Amnesty Hearings

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I call to the witness stand Colonel Hendrik Johannes Petrus Botha. He will give his evidence in Afrikaans, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Number 1 is it?

MR VISSER: I'm sorry. Mr Chairman, it's number 1 in Bundle 1 of the Zandile case, it's page 1 and following.

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Botha, you are an applicant and you apply for amnesty in terms of the Act and furthering of reconciliation with regards to any irregular acts, omissions or offences which was committed with regards to the kidnapping and detention and elimination and then the coverup of the death of Phila Portia Ndwandwe whose MK name was Zandile and we will refer to this person as Zandile as well as the arrest and the detention and the elimination and the coverup of the death of Bumezu Ngubene and we will refer to this person Bumezu and also the arrest, detention and elimination and the later cover up of the death of Sibo Sizwe Nglovu, Manzi Vilakazi, Elias Gift Mjali and we will refer to these people as the kwaMashu three, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on for the sake of clarity, as far as I'm concerned, can we call this bundle, Bundle 2, call the first bundle the Bhila bundle, Bundle 1, this is Bundle 2.

MR VISSER: And could we then immediately renumber the other bundles as well Mr Chairman because it will make it so much easier. Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

Your application, for the sake of the record, we'll find that in Bundle 2, pages 1 - 23?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You are aware and you know the contents of your written application of which there is an extract in the pages we've just mentioned, pages 1 -23. Do you confirm that the contents thereof is correct with the exception of that which you might explain in your evidence later?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You ask for the incorporation into your evidence the document which is known as the document which is known as "The Foundation for Equality Before the Law" and also the submission of General Johan van der Merwe as well as the statement of ex-Generals and we know that the Foundations document is in volume 3 page 169 to page 404 and General van der Merwe's submission, Volume 2 page 126 - 156 and the statements of the ex-Generals, as they are referred to, in Volume 2 page 157 to page 168. Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Botha, please tell us about your background, where you come from, where you were born etc?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I was born on the 2nd January 1953 in Lamberts Bay in Western Cape. I was brought up in South West Africa. In 1969 my parents moved to Oshakati in Ovamboland and I went to boarding school in Windhoek where in 1971 I matriculated at the high school in Windhoek.

MR VISSER: During the time whilst you were growing up in South West Africa which is now known as Namibia, under what political influences did you find yourself?

MR BOTHA: I grew up in a National Party house, my parents were conservative and consequently our outlook and discipline in the house was conservative in nature.

MR VISSER: Yes and in the time whilst you were in South West was there then already talk of the bush war in Ovamboland?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson yes, in 1969 Ovamboland was quite a quiet place. After I joined the police force the increase in terrorism in Ovamboland was increasing and it escalated to such an extent that with the civil war in Angola it was part of the process and was part of the consequences of that war in Nambia.

MR VISSER: You already said that in 1971 you matriculated and then, did you immediately join the South African Police force?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson, that same year I joined the South African Police. I was for six months a student constable at the police in Windhoek and for six months I received my training in the Police College in Pretoria in 1972.

MR VISSER: You are now referring to page 3 of Volume 2 where you give a summary of your police career, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: But you can just quickly summarise it for us?

You did a security course 1972 to 1973 in Pretoria and you also you were promoted from 1973 to 1981 from Constable to Sergeant, Warrant Officer and Lieutenant in the security branch in Windhoek, South West Africa?

MR BOTHA: That is correct sir.

MR VISSER: Just in order to explain to us, your police career, you had three different force numbers, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: I think you have stated it?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: You put it in the margin on page 3. All three of them are there Mr Chairman, you will see in the margin 59737M and then 000161 and 405290/1. In 1983 you came to Durban, that was a transfer, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You were then a Lieutenant in the South African Police?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were transferred to the security branch in Durban?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And there you did service until November 1993?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In that time which we are talking of you were promoted to Captain and then Major and then Lieutenant Colonel, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And later you became the commander of the intelligence unit of the security branch here in Durban or Port Natal?

MR BOTHA: Yes, it was the intelligence unit in Natal, it was after the three of them amalgamated.

MR VISSER: I apologise, yes. You also say that since November 1993 up until 30 November 1996 you were promoted to Superintendent Intelligence Management Internal Security Mpumpulanga Province and that Mpumalanga, is that in the Transvaal?

MR BOTHA: Yes, the old Eastern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: And you left the South African Police Force on the 30th November 1996 with a package, a severance package. Can you please tell the Members of the Committee about your background and approach which you experienced during the time whilst you were serving as a police officer and in general just sketch your political background with regards to your job as a police officer.

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, directly after my security course training in Pretoria I went back to South West Africa and I worked there at the security branch. As the bush war escalated and because I was involved in the security branch in Windhoek I was tasked with the gathering of information South of the Red Line as it was called and we weren't really exposed to terrorism in the terms of the bush war in Ovamboland itself. After the civil war in Angola and with the escalation of the bush war there was also internal terror which was on the increase in South West Africa and in 1975/76 we found the first acts of terrors in the urban areas in Windhoek and in Swakopmund and then it made us quite aware of the urban terror. Because we lived in South West Africa and we were aware of the war in Angola it became an everyday way of life and it was not something that you only took notice of, something that happened far away from you and consequently your whole life was directed towards this.

With my transfer to the division in Durban in 1983 I also experienced here that Natal at that stage was already a target of the liberation movements.

MR VISSER: And with everything that went along with it?

MR BOTHA: Yes absolutely, terror whether it was directed at Government institutions, individuals or police officers, it was something that happened every day and it was quite a new experience for me in terms of the liberation movements, that is the ANC and the PAC and other surrogate organisations of these liberation groups.

In 1983/84 there was a great increase in terror in Durban specifically and Durban, which was the head centre of the division for Port Natal, was the target of such acts of terror.

MR VISSER: Can you just please tell the Committee and give them an outline of the structures which was valid here in Port Natal? We know that Mr Steyn, the then Brigadier, was the Division Commander. I'm jumping ahead now, but if we can just get to the relevant facts, we can return to '83/'84 later on if you want to, but in '87 what was the structures then?

MR BOTHA: In 1987 Colonel Steyn, the later Brigadier was the Commander of the security branch.

MR VISSER: And he is also one of the applicants in this case?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the terrorist unit, how were they constituted?

MR BOTHA: In 1983 when I arrived in Durban the terrorist unit was under the command of Captain Andy Taylor?

MR VISSER: Was he Captain then already?

MR BOTHA: Yes he was a Captain then already and was mainly directed at the investigation of terrorism, under the Act of Terrorism.

MR VISSER: The Act of Terrorism only really came to light later. When was it promulgated?

MR BOTHA: In 1973.

MR VISSER: Then I'm making a mistake, sorry. Please continue.

MR BOTHA: And later the same unit, as there was a bit of a shift in the approach as to when it comes to stopping the terrorism and fighting it, this unit as an investigation unit divided into two units or sub-units if I can call it that, Chairperson. Mainly in command was Colonel Andy Taylor with an investigation unit directly under his command and there was an MK intelligence unit which was under my command.

MR VISSER: Can you as far as 1987 is concerned tell us what was the extent as far as manpower was concerned within the terrorist unit and then also the investigation part and also the intelligence part?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson in total at the security branch we were about 200 members. C Section, as our unit was known under the command of Taylor, existed out of 18 persons in total. It was an investigation component, administrative one and the intelligence component. The investigators, I'd estimate there were about six to eight of them. The administrative component, there were two members and the balance was made up by the intelligence component itself.

MR VISSER: So it was in the vicinity of eight people who worked at intelligence unit in 1987?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. Some of the members in the intelligence component, who are also applicants in this case was Major du Preez, Warrant Officer Wasserman and Sergeant van der Westhuizen.

MR VISSER: Did you support a specific or political party?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, since I was a child I grew up in a National Party house and as I grew older and the National Party was the governing party, I've always been a supporter, yes.

MR VISSER: And we now that the National Party had a policy of separate development and they adhered to this and they also promulgated this and it later became known as the policy of Apartheid?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you, in your younger years, experience any impulses in your milieu, the one you grew up in which makes you realise that this policy was wrong?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the situation then, who were the people you got into contact with since you were young?

MR BOTHA: The impressions I got as a child and that's also in my younger years I thought that the policy was implemented by the government of the day I thought it was correct and later in my police career I thought that we had to maintain this policy at all costs.

MR VISSER: And specifically the security branch, not true?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: Because we know the security branch and we've heard quite often they got involved in a political struggle with the liberation movements?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it's also so that since 1948, it's a question of history, the National Party was also the government of the country?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We also heard from other witnesses that within the security branch the members had to study literature of liberation movements etc., was it also in your case the same?

MR BOTHA: Yes it's correct, except for the fact that during my training at the security branch and also the courses I completed I was exposed to the literature of the ANC and the PAC and we had to study it in order to stop the revolutionary onslaught and also to understand it and because of the nature of my work, I often saw this kind of documentation so that we keep ourselves up to date.

MR VISSER: And these documents, especially those of the ANC/SACP Alliance was directed at encouraging the black population of South Africa to revolt in the country, is that not true, in order to take over the political power by means of violence?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the consequence of that?

Mr Chairman, may I just ask the interpreters to give an indication as to whether we're going at the correct speed? Yes thank you, it seems that we are.

Sorry, where was I? You referred to literature and you also referred to the extent thereof and you spoke in general terms. What was the consequence of this inciting political literature with regards to what was happening in the country, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, in order to stop the revolutionary onslaught in South Africa and also to understand it and the way we experienced it here in Durban, there were two dimensions to it, these were politics and the military part of it. The documents which were distributed was for the politicizing of the masses. Together with that, we found the infiltration of trained terrorists from abroad, with specific instructions and tasks and they committed acts of terror.

MR VISSER: And later on, maybe it's appropriate to say it now, the training started happening more and more internally?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. As there was an improvement in strategy, if I can call it an improvement, it shifted from external training to local training with an internal command structure.

MR VISSER: Yes and to which specific occurrences are you referring to when you speak about this internal component?

MR BOTHA: Here I specifically refer to operation butterfly which is the code name of an ANC operation

MR VISSER: Yes and we'll get to that. The component which you referred to, the military one that is, the one which caused these acts of terror, what influence did this have on your average member and also on yourself within the security branch? We're talking about these explosions, murders, etc?

MR BOTHA: In 1986, '85/86, we experienced that Durban was, as it was referred to in the media, the most bombed city in the world, that in one night we'd have five bomb explosions. You'd go from one scene to another, you'd actually walk from one scene to the other, that you experienced a motor bomb explosion a few days before Christmas, an explosion at a shopping centre where children became the victims of an act of terror and that in that same time, over Christmas that is, holiday goers and their Combi bus would be the target of another motor car bomb and it was only with the grace from above that the people after they got into the bus, nothing happened to them and this ate away at a person and you felt powerless against this onslaught which we couldn't stop.

MR VISSER: That this also motivated you to do more an more in order to try and prevent it?

MR BOTHA: Absolutely Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And as time went by was there also more and more pressure on the security branch specifically to try and normalise the situation?

MR BOTHA: Yes the pressure became worse daily, we had to do everything in our power to obtain the information and to stop this wave of violence at all costs.

MR VISSER: Now we don't have to go in that any further, we know that a few thousand people got injured and died and millions of rands worth of damage was caused in struggle of the past for political reasons, I just want to ask you this, did you ever commit any offence for any purpose other than to execute your duties as you saw them in order to stop the political struggle?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I never did it for my own personal gain, it was as a police officer.

MR VISSER: We also heard and we also saw it in the ANC submissions to the Human Rights Committee of the TRC that they, in Korea, followed the principle of revolutionary warfare, that's where they got it from and that they also implemented it here in the form of the four pillars of the struggle. We know what they are, we're not going to go through it again, the fact of the matter remains that this Committee has heard a lot of evidence concerning this and also when Mr Rosslee and Wasserman testified, it was evident that what you were dealing with was a multi-dimensional attack which took place on all the levels of society, it was political, economical, spiritual and together with that, the violent struggle, is that not true?

MR BOTHA: That is true, Chairperson, I think it was already decided in Vietnam.

MR VISSER: Did I say Korea?

MR BOTHA: Yes you did.

MR VISSER: Vietnam then. Now what do you say about the question of intimidation, how did this influence your work? Maybe you can just quickly tell us, from your perspective, what role did intimidation play in execution of your tasks and duties?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson as I've already said, the onslaught was multi-dimensional and from the propaganda struggle which led, the intimidation was one of that. The experience we had as police officers was that when we investigated a case your witnesses were intimidated and consequently the evidence in court became more and more vague and we had less and less success as a result. The masses and those who supported the government of the day was intimidated and they had to become part of the liberation struggle in some or other form. Stay away actions were propagated, protest actions and people were forced by means of violence to form part thereof.

MR VISSER: Or rather let me ask you, you believed or did you believe that the ANC/SACP, if they were to take over in the country they'd establish a dispensation in this country which would be acceptable to everybody and would also be advantageous to everybody?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: How did you see it then? What was your alternative if you look at the policy of the National Party?

MR BOTHA: If I can take it from the top to the bottom, the Government, the Police top structure and myself personally believed, none of us believed there could have been an alternative to the policy of the government of the day, which was the National Party. We had a democracy which was functioning. In retrospect, I believed that the apartheid system worked as far as I'm concerned. If communism or the Communist Party together with the ANC and the PAC, if they were to succeed to gain control by means of their revolutionary struggle, then we would have been left in chaos and that had to be prevented at all costs and I would have given my life to prevent that.

MR VISSER: Here in Natal, well let me put it this way, it's a matter of record, the ANC/SACP Alliance propagated their struggle through certain organisations, am I right when I say that?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Right here in Durban, which of these organisations came to your attention during this revolutionary struggle?

MR BOTHA: The most prominent ones that figured was the United Democratic Front and the Natal Indian Congress and there were other sub-organisations, sub-structures and I cannot get to their names right now.

MR MALAN: Name of few for us please?

MR BOTHA: I'm trying to think of some. There was a Durban Housing Action Committee, there were several protest organisations if I can term them as that.

MR MALAN: Do you not want to mention a few more so that we can get an idea. Were they organisations of the UDF or the organisations of the ANC or were they just in a general broader alliance, what are you referring to?

MR BOTHA: I refer to a broader alliance where they were involved and the easier answer would be if we look at the individuals involved, if you found one individual who was involved with three of these organisations and his own involvement was mirrored in these protest actions that were the order of the day.

MR MALAN: I do understand that, but you were responsible for intelligence, you were the chief of that section, you should be able to tell us to which organisations are you referring to?

MR BOTHA: You are correct if you say I was chief of intelligence but I was chief of MK Intelligence.

MR MALAN: So you did not work with this, please excuse me, I did not comprehend the question properly initially.

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, it must be my fault that I do not put the question clearly but just to address the issue that was addressed by Commissioner Malan.

Is it correct that the ANC amongst others was a banned organisation during this time in 1987/1988?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And is there any indication that organisations such as the UDF were actually an ANC organisation under the cover of something else?

MR BOTHA: That is true and that is how we saw it and we viewed it as an internal wing of the ANC.

MR VISSER: Yes and if I'm correct and Mr Malan can correct me but I think that the TRC in it's report found that the UDF incited violence? Was that your experience?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I can't say you're correct or incorrect, I don't know if that was the finding.

MR VISSER: I speak from what I read in the newspapers and not from the report itself. However, just to get back to the issue of intimidation and pressure by other organisations and the ANC you, in Natal, had to deal with necklace murders?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson, we dealt with necklace method, not in the same manner as in the Eastern Cape, but it did occur here as well.

MR VISSER: We know from history that on the 21 July 1985 there was a limited state of emergency proclaimed and that was lifted in March and from 12th June 1986 there was a general nationwide state of emergency that was renewed every year until it was lifted on the 8th June 1990 except for here in Natal where a few months later on the 18th October 1990 it was lifted. Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now during that time you were here in Natal as chief of MK Intelligence Unit and you combated this struggle?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now during this time of the state of emergency powers were given to the security forces, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Especially the security branch of the police and then especially in regard to detention without trial?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then I could ask you the question because these incidents for which you apply for amnesty falls within the time frame when there was constant state of emergency and the solution would be here, why do you not just detain the people than to kill them, what would the reaction be to that?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the detention would not necessarily stop the terror campaign, the information that was available to us according to the arrests and changes to the state of emergency came from another department in South Africa. Our own input from the security branch Port Natal was limited to the people we knew and whose activities we were aware of but the acts of terror was handled outside the framework of the state of emergency and we simply - to take an individual out of the system did not stop the acts of terror because the network was far broader than that, even right into Swaziland and during the same time information was available to us with the codenames Operation Mother, Burning Forest, Grey Clouds, Blue Seas. This was an ANC strategy and not only a strategy but a real implementation of infiltration of terrorists, political as well as military throughout the whole South Africa from the far North Transvaal to the Eastern Cape and you have referred to the Terrorism Act, that you also acted in terms of the Internal Security Act?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Mr Botha, many people in this country believed that in the state of emergency you could just take somebody and detain them. Was it done in that manner?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson, you had to have enough evidence as to the involvement of a particular person when this person was detained. His detention had to place a damper on the activity as well the role that he fulfilled in society where he would further these activities.

MR VISSER: Please excuse me maybe our roads left here, but is it not correct that - and the regulations that was applicable was available but you could not detain a person indefinitely but there had to come a time when one had to make a submission to the Minister and then a Minister had to authorise such detention, I think it was after 30 days?

MR BOTHA: After 30 days, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: However that may be, what did this experience teach you? These additional capacities that was given to you by the state of emergency, did this succeed in stopping the violence or eliminating the violence?

MR BOTHA: Definitely not Mr Chairperson, the contrary was true with the proclamation of a state of emergency with the arrests of prominent individuals it influenced the broader masses in such a manner that they were more incited.

MR VISSER: Yes and what you are referring to now is it also true in that certain movements were established in particular with regard to these detainees? We think of the Release Mandela Campaign that was not only concerned with the release of our current President but with other persons in detention as well and the Release the Children Campaign and these were all campaigns against detention, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Mr Chairperson

MR VISSER: Was this also the experience in Durban?

MR BOTHA: Yes we also experienced it in the same manner.

MR VISSER: And during this process Mr Botha, you were also obligated to protect the public?

MR BOTHA: That was our priority, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: All members of the public?

MR BOTHA: All members of the public, yes.

MR VISSER: Was it possible for you to not only for the security police but for normal policing - I think it's going to be held against me if I say normal policing - but for the police persons outside the security branch, could they not enter freely into the townships and to patrol there, was it possible, to protect those members of the public?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, policing in general and specifically black areas became more difficult, entry was limited and our movement was limited and in some instances there was a cordon, specifically Lamontville.

MR VISSER: This was also referred to as a no go area?

MR BOTHA: That is true Chairperson?

MR VISSER: And if police had to enter there at night, what would happen? What was your experience?

MR BOTHA: We would be the target of an attack.

MR VISSER: And this all added to the fact that you could not properly protect the civilians of these areas?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in this process Mr Botha, did you get the impression that anarchy reigned or was on the increase and could take over in this area?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson. At the end of 1986 that was definitely the feeling that we were losing the struggle and something had to be done to stop it before the country was enveloped in chaos.

MR MALAN: Can I just return to the previous question, you said that in certain areas it was more difficult to get into some places and you said "cordon sanitaire", what do you understand by that?

MR BOTHA: This referred to a specific black area, Lamontville, where police sealed off the whole area in order to re-establish order in that area and we did everything in our power, we delivered bread, milk and this was one of our attempts to establish order.

MR MALAN: Do you refer to it after that as a no go area, I don't think it was quite like that, I think the Advocate put it as a no go area, but I don't think that you meant it as that, I just wanted to clarify this?

MR BOTHA: I think what we are trying to say here or what I am trying to say is, the no go area stretched so far that we had to put up a cordon in certain areas so that we can do normal policing.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Commissioner, you have just exposed my ignorance of the French language, thank you for the correction.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought it was Afrikaans, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I thought it was Russian, my Attorney has just told me that it's French.

Mr Botha, in your attempts do you believe that you were indeed capable of combating attacks on civilians, buildings, holiday places etc through your actions?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Which actions were these?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I have just told you of the circumstances and how acts of terror took place. To understand this question correctly and to understand the answer of it, we had to make some adaptations and I'm talking here specifically about the security branch and the adaptation in terms of your own ability to gather information or intelligence and then the usage of such intelligence and by means of a pro-active or reactive action, the elimination of individuals. And during the same time in 1986 where the investigative unit was divided into two components ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: I don't want you to divert too far from the point and I see there's only a few minutes left but can we just end this issue? The gathering of information, was this important to you?

MR BOTHA: This was the primary leg of the security branch.

MR VISSER: Yes, it is that leg that told you or hopefully would have told you what was going to happen?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where you did not have any intelligence it was difficult if not impossible to act preventively?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Just in the remaining time - Mr Chairman, if you will allow me to interrupt the examination but we believe that we have to say something from a point of view of explanation to the members who are appearing, who are sitting with you today who have not been exposed to us, as it were, before. Mr Chairman, you will recall that on occasion in the past, certain cross-examination was directed to certain of the applicants for whom we appear in regard to precisely the point that Commissioner Malan raised this morning, that being that the applications are all basically the same. Mr Chairman, you will be reminded that there was one occasion, I can't remember which it was, but I believe it was in the Umzimkulu matter, where we explained to you and the panel then sitting with you, how precisely this came about and it concerns a long history of reticence on the part of policemen to apply for amnesty and how it eventually came about through the efforts of persons such as particularly General van der Merwe and also others that literally on number 99 decision was made to apply to support the process of the TRC and to apply for amnesty. When that happened Mr Chairman, my poor attorney was suddenly swamped.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sure "poor" is the wrong word, my "overworked".

MR VISSER: But he was swamped Mr Chairman and the best that they could do in order to get the applications in was to tell the word processor certain things and have it duplicated and basically it was intended that the words that are here would cover basically every conceivable situation. You would find for example - and that was the very point in Umzimkulu, but there's no cross border raised in things that we're talking about "what are you talking about when you mention that?" well that's exactly the problem which we encountered. But, Mr Chairman, tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock Mr Botha will tell you about the structures that Mr Malan was asking about today.

MR MALAN: I just want to make sure that I heard you properly Mr Botha and I look forward to tomorrow because I think this is of great importance to the greater intelligence and information surrounding the Commissions activities as to where the Commission has arrived in it's investigation and the amnesty process will give us much more information that we did not have. Before I ask you the question, let me tell you that from the Amnesty Committee we are well aware that the whole process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission starts with the amnesty process, that we can only get information from applicants.

The investigative capacity is severely limited and please do not think that there is the notion with the Amnesty Committee and all it's panels to lean more over when things come to a knife point as to the condition of amnesty, but this can only be done at a full disclosure and according to my experience, this is the thing that bothers the panel mostly and we feel sometimes that people are trying to avoid making full disclosure.

Did I hear you properly now, you said that your own capacity was limited, you intelligence gathering and usage thereof, it was decided on a proactive and reactive stage to eliminate some of the opposition?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MALAN: I'll leave it at that and Mr Visser can lead your evidence tomorrow, but this is one of the central points around which the amnesty application revolves so can you please speak as openly of this as possible?

MR VISSER: I hope I'm not misunderstanding you Commissioner Malan, that he does not say that there is the impression that the notion exists that they would rather give amnesty then refuse it?

MR MALAN: I am not speaking of impressions, if we have to take a decision then we would rather grant amnesty instead of refusing it and I want you to be aware of this, we are not here to oppose or refuse amnesty in principle. We hear it and we have to decide on it within the greater framework and in the interpretative, if that is the word, to have it play a role there. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS