Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Before we start today's hearing, I think I should explain why I am now presiding over the hearing. Unfortunately Judge Mall was taken ill yesterday and is in hospital at the present time. We are uncertain as to how long he will be there, but obviously it will be for some time and in the circumstances I was requested to take over the hearing. I have discussed the matter with the legal representatives of the applicants and the victims and we have agreed that we can continue with the hearing, with the hearing of evidence but that arrangements will be made to obtain a transcript of the evidence that has been led up to now and of course a recording will be made of the evidence and a transcript obtained from now onwards. If Judge Mall recovers rapidly, which I trust he will, and is able to rejoin us, we will then have a Committee of four with a complete record of all the proceedings available to us. If he is unable to join us we will then proceed with the present Committee of three and the reason for the transcript and the delay in addresses is that you will all be able to refer me and the other members of the Committee to any points you wish to make in regard to the evidence that has already been led. As I say, I have discussed this matter with the legal advisers concerned and as I understand it they are all in agreement with this procedure.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, Visser on record, what you have stated so far is in fact correct, as far as we understand it. Thank you.

MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, John Wills acting for the families of Shabalala. I also agree that that's an accurate reflection of what was agreed in chambers.

MS POSWA: Adv Poswa on behalf of the Ndaba family. That is the correct position.

MS THABETHE: Thabile Thabethe the Evidence Leader. I'm always at the service of everybody else. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps one thing that I should have done at the beginning, I will do now and that is place myself on record. I am Judge Wilson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may it please you. You, having come into the matter fresh, it might be helpful if you were told some of the background to the application and I'm now referring to the Ndaba and Shabalala incident so as to be able to follow better perhaps the evidence as it unfolds before you.

Mr Chairman, you are acquainted with a document which since the 5th of February, we have been handing in to the Amnesty Committees. It's a document under the heading General Background to Amnesty Applications. In the applications in which we have appeared, fortunately Mr Chairman we have appeared before you after the 5th of February and you are therefore conversant with that document and no more has to be said about that, Mr Chairman, also, we are fortunate in this sense that in November of last year, you yourself headed a Committee who heard some of the incidents which took place in Natal and there is a record of that evidence and I specifically refer to the evidence of Col Botha. You will recall that he gave evidence for some three days before you on the violence in Natal which included Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula, Mr Chairman. The pages, Mr Chairman, in that record run from page 516 to 611 and that is just the background, Mr Chairman.

What we have done in order to be of assistance to the present Committee which was under the Chairmanship of Justice Mall, was to hand 2 further documents to this Committee. These you perhaps have not seen yet. The one was handed in as Exhibit B and Chairperson, what this comprises, is simply an extract from the book of Gen Stadler, The Other Side of the Story, where he deals with Operation Vula, the reason for that being that in Ndaba and Shabalala's incident it really concerns Operation Vula. Apart from that Mr Chairperson, we also handed up an Exhibit C. Now this exhibit would probably not be new to you because this was a document handed to us in November when last we appeared before you here in this hall, by Ms Gail Wannenburg and it also concerns Operation Vula and that is also before you, Mr Chairperson.

Now without much further ado, what has happened in the meantime since this hearing has commenced, was that we have handed up statements of evidence of the witnesses as we have progressed thus far, the first witness having been Col Botha and that is Exhibit D, Mr Chairman and I will address you on that in a moment. After Mr Botha, Gen Steyn has given his evidence and he is yet to be cross-examined. Mr Chairman, with your leave, the facts that unfolded before the Committee from the evidence of Col Botha are these.

He says that in 1988 he was the Head of the Intelligence Section of the Terrorist Unit of the Security Branch of Port Natal. Col Andy Taylor was the head of a different unit within the Terrorist Unit in that he handled the askaris and his function was the identification and arrest and interrogation of terrorists with the help of Askaris. Mr Chairman, apparently during the year 1990 there were something like 9 askaris under Col Taylor and Col Taylor accommodated them at a farm that you'll hear about at Camperdown, Chairperson, where they were - you know about that.

Now Mr Chairman, the story begins in 1988 when Botha says he approached Mr Ndaba in Swaziland, who was then fairly high up in the hierarchy of MK, in order to recruit him as an informer of the Security Branch, which he succeeded in, according to his evidence. Mr Chairman you will recall that evidence was given before you in November of some changes that took place in the top structure of MK in Swaziland and these were, very briefly Mr Chairman, that Mr Tami Zulu was recalled from Swaziland. I must say Mr Tami Zulu who was the head of the or the Commander of MK Natal machinery in Swaziland, was recalled in 1988 to Lusaka in Zambia. As a result of that Mr Chairman, Mr Ndaba who had been second in command at that time, became the Deputy Commander of the MK Natal machinery in Swaziland.

Botha gave evidence, Mr Chairman that when this happened and Ndaba being his informer, he became apprehensive that Ndaba might be targeted by the Security Forces or the Intelligence components in the Republic of South Africa. He says and explains that to mean that whenever a person became the Commander, he automatically was placed on a target list by ...(indistinct). Having become thus apprehensive, he spoke to Ndaba and suggested to him that he should try to manipulate it that he be recalled to Zambia, which apparently happened, Mr Chairman. We don't know how but in fact Mr Ndaba was called to Zambia and someone else took over from him.

Mr Chairman on the 7th of July 1990 Mr Ndaba was arrested. Botha told us that approximately 4 to 6 weeks prior to the 7th of July, Mr Ndaba made contact with him, that was with Botha. It then appeared that he was in the country. Botha was told that Ndaba had infiltrated the RSA during the beginning of the year, January or February of 1990 and Ndaba gave him certain information. Over the period of the 4 to 6 weeks, Botha recalls that he saw Ndaba on two or three occasions during which information was received from Mr Ndaba. What that information was is not really relevant at this stage, but is relevant Chairperson, is that Mr Ndaba referred to a project, to which he referred to as the President's Committee and it was clear that it involved infiltration of highly placed ANC leaders into the country. It involved the setting up of safe-houses, it involved the importation of armaments of war and it involved the setting up of structures for purposes of a hands-on command situation. Am I going too fast Mr Chairman? And most importantly a sophisticated communications network with computers and a radio, telephone etc. etc.

If, Mr Chairman, you would have regard to Exhibit C, the second page, the third paragraph, you will see a fairly accurate summary of what I am attempting to tell you. It says:

"The major objectives of Operation Vula were to relocate senior and middle level leaders from the ANC external leadership into South Africa, to create a nation-wide underground network to co-ordinate and support a general insurrection against the apartheid state and to penetrate the South African governmental and security structures for the purposes of intelligence collection and covert disruption.

That for Vula to succeed, it had to create an underground organisation far more sophisticated, secure and secretive than the ANC and it's military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe had been able to achieve to that point in the arms struggle. In addition it had to create or obtain a secure means of real time communication between the external leadership at the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka, in Zambia and the Vula Operational Command inside - I'm sorry, I repeat - in Zambia and the Vula Operational command inside the country. It's existing communications system with internal underground operatives consisted of an operation of one time inscription pads, air flight couriers, cross-border smuggling messages etc."

Now Mr Chairman enough said about that. That is basically in our submission all you have to know to place you against the background of what was to transpire later. I might just add, Mr Chairman, that during the course of time, prior to the 7th of July, Mr Ndaba had told Botha of certain persons that had already been thus infiltrated into the RSA. They consisted of Mr Kasrils, Mr Maharaj and Mr Slovo and as well as others of which he mentioned Mr Gordhan, Mr Patel, Dipak Patel and his evidence was clearly Mr Shabalala as well. There's no dispute about the fact that Mr Shabalala and Mr Ndaba were working together in the same unit under the auspices of what later became known as Operation Vula, Mr Chairman. Now all of what I've told you thus far is briefly summarised in Exhibit D, the evidence of Mr Botha. Now Mr Chairman, Botha gave evidence to say that on the 7th of July, that was a Saturday, he was telephoned by Maj du Preez and he was informed that a high-ranking terrorist had been arrested and was held at C R Swart Square. It is common cause among the applicants that du Preez also telephoned Col Taylor, I'm sorry not Col Taylor, terribly sorry, phoned Wasserman and van der Westhuizen as well as Col Botha. All of these persons then went to C R Swart Square where of course they found Ndaba. At the time Col Taylor was present and it is perhaps relevant to note, Mr Chairman, that Mr Ndaba had been arrested by an askari, Mr Vusi Ninela. It later appeared that another askari was also involved in the arrest, but nothing much turns on that. The fact of the matter is Ninela and/or one or more of the other askaris arrested Mr Ndaba.

At C R Swart Square, Col Botha then took the other members, Taylor, Wasserman, du Preez and van der Westhuizen into another office and then explained to them that Ndaba couldn't be held because he was his informer. We know from the evidence of Gen Steyn, that Steyn and Botha were the two people who were aware of the status of Mr Ndaba as an informer and nobody else. When Botha intimated this news to the others, Col Taylor got upset and he and Ninela, who was also present, withdrew. Botha then instructed du Preez, Wasserman and van der Westhuizen to take Mr Ndaba to a safe-house which they used, which was situated at Verulam. The reason and the purpose of that was that, first of all to lie low for a while and secondly to work out a "dekstorie" in case the ANC got wind of the fact that Mr Ndaba had been arrested. All of this happened during the late morning of Saturday the 7th of July 1990.

Mr Chairman, soon after arriving at Verulam, are you looking in Exhibit D to find where I am now, Mr Chairman? It's at paragraph 22.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - microphone not on)

MR VISSER: Oh, I'm not sure I know which one you're talking about Mr Chairman. But however that may be, soon after their arrival there or on their way there, Botha is informed by Ndaba that he has a prior arrangement to meet Mr Shabalala and he tells them where this meeting was to take place, near the Greyville racecourse. Ndaba and Botha then consider whether Ndaba should attend the meeting or not and the decision is taken that he should. Ndaba then, sorry, Botha then assures Ndaba that the members of the Security Branch will be in close attendance in case there may be any danger to Ndaba because of the fact that he had been arrested that morning and they agree on a special signal which Ndaba would give if he felt threatened. A long story cut short, Mr Chairman, they arrived at the appointed place. du Preez, Wasserman were in a car with which they went there and they observed a blue Toyota Corolla with which Mr Shabalala had arrived and into which Mr Ndaba had gotten with Botha and van der Westhuizen on foot somewhere in the vicinity. At some stage Ndaba gives the signal and immediately they approach the vehicle and Shabalala is "arrested". They are then both transferred back to Verulam, Mr Chairman, where they are held in separate rooms and now the following facts appear to emerge.

Ndaba is now very uncertain about his position. The Security Branch now has Shabalala in their custody where they had no intention of arresting him in the first place. During the course of the weekend, Mr Shabalala makes it clear to the members that he suspects Mr Ndaba of being a police informer. The immediate result of that is that Mr Shabalala can now not be released because the intention is that Mr Ndaba should be released, where he could continue with his work in Operation Vula and give feedback to Mr Botha.

Mr Chairman, during this weekend there is a debriefing of Mr Ndaba by Botha and according to Botha's evidence, for the first time that weekend he realised the complexity and the importance of the Operation Vula operation, so much so Mr Chairman, that he reports to Gen Steyn and on that Monday the 10th Botha and Steyn go up to Pretoria to Headquarters to inform Headquarters of how they now see Operation Vula. They stay there and it's not clear whether they stay till the Tuesday or to the Wednesday the 11th or the 12th, but now much turns on that Mr Chairman, but what is clear is that instructions go out from Gen van der Merwe that all the intelligence agencies in the country be informed as well as overseas embassies, because, at the time as you will recall Mr Chairman, there were serious negotiations about negotiations going on and there was serious talk about the cessation of the arms struggle and people were talking about getting together to solve the conflict of the country by negotiation. It was foreseen that if arrests took place of such high officials as the ones that we have mentioned to you earlier, it would have a dramatic effect on the negotiation process.

They came back Mr Chairman and then what happens is, on Wednesday the 12th, while Wasserman and du Preez are keeping observation, Mr Siphiwe Nyanda realises that an observation is being kept on him and he attempts to escape. He then becomes arrested. Mr Chairman this arrest now triggers a number of arrests so that between 12 and 15 to the best of the recollection of Botha, people of Operation Vula are arrested during the course of the day, apparently according to the cross-examination until late that night on the 12th of July.

Botha and Steyn go back to Pretoria on the Thursday the 13th, I'm sorry, Thursday the 12th to report, or it might have been the 13th Mr Chairman, I'm not sure but they go back to Pretoria to report the new development and to await orders. In the meantime what has happened, according to Botha, is this. He, that is Botha, reported back to Ndaba what was transpiring and when Ndaba heard that arrests had been made, he became very anxious. What apparently happened on Friday the 13th Mr Chairman or Thursday the 12th, I'm not certain, was that it was decided in Pretoria that a National Investigation Unit be set up to investigate the whole issue around Operation Vula and during the course of their visit to Pretoria which took a day or two, they were told, Mr Chairman, there will be no prosecutions of any of the people who had become arrested.

Botha says that when he came back to Durban he went and he told Ndaba that there won't be arrests and this apparently upset Ndaba terribly.

CHAIRPERSON: There wouldn't be arrests, or there wouldn't be prosecutions.

MR VISSER: There wouldn't be prosecutions of the people that had been arrested or will still be arrested. Sorry, thank you, Chairperson. Now, up to this stage the problem with Shabalala, you will recall, was that he might endanger the position of Ndaba. Now suddenly Ndaba himself has become a problem, because Ndaba then told Botha and the others apparently that he thinks it better for himself to go and take his chances with the ANC, to make a clean breast of it in the hope that he would be forgiven, rather than to stay on with the Security Branch as an informer.

Mr Chairman, when this happened, Botha considered the circumstances and he went and discussed it with Steyn and they said to each other that under those circumstances unless Mr Ndaba is brought to a different insight, he can't be released. Steyn tells Botha to go back and to see to it if he can, to get Ndaba "se kop reg", he must get his head straight. Botha went back to Verulam and according to him attempts were made, serious attempts were made, but Ndaba had become very morbid and very worried and he stuck to his guns that he would rather go and talk to the ANC and see whether he could obtain remission from them.

Botha then decided that in the circumstances he had no option but to eliminate Ndaba because he couldn't release him, he certainly couldn't charge him of anything and thus his fate was sealed. The situation then, Mr Chairman, as far as Mr Shabalala was concerned, changed slightly because where previously he was kept and could not be released in order to protect Ndaba, Ndaba himself was now going to be eliminated and Botha explained to the Committee that what his considerations were in regard to Mr Ndaba and these were the following. He said that in that time when negotiations were under way and where they had strict instructions to do nothing which would jeopardise the position of the National Party at the negotiation table, he was afraid that if Shabalala was released, he would tell the world that he was abducted, he was held against his will, that is unlawfully, and the probabilities were that he might have put two and two together that Ndaba was eliminated and he might have made that inference of his public and the mere publication of such matters was a thought too horrible to contemplate because that would have jeopardised precisely the South African Government and the National Party where that was the one thing which they were ordered and instructed to avoid.

Then Mr Chairman, having decided that, the night of the 14th/15th of July, Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala were taken to the Tugela Mouth, where they were both killed execution style by Botha, Wasserman, du Preez and van der Westhuizen. Those members then went back, took the car of Mr Shabalala, that is the blue Toyota Corolla, drove it out on the Ndwandwe Road to a place which could not be identified later, although attempts were made, it was there sprinkled with petrol and set alight and burned out. Now Mr Chairman, as brief as I could, that is the background and I hope that I haven't slanted any of the facts, but if I have my learned friend will certainly tell you about that and after that Gen Steyn has given evidence and his evidence was as you can imagine, simply confined to those areas were he personally had knowledge and that is, he visited Pretoria with Botha on two occasions and he himself went to Pretoria on three occasions, the last being without being accompanied by Botha and the evidence of Botha as to what was discussed between them, was confirmed by Gen Steyn and presently he is awaiting to be cross-examined, Mr Chairman. I may just point this out Mr Chairman, in cross-examination two issues on the facts were placed in dispute. The one is whether Mr Ndaba was in fact an informer and secondly, Mr Chairman, it was suggested that the reason why Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala had to be killed was because they had been tortured to such an extent that they could not be released. Those were, as far as we are concerned, the two main disputes which arose from the cross-examination on the facts, Mr Chairperson.

Perhaps my learned friend would like to, well my learned friends would like to address you on something which I might have left out?

MR WILLS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairperson. Basically Mr Visser has given the evidence from his client's perspective. I submit that much of what he says is contested by ourselves. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go through every aspect of what is contested. I am alive to the fact that you're going to be referring to the transcripts of the proceedings and much will come to your attention therein, but there are certain things that I think are important for me to highlight. First is that it is clear that our position is that we dispute that Ndaba was an informer. We submit that Ndaba was arrested on the 7th, he was tortured to release names, it was then that Vula, that the planning around Vula became known to the Security Police. They then decided to go up to Pretoria and take further instruction. They got specific orders from Gen van der Merwe and this is common cause that further arrests should be delayed until the week commencing the 16th of July. These orders were not adhered to. The - our version is that they were deliberately not adhered to through reasons of personal ill will and malice towards those who'd been arrested. The version for the applicants is that, as given by Mr Visser, that circumstances concerning Gen Nyanda were such that he was alive to the fact that he was being followed and hence was likely to escape unless they acted. We dispute that. Our version is that further, sorry, as a result of the evidence that was given, it's common cause that it was in the knowledge of both Col Botha and Gen Steyn that prosecutions would not proceed and that as a result of the fact that these people were already held, they acted and killed these people in the full knowledge that prosecutions wouldn't proceed.

There is a certain amount of dispute about the way the executions occurred. That in short, summarises our dispute to the application on the facts so far.

MS POSWA: I don't have anything to add, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Gentlemen, for that. I take it when you come to address us finally after we've had a chance of reading everything, you will bear in mind what you've already told us. We're now going to proceed with cross-examination are we?

J A STEYN: (s.u.o.)

MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: Mr Steyn, your first affidavit was made in November 1996. Is that correct? That was the affidavit attached to your application? And I'm referring here to the voluminous application which is attached to the original bundle.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: It was signed on the 16/12/1996.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: And then you've made this other statement which my copy is unsigned and undated, but which we received on Friday, is that right?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Now, I have a problem in a sense that in your application, the one application and the affidavit that is dated December 1996. You make no mention of you even knowing or coming to terms with the fact that Ndaba would be eliminated and you even, bringing this up with the first applicant, Botha, at any stage, the first mention you make of any elimination is when you say on page 89, where you say

"On 16th of July 1990 Col H J P Botha informed me that he had eliminated Ndaba and Shabalala."

The bottom of the page 89. Is that correct?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Now the picture you create in the affidavit that was submitted after these proceedings commenced is an entirely different one. Is that not so? You indicate that you, before hand, in fact on the 14th, when you met with, on Saturday the 14th when you met with Botha before these two people were murdered, that you more or less gave Col Botha the tacit go-ahead to kill these people was he not in a position to get Ndaba's mind right. I want you to explain why you didn't mention this in your first application.

MR STEYN: During the first application for amnesty we did it on our own and we had urgency of time factor which pressurised us and all of us and probably especially myself, did not give all the facts completely in the first application.

MR WILLS: Are you saying that you weren't assisted by legal advisers on the first application?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Are you, you're obviously aware of the details of Botha's first application, that is the application attached to his affidavit which was signed on the 13/12/1996, because you say so in your application?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: You incorporate that application into your application?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Now in that application he doesn't mention the fact that he had any discussions with you pertaining to the elimination of Ndaba before then.

MR STEYN: His position could possibly have been the same as mine that as a result of the pressure of time on us, we simply expressed ourselves as well as we could in our applications so that the applications could be lodged timeously.

MR WILLS: My understanding is, is that the five of you collaborated quite extensively with each other as far as the facts concerned and the information you put into your application? You got together as a group and discussed your applications?

MR STEYN: Yes, we did discuss the applications.

MR WILLS: And you made sure that everything fitted prior to your handing them in, there were no contradictions?

MR STEYN: No, the idea was that we should try and see what we could remember because these things happened a long time ago and in the process you try and get the best information and you might be reminded of something by somebody else and on that basis you chat to the next person to try and find out whether you could actually arrive at the best possible picture of the facts.

MR WILLS: Yes. Well it seems to me that this crucial meeting of the 14th where you actually tacitly give an order for an elimination, wouldn't be something that you'd forget, with respect.

MR STEYN: The fact of the matter was that we didn't at that stage enjoy legal representation. We didn't have it for all our applications and I want to repeat that our point of departure was that we were trying to compile the best possible document which would indicate at least that we were applying for amnesty and if there were certain aspects which we omitted to mention, it wasn't done deliberately.

MR WILLS: My question with respect, Mr Steyn, is that in these discussions you wouldn't forget such an important aspect as when you actually took a decision which might have resulted in somebody's life being taken away, it was an important decision, it is something that you wouldn't forget. Is that correct?

MR STEYN: No, no, Chairperson, the point is that and here I want to repeat myself, these things happened a long time ago and it's possible that we forgot to mention certain facts which later, after we discussed the matter with each other, we'd reminded each other of certain aspects which then came to the fore.

MR WILLS: But before you filled this application in, you were already discussing the matter with each other.

MR STEYN: We were under pressure.

MR WILLS: So are you saying to the Committee, Mr Steyn, that you did forget that you had this discussion on the 14th prior to you filling your application in, your first application?

MR STEYN: Please repeat the question.

MR WILLS: Are you saying, in answer to my question, that you did forget this important meeting that you had with Mr Botha where you said that "if you can't get Ndaba's head right, just take him out"?

MR STEYN: That is so, but at that stage, and this probably applied to more than one of us, we didn't look at all the facts and we couldn't remember all the facts, yes.

MR WILLS: I want to first turn...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on to something else, Mr Wills, this you say happened on the 14th? Now Mr Botha refers to a meeting with Gen Steyn on the 14th doesn't he?

MR WILLS: My understanding of that meeting in that application Mr Chairperson, is that he referred to the meeting but he didn't refer to the fact that Gen Botha had indicated that had he not got Ndaba's head right, he could be eliminated. That's in dispute.

CHAIRPERSON: The point I'm making is that Gen Botha does remember a meeting on that day, he hasn't forgotten the fact that they met on that day.

MR WILLS: Yes, Botha hasn't.

CHAIRPERSON: And Gen Steyn said he had seen, he incorporated Botha's affidavit.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman and may I just refer you to the last sentence of the first paragraph at page 17 of the bundle?

MR LAX: Of course that was on the 13th, but anyway, it was a different meeting, that was on the 13th of July. If you read from the previous paragraph on page 16

"On the Saturday morning I went to speak to Gen Steyn in his office and I informed him and he told me etc"

about people not being arrested etc so that wasn't the 14th.

CHAIRPERSON: Saturday was the 14th.

MR VISSER: No, no, he says the 13th. Mr Chairman, perhaps I'm the one that is

CHAIRPERSON: Saturday was the 14th and if he said he was told about the meeting the day before in Pretoria.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, my point is the specific aspect of the, of this witness tacitly giving the go-ahead to the elimination, but be that as it may, I'll continue from this point. I want to concentrate on the period prior to Mr Ndaba's arrest. You indicate in your second application that you were aware of the fact that Mr Ndaba was in fact an informer.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now when did you first become aware of this?

MR STEYN: It was brought to my attention again after Ndaba came back to South Africa.

MR WILLS: So was it - did you know about this earlier then, when he returned to South Africa?

MR STEYN: Earlier on in 88 Botha had made contact with Ndaba.

MR WILLS: Yes, I know that. I just wanted to know, did you know as early as 1988 that Ndaba had become an informer?

MR STEYN: Yes. I can remember that high-ranking people and several people in Swaziland and other neighbouring countries had already at early stage, 86, 87, 88, had been recruited. Now if I have to state today that I can remember specific names, then that would not be correct, but I can imagine that, but I don't want to say something if I'm not 100% sure.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, I'm being asked about a tea break by my colleague. I don't know if you want to continue since we started late, or shall we take a tea break at this stage?

CHAIRPERSON: It's not only us that we have to consider. I imagine members of the audience may have been sitting here for some time waiting for us to starts and if - 11 o'clock, is that the normal time? Very well, we'll take a short adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

J A STEYN: (s.u.o.)

MR VISSER: ...(microphone not on) continues, may I ask whether you will grant an indulgence to us if protocol succumbs to the heat in the building and we can take our jackets off?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairperson. I just want to go back a little bit, Mr Steyn. You say that you were well aware of the fact that Mr Ndaba was an informer prior to his arrest?

MR STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: Now you also had a discussion, I think some time towards the end of 1990, with Eugene de Kock concerning the elimination of I think Mr Sekakane, it might be part of another application of yours, I'm not sure. I'm referring here to page 1 of Exhibit F, the affidavit of Mr de Kock. I don't know, has this document been shown to you.

MR STEYN: I cannot remember, I'll first have to look at it Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Can you just look through it?

MR STEYN: Are there specific paragraphs Chairperson that I have to look at?

MR WILLS: It's a relatively short affidavit, but basically my question is, were you aware or do you agree that you had a meeting with de Kock as he indicates in this affidavit, which basically centres around the elimination of an askari, which was later carried out by de Kock's unit and I think that the person they refer to here is Sekakane.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I did not speak to de Kock about the elimination of Sekakane.

MR WILLS: So you dispute the contents of this application, of this affidavit?

MR STEYN: With regard to that specific question, yes Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Well you see, because in paragraph 3.2 of this affidavit, de Kock indicates that you had this discussion with him about Sekakane who was about to tell what happened to an ANC operator who was involved with Operation Vula. You deny that that discussion ever took place?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Because de Kock's recollection of this incident implies that at that stage which was late in 1990, you were of the view that Vula, sorry Ndaba was an ANC operative not an informer.

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I did not discuss this matter with de Kock.

MR WILLS: Now let's get back to the information or the meetings that you had, or the information you got from your subordinate, Mr Botha, prior to the arrest of Ndaba on the 7th of July. We have the evidence that you were a person who was a hands-on Commander, that you worked closely with your subordinates. Now we know that Ndaba, or it's a alleged that Ndaba met with Mr Botha three or four times in the 6 weeks prior to his arrest and it seems from your affidavit that you were aware of the fact that this was going on.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Now I want to know what information was given to you as a result of those communications.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Col Botha told me that according to the information that he had received, structures were being built up by leading figures of the ANC SACP and he referred to these structures or whatever one could call it at that stage as the President's Committee. That this was a Committee or a structure that was busy with building structures including weaponry, networks, communication networks and so forth.

MR WILLS: Is that all, to the best of your knowledge obviously?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, there could have been more. I will think about it. Yes, there were the presence of possible senior ANC members that were mentioned. Members that were possibly in the country at that stage.

MR WILLS: Can you remember the names of those persons?

MR STEYN: I think it was Mr Kasrils, Mr Maharaj, I forget the other names for the instant.

MR WILLS: You obviously, at that time, knew that these were very senior persons as far as the ANC's military struggle was concerned?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Now what did you do with this information when it came to your knowledge?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I reported to Col Botha. Due to this information that was news to us, I told him to continue to monitor this situation so that we could see what flows out of this.

MR WILLS: Did you not tell anybody about this information? Particularly your seniors, possibly General - was it Gen Basie Smit at that stage?

MR STEYN: I cannot specifically remember if I reported it to Headquarters. The news, or the information was news for us and if I can remember correctly the thought was that we first had to let this thing take it's run and then see where we ended up. If something constructive came out, if something positive came out that could give more confirmation to this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: But surely it was of vital importance to those senior to you who had connections with the politicians who were negotiating the future of the country, to let them know that this organisation had been set up?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. I think that the information and the value of that information we probably did not appreciate to its full value.

MR WILLS: I put it to you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's not we, it's you, isn't it? You didn't discuss it you say with anyone else, you just took the decision to sit on it. Is that what you're asking us or telling us?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I can just say, I think that I, at that stage, along with Botha, did not realise the seriousness of the situation.

MR WILLS: I put it to you, Mr Steyn that had you become aware of knowledge that these senior persons Kasrils and Maharaj were in the country, these "terroriste" as you refer to them as, were in the country, you would have immediately brought that to the attention of your seniors in order that this information could have been followed up immediately with the utmost seriousness.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I already answered how I handled the matter at that stage and how I saw the matter at that stage.

MR WILLS: So essentially you handled it like a routine bit of information, it could have been information about anyone, just get more information?

MR STEYN: No, it is a case of what I told Botha. "Investigate and continue and see what we can get hold of", something more that would confirm.

MR WILLS: You didn't put other resources into this operation to assist?

MR STEYN: Probably Botha would have done this and he would have probably continued with this and I accept that he did continue with this.

MR WILLS: Did the information include the establishment of safe-houses for these senior operatives that you received before the 7th of July?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember precisely, but it might be the case, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: I mean surely at the least you would have ordered that these places be observed so you could trap these people you'd been looking for, for so long?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, at that stage we had already had some places under observation, different places, but at that stage we did not connect this with this specific organisation.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but if you were told, this is how I understand the question, that this particular organisation had established safe-houses, it would have been important to find out where they were and to have kept them under observation.

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you make any attempt to do so?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I said that Botha had to monitor the situation and this would then include all investigations that he would deem necessary at that stage to gain further information in this regard.

MR LAX: You see, General, my difficulty with what you're saying is, it's already been established that you were a hands-on man, you weren't someone who just left it to your subordinates to just do their own thing. They had to report to you regularly, personally. As Botha has already said, you were the only one who knew about Ndaba. Now Ndaba wasn't just a small fish, he was a big fish and he suddenly pops up back in the country. And not only does he pop up back in the country but he pops up with information about very, very senior military operatives, I mean Kasrils, Mr Maharaj, these are very senior people within the ANC's military structure at that time. People you would dearly have loved to have got your hands on if you had the opportunity to.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: And yet you just say "Go ahead, this is - just keep it under observation", that's the maximum that you do?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I say, with all respect, keep it under observation, what I mean by this is that he would put in place all possibilities to take this matter further. It was difficult to discuss it with wider people because at that stage we, in the Security Branch, had knowledge that of our Intelligence Services had been infiltrated by the ANC.

MR LAX: Carry on, Mr Wills.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask one more thing before we let you - As I understand what I was told, I haven't checked up and my memory confirm it, but Mr Visser told me that Col Botha was in charge of the Intelligence in Natal.

MR STEYN: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now wasn't it probable that people like Mr Maharaj, Kasrils and others might be elsewhere in the country?

MR STEYN: It is possible Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely if there's information about what appears to be a very important ANC structure, one wouldn't leave it to Natal to inquire into it?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the only answer that I have to this is that myself and Botha handled this matter. We were infiltrated. We had the information at our disposal and it was difficult at that stage to discuss it widely with other instances, with other intelligence units. On the one hand because we were not sure of the seriousness of this matter and on the other hand, the possibility of who in our office would become aware of this and if facts had to be contained in this.

MR WILLS: The why did you go and see Mr Basie Smit and those other number of generals on the 10th and the 11?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, this was after Col Botha had spoken to Ndaba and had gained more information and this is after they illegally had broken into houses at places of the ANC and had gained further information and this placed the matter in a completely different light.

MR WILLS: The point is, is that you obviously trusted your seniors and that's why you went to them, on your evidence, you had the full information. What I'm saying to you is why didn't you go to your seniors whom you trusted when you got the information about the senior people being in the country?

MR STEYN: We were not sure about this information Chairperson, we probably as it seems, we underestimated it.

MR WILLS: Mr Maharaj was arrested outside of Natal, is that correct, to your knowledge?

MR STEYN: If I can remember correctly, in Jo'burg.

MR WILLS: When were you informed about the fact that Ndaba had been arrested? On the same day, the 7th?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: And how were you told? What was said to you? I know that there was a telephone conversation between you and Mr Botha. What did he say to you on the phone then?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, he said that Ndaba had been arrested, that it created a situation which was problematic and that he would handle it and I told him to continue and carry on and see how you can handle this matter to the best of your ability in the light of the fact that at that stage he was an informer.

MR WILLS: Did you tell any of your seniors that this important informer had now been arrested?

MR STEYN: No, not that I can remember, not at that stage.

MR WILLS: Did you ever tell any of your seniors that this person was an informer?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, I cannot remember.

MR WILLS: Why not?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember what the reason for this was. I might have done it at a later stage, I'm not sure. I will have to think about it but I'm not sure at this moment.

MR WILLS: Because it would seem to me that if your evidence is correct and Mr Ndaba was an informer, that clearly his accidental arrest would have created problems for your further source of information in regard to Operation Vula and you would have had to have brought this to the attention of seniors to get advice on how to deal with the situation?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, when we spoke to Head Office, this was a couple of days later, this was two or three days later, in other words we said that we had received information but we did not inform Headquarters about the real facts. At that stage Shabalala had already been arrested.

MR WILLS: Now we have the evidence of Botha that he told a number of people including Col Taylor, that Ndaba was an informer at the time he was arrested on the 7th, this is at CR Swart Square.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson. He did give evidence to this effect.

MR WILLS: So not why - it struck me from the evidence of Col Botha and it seems from your answers that you hold a similar view, why did you try and contain this information when it was already out the bag that this person was an informer?

MR STEYN: It was in a small group, Chairperson, that's, we'd given this information with the request that this was to be handled confidentially and this is according to Botha.

MR WILLS: So you trusted Col Taylor and the four or five members from C20 more so than you did your superiors?

MR STEYN: No, it was not the case that I trusted them more, the fact was just that at that stage I trusted these people and I hoped that it would stay within our circle.

MR WILLS: Now you go to Pretoria on the 10th with Mr Botha?

MR STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: And according to Mr Botha you consciously hid the fact that Ndaba and Shabalala were arrested to your superiors.

MR STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: Why did you do that?

MR STEYN: We told Headquarters that we had received the information. At that stage Mr Shabalala had been detained unlawfully and I would not give this information to Headquarters.

MR WILLS: I know that you would not, I'm asking why you would not.

MR STEYN: The fact is that we wanted to keep his detention a secret.

MR WILLS: Why?

MR STEYN: He was unlawfully detained.

MR WILLS: Are you telling me that you would have got a crack on the knuckles from Basie Smit or been reprimanded because you'd unlawfully detained somebody?

MR STEYN: Yes, there could have been repercussions from their side.

CHAIRPERSON: Well had you decided by then that you were going to kill him?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, during the week, the exact date I cannot recall, but I could have realised at that stage that the detention of Shabalala was a problem for us.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, you've told us, he was unlawfully detained. You didn't want your superiors to know he was unlawfully detained. You couldn't release him because he would tell people he had been unlawfully detained.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you had only one option - to kill him to cover up your unlawful detention.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson. I say that we had early in the week, this thought had been considered by me. I cannot arrive at a date or tell you exactly what day it was but that is the case. That possibility had already existed.

CHAIRPERSON: He would be eliminated to cover up his unlawful arrest?

MR STEYN: Amongst others, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR WILLS: I've heard and possibly you'll be in a position to confirm this, that at the time the arrests were going on of the other people, or should I rather say, from the time of the arrests of the other persons that occurred from the 13th onwards, sorry the 12th onwards and you were, and there was this investigation team set up and it was leading to the so-called scam prosecution of these people, they were going to court, there was a bail application. At that time members of the police, other members of this investigation unit were looking for Ndaba and Shabalala, they didn't know what had happened to them.

MR STEYN: No one would have known, apart from our small group. No one would have known where they were at that stage.

MR WILLS: So you were hiding this information from everybody, even the members of the investigation team that were set up on national instructions in order to investigate this Operation Vula.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now how is this within the scope of your duties as a policeman?

MR STEYN: I don't understand the question, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Well I'm asking you, you say in your affidavit that at all times you were acting within the course and scope of your employment as a policeman. I'm asking you how can the hiding of vital information and contrary to the orders of your superiors, be an act within the course and scope of your employment as a police officer?

MR STEYN: Due to the unlawful detention, I believed that at that stage I was doing the right thing.

CHAIRPERSON: But it was not within the course and scope of your duty. As I understand, you have just agreed that an investigation unit had been established to investigate Vula and the facts surrounding it and you deliberately concealed information from this Investigation Unit.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That could not be described as being within the course and scope of your employment as a policeman, to conceal information.

MR STEYN: We did not want them to know that we had these people with us. We said, continue with the investigation as Headquarters had ordered and show the whole operation.

CHAIRPERSON: So you had made your own decision, you didn't care what Headquarters said, you didn't care what other people said and you say that you decision is enough to say it was in the course and scope of your employment as a police officer?

MR STEYN: That is how I thought at that stage, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: That's how you think about it now too, not just then.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: In spite of what we're telling you.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: I mean I'm not for one moment wanting to say you may not have been bona fide in your belief that you were doing the right thing, but what you were doing was clearly not within the course and scope of your employment. Look, it's quite a legal argument. It's a matter which counsel will no doubt argue at the end of the matter. I won't take it any further.

I want to now concentrate on the instruction that Botha says he received at that meeting on the 13th, this is the meeting where he met with - sorry, my date is wrong, the 12th, the morning of the 12th when he met with Gen van der Merwe who was then the most senior police person in the country and the instruction I refer to was the instruction where he was told that no further arrests must be made prior to the week commencing the 16th, do you recall his evidence in that regard?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now he interprets that as being an instruction from Gen van der Merwe.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Do you also interpret that as being an instruction from Gen van der Merwe?

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now the evidence is clear that you returned - sorry, I'll withdraw that. You know at this stage simply from the fact that you first meet Basie Smit and people, I think it was on the Tuesday, they consider this information so important that they hold your stay over to the Wednesday morning when you meet first thing, before business starts, with Gen van der Merwe.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: So you realised that the information that you had and this whole operation was viewed by your seniors as an extremely important and sensitive operation of the utmost importance.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: In fact, would you agree that it was probably the most important thing that they had to deal with at that stage?

MR STEYN: It was very important. MR WILLS: Now you are advised at that meeting by Gen van der Merwe that he has to refer to the matter to the State President.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Foreign Affairs.

MR STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: Internal and External Embassy officials.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: And because of that you're given the instruction that you don't arrest before the 16th.

MR STEYN: That was the order.

MR WILLS: This instruction was given, according to Botha, before 7.30 on the morning of the 12th.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now we know, according to your evidence, that the first arrests occur at lunchtime on the 13th.

MR STEYN: Correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now I'm going to put exactly the same question to you that I put to Botha. I find it absolutely staggering that in the light of the sensitivity of this information, you did not ensure that this instruction was communicated to those under you immediately and I want you to try and convince me as to why you justified your decision not to communicate that right up until more than 24 hours later.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, at that stage we had already had the information of safe-houses that we gave attention to. At that stage I understood that the people who had already been in place in Durban along with the reconnoitring of certain safe-houses and addresses that we had, had specifically been there to gain more information to get the movement of the suspects to see which vehicles they used and their registration numbers and I also accepted that and it was, according to me, the fact that we had to continue with the observation but do not arrest now. When one does observation then you do it for as long as it is safe for you and it is going well and in the process you gain certain information. This was the thought at that stage.

MR WILLS: Sorry. You see I didn't understand your answer. You see to my mind, I would have thought that this would have been the least you would have done. Remember when, I'm not talking here, I'm not cross-examining a sergeant, I'm cross-examining a senior policeman. You at the time had the rank of General.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: What I would have thought that at the very least you would have done, is immediately communicated with your men on the ground and said "look, this is the instruction that we have. I want to know every single movement that occurs, I want to be brief completely about this matter and if there's some sort of reason as to why you can't adhere to van der Merwe's instruction, contact me immediately." I want to know why you didn't do that.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, personally I did not give this information to the people, the people that were on the scene. I will explain that when I left here, there were members of the Security Branch in place to do observation of certain houses and safe-houses, of which we had information. This aim was then not to arrest, not at all, but to see how much information we could gain by means of arresting.

MR WILLS: I know that, you're not understanding me. I'll try and be more simple. General, please, if you don't understand my question, ask me to repeat it. What I'm saying to you is that you get an instruction from a senior policeman not to arrest people and you don't communicate that down the ranks and I find that most odd. One would expect you to do so.

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson, I cannot remember that I had done this and if I had left it for Botha to do and if there had been a misunderstanding between myself and Botha, we were both in Pretoria but I cannot remember that I had done it, due to among others, the reasons that I have just given.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand how the reasons you have just given have anything to do with a general ban on arrests by General van der Merwe. He didn't say that no arrests are to be made at safe-houses. You keep on coming back to watching safe-houses. The question was why did you not tell those below you, or order Col Botha to tell those, "There must be no further arrests made till the 16th of July"?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot remember why I did not do it and if I discussed it with Botha or not, because I think that Botha also gave evidence that he did not do it either, if I can remember correctly. My only solution that I have and my only answer, not solution, is that the thought had been that we have these people in place, there was no order to arrest, it was just for observation and to gain as much information as possible.

MR WILLS: Possibly I might suggest to you that you knew at this stage that the negotiation process had reached a level where it was unlikely that anybody was going to really suffer as a result of your action and I'm talking about the people you were observing, the ANC comrades involved in Vula and that you wanted to make sure that they had as hard a time as possible and you were hoping that they would be arrested.

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, our aim was to gain information, as much as possible information.

MR LAX: Well you see, you have one problem now and that is, Botha's evidence is by this time, on the way back from Pretoria, you informed him that nobody would be arrested. You already knew at that stage on your way back from Pretoria not that nobody would be arrested, that there would be no prosecutions and that whatever arrests there were would come to nought.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, if I can just be fair to the witness, according to the evidence that I recall the decision about the no prosecutions was on the 13th, which was a couple of days later.

MR LAX: Except that then Botha's mistaken, if that is the case, because he gave two different versions of when he was informed. One version is that he was informed by you on his way back from Pretoria on the plane, on that very Friday afternoon.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as far as I can remember, on the 13th I told Botha that there would probably not be any investigation. I know the other version...(intervention)

MR LAX: And it exists in your first affidavit as well. But that's not what his evidence before us was at one point and I made a very careful note because it struck me at the time as quite strange. But let's carry on. I just thought I'd put that to you as a problem.

MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Now, you have this high-level meeting, you know that you're sitting on a hot potato, what did you do when you got back to Durban?

MR STEYN: At which occasion was this Chairperson?

MR WILLS: Sorry, let me withdraw that. I'll just start with something else. It's clear from Botha's evidence that you returned to Durban on the 11th, do you agree with that?

MR STEYN: I think that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now when you returned to Durban on the 11th, what did you do?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot remember exactly what I did at that stage. The investigation was under way. I cannot say exactly. I also had other tasks to do. Botha handled the thing, so I cannot exactly say.

MR STEYN: Did you not call key players in your operation together and give them feedback of the importance of this information, or of this operation that they were investigating?

MR STEYN: Certain people had already been in place who were busy with the investigation, Chairperson and they were aware of this.

MR WILLS: How were they made aware of this?

MR STEYN: Botha had to tell them all this, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Botha told me that he only met with them on his return from Pretoria.

MR STEYN: I accept that this is when he informed the members.

MR WILLS: Did you not tell Botha to do anything specific?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I can accept that I told him to continue with the investigation, do everything that is possible so that we can get this matter to a point, so that we can get the best out of this matter. Yes, we had to discuss the matter, but in finer details, after all these years, I cannot remember or say exactly what I had told to whom at which stage.

MR WILLS: When did you first become aware of Nyanda's arrest?

MR STEYN: On the 7th, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: He was arrested on the 12th.

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon, on the 12th. If I remember correctly, it wasn't long after the arrest.

MR WILLS: Well, can you remember what time that was?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot remember, but I would say that it was shortly after the arrest.

MR WILLS: Now, I know it's Mr Botha's evidence, but is it also your evidence that Nyanda was the first of these persons to be arrested?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: And Mr Chairperson, I must apologise to my colleague for not putting this to Mr Botha but it's only come to my light subsequently, in fact this morning, that I'm instructed that the first person that was arrested was Mr Gordhan and Mr Onash Sancar, they were arrested before Mr Nyanda.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I am not aware of this. I did not know this, if this had been the case.

MR WILLS: Well, is it not the case that if this is true then this theory that you've been wanting the Committee to believe, that Nyanda's attempt to escape precipitated his arrest, would in fact be untrue.

MR STEYN: Yes, but I was not aware of any arrests, as far as I knew Nyanda was the first person to be arrested.

MR WILLS: Now I think it's common cause among the parties that Nyanda's arrest occurred at approximately midday on the 12th.

MR STEYN: I remember it like that, if it is correct.

MR WILLS: Now other people were arrested right up until late at night.

MR STEYN: That is correct. After Nyanda had been arrested, other people had also been arrested.

MR WILLS: Why didn't you put a stop to those arrests, in line with the instruction that you had received?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, after the first person had been arrested it would have been impossible, the message would then have spread and people would have fled. Safe-houses would be evacuated and so forth.

MR WILLS: But who did you discuss this with when Nyanda was arrested? What was the first thing you did when you heard that Nyanda was arrested?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: There's no evidence before the Committee either in your affidavit or in your evidence in chief that you phoned anybody senior about this arrest, until, the only time you did anything about that was the following day, the 13th when you flew to Pretoria, with Botha.

MR STEYN: I probably at some stage of that day, I can't remember exactly when, made an arrangement to go to Pretoria to go and report these new events.

MR WILLS: Yes, but what I'm suggesting and what I cannot believe about your testimony in this regard, with respect Mr Steyn, is that you've got this high-level instruction not to arrest and even if your version is true, which we don't believe it is, even if it is true, the moment you had heard of Nyanda's arrest you would have immediately phoned your seniors in Pretoria and said, "What do we do now?"

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I already said that I probably did speak to Headquarters because I made an arrangement, I made a meeting, I said this.

MR WILLS: This is new evidence now. The first time you're mentioning this.

MR STEYN: I answered just now Chairperson that in all probability I had spoken to someone because I had to arrange a meeting with Headquarters.

CHAIRPERSON: It's one thing to report to Headquarters, it's another thing to phone up and say, "Will the General be available for a consultation tomorrow morning? Can I see him at 11 o'clock?" Can you tell us which you did?

MR STEYN: I would have contacted one of the senior members at Head Office to arrange for a meeting the next day.

MR WILLS: So your evidence is that you just phoned to make an arrangement for a meeting, but you didn't disclose the fact that this high-level order had been broken as a result of circumstance?

MR STEYN: I probably said it, but I can't remember exactly what I said.

MR WILLS: Well I put it to that had you done so, that would have appeared in your papers today, in your second affidavit at least.

MR STEYN: The way I remember it is that irrespective of what I put on paper in my application in my application, that which I'm testifying to today orally also forms part of my application. There are very few people who can remember exactly what happened 10 to 12 years ago, it's not easy.

MR WILLS: You see, I would have thought that because you'd got such a high-level order, that you would have spoken to the person who gave you that order, i.e. Gen van der Merwe directly and not gone through anybody else and phoned Gen van der Merwe. You would have got him out of anywhere he was at the time and insisted on speaking to him personally, immediately, within 5 minutes of the knowledge of the arrest and said to him, "Gen van der Merwe, we've got the position where Siphiwe Nyanda has been arrested, the other people are going to flee, I want you to change the order, I want you to say - I think the best thing for us to do is arrest the other people immediately before they flee."

MR STEYN: No, I wouldn't necessarily have spoken to Gen van der Merwe, I would have spoken to a senior person, a general or somebody else who was available and I would have made an arrangement with that person, it's not necessarily so that I would have spoken to van der Merwe because as I said earlier, after Nyanda's arrest, other arrests followed, if I remember correctly, very shortly afterwards up until that evening.

MR WILLS: Did you tell your troops on the ground, or Botha at least, to wait until you had communicated with this so-called mysterious third person?

MR STEYN: No. After the arrests started, matter simply could not be contained any longer.

MR WILLS: Why not? Wasn't the police a military organisation where if you said to your seniors on the ground "Hold fire until I've got permission from my superiors", they would have been obliged to hold fire?

MR STEYN: After the first arrest took place, we could no longer turn back. People would have fled and everybody would have been aware of what was going on, this operation had a very sophisticated communications network, which would have alerted people within minutes of a possible arrest, or two or three arrests.

MR WILLS: Nyanda was alone at the time of his arrest.

MR STEYN: I don't know, I can't remember.

MR WILLS: Well I put it to you that he was.

MR STEYN: I can't dispute that. MR WILLS: Now you decide to go and discuss this matter with people in Pretoria the following day and again you take Botha. Now I'm referring to the meeting of the 13th.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Now why at that stage? Now you know that arrests have taken place, the whole thing has been exposed, the whole world knows about the fact that certain prominent ANC people have been arrested. Why at that stage, didn't you raise the issue with your superiors that you already had Shabalala and Ndaba?

MR STEYN: No, we deliberately didn't mention it.

MR WILLS: I'm asking why?

MR STEYN: We didn't want anybody to know that they were with us.

MR WILLS: Now my understanding is, and fortunately this isn't from personal experience, my understanding is that as a Security Branch routine procedure, is that if you have an informer, you keep that informer and you use him to corroborate the information you get from other suspects, so for example if, let's take the position with Mr Gordhan, you've arrested him on the 12th, my instructions are at about 10 in the morning, you question him and you get certain information and then you will go to your informer Ndaba and you will say "Gordhan says this, what have you got to say about that?" Is that not true?

MR STEYN: Yes, any information which we would gather in the field during this investigation would be contacted, or dealt with by the handler of that particular informer, depending on the nature of the information.

MR WILLS: Yes and put to the informer to get his input because that's how you create the big picture, not so?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is true, depending on what you need and depending on what was still outstanding or unclear, things that you were still dubious about.

MR WILLS: And you knew that you were going to be holding these people for some time and obviously you were going to be asking them questions and you were going to be seeking information from them, not so?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Well then why do you kill? Why do you kill Ndaba within two days of the arrest of these people, if you say he's an informer who can help with the corroboration of information?

MR STEYN: At that stage there was a confiscation and seizure at various houses of documentation and we had volumes and volumes of documentation exposing this operation. Armament was seized, computers etc, so we had a lot of different kinds of information at our disposal and for all I know, Botha did have some contact with Ndaba in this period, for all I know.

MR WILLS: Isn't it true Mr Steyn, that you killed Ndaba and Shabalala to cover your tracks?

MR STEYN: That's not true.

MR WILLS: Well, why did you kill him?

MR STEYN: We found ourselves in a situation where it was very difficult because Shabalala had been arrested unlawfully and detained unlawfully. We were running out of time, we'd been detaining him for quite some time, since the 7th. He'd become aware of Ndaba's position vis a vis ourselves and to release Shabalala would immediately have made it known that Ndaba was in our possession.

MR LAX: Surely, with respect General, why would Shabalala care if he knew Ndaba was an informer? If he knew he was a sell-out he wouldn't give two hoots at that stage if the man disappeared. I mean he - so far as we understand it you're relying on the fact that this man was an informer and you're relying on the fact that Shabalala, through his conduct and through what he said, indicated that he was now aware of Ndaba's role. If that was the case, he wouldn't regard him in a very favourable light, he wouldn't give two hoots what happened to him. This was a man who had turned against him. Why should he worry what happened to Ndaba at that stage?

MR STEYN: If he was released, he would be able to notify the structures and networks of Operation Vula that Ndaba was in our possession.

MR LAX: It wouldn't have mattered at that stage because you already had uncovered the whole chain yourself anyway. You were in the process of observing these people and maybe even arresting them.

MR STEYN: We had detained a man unlawfully for a couple of days. Negotiations at the highest level were taking place between the Government and other parties. This information was to be revealed that we were unlawfully detaining somebody, it would have a major impact on what was happening in the country at that stage.

MR LAX: Surely there were bigger fish to fry in the country at that time? One small little unlawful detention is not going to break the whole negotiation process?

MR STEYN: That's how I saw it, it would have created an embarrassment.

CHAIRPERSON: But if you had released Ndaba at the beginning of it all and apologised and said, "Sorry, it's a misunderstanding", what embarrassment would there have been?

MR STEYN: We were not certain, according to Botha, what Ndaba would do after release. He could have gone to his colleagues and told them that he'd been in custody, he could also have made a clean breast with them. So we were not certain.

MR LAX: But even so, how would that be a major embarrassment to you? I mean, you arrested the wrong man and then he goes and admits that he's an informer anyway. I mean, it's common knowledge that different people use informers for all sorts of purposes.

MR STEYN: Could you just repeat the question please?

MR LAX: What difference would it have made and what huge embarrassment would it have made for Ndaba to admit to the ANC that he was an informer? Everybody uses informers. At that stage both sides were using informers, on your own version, your own organisation had been penetrated.

MR STEYN: That's correct. Ndaba, according to Col Botha, was familiar with certain of our movements and operations and networks and if he was to reveal those, it could have compromised the Intelligence network existing between Botha and Shabalala.

MR LAX: Except to say this, that the network that we're talking about was one from 1988. We're now two years down the line. This had very little to do with Swaziland, the whole picture has changed, he's now operating in the country not from Swaziland. It's a totally new scenario. Where's the big catch?

MR STEYN: Botha had already, after he arrived in the country, had several meetings with him.

MR LAX: Botha's testimony was that all that he got out of him during this time was the bare bones of this President's Committee operation. The bare bones and that's your testimony as well. It's your case that only the bare bones came out at this stage and that the detail came out later, so how could he have known what Ndaba knew in detail at that stage?

MR STEYN: His meetings with Ndaba took place in ways which, as I understand it and according to normal practice and procedure, in such a way that Ndaba could have been aware of our methods of operation, making contact etc and Ndaba had also been at the safe-house and he'd been interrogated there by other members, members from Head Office, he'd made certain identifications from a photograph album and Shabalala had done the same, so in this process, according to Botha and I agreed with him, Ndaba could have become aware of more than just that which him and Botha had talked about and discussed over the months.

MR LAX: Every single suspect or detainee gets put through the same sort of interrogation where they are shown photo albums and they're asked to try and identify people and sometimes they co-operate and sometimes they don't. We have Botha's evidence, which is that he wasn't contacted via some other channel, Ndaba had a phone number to get hold of him which he used when he wanted a meeting, so it's not as if there was another whole network of people that would be put in danger, it was a direct contact, that's Botha's evidence. Do you understand my problem? We're not talking about a man who - you see, the problem is that Botha says he got the bare bones from the man, you say he got the bare bones from the man, nobody else knew about Ndaba's status except you and Botha, nobody else.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood that very clearly from what I have been told that that was the position. So Ndaba had no information about anybody else in the police force, about any contact, anything. He could have merely told them that he had met Botha.

MR STEYN: Except for the contact which he'd done. There were several ways of making contact with informers. Botha couldn't be sure in his own mind that his meetings hadn't perhaps been observed, that it hadn't become known.

CHAIRPERSON: By who?

MR STEYN: By the ANC itself.

CHAIRPERSON: But the ANC already knew Ndaba was an informer. You say it's possible they'd observed him meeting Botha.

MR STEYN: No, this was a properly structured network in terms of which secrecy had been practised to a large extent by Operation Vula and pursuit observation - there were several possibilities which existed.

MR LAX: Except to say this, General, and that is in a sense you people panicked when Nyanda was suddenly arrested.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR LAX: You panicked when Shabalala and Ndaba were arrested. They were equally integral to this operation. They were - their arrest could equally have precipitated the sort of panic you say was likely to occur within the chain and the network from Nyanda's arrest. Do you understand what I'm saying, what I'm asking you?

MR STEYN: Could you repeat please?

MR LAX: What I'm saying to you is this, your big concern about why you went on with the rest of the arrests was that you thought there would be a panic in the ranks of Operation Vula, people would cover their tracks, they would disappear and so on and that was a consideration for you. I'm asking, why wasn't there this same consideration when you arrested, on your version, a senior person in that operation, who's been responsible for its establishment in KwaZulu Natal and Shabalala, who was someone who works with him, where you are now saying to the Chair that you were worried the ANC was watching its operatives and watching these goings-on.

MR STEYN: This is one possibility, but the fact of the matter was that this detention of Shabalala which had been unlawful and carried on for quite some time, made it impossible to place him back. Botha told me that Ndaba would not testify against Shabalala if there was something that he could testify about. After this period of time, such a long period of time to entertain the possibility that Ndaba was going to go to the ANC and spill the beans, well that created a problem.

MR WILLS: You see, you haven't answered my question. I'll try and put it in a different way, so that you can - let's see of I cam get my meaning across to you and I don't mean that in a paternalistic way at all, I'm sorry if I come across that way. One of your big concerns was the panic that Nyanda's arrest precipitated. I'm asking why didn't that occur to you, that same notion of panic that might be precipitated in Shabalala and Ndaba's "arrest", I use arrest in inverted commas, because we know it wasn't an arrest but be that as it may.

ADV BOSMAN: Perhaps I can just come to your assistance here, Mr Lax. Gen Steyn Mr Lax's is referring to the panic which was expected in the ANC circles after Nyanda's arrest and his question is why would you not have expected that after Ndaba and Shabalala had been arrested, there to be a similar kind of panic in the ANC circles?

MR STEYN: That's correct, there probably would have been such panic, I can accept that.

MR LAX: My question is, why didn't you then proceed with wholesale arrests immediately, because you had the information, you'd already raided the safe-houses, you'd established some of that information through the unlawful raid that Botha referred to on two separate houses and we know that one of those houses was one of the houses where there was a computer in.

MR STEYN: Yes, the investigation was not yet finalised at that stage.

MR LAX: You see, by that stage the horse could have bolted, so you were willing to take the chance at one stage but two days later or three days later you weren't willing to take the chance.

MR STEYN: The fact was that the fact that we had Ndaba in our possession and Shabalala, that created a problem for us. As I explained their release could have led to several options.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Wills, we took over from you for a long time.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I want to ask something before you go back to Mr Wills. As I understand the evidence, only you and Botha knew that Ndaba was an informer.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He gets arrested by one of Taylor's askaris.

MR STEYN: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Which was contrary to all your plans. He was a most important person.

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you explain, did you ask Botha, why he then told so many people that Ndaba was an informer? According to what Mr Visser has told me, he told Wasserman, van der Westhuizen, Taylor and Ninela and du Preez.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was he suddenly disclosing to all sorts of people, including Ninela?

MR STEYN: The idea was that these people should deal with it on the basis of confidentiality. He was in a dilemma at that stage and his thinking at that stage as he later explained it to me was to keep it a secret to, if possible and if circumstances justified it, to place Ndaba back into the system.

CHAIRPERSON: But then when they illegally arrest Shabalala, they take him to the same safe-house as Ndaba.

MR STEYN: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Again, it appears to indicate they weren't particularly interested in Ndaba's security, they decided it wasn't of any importance to them, or sorry not they, Botha had decided.

MR STEYN: I don't know how Botha dealt with it at that stage or what his thinking was in this regard, but it's true that they were detained together at the same safe-house.

MR LAX: It wouldn't have been usual to take two people, especially where you're trying to keep the knowledge of one away from the other, to the same place and hold them in the same place and be seen talking to them and so on.

MR STEYN: Yes, under normal circumstances it wouldn't have been correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I just want to make one correction. If you understood that I said that Botha told Ninela about the information status, that is incorrect, Mr Chairman. He told the other members of the Security Branch, not Ninela.

CHAIRPERSON: What you told us was Taylor and Ninela were upset and withdrew.

MR VISSER: Taylor was upset and he and Ninela withdrew.

CHAIRPERSON: You said Ninela was there.

MR VISSER: No, no, no.

CHAIRPERSON: If he withdrew.

MR VISSER: Well, that's not the evidence Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that's what you said.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Visser, you did actually say that, because it struck me as something that I might have missed earlier and I made a special note of the fact that Ninela had been informed, in your summary, just to follow it up later. If you were mistaken in saying that, that's fine.

MR VISSER: Yes, Sir, I'm sorry if I brought you under that impression, but it's paragraph 18 of Botha's evidence, Mr Chairman, it's quite clear that Ninela wasn't part, in fact the other members were taken away from Ndaba and Ninela and told this in a separate office.

MR WILLS: Thank you. Mr Steyn, I want to return to the meeting of the 13th with you and Mr Botha in Pretoria and my understanding is that you went to that meeting to appraise your superiors and to get, I think you used the word or it was translated to me as orders, as to what to do next.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: And you also received orders, as I understand it, at that stage to set up a National Investigation Unit to investigate Operation Vula, which it was decided would be to be headed by Col Zen de Beer.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: And then, according to the evidence of Botha, you met with somebody else who told you that the prosecutions were not going to take place.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Who did you meet with who told you that?

MR STEYN: We gave several briefings. I remember Gen Beukes and Gen Pruis and I remember members of the Intelligence Unit at Head Office and it was these people that we gave the briefing to.

MR WILLS: Now, you say, I think you use the same word in your affidavit, when you received this information, you were disappointed that no prosecutions were going to take place.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Why were you disappointed?

MR STEYN: It appeared to us at that stage that there was a massive underground structure which had been revealed and it was as a result of that, it appeared that there would be no prosecutions and it was difficult to think about this and consider it.

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR STEYN: We were told that the negotiating process was under way and it could have an impact if there was to be prosecutions.

MR WILLS: Is it not so that the word you used, disappointing, is basically a euphemism? Your emotion, you were absolutely shaken to the core by this, you wanted these people to be prosecuted, you wanted them to sit in jail for a long period of time and you wanted to make sure that these terrorists and communists suffered as a result of what they were doing to your beloved country?

MR STEYN: No. The idea was that this matter should just take its normal course, like any other big case.

MR WILLS: I know what the idea was, I'm asking you about your feelings. I'm saying that disappointment isn't a strong enough word.

MR STEYN: No, I think I was disappointed.

MR WILLS: Just shrugged it off? I'm disappointed about that?

MR STEYN: No it wasn't that easy, it wasn't that easy to just say well, just shrug it off. We were disappointed.

MR WILLS: I'm suggesting that you were more than disappointed, you were very cross about this.

MR STEYN: To what extent I was disappointed, well I can't spell it out.

MR WILLS: Was it a great extent?

MR STEYN: I was disappointed to a reasonable extent.

MR WILLS: Well, I don't understand that, but we'll move on. Now are you sure that this was communicated to your separately from Botha?

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, I think that was the case. I'm not sure.

MR WILLS: And then you travelled back with Botha to Durban. You travelled back together?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot remember if we had returned together every time. I can not remember exactly.

MR WILLS: But you told Botha that no prosecutions would take place, according to his evidence.

MR STEYN: At one stage I had said that to him, yes.

MR WILLS: He says you said that to him on the 13th. We're not talking about one stage, we're talking about on the 13th.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: He was also disappointed.

MR STEYN: Yes, he was.

MR WILLS: You then get back to Durban. What did you do, in relation to the situation that you had, i.e. you had two people who might have useful information about Vula, you have a whole lot of people in jail and you've got the investigation headed up by de Beer. What did you do with de Beer? What information did you give de Beer?

MR STEYN: All information that had been available at that stage, as a result of seizures and so forth, had been given to de Beer with different members to support him and he was told to investigate the matter.

MR WILLS: But you again take a conscious decision not to make Mr de Beer aware of the fact that you have a living suspect, a living informer in your possession that might be able to help out with some information, not so?

MR STEYN: No, I did not tell him that.

MR WILLS: Why not?

MR STEYN: Any information that we could get hold of from anyone, including Mr Shabalala, we could have told this information to the investigating team of Mr de Beer, by saying that we had information of this nature, please investigate it. It was not necessary that we have a person that we got this information from.

MR WILLS: Surely this operation was of such importance that it might have benefited Mr de Beer to speak to Ndaba himself?

MR STEYN: No, we could, no Botha rather, he could take all the information and he could conveniently have conveyed this information to de Beer, which I believe he did.

CHAIRPERSON: That would mean that Botha would have to know precisely how de Beer's investigations were going, precisely what information he needed, including the identification of a messenger, what sort of car had been used, matters of that nature.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Nonsense, Botha wasn't the investigating officer. He would not have known every little detail that came to de Beer, but for some reason you wouldn't let de Beer have access to the potential witness.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, with all respect, Botha would have at all times, tried to stay briefed with everything that had been done with the investigation team to be able to help. This is logically the way it would have worked.

MR LAX: Except General, that we know he didn't and he's already told us. He doesn't know what they did, he doesn't know whether they visited Shabalala's family or Ndaba's family, but those are things he would have been interested in, these were people in his custody, you know, he would have wanted to know what the family's response to these people being missing might be for example.

MR STEYN: Chairperson,...(intervention)

MR LAX: He didn't have any knowledge of that at all when it was put to him.

MR STEYN: I would think the right procedures would have been and I also accepted that this was the case, that Botha would have conveyed all the information that he had in his possession to the investigation team and this is the normal practice.

MR WILLS: You are dealing with someone who, in his own version, was extremely disappointed and disillusioned because he knew this was just a total waste of time, nothing was ever going to come of it.

MR STEYN: But Chairperson, the instructions were still that the matter be taken to its full consequence and investigated to its full consequence,

MR WILLS: You'll concede that it's very hard for somebody who knows this is an exercise in futility to really put his heart into something.

MR STEYN: You are now referring to - in all honesty Chairperson, I would say that Botha had, what he had known, and I also accepted this to be the case, that he had conveyed this in order to help the investigation team. Not necessarily with Zen de Beer but with one of the members but I will say that this is how I would accept it.

MR WILLS: Mr Botha gave information to us that the investigation was a scam, would you agree with that?

MR STEYN: Yes, in this sense, Chairperson, that these investigators did not know that in all probability prosecutions would not happen.

MR WILLS: But surely, sorry had you not finished?

MR STEYN: Please continue.

MR WILLS: I'm sorry if I interrupted you. Surely at least one of the purposes of the investigation was to get a lot of information? To get information, I mean that would have helped the Government or the National Party or the police, regardless of whether or not prosecutions occurred.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: So surely it would have been in your interests to support the investigation to the greatest extent possible?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: And I put it to you that it would have been the correct procedure to have made it known to the person who was in charge of that investigation that you had somebody with information that he could speak to.

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, that is not necessarily the case. The information that Botha had in his possession that he had gotten hold of from Ndaba and from Shabalala, could be conveyed by him in different ways.

MR WILLS: Although it could be conveyed, we all know that, that you can take hearsay evidence to anybody you like, what I'm saying is that if you had treated this investigation seriously, as per your orders, it wasn't a small investigation, it was orders from Pretoria that a National Investigation get under way, that you should have made that person, that witness available to that team.

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I do not agree, because I will say again, Botha could convey all the information that he had in his possession, while these people had been in our possession and we did not want people to know about this.

MR WILLS: Isn't it true, Mr Steyn, that again you actively hid these two individuals, Shabalala and Ndaba from this investigation team? That's the reason you didn't tell Steyn of the existence of Shabalala and Ndaba? You actively hid that from their attention? De Beer - you didn't tell de Beer about the fact that you were holding these two people, because you wanted to hide it from de Beer that you had these two people.

MR STEYN: We did not want them to know this Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Well then you must have been acting contrary at least to the spirit of the instruction that was given, because you were hiding vital information from the investigation that had been set up.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I have already said that all information that Botha could get hold of, he should have conveyed this to the investigation team without saying where he had gotten the information from. It is not necessary, many investigations worked like this and also worked like this in the past.

CHAIRPERSON: But surely it is of extreme importance where the information has come from? If it's some little foot soldier who's heard gossip somewhere and he's passing it on or if it is a senior ANC official who's giving the information.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is important who it comes from?

MR STEYN: Yes, Mr Botha could have said that this is information which he had in his possession, good information, reliable information and this would have been enough for any investigation team.

CHAIRPERSON: So they must accept? Botha says it's reliable so that's enough for them, they were a National Investigation Unit.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: May I just interpose here? Gen Steyn, what is not clear to me is that in this time where there was such a double situation, weren't there questions about what had happened to Ndaba and Shabalala?

MR STEYN: Are you referring to from inside?

ADV BOSMAN: They were two very important people.

MR STEYN: Yes, I do remember, and if I remember correctly there were questions from the ANC side at a later stage and naturally the ANC, after these people had not met the appointments after a few days, the ANC realised that something was wrong and that there'd been a security breach.

ADV BOSMAN: Did this not worry you?

MR STEYN: It was a problem for us, yes.

ADV BOSMAN: Would one then not expect the investigator, Mr de Beer, had been taken into your confidence?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the time had already gone by, a few days had gone by and it was difficult for us, we did not know where we were going to at that stage with these people and we did not inform de Beer, or I did not inform de Beer.

MR WILLS: Thank you. Mr Steyn, if I'd been in your position then, I would have at least felt a little bit guilty that I wasn't revealing this information, I was hiding something from my superiors. Did you feel that?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was not correct to withhold it from them but I did.

MR WILLS: Now is it not so that on the 9th of July, that's the Monday morning, that C R Swart police station had already been approached by lawyers representing the ANC asking about the disappearance of their two comrades?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember that date. I know there was inquiries made, but I cannot remember.

MR WILLS: Quite soon after their disappearance?

MR STEYN: In all honesty, the best that I can do and I'm honest if I say that I cannot remember, I know that inquiries had been made but I cannot remember exactly.

MR WILLS: Is it not so that there was a story run in the newspaper called the Weekly Mail, I think on that Friday the 13th, about the disappearance, but my instructions are unclear, it might have been that 13th or the next week.

MR STEYN: I can recall that there had been a newspaper article.

MR WILLS: And is it not also so that members of your investigation team, de Beer's team, were actively looking for Mbuso and Shabalala?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson. They would have investigated the whole matter, not only these two.

MR WILLS: And they were looking for those people and you and Botha just went along with their story, saying that you didn't know where they were either.

MR STEYN: That's correct, we did not reveal this information.

MR WILLS: And you obviously felt guilty about that?

MR STEYN: Yes, in the sense that we did not tell them.

MR WILLS: You were pulling the wool over the eyes of your own people.

MR STEYN: No, we did not tell them.

MR WILLS: Now, I want to turn to the fateful meeting on the 14th between you and Botha, that is the meeting that Botha refers to and which only came up in your later affidavit where you say, or when Botha says he came I think to your house and he reported that Ndaba was panicky and was wanting to go back to the ANC and tell them about the story and he sought your advice.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Can you tell me what happened at that meeting? First of all, did it in fact take place at your house?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot remember where it happened.

MR VISSER: Botha never said so, Mr Chairman. Paragraph 11. Gen Steyn's statement, paragraph 11.

MR WILLS: I'm sorry. You can't remember where the meeting took place?

MR VISSER: At his office.

MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Visser, I'm trying to remember a lot of information. So the meeting took place at your office. This is the Saturday now?

MR STEYN: If I can remember correctly, that is correct. That is how I had written it in my application.

MR WILLS: Now were you called by Botha to come into your office, specifically for this purpose?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Anyway, what did Botha say to you at this?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Botha informed me, as I said in my evidence, that problems had arisen. He referred to the fact that we had Shabalala in our possession and that we did not know what to do with him. He said that in the light of Shabalala's arrest, a fear had arisen that if he had to be set free, that he would endanger the position of Ndaba in the ANC. We discussed different matters. Over and above this Shabalala, he said that Shabalala suspects that Ndaba was co-operating with the police and that setting him free for this reason would probably not have been possible. Ndaba, according to Botha, verbalised his fear and that the ANC, as a result of the arrests on the 7th, had or could have become aware of the arrest on the 7th and Botha said that up to that stage his conversation had been of such a nature that it would, or that it appeared that Ndaba would rather want to play open cards with the ANC if he had been set free. This is more or less the conversation that had taken place that day.

MR WILLS: Was it not discussed that you were worried about the fact that de Beer's unit might eventually find out where these people were?

MR STEYN: I don't believe that we spoke about this Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now, it seems that the gist of Mr Botha's evidence was his concern of the state of mind of Mr Ndaba at that time. It seemed as if his state of mind had deteriorated from when he came back from Pretoria on the 13th and advised Ndaba of the fact that there were no prosecutions that were going to take place, that that is when Mr Ndaba began, to use a loose phrase, to fall apart?

MR STEYN: If I remember his evidence correctly, that is what he said, yes.

MR WILLS: Now this is a person who's been working as an informer for you people for the best part of 2 and a half years, since 1988.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no, I don't think it was for such a long time. As far as I can remember, unless Botha wants to give other evidence, after Ndaba, in 1988 according to him, he had gone to Lusaka and as far as I know until he returned to the Republic, as far as I know, he had not made any contact with him. If there had been any contact, there were various informers and I can't remember everything and if there were and I cannot remember it now.

MR WILLS: Rephrase. He was helping you with information and he had been, he'd agreed to put his life on the line to help you with information and your unit.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Didn't you think, Mr Botha, didn't you feel it in your heart that it might be, it might at least be decent to give him an opportunity to regain his stability, to give him a couple of days to compose himself? Why didn't you do that?

MR STEYN: Are you meaning that we had to set him free?

MR WILLS: No, I'm not. I'm not meaning that. You've already held him for the best part of a week, six days and whilst I can't remember the names, I've become aware of people who've been held by the Security Force for three months before I've got to see them. It would have been easy for you to have held him for a couple of more days just to give him a chance to compose himself.

MR STEYN: I think Botha's fear was, not his fear, I think Botha's point of view as he gave it to me and I had accepted it was that a stage had been reached where Ndaba was not prepared to take any of these possible options that had been presented to him. I think this was the factor that had been taken into account, that no more time had to be used.

MR WILLS: No Botha's evidence is that he was very upset and beside himself and not in control of himself and it was in that context, according to Botha, that Ndaba had said that he was considering going over to the ANC. He was very upset.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Well surely you must at least know that when people are upset, they say things that they don't mean and that it would have been wise for you to wait at least possibly even for just another 24 hours to give him a chance to regain his senses.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, according to Botha, he had reached a stage where he thought that the conversation had stopped there. That's how I understood it.

MR WILLS: Didn't you challenge Botha on this? You're the senior man here. Botha had come to seek your advice. I would have thought that at the very least, had he been one of my comrades, I would have said "let's give him a chance, let's give him a break, let's see if he changes" but instead you rushed through with this execution.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I accepted what Botha had done at that stage. I accepted it to be like that.

MR WILLS: You believed everything Botha had said to you?

MR STEYN: I had worked together with Botha for a long time. He did very good work.

MR WILLS: You didn't think it would be necessary to think that you're killing one of essentially your own men to go an see him yourself, and see the situation for yourself?

MR STEYN: No, I accepted his word, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Now, I can't understand your logic in regard to the decision to kill both of them. I know this has been covered by the Committee but very briefly, what would have been wrong with killing Shabalala and letting Ndaba go free?

MR STEYN: If Shabalala had been eliminated and Ndaba was set free, is that what you're talking about?

MR WILLS: Yes.

MR STEYN: Then Ndaba could have - the fact that Shabalala was in our possession could have been made known by him.

MR WILLS: It was already known that these people had disappeared.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: You see, Mr Botha mentioned this issue in his evidence in chief, that if you tell the ANC that there's an informer in their midst then a big witch hunt takes place within the ANC and they can use this situation to their advantage.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Well, why didn't you do the same with Ndaba at that time? Release Ndaba to the ANC, let them know by some, for want of a better phrase, dirty tricks department that this person is an informer and then they themselves would conduct their investigation and they'd never trust a word that Ndaba said and you could exploit this whole situation in relation to Vula?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as Botha had pointed out in his evidence, Ndaba would have been capable of conveying certain information that he probably could have gotten hold of during their meetings in the last three or four meetings. He could also become aware of information due to the interrogation by other members of C20 and of Headquarters members that were there. He could, for this matter have conveyed any information to the ANC and this was a risk.

MR WILLS: I put it to you that you could have done it in such a way that the ANC didn't believe a word he said. But let's move on.

CHAIRPERSON: Where were these interrogations by members of 20?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, this was at the safe-houses where they were detained.

CHAIRPERSON: And where did they come from?

MR STEYN: They came from Pretoria, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What is 20?

MR STEYN: It is a unit that when arrests had been made in the regions, then this unit came to interrogate the people b means of photo recognitions to establish where certain trained people had been that had left the country. What the position of people were.

CHAIRPERSON: And from Head Quarters, who came?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I can remember correctly it was Daan van der Berg, I think Paul van Dyk, I have, I did read it somewhere in the past two days, or made a note of it, I can't remember, but there were more than two, Chairperson, more than two people.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, for your assistance, it's paragraph 35 of Exhibit D.

CHAIRPERSON: And they would all know who they were interrogating?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So all these people, who did they come to interrogate? Ndaba and Shabalala?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So all these people knew that Ndaba and Shabalala were in your custody at a safe-house?

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: And presumably entries were made in connection with Ndaba when he was arrested and taken to C R Swart Square?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the persons of C20 who did this interrogation were under the impression that these people were not arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I'm just talking - a separate item, we have been told that an askari arrested Ndaba, he took him to C R Swart Square, various policemen were phone up and told that a senior terrorist was in detention there and they went there to see him?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I presume that entries would have been made in the occurrence book at C R Swart Square, when a man who had been properly arrested, had been brought there.

MR STEYN: I think entries had been made at C R Swart.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was a lot of indication about these people. You refused to tell your seniors that you had these people in your custody, but these other men knew about it, they'd been there, they'd spoken to them.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson, they saw them to ask questions...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Presumably of all the information they got.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson, with the understanding that these are informers. These people had come back and these people had information that they could gain.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and they knew who they were, you have told me.

MR STEYN: That's correct, I'm talking about C20.

CHAIRPERSON: And HQ.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson. The members on the scene at the safe-house knew who they were handling.

CHAIRPERSON: And the people who came down from Pretoria to interview them, knew who they were.

MR STEYN: That is exactly the people that I am referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't understand why you were so secretive and said you wouldn't tell anybody you had them there, you wouldn't tell de Beer you had them.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, we accepted and this was a normal practice that these people doing the interrogation at a safe-house would not go and talk about it in a loose way, not under those circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: Well did you think de Beer, an officer appointed by, as a National Intelligence Unit, would talk about it?

MR STEYN: No, I would not say that he would have spoken about it, but if he had have known the whole truth, that prosecutions wouldn't have happened, then it would have influenced his investigation.

CHAIRPERSON: But what I can't understand this is what - some investigators were allowed in to come and talk to them, other investigators you decided, you yourself and Botha, you weren't even going to tell the other investigators that they were there and available.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And this is in the course and scope as your duty as a policeman?

MR STEYN: That's how I saw it.

CHAIRPERSON: You decide who shall be entitled to talk to potential witnesses.

MR STEYN: At that stage, that was the attitude that I had, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Chair, if I could just follow up on one thing that I'm not clear about. General, did these people from C20 come down specially for this, to speak to these two chaps?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, as far as I can remember, they were busy with other people. If the other people that they'd been busy with at that stage were there and if they had just finished with them, I cannot remember at this point, but I do know that they were not there specifically. If I remember correctly they weren't just there for these people.

MR LAX: You see, my recollection of Col Botha's evidence is it was purely coincidental that they happened to be at the safe-house and he thought he would allow them the opportunity in Ndaba's case on a, the English word escapes me, on a "vrywillige" basis, to talk to these people and see if he could add to their knowledge and obviously not in Shabalala's case, I doubt whether Shabalala would have volunteered the information, but again, these two people are kept in the same house. It seems they went out of their way to give Shabalala the impression that Ndaba was actually an informer, just judging from the way in which he was questioned and the way Shabalala was held and it wouldn't have been very difficult for him to come to that conclusion.

MR STEYN: I accept this to be so, yes because on an occasion, Shabalala according to Botha, had also said this.

ADV BOSMAN: Can I just clear up one matter here Mr Wills, if you don't mind? Col Steyn, please help me if I misunderstood you. You said that the members of C20 had done the interrogation under presupposition that Ndaba and Shabalala were informers. That's how I have written it down. Am I wrong?

MR STEYN: Normally this would have happened like this. People, can I please explain Chairperson? When we find someone who's been trained and we take him to a safe-house, then C20 gets the opportunity to talk to these people. They would not know if these people had just returned, if they were informers and if they were in unlawful detention but they would get the opportunity to speak to these people.

ADV BOSMAN: So did I then indeed understand you correctly that they had thought that both these people were informers?

MR STEYN: They could have understood it like this, Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Steyn, it is not logical to me. If Shabalala had not been an informer and he was not prepared to co-operate, because this is what the evidence indicates up to now, how could they have thought that he was an informer?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, can I please explain? These people do the interrogation and irrespective of what they thought or did not think, they might have thought they were informers, they might have thought that these were people that we were unlawfully detaining, the fact is that their interest was to interrogate these people, to get the information that was important to them. I cannot recall exactly how they saw it at that stage. I did not even see any one of them at that stage, Botha negotiated with them.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Steyn I will not take this much further, I just want to put it to you that I cannot understand why you say that they had gone from the presupposition that these people were informers.

MR STEYN: The fact that they were in a safe place and not at a police station as we had done a lot in the past, could have created the impression that these people were informers that were being interrogated. This happened a lot.

MR WILLS: Is this a convenient time, Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Does a quarter to two suit you, Gentlemen?

We'll adjourn till a quarter to two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

J A STEYN: (s.u.o.)

MR WILLS: Very briefly Mr Chairperson, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: (cont)

I want to turn, to just consider Shabalala specifically and his position. You say that very early on, or earlier on his fate was sealed. Obviously you're referring to the fact that you'd sort of come to the conclusion that he was going to be killed far earlier than that same decision in respect of Ndaba. Is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR WILLS: Now when was this?

MR STEYN: I think it was at a stage when Botha told me that Shabalala had become aware of the fact, or had gained the impression that Ndaba was an informer.

MR WILLS: And why did that information bring you to that conclusion that Shabalala must be killed?

MR STEYN: If he was released he would obviously, he could reveal the fact of his own arrest and detention and also that Ndaba was in our possession.

MR WILLS: Now, didn't you consider not releasing him and holding him?

MR STEYN: No. Botha did not consider it at that stage and when he discussed the matter with, the idea was that if he was released he would then reveal all the knowledge that he already had.

MR WILLS: I'm not speaking about Mr Botha, Mr Steyn, I'm speaking about you. Didn't you consider that rather than taking a man's life, you could just detain him for a while longer, for a month or two until this whole saga had blown over?

MR STEYN: He'd already been in detention for quite a few days and Ndaba had already expressed the fact that he was not going to testify and if we were to release him, even if it was only a day or so afterwards, he could then go and reveal all this information.

MR WILLS: Didn't you think it would be more embarrassing to the South African Government negotiating team if it had been found out that you had arrested and cold-bloodedly murdered two people?

MR STEYN: It, if it had become known at that stage, it would have embarrassed the Government.

MR WILLS: In the light of that, surely you should have brought this to their attention?

MR STEYN: We deliberately did not do so.

MR WILLS: Finally, Mr Steyn, your colleague conceded yesterday that it was common practice for a suspect who was arrested by the Security Branch, to be assaulted and tortured by members of the Security Branch, in order to get information. Do you agree with that?

MR STEYN: Yes, there were many cases in which the people had been assaulted to extract information from them.

MR WILLS: So the chances are that at the least Shabalala would have been assaulted and tortured in order to try and extract information from him, not so?

MR STEYN: There was such a possibility but I'm not aware of it because I didn't visit there at that stage because I never went to the safe-house and not whilst they were being detained there or whilst C20 was there, for the entire duration of the operation I didn't visit there once.

MR WILLS: Isn't it your experience that in the main, people turned to be askaris because of the extreme pain inflicted upon them?

MR STEYN: Not always. Many people collaborated with us voluntarily.

MR WILLS: Those who didn't collaborate voluntarily, torture was applied to them?

MR STEYN: In many cases, yes.

MR WILLS: And we know that Shabalala, from your evidence, from the evidence of Botha, didn't collaborate with you.

MR STEYN: Yes, according to Botha he didn't.

MR WILLS: So the chances are he had a hard time whilst under your care.

MR STEYN: It is possible, but I can't comment on that.

MR WILLS: And you say that he's been debrief by these Security Policemen under the C20 Unit?

MR STEYN: According to Botha yes, I don't have first-hand information because I wasn't there.

MR WILLS: You see, I put to you that this is the truth about what happened with these two individuals, that you arrested them, you arrested Ndaba first as you say. He wasn't an informer. Your unit beat him to the point that he cracked and gave information and that is the reason why the arrest of Shabalala followed at that point and not earlier and the arrest of the other senior people happened after that even and not earlier.

MR STEYN: No. I can't say that either were assaulted. What I can say as far as my knowledge went was that Ndaba co-operated.

MR WILLS: And then you beat Shabalala, your unit beat Shabalala so badly that it would have been a political liability had anybody seen him, had a doctor seen him in terms of the detention laws at that stage.

MR STEYN: No. No doctor saw him and I can't tell you whether they were assaulted.

MR WILLS: And that that is the reason why you continually kept their arrest or their detention by your unit a secret from anybody except this small group of murderers.

MR STEYN: Are you referring to the assaults perpetrated on them.

MR WILLS: I am referring to the only reason that I can think as to why you did not reveal these people to your superiors.

MR STEYN: That they were assaulted, is that the question?

MR WILLS: That they were in such a bad way that it would have been just totally and utterly embarrassing for you.

MR STEYN: No, I was not aware of that fact.

MR WILLS: And that when you were told on the 11th that no further arrests were going to be, or that the arrests must wait, sorry I'll rephrase that. When you were told on the 13th that these people weren't going to be prosecuted, you decided, you knew that they were going to be released and because you hated these terrorists, to use your phrase, so much that you decided hurriedly to kill them before they were released.

MR STEYN: No. I didn't in my evidence say that I hated these people, at no stage, not in my evidence.

MR WILLS: And I put it to you that this was a frolic of your own and it wasn't in any way politically motivated by your, at least by your superiors, you acted totally on your own with your small group of murderers.

MR STEYN: I didn't inform my seniors of this decision after it was done and we took the decision and I believed that what I was doing at that stage was the correct thing in the circumstances, by agreeing with what Botha had done.

MR WILLS: And the decision to kill them wasn't for all the reasons that you have tried to get us to believe. The decision to kill them was simply to cover your tracks so that your own people in the police, Gen van der Merwe, your own National Party Politicians, that it wouldn't come to their attention that you'd acted so abominable as regards those people.

MR STEYN: No, we acted on our own and in secret.

MR WILLS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS

MS POSWA: Yes, Mr Chair. I will try not to cover the questions asked already by my colleague.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS POSWA: Mr Steyn when did Botha inform you that he had recruited Charles Ndaba as an informer?

MR STEYN: The first time that I could recall that again, was after he had re-entered the country before his arrest. Previously I had been aware of his recruitment but I was aware of many members in Swaziland and neighbouring countries who had been recruited. Yes, I remember I think that Ndaba had been recruited earlier but it's difficult to be specific. We handled a lot of people and those were difficult times. I'm not sure of that first aspect. When he told me this after Ndaba had returned, I could recollect it, but it did pass me by for quite a long time.

MS POSWA: When did you learn about Ndaba's presence in South Africa?

MR STEYN: It was after Ndaba had returned to Durban that Botha told me that he'd made contact with Ndaba.

MS POSWA: Well we have documentation to the effect that Ndaba was on the wanted list by the Security Branch and as late as between 1988 and 1989. How do you reconcile that with the fact that he was meant to have been an informer? Why would he be on the wanted list under those circumstances?

MR STEYN: When we handled an informer, you wouldn't make that fact known and the other Security and Intelligence Units would probably have the name of such a person on a list without knowing that somebody else in the Security establishment was handling that person.

MS POSWA: So when in fact you are working with Ndaba this side and then the rest of the Security Branch is seeking him.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MS POSWA: That must have caused a lot of double work, mustn't it?

MR STEYN: Yes, but the issue was that you had to protect the man.

MS POSWA: Your colleague said here that you didn't have much resources. I mean to my mind if you have a group of informers who at the same time being sought after and hunted down by another Security Branch, to me it makes - it sounds as if a lot of resources were available and that you were using and this was being wasted really.

MR STEYN: No, I repeat, if you handled somebody, then other members of the Security establishment wouldn't necessarily know about that so it's possible that his name appeared on a list compiled by some other department of the Security establishment with a view to tracking him down.

MS POSWA: Were you aware of the fact that the Security Branch was, at the same time, also making raids at Mr Ndaba's home?

MR STEYN: No.

MS POSWA: Would such raids have been routine? Did you know of any such raids existing, not particularly concerning Mr Ndaba but any other person?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was the practice that people who had left the country to be trained, their homes and their families were visited regularly with a view to gathering intelligence and to find out whether they had returned.

MS POSWA: So you cannot deny the fact that such raids could have been, that such visits would have been made at Mr Ndaba's home?

MR STEYN: No I can't deny that.

MS POSWA: Would that not again be inconsistent with the allegations that he is an informer?

MR STEYN: Once again, the people who were doing the normal investigation into dockets of people who had left the country for military training, would not have known about the informers.

MS POSWA: So in the Security Branch you had two parallel systems, one dealing with informers and the one chasing after the same informers?

MR STEYN: No, the person conducting the investigation after the person had left the country would not know that the person that he was investigating was an informer for some or other intelligence service.

MS POSWA: Why not? Why does the person who is handling the informer not just get him off the list? I mean, it doesn't make sense.

MR STEYN: Because then you would expose him immediately.

CHAIRPERSON: It would become obvious if his house was never visited, if all the other houses were visited and his wasn't.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MS POSWA: When Ndaba was arrested, was he booked, meaning was his name properly registered in the book at C R Swart?

MR STEYN: Not as far as I know. Are we talking about Ndaba?

MS POSWA: Yes.

MR STEYN: Ndaba was arrested by people who took him to C R Swart where, according to the evidence, Botha and Taylor and others had found him. Whether there were certain book entries made in an official journal, I'm not certain of. I did hear that some of the people who had performed the arrest had been assisted by members of the Uniform Branch who had made certain inscriptions in pocket books, if I remember correctly.

MS POSWA: So you're saying that inscriptions are made in pocket books and not at the C R Swart Charge Office?

MR STEYN: I can't say, but it may be.

MR LAX: Sorry, if I may interpose? General, before lunch you clearly told us that as far as you knew entries were made at C R Swart in the occurrence books. The Chairperson asked you about that and you answered in the affirmative.

MR STEYN: Chair, then I answered incorrectly and then I want to rectify that by saying that I seem to recall that the people who had assisted with the arrest, in other words as far as the transport to C R Swart was concerned, I'd heard that these people had made entries in the pocket books, that they had conveyed, picked up such a person and conveyed him to C R Swart.

MR LAX: You spoke of occurrence books which are different to pocket books.

MR STEYN: That's correct, but I beg your pardon, I can't say that there was no entry made.

MS POSWA: If I remember correctly, it was alleged that the problem with releasing Ndaba was that he had been in fact divulging the fact that he had been arrested, was the fact that this had been done unlawfully. Can you correct me, please?

MR STEYN: Could you please repeat the question?

MS POSWA: It has earlier been alleged, I don't know whether it was by you or Mr Botha, that Ndaba had been arrested unlawfully and therefore you were not able to divulge this information in Pretoria when you went on your visits there, but in the light of the fact that something could have been done in the occurrence book, would it not have been proper to check whether in fact this had not been registered in the occurrence book?

MR STEYN: Anybody could check those books, the occurrence book, to see whether there was such an entry or not, if that is the question.

MS POSWA: Yes, subsequent to that, you had earlier said that the problem you had with legalising Ndaba's arrest was the fact that, in fact informing Pretoria about his arrest was that it had been done unlawfully and you feared that action could be taken against you for that.

MR STEYN: No. Ndaba was arrested by people who were unaware of the fact that he was an informer. Shabalala was arrested unlawfully and we didn't discuss the matter with Headquarters.

MS POSWA: So the reason for not discussing Shabalala's arrest was that it had been unlawful?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was unlawful.

MS POSWA: What was the reason for not discussing Ndaba's arrest?

MR STEYN: We told Head Office that we were acting on information.

MS POSWA: I'm sorry, I don't understand.

MR STEYN: We told Head Office that there was information which we had and we didn't actually give them the real facts.

MS POSWA: There's another aspect of this, of your evidence, which I find quite disturbing. I do not understand how Ndaba, a trained cadre, knowing full well the brutality of the Security Branch, would actually tell you, or he obviously told Mr Botha that he wanted to hand himself over to the ANC. I would - what sounds more plausible is the fact that he would just let you take him back into the mainstream, you know, and then when he gets to the ANC, hand himself over and not to tell, give you this information. Was that not odd?

MR STEYN: You've now given quite a long question. Can you repeat it please?

MR LAX: General, what you're being asked is, I could put it crisply in this way, why would Ndaba tell your people that he's going to take his chances with the ANC when that would immediately alert you to the risk that he now poses. Why wouldn't he just keep quiet about that and then at the appropriate time, once you've reinstalled him back in normal society, for want of a better phrase, then go and take his chances?

MR STEYN: What Botha told me and I'm speculating is that Ndaba was worried about his "arrest", in inverted commas, that more people would know about it and that that would jeopardise his position.

CHAIRPERSON: I understood that he said that he was going to turn himself over to the ANC after he'd been told there were going to be no prosecutions, not that it had anything to do with his arrest.

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, his concern was the fact that he'd been seen with Shabalala on certain occasions and if he was to walk free later, not knowing what was to happen to Shabalala, then as you've just said, then he could have explained his position to the ANC but I've already pointed out earlier, he could also convey further information which he gathered and he could convey it to the ANC.

MR LAX: The point of the question is, why would he tell your people that that was his intention when he knew that immediately that was signing his own death warrant? He must have known that as an experienced operator. That's the question that you're being asked. Do you understand what I'm saying? Why would he tell you that he was going to take his chances with the ANC which would automatically mean that in your eyes he becomes a threat? Do you see the point?

MR STEYN: I think I understand.

MR LAX: He's a senior person, an experienced operator, we're not talking about some foot soldier.

MR STEYN: He could have done anything once leaving our hands, he could have given any information and he could have revealed several different things. By telling us that, by telling us that he'd rather take his chances with the ANC, well that was a possibility and it could have turned out that way. Once again we didn't have the control to be able to say and to assume that that is what would happen.

CHAIRPERSON: When he told you that you then decided to kill him? You had the control to do that.

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the question that's been put to you in various ways is surely he must have realised that if he told you he was prepared to throw away being an informer and go back to the ANC, you would not be very happy about it.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MS POSWA: I want to put it to you Mr Steyn that this is highly improbable that, in the circumstances, you should have quite queried this, I mean this would have been a cause for concern if Mr Botha raises such an allegation, weren't you concerned? I mean, in your experience and your own experience now, had things like that happened before? Would an informer just tell you, "Look here, I've been arrested, I may be found out, I'm going back to the ANC"?

MR STEYN: Yes, it had happened.

MS POSWA: So you didn't find anything strange in that?

MR STEYN: Strange in which way?

MS POSWA: Mr Chairman, I just don't want to belabour the point because I don't know whether the applicant doesn't want to answer or he doesn't quite understand what is being said here.

MR STEYN: I am prepared to answer, if I understand the question.

CHAIRPERSON: He had answered.

MS POSWA: Okay, I'll move on. And then did you then, when Botha gave you this information, did you impress upon him the importance of Ndaba and the importance of reserving him as your informant, when he told you that Ndaba is unstable?

MR STEYN: That's correct. From the start I told Botha to do everything possible to keep Shabalala quiet and to try and see whether we could reach a good solution.

CHAIRPERSON: You mean Ndaba?

ADV BOSMAN: ...(indistinct - talking simultaneously with Chairperson)

CHAIRPERSON: The interpreter gave it up as Shabalala. Ndaba.

MS POSWA: So when was it you talked, on the 14th of July, if my memory serves me correctly?

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MS POSWA: And in that meeting and at that meeting you still were saying that Mr Botha should try and change Ndaba's mind-set?

MR STEYN: Yes that was discussed.

MS POSWA: And the same evening he's murdered?

MR STEYN: Are you referring to the 14th?

MS POSWA: Yes.

MR STEYN: No, I can't recall, I was only informed on the 16th that he'd been eliminated.

MR LAX: Perhaps I can help you General. You had a meeting with Botha on the morning of the 14th where you gave him specific instructions to try and get his head right.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR LAX: And where the innuendo we seem to understand, the innuendo was that if he didn't get his head right, he should be despatched.

MR STEYN: At that stage I think Botha and I agreed on that aspect.

MR LAX: The question you're being asked is why was the decision to kill him made so quickly when you had suggested that he give him an opportunity to get his head right? Have I put it correctly, Adv Poswa?

MS POSWA: Yes, thank you.

MR STEYN: This discussion between Botha and myself was on the 14th and on my return from Pretoria on the 16th I got the information that he had been eliminated. I don't think it was the same day that the elimination took place, on the 14th, I think it probably took place on the 15th, but I'm not sure.

MR LAX: I'll help you, it was on the night, that very same night, that evening they took them up to Tugela Mouth and sometime during the course of that night they were executed and dumped in the river.

MR STEYN: I accept that.

MS POSWA: I feel again here's another inconsistency. At this stage here, you have this man who has given you a wealth of information that has been taken up to the Commissioner of Police, at a stage at which you yourselves claim that you would then be able to have an upper hand in the negotiations. Then you just do not give him time to work things out and sort himself out, you quickly just get rid of him.

MR STEYN: The last discussion I had with Botha was on the 14th and I told him to try and do the bet that he could. I didn't tell Botha to eliminate him that evening, but by implication I agreed to the elimination although I don't think a date could be attached to it.

MS POSWA: Mr Steyn I want to say that there are so many inconsistencies in this story, it's really very difficult to believe which or what is what. Now when did you become aware of Ndaba and Shabalala's elimination? You said on the 16th?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MS POSWA: What did you do with this information?

MR STEYN: We kept it a secret.

MS POSWA: You did not inform your superiors?

MR STEYN: No, never.

MS POSWA: What was your legal duty in the circumstances? What would have been normal or the usual channel that you would follow once you had this information in your hands as head of the Security unit?

MR STEYN: If it had come to my attention that somebody had committed a murder or committed an offence, it was my normal police duty to make that known. I didn't do that.

The position was that these people were in detention and they were killed and either I had to go along with what had happened, or I had to reveal it and I decided, or I chose not to reveal it.

MS POSWA: So you were not acting within the course of your duties by concealing these deaths?

MR STEYN: I thought in this whole process that I had acted, in the circumstances, that I'd acted within the course and scope of my duties.

MS POSWA: Mr Steyn, you've just told me what you were supposed to be doing and you say you did something totally different, in fact you did nothing. Now could that be said to be in the course of your duties?

MR STEYN: The fact that I didn't mention it, the fact that I kept that to myself, I believed in those circumstances to be the correct procedure.

MS POSWA: Now at this stage the negotiations are continuing.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MS POSWA: You have said here in your evidence, both you and Mr Botha, that you felt that you needed to strengthen the position of the National Party in the negotiations by concealing these arrests and subsequent murders. Not so?

MR STEYN: Yes. the revelation of that fact would, in my view, have changed the entire situation in the sense that the negotiations were at a fairly advanced stage and if these eliminations were made known it could jeopardise the situation.

MS POSWA: But the ANC was asking after these people. They were at the negotiating table and they were asking the National Party, the party which you support, now where are Charles and Shabalala? Would it not have been better to produce them at the stage whilst they were still being detained unlawfully, or did you knot exacerbate things by actually then just murdering them? You made matters worse for the National Party, to my mind.

MS POSWA: Not at that stage because nobody knew it at that stage. We concealed that fact, we kept it a secret.

MS POSWA: And you were certain it would never come out?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon?

MS POSWA: You were certain it would never come out?

MR STEYN: Not at that stage.

MS POSWA: If the Chairperson will bear with me. Mr Steyn, what was Charles's registration number as an informer?

MR STEYN: No, I would never be able to remember that.

MS POSWA: Did he earn a salary as an informer?

MR STEYN: I cannot remember what amounts were paid out to him by Botha.

MS POSWA: Would there be no proof, is there proof of that available?

MR STEYN: I don't believe that there is today and I believe that the inquiries that we had done to clear up certain situations about the informers and we were told that everything has been destroyed and that no documentation existed.

MS POSWA: So you don't know how much Botha paid him?

MR STEYN: No.

MS POSWA: Mr Steyn, I must say it is very, very difficult for anyone to believe this set of events as set out by yourselves because there is no supporting evidence, there is a whole change of story from one point to the next. I really must put it to you that this whole thing is just concocted and I wonder at your seriousness in applying for amnesty. You have come here and you have totally misled the Committee as to the actual facts that took place and I really don't think at this stage that there has been a full disclosure.

MR STEYN: Chairperson...(intervention).

MR VISSER: Is that a question or a judgment, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all?

MS POSWA: That is all thank you, Mr Chair.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS POSWA

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: One or two points with your leave, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, sorry to disturb my learned friend. There is one little tiny detail that I forgot to task, if I could just ask that, it will take one minute. Thank you

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: Mr Steyn, are you aware of the way the Security Branch organised the numbers of informers? The alphabetical letters used. Is there an alphabetical prefix or, in respect of each informer number?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: And what is that?

MR STEYN: There were different types of informers, Chairperson. When you met an informer for the first time then he is handled as an occasional informer and this means that some time would lapse during which he will be tested and the nature of the information he provides will then be inspected and then also the words G. If he should develop then he would become a full informer. And in those years, in the early years in Natal it would be a P N, Port Natal, with a number. This would then be assigned to him.

MR WILLS: And if he was a policeman under cover, what would have been his number then?

MR STEYN: Then there were different numbers.

MR WILLS: And do you know what the prefix was like this PN in front of an experienced informer? Can you remember what the alphabetical prefix would be for a policeman working under cover.

MR STEYN: More or less on the same basis. I think it was, at that time it was called RS Informers. That's correct, RS instead of PN in the case of Natal.

MR WILLS: And can you remember if there was an alphabetical prefix in respect of the files that you were keeping on all of the ANC people that you were interested in investigating? You kept files on people?

MR STEYN: Yes, we kept files on thousands of people.

MR WILLS: Now did those files have a consistent alphabetical prefix?

MR STEYN: In the old days there was a card system according to which people worked, by means of an index system and the particulars of the suspects on which you had files could then be kept up. The card would then refer to a specific file with a number.

MR LAX: Yes, you're being asked whether there were specific alphabetical prefixes in the same way that related to those cards or files as the case may be.

MR STEYN: The suspect files were loose from the informer files, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: So just in short then, if we had documentation relating to Ndaba, emanating from your department at that time, it would, his name would be referred to with an alphabetical prefix PN, is that correct?

MR STEYN: If that was the case, I don't know what he was registered as Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it an alphabetical prefix to his name or would he then have a number?

MR STEYN: He would have had a number Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WILLS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairperson. So if he was an informer he would have had the PN on the prefix to his number. Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

NOR FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on)

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I will be brief.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Gen Steyn, the majority of the questions that have been posed to you actually handled about the knowledge of Mr Botha. You were not personally there during any interrogations of Mr Ndaba, is this correct?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You did not speak to him yourself?

MR STEYN: Never, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You did not know what the circumstances wee under which the members of C20 had spoken to Mr Ndaba?

MR STEYN: No, I was not there, I cannot say, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I will just repeat, you did not know what the circumstances were under which the members of C20 had spoken to Mr Ndaba or Shabalala?

MR STEYN: No, Chairperson, it was only hearsay evidence that I'd given.

MR VISSER: And in effect you are then speculating when you are giving answers about the situation at the safe-house at Verulam?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You refer to the fact that there was a suspicion that there had already been a mole and the person who had infiltrated into the Security Branch in Port Natal, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was that confirmed later?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I do not expect of you to go in on this any further. Would there have been any sense to inform Mr de Beer or Headquarters that you had unlawfully detained Nyanda or Shabalala?

MR LAX: You said Nyanda.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Ndaba and Shabalala. Thank you, Mr Commissioner. Would there have been any sense in conveying this information?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Just to correct it and especially for the information concerning the Chairperson you had been asked why Ndaba was given more time to get his head in order, Botha gave evidence here that the Saturday afternoon after he had spoken to you, you went to speak to Mr Ndaba again and you in this conversation, you said that he was not interested to co-operate any further as an informer, that he refused to undergo plastic surgery to change his appearance, that he had been offered R50 000 to relocate himself and this he turned down and that he was not interested to give evidence against any of the people of Vula who had been arrested.

MR STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is this information that Botha had given to you?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But this is not information that you have any personal knowledge of?

MR STEYN: No.

MR LAX: General, just one small question and you may not be in a position to answer this, I don't know. To the extent that it would have been "usual", Ndaba's shooting by Botha himself, Botha being his handler, strikes one as particularly cold-blooded. Here you are, this is your informer, you've handled him for a number of years.

MR STEYN: That's correct.

MR LAX: Doesn't one, I mean if he really was his informer as he says he was and as you have been told he was, it just seems to me that he would have got someone else to do that.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not know what Botha's thoughts were at that stage.

MR LAX: You know it might be argued later that the fact that he did it himself, implies that this wasn't necessarily his informer.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I said, I did not know how he convinced himself, or undertaken to do this himself.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I understand the next witness has been waiting here for part of last week, and for the whole of today. Can we see if we can now dispose of him.

MR MAHARAJ: Sorry, Chairperson, do you really intend to dispose of me?

CHAIRPERSON: Not in quite that way perhaps.

MS POSWA: Mr Chair, we had asked that we would need time to consult with our witness, so can we do so? If you can just give us the next 20 minutes?

CHAIRPERSON: Well we'll give you as short a time as you can do it in because you have the long adjournment. Let us know when you are ready.

MS POSWA: Thank you, Mr Chair.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Are you calling your witness?

MS POSWA: Yes, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Who?

MS POSWA: Mr Chair, I call Mr Maharaj.

SEPTEMBER ...(indistinct) MAHARAJ: (sworn states)

MS POSWA: Mr Chair I'd like to incorporate Mr Maharaj's statement which I had given earlier to the Evidence Leader. I don't know what exhibit number it will be marked as.

MS THABETHE: F.

MS POSWA: Exhibit F.

MR LAX: The next one would be I or J depending on what your particular preference is Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I, at the end of my bundle, I have H and then I have statement by Mrs Zanyana Ndaba.

MR LAX: That's not before us yet, Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: Sorry, Mr Chair, I made a mistake. It should be I, Exhibit I.

MR LAX: Which one should be I?

MS THABETHE: The statement by Mr Maharaj.

MR LAX: Okay. That's it, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Right.

EXAMINATION BY MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj, kindly introduce your role and experience in Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, I joined Umkhonto weSizwe at its formation. I went off for military training, 11 months training in the German Democratic Republic, in 1961 to 62. I then came into the country, served in various underground structures including those of the Communist Party, of which I became member of the Central Committee. I served in Umkhonto weSizwe and just before my arrest had been selected to become the Political Commissar of Umkhonto weSizwe.

I served 12 years in prison, came out, was house arrested in Durban, escaped from house arrest 6 months later and went to Zambia where I was appointed secretary to the Internal Reconstruction department of the ANC which was the name for the ANC as it operated illegally within South Africa, as distinct from the ANC's external structures around the world. I joined the Revolutionary Council which was charged with prosecuting the military political struggle within South Africa. I then became elected member of the National Executive of the ANC and when the Political Military Council was appointed, I was member of the Political Military Council.

In the course of that work as the secretary of the ANC underground, I was selected by Pres Tambo to lead Operation Vula. It was mandated by a decision of the National Executive in 1986 and I was charged by Pres Tambo together with Joe Slovo and himself, to develop the strategy for such an operation, covering not just Vulangela but any such operation within South Africa.

MS POSWA: Would you, may I interject there Mr Maharaj? Would you, in the light of all this experience, regard yourself as a military expert?

MR MAHARAJ: That would be a matter for the Commission to decide, but I was going to say Chairperson that after that, having been selected to command Operation Vula, I did refresher military courses in the Soviet Union, in Cuba, and the German Democratic Republic. I also did Intelligence training in the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, so in the light of my training and in the light of my experience, I think I'm as capable as any of the applicants to talk, not just on police matters, but on military matters.

MS POSWA: Thank you. Could you then just briefly outline your role in Operation Vula?

MR MAHARAJ: I was saying that when the National Executive mandated Pres Tambo to mount such operations, the resolution of the National Executive entrusted it to Pres Tambo and that he would be assisted by Joe Slovo. In pursuance of that resolution that very day, Pres Tambo approached me and three of us sat down and I was asked to drop the strategy position as to how we would execute such operations. That was finally thrashed out as a framework and Pres Tambo then informed me that he was selecting me to be the first of the groups to go inside the country. My role then in Vula was under the President's guidance, to develop the strategy, develop the plans and carry out the infrastructure work that would enable such an operation to succeed and I then became the person who entered the country together with Gen Siphiwe Nyanda who was my Deputy commander in charge of that operation.

We entered the country on a semi-permanent basis together in July 1988.

MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj, can you just outline for us the screening or vetting process of persons involved in the operation?

MR MAHARAJ: Operation Vula by its very name, was an extremely secret operation. The National Executive in mandating the President to conduct the operation gave him an open mandate and indicated that he would file reports only in the way he saw fit without endangering the lives and identities of any of the senior members of the movement who would be operating in South Africa. So we operated under those terms. People who were selected at the highest levels had to have very clear legends, legends not just within the ANC but legends capable of misleading the South African Intelligence system as to our whereabouts. The screening had to be thorough. It was not just the technical training that was involved. There was involved competence, experience and capacity to interchange between the roles of political work and military work.

So, the screen process that went on before I left Zambia was that I had a personal hand in the screening and after I left Zambia in our communications, we would exchange views with the President as to our requirements of personnel and we would indicate our own preferences based on our knowledge of cadres. Lusaka would, in the meantime, also recommend cadres to us and request our views as to whether we would be prepared to have such a person join our structures within the country.

MS POSWA: And Mr Maharaj, it was upon this basis that Mr Charles Ndaba was hand-picked onto the operation?

MR MAHARAJ: Correct.

MS POSWA: Did you have personal knowledge of Mr Ndaba?

MR MAHARAJ: I have met Charles probably about 6 times in the course of our work and in the course of his work before he was under my command. I came across him in Swaziland, when he was working in the Natal military machinery, that is the structure charged with prosecuting the military aspect of the struggle within the province of Natal. I also came across him thereafter within the country, but without divulging my identity. I was operating in South Africa with a different identity from my normal appearance and walked through the streets of South Africa without many, many of my comrades recognising me. In fact some of the underground cadres who were brought in from outside and when I met them face to face, were not aware of my true identity.

MS POSWA: What would your comments be as we have been sitting here for the past few days, you have heard the evidence of both Mr Botha and Mr Steyn. What would your reaction be to the fact that Mr Ndaba was an informer?

MR MAHARAJ: Charles Ndaba left the country round about 1982 to join Umkhonto weSizwe. He underwent extensive military training. After that training and before the training he was in the military camps in Angola, military camps of the ANC. He served in those structures. He was then moved to the neighbouring country, Mozambique and Swaziland and he functioned in Swaziland when conditions were extremely tense and dangerous. The Umkomati Accord had been signed and as is now known it was preceded by a secret accord between Swaziland and Pretoria, which gave a free hand to the South African Security Forces to operate in Swaziland. Numerous cadres had been bombed, had been shot. one of those included the one-time secretary of the Revolutionary Council, Cassius Maake. I had operated in Swaziland myself, clandestinely, at one stage continuously for 6 months in 1982, so conditions were extremely dangerous. You were in constant danger of being ambushed or kidnapped but Charles was working in a structure which was directly charged with prosecuting the military struggle in Natal. He rose to be Commander of the Natal Machinery in 1988 and because of conditions in Swaziland where people used to get arrested and be deported, he was subsequently deported in 1988 to Zambia. It is true that at that time there was some concern about the reliability of some of the members of the ANC structures and of Umkhonto weSizwe operating in Swaziland, so any withdrawals would go through a further screening in Zambia and his name came forward in that context. But Mr Chairperson, ...(intervention).

MS POSWA: Sorry, Mr Maharaj, can I just interject? Would you say then that Mr Ndaba's deportation from Swaziland was, would it have been self-inflicted as had been suggested by Mr Botha? That Mr Botha led evidence to the effect that Mr Ndaba had been advised to get himself moved into the mainstream into Zambia.

MR MAHARAJ: Well I would be very surprised if Pretoria was treating its agents by giving them instructions to get themselves out of Swaziland and shifted to Zambia and leave it to them to their own resources to achieve that shift, particularly where the person had just been made Commander of the machinery. The deportation of Charles took place in the context of a number of arrests that were ongoing and as each person was arrested, Swaziland authorities would arrange to deport the person. As an ANC member in this particular period, the deportation could only be to Zambia, Tanzania or Angola. Mozambique was excluded. But I have a report here, Chairperson, from within the Security Branch, dated 31-08-1988. It says there, it is a routine Pretoria Security monitoring and it says there under Clause 2 (c), 2 9(4) that Z C Ndaba, MK Charles, has been deported to Lusaka. Its in the context of other deportations and other people leaving Swaziland. It has been passed on within the Security Branch for the attention of Maj Taylor, it is also countersigned by Capt Botha and there are various other signatures and I have copies of that available for the Committee. I would also like to draw your attention that during that period of 1988, Charles Ndaba was the subject of intense interest by the South African Security Police. Efforts had been made to kill him in the Piet Retief group. Then there were, I'll just get my dates right, the Piet Retief ambush took place on the 8th of June, then on Sunday the 12th of June,

MS POSWA: Which year?

MR MAHARAJ: 1988, two operations were carried out by Pretoria's agents in Swaziland, one of them was an ambush of a vehicle and Pretoria were looking for Charles Ndaba. That information is confirmed in de Kock's evidence given at the TRC Amnesty Committee about three weeks ago. There is also another report from within the Security Branch and this is relevant to the numbering system and it is relevant to Capt Botha. The first is a report submitted within the Security Branch structures by Sgt Wasserman and Capt H J P Botha and he's described there as the "Verslag skrywer", the report writer. It is dated the 14th of February 1988. It is based on an agent's report who had gone to Swaziland and the agent's number is given as PN664 and in that report the agent says that he met a person called MK Zandile in Swaziland, paragraph 28. MK Zandile, Charles Zandile is then identified by means of a photograph as Charles Ndaba and the reference for Charles Zakhele Ndaba, otherwise known as MK Zandile is given as S4/52573. That I have reason to believe is a simple file reference of people they are monitoring, not a reference to an agent because the agents are PN. What is interesting about that report Chairperson is that after that lengthy report, at its end, is a distribution list of information but before the distribution list on paragraph 41, all names that this agent had visited in Swaziland, are summarised. It says then

"The peoples recognised are Buthelezi Gatsha"

and then it has an "Afdeling" reference number for him with a PNV number, then Headquarters reference number. Then it has two names "Jabo and Lucky". Against them the Security Branch say, "Of no security importance". That is the way they covered a potential or active agent. Then they came to Charles Ndaba. They give his full details, they have no PN reference for him, and they give that file number. They then have later down the name Mr Zondi. Against him they say "Not of security importance". That is the way they protected their agents, so that the rest of the structure would not take interest. At the end of that report, there is the distribution of this report within the Security Branch. 14 divisions were circulated with that report. I also would like to put that report in.

Then there is a report dated 14th...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on anymore, can we have the reports that have been put in so far and give them numbers and what have you?

MR MAHARAJ: That's the first one. That's the second one.

MR VISSER: The first report was the one dated 31st August.

MR MAHARAJ: The first one is dated 31st August.

CHAIRPERSON: The one in front of us.

MR VISSER: Unless you want to do it chronologically Mr Chairman, it might make more sense in doing it like that.

CHAIRPERSON: I think rather the way the witness is dealing with it. Can we have the first report?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir. In a moment, they all are stuck together as a file. They are stapled together as a set.

CHAIRPERSON: Well the bundle will be J, the first one is

MR MAHARAJ: 14th of February.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is the 14th of February?

MR MAHARAJ: Right on the top.

CHAIRPERSON: And the next one is 14th of September.

MR MAHARAJ: The next one is 14th of September.

CHAIRPERSON: That will be J2. 13th of June, J3.

MR MAHARAJ: 13th of July, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry, July, yes.

MR VISSER: Is 14th of September J2, Chairperson?

MR MAHARAJ: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: 14th of September is J2. 13th of July is J3.

MR VISSER: 13th of July. Mr Chairman, you're loosing us. Did you say 13th of July? I've got one saying 18th of July and 19th of July, is that the next one?

MR LAX: Yes, it's got all three dates on.

MR VISSER: Okay, but that's J3.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the three we've got.

MR MAHARAJ: Then Chairperson, after that there should be one that's very faint. It has a sort of telex tele-type print and has a faint, right at the top, second line, 16th of July 1987.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. That'll be J4.

MR MAHARAJ: J4. And then the next one in a similar type of typeface is 31(8) 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: J5.

MR MAHARAJ: J5.

MR LAX: Mr Maharaj, can I confirm? I've just numbered these pages while we've been talking from 1 to 18, is that correct?

MR MAHARAJ: You mean the whole batch?

MR LAX: The whole annexure.

MR MAHARAJ: Correct.

MR LAX: The it'll be easy just to refer to the page reference to find whichever.

CHAIRPERSON: Right are we all ready.

MR MAHARAJ: If I may therefore with your permission Chairperson, then go through it in this order that's over here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: If we then look at the first document, 14th of February 1988, you will see that the report has been filed by Sgt Wasserman and it deals with the visit of a Lucky, paragraph 1 says that the reporter or the informant is PN 664. That agrees with the general view and my own view that PN was the prefix for an informer working with Port Natal Security Branch and you would see that that informer was under the command or directly reporting to Mr Taylor, Maj Taylor. The visit is a visit of MK, of Lucky, agent 665 sent by Lucky. On paragraph 2(8) page 2, you would see that this agent says that he and a Lulu travelled and met a Mr MK Zandile. He is identified as Charles Ndaba and on the column on the side, the margin, is the file no. S4/52573. Of particular importance here Sir is to note that Charles Ndaba's name appears without any PN number. You then go through to the page 11, which is still that same report and you have paragraph 40. "Uitkenning persone" Under that you will see the name of Jabo and Lucky and Zondi with an observation, not of security importance. so there were two ways to cover the identity. If a person featured and you wanted to block it out from attention by others, you said not of security importance or you identified the person as PN 66 whatever and no recipient would know the identity of the PN except those working with it. You will see there that Charles Ndaba as at the date of that report, has no PN reference number but has an S4/. At the end of that report was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: PNV number.

MR MAHARAJ: PNV, yes, I don't know the significance of PNV, maybe the experts who were giving those file numbers would know. It's the "Afdelings" reference. What we know for certain Sir, is that PN on its own was a reference number, as testified by Mr Steyn, that PN was the prefix for a confirmed informer.

MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj, may I just interject at that point? We had - Mr Steyn gave evidence to the effect that they had no way, no-one had any way of knowing who the informers who were in that they had two parallel systems whereby they could not divulge an informer and when I asked him, "Why not remove him from the list?" the response was that that would then make him, expose him to other members of the Security Branch as being an informer. What is your view?

MR MAHARAJ: My view is simple, based on this, their own reports. As you see in paragraph 41, if the name Jabo appears, and Jabo is not a complete name, does not enable you to identify. I will show in the subsequent reports how they would follow through to reach the identity of the person. Get photographs, do searches to identify the real name of the person, but here they are actually saying, "not of any security importance" and you see on the next page that that report had the distribution list, there are 14 groups to which it was distributed. Anyone of them reading it is seeing Jabo is not of any importance, don't waste your time. On the other hand if the person is a confirmed agent or informer, the person would feature in the report as PN, as you see on page 1. Page 1 says the informant PN664 has established the following information. So no name appears there, no identity appears and it is distributed to these 14 groups, but they have no way of knowing the identity. What they have is the content of the report. That's my response to that, that measures could be taken, but I will show other measures that could be taken because you then turn to the next report J2, which is page 13. There you will find that the report has been filed on the 14th of September 1988 and it has been filed by Capt H J P Botha, the man who says he recruited Charles Ndaba to be his informant. He compiles this report and what he does in the report is to say, I'm confirming that the photographs circulated to all of you is a photograph of Charles Ndaba. And Charles Ndaba's name appears in paragraph 2 as Z Ndaba - FA4190 PN, but the distribution list for that is to 15 different sections. If Charles Ndaba was Capt Botha's informant, would he hand him over to the wolves deliberately, when he has the mechanisms to conceal his identity?

The next report Sir is a report dated 18th of July 1988. And this one is handed in by Sgt Lodge Labuschagne, page 15 and it deals with a black woman called Ellen. On page 16 once more paragraph 2 the identification is Charles Zakhele - Charles Ndaba FA 4190 Port Natal, file number S4/62573. Not a PN number and its distribution list is at the bottom of that page. And then if you look, Sir, because of the character of Charles Ndaba, to Exhibit J4, page 17, that report is dated 1987. Why have I brought it? I have brought it here to say that that is how seriously Pretoria saw Charles as a military adversity, that it is not an accident that at Piet Retief and in the ambush in Swaziland in June 1988, efforts were made to get Eugene de Kock's unit to eliminate him. That's June 1988. It's no longer two divisions not knowing what they were doing because this distribution list includes in some of the documents C20, it includes C10.

I then turn to page 18 and there the report is dated 31st of August. That is where again in monitoring all people that they come across in Swaziland, they say in paragraph 2(4) that Z C Ndaba, also known as Charles, has been deported to Lusaka. But just above that Sir, you will see 2(3) R P Lalla, permanently resettled in Maputo. Both of these comrades of mine, because of the sterling work that they were doing in Swaziland and because they were seasoned in Swaziland, were withdrawn and subsequently re-entered South Africa in 1990 as part of Operation Vula. Lalla was arrested at 1 o'clock at the safe-house at the Knoll, but I'll come to that later. I thought I should put these reports to show Charles' background, his calibre, the nature of the monitoring by Pretoria, the fact that his identity was being circulated with 15 sections by Capt Botha and those sections included sections that would try to eliminate him and therefore I certainly challenge the view that his deportation was arranged to Zambia in order to save his life.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go away from these reports, I notice that on page 11 paragraph 39(10), reads

"Documents marked B,C and D are all written by Charles Ndaba."

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: A handwriting test is...(intervention)

MR LAX: Handwriting sample.

CHAIRPERSON: Handwriting samples is compared with the documents and the writing agreed.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't had a chance, nor the time, to see what sort of documents they are.

MR MAHARAJ: They are not included Sir. What has happened is that the agent sent from Port Natal went to Swaziland, got introduced and visited people and surreptitiously stole these documents and brought them back to South Africa. South Africa then subjected those documents to tests, with the evidence of their informant that I collected these documents quietly and clandestinely in house so-and-so, while I was meeting Charles Ndaba. In some instances it might be that Charles just left the room, in other instances they would send people to collect a glass that a person may have used to have a drink, so that they could bring the glass back to fingerprint it. That's what they did with Keith McKenzie and Rashied.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS POSWA: So in your view, Mr Maharaj, you feel that the allegation that Mr Ndaba was an informer is totally unjustified?

MR MAHARAJ: I have only so far given the sample of reports that had reached us while working in Vula inside the country, but there are other bases on which the question rises about Charles. He was then suggested by Headquarters that he should come in as a reinforcement to our personnel. He was crossed into South Africa in the first week of February. He was put in a unit under Mbuso Shabalala, not above. Mbuso Shabalala was heading that section. The weekend of their disappearance they had gone out to work in KwaMashu which was one of their assigned areas of work. We already became aware by Monday, I think it's the 9th, that these two men had disappeared. I was in Johannesburg at the time and I received a secret communication from Kibusa, Siphiwe Nyanda, to say that these two cadres had not returned. We immediately agreed in communication that a search should be made to ascertain what had happened to these two. Secondly, that measures should be taken to abandon all safe-houses that these two cadres knew of and that was not because we suspected them to be agents, that was because it was a necessary step for our own security. Now, we then ascertained that Charles Ndaba had not kept certain appointments on Friday the 6th. he had also not kept appointments on Saturday. As regards Mbuso Shabalala, there was an appointment that he was supposed to have with Charles Ndaba on the Sunday and Mbuso Shabalala's family said that he was with them on Sunday. We then arranged through the family for lawyers to begin making inquiries with C R Swart on the Monday and Tuesday. So, my sequence of the arrests is different from the one here. I also have a different sequence of the arrests on the 12th.

MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj, can I just interject here and take you back to the evidence we heard from Mr Botha, paragraph 17 of the second version of events?

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph?

MS POSWA: 17. Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph 17, yes I've got it.

MS POSWA: Would Charles have had that much information about Vula as suggested by Mr Botha?

MR MAHARAJ: I just need that version of...

MS POSWA: Sorry, not paragraph 17.

CHAIRPERSON: What Exhibit is it?

MS POSWA: Exhibit D, Mr Chair. Oh sorry, paragraphs 8 and 9.

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, it is impossible that Charles Ndaba should have the information on paragraph 8 and 9 at the moment of his entry into the country. I say this for the following reasons. First of all, the identity of myself and Siphiwe Nyanda who entered the country in July 1988 was so strictly guarded that even the National Executive Committee of the ANC was informed in different that I was in hospital in the Soviet Union since 1987 and that Siphiwe Nyanda was undergoing a field officer's training course lasting 5 years at a military academy in the Soviet Union. Nobody, no cadre being sent in the country, would be given that information, it's completely contrary to any simple underground rule. The cadre could have got arrested crossing the border at Swaziland, got tortured and immediately under torture says, "But Mac and Siphiwe are in the country" and when the person settled in the country, we always only revealed our identity on very strict need-to-know. What was Vula's mission? Paragraph 8. Each cadre was only briefed about their specific area of work. We were not going to tell them that we were co-ordinating the underground political section, military section, Intelligence section and the overt sections of struggle and take the risk that in the course of their highly risky work, if they got arrested by accident and were tortured, they should reveal the top committee. Certainly we'd learned from Rivonia and we'd learned from our own arrests that you don't do things like that. Charles Ndaba, I say he was brought in on the 7th of February. By then the February 2 speech had been delivered by F W de Klerk. Shortly, a few days after the 7th of February, Nelson Mandela was released. The situation was now extremely fluid. In fact, precisely because of that situation, we began to introduce systematic discussion, to talk about the option of what we do with the underground as this situation develops, not in order that we take the decision, but in order that we prepare our forces for whatever would be decided by the leadership. So Charles Ndaba would not know this overall mission, this is ex post facto, we were not going to reveal our communications systems, we had spent 50 000 pounds developing our communications system, even the Soviets wanted it from me and I wouldn't give it to them and you think I would give it to a cadre to say "you man it"? Communications was manned by myself directly with one person working under me, by Siphiwe Nyanda directly. I and Siphiwe Nyanda did the transmissions, we personally did the receiving and we personally did the decoding until work expanded to the point where I took on Janet Glove as my secretary and Siphiwe took on one person in Durban. The only other person who was briefed about the communications system was Ronnie Kasrils who entered the country in February 1990 as part of the top leadership structure and he was briefed about the communications system and was being taught to use it because he would hive off to take command of a particular geographical area. That's where the communication was. No way Charles Ndaba would know that.

MR LAX: If I may, Mr Maharaj, when did you take on a secretary? When was that approximately?

MR MAHARAJ: I took on, Janet Glove had been infiltrated into the country separately before my entry into the country, in a separate mission. Lusaka then alerted me that she was present in the country as a propaganda worker. I then eventually took her on under Vula as propaganda worker then found that her computer skills and training in disguises was such that I took her on as my secretary round about early 89.

MR LAX: So it's long after this incident?

MR MAHARAJ: Long.

MR LAX: No, no, sorry, early 89?

MR MAHARAJ: Long before, long before and Janet Glove was then working directly under me.

MS POSWA: Mr Chairman, we are still on Exhibit G. Could you comment on the contents of paragraph 17?

MR MAHARAJ: The disappearance of Charles Ndaba and the subsequent disappearance of Mbuso Shabalala was a problem for us. We were satisfied by Tuesday the 10th of July that these two had definitely disappeared. They had not conformed to the regular practice that if you went out on work, you came by the appointed time and reported back and if you failed to make the appointed time, you had a fall-back arrangement. The fall-back arrangements were not too far apart. If they were made too far apart, they would have no sense. I was in constant communication with Siphiwe Nyanda who was in Durban while I was in Johannesburg at that stage. We were clear that these two people had disappeared. Now the question was, how had they disappeared? So far as I knew in different places their circumstances of disappearances has now been unearthed. Ninela, who everybody says was the arresting person, askari, says in his affidavit that he was with Goodwill Sekakane. It's a sworn affidavit. I think its an exhibit here. Why he doesn't ...(intervention)

MS POSWA: Sorry Mr Maharaj, for purposes of the record, what exhibit number is that? Do you that, Ms Evidence Leader? Can you help us here?

MS THABETHE: Can you also help us...(indistinct)

MS POSWA: I'm asking what ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: The affidavit of Ninela.

MS THABETHE: The affidavit of Ninela?

MR LAX: Yes, it's in a batch from the TRC.

MR VISSER: Exhibit F, Mr Chairperson, it's a page marked 22 in Exhibit f.

MR MAHARAJ: I'm sorry, so it is. Thank you. Ninela, page 22, says that he was, paragraph 7 page 23 that he was with Neville and they were in the street when they spotted Charles and he goes on to recount the arrest. From the amnesty application of Eugene de Kock and I have extracts of his, he says he was called upon, informed about the death of two Vula operatives and required to eliminate Goodwill Sekakane because he was threatening to tell about Vula, how these two colleagues had disappeared. Indeed Goodwill Sekakane was an askari and he was executed and I believe his body has now been exhumed and identified and he was killed. So, in my view, the evidence of de Kock and Ninela suggests that the detention, the arrest, was carried out by Ninela and Goodwill Sekakane and I do not understand why it's not been put open cards.

MS POSWA: Still in Exhibit D, Mr Maharaj, can you comment on the contents of paragraph 59 please?

MR MAHARAJ: Paragraph 59, Chairperson, it's difficult for me to control my language when I speak about paragraph 59 because it's the biggest give-away to a cover-up conspiracy. It says there that

"Charles Ndaba was privy to vital information about Pretoria systems. The first ones", it says, "is that during Charles's stay in Swaziland and Zambia, Ndaba was coupled to the communications and logistics infrastructure of the Security Branch".

Now I have shown you documents which indicate that if we were to suppose he was recruited, he could only have been recruited late in 1988, but within weeks of recruitment would have gone out of Swaziland. What infrastructure would he have learned? What communications system would he have got known to except some telephone numbers to phone? Then we were told by Capt Botha that when he was sent, told to go to Zambia, he was given no contacts in Zambia. What logistical infrastructure and communications network of Port Natal would he have found out in Zambia and by his own admission Capt Botha says he had no contact with him while he stayed in Zambia, in fact he claims that the contact was established 4 to 6 weeks before the 7th of July inside the country at the initiative of Charles Ndaba. What infrastructure? So it puts this huge word, communications and logistical infrastructure that Charles Ndaba would have got to know in Swaziland and Zambia and then uses that to justify his murder. Then it says:

"these communication and logistical networks were not only used by Charles Ndaba"

but they themselves said that he didn't use it. I find that diabolical. Then it goes that he had information about the Intelligence network in the Security Branch in Durban but they say in their evidence that he made contact 4 to 6 weeks before the 7th of July, which places it at its earliest in May and then goes on to say that he had 2 to 3 meetings and did not have him meet other people. What again, is this huge word Intelligence network? If Durban, Port Natal was working that way, making an individual informer know that elaborate network, then they don't deserve to be called Durban Security Branch. And then, Chairperson, we come back to the smearing of Charles Ndaba's name, after they have murdered him because in the next paragraph they then throw a hint that there was another informant inside Vula. I am satisfied, head on the block, they did not penetrate Vula. I'm ready to say, on the contrary and Capt Botha referred to me the other day when he was giving evidence, he said: "Ask Mac Maharaj about the houses in Reservoir Hills and Chatsworth". Sir, I won't tell you about that unless you ask me, but he raised the matter. Those two incidents shows that we had penetrated Durban Security Branch right to the top. These four reports that I have filed today is from that stack. You show me one from the ANC, from Vula.

MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj ...(intervention).

MR MAHARAJ: You see, I don't regard this thing as at all significant, it's fabrication, justification for killing.

MS POSWA: Thank you. When it was discovered that Messrs Ndaba and Shabalala were missing, what actions did the ANC take in the media in view of the negotiations being conducted at the time and with the government of the day?

MR MAHARAJ: Firstly, we got in touch with the families and Mbuso's brother, Will Shabalala, was a member of MK, had been outside the country trained, was one of the first of the trainees to come and operate in the country, had retreated, was operating in the political section, had come into the country clandestine before I came in and was successfully operating here in touch with his brother Mbuso. So we put out word through the family to make inquiries.

Secondly, just as the Security Branch were putting their propaganda to the media, we spoke to the media to raise the question of the disappearance of Charles and Mbuso and we already put it out by round about the 15th of July that we were satisfied that they were killed. Then I briefed Pres Mandela on his birthday the 18th of July on his arrival at Johannesburg airport from the East, I briefed him about the arrests, about Charles and Mbuso and I briefed him about the observation and surveillance that was being carried out around me and on the morning of the 19th at 7 o'clock in the morning, from his home in Soweto he phoned F W de Klerk and in my presence requested a meeting which meeting took place, where he told F W de Klerk that these are ANC cadres that you have arrested and you better go carefully. He had a subsequent meeting with Pres de Klerk, raising the same question because after the arrest of the 12th, about a week later Billy Naair was arrested in Durban at the Teachers' Centre. By that time, round about the 20th, 21st, 22nd of July, the National Executive of the ANC had met and once more he met Pres F W de Klerk to raise the question of these arrests and the disappearance of these two men. The Security Branch assured him and assured the public that they had no knowledge of the arrest or otherwise, or presence of these two people.

MS POSWA: Mr Maharaj, as we heard, as the evidence was or has been led, indeed Mr Steyn and Mr Botha had made this their own secret and had not divulged it to their seniors, but can you tell us, in your opinion, would the arrest and subsequent killing of Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala have improved the political position of the National Party in the negotiations or would it have matters worse for them?

MR MAHARAJ: I can understand how some junior officer could think that something like that would give advantage or no advantage. Dozens of people had been arrested, detained illegally over the years. Dozens of frame-ups had taken place, implicating even the Minister, Vlok had been involved in the fabrication of Shirley Gunn, the bombing of Khotso House, so illegal detention in the scale of horror was petty, nothing and as we know over the negotiations process, we had to negotiate not while one person was being murdered, we had to negotiate while hundreds of our people were being massacred on the trains and in the townships. Pres Mandela has said, what is negotiation about except negotiating with the enemy. He has told the Irish at Arniston, "you don't negotiate with your friends" and when we have said, "How do you sit down with this Bantustan leader?" He has said, "but I sit down with de Klerk, who's hands are dripping with blood". It would have made no difference. It would have made no difference. It's only a petty Intelligence officer who would read as if their small world constitutes the universe. My own detention, Sir, I sat in detention for 4 months, from 25th of July. Pres Mandela visited me twice. I said "Don't bother to get me released, get on with the work of negotiating, you'll get me out in due course." As long as I could get one assurance, "Do everything you can to make sure that they don't kill me out here." So I don't think that the detention was a problem, I think the murder was heinous.

MS POSWA: Thank you, Mr Maharaj. Was there anything else maybe which I might have left out, which you'd like to tell the Committee?

MR MAHARAJ: Chairperson, I came here to give evidence on behalf of the families but I've come here also really in pursuit of the truth. What I find alarming is not just full disclosure, I find alarming false disclosure. I've heard the evidence, I've heard political motivation, I have a sense that these two people were killed out of malice. If I ever acted like that as an officer in Umkhonto weSizwe, as I've heard the General and Capt Botha say they behaved, they would not be fit to be officers of Umkhonto weSizwe and it was just the right ... (indistinct) guerrilla army, but it goes against the fundamentals of any army, any Intelligence Service, any police service, that you should convey top secret things to juniors and not pass it to your seniors. That's the most secure way of undermining any cohesive structure. Confidences are shared upwards, not downwards. When you share confidences downwards, then you have ensured that you are not fit to lead any team.

MS POSWA: Thank you, Mr Maharaj. That will be all Mr Chairman, for now.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS POSWA

CHAIRPERSON: Subject to what you Gentlemen have to say, I would like to continue for some time. I don't think we will manage to finish this today but we might get towards it. But I bear in mind that there is one section of our community that works non-stop the whole time while the rest of us may not be. Are you available to do a little more? Right should we carry on for a little while.

MR WILLS: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS

MS THABETHE: No questions, Mr Chair.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, am I correct that throughout this hearing of this incident, you have advised and instructed both Ms Poswa as well as Mr Wills on matters which you have heard evidence about here?

MR MAHARAJ: I have advised, not instructed.

MR VISSER: Advised. And you have come to this Committee to give evidence, you say, on behalf of the families? I'm sorry?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: You have not come to this Committee to oppose the applications on your own behalf, have you?

MR MAHARAJ: Now that I have had the opportunity to give evidence and as I was listening to the evidence being presented, Chairperson, while Judge Mall was still Chairing, I did request to be allowed to conduct examination myself, because what I found startling was not just the gaps in the disclosures, but what I found startling was the falsifications.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, just answer this question. Did you come to this hearing to oppose, in your own name, the applications of, for amnesty, by the applicants?

MR MAHARAJ: I am saying, I did not come, but in the course of hearing the stories, I decided to oppose it too.

MR VISSER: But, have you got Exhibit I in front of you?

MR MAHARAJ: Exhibit I, yes.

MR VISSER: Well look at page 2, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Applicants' motivation. You refer there to short of a full disclosure, you refer to proportionality, you go on to 8 and you say the applicants need to say much more and you say that they haven't established that the murder was associated with a political objective.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Etc., etc. Isn't that an allegation of opposition by yourself?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, I have been put a set of questions by

Adv Poswa and she said to me, we need a statement from you to

file, but you are in Johannesburg. The sitting is starting in two

days time, could you respond to these questions, and if you look

at the last paragraph, it says:

"My own attitude to the application would depend on

what they have to say under oath and in the course of

cross-examination at the actual amnesty hearing. I

support the Truth and Reconciliation Act and believe

that only applicants who meet the criteria

satisfactorily should receive the amnesty."

And I am saying that over the past three days, listening here, has convinced me that at the present moment on the disclosure made, I should oppose it.

MS POSWA: Mr Chairman ...(intervention)_

MR VISSER: Just repeat that last answer please.

MR MAHARAJ: Listening to the evidence of Capt Botha and the evidence of Gen Steyn under cross-examination, I haven't heard his evidence in chief, but I've read it, I am now convinced that I myself feel I should oppose it.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MS POSWA: Mr Chairman, if my colleague could enlighten me. Could my colleague enlighten me, what is the purpose of this line of questioning?

MR VISSER: Perhaps if she listens long enough, she'll find out, Mr Chairman, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: I presume this is to show that this is not an independent witness, but a person with an interest.

MR MAHARAJ: But that doesn't make me any more or less honest.

MR VISSER: We'll come to that Mr Maharaj. Mr Maharaj, now where was I? Yes, when you drew this statement and had it typed out, did you receive legal advice on the contents thereof?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: You did this off your own bat?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, straight off my bat with the secretary at First National, First ...(indistinct) Bank.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Maharaj, the point of the matter is simply this, apart from it showing, or as you say it might not show, some prejudice on your part, I want to ask you this. You are not in any way related to the late Mr Shabalala or Mr Ndaba, is that correct?

MR MAHARAJ: I don't know what you mean by related?

MR VISSER: Blood relationship.

MR MAHARAJ: Oh, no.

MR VISSER: You are not a dependant of either of the two of them?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MR VISSER: Yes. You are certainly not an implicated person.

MR MAHARAJ: I am implicated.

MR VISSER: Who implicated you in the murder?

MR MAHARAJ: Capt Botha.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, we can't speak together, we can sing together.

MR MAHARAJ: I thought your questions was finished. Who implicated me.

MR VISSER: My question is this. Has anybody implicated you in the murder of either Mr Shabalala or Mr Ndaba?

MR MAHARAJ: No.

MR VISSER: So, you're not an implicated person.

MR MAHARAJ: I am implicated in the application for amnesty because Capt Botha used my name three times.

MR VISSER: Yes, does that implicate you in the murder of Mr Shabalala and Mr Ndaba.

MR MAHARAJ: No, I am implicated in the application. I received a notice from the TRC that I am an interested party.

MR VISSER: Yes, well we will address argument on that score to the Committee, but I just want to put it to you that in terms of the provisions of the Act, that doesn't make you an implicated person.

MR MAHARAJ: I received a notice from the TRC. I have it here, saying "you are an interested party".

MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Maharaj, what you have handed in as Exhibit J.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: When did you first come into possession of these documents?

MR MAHARAJ: I don't have an idea what date.

MR VISSER: Was it before this hearing in this incident commenced?

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, this no, I dug up over this weekend. No on Friday I was here, Yes, I was here on Friday, I came with them, and I got it on Thursday night.

MR VISSER: Alright, well that's good enough. You were here on Friday and you had them with you.

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did you tell Ms Poswa about the contents of these documents?

MR MAHARAJ: I have never had a session with them, enough time, I arrived here on Thursday, had a very short session and I told her that I have some documents. They didn't appear to even know what these documents, they didn't bother to look at them.

MR VISSER: Didn't you tell her what the documents were about?

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, the questions she raised didn't touch on that aspect.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, forget about the questions she raised. Did you or did you not tell Ms Poswa that you have documents which you wish to use when you give evidence.

MR MAHARAJ: No I said today at, during the break when we adjourned, because this morning I was here too. Same thing, they were discussing what to do with the cross-examination of Gen Steyn. So the break that we took this afternoon was, what do we do with you? And that is where I drew their attention, I said, "Here are documents, I would like to introduce them."

MR VISSER: Yes, and are you saying to this Committee that the first time you ever became aware of the existence of these documents, was on Friday last week? Is that what you're saying?

MR MAHARAJ: That I became aware of them?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: No, Sir, I said I dug them up.

CHAIRPERSON: He said he dug them up on Thursday night. It presumably means he had them.

MR VISSER: Alright, so you had them before Thursday night?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would it be correct that at all material stages you intended to use these documents which you then dug up on Thursday evening?

MR MAHARAJ: On Thursday when I came here, I sought for material that would give me some insight. I had read the statements sent to me on Wednesday or so, by Adv Poswa, saying that the statement of Capt Botha says that Charles was an informer. So I began to look for material that would throw light on this matter and in the course of that, came across these reports.

MR VISSER: On Thursday evening?

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, no, no, the date. Let me get the dates, Sir, correctly put. What day of the week is 17th of August?

MR VISSER: That was Wednesday. I'm told it was Tuesday last week.

MR MAHARAJ: Right. It's either on Monday or Tuesday last week that Adv Poswa phones me and says she is acting for the Ndaba family, would I be prepared to come and give evidence? I say, "What's it about?" then I learn that it's about Charles Ndaba's death and the fact that it is claimed that he is an informer. I say, "I will certainly be prepared to be available for the family". On the 17th she faxes me a set of questions and phones me to say I cannot come as a witness, unless I prepare a statement. I prepared a statement and faxed it through to her on the same day and then I start preparing. I start looking on Wednesday for information and in the course of the search for information this is one part of the information that I put together.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, what is the short answer? did you or did you not dig up this document, Exhibit J on Thursday evening, last week. yes or no?

MR MAHARAJ: This would have been dug up, by the process of finding this document would have started on Wednesday and I arrived here on Thursday morning, so I arrived with it.

MR VISSER: When did you arrive here first, for the first time with it in your possession?

MR MAHARAJ: Thursday morning.

MR VISSER: Thursday morning. And it didn't occur to you to hand this to Ms Poswa so that she could alert us to this document, so that we could prepare on the document, it didn't occur to you?

MR MAHARAJ: I certainly mentioned that I've got documents, but they were more interested in debriefing me in preparation for the cross-examination of Mr Botha.

MR VISSER: So did it occur to you or didn't it occur to you?

MR MAHARAJ: It occurred to me.

MR VISSER: I see. But it didn't occur to them?

MR MAHARAJ: It didn't strike a significance with them.

MR VISSER: I see. You know what is strange Mr Maharaj, is that Mr Botha presented himself as a witness, he was cross-examined at length and nothing or basically nothing of what you testified here today was ever put to Mr Botha.

Let me be specific. Nothing of the contents of Exhibit J was ever put to Mr Botha. Now can you explain that?

MR MAHARAJ: No. You are concerned with the word that you find it strange.

MR VISSER: Very strange. I would change that to very strange.

MR MAHARAJ: Alright. Then Chairperson, you'll have to bear with me. Let's start and look at the times available.

Have you any idea what time I arrived on Thursday?

MR VISSER: No, but I've got a feeling you're going to tell us.

MR MAHARAJ: No, I'm not going to tell you. You'll have to extract it. I come here on Thursday, I am seen by two people representing two families and their first concern is "Have you seen Mr Botha's statement?" and I am concerned, "How long is this going to take?" Mr Botha starts giving evidence. Breaks are concentrating on the evidence of Mr Botha. There are two versions and you will recall that I left in the middle of the cross-examination because the TRC could not give me a schedule when they want me here. So it is in that context that reference was made to material that I have, neither of the two legal representatives had the time to look at my information. And I have come back this morning under the same circumstances, Sir. I come back this morning, through a phone call over the weekend to say, be here in the morning, short cross-examination and then you are in the box. So I fly in at 8 o'clock and right now at lunch time I spent more time phoning my office in Pretoria, in Johannesburg to say "I can't be there tomorrow. Cancel my this appointment and that appointment, including the Governor of the Central Bank".

MR VISSER: Yes, I just hope that you're not going to blame us for that.

MR MAHARAJ: No, I never do that.

MR VISSER: Alright. Now looking at Exhibit J, I have had no time, as you will appreciate, to study this document.

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: But may I point out some obvious features to you? Would you look at page 2 of Exhibit J (1) paragraph 2 (8)?

MR MAHARAJ: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Why do you say, the person MK Zandile is identical to Charles Zakhele Ndaba, because that was your evidence?

MR MAHARAJ: I know Charles Ndaba's codename in MK was MK Zakhele.

MR VISSER: But that's Zandile.

MR MAHARAJ: Zandile is, they are saying it here.

MR VISSER: You misreading it, Mr Maharaj, let me read it for you and I'll interpret it as we go along

"Later he was through Lulu and MK Zandile and black man Zakhele"

he was identical to Charles Zakhele, there are two different people that they spoke about.

MR MAHARAJ: Correct.

MR VISSER: Now I'm not sure what the point was that you tried to make.

MR MAHARAJ: The point that I'm trying to make is Zakhele, codename is identified as Charles Ndaba.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: That the enemy, my enemy at that time, agents are desperate to establish the identity of Zakhele.

MR VISSER: No, that's not what this paragraph says, with all due respect.

MR MAHARAJ: No, wait a minutes. It says, Zakhele identical with Charles Zakhele Ndaba.

MR VISSER: Yes. And the reference no ...(intervention)

MR MAHARAJ: Hold on. "Foto uitkenning gedoen"

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: You don't do a "Foto uitkenning" unless you want to identify him.

MR VISSER: Well of course not, Mr Maharaj, but you know what this says, quite clearly and you will appreciate that, what this man says is that I had Lulu and MK Zandile and they identified Charles Zakhele Ndaba from a photograph in a terrorist photo album. That's all they're saying.

MR MAHARAJ: And they go on, paragraph 39 (10) to say: "Documents marked B, C and D have all been written by Charles Ndaba."

Zakhele that they have identified in the photograph is now linked with certain documents that they have brought to Port Natal.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: They establish his identity plus his authority.

MR VISSER: So?

MR MAHARAJ: So, they are trying to ring-fence him for action. They're ring-fencing him for action because in June operations are carried out against Charles Ndaba in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: But Mr Maharaj, this is the 14th of February 1988.

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: It's the beginning of the year.

MR MAHARAJ: MK didn't start in February 1989.

MR VISSER: That's not the point. You must say that Mr Botha had already recruited Mr Charles Ndaba before that date for any of your evidence to make any sense in this regard.

MR MAHARAJ: No, sir, it doesn't make sense.

MR VISSER: That's my point, it doesn't make sense.

MR MAHARAJ: I say, Mr Botha had not recruited him.

MR VISSER: Precisely.

MR MAHARAJ: But if he had recruited him, he would not appear with the number S4/62573. Well he would appear with PN or G.

MR VISSER: So we have both now established, have we not, Mr Maharaj, that all that we can derive from this paragraph 2.8 is that by the 14th of February 1988, if your inferences are correct, and for purposes of argument, I will concede that they are, Mr Charles had not been recruited as an informer by Botha at that time.

MR MAHARAJ: Definitely.

MR VISSER: If that is all you wanted to say we would ...(intervention).

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, I'm saying more.

MR VISSER: No, no, we'll get to that. We'll get to that. You see, Mr Maharaj, as I understand your evidence, and again I haven't read through this document, but I'm bound to do so tonight, your point is that based on the evidence of Gen Steyn, that a Port Natal number would have been given with a prefix PN to an informer, you make a point thereof that Charles Ndaba could not have been an informer in the minds of the Security Branch of Port Natal because he was never given a PN number, do I understand you correctly?

MR MAHARAJ: Do you want me to say yes, no, or answer you?

MR VISSER: Something like that, yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Can I answer you?

MR VISSER: Please go ahead Mr Maharaj, you're not going to be concerned with anything I'm going to advise you, so do whatever you like.

MR MAHARAJ: Sir, I've argued that I agree that a PN number goes for a confirmed informer. I accept Gen Steyn's view that a G would be for somebody that has just been approached and still needs to be verified as to reliability.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: I'm saying that a series of documents here show that Capt Botha, who claims that he recruited Charles Ndaba, was consistently circulating the identity of Charles to other agencies of the Security Forces, whom he says would have likely eliminated him.

MR VISSER: That's another point.

MR MAHARAJ: No, no, but precisely because of that, it makes it incomprehensible that Capt Botha should be circulating the identity of Charles Ndaba to other sections including the killing section.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, that is one point. Was your other point not that had Botha recruited Charles Ndaba as an informer, he would have had and he would have referred to a PN informant number for Charles Ndaba. Isn't that you other point?

MR MAHARAJ: And/or would have said "Nie van veiligheid belang".

MR VISSER: I see. Yes, that's a third point. Let's deal with the middle point now first. Please turn to page 11 of Exhibit J (1) and you referred the Committee to paragraph 41. I want to refer you to paragraph 41. Now I read there, in plain language, "Ndaba Charles Zakhele, MK Zwelakhe" and then there's a reference number, obviously to a file or something, I don't know, I haven't had an opportunity of talking to Botha about this, and then there is a division reference, which is a PN reference.

MR MAHARAJ: Very different reference. What is says there is PNV/V/139.

MR VISSER: Whatever.

MR MAHARAJ: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. An informer's number, check P, page 1. Page 1, "Code number of source."

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: That's just below the date.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: The code number is PN 666.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: No strokes, no strokes.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: Next one, paragraph 1 "Informant PN 664." No strokes and Gen Steyn was clear, he said PN, he said G for a person they have touched but do not know his reliability. When the person is tested and becomes reliable, PN and a number.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: If the person has been a uniform policeman and goes undercover, RS.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MAHARAJ: I agree with him.

MR VISSER: I see.

CHAIRPERSON: If you're looking at the top of the list Mr Visser, I take it you're not suggesting that PNV 4 means an informer.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I simply don't know, I'll have to find out what the evidence is in this regard. But be that as it may, all of this is February 1988.

MR MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it's running towards half-past. I have obvious difficulties with this document.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - mike not on) already anticipated what going to happen ...(indistinct)

MR MAHARAJ: Except Sir, I would really plead that one appointment I can't cancel and that is, I need to fly off by 2 o'clock tomorrow.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, perhaps by what I'm going to say now, it may or may not solve the problem for Mr Maharaj. I have the problem that Botha sits in Pretoria at the moment. I'll have to try to get hold of him and see whether I can discuss these matters over the telephone. Perhaps telefax it through to him and then discuss it over the telephone but there may be a hitch in that we might have to ask you to allow this matter to stand down until we meet again which will be on Monday next week. Now perhaps we can sort this whole problem out by asking Mr Maharaj through the Chair right now whether that would suit him better or not?

CHAIRPERSON: We have already anticipated having a different Committee next week.

MR VISSER: I wasn't aware of that Mr Chairman. Yes, I wasn't aware of that. Oh yes, you did mention it to me, I just forgot.

MS POSWA: Mr Chair, can I just ask my colleague over there whether Mr Steyn is not in a position to clarify these issues as a person who was a member of the Security Branch and he's right here in Durban. I am certain he would be able to clear any questions Mr Visser will have about code names and code numberings.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I prefer to do my research the way I believe it should be done. You have seen Mr Steyn yourself and heard his evidence, he's very uncertain about even.

CHAIRPERSON: No. Things I think you could certainly do, Mr Visser is with Mr Steyn's assistance, if you're having trouble getting through, find out from someone here, there must still be some people around, what PNV4 means, things of that, I'm saying not what he wrote but the actual technical details you should be able to sort out. The other is, I see your problem. I may say that a member of the Committee has already said that in the light of this evidence, it would perhaps be necessary to recall Mr Botha, so do what you can to get in touch with him this evening.

MR VISSER: Would you like me ask him whether he can come back again tomorrow, Mr Chairman, to be recalled?

CHAIRPERSON: I think so.

MR VISSER: It might be a problem, he's, in a professional way he works for himself basically now and he has been sitting around, but I'm not tendering that as an excuse. I certainly will try to get him here.

CHAIRPERSON: Or we could do it later in the week perhaps, Thursday or Friday.

MR VISSER: Later in the week Mr Chairperson I have to be ...(indistinct)

MR LAX: Mr Visser, it does appear from this document that two of your other clients are both named throughout these documents, if might help you a little bit anyway.

MR VISSER: No we'll obviously see how far we can get, but if we can get shot of this Mr Chairman, we'll definitely do so.

CHAIRPERSON: It think that's the best we can do. What about tomorrow morning, 9 o'clock?

MR VISSER: We're used to starting at 9.30 Mr Chairman, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: If we start at 9.30 and you've got your information will you be finished by 12 o'clock. Mr Chairman, I don't, it depends a lot on the witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should.

MR VISSER: But probably.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's limit it to a ...(intervention).

MR VISSER: I'll be brief, Mr Chairman. I see Mr Lax is laughing.

MR LAX: We've heard that one before.

MR MAHARAJ: Mr Visser should know that I always pull surprises on him.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS