had infiltrated at quite some time before the actual incident occurred and that in order for him to have been accepted or for them, for him to have accepted their information, that would have been relayed to them or to Mr Mbane at a very early stage in the operation. So, you would have been in possession of the addresses of these people which would have been legitimate if they would have wanted your askaris to be accepted.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I would have had the addresses from the debriefing sessions, etcetera. I would have given it to General Liebenberg and there, action would have been taken, but during an infiltration you had to look at the addresses, these addresses would have been investigated, action would have been taken and action was taken in Guguletu, but many of the addresses were fictitious, because the people did not sleep there every evening.

MS PATEL: Are you saying then, Sir, that proper surveillance was carried out at these addresses that you were, that were given to you at the initial stage?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I believe that the information would have been given to the local security branch and I would have sent people to those addresses. I liaised with all the branches, I would have even given these addresses to the detectives, because it is better for a detective to go to these houses and he does not attract the attention which a security police does, because then they know that politics are involved. That is what I would have done, yes.

MS PATEL: So, with all the resources available to you, the assistance from all the various departments in the Western Cape, you were unable, from that time till the time that the operation had taken place, you were unable to effect an arrest or to get enough information inbetween in order to do that?

MR BELLINGAN: I would have done all that was possible between Liebenberg, I and the other branches we made all the attempts we could and as I said yesterday at the scene, this is, I told Jimmy and Eric keep control of the weapons, try to drive the vehicle. If we do not make contact, we have to try to arrest them and something happens make sure that something serious does not happen. That is why Jimmy drove and Eric kept the weapons away. So, I still wanted to attempt an arrest and as far as I was concerned, it was a very risky situation and I believed that we would be involved in a fight and I did everything possible that I could in order to trace down these people or track down these people.

MS PATEL: All right. Mr Mbane says further that soon after he had infiltrated the group there was a request given that he was the senior in charge of the group, for him to train the rest of the group and that this request was then relayed to you and you then gave him permission to proceed.

MR BELLINGAN: If I can comment on this. At Crossroads, according to the information that Mbane had, there were a whole lot of weapons that were hidden in a church. There was even a shooting range that was, and he asked me what must I do if the people ask me to teach them to shoot. In order to live out the legend I would have said to him, yes, teach them to shoot, but do not go with them in operations, do not become involved in operations.

I recall one specific incident. I used a police helicopter to take aerial photographs of Crossroads. They wanted to attack the police helicopter while Mbane said do not do that, you are going to get trouble from the Boers side. That was my instruction to them, teach them to shoot and speak propaganda, but do not go into operations. I only know of one isolated incident where I told them to just scare off a police vehicle, just to live out their legend properly, because otherwise the infiltrated freedom fighters would wonder why these people want to train us, but they never want to go on operations with us and this is why we had to stage something just to give their, make them more legitimate.

MS PATEL: Mr Mbane accepts that the incident in which the seven deceased here were killed was, in fact, the first major operation that he took his group on.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, but before this they did have an, other operation, they shot at a police vehicle, but nobody was killed or hurt. It was just a round of shots that were shot off.

MS PATEL: Okay. He says, further, that in the bid to train them that you had supplied him with ammunition and arms and he mentions specifically the arms that were given to him.

MR BELLINGAN: But as I have already said, they have infiltrated with two AK47's, two double magazines plus a Tokarev. Now they have the weapons, so I am not denying this, but if he got training for this and gave them training then it was with those weapons that he did it. They were already trained, but Jimmy had to live out his legend and if anyone in the group said to them show us how these guns shoot, then he had to do something to live out his legend. So, I do not deny this, but I did not bring in any extra weapons, if that is what you mean.

MS PATEL: In terms of living out his legend, he says that when he first came there he was presented with a gun that was defective and he was asked to repair it and that Eric Maluleka who was with him, who was an expert in the field then repaired it and that was part of him living out his legend at that stage and that they did not require much more than that subsequently. So, the basis of the trust had already been established.

MR BELLINGAN: I do not have any reports to go back on and I cannot say while I will, would deny this, instructions were given, legends were lived out, weapons were repaired, I am not going to deny this. They were on the ground, what they are saying there is what they, they reported this to me and I reported this to head office. Today I do not have those documents before me to say they are either lying or not. I think they most probably did fix the weapons, they gave training, I am not denying this.

MS PATEL: He says, further, that four AK47's were handed to him, eight fully loaded magazines, four, what he terms, defensive hand grenades and four detonators were handed to him.

MR BELLINGAN: Definitely not from me. Here I am standing, I have the responsibility of two AK47's and a Tokarev, why would I hide that, I do not know where he got those weapons.

MS PATEL: All right, he says further that during the weeks that he spent with them and whilst he was training them, that you then, between, sorry, I should say that Mr Liebenberg was, at most times, together with you, so when I say you I include Mr Liebenberg, all right. That during the time that he had infiltrated and while he was training them, you then supplied them with further ammunition in order for him to effect the training.

MR BELLINGAN: No, they would have had enough with them. Possibly after the shooting incident on the Caspar I might have given them a few extra rounds, but I cannot recall this incident.

MS PATEL: He says, further, that all they had on them, was Chris Piet had an AK47 and there were two revolvers amongst the group, that was it.

MR BELLINGAN: As he reported to me and as I said in the encoded message, that is how the information went. Today Jimmy Mbane has another story and it is not in agreement with what happened then, I cannot comment. I deny that he says that I gave such and such to him, what is on paper is the truth. Unfortunately, I do not have all my hand written notes.

MS PATEL: And you stand by that regardless of the fact that this incident happened so long ago and that all your notes were destroyed?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, why would I just give a little bit and not everything? Here we are dealing with the full disclosure. I will speak the truth, but I will not add any fiction. (end of tape 1A).

MS PATEL: Is it part of the practice at Vlakplaas that when ammunition and arms is given out that it is not always in a proper condition for use, that it may be, as they say, doctored?

MR BELLINGAN: No, there is a difference between in a good condition and doctored weapons. I think a doctored weapon is something that will possibly explode in your face. The weapons might have been old weapons, which were taken away from ANC cells or court cases. Some were in a very good condition, some were in a worse condition and these were not from Vlakplaas, let us just correct this. This came from security head office. At that stage Vlakplaas did not have any weapons.

MS PATEL: He says, further, that during the training, the grenades were not used at all, because he was afraid that they were, in fact, doctored.

MR BELLINGAN: No, I do not have any knowledge of that.

MS PATEL: When was the first time that you heard about the operation that was to take place, the attack on the police van?

MR BELLINGAN: It was a week before the incident when Jimmy came and told Lieutenant Liebenberg and I, at the Holiday Inn, where we had a room, where we debriefed him and I said, composed the encoded message for head office. It might have been a week to five days before the time. I do not know specifically. I was confronted with this during my Section 29 investigation, but I never got this information, I cannot say whether this was the first document or the first date.

MS PATEL: Okay. He says he, indeed, approached you the week prior to the incident and this had happened at a stage after which the group had been trained for at least five, six weeks and, as you say, they were anxious to get involved in something and they then put it to him that they wanted to get involved in an incident and the idea came up that they would attack the police van, that would pass this intersection, and that this idea had originally come from Chris Piet.

MR BELLINGAN: To start at the first point, it was not five to six weeks. I said I arrived here either the 30th of January or the third February. So, five or six weeks could not have passed. The idea most probably came from their freedom fighters, but the idea that I had then was, everything that was included in the encoded message came from Jimmy and Eric and I stand with that, I keep to that.

MS PATEL: Okay. If one then turns to the "kripto berig", if one sees on page, on the last page.

MR BELLINGAN: Triple four.

MS PATEL: Which would be numbered, probably, ... (intervention).

MR BELLINGAN: Triple four.

MS PATEL: ... 444, triple four, ja. The third or the fourth, fifth paragraph.

"Head office sources came with the information during the 27th of February."

So, he confirms that date. He says that is the time, the date on which he came to see you.

MR BELLINGAN: That is possible. If this is, stands like this on paper, then it must be the truth.

MS PATEL: All right, fine. He says, further, that the idea to attack the van had arisen on the Tuesday prior to the incident and that he told them that they could not just go in and perform an operation of this seriousness without properly checking out the scene where it was to take place and on that basis he managed to postpone the attack on the van and that he himself on the Wednesday morning went through to the area with Chris Piet to survey the area. He told them, he told Chris Piet and company, further, that they needed to ascertain that the van comes through generally at the same time and that they should do it for a few more days, but that on the Thursday morning he made an excuse and asked Eric to accompany some of the members to the scene and that he then contacted you on the Thursday to inform you of what was happening.

MR BELLINGAN: That might be so, because if I saw him the first time on Tuesday I would have told him to try and delay that until we had more information. I mean, there are ways in which he could get out of the group. I told him that if they asked him where you were going, that he should say that you had to contact other informers. He had to go to the city to see if his weapons were correct, ready. What he has said, thus, could be true, that he came out and he came to see me again to tell me that the people were serious, they wanted to continue with the operation and then I would have asked him is there no possibility that we could get them together at a central point and that we could arrest them. That is what I would have asked him. Surely prevention is better than cure.

MS PATEL: Regarding that point, he says further that they generally met in one of two places every day and that that information was made available to yourselves.

MR BELLINGAN: They said that they were meeting at different places at different times, there were no means of communication in Guguletu at that stage. We do not, did not have cell phones then like we have today. If he had to page me, he had to go out to one of the other townships and then I would not be near a telephone and when I was at the telephone, he would not be at the same telephone booth. So, there were communication problems. You know yourself how ungovernable these Black townships were in the Cape Peninsula at that stage.

MS PATEL: He says further that on the Thursday evening when he met you that you had, indeed, told him to try to delay the matter further and that he then subsequently met you and Mr Liebenberg on the Friday and, in fact, had taken you both out to the scene of the incident, had pointed the exact point at which they would be, he had pointed out the point on the road at which he would drop certain of his members. So, you knew, according to him, exactly where the incident was going to take place, when it was going to take place and how many people were going to be dropped off at which point.

MR BELLINGAN: I am not going to deny this. As I can, if I can remember correctly, there was a possibility that he could have taken us there, but then there is also the possibility that at, the late stage they would have said, no, we are not taking this bus, we are taking this other vehicle. We were shown the place, but if Jimmy was not the Commanding Officer of the group, how could he then say to the people that they had to get off their and they had to do this. Surely that would cast suspicion. I believe that the place was shown to us and that he was, possibly, told to drive into the pavement that we can arrest you, but things happened differently.

MS PATEL: Why does this information only come out now, Mr Bellingan, that you were actually taken to the scene.

MR BELLINGAN: I only remembered it now.

MS PATEL: But, surely, this is crucial, crucial evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I agree, I am not running away from this. I am suddenly remembering this, I am not disagreeing, it makes sense, the possibility is there. This is my modus operandi, I would have told him to show me this place, I would not have done it on my own. The possibility remains, if that is what he says, it is true.

MS PATEL: The only information that you have ever given us in all the proceedings before this, in the Section 29 proceedings that has gone before this, in your applications to us that has gone before this, in your evidence in chief, in your cross-examination, the only evidence that has ever been given to us, Mr Bellingan, is that you received information that they might, possibly, attack the van and that this information was only confirmed to you on Sunday. So, where does the question of the scene having been pointed to you on the Friday, already, come in?

MR BOOYENS OBJECTS

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, the witness qualified it with the qualification, the possibility exist.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood him that the further he went on, he said, yes, I remember this now. He is shaking his head in agreement. You did say it, did you not, that you remember he pointed.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I have also told them during the hearing I do not have any documentation. Some of the people in Cape Town do not want to talk to me, there is nobody refreshing my memory and somebody, you come here now and you refresh my memory, it makes sense. I am not running away from it. Mr Koisan told me earlier that I would get a statement from Jimmy Mbane and he was saying that and that and from Eric Maluleka and everybody, I have never seen those statements. I received that on Saturday morning. I had nothing to base my ideas on. I am not running away from this, it could have been my modus operandi. I was involved in millions other incidents. I am not running away, but I had nothing to fall on.

I am placing it on record, I want to make a full disclosure in all my amnesty applications. I am not playing games.

MS PATEL: You have placed ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Do you indicate by that, that you have been involved in millions of other incidents where people were killed?

MR BELLINGAN: I would not say millions other cases, I was involved in many other cases where people were arrested. It was a complete and I cannot remember everything.

CHAIRPERSON: We are not talking about an arrest in this application, we are talking about seven people being killed. Were you involved in many other cases where people were being, were killed?

MR BELLINGAN: I was involved in a few other instances, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And are they matters which you have applied for amnesty for?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, in affirmative.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I think we ought to have made available to us all the amnesty applications rather than one out of 11. Could arrangements be made?

MS PATEL: I will attempt to, thank you.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Bellingan, are these incidents arising out of activities of Vlakplaas in the Western Cape?

MR BELLINGAN: It was everything I was involved in while I was at Vlakplaas.

MS KHAMPEPE: And were you involved in any other incidents of a similar nature here in the Western Cape?

MR BELLINGAN: Shooting incidents, no, but sabotage and together with the staff, I was involved in shooting incidents.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MS PATEL: If, Mr Bellingan, something as crucial as you have been taken to the scene on the Friday had occurred, could you then please explain your evidence that it was on the Friday before that you and Mr Liebenberg had gotten together and were concerned that you had not received confirmation, yet, at that stage, of whether the attack would take place or not and that preventative measures would have to be taken?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: But you are now telling us that on Friday he came and took you to the scene?

MR BELLINGAN: Whether it was the Friday or the Thursday I was taken to the scene, it was like that. I cannot specifically say yes or no.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, why did you then tell us when you gave evidence in chief that he did not get back to us on, he did not get back to me on the Friday and I realised we would have to take steps to prevent it?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, as I say ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: You were not saying you could not remember, you were giving direct evidence that he did not come back to you on Friday as arranged. Now you tell us he probably, on Thursday or Friday, took you to the scene. I am afraid I have great difficulty understanding how you could deviate in that way.

MR BELLINGAN: I am not trying to mislead the Commission, I am asking your pardon, I must have misunderstood.

MS KHAMPEPE: But you prepared your affidavit and that also appears on paragraph 22 at page 31 of your affidavit. You were very explicit about that point. You still expected Mr Mbane to come back to you with further information.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I think I would have expected him to come back with further information.

MS KHAMPEPE: What further information were you expecting to get from Mr Mbane?

MR BELLINGAN: If we could only know where they would gather, where we could arrest them. If we could just get better information, what Kombi they would be using, for example.

MS KHAMPEPE: But he had taken you there the very day, he had taken you to the scene of the intended ambush. That is what you have just told us.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I believe the possibility is there. If that is what Mbane is saying that there is a place where they are going to launch the attack, I would have asked him, show me the place. To tell, not to tell him that, how would I know what the scene was like. I could have told him that, yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: With due respect, Mr Bellingan, I have great difficulty in understanding your evidence now, but carry on, Mrs Patel.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood a few minutes ago that when I was intervened when your council objected, that you agree that you now remembered that you were told and taken to the scene on Friday, but when you were asked questions by Mrs Khampepe, you seemed to be drifting away and not saying that you remembered, but saying if he says it, I cannot deny it, which is very different, Mr Bellingan.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I do not want to express myself wrongly. My normal practice was I would have gone to that scene. If that is what he is saying, I went there.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you remember it or do you not? Do not talk to me about normal practice now, tell me what you can remember, which I thought you were doing a few minutes ago, as did your council.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he did take me there, he would have taken me there.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MS PATEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

He says, further, that he pointed out the location or the vicinity within which the arms would be put on the scene, that they would plant some of their weapons on the scene beforehand and that location that was pointed out, was more or less in the same vicinity that was pointed out at the inspection in-loco that was held yesterday morning.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, if he showed the certain points, I would have place people nearby to control that. I cannot say with certainty that that had happened like that.

MS KHAMPEPE: But do you agree that he told you that he would plant arms at certain locations?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I cannot remember.

MS PATEL: He says clearly, Mr Bellingan, that this was done in agreement with you. That that is the place at which he would leave some of the weapons that they would have come with to the scene.

MR BELLINGAN: As I have said previously, I do not have a record on which to fall back. If that is what he said previously, I am not going to deny it. It could have happened.

MS PATEL: He also says, Mr Bellingan, that he told you that they would steal a van, that they would then use to come to the area that morning.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman. Lieutenant Liebenberg tried to find out what kind of vehicle was stolen in Guguletu and the finer detail regarding this vehicle was obtained by Liebenberg. He told me he is going to investigate the matter.

MS PATEL: He says further, Mr Bellingan, that it was, he was instructed at more or less which time to drive through that vicinity and that you and your men would be ready waiting for them.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I would have given instruction to depart the same time that the bus usually departed and when that did not happen, we would withdraw. I would have given him that instructions, yes.

MS PATEL: You say in your application, Mr Bellingan, that you arrived at the scene that morning round about five o' clock. Is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Could you please explain at which points on the map people were placed?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, in those bushes numbered I there would have been people and the opposite bushes, on the western side, there would have been people posted, there would have been people round the corner where I indicated where we were sitting.

ADV MOTATA: Excuse me, Mr Bellingan, I see on the map we are referred to two places where there are "bosse" on both sides of NY1, but if you do refer us to the map and where you placed people, have some specifications so that we could follow.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, as far as I know, Dolf Odendal made the placements in the bushes, I, at the eastern side, on the right-hand side of the page.

CHAIRPERSON: I?

MR BELLINGAN: U Sir, U.

CHAIRPERSON: U.

MR BELLINGAN: U. It is U and then the bushes on the western side, TSRQ, in that vicinity and, as I have heard later on, is that there where they crossed the bridge, there was also a group of people.

MS PATEL: That would have been Mr Odendal at the bridge, not so?

MR BELLINGAN: I think so and Liebenberg perhaps. I do not have that planning with me. As I have said yesterday, we were parked round that corner and the other people were stationed at various places, but it would not have been far from the crossing. MS PATEL: Would you accept, Mr Bellingan, that the area surrounding the intersection was, in fact, surrounded by your men or by the people in your operation that morning?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, the people in that vicinity would have all been people from our group.

MS PATEL: And that from five o' clock in the morning?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And you confirm that Mr Mbane would have been told to come to the scene past seven o' clock that morning?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, it had to appear normal. If he had decided on a different time we would have been in place. I cannot say what could have happened on the ground with them. They could have been involved in an accident or anything. So, we made provision as from five o' clock that morning.

MS PATEL: All right. Just in terms of the planning, there is a document in your bundle, that is Volume III, I think. It is not titled at all, so I am not sure how I am going to refer to it. Perhaps if, grant me a moment please, I will point the page out. It is on page 102.

CHAIRPERSON: This is Volume III?

MS PATEL: That is correct. Do you have it, no?

CHAIRPERSON: I think we could take the adjournment at this stage and you can arrange for them to get a paginated volume. We will take the short adjournment now.

MS PATEL: Would everyone please rise.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: (Still under oath).

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, have you got the numbers now?

MR BOOYENS: M'Lord, I have got some numbers at this stage. We have not, we have grab hold of our own document and start paginating. We got as far as page 118 at this stage, so, but we will get somewhere, I am convinced.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL (cont)

MS PATEL: Thank you Mr Bellingan. Could you please, if one looks at that document, it does not have a title or a heading, one is not, could you perhaps explain where this comes from?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, after Colonel de Kock took over in 1984, 1985, his instructions was that everything should be organised, there should be control, records should be kept, there should be in-service training, attention should be paid to rehabilitation of the askaris and he asked me, as I have previously said, that various times the police regulations, the standing orders, when they should shoot and not, I had to convey it to the askaris, the permanent Black members and all other members. Every month meetings were held, in-service training was held and later on, because of my experience and because I was one of the older members at that unit, I drew up certain documents regarding deployment and, for example, when I was involved in this training, I referred to these documents so that they know what the haves and the have nots were or what they had to do.

It was not like them being like a pack of wild dogs. There was certain order in everything, there were certain, what were the instructions regarding arrests, when there were shootouts. This document is part of that. What should the people do when they were for three, in the veld for three weeks. When they returned to Pretoria they had to do certain things after they had come back. They had to do research at the Research Desk, C2, they had to bring their photo albums up to date, they had to know about new legislation.

So, this document does not have a heading, because it is part of that type of document. We have tried, for this application, to find bits and pieces of all old documentation. This is an in-service documentation, because based on this, instructions would be given regarding the servicing of the vehicles and if certain askaris, if they were involved in a false flag operation, they had to be careful. For example, they had to know whether the specific person I needed to apprehend should not know me, for example. When an askari worked in a certain area, the liberation, they have heard from the liberation fighters that he had been arrested or he is co-operating with the security police. Therefore, I could not send in a person to infiltrate if they knew he had already been apprehended. You should be aware and prepare safeguards so that these people should not be ambushed. This was a part of this document.

MS PATEL: So, if I understand you correctly, Mr Bellingan, this is almost a code of conduct, a checklist of what should be done, what should not be done at certain stages in an operation?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, this was used to tell the new members, based on experience, to try to give them as much guidance as possible. Many of the people who were there have not been with us for a long time. We wanted to organise Vlakplaas, under de Kock, as a controlled unit. There was a bit of chaos before that.

MS PATEL: So, it is a properly controlled operation that you are involved in. Is that what you are saying?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. We tried and we were successful to develop control mechanisms. The place had to be neat and tidy. Everybody knew what his responsibilities were. It was a rehabilitation progress, we had to develop these askaris. After a few interviews de Kock decided that they had to go to Hammanskraal so that they had to undergo crash courses to become policemen, because they had to be placed out to, sent to other units.

MS PATEL: And that is one of the reasons, Mr Bellingan, that you were so highly regarded in your job, is that you were able to keep control, you were able to maintain discipline, you were good at training people, you had extensive counter-insurgency experience, this and other similar factors taken together, are part of the reason of why you were so highly regarded in whatever you did and that was, even at that stage, during 1986.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, this was part of the whole scene. Mr de Kock wrote a, recommendations in my personal file and that I was doing what a disciplined policeman had to do. I knew that there was only the one way to do something and that was the correct way. I always tried to do my utmost best.

MS PATEL: All right. If I can just then specifically refer you to page 102 of that volume, paragraph 13. You make mention there of a "pseudo-operasie". Could you please explain more fully what is meant by this term and under which circumstances it would have been done?

MR BELLINGAN: I refer here to a false flag operation. When we, as I have said, for example, this askari would, for arguments sake, be released from jail, he becomes an askari and I want to infiltrate him, for example, in an area like the Jeppy Station, Western Cape or Barberton. I then draw up a profile of that person, does he know that area, is he coming from that area, do these people know that he had been apprehended, that he was an askari and, for arguments sake, Barney was standing on a station and he was waiting for other liberation fighters. Those people were also well trained and had a good intelligence network. They recognised him, first of all, and they recognised him as an askari and they would shoot him or something would happen to him and the people on the ground had to manage it very well to prevent these type of circumstances. Our person should have the advantage and you had to know your environment before launching these type of operations.

MS PATEL: How would this, then, be effected?

MR BELLINGAN: Do you mean the Guguletu incident?

MS PATEL: No, no, just generally, on general principles. You have used the example of an askari being thrown into an area, possibly, that he may not know well or that he may be recognised. How would you, from your side, ensure his safety?

MR BELLINGAN: Firstly, if this was a short-term operation, you get different pseudo operations, I would have deployed other members too, but I would have asked the security branch members what information do you have regarding freedom fighters that have come in and I would have given him a weapon as well, a legal weapon so that he could operate with that. So, any operation has its risks, things can go wrong. If those people identify him then they can possibly shoot him or they will not appear for the meeting. So, it had its risks.

MS PATEL: And you would minimise your risks by trying to place your own people in the vicinity and doing your research before the person is sent in?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I would try to minimise my risks, but these risks always remain, the co-operation of the people doing it, if that person sees that he does not want to carry on, then we withdraw him. As in Mbelo's case, we withdrew him, because he thought his life was in danger. I thought he was not, he is not expandable, so he was just a human being, that is why I withdrew him. This is the type of thing that one always had built in.

MS PATEL: So, if I understand you correctly, operations were never managed in a hodge podge manner, that proper measures were taken to ensure the protection of your people. Is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: As far as it is possible and viable, yes, I attempted to control it properly.

MS PATEL: All right. If we turn to page 121, paragraph 15, that is next page. Oh, sorry, no, that is 103, 103, mine has been paginated, the next page.

MR BELLINGAN: 103?

MS PATEL: Yes, sorry.

MR BELLINGAN: Okay, sorry.

MS PATEL: The next page.

Mention is made of use of cameras and just if one generally looks at the nature or the information that is laid out in this document about you, your members being placed at a scene, perhaps, a hour before the time, the use of cameras, proper protective measures, placing people at proper points. Would this amount to or would this be akin to a planning for an ambush?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, if I can explain an ambush. We would be there a few hours before the time. If you want to arrest people or you see this, view this as an ambush, you would be there a few hours before the time, because people could say they are coming at two o' clock and they come at one o' clock. I also believed to play for time both sides, rather be too early than too late. So, that is, those were normal practices.

MS PATEL: So, you would arrive at a scene a couple of hours before whatever it is that you are waiting for to happen would happen?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that specific morning, I cannot remember what they said, but it was before five o' clock, it was, we came there at about 03H30. Somebody could be late and you have to be in place in a disciplined manner.

MS PATEL: And assuming the incident is meant to take place at a particular time and it does not take place at that time, you would wait for a while?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, you would wait a while. You waited and we drove around in the vicinity. Every case has its merits and is dealt with on its own.

MS PATEL: What, in your times, would be "a rukkie"? How long would that be for you?

MR BELLINGAN: In this case, for example, it can be 15 minute, half a hour, a hour. The people in the bush were lying quietly for a longer period of time, because we could not just let them come out, but the people in the vehicles had to start moving around, because the civilians were going to work and in order not to attract attention, we had to drive around. So, every case has its merits. In this case I do not think that it was very long after that that we started moving around.

MS PATEL: Okay, but the people who were placed in the bush and in the surrounding areas were given instructions to wait for a while longer. Is that fair?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I believe that that could have been the instruction.

MS PATEL: Okay and you accept, Sir, that the incident of the shooting started shortly after the time that the bus was meant to pass had passed? So, at that stage all your men would still have been in place or sorry, ja, sorry, I take that back. That most of the men in the surrounding areas would have still been in place.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, they were still in place and if it, they were all on the ground, they were not all in the bus, so they were driving around and seeing, looking for the bus.

MS PATEL: At which, at what time, can you recall, did you see Mr Maluleka on the scene?

MR BELLINGAN: As I have said, it could have been after 07H35, half past seven, 07H45, etcetera. If you can say that I have given a specific time, but it is more or less in that vicinity. MS PATEL: Is it not sooner than that? Is it not before 07H30?

MR BELLINGAN: That could possibly be. In my statement, I cannot remember where I said that I saw him.

MS PATEL: If I recall, your statements made initially, they were just about past, I think most of the members said 07H20, 07H25, is when the incidents ... (intervention).

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, more or less.

MS PATEL: Okay, so this is barely ten minutes, ten minutes after the bus would have passed?

MR BELLINGAN: Every situation is dealt with on the ground. There are guidelines, but it is not to say that they are, these guidelines are followed specifically. We might have left eight minutes afterwards, driven around in the vicinity. So, every situation differs. This is just guidelines.

MS PATEL: But this was an important operation, Mr Bellingan. This was your opportunity after months of working, after having sent Mr Mbelo, Mr Mbelo having been pulled out, after lots of money, lots of resources having been spent, this was your opportunity to, as you say, arrest seven people. Why would you have moved out within ten minutes or started moving around within such a short space of time?

MR BELLINGAN: We just decided that we were going to drive around in the vicinity and I will stick to that. It was at that moment that the men started driving around.

MS PATEL: Would you then accept that whilst you were driving around, you were still prepared for action, so to say?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I would have believed that if anything had happened, we would have been prepared. Only when you reach a safe place do you become calm again. While you are in a vicinity, you are always ready for action and the police vans were attacked in Guguletu while riding, driving in single file, so you are always tense and you are ready for any situation.

MS PATEL: So, if people on the scene, members of your operation had said that they were caught off-guard or that they had acted impulsively on the scene, that would not be a fair reflection, because they would have, at that stage, still have been under instructions to be on the alert and on the lookout and that the risks that were posed initially may still have been present?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. All those persons at the scene come from different branches, Guguletu Detective Branch, etcetera. So, there was not a rigid rule or guideline that was laid down, so that these were all trained men. If you withdrew, then they moved. I met some of the previous evening, some of them I did not even know. I only realised that afternoon who they were. So, these are faces that you see and every person would have decided where he was going to go. If I can remember correctly, a vehicle was burning and somebody said he was going to look at that. That is my reason.

MS KHAMPEPE: May I interpose, Mr, Ms Patel?

Mr Bellingan, when you received radio information about the possible presence of the insurgents in the area, had most of the 20 member group of your, of the police moved from their original positions, at that time?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, most of them were still in place, but those of us who were in the vehicles, were at no specific points any more. I cannot say exactly where the others were. We started moving, so the others must have started moving too.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV MOTATA: Just a follow up on that. Let us look at those who are in the bushes. Would you say they had the same movements as you people in the cars?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot speak for them. I believe that they were still lying there, because I only heard later that some of them ran over the road and were shooting in the bushes, so it might have been that they were still lying there.

ADV MOTATA: Thank you.

MS PATEL: You have just accepted, Mr Bellingan, that at the time you saw Mr Maluleka on the scene, it was just before 07H30, after the bus had passed and if one accepts that the bus, as a matter of course, passes at 07H15, then within that 15 minute period, you had seen Mr Maluleka on the scene. All right. Mr Mbane says that he was given instructions to bring the people in just after seven, just after seven o' clock.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot recall having said to him just after seven, but he would have been working according to instructions from Christopher Piet, so I cannot give any clarity in this regard.

MS PATEL: Okay. If, and he, in fact, says that they did come in later, at least, later than you and your men arrived on the scene at five o' clock. Now, if the area had been surrounded from the time that you say it had been and, you will agree that there are only certain entry points into that specific area, could you then please explain how those members gained entry into that area?

MR BELLINGAN: He could have dropped them at another point and they could have walked in, but originally he said that they were in the bus and they would drive in with them and what happened and what they decided during the interim I cannot say.

MS PATEL: He says clearly, Mr Mbane says clearly that when he drove in and he came from the Guguletu area on the NY1, if one refers to the map, that is from a southerly direction moving north, that he, in fact, witnessed that your men were ready, he saw a vehicle on the side street waiting and he knew that your people were now ready and they were let through.

MR BELLINGAN: No, if someone had seen the bus, it would have been reported and steps would have been taken. This is the first thing that I heard about this, that he came ... (end of tape 1B) in from that side.

MS PATEL: ... the area, Mr Bellingan, how is it that if most of your people were still in place, the van came through, in which they were travelling. Do explain?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot comment on how they walked in. There are different directions that they could have come in, such as the normal workers who were walking to the station. They did not have identity jackets, they could just have walked in like normal members of the public. I cannot comment further.

MS PATEL: Would your members not then have, at least, mentioned that this was a busy area, that there were lots of people in the street or that there were some people walking in the street? If one looks at the evidence, Mr Bellingan, the only people that are referred to at the scene are the few Black men who they saw were suspicious looking. No one else is mentioned, because, also, if one takes that further, there is no question ever, besides the bus that arrived at the scene, in which, which Mr Benting was driving, one takes that further, there is no mention made that there were civilians in the scene and that your men needed to be cautious in protecting the people who were there. Surely, that would have been raised.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, this would have been told at the session. It is as good as making an operation in Adderley Street. It would have been said the previous evening or that morning. So, we would have taken preventative action. From 07H15 to 07H30 everybody was on their way to work and if you go and look one morning, then you will see how busy it is there. So, there was, it was a hive of activity at that stage.

MS PATEL: Do you agree, though, Mr Bellingan, that if there was that risk, it would have been discussed or it would have been mentioned by some party who was present at the scene that, look, there are civilians walking around here, we need to be extra cautious or please, there are women walking around on the corner of NY1 and NY3, please be careful. Surely this kind of information would have been relayed to the rest of the parties on the scene by way of radio, which everyone or almost everyone was in possession of?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe that everybody knew about this before the time. It is part of normal training to know that if there is a shooting, that the civilians have to be taken care of. This is normal practice. Everyone would have done this or would have ensured their safety and that is why I have also said, earlier, that the first idea that I had is that there were civilians, anything can happen, if shooting was to take place and we were hyper-careful.

MS PATEL: Do you know at which stage the van arrived on the scene, in which Mr Mbane and company ... (intervention).

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot say whether, when it happened. I can remember that after I had been shot and my weapon was eliminated, the bus was there already. So, this happened in a matter of seconds, I cannot say exactly.

MS PATEL: Okay. Mr Mbane says that after he dropped the members, as he had agreed with you, at the points arranged with you, that he had gone over the bridge, towards Montana area, and had turned around, because he still had, besides himself, he had the driver and he had Chris Piet in the car with him, in the van, sorry, and that he came back and once he came back over the bridge, that is when he heard what he thought was an explosion and shooting.

MR BELLINGAN: Jimmy never told me that he was going to drop off the people. The idea was that they remained in the Kombi, that they could be drawn into that corner, so I have no knowledge that he ever told me anything like this.

MS PATEL: So, Mr Bellingan, would you repeat that? Did you say that the arrangement was that they would try to be cornered somewhere?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, as I said, we did not agree that they would be dropped off somewhere. I told Jimmy to keep everybody in the bus, keep control of the weapons so that we can keep them at a central point or keep, where all the weapons are.

MS PATEL: And which corner would this be, if one looks at the map?

MR BELLINGAN: NY1 and 111.

MS PATEL: So, then in terms of the way things panned out, at least that part of your instructions were carried out. He then came back and the Kombi stopped at that part of the intersection, as per your agreement?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, it did.

MS PATEL: Okay. He says further in terms of, maybe I should deal with the question of how they were armed. He says that they were armed, Chris Piet was armed with an AK47, Chris Piet was in the van with him still at the time that they moved on to the intersection, the driver had a pistol with him and he had his Makarov on him, all right. Then he says that two of the AK47's that were subsequently found in the blanket, as per the agreement, those were where they were, all right. Then he says, if I may just confirm before I give you the incorrect, that of the group that was dropped off on NY1 with Maluleka, those two were unarmed, because the agreement would be or the arrangement was that they would then go and get the two AK's that they had buried the previous or that they hidden the previous night. That was then found.

So, in terms of Mr Mbane, the two gentlemen with Mr Maluleka were unarmed at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: You are going on a long way. Should you not ask him to deal with it point by point rather than ask him to deal with it, a long story?

MR BELLINGAN: The instructions to Jimmy were clear, that they had to retain control of the weapons and that they bring them all to the crossing where we could arrest them, that we could then link them to these weapons, if we found them with weapons in their control. I cannot say whether these weapons were hidden or whether they got off at the bridge. I just heard that he had dropped them off somewhere, but I do not know where exactly this happened.

MS PATEL: So, there were specific instructions in respect of the ammunition, so that it could be checked later for fingerprints and it could be, then, connected to specific individuals on the scene or specific deceased on the scene?

MR BELLINGAN: That is normal tactics. It is no use that I arrest seven people in a bus and I cannot link them to the weapons. They will just say that it is the driver's baggage. So, in order to get this proof, we would have to link or lift the fingerprints on the weapons.

MS PATEL: Was this evidence ever led at the inquest?

MR BELLINGAN: I just gave my evidence and I left. I did not attend the inquest from beginning to end.

MS PATEL: I put it to you that that evidence was never led at the inquest, Mr Bellingan. That was never done.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Brits, the Investigative Officer, you will have to ask him. I cannot speak on his behalf, because I had nothing to do with the investigation.

MS PATEL: It would be, at best, shoddy workmanship, do you not think, that such crucial evidence would then have been led, would not have been led.

MR BOOYENS OBJECTS

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, is the witness to be blamed because he was counsel, appearing at the inquest for somebody or is he being blamed because he was the Investigator, because he was neither, or is he just asked to express an expert opinion about the way council should have done it, which I submit, he is not qualified for. I do not think this question is really taking us anywhere.

MS PATEL: May I respond? My learned council, learned friend seems to lose sight of the fact that Mr Bellingan is accepting responsibility for this entire incident and that is his words. Those are his words, he is accepting responsibility for the manner in which this operation was conducted, for the people that were killed. So, surely, by that same token, and it is a natural extension, that Mr Bellingan should be able to explain how the investigation was conducted subsequently, because his men were directly involved in that incident and so it would be in his interest to, at least, ascertain the manner in which the evidence was handled, the investigation was done and to what extent his personnel on the scene are going to be implicated or not, because this was a covert operation at best.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, if by accepting responsibility Mr Bellingan is supposed to answer for the way subsequent investigations were handled by Murder and Robber and so, then it is a valid question, but quite frankly I cannot, fail to see the relevance of it, but, in any case, if the Commission allows it ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: How long did he stay in Cape Town after this?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, a month and a half after we have withdrawn I remained in Cape Town. We stayed here for quite a while, a month and a half afterwards. During that time we returned and then we came back. It was about a month and a half to two months while we were still active here.

CHAIRPERSON: What were you active in doing?

MR BELLINGAN: We, there was still movement of freedom fighters in the area, we tried to track them down. If I can remember, we changed some of these people and brought in new askaris. We continued with this and arrested a very big freedom fighter cell during April. I think 14 or 17 of them were arrested as a result of information that we followed up.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you have anything to do with the investigation of the deaths of these seven people?

MR BELLINGAN: No, all that would have happened is that they would have asked me to send my people for statements and my own statement and that was all. I did not go to visit Mr Brits or anything like that.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you feel you could rely on Mr Liebenberg to do anything that was necessary to keep you out of it?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that was what he was supposed to do.

CHAIRPERSON: I do not think you can take the matter much further, can you?

MS PATEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

To return back to the question of how the members on the scene or the members of the group were armed, Mr Maluleka had a Tokarev with him.

MR BELLINGAN: And if I can remember correctly, I have given earlier evidence, I think there is a Tokarev on the scene and yesterday I said that that Tokarev that we issued, from security head office, had been lost a little while before that. So, this is a new Tokarev. Whether he got it from the freedom fighter cell I cannot say, but he must explain how he obtained this Tokarev, but his Tokarev, if they had conveyed this correctly to me, was lost when the Kombi got stuck in the sand, before the shooting of the Guguletu 7, if I can remember correctly.

MS PATEL: Okay. He says further that two of the members that he dropper further towards the bridge were armed with AK47's of two. So, that makes it five all in all.

MR BELLINGAN: If everything that is in the encoded message is what was conveyed to me. I cannot give any clarity about what he is saying.

MS PATEL: Okay and he says some of the members were given the hand grenades that, and this is all part of the arms and ammunition that were supplied to him by you.

MR BELLINGAN: I did not provide them with hand grenades.

MS PATEL: Perhaps this is an, I have here copies that have been made available to me of the, what I think is called, the SAP13. It is the register of the arms and the ammunition that was ... (intervention).

MR BELLINGAN: Handed in.

MS PATEL: ... handed in. If I can just pass this out and, perhaps, if we could mark this EXHIBIT, where are we now, D.

Perhaps, Mr Bellingan, while they are passing that around, if I may just add, there were also two revolvers that certain of the members on the scene had.

Now, if one looks at the exhibit, Mr Bellingan, you will notice that there are only three AK47's that were handed in.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Would it then be fair to infer that the two AK47's that you mention were given to the askaris, was then held back and it was not handed in or would that have been handed in as well?

MR BELLINGAN: Of those three AK47's, as I said yesterday, two must have been those from security head office. I cannot remember 100% in what condition they were, but they were the two AK's under the blanket. There was a dispute over whether they were the freedom fighters AK's or from security head office. I cannot say whether these are the AK's that did no go back to head office, so it must be part of those three.

MS PATEL: If that is the case, then what was the blanket in which the AK47's were wrapped in doing in your car?

MR BELLINGAN: It was not my car, it was an unrest vehicle. MS PATEL: Was it the vehicle that you were travelling in?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I think I left the scene with Captain Liebenberg to a doctor, so I cannot remember how it got there.

MS PATEL: Okay. What is your knowledge like on explosives, Mr Bellingan?

MR BELLINGAN: I am trained as an explosive expert in 1990.

MS PATEL: 1990 and before that, what is the extent of your experience with explosives?

MR BELLINGAN: Knowledge and no practical experience. I just, what I know is what I read. I am not an expert, but you are just under the Law of Explosives Act, you are just trained as an inspector, but I am not an expert.

MS PATEL: Fair enough. Would you have, before this incident, ever had the opportunity to deal with explosives of any nature? How they operate, what it looks like, to handle one?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, they give you courses before you go to the border in hand grenades and enemy hand grenades and they show you the impact that they, these explosives have and we got training as to identify these things. Yes, I had a knowledge, but I was no expert.

MS PATEL: Okay. Generally, though, if a bomb explodes or a grenade explodes, you will accept that, at least, some measure of damage must be caused?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, depending on the type of terrain, yes, but there will be damage.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I refer you to the bundle of photographs B, it is this. Oh. Mr van der Merwe says it is B5. I will accept his word.

If we go to the second-last page, if one looks at point K, which is marked on the photographs, that is the point of impact of the grenade that was allegedly thrown. Is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: According to witnesses, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is on photograph numbered 33 and 34. MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS PATEL: That is correct.

You will accept, from the photographs, that the damage there is extremely minimal?

MR BELLINGAN: I did not attend the scene as an explosives expert, but there is much less shrapnel than other, but there, it would, the shrapnel would not have remained in the hole, it would have been, spread over the whole area, but this, the damage does look minimal, I agree.

MS PATEL: All right. If, even if one looks at the white pole on both photographs, there is no sign of any kind of damage to them.

MR BELLINGAN: Not that I can see in the two photos.

MS PATEL: So, what is your comment on that? How do you explain that?

MR BELLINGAN: Just remember that shrapnel moves in different directions. If I do not, if I am not wrong, one must look, this was a M26, South African hand grenade and at that stage it had bigger shrapnel and it has already happened that shrapnel misses something close to it, it does not hit everything and if we can ask Captain Kleyn, there was green paint at his, on his vehicle. As the hand grenade was thrown at his vehicle and moved away, I believed this is what happened. People have already survived where a hand grenade was thrown into a room. So, it is not always a fact that the direction in which the shrapnel moves, it might have missed the pole totally or partially. I am not going to give expert evidence on, about something that I do not know about.

MS PATEL: Absolutely. No, one is not dealing with whether people would have died as a result of a grenade being thrown or not, one is just dealing with the question of damage and, surely, there must have been some damage in the nearby areas.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot comment on this.

CHAIRPERSON: What sort of grenade did you say it was?

MR BELLINGAN: I am speaking under correction, but somebody at the scene or maybe after, told me that it was a S26, not the Russian hand grenade. Somebody said that it was one of our own forces hand grenades. The pin was not there, left there so that we could identify it. They say it could have been stolen. Some of the people bought hand grenade for dagga. There was a market for this. So, I heard it somewhere, but I do not know what the report says, what type of hand grenade this was.

MS PATEL: This then places into question, Mr Bellingan, the manner in which this entire incident, according to your version, unfolded, because it was exactly this explosion or the explosion that had resulted as a, that had resulted from the hand grenade that had been thrown, it was because of that that the entire incident unfolded, that people started shooting and that, according to your evidence and the evidence of the rest of your members, that this is how it unfolded, that there was, because of this grenade, there was then, according to them, a lawful attack upon your people.

MR BELLINGAN: That is what we said from the start. There was an explosion and shooting and a small war broke out.

MS PATEL: If one looks, then, at the minimal damage that was caused by this, is there room, then, for argument that your members overreacted?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot comment on that.

MS PATEL: Fair enough. To go back to Mr Mbane. He then says, he says that they were allowed in to the area, that the area was completely surrounded, that he too, that he ... (intervention). MR BELLINGAN: Can you just repeat your sentence from the beginning please?

MS PATEL: Sure, sure.

Mr Mbane says that he was then let in to the area. By "let in" I mean that he was allowed in without being stopped by anyone, into that intersection and that, as I have said before, he dropped off a few members, he dropped off two groups of people, went over the bridge and came back. At that time he too heard what sounded like an explosion and the firing had begun. They then came into the intersection, he was sitting at the door of the van, he then jumped out and tried to escape, but because of the shooting he was not able to run and that at some stage he was rolling on the ground. Would you have noticed him at this stage? Can you comment? Do you recall?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, somebody told me that I apparently said do not shoot that tall man. He ran away in a southern way, towards Mannenberg, Guguletu Police Station. I did not see him rolling on the ground.

MS PATEL: He confirms that he, indeed, ran in the direction that you have just mentioned. He then says Chris Piet followed shortly after him from the vehicle and that he did shoot at the intersection with the AK47 that he was armed with, but that he was shot down very quickly and he confirms the point at which Chris Piet is lying, that he fell down round about there at the scene.

MR BELLINGAN: If he had seen that, that establishes what his, view.

MS PATEL: He says then that he saw you, Mr Bellingan, drag the deceased, Mr Konile, from the van. He says Mr Konile did not get out on the drivers side, because there was lots of activity on that side, there was shooting on that side and he just followed himself and Chris Piet out of that side of the vehicle and that you got him before he managed to get out of the vehicle and he says he heard a shot fired at the vehicle. He cannot confirm whether you had, in fact, whether the bullet that had been shot then had, in fact, at that stage hit Mr Konile or not.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I deny. I did not drag him from the vehicle. I deny his allegations.

MS PATEL: He goes further. He says after you dragged him out of the van, you shot him. You shot him at the intersection and that he was able to see this, because he was still in the vicinity at the time.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, it is the first time I hear this. I deny that I dragged him from the vehicle. I did not deny that I had shot him, but I did not drag him from the vehicle.

MS PATEL: If one goes to Mr Benting's evidence, the bus driver who arrived at the scene, do you accept that you are the person who went to the bus and said something to the effect of, what is he doing here with the children, or something to that effect?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot remember that I have spoken to the bus driver. Later on they told me a bus full of children passed there. It was only later conveyed to me. Somebody with a blue, they said somebody with a blue jacket said something to them. There was somebody on the video with a blue jacket on. I was wearing a blue jersey. I cannot remember this.

MS PATEL: Fine. Mr Benting says, as well, from where he was standing, and you have noted from the inspection in loco where the bus was, that he had fairly good vantage point from where he was, that he saw you shoot Mr Konile in the head.

MR BOOYENS OBJECTS

MR BOOYENS: I am not sure whether he said he saw this witness, Mr Chairman. I, he says he saw a policeman with a blue jacket.

MS KHAMPEPE: May I just ask a point on, on a point of clarification. Me Bellingan, you say that there was somebody who was wearing a blue jacket that morning.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, we saw that on the video. It looks like a denim jacket the guy had on, a blue jacket also then.

CHAIRPERSON: Black.

MR BELLINGAN: No, blue denim. Sorry, Sir.

MS KHAMPEPE: Do you know who that person is?

MR BELLINGAN: If we can look at the video again, I could perhaps determine who he was.

MS KHAMPEPE: No, off the cuff.

CHAIRPERSON: Could that be done here in the interim, during the adjournment? You do not have to be present, Mr Booyens. Your client has an opportunity of looking at it and stopping the video at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: I am indebted to you, My Lord.

MS KHAMPEPE: And, further, do you recall having spoken to any of the people in the area who were civilians?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I cannot remember having spoken to anybody there. I could have told people to drive past, but I cannot remember whether I have spoken to anybody. I was at the intersection, I wanted to control the situation. I could have said go this way, try to get a Caspar, but I cannot remember speaking to somebody specifically.

MS KHAMPEPE: Indeed, if you did speak to anyone, it is something that you could have remembered.

MR BELLINGAN: I did not speak to Mr Benting. I was confronted with this fact later on. I cannot even remember this.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MS PATEL: Mr Bellingan, Mr Benting has testified previously that at the scene he witnessed a shooting. The person he then points out as having been shot, that he had seen, is the person lying in the intersection, which is the same person that you have admitted to shooting. What is ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Is that so?

MS PATEL: There is only person at the intersection in the street ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Afterwards there was only one person there, but the points pointed out were completely different, were they not? You will recollect that Mr Benting pointed out a spot on the centre of the N1 road to the north of the N111, some seven paces, I think it was, from where the body was found. No, no more.

MS PATEL: If I may, my recollection was that it was about two paces, but I ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Two paces from him. It was, sorry, 15 paces. He was 15 paces from the corner. The point he pointed out where the body was, was two paces up from the corner.

MS PATEL: That is 13 paces then from where he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Where he was and some 22, 20 odd paces or 20 to 22 paces from where the other body, which is the person shot by the applicant, the first applicant.

MS PATEL: If my understanding is correct then, if one accepts that the initial distance was 15 paces and the second distance that Mr Benting pointed out was 13 paces, then the difference in the position of the body at the intersection would have been two paces ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: No.

MR BELLINGAN: ... or am I wrong?

CHAIRPERSON: The body was seven paces from the corner.

JUDGE MILLER: Mr Bellingan, how many people were shot in the intersection on the road?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, it was only the person who I shot.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes, that is what my understanding is, just the one person.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Bellingan, I cannot recall your statements, statements that you made during the Section 29 hearings, I cannot recall clearly, but I, would I be mistaken if I say that you did concede that there was only one person who was shot at the intersection?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, it was only person I shot there.

MS KHAMPEPE: No, but that there was only one person who was shot that day, not by you personally?

MR BELLINGAN: At that intersection it was only the person who was shot.

MS KHAMPEPE: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairperson, I do not mean to intervene at this stage, but it may actually resolve this particular dispute. I also do not mean to intervene in the distances that were raised and pointed out by Mr Benting yesterday, but he had testified at the Weaver Trial in this particular matter, that the person whom he had seen being shot is the person shown on photograph number 22. If you look at the bundle of photographs, that happens to be Mr Konile, which Mr Bellingan concedes is the person he shot and I think that puts it beyond dispute.

CHAIRPERSON: What page (...indistinct)?

MR BOOYENS: It is page 56 of the, it is page 562 of the Weaver Trial at line three.

MS PATEL: Mr Chairperson, you do not have a full copy of the Weaver ...

ADV MOTATA: We do not have the full copy ... (intervention).

MR P WILLIAMS: Mr Chairman, ... (intervention).

JUDGE MILLER: ... of that.

MR P WILLIAMS: Mr Chairman, if I can be of assistance here. Also on page 204 of Volume I, at the Section 29 inquiry, the, it is conceded that the person is, in fact, Zabonki Konile.

CHAIRPERSON: I do not think it is in dispute that that is the person that the applicant shot. The question was that the other, the, if you look at the statement made by Mr Benting and the spot pointed out to him, it appeared he was pointing out some other incident, because he referred to, in his statement at page 399, paragraph five,

"I could also see about three metres from my vehicle, a Black man lying motionless on his stomach in the middle of the same intersection."

Well, he showed us at the inspection that he was parked 15 paces from the intersection. If this was three metres away from him, it was a long way away, but if there is this other evidence where he actually looked at a photograph, that I think would be far more reliable than his recollections now of empty places on the road.

MS PATEL: Mr Chairperson, can we then accept that the person who Mr Benting see, saw being shot is the same person that Mr Bellingan shot?

MR BOOYENS: Certainly not before I have cross-examined him, M'Lord.

CHAIRPERSON: You can accept that he said at the trial that the person he saw who shooting was the person shown in the photograph.

MS PATEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

Mr Benting confirms that the person Mr Konile, lying at the intersection was lying down at the time that he was being shot and that he was shot in the head.

MR BELLINGAN: I deny that I shot him while he was lying on the ground.

MS PATEL: Do you confirm that Mr Konile was shot in the head at the very least then?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was shot in his head while standing.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence and I was going to ask you about this later, but I can ask you now. You say that he appeared to be facing you in the process of throwing a hand grenade at you?

MR BELLINGAN: He was looking in my direction. Later on I heard that I had hit him at the side of his head. I do not know why, he might have turned his head, but he was looking at me.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the evidence is that he was hit on the back of the head and the bullet came out of his left eye and he would have had to have turned his head at a, as I understand the evidence, at an angle of 135 degrees. Do you remember that evidence being given?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I remember the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: It was referred to in the judgement at the Weaver Trial.

JUDGE MILLER: Sorry, just while we are dealing with this, sorry, Ms Patel. Mr Bellingan, is there any difference between a Chinese hand grenade and a Russian hand grenade?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, the Chinese stick grenade is a long stick with a knob on the one side. There is a difference between that and the other Russian hand grenades.

JUDGE MILLER: Because in your application affidavit on page 35 you say that this person you shot, Mr Konile, he had a hand grenade of Chinese origin in his possession.

MR BELLINGAN: I thought it was a Chinese hand grenade. JUDGE MILLER: You, that is what you thought.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

JUDGE MILLER: Yet, in the affidavit, which was deposed to yourself, shortly after the event on the 26th of March 1986 at page 383, you say that, let me just find about, you talk about a hand grenade of Russian origin. Third paragraph from the bottom,

"The object which the Black man had in his hand and which I thought was a Russian hand grenade ...",

Now, if they are different, how can there be this, can you explain this difference.

MR BELLINGAN: In my statement I said that and they said at that stage it looked as if it had a stick and he said, I tried to give an explanation. I thought it was a Russian hand grenade which was used as a Chinese hand grenade, a stick hand grenade.

ADV MOTATA: Whilst we are at that, after you shot them man, did you find that he had anything in his hands?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I did not look at that stage. I moved it round, I tried to control what was happening at the intersection and only later I realised that he had nothing with him and that little stick was lying further bit away.

MS PATEL: Mr Bellingan, can you perhaps just, if you can recall, describe in a little bit more detail the stick that was found closer to the body of Mr Konile? Was it just an ordinary stick?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I cannot explain where it had come from, whether he had it in his pocket or whatever, I cannot explain.

MS PATEL: Is it, the question was could you describe the stick?

MR BELLINGAN: It was a long stick, thick and long, pitch black with a knob at the one end.

MS PATEL: And is this the same instrument that you thought was a hand grenade?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is what was presumably the hand grenade in his hand.

MS PATEL: If one accepts that this was a group of armed people, dangerous, according to your opinion, properly trained, how probable is it that the person would then jump out of a van carrying a stick of that nature that surely could not protect anyone?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot give an explanation what he was thinking at that stage.

JUDGE MILLER: Sorry, is there evidence somewhere that there was a firearm found in the vehicle from which he got out of?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. I do not know whether fingerprints were taken to compare the two ... (end of tape 2A), whether that firearm belonged to him. I only later heard about this firearm, this weapon. Later on they told me there was a weapon in that vehicle.

JUDGE MILLER: So, you do not know where precisely in the vehicle, whether it was in the front seat or the back seat or lying on the floor or wherever in the vehicle?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: I want to put it to you, Mr Bellingan, that the manner in which Mr Konile was shot accords with the forensic evidence that was led at the inquest, at the Weaver Trial, sorry, at the Weaver Trial, and that it does not accord with your version of how the person was killed.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, that is my version, how I had shot this person and I stand by that. I do not know how they testified in the Weaver Trial.

MS PATEL: Okay. I want to put it to you, further, Mr Bellingan, that this group of young men who were massacred were done so at your instance, that the matter was planned from the start and that if one looks at the way in which people were placed at the scene, at the manner in which the entire operation was carried out, that it accords, that it accords with the fact that these boys were lured into that area and then brutally killed.

MR BELLINGAN: I do not agree with Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: And I want to put it to you, further, Mr Bellingan, that you have come to this Committee on the off chance that a crime may have been committed. Here is your crime, Mr Bellingan, as you have stated in your original application, conspiracy to murder. That is exactly what has happened here.

MR BELLINGAN: I am not a legal person and at that stage when I applied for amnesty, I heard certain rumours of who had said what. I do not know what crime was committed and I just felt that this whole thing should be placed on the table and my version of what had happened and that was why and that is how I had applied. That could have been an error, there was no conspiracy to murder. Generals, from the top to the bottom, should be involved in a so-called conspiracy, but that was not the case. The Generals had turned their backs on us, but it is no use to tell stories here, there was no conspiracy. It was, perhaps, something, a wrong phrase I used in calling it conspiracy.

MS PATEL: Regarding your contention, Mr Bellingan, that you are not a "regs geleerde", as you put it, let me refer you to page 19 of the first bundle. It is your affidavit. If one looks at the second paragraph on that page. It says,

"During that time de Kock instructed me to give the following instruction or training to the askaris and some White members.",

and you list, you list.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I agree, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: "Laws like, like Safety legislation and Criminal

Procedure Act".

MR BELLINGAN: I have never studied Law. The only Laws I have studied is the Law I have done at Police College. Later on they said they were going, this would be conspiracy and I thought I would contact a legal team. If I can remember correctly what the details or the description of conspiracy is, I am not a legal person.

MS PATEL: In as much as you may not have a Legal Degree, Mr Bellingan, your superior saw it fit that you were suitable experienced and qualified, without the formal certificates to prove that, that you were formally qualified to actually instruct people in terms of appropriate Criminal Legislation.

MR BELLINGAN: They had the necessary confidence in me and this legislation said you should always look at the various notes attached to the legislation and I always advised them rather look at the notes or at the memorandum of the legislation.

MS PATEL: You will accept that conspiracy to murder is not such a technical term that an average person with a bit of legal knowledge would not understand and appreciate the full import of?

MR BELLINGAN: It was told to me at the Holiday Inn by the TRC people, that was before the cut-off date, I wrote conspiracy there, because it is not my meaning, opinion today and that is why we have used different terminology.

MS PATEL: I put it to you, Mr Bellingan, that you have not made full disclosure to this Committee and that you have misled the Committee and, more importantly, you have misled the victim's families and through that, you have misled the nation.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I do not agree with this statement.

MS PATEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson, that is the end of my cross-examination.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Bellingan, just a few aspects. If you, you have already told us that you are applying for amnesty for other deeds?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And without going into any further detail, are there cases for which you apply for amnesty, because you have executed a person?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: It was suggested to you that, for one or other reason, you have not made full disclosure and are only telling half truths. If you, as alleged by the other witnesses, if you have dragged this person from the car and shot him dead and if it could be argued that you have shot him dead while he was lying on the ground or that you have planned to ambush these people and shoot them dead, is there any other reason why you think you should not apply for amnesty?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: One aspect which surprised all of us is the question that you are now saying that you can recall that you did, before this incident, visited the scene together with Mbane. Is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage when we drew up your application, and I am referring to page 35, paragraph 22, yes, paragraph 22, page 31, page, paragraph 22, the information you provided there, was that how you remembered it at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you discuss this with Mr Liebenberg and he supported you in this sense?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And now, when it was put to you like, that was what Mbane said, you remembered that?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: If you had remembered that, that you and Mbane went to that scene the previous Friday, do you think that would, it would have affected your amnesty application in any, one or other way? For example, if you have inserted here that we visited that scene?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I believe it would have put the truth on the paper.

MR BOOYENS: Do you think it would have prejudiced you?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You have been confronted with medical testimony of wounds, etcetera. Can you comment on the medical evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I cannot. I agree with what it says.

MR BOOYENS: Can you comment at all, do you know in which position this man's head or body was at the moment when you pulled the trigger?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I could not see it. I was, I just saw this man and I shot him. I just saw the hand, I did not know whether his head was turned around or halfway turned around. I cannot remember.

MR BOOYENS: At the stage that you shot him, did you come running towards him, were you moving or were you standing still?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I was moving.

CHAIRPERSON: Which direction?

MR BELLINGAN: I was running towards the Kombi, towards the back, so that in case the hand grenade exploded, I could go for cover.

CHAIRPERSON: If the hand grenade exploded when you were two or three metres away, you would not have much chance to go to cover, would you? You were running towards somebody who, you say, was threatening you with a hand grenade in his hand, looking as if he was going throw it to you and if you shot him, he would drop the, that hand grenade and you would be going right towards it. Is that what you are saying?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I would have moved to the right of him and tried to hide behind the Kombi.

CHAIRPERSON: But you had no idea how, when the grenade would go off, you were going towards. I find it very hard to accept that anyone would voluntarily go towards a hand grenade that, in the circumstances, was triggered.

MR BELLINGAN: I was moving towards the intersection, when I reached the intersection I saw this man, so I was already at the so-called danger point.

MS PATEL: Mr Chairperson, I am not sure whether I would be allowed to do this, but there is a point that I wish to raise on this that I have omitted.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL

MS PATEL: Thank you.

Mr Bellingan, can you remember in which hand Mr Konile was carrying the instrument?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I cannot.

MS PATEL: All right, then I will leave it there. Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS (cont)

MR BOOYENS: With possible further relating, relations to the hand grenade question. If the hand grenade is in someones hand, is it already dangerous?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: But now I am saying, that has it been fused, is it ready to explode?

MR BELLINGAN: Not necessarily, it depends on whether the pin has been pulled out.

MR BOOYENS: And you saw the person with what you thought was a hand grenade, you shot him. Did you then take cover after he fell or did you not?

MR BELLINGAN: I was at the back of the Kombi and that was my cover and nothing happened. Everything happened very fast.

MR BOOYENS: So, to summarise, you saw the hand grenade, you shot him, he fell and you ran in behind the Kombi?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct, I moved to the right-hand side.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: A few questions. Firstly, I have a few questions. Firstly, I have already raised the question of wanting to be informed of the other ten matters in which you are applying for amnesty for, the schedules, which we have not had made available to us as yet.

MR BOOYENS: Can I deal with that, Mr Chairman? As far as I know, only skeleton applications have been filed thus far. The reference you will find, the only reference and the other documents, we were instructed at a fairly late stage, the other documents are in the process of preparation, so what you will find will be hand written wisdom and not much more. So, in other words, referring to page 21, Schedules one to six and eight to 11 does not, is not yet in the possession of the Commission. So, please, if anybody deserves to be reprimanded for that, it is not my learned colleague on the other side, it is me.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it be possible for you just to prepare a list? Cosatu House, I take it, is a bombing and the date of them, really.

MR BOOYENS: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: That, to get some sort of sequence of the events, if you could put, are they in the date order, in one to 11, or not. If you could possibly, I do not want to see the details of them, just the date and the nature of the offence.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, what we will do is we will just, Cosatu House bomb and the date, if we can remember, and then also just what it was that happened in the specific instances.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, now, I want to ask you about page 18 of your application. The paragraph in about the centre of the page you refer to your return to Pretoria, had become more concerned in the total onslaught and he wanted you as a group leader to return to Vlakplaas and this is between, you remained there from 1985 to 1993.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you and your group were concerned with arrests and shooting incidents, when necessary, where many ANC, PAC terrorists were concerned.

"I can, unluckily, not remember all the names, the incidents and the dates where ANC, PAC terrorists were arrested or killed, because the documents have been destroyed."

Can you give us an indication of how many terrorists were killed by your operation, alleged terrorists were killed by your operations?

MR BELLINGAN: Cases in the Western Cape and where, we did not work there long. After the Guguletu 7 we opened a cell in Crossroads of freedom fighters and some of my members of staff or personnel were involved in inquests where people were wounded and, if I can remember correctly, were killed and in the Yengeni case, we were also responsible for the arrests together with other units, the arrest of Mr Yengeni and his group, that is, and people were also wounded there. I will have to ask Lieutenant Liebenberg if he has any statistics, but of my personnel were also involved in shooting incidents. There were incidents in Soweto where some of my personnel were involved as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, how many were there and how many people were killed?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: That you were responsible for, that you planned operations, that your people, your group performed?

MR BELLINGAN: If I say ten, then it is ten. I will have to go and enquire as to this, because all our documentation was destroyed at the security head office. I have no evidence, our colleagues do not want to speak to us to assist us in this case.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I find it difficult that you say here now, I will have to go and enquire. Surely, before you decide to apply for amnesty, you try to get the information of the various offenses you have been involved in, you discuss it with your attorney and your advocate, you do not say you will have to go and enquire now.

MR BELLINGAN: I asked them about shooting incidents where people were involved, is it necessary to apply for this or only for the controversial cases where we murdered people and then they said that the Guguletu 7 was one such incident, because I brought the weapons from Pretoria and that case, I was scared that I would get the, idea that we were ajan provocateurs. Some of my people did not apply for this.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, which were the cases where you murdered people?

MR BELLINGAN: It was in the case of Mr Brian Kalunga, the Dirk Coetzee bomb, there were foreign operations, Swaziland and Botswana and there was an incident in the canteen where I was not involved, which I had just had knowledge of.

CHAIRPERSON: Right. One other matter, I do not know if it is a waste of time or not, because I have not consulted with Mr Mbane, but you have been questioned, quite at length and it appears he is going to give evidence and I think that there are certain other things he has said which you should be given an opportunity to explain before he comes and gives such evidence, if he does and in his statement, not affidavit, which we have been given portion of, he says, and it is at page 393, paragraph 28, that while he was infiltrating these people, Lieutenant Liebenberg sent an informer by the name of Lizo, who was found to have a tape attached to his body, and that he, as Commander, decided to shoot the informer and killed him.

MR BELLINGAN: I have no knowledge of that incident. I know that he had an informer there, Lieutenant Liebenberg, but the first time I heard about this was whether, when my legal team informed me as to this paragraph.

CHAIRPERSON: So, he talks about having an urgent meeting with Lieutenant Liebenberg to ask him about it and he told him about it, you were not present and Lieutenant Liebenberg never told you?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I have no knowledge of such an incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Because he goes on and says at paragraph 13 that Lieutenant Liebenberg sent another informer, without his knowledge, who was also found with a tape and that he then instructed Chris Rastaman to shoot and kill him.

MR BELLINGAN: I have no knowledge of this.

CHAIRPERSON: And, finally, that yet another informer was sent by Lieutenant Liebenberg who was interrogated by Eric and who admitted that he was an informer and that he and Eric then shot and killed him.

MR BELLINGAN: I have no knowledge of that incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Nobody ever told you, none of your own people, none of your askaris, nor Lieutenant Liebenberg?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Have you got any questions.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Bellingan, you have stated throughout your evidence that the primary objective of the whole operation was to effect an arrest of the insurgents, that is so?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you believe that the askaris had succeeded to gain the trust and the confidence of the insurgents?

MR BELLINGAN: At stages I was told that the group did not trust them and that they were antagonistic towards them. So, I am not 110% sure that they were in control of this insurgents group.

MS KHAMPEPE: But they had been there for, according to your evidence, almost four weeks, whereas Mr Mbelo had not lasted a night. He only lasted one night.

MR BELLINGAN: They were trusted, but there was always the possibility that there could be a problem.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was it not possible for you to suggest to the askaris to convene a meeting of the group at a venue that you would have previously have discussed with the askaris, which would have, which would then have enabled your group to effect an arrest at a grand scale, because they would have been in one meeting?

MR BELLINGAN: That idea did occur to me, just as one wanted to arrest them, we tried to get them away from Guguletu, but they said that those people would not leave Guguletu. They were too scared of police roadblocks. It was raised, we looked at the West Coast Road, at the possibility of catching them there. These possibilities were investigated, but Mbane told me that those people were too careful and scared, they would not move outside the Black townships.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did Mr Mbane or Mr Maluleka ever told you the type of weaponry that the group possessed?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I was told from time to time what kind of weapons they had in their possession and how they could still obtain more if they needed them.

MS KHAMPEPE: And what type of weaponry were you advised were in their possession?

MR BELLINGAN: Hand grenades, AK47's and Western weapons, that is weapons that look like those of our countries security branches, were also in their possession from time to time and on occasion we found R5 army guns in a house in Guguletu.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, you also have stated that it was normal practice for Vlakplaas to pay, what you termed, head-money to askaris?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, what I want to know is, how was the amount determined?

MR BELLINGAN: If I can remember correctly, it was first

R1 000,00 per arrest or whether he was dead or not,

R1 000,00 per head and then later this amount was moved up to R2 000,00 or R2 500,00 and this was determined on merit. I cannot say how this was determined, it can, it was revised regularly. It could even be revised yearly.

MS KHAMPEPE: So, the amount was not dependent on the type of operation which had to be executed?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, if it was high risk, it could have been higher. It depended on the Commanding Officer. I only gave the motivation and they gave the motivation to the Secret Fund Department.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, on this occasion there were no arrests?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it was either dead or alive.

MS KHAMPEPE: So, on what basis did you proceed to effect a, head-money of R7 000,00 to each askari?

MR BELLINGAN: I included this all in my report with a covering letter. I would give it to Colonel de Kock and he would send it to Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Schoon would take it to the Commanding Officer of the Security Police. I could not decide what the amount was to be.

MS KHAMPEPE: No, why did you pay R7 000,00 to each askari, because there were no arrests which had been effected?

MR BELLINGAN: Because there were seven dead freedom fighters, so we claimed money for them.

MS KHAMPEPE: So, you, in fact, paid head-money, because there were seven corpses?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were the askaris aware that there would be head-money in the event of there being of, in the event of people dying during the operation?

MR BELLINGAN: No, that was a motivational mechanism to point out some of their former freedom fighter colleagues.

MS KHAMPEPE: But were they aware, prior to this incident, that they would get head-money?

MR BELLINGAN: It was a general policy at Vlakplaas, it was not only for this specific case, every case that took place a certain amount of money was paid and he was aware of the fact when he arrived at Vlakplaas that he would work, be working be head-money.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, prior to this arrest, are you aware of Mbane having received head-money?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he did receive his money.

MS KHAMPEPE: Prior to this incident?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I cannot remember. I know that thereafter he was also involved in successful operations where freedom fighters were caught or killed and he received money for this, but I cannot say whether he was in, which operations he was involved in before this.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, was it normal practice for Vlakplaas, also, to give head-money to people like Mr Mbelo who were part of the police unit?

MR BELLINGAN: It was also brought in later, because they did not want the Black policemen to become negative. That is why they also gave them a bonus.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now, why was Mr Mbelo, if you did not want to create some antagonism, why was he only paid R1 000,00?

MR BELLINGAN: Because he also infiltrated and he placed his life, his life was at stake and Colonel de Kock believed that if he also put his life at stake, that he would also get some money for the operation.

MS KHAMPEPE: Why was he not paid R7 000,00 like the askaris?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot say.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you put through the motivation, did you not?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, all the telexes and encoded messages, I gave this to Colonel de Kock and he decided what the amount was to be and who was to receive what.

MS KHAMPEPE: And his decision was really based on your motivation?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, all the encoded messages.

MS KHAMPEPE: Bear with me, I just want to see if there is something that I have not left out.

Now, at the meeting at Wingfield you gave instructions to your group that if their lives were in danger, they had to shoot to kill?

MR BELLINGAN: What I did say was that, when we walked out there, we are not to endanger ourselves today, so that, it is not going to be easy. I must have created the perception among them that we were not to fail.

MS KHAMPEPE: But what words did you use? I mean, according to Mr Mbelo, he says that you used the word "sweep", "take out", you had to take the insurgents out.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot recall my exact words. I might have created that impression, yes, that perception.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was it customary for people in Vlakplaas to use convoluted terms instead of simple words like "arrest", I mean, if you cannot remember you could have said it? Was it customary for you not to say "arrest the insurgents" or "kill the insurgents", but you used other words which were not that simple?

MR BELLINGAN: It was general terms among policemen, not only at Vlakplaas. That when they went to the border they would also say "we will take them out" or "do them in". It is a general, general terminology which was not only just used at Vlakplaas.

MS KHAMPEPE: And that meant to arrest, in your case?

MR BELLINGAN: If you take the word "take out" and "do in", that means to kill. The Defence Force used a term "eliminate". We always said that he was "done in" or "taken out" and we interpreted that as being killed.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was Mr Odendal the person who gave instructions to the whole group at Wingfield on the third of March?

MR BELLINGAN: He was the senior there who led the whole planning.

MS KHAMPEPE: To your recollection, do you think he also used the same words?

MR BELLINGAN: I do not think so, because he was a uniformed man and we did not know one another. It is not terms that you would use in front of strange people, only if one knew these people would you say we would "take them out" or "do them in". These are terms that one would only use if one knew one another.

MS KHAMPEPE: He was the one who gave instructions to the whole group, is it not so?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was in charge of the whole group.

MS KHAMPEPE: To your recollection, what instructions did he give in respect of this operation? What were individual members supposed to do?

MR BELLINGAN: The idea of the whole group was to try to arrest these group, this group when they arrived there and if there was a shooting then each person would have to think for himself.

MS KHAMPEPE: You hand picked a large number of the people who participated in this operation, that is the evidence you gave yesterday?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: And you had to select people who would be able to think on their feet, that is the evidence you gave?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Did you hand pick Mr Sterrenberg?

MR BELLINGAN: I would have told Mr Odendal to get people who know how to handle situations. I met him, I would have phoned him or Mr Odendal would have phoned him. I could not just have said you must come. I would have told Mr Odendal you choose your people, but I would have said, for safety reasons, I know him, so I think that he should be chosen. Murder and Robbery would have sent their people. I would have said that we are looking for people who have worked in counter-insurgence actions or operations and who can think on their feet.

MS KHAMPEPE: When was this selection made of the group of police?

MR BELLINGAN: It might have been that I told this to the Commanding Officers on Friday or Sunday afternoon after the meeting, that we phone them to come in. I cannot say exactly when.

MS KHAMPEPE: You are aware of the evidence that Mr Sterrenberg gave during the Weaver Trial that his intention at shooting one of the insurgents was not to arrest, but to kill?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, because that member was starting, was shooting at all the other members and it ended up in a fight and he did intend to go and shoot that man when that man started shooting on the others. That is how I understood it later.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV MOTATA: I just want clarification on a few items and I will start off by following what my sister asked you, that your main objective was to effect arrest and we look at the events of the askaris who were being sent in to Guguletu to go and look for these people and identify them. That took approximately four weeks, is that not so. Did they give descriptions of these people they were meeting of and when they were giving you feedback?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, they gave me descriptions, which language they spoke and where they came from.

ADV MOTATA: So, you had an idea how they looked like?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I had a reasonable idea.

ADV MOTATA: Now, you said in your evidence that they were moving from place to place. What I want clarification on is that every time the askaris came and gave a report, they could go back and find these people even though they were moving from place to place.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, the askaris had their ways of making contact. They had their methods of making contact with these people.

ADV MOTATA: Was there no possibility of following these askaris to see where they lived, so that effects, arrests could be effected?

MR BELLINGAN: Those were very difficult circumstances which prevailed those years, there were no addresses, you could not walk there, whistles were blown when we entered. We also thought that we had to get them out to another place, but this was not viable. We tried it.

ADV MOTATA: What I mean is that following the askaris surreptitiously that you are not even noticed by the askaris where they are going, that you must identify the house and, at least, arrest some people there. That is what I mean.

MR BELLINGAN: It was very difficult.

ADV MOTATA: To follow askaris?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, walking around in these areas was very difficult.

ADV MOTATA: Now, on this particular day, the third of March 1986, you had anticipated that the mini-bus would be attacked, is it not?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

ADV MOTATA: And when the mini-bus went through, you had either to disperse or just move around, because the danger you had anticipated was no longer there?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

ADV MOTATA: Now, when these people came back you had to defend yourself, because the ambush you had laid or preplanned was no longer feasible. Now you had to react to an attack to you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

ADV MOTATA: Now, if you were reacting to a personal attack, how could you come here and say to us, no, I want amnesty for that attack which I was defending myself?

MR BELLINGAN: As I have been told before, I played the role of an ajan provocateur. I brought people in, I let people, other people come in here with weapons, there were allegations that I had shot that person to death wrongly. Nobody wants to say who is making the allegations. I decided that I want to put, place this on the table and ask, if possible, if it is necessary, if my colleague and I can receive amnesty or be granted amnesty for this.

ADV MOTATA: For somebody who attacked you and you defended yourself, you want amnesty for that, that is what you are saying?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, and there are people who say that we lured them from Pretoria, that we trained them here and we were said that we actually came to lure them here. I did not know where I was standing and that is why I applied.

ADV MOTATA: Just to go back, in Annexure C, you are saying that at least you knew one where lived. There is a house number you gave, NY21, if I am not mistaken. Is that not an identifiable place? I will give you the page, C, Annexure C. It would be, my page is marked B1, B2, C1, it would be C3, at least, we see that there is somebody, just hold a second. Yes, C, there will be three in brackets. Yes, that would be the one. If you look at three, the second sentence,

"He is living at NY21 presently.",

but there is a mark before that, but it will appear 21, Guguletu. At least we know a house. C3 on mine. No, there would not be a date up there, Part Two. Update will mean Part Two. As you have the pages, just forget that, count the pages, one, two, three, four, the fifth page. Ja. Let me give you mine. No, page three, page three you need, three in brackets, the second sentence.

"Somebody is living at NY21."

MR BELLINGAN: NY121, Mr Chairman.

ADV MOTATA: "He is presently living at 21 or 121",

but, in any case, it is a number.

MR BELLINGAN: As far as I know the NY1, NY21 were the names of streets, it is not a specific house address.

MS KHAMPEPE: Just to follow on that one, Captain Bellingan, you know, I think the problem of addresses being absent in houses in Black townships was not something which was peculiar to the Western Cape. In fact, it was a prevalent problem and people had deliberately erased addresses in their houses to prevent the security police from effecting arrests or to make things difficult for the police to identify the people's houses, the activists houses, but that did not stop the security police from effecting an arrest, because they had to employ other means, I mean, diagrams were drawn and street maps were used of certain places ... (intervention).

MR BELLINGAN: I agree.

MS KHAMPEPE: ... and if you really wanted to address that problem, I think you could have done so. It was not an insurmountable problem.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I agree, we had many addresses, I do not know which addresses, where people were apprehended, but I cannot remember ... (end of tape 2B) at which addresses, but I do agree with you.

ADV MOTATA: Just lastly, these, the deceased, the Guguletu 7, did you know any of them whether they committed crimes prior to the incident on the third of March 1986?

MR BELLINGAN: According to my reports, I have mentioned in which hand grenades attacks, stone throwing, etcetera, they were involved.

ADV MOTATA: So, hence, it would have made sense to say, let us sweep them up?

MR BELLINGAN: It would have made sense, because if they shot at us it would have happened.

ADV MOTATA: Thank you, I have got no further questions.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Bellingan, I am sorry to be doing this, the R7 000,00 which was paid to the askaris, where was it paid? Was it at Koeberg or at Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: As far as I know it was a process which took two to three weeks. It would have been paid at Vlakplaas usually. One of the members could have come to Cape Town, one of the Warrant Officers came here, it could have been like a month or a few weeks later on, we could have paid him at Koeberg. There was no standard procedure. The only thing we believed in was that he had to be taken as quickly as possible to a bank. We had a bank account so that the money would not get lost.

MS KHAMPEPE: I find that very intriguing that you had to quickly take them to the bank.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, what had happened at Koeberg is that they received their monies, it is about R700,00, and that evening they go to a bar and they come back just with their underwear on. We were busy with the rehabilitation process.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you remember what bank you made use of?

MR BELLINGAN: It would have been the bank preferred by the individual.

MS KHAMPEPE: So, if Mr Mbane says that payment was effected at Vlakplaas, you would agree with his version?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, if that was what he says, it is correct. I cannot remember in each individual case where payment was made. Responsible people would take their money and go to the bank themselves, but there are a few difficult customers when you had to take them to the bank.

MS KHAMPEPE: They were not that responsible?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I was responsible Ma'am, Mr Chairman, oh, sorry.

MS KHAMPEPE: I am just saying this, because I seem to recall you saying yesterday that payment was effected at Koeberg. That is not so?

MR BELLINGAN: I think that was Mr Mbane.

MS KHAMPEPE: Okay, okay, okay, thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: I do not think that we can go on for the moment. Two o' clock. We will now adjourn till two o' clock.

MS PATEL: Would everyone please rise. Thank you.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: (Still under oath).

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, have you got any questions arising from the Committee's questions?

MR BOOYENS: No, Mr Chairman, the only thing that remained behind was the viewing of the video. It was not here when we came up earlier on and I, quite frankly, think the video is available, there is only the one issue as if to whether there were other people with blue jackets, it can be viewed. I think it will be just a waste of time to start running around the video once again. It is there, it is evidence before the Court.

CHAIRPERSON: If anybody wants to refer us to any aspect of it, they can do so.

MR B WILLIAMS: Mr Chairperson, if I may raise it at this particular point. I have received a request from the families of Mrs Konile, Mr Miya, Mr Mjobo and Mr Piet, if they could address just one or two questions to Mr Bellingan. I would like to know what the Committee's attitude is towards that. My personal feeling is that it may be part of the process. I would like to know what the Committee's view is.

CHAIRPERSON: You are representing them, are you not?

MR B WILLIAMS: That is so your, that is so Mr Chairperson, the ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: What sort of questions do they want to address personally?

MR B WILLIAMS: Your Worship, I represent them as their legal representative. My feeling is that these are not necessarily legal questions that relate to the merits, I think they are questions of a personal nature and I would ask that the Committee consider allowing them the opportunity to address one or two questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I am reluctant to turn amnesty applications into emotional incidents which are rather the type of inquiry held by the Truth and Reconciliation itself. On the other hand, if they are here and they are literally one or two questions which they wish to, I do not want to make life difficult for them. Can you explain to them that provided they limit their questions and it is just one or two, they will be allowed. Do you have any objection?

MR BOOYENS: M'Lord, depending on the relevance and so on, one can understand what is going on here. I would rely on your Lordship. I reserve my rights to object, I will not, a right, which as your Lordship know, I do not exercise too freely.

MR B WILLIAMS: Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson. I, when I discussed the matter I had indicated that should the Committee exercise the discretion in their favour that it would, at the most, be limited to one or two questions and I hope that that will be followed. Thank you very much. If I could then just ask Mrs Konile to come to the chair.

To the members of the panel, this is Mrs Konile and she is the mother of Mr Zabonki Konile, one of the deceased in this particular matter.

QUESTIONS BY MRS KONILE

MRS KONILE: I would like to ask Mr Bellingan that, whether he says me and that I am the mother of the man he killed, he killed my one and only son. He is asking for amnesty, what does he think about me and what does he say about me as well as Konile's child and what does he say with regard to the sweeping that he was directed to do?

I will never ever forgive Bellingan and my entire family does not want to forgive Bellingan, because he says he was doing his job, that his job was to kill people and I am through.

CHAIRPERSON: That does not really call for an answer, does it? Is that all she wishes to say?

INTERPRETER: There is an interference with the interpreting service.

MRS KONILE: I am through.

CHAIRPERSON: Does Mr Bellingan want to make any remarks?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I do not want to comment at this stage.

MR B WILLIAMS: That is all that Mrs Konile wishes to say.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MRS KONILE

MR B WILLIAMS: Mr Andile Mjobo, he is the brother of Zennith Mjobo, also one of the deceased in the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Is he to ask questions or is he to express his families views, because that can be done after we have completed the applicant's evidence.

QUESTIONS BY MR MJOBO

MR MJOBO: I want to ask a question.

Good afternoon Mr Bellingan. The question I want to ask from you, as you told us that you are a Christian, have you come to ask for forgiveness or have you come to kill us even more emotionally?

CHAIRPERSON: Anything else?

MR MJOBO: There is no other question that I want to ask, but I want to know whether he has to come ask for amnesty or he has come to mislead us and kill us emotionally or disturb us emotionally.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MJOBO

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is fairly clear that this is an application for amnesty.

MR MJOBO: I do not see him asking for forgiveness, because he keeps on saying that he does not remember some of the things and Mr Benting says he does remember where he was, but with him there is a lot that he does not remember. I do not see him asking for amnesty, I think he has just come to destabilise the whole process of amnesty. As a result, I will never ever forgive him. He has just come to disturb us and destabilise the whole process.

CHAIRPERSON: You may go. I am not prepared to allow further matters of this nature if this is all they have to say. This is not asking questions.

MR B WILLIAMS: Your Worship, if you would just permit Mrs Cynthia Ngewu, she is the mother of Christopher Piet, she had indicated to me she would want to ask a question, your Worship.

QUESTIONS BY MRS NGEWU

MRS NGEWU: I am Christopher Piet's mother.

Mr Bellingan, at the time that you shot my son, he was dragged with the use of a rope. Why did he have to drag my son. As a Christian, could he not pick my son up and put him wherever he was supposed to be put? Why did he have to drag him using a rope?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman and Madam, the reason why we did that, there was information and it was the usual practice from freedom fighters that they had a hand grenade under their bodies and to prevent that somebody gets hurt, it was the usual practice to drag that body with a rope, to turn it round and to see whether there was a hand grenade. That was the reason why that was done and for no other reason.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's ...

MRS NGEWU: After my son had died, you still dragged him. What do you have to say about that?

CHAIRPERSON: The question has been answered. If you listened, he explained that the reason why they move bodies like that, from a distance with a rope, is in case there is a hand grenade under the body which will explode when the body moves. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MRS NGEWU

MR B WILLIAMS: And we have one final member of the Miya family. Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson.

QUESTIONS BY MRS MIYA

MRS MIYA: I am Jabulanie Miya's sister.

I do not have a question personally, but there is a question from Jabulanie's daughter who is a 12 year old by now and her name is Sibusiso. She gave me this letter this morning when she heard that I was going to attend your amnesty hearing.

"To the police that killed my father. Why did you kill my father and if this question is hard to say, it was not hard to kill my father."

She is asking you, the killer of her father, to answer it.

MR BELLINGAN: We did not hear the question.

MRS MIYA: I will repeat the question.

"To the police that killed my father. Why did you kill my father and if this question is hard to say it, it was not hard to kill my father."

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I was not responsible for that persons death. So, I cannot comment on that question.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MRS MIYA

MR B WILLIAMS: Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson, the families are indebted to you and to my colleagues as well.

MR BOOYENS: That is the evidence I intend calling, Mr Chairman.