CHAIRPERSON: Are we ready to proceed? Yes.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I see you're looking at me. Visser on record. Perhaps you would like some feedback on the position of the victims. I didn't make enquiries this morning. I see there's nobody here to represent them. Perhaps Ms Thabethe wishes to address you on that before we start with the incident.
CHAIRPERSON: Can we proceed in their absence?
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair. I will be representing the interests of the victims in this matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, they're not here, but we can proceed.
CHAIRPERSON: Thanks.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: They are aware of the fact that we are starting at half past nine?
MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, they were present yesterday, they are aware.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, before we get down to the amnesty application in regard to Mr Cele, we have made good our threat yesterday of drafting a further document for you in regard to the violence in Natal and which also refers to Operation Vula. If you have Exhibit A which we handed in yesterday, before you, Chairperson, could I ask you to turn to page 20 of Exhibit A and could I ask you and the Members of your Committee to tear out from page 20, the rest of those pages of Exhibit A. We will now hand to you a document which will run from page 20, which will replace the documents which you've now torn out.
Mr Chairman, while we're about handing up to you documents, we have prepared for you an extract from the written presentation made by the Foundation for Equality before the Law. You will recall, Chairperson, that that's quite a thick document. I've got one in my hand. You will recall - you will remember when you see the cover page, what that document looks like. We're not going to deal with that whole document. What we've done is we have extracted Chapter 17 from that document and Ms Thabethe has kindly assisted in making copies for you, Chairperson, and we will ask you to accept that as Exhibit B, which we'll hand up to you. Perhaps I should hand to you these documents now so that you can follow better. May I approach, Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do. You'll hand us the substituted pages as well?
MR VISSER: These are the substituted pages, Judge, that's part of a, b, c, d.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the substituted pages will be the first document. That won't be given a new exhibit number because that forms part of Exhibit A. And it now runs to page 35 if I'm not mistaken, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it does.
MR VISSER: Yes. Then you have a document which is headed "Chapter 17", we would ask you to mark that Exhibit B. That's the extract from the Foundation for Equality before the Law. B for bravo. Oh yes, my attorney just reminds me that that document, the Foundation's document, was the original Exhibit P45. So we mention that as well.
Then Chairperson, you'll see another document. That document has a chap, a rubber stamp on the top of it stating "Facts to Gail Wannenberg". Chairperson, this document was made available to us by the TRC on the last occasion when we appeared before your brother, Justice Wilson, Malan and Sigodi, in the other applications concerning Natal incidents.
We make that available to you, Chairperson. We won't specifically rely on it, we're not even certain whether all the detail here is correct. But it is an interesting document. It was compiled by a Dr Robert Henderson from Canada and it gives an interesting perspective on Vula. And that is for your own reading pleasure, Chairperson.
Then lastly, we hand up to you a summary of the evidence of Lt-Col Botha, who will be the first witness. And may we suggest that that be marked Exhibit D.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't propose to deal with the new pages 20 and further from the bar as it were, Col Botha who is now going to give evidence in the Cele matter before, when we commence with that matter, is far more au fait with the facts and we thought it better for him to run through that document with you, so that if there are any questions which may occur to the Members of the Committee, they could raise it with him because he's the ideal person to deal with issues which may arise from Vula and Butterfly etc.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Visser, I don't have a copy of Exhibit D, can you perhaps assist me please.
MR VISSER: I'm terribly sorry, Chairperson. Terribly sorry.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Yes. Well Mr Chairman, if you are satisfied so far, then we are ready to proceed with the Cele matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we appear in the kidnap and killing of Mr Dion Cele, on behalf of Col Botha, Col Vorster, V-O-R-S-T-E-R, and W/O Wasserman, W-A-S-S-E-R-M-A-N. Perhaps you would require the other interested parties perhaps to just place them on record, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well I think we already have, we did that yesterday.
MR VISSER: Alright. If I may proceed then, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: I call Col Botha to give evidence. He prefers to give his evidence in Afrikaans. He is ready to be sworn in. He had no objection to taking the oath.
H J P BOTHA: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Botha.
Mr Botha, you are an applicant for amnesty in the application with regard to the abduction and killing of Mr Dion Cele. He is also known as Mr Mbova, M-B-O-V-A Mzimela, M-Z-I-M-E-L-A. His MK name as Charles and he had an alias, Dion Cele. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Your amnesty application can be found in the Cele bundle, from page 19 to 34. Do you confirm the content and the correctness, with the exception of any amendments or adjustments that you wish to bring to the evidence of your official amnesty application?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the incident is at page 29 of the bundle. You will probably not find it necessary to refer to that bundle, in view of Exhibit D.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: But that is where it is - where it resides in that bundle.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR VISSER: You have also compiled a statement along with your legal representatives, in which you according to your current recollection have summarised the facts of the matter, and that can be found in Exhibit D.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you also confirm the content and correctness of Exhibit D?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.
MR VISSER: In Exhibit D you refer to Exhibit A, that is the general background, and do you have personal knowledge of the matters with regard to annexure A, insofar as they refer to Lesotho and Botswana?
MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Now with the exception of those two aspects, do you confirm according to your knowledge and insight, the correctness of Exhibit A?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: If we could then page through Exhibit A, I would like you to go to page 20 of Exhibit A, actually page 21. And then when I ask you to submit to the Committee the circumstances as you understood them with regard to Swaziland and Natal. Would you be able to do so please?
MR BOTHA: Certainly.
"Chairperson, during a summit which was held at Simonstown approximately at the end of 1980 or the beginning of 1981, during which all the members of the Security Committee were involved, among others a decision was made that the information collection and actions in Swaziland, even though they were situated outside the borders of the RSA, fell below the auspices of the Security Branch of South Africa for the purposes of the collection of information and the execution of duties."
MR VISSER: We are not really certain of the definition of operations in those circumstances.
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"Because the South African Police had no statutory powers to act in an independent neighbouring country, it meant that actions in Swaziland would be illegal.
However, an agreement was made with the Swaziland authorities two years before the Umkomati Accord, which made provision for actions in Swaziland prima facie."
MR VISSER: I see that we did not add this. The Umkomati Accord was signed in 1984?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And that means that the Swazi Accord would have been in 1982?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well.
CHAIRPERSON: This is the agreement with the Swaziland Government?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: 1982?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"It was the knowledge of the members of the Security Branch that intermittently from Mozambique through and in Swaziland, an active role was fulfilled by high profile MK members in the planning and execution of violent actions in the RSA. That weapons of war were smuggled by and through Swaziland to the RSA. That a great deal of terrorists had left the RSA and after they had completed their military training, had returned to the RSA via Swaziland. That there was an extensive network of safehouses and other facilities with which terrorists were supported. That financial and logistical support was provided to such persons in Swaziland.
Due to the geographical proximity of Natal to Swaziland, the activities of the liberation movements in Swaziland became known to Natal. The Security Branch Eastern Transvaal was naturally also affected by this. Due to their intelligence capacity, the Security Branch was kept up to date very well with activities and personalities and their activities in Swaziland.
The Security Branch was up to date regarding who the ANC operatives were and what their intentions were. By means of well-placed informers they regularly received information regarding the terrorists and weaponry that would enter the RSA, as well as the routes along which they would travel, as well as the situation of the DLBs and safehouses. The DLBs actually refer to weapon stockpiling location and not necessarily points of information. They also had knowledge about safehouses, contact persons and so forth, which placed them in a capacity to act in future.
Swaziland also played an important role in the execution of the ANC/SACP alliance's Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula. In Swaziland certain structures had been established by the ANC/SACP alliance and had been operated as such. There was an RPMC, a Regional Politico Military Committee under which the so-called political committee and a military committee functioned."
MR VISSER: Yes, and for the convenience of the Committee two quotes have been taken from the Further Submissions of the ANC to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 12th of May 1997. The first deals with the period from 1983 to 1985, and that refers to page 48 and 49 of that document. And the second refers to the period from 1985 to 1990, and that is from page 53 of that document. And that basically deals with the committees and the personalities involved in those activities.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now with Natal itself, could you submit to the Committee from page 25, paragraph 79. Chairperson, I'm going a bit quickly ...
CHAIRPERSON: That's quite alright.
MR VISSER: I suppose you understand what I'm referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: I'm referring to the Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of 12 May 1997.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Please do stop me if ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, you carry on.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
Please continue, paragraph 79 from Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA
"Chairperson, with regard to the province of Natal and with the exception of somewhat uncoordinated commission of violence which was experienced across the country, Natal suffered the consequences of two highly organised structures of the ANC/SACP alliance, namely Operations Butterfly and then Operation Vula.
Operation Vula which was established in the final phases of 1985 and went to 1990, but which was actually aimed at lasting much longer ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: It was a five year plan, isn't that so?
MR BOTHA: Yes. And it had to lead to the unleashing of a civil war.
"During the five years an infrastructure would be established within the country and weapons would be stockpiled within the country. And according to the plan the masses would be politicised to such an extent that they would spontaneously rise up if there would be a spark to the so-called flame.
By these means the Vula operatives did not commit violence ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: They were busy with preparations.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And we will hear later what the spark or one of the sparks at least were.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"Operation Butterfly was a structure of MK. In other words it was a purely military structure within the ANC, or at least a purely military operation within the ANC.
While those members shared very much the same objectives as Operation Vula, they were more violently oriented and committed acts of violence. Operation Vula in contrast was an operation of the SACP.
Initially, during the '80s, Natal was into three security divisions within the SAP, namely Division Natal with the head office in Pietermaritzburg, Division Port Natal, with the head office being Durban and Division Northern Natal, with the headquarters being Newcastle.
It is important to mention this due to the fact that over the period of the 1980s, initiatives were brought in from the three divisions which later became one, Division Natal."
MR VISSER: And in which year did this take place, can you recall?
MR BOTHA: I cannot recall the precise year, but I would think that it was in 1988 or '89.
MR VISSER: Very well. That is when there was only one Division Natal.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. In the following paragraph, 83, you have given a background of how your staff was numbered, with specific reference to Durban.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you have also given the position of Col Andy Taylor. And if we look at the bottom of page 26, where Mr Botha gives evidence, you say - and you refer here to the evidence that you gave in the Ndwandwe amnesty application.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: You say
"Mainly in command was Col Andy Taylor with an investigation unit directly under his command."
Now his unit was actually a unit that dealt with research regarding terrorism.
MR BOTHA: Yes, it was a terrorist unit.
MR VISSER: It was a terrorist unit. And furthermore you say in your evidence before Judge Wilson and the Committee Members
"And there was an MK Intelligence Unit, which was under my command."
That is below you.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And then we speak of manpower and you say
"Chairperson, in total at the Security Branch (and you refer to Durban) we were about 200 members."
Does that refer only to Durban?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that refers only to Durban.
MR VISSER
"C-Section as our unit was known, under the command of Taylor existed out of 18 persons in total."
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER
"It was an investigation component, administrative one and the intelligence component, the investigators, I'd estimate there were about six to eight of them."
And then you how many there were in the administrative component. And furthermore you say:
"Some of the members in the intelligence component, who are also applicants in this case, was Maj du Preez, W/O Wasserman and Sgt van der Westhuizen."
And that is still the same situation, not so?
MR BOTHA: Yes, the situation remains the same, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Well the situation here, Mr Botha, is that you weren't really a lot of people who could address the problem of the struggle of the past here in Natal, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue then, paragraph 84.
MR BOTHA
"Chairperson, Natal was a boiling pot of violence, especially from 1985 the violence escalated. Col Andy Taylor kept an informal record of incidents in which he kept record of the acts of terrorist as they manifested themselves. A copy of this was handed over to the TRC's Investigative Unit in Durban in 1997 and also served as an annexure or an exhibit in the Ndwandwe amnesty application."
MR VISSER: And there you refer to Exhibit A. Mr Chairman, this was a document written in manuscript, which we retyped at the time. We can hand it to you so that you can get the feel of the document. Mr Chairman, what it deals with is it deals with the dates, the places where violence took place, it gives a reference number, it gives a description of the type of violence and where there was a result it gives you that. We are not going to formally hand this in as an exhibit, but we will make this available to you to page through to get the general feeling of it.
CHAIRPERSON: If we require it we will do so.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you find that you would like that as an exhibit, then clearly we will reproduce it for you and we will hand it in.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. So in paragraph 85, the Exhibit A is this document here ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: That's the one that I've just handed to you.
CHAIRPERSON: ... that's the informal record kept by Taylor.
MR VISSER: Yes, that's the one I've just handed to you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Now we must just understand one thing, that that document isn't necessarily complete, it does not give everything necessarily.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR VISSER: But it gives a running commentary on the violence as it were, in Natal. Then Mr Chairman also in the Ndwandwe amnesty hearing, in the record at page 568 and following, that document is discussed and summarised in the evidence of Mr Botha. And we've given you that reference at page 27 of Exhibit A.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
MR VISSER: Now one of the things which took place here in Natal was the so-called Operation Butterfly.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And that is the one which fell below Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Could you inform the Committee with regard to the brief summary that we have compiled regarding Operation Butterfly please.
MR BOTHA: Chairperson - or before I continue, let me just explain to you that in the past MK operatives or trained terrorists would infiltrate the country, carry out an order which had been given to them, either in Zambia or in Swaziland, and then they would withdraw again. Either that, or in other circumstances they would be arrested, prosecuted and sentenced.
Now in the case of Operation Butterfly there was a shift of emphasis from the usual to an establishment of a high profile infrastructure within the RSA, consisting of trained MK operatives or terrorists, who wen they had established themselves within the country would be supported or were supported by local members of MK.
CHAIRPERSON: That's within the country?
MR BOTHA: That was within the country.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA
"During the investigation of Operation Butterfly and the activities of these persons and during the investigation and the trial of a case which was STATE vs DUDU BUTHELEZI AND OTHERS, case number 70/86, Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, this case being known as Ramlakan case, the existence of the first APMC, which Area Politico Military Committee and their activities under the operational name Butterfly, was exposed within the RSA. And this was the first time that such an operation had been identified within the RSA.
These activities included the infiltration of terrorists to Natal, the smuggling of weaponry, ammunition and explosives, the establishment and extension of structures, the training of terrorists internally, as well as acts of terror which were committed in Natal. In other words, he was recruited here, trained here, provided with weapons here and he immediately went over to commit acts of terror.
Now the Amanzimtoti limpet mine explosion on the 23rd of December 1985 was one of the more prominent examples of terror which were committed by this particular group."
MR VISSER: I'm told that we're going a bit too quickly, Chairperson.
Could you please proceed somewhat slower. It might just be a good idea to pause for second at the end of a sentence, so that the interpreters can catch up with your speech.
MR BOTHA: Very well.
The Amanzimtoti limpet mine explosion on the 23rd of December 1985 was an example of this. A person by the name of Andrew Zondo was found guilty regarding the placement of this bomb and later he received the death sentence for this.
The members of the so-called APMC consisted among others, of medical students who were connected to the University of Natal, under the leadership of one, Dr Ramlakan."
MR VISSER: Yes. And just to avoid confusion, APMC is also referred to DPMC from time to time, isn't that so? But it is the same thing.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct, and I will explain what DPMC stands for. It is Durban Politico Military Committee, because that was the area in which they were actively involved.
"And they were compiled from two groupings, namely externally trained terrorists, among others, Andrew Zondo and Robert Ndlanzi ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: N-L-A-N-Z-I. Very well.
MR BOTHA: Alias George Fakude. They were not the only ones, but they were just two of the more prominent members.
"The second grouping was the internal ANC/SACP supporters among others, including Dr Ramlakan and his spouse, Sandi Africa."
MR VISSER: ... it doesn't matter. Continue with the other names. Lulamela ...
MR BOTHA
"Lulamela Caute, Portia Ndwandwe, Percy Nlati, Pumezo Ncgweni, Dudu Buthelezi, Nokosipo Stanly Biela."
MR VISSER: Now Ndwandwe and Ngweni and Biela were also mentioned during the amnesty applications which have previously been heard before the Amnesty Committee right here in this very same hall in November 1998.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: This was before Judge Wilson.
MR BOTHA: That is so.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"Also involved in the DPMC or the APMC as it was known, were the following persons: Raymond Lala, alias MK Brazo ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And he is a victim in one of the incidents during which you have applied for amnesty for assault?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Then there's also Sandi Africa, Dr Ramlakan himself. Who was Kevin Qoboshiyane? Perhaps I should just spell that for the record; Q-O-B-O-S-H-I-Y-A-N-E. Who was he?
MR BOTHA: Kevin Qoboshiyane was also one of the trained ANC terrorists who came from the outside and became involved within the RSA.
MR VISSER: Then there's Mo Shaik and his two brothers, as well as his father.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And one Molana. I beg your pardon, did you want to say something with regard to Mo Shaik?
MR BOTHA: Yes, with regard to Mo Shaik's involvement it was a continuation of an activity in which they had been involved a year previously regarding the infiltration of a high profile ANC personality, Ebrahim Ismail, and they were involved with the DPMC. Information had been conveyed to the DPMC, which could be used by them in the establishment and accommodation of infiltrating terrorists.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA
"Directly after the Amanzimtoti bomb on the 24th and the 25th of December 1985, within 48 hours 52 persons who were connected to the DPMC were arrested. Among others, Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela. Approximately half of the arrested persons were later charged in the Ramlakan matter, including the latter-mentioned three persons."
MR VISSER: Very well, and in '93 you say that Robert Ndlanzi, alias George Fakude who we have referred to previously, had been in Natal for a week or so from Swaziland when these arrests took place and he was also arrested.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And he was also found guilty and sentenced with his involvement in Operation Butterfly.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And with regard to Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela, who were charged as you have stated in the Ramlakan matter, they along with a fourth person were discharged before the completion of the matter.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 95 it is stated that Ndwandwe had managed to recruit the remaining members who had managed to escape and created new units under her control, with which she continued to commit acts of terror within the Republic.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And that she left the Republic in 1987 and went somewhere overseas where she obtained military training. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And that after Tommy Zulu and Charles Ndaba had been transferred from Swaziland, she became the de facto commander of MK in Swaziland and she was also in control of the Natal operations of MK.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't been able to catch up. What is Ndwandwe's first name?
MR VISSER: Phila.
CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell that?
MR VISSER: P-H-I-L-A. Now it's either Porta or Portia. I think it's P-O-R-T-I-A. Commissioner Lax agrees with that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it should be.
MR VISSER: And Ndwandwe is N-D-W-A-N-D-W-E.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you I have that. Thank you.
MR VISSER: And then you refer to the evidence that you have given in this regard, with reference to the Ndwandwe matter, volume 3 page 466 to 467. Could you then briefly address us regarding Operation Vula, on page 30, paragraph 97 and following.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
"Operation Vula, and as it appeared from the document which was compiled by Ronnie Kasrils "Politics on the Armed Struggle - the Revolutionary Army, appeared to have the following ideas as its basis. Kasrils' idea was that the internal bases of power had to be established by advanced attachments of MK.
'The development of the armed struggle is dependent on its being rooted among the people. Our MK combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a people's war.'
Trained MK cadres had to activate the masses politically:
'The armed struggle must compliment mass struggle and we seek to combine all forms of struggle, violent and non-violent, legal and illegal.'
The underlying strategy was:
'Political and strategy determines military strategy and our combatants and organisers must be imbued with political theories and ideas, must understand politics guides the gun.'
The central concept for the operation was that a power basis had to be established within the borders of South Africa, which would replace the necessity to leave the country to obtain training and swallows the necessity of receiving orders from outside the country.
Kasrils' idea of a basis of power within the country was accepted by the ANC/SACP alliance, but the viewpoint was that it was ANC leaders and not MK cadres who would have create the basis of power and politicise the masses. There would have to be an abbreviation of the communication from the front of the struggle to the head office in Lusaka.
The operation would have three corner stones, namely: a) political combat work, military combat work and the intelligence work, specifically aimed at the SAP, the South African Defence Force and National Intelligence Services, as well as other targets which would be identified.
Vula was launched during December 1986 and would be a five year operation. The ultimate objective was a violent revolution. Vula's origin was preceded by a preparation phase which had already been initiated in 1984/1985. Legends were created for the prominent members who were involved in Operation Vula, namely Mac Maharaj played the key role in Operation Vula. He would have cancer and would have to be treated for five years in Russia."
MR VISSER: Yes. There are various deviations or other perspectives which have been offered by other persons. For example, that he would have had kidney problems or whatever the case may be. The fact of the matter remains that the legend that was created for him would have indicated that he needed five years of medical treatment in Russia.
MR BOTHA: That's correct. "Dit sou verduidelik sy afwesigheid binne die strukture van die ANC in Lusaka". ...(no English interpretation)
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA
"Siphiwe Nyanda as his cover, would have to obtain five years training in Russia and other legends were also created."
MR VISSER: Now this information can be found in an issue of the British MI5. We don't have that document available to us. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: No, we don't.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR BOTHA
"High profile ANC/SACP members had to operate covertly in the RSA and establish an infrastructure for the establishment of underground structures, DLBs, once again for the purpose of weapons stockpiling, safehouses, transit facilities, as well as a communications network. The plan was that the armed struggle would fall under the direct internal command of the MK commanders who were present in the country.
Within the ANC itself it was a secret movement. It was only in selected groups. Only selected groups were aware of it and acted supportively for this. The initiative for this came from the SACP. And one could draw the golden thread from the involvement of individuals within operation Vula, that all of them were registered members of the SACP and/or that they were considered for action within the SACP."
MR VISSER: I wonder if we could just pause there and just refer to Exhibit C, where on page 4 reference is made to the secrecy - in paragraph 3, from the top of the page.
"The authorisation for implementing Operation Vula was a "Top Secret" NEC resolution, taken in 1986, working out of the ANC headquarters in the Lusaka. The operation was placed under the President's project, chaired by ANC President, Oliver Tambo and included Joe Slovo as principal planner, Mac Maharaj as principal recruiter and in-country commander, Siphiwe "Kebusa" Nyanda, as deputy in-country commander, Ivan Pillay as administrator responsible for project co-ordination and a few others."
Would you agree with that summary of Exhibit C?
MR BOTHA: Yes, it is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR BOTHA
"Initially these persons were applied within the country. They acted under the Durban Political and Military Committee. And here I must just qualify that this is not the same Durban Political and Military Committee which was referred to in Operation Butterfly. Durban, in the establishment of Operation Vula, was divided into districts and zones for the politicisation of the masses as well as the identification of individuals for training."
MR VISSER: Yes, and here you refer to Chapter 17, which is Exhibit B, isn't that so? Mr Chairman, if you could perhaps turn to paragraph 6 you will find what the witness is now referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold on.
MR VISSER: It's at page 112. We should have re-paginated it. But dealing with the page numbers as they appear now, page 112 paragraph 6. And there reference is made to the ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about paragraph 6 of Exhibit D?
MR VISSER: No, no, of Exhibit B for bravo.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Chairperson. B for bravo.
CHAIRPERSON: Hold it.
MR VISSER: And it's paragraph 6, that is at page 112. And we're not going to read it, but that is what the witness is referring to, the zones and areas and zonal and area commanders etc., Chairperson. So that should just be noted alongside paragraph 105 of Exhibit A.
Very well, please proceed.
MR BOTHA
"Their activities included the recruitment of agents in the Security Forces, the pressure and circulation of political literature in order to politicise persons regarding problems or problematic issues within the country, as well as the mass import of weaponry from abroad into stockpiling points in the RSA."
MR VISSER: Before you proceed. Chairperson, I hope I'm not confusing you, I'm just trying to be helpful to give you the cross-references. If at page - at paragraph 105, at the end of that, you can refer again to Exhibit C, page 2 of Exhibit C, the third paragraph. And I will read it to you. Exhibit C says this: - if you have it before you, Chairperson, that's the Gail Wannenberg document.
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were ..."
...(intervention)
MS THABETHE: Sorry, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
MS THABETHE: Can my learned friend please repeat the page numbers.
CHAIRPERSON: This is page 2 ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Of Exhibit C.
CHAIRPERSON: ... of Exhibit C, paragraph 3.
MR VISSER: It's the third paragraph from the top. They're not numbered.
CHAIRPERSON: They're not numbered, yes.
MR VISSER: Has Ms Thabethe found it?
MS THABETHE: Yes, thanks.
MR VISSER: I read it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were to relocate senior and middle-level leaders from the ANC external leadership into South Africa to create a nation-wide underground network to co-ordinate and support a general insurrection against the apartheid State and to penetrate the South African governmental and security structures for the purposes of intelligence collection and covert disruption. But for Vula to succeed it had to create an underground organisation far more sophisticated, secure and secretive than the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe had been able to achieve to that point in the armed struggle. In addition, it had to create or obtain a secure means of real time communication between the external leadership at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia) and the Vula operational command inside the country.
Its existing communications system with internal underground operatives, consisted of a combination of one-time inscription pads, air flight couriers, cross-border smuggling messages etc."
Now Mr Chairman, if you will allow me to confuse you even a little further, from the Internet there is a document available, which can be down-loaded. It is called "Talking to Vula" and it is by a Mr Tim Jenkin. He was a gentleman who lived in England and who developed and perfected this one-time encryptic pads and the communication system which evolved through telephone modems talking to computers, which allowed instant same time access, both from South African, Lusaka and England.
Now it's an instructive document to show how it evolved. And if you are at all interested, Chairperson, it is available on the Internet as I stated, under the heading "Talking to Vula". We have a copy thereof, which again we can make available to you. We don't believe it really is more than of interest value to you, but of course it is available if you want it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks very much. I mean these are technical developments that speed up communication.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we don't have to be educated on that.
MR VISSER: I think you don't need to know anything beyond that, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: For present purposes. Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER: Very well, would you proceed.
MR BOTHA: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA
"Role players in Operation Vula included Oliver Tambo, as already mentioned, Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils, Archie Abrahams, Siphiwe Nyanda, Raymond Lala, Jeanette Love, Pravine Gordon, Ivan Pillay and others.
Sometimes Vula also co-opted MK operatives who were successful to the Vula structure. And here is an example of Paul Gotesemang. Within the Vula structures he was known as Rexal, R-E-X-A-L and he was the brother of Mbuso Shabalala."
MR VISSER: And that is the subject of the amnesty application which is served before this Amnesty Committee?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Proceed with paragraph 108.
MR BOTHA
"Maharaj, Kasrils and Nyanda were sent in first to the RSA, in order to establish Operation Vula and their mission was to create an infrastructure. By June 1990, after two years of the establishment of the infrastructures, there were already three established infrastructures, namely in Natal itself, the PWV area and Cape Town.
As I have already said, Natal was divided into a so-called central, southern, northern and western zones and districts. When the first official negotiations began between the SA Government and the liberation movements, Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo ..."
And here I just want to qualify. Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo is incorrect here ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Joe Slovo was not in the country?
MR BOTHA: That is correct. The other three that I have mentioned were already in the country.
MR VISSER: So you are saying that Joe Slovo must be replaced by Siphiwe Nyanda?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue. So they were already in the country. What year are we referring to?
MR BOTHA: We are referring from 1988 to approximately 1990.
"At times they had to leave the country in order to participate in the ANC's negotiations team, then they would re-enter the country and conduct negotiations after which they would again leave the country legally and then re-enter illegally to continue with Operation Vula."
MR VISSER: Now this legal and illegal, this has to do with the legislation which at that stage came to the statute which gave indemnity or exemption from prosecution in order to grant the leaders of the ANC and the SACP and other liberation movements the opportunity to enter the country and participate in the negotiations.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"During February 1990, Mr Nelson Mandela was released. Documents indicate that during the remaining two years of the five year plan of Operation Vula, Mr Nelson Mandela's death was identified as the trigger of the insurrection, the spark which would ignite the civil war."
MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, if we may refer you to Exhibit B for bravo, at the page which is marked 117, paragraph 10.
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it.
MR VISSER: Paragraph 10 reads - a particular aspect, which is of the most significant importance is the content of a particular paragraph which appeared in an encoded message sent from Mac Maharaj in Johannesburg, to Siphiwe Nyanda in Durban on 24 June 1990, a mere 13 days before the arrest of the Vula operatives commenced. The said paragraph reads as follows. Yes, my attorney has a computer printout, but it's unfortunately not here, but this appears to be a correct quotation from that encrypted message. The said paragraph reads as follows
"In the meantime we have had word from Cleo, codename for London, that Donald, codename for Chris Dlamini, will be coming into the country round the end of June 1990. Besides the equipment you already have, it appears that Ntabo's outfit, codename for Jacob Zuma, also a member of the NEC, is currently required to store two pieces, codename for firearms, which were in the hands of the enemy group planning Madiba's assassination. From the description that Ntabo gave me, one of the pieces seems to have an optical sight and given the internesent (there's a comment to say, it should probably mean internecine) struggle within the enemy camp I am attracted to borrowing one of those pieces if it is suitable for use by us, even if on a temporary basis."
And Chairperson, further down the document it appears that when Mr Nyanda was arrested secretive compartments were found in his car. At the bottom of page 118 there is a reference to that. It was a Toyota Cressida and in one of the compartments was found a 45mm submachine gun, serial number so-and-so and an optical night-sight for that weapon.
Chairperson, in the other side of the story the little booklet that was given out by Gen Herman Stadler, on the very last page you will find photographs of that car and the weapon which we've just referred to.
Now just in conclusion with regard to the general background - and I now refer you to Exhibit C, Chairperson. The first paragraph "Discovery of Vula", Dr Henderson says in Exhibit C:
"On the weekend of 6 July 1990, the South African Security Police picked up two suspected African National Congress underground operatives in Durban. Mbuso Shabalala and Charles Ndaba were in fact part of a major ANC underground operation to create the political and military structures necessary for launching a general insurrection - a people's war - within South Africa, a covert operation which had been running for two years unknown to the South African Security Forces."
And that refers to the person, Ndaba and Shabalala, who are also the subject of another amnesty application in the current session before the Amnesty Committee here.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And do you find yourself in concurrence with the summary that I have just read to you?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I do agree with it.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, thank you for allowing us to deal with those. If we may now return to the incident, with the following comment. After this moment, Chairperson, we will not deal, unless you specifically require us to do so, with any political or general background any longer. We believe that we have placed what is necessary before you and this will form the basis of all the amnesty applications in regard to all the incidents mutatis mutandis, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Yes, I think Mr Visser, you may proceed.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson. But if I may just add one thing. If any questions do arise from your reading of Exhibit A as has now been supplemented or any of the other documents, this witness will be available for the duration, Chairperson, and he can be recalled quite conveniently at your request. He can answer any of those questions which may arise in your mind.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.
MR VISSER: Mr Botha, can we go to Exhibit D. You have referred to Exhibit A and we have heard the aspects of that document that you know about. In Exhibit A, reference is also made to evidence, both written and oral, which was given and you ask that this evidence be incorporated in your amnesty application, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you have just - I think there are A's on the first place, I think it should actually be a B. But at the second paragraph regarding relevant evidence, you have also referred to your evidence in the Portia Ndwandwe, the Zandile case, which you have also referred to in your evidence this morning, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: If we can then page to page 2. Could you inform the Committee regarding your share and knowledge in this incident please.
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the abduction and elimination of Dion Cele took place approximately during July 1988 in Swaziland and ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And the incident came to an end in Pietermaritzburg itself.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
I refer to the amnesty application of Lt-Col J A Vorster with regard to this incident and concur with it insofar as it is of application to me.
My further share in the incident was the following. I confirm that we had information which indicated that Cele would be willing to co-operate with us as an interpreter(?).
MR VISSER: Now the complete background is given by Col Vorster and among others reference is made to this information which was supposed to have come from an informer. Now usually it would not have been expected of you to expose the identity of an informer, but with regard to this specific case I understand there can be no prejudice should the name of the informer be made known.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now can you tell us who the informer was who made this information available to the Security Branch?
CHAIRPERSON: What are we talking about, the information that Dion Cele is prepared to work for the government?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson. And this particular person is also involved in the kidnapping, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And in this particular case, we are satisfied that there can be no harm if we disclose the name to you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR BOTHA: The informer which was handled by Col Vorster and the others in Pietermaritzburg was one, Neville, also known as Goodwill Sikhakane.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't know whether you have the document - no, my attorney tells me you don't have it, but Goodwill Sikhakane is also the subject of another incident for which amnesty will be asked, but not before you during this session.
CHAIRPERSON: I see. Anyway, just carry on.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR BOTHA: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you informed by this man, Neville? He was the informer?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And who did he inform?
MR BOTHA: Neville was handled by Col Vorster in Pietermaritzburg and at that stage the divisions Natal and Port Natal and Northern Natal still functioned separately from one another, but due to our success in Port Natal and the recruitment of infiltrated ANC terrorists, which we could redeploy into the structure of MK, Col Vorster liaised with Taylor here in Durban and asked for assistance in this recruitment attempt of Dion Cele. Now this attempted recruitment would mean that we would have to abduct Cele from Swaziland and that here within the borders of the RSA, he would be persuaded to co-operate. And the information which Vorster gave Taylor and me was that Cele had declared himself willing or had given an indication of willingness to come out to the informer, in other words, out of Swaziland to work with us.
Col Vorster will provide more detail to you regarding how the informer, Neville himself, came out of Swaziland. ...(transcriber's own interpretation) It was due to his position that he identified Cele.
MR VISSER: I see that there is a gap here in Exhibit D. Could you just inform the Committee what the arrangement was and how the arrangements were launched. You were in Durban, what happened then?
MR BOTHA: Yes, Col Taylor came to speak to us, at least he contacted me and requested my presence when Vorster came to visit him with the request that we assist in the recruitment of Cele.
MR VISSER: Yes. Colonel Taylor was Col Andy Taylor?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And he has since then passed away?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. Now you had this order and what did you do?
MR BOTHA: We began with the preparations.
MR VISSER: Who is the "we"?
MR BOTHA: That was Col Andy Taylor, Col Vorster, myself, Laurie Wasserman. From Pietermaritzburg there were persons by the name of Jerry Brooks - I cannot recall his rank anymore and ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: I beg your pardon. Please continue.
MR BOTHA: ... and then Col Taylor also called Frans Labuschagne from Middelburg, as well as a Sgt Verwey to assist, due to their knowledge of the road network in Swaziland.
The planning was that we would enter Swaziland illegally via a border post and that we would meet the informer Neville in Manzini and that he would point out to us the college where Cele took night classes. We did not know him physically, we just knew his name.
And then after the informer had lured him to a vehicle we would take him illegally over the border fence to the RSA, and for that purpose Labuschagne and Verwey would be of value to us because if we experienced a problem within the Swaziland territory according to our knowledge, they knew the dirt roads which led to the fence where we would then cross the border illegally.
MR VISSER: Very well. And as far as you can recall, Sam du Preez was one of the members who went with you from Durban?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VISSER: Because Mr Verwey stated in his amnesty application that Mr du Preez indeed accompanied you, but you say that this is not the case?
MR BOTHA: No, that is incorrect. Chairperson, it then also came to be that during July 1988 we travelled to a place which belonged to the Department of Forestry and was situated between Nerston and Amsterdam, where we spent the night.
CHAIRPERSON: Just give me the name of the place again, where?
MR BOTHA: N-E-R-S-T-O-N, Nerston. It's a border post, Chairperson and the town is Amsterdam, as in the Dutch Amsterdam.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: What did you travel with?
MR BOTHA: We travelled a hired Volkswagen kombi.
MR VISSER: Where was the vehicle hired?
MR BOTHA: It was hired in Durban, from Avis.
MR VISSER: And who went with you in the kombi to Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: With me in the kombi there was Laurie Wasserman, Andy Taylor and Vorster, as well as Jerry Brooks, who drove with a vehicle and Verwey and Labuschagne joined us later. I don't know whether this was at Amsterdam at the place that belonged to the Department of Forestry or at a later point.
MR VISSER: You say that Taylor and Vorster travelled with you. In the kombi?
MR BOTHA: No, they travelled in their own vehicle. We travelled in three vehicles.
MR VISSER: Brooks in the one, Taylor and Vorster in the other and you and Wasserman in the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now let us go to the point where you arrived in Swaziland. You and Wasserman then went through the border post into Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Legally?
MR BOTHA: Yes, legally. Just to supplement that, before the night of the seizure action or the abduction we legally entered Swaziland via the Nerston border post with our passports, we met our informer at the George Hotel, he identified the college to us, he identified Dion Cele to us and according to that we could undertake planning in terms of where we would seize him.
MR VISSER: And who had to be placed where in order to undertake the reconnaissance surrounding this entire operation so that it would run safely?
MR BOTHA: The following evening we went in three vehicles to the Nerston border post and crossed into Swaziland.
MR VISSER: Were you and Wasserman still in the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes, Sgt Wasserman and I were in the kombi. Sgt Verwey was in a vehicle and Col Vorster and Mr Labuschagne were together in a vehicle.
MR VISSER: Where was Col Taylor?
MR BOTHA: Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks remained behind at the Nerston border post ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Can I just stop you there. I got the impression that you were already in Swaziland and you say now the following you were back in Nerston. That's in South Africa. So you legally entered Swaziland and did you come back again into South Africa?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I will explain. I said that the entry to Swaziland did not take place upon one occasion only, the night of the abduction was preceded by a reconnaissance trip to Swaziland during which we followed the entire procedure of picking up the informer at the hotel. He showed the college to us, he identified Dion to us and surrounding that we understood our planning for the abduction operation. We returned to Nerston and then the following evening we re-entered Swaziland.
MR VISSER: So there were two occasions, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well this time, did you enter legally again?
MR BOTHA: Legally again.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER: You were in a kombi with Wasserman and you have already told us who manned the other two vehicles. I think that would bring us to paragraph 4 of Exhibit D, but before we get to that, did you meet Neville again in Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: Yes, we met him again at the George Hotel.
MR VISSER: Did you pick him up there?
MR BOTHA: Yes, we picked him up and a small distance from the George Hotel, Neville then took over the driving of the kombi while Wasserman and I concealed ourselves in large cardboard boxes which had been placed in the back of the kombi.
He drove to the college and parked diagonally opposite the gate. Sgt Verwey and his vehicle stopped some distance ahead of us, and behind us were Vorster and Labuschagne. They would be our backup should something go wrong. The informer met Dion after he had finished his classes at the college and accompanied him to the kombi.
For the purpose of the abduction we damaged the left front door of the kombi so that it could not open. We wanted him to enter the kombi by means of the sliding door. After he had climbed into the kombi he sat down on the seat directly in front of us.
MR VISSER: That would be next to the driver?
MR BOTHA: No, directly behind the driver.
MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, perhaps we are misunderstanding each other. Mr Cele climbed in by the sliding door.
MR BOTHA: Yes, and sat down on the seat.
MR VISSER: Which seat are you referring to?
MR BOTHA: The kombi had double seats behind the driver's seat.
MR VISSER: So he sat in the second row of seating on that bench.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA: And I just want to explain. Because a kombi usually had double bench seating, the first seat next to the sliding door had been removed so that we had more room in the kombi. In other words, there were two seats in the front of the kombi, one for the driver and the passenger and then one bench seat which was adjacent to the engine and adjacent to the section containing the boxes in which we were concealed.
CHAIRPERSON: Is all this detail necessary?
MR VISSER: Not really, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well you must try and control it.
MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed. Cele then climbed into the kombi, and did you move away?
MR BOTHA: Yes, the vehicle drove away and while it was in transit, Wasserman and I seized Cele and kept him under control.
MR VISSER: Did he scream?
MR BOTHA: Yes, he screamed and shouted. We gagged him so that he could not make any noise.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA: On the way we stopped near the border post so that the driver, who was the informer, could climb out and stay in Swaziland. I took over the driving of the kombi while Wasserman remained with Cele and we drove up to the border.
At some point we left the usual road and followed a dirt road, according to which we crossed the border into South Africa illegally after the fence had been pressed down to ground.
MR VISSER: Please pause there. Wasserman will tell the Committee that he hit Cele a few times with the first in order to bring him under control. Did you see that?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that was in the process of controlling him and making sure that he was quiet.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may interrupt. Would you perhaps give an indication whether you would take the tea adjournment at quarter to eleven or at 11 o'clock. I know some of the judges prefer to take it at quarter to eleven and others at 11 o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: Well now there's no hard and fast rule about that. I was under the impression we'd finish. If he hasn't very much more to say on this aspect of the matter, we'll adjourn at 11 o'clock if you don't mind.
MR VISSER: Yes, he's virtually through, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
Now after you had left Swaziland, where did you go then?
MR BOTHA: We went back to the house belonging to Forestry in Amsterdam, where Vorster and I began to speak to Cele that night under the leadership of Taylor. This whole exercise was aimed at winning his co-operation as an informer. And the other reason why I was there was to correlate and confirm any information as correct, should he give any information.
MR VISSER: Was there a chief interrogator of Mr Cele?
MR BOTHA: No, the interrogation was jointly undertaken by me, Taylor and Vorster.
MR VISSER: So it is actually incorrect when you say that Cele was interrogated by Taylor, he was actually interrogated by you, Taylor and Vorster?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: What was his attitude?
MR BOTHA: Initially Cele responded to that which was known to us, because we had to put leading questions and consequently he would be able to respond to what we wanted to know. But I was under the impression that after he had crossed the border he would very willingly offer his services to work as an informer.
Now during the interrogation I received the impression that he was not very favourably inclined to do so and upon occasion it was said 'This guy isn't going to work with us'.
MR VISSER: Did it become clear to you the evening after the abduction there at Amsterdam already?
MR BOTHA: Yes, one would have a feeling that when one was involved in such a seizure action and attempting to replace him into a structure, there would be feeling whether it was going to work or not. Sometimes there would just be an immediate summation of the person's attitude, sometimes one's impression would only be garnered after a few weeks of dealing with the subject.
MR VISSER: The fact is that he was abducted and he wasn't willing to co-operate, so what would the repercussions of that have been?
MR BOTHA: We had to take him back from Amsterdam to Pietermaritzburg or to a safe place where we could work with him further. Now he knew that Sikhakane was instrumental in his abduction, that he had in fact lured him to the point of abduction. We could not leave him there immediately and say go back to Swaziland ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Are you referring to Cele?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: What would he then do?
MR BOTHA: He would immediately convey the identity of Neville as an informer to the ANC, and that is why it was decided to take him to Pietermaritzburg. And the following day we then indeed transported him to Pietermaritzburg and all the members and their vehicles returned to Pietermaritzburg with the exception of Verwey and Labuschagne, who had already returned to Middelburg the previous evening after they had finished their task that we had brought them out for.
MR VISSER: Where was Wasserman? Did Wasserman return with you to Durban or did he remain on the farm?
MR BOTHA: No, Wasserman remained on the farm with the rest of the people. I brought the kombi back to Durban in order to return it to Avis, because there was a limited time for which we had hired the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Very well. And then in paragraph 11 you say that the following day you heard that Cele had been eliminated. Who told you this?
MR BOTHA: I'm of the opinion that it was Col Taylor who told me this, because I made enquiries regarding Cele to determine whether or not there had been any progress.
MR VISSER: Yes. And the reason was that he had not wanted to co-operate as an informer.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You then say in paragraph 12, that for obvious reasons you did not make the matter known and you made yourself guilty of defeating the ends of justice. The evidence will then be placed here before the Committee, the evidence of Vorster and Wasserman regarding what exactly took place on the farm after you had departed from there. Perhaps I can just ask you the following ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Where was this elimination of Cele, was that in Pietermaritzburg or was it still while he was still on the farm?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, the evidence will be that it is a farm in the Elandskop area, in the district of Pietermaritzburg.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see.
MR VISSER: It was used as a safehouse - to use that expression, and that as the same farm on which Ndwandwe as well as Tekere were also assassinated. Cele of course also, but you'll obtain more detail from the other witnesses later on.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand, yes.
MR VISSER: Perhaps I could just ask you this. On that evening when you came out with Cele from Swaziland and he didn't want to co-operate and you then foresaw that he could possibly be eliminated.
MR BOTHA: It wasn't specifically discussed, but I foresaw that, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And the one reason was because if you had released him he would be able to expose the identity of the informer, which then would be the end of the informer. Was there any other reason that emerged within you indicating why nothing else could be done with him other than elimination?
MR BOTHA: What also became known to me after my first meeting with the Swaziland informer, is that he did not operate alone in Swaziland, but that there was an entire family network within Swaziland, because he lived there and that it was not only his own life but the lives of his family which would be jeopardised.
MR VISSER: And then from paragraph 13 onwards, would you just conclude.
MR BOTHA: I cannot recall who said this to me, how he was eliminated and who precisely had eliminated him. It wasn't necessary because I didn't ask for those details.
MR VISSER: And what do you say about your conduct in the abduction as well as you emission to make the matter known?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I did this. It was aimed at protecting the State and the National Party, as well as maintaining the government. I was not benefited in any way or rewarded for the action. I did not draw any personal advantage from this. I did this because I believe it was right for the country and it was part of my duties. It was necessary that if the decision was taken to eliminate Cele, this would be the right decision.
MR VISSER: Would you please turn to page 1 of Exhibit D. Your application involves an abduction or illegal arrest. That would be the chief offence, abduction or illegal arrest of Dion
Cele, the transgression of border control regulations when you brought him out.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: His illegal detention or depravation of his freedom, defeating the ends of justice, which you have already informed us about and any other offence or illegal deed which may emanate from evidence. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, thank you, that is the evidence-in-chief which we wish to place before you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We'll take the adjournment at this stage and resume at a quarter past eleven.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
H J P BOTHA: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: You have no further questions to put to Mr Botha in-chief?
MR VISSER: Thank you, no Mr Chairman, save for drawing your attention to one further aspect, and that is that in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, volume 3, at page 205 there is reference to this incident of Mr Dion Cele. I just draw your attention to it. Perhaps I can read to you quickly.
CHAIRPERSON: I'll save you the trouble.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: But it does not - it's not at variance at all with the evidence which you're about to hear.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Do you have any questions to put?
MR NEL: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put on behalf of the victims?
MS THABETHE: I do, Mr Chair, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you please do so.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Mr Botha, when it was reported that Cele would be willing to co-operate, were you there? Were you present?
MR BOTHA: That's correct, I was present, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Were you told on what basis he would be willing to co-operate? Or rather just to rephrase the question, did Mr Sikhakane tell you on what basis he reached the decision that Mr Cele would be willing to co-operate?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, Col Vorster informed us that Sikhakane told him that Cele was willing to be recruited as an informer. I was not personally informed by Mr Sikhakane.
MS THABETHE: So what you are saying in other words, is that you don't know the basis upon which Sikhakane reached the decision that Cele would be willing to co-operate. Is that your evidence?
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Would you know when Mr Sikhakane actually informed Mr Vorster? In terms of time, when did he inform him?
MR BOTHA: No, I would not know exactly when he informed him.
MS THABETHE: When were you informed that there was such a possibility?
MR BOTHA: A few days before our departure for Amsterdam to execute the abduction.
MS THABETHE: Was it two days, three days, a day before?
MR BOTHA: I would say it was less than a week, within a seven day period.
MS THABETHE: Would you know whether the information, whatever information was given by Mr Sikhakane to Mr Vorster was verified? About Dion Cele.
MR BOTHA: Yes, if I understand the question correctly, the information which Col Vorster had via Sikhakane, he verified it with me on the grounds of information that I had which we received from Swaziland that Cele was responsible for border work. And we confirmed that he was responsible for border work.
MR LAX: I think the question you're being asked is a subtly different one. She's saying, was the information that the deceased would co-operate with you verified? In other words, was the information Sikhakane gave you that led to the abduction of the deceased, was that information that he'd be likely to become an informer or a worker with you, was that verified? That's what she's asking you.
MR BOTHA: No, that information was not verified by me.
MR LAX: Was it verified by anyone else as far as you know?
MR BOTHA: Not as far as I know, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Now you've also indicated that Mr Vorster informed you or requested you to come and join them for this operation of the abduction of Mr Cele. Do you know why specifically you were called to come and join them for this operation?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I said that at that stage Col Vorster was at the Division Natal and we were the Division Port Natal and right up to that stage we had much success with out actions against terrorists in the Division Port Natal. We had a very thorough network of informers in Swaziland. This was the first operation for Col Vorster and Pietermaritzburg and that is why they needed our expertise in terms of what our information network was, and that is why we were asked to accompany and work with them.
MS THABETHE: When you were requested to become part of the operation, what was going to be your role in the whole operation?
MR BOTHA: At that stage I worked with MK Intelligence, I was responsible for the analysis of this information. And consequently if Cele conveyed information I would be able to verify it on the basis of what was already known to us. And in the whole process I would play a part in his abduction and it would be an active role.
MS THABETHE: You have also indicated that when you went to Swaziland you first went for the reconnaissance and then you went back to the borders. You've also indicated that Mr - you went to a hotel where Mr Sikhakane pointed out Mr Cele. Would I be correct to say so?
MR BOTHA: No. We found Mr Sikhakane at the George Hotel and from there we went to the college where he identified the college to us, and he met with Mr Cele that evening so we could identify Mr Cele as to what he looks like. And that was the purpose of the reconnaissance that evening.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand that to mean that when Mr Sikhakane was talking to Cele, you watched that from a distance, or were you part of the conversation between the two of them?
MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson, this took place over some distance. Mr Cele attended classes at the college in Manzini and when classes ceased at approximately eight in the evening he would come out and Mr Sikhakane would meet him at the gate so that he could identify him to us. And this was done over a distance by means of observation.
MS THABETHE: Can I proceed, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Before Mr Vorster told you anything about Dion Cele, as a person who was responsible for information analysis, did you know anything at all about Mr Dion Cele before?
MR BOTHA: Yes. I knew he was part of the MK Natal structure in Swaziland, responsible for border work. Border work entailed that he worked in certain areas at the border, he recruited people who assisted them in the insurgence of terrorists into the country and the smuggling of weapons by means of couriers. So his role and activities within the MK structure of the Natal machinery was known to me, yes.
MS THABETHE: So you wanted to recruit him, that's correct isn't it?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: When you say it was known to you, you did not know the individual, you knew somebody by that name?
MR BOTHA: That's correct, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: What I wanted to know is, you had indicated that you had intentions to recruit him, what were you going to use him for?
MR BOTHA: As an informer.
MS THABETHE: Another question with regard to that, that the family asked me to ask you is, would you have recruited him if you had not been informed that he was willing to co-operate? Bearing in mind that you already knew about him before.
MR BOTHA: All persons were targets for recruitment by the Security Branch. The fact that we became aware that he was an easier target is why we specifically focused on him.
MS THABETHE: You have indicated that when you took him into the car, when he was taken into the kombi he screamed. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
MS THABETHE: Did he say anything else besides screaming?
MR BOTHA: Yes, asked who we were and what were we doing.
MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that from there you took him to Amsterdam where he was questioned.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MS THABETHE: And where he furnished you with some information.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MS THABETHE: What kind of information was this?
MR BOTHA: It was information with regard to the structure in Swaziland, information which was known to us or which was not known to us, which I could verify.
MS THABETHE: And then you said also that it became clear that he did not want to co-operate with you. On what basis did you reach this decision? Like I want to understand because there was information that he gave to you. Now what made you, or what led you to believe that he's not willing to co-operate with you?
MR BOTHA: The moment one would ask the person "Are you prepared to go back and receive information as to when terrorists would infiltrate? Would you get that information for us with regard to weapons being smuggled in?" And that is what we would want from an informer which is placed back in Swaziland. And when these leading questions are asked with regard to that, there was a refusal and his body language indicated that he was unwilling to concede.
MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that you were not present when Mr Cele was killed, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
MS THABETHE: So you wouldn't know how he was killed would you?
MR BOTHA: No, I don't know.
MS THABETHE: At this stage Mr Chair, thank you, I have no further questions for this witness.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Botha, I am not hundred percent clear with regard to the reconnaissance that you undertook. You did not mention that in your application or in Exhibit D which is before us. Would you not regard it as very relevant to your application?
MR BOTHA: Yes. During consultation it was not regarded as relevant and in my evidence today I mentioned that the area was not strange and we knew what Cele looked like because he was identified do us. And the point was Skosana was introduced to me for the first time by Vorster in Swaziland - oh, excuse me, Sikhakane. I knew of his existence as an informer, but what he looked like and so forth was not known to me and he was only introduced to me in Swaziland.
ADV BOSMAN: Was it discussed beforehand that you would go back and report back and then you would do the final planning?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I think Col Vorster would be able to give more evidence in detail, but I can just explain it as such. There was no finality with regard to a precise day and date on which he would come out, that is why there was an excursion, there was an arrangement with Vorster and the informer. He confirmed it and a final arrangement was made for the following evening, and the following evening we carried it out. ...(transcriber's own interpretation)
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks very much, you are excused for the time being.
WITNESS EXCUSED
