MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I beg leave to call Mr Raymond Lalla. If I could just have one minute to rearrange seating so that he can be ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Would you like us to leave and we'll just stand outside while you rearrange? Very well.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.
Chairperson, thank you for the indulgence. The next applicant is Mr Raymond Lalla who will testify in English. He has no objection to taking the prescribed oath.
RAYMOND LALLA: (sworn states)
MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, just for the record before we start I beg leave to announce that there are a number of victims in this particular matter. Some of them are behind me and some of them are here. Those who want to ask specific questions, I have asked them to be around here. There are some victims who are seated at the back seat there. Thanks Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chairperson.
Mr Lalla, your name appears as the first applicant in the bundle 1, namely Operation Butterfly?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, your application appears under the reference number AM7256/97 at pages 1 to 5 of bundle 1, is that correct?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And if you please turn to page 5 of the bundle, which I'm showing you, on the top is a signature under deponent. Is that in fact your signature?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And do you confirm the contents of the application in the prescribed form?
MR LALLA: I do.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I notice underneath your signature, it says Commission of Oaths, which has got a signature. Do you see that?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: To the best of your recollection, was this application attested to before a Commission of Oaths on the 10th May as appears on page 5?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And you can't explain why there's no further details relating to the Commission of Oaths?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes.
MR LALLA: Sir, now if we peruse your prescribed form at page 1, paragraph 7(a), you refer to the fact that you apply as a member of the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And at paragraph 7(b), you state the capacities in which you served at the ANC for the period 1981 to 1990?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Sir, now when we get to page 2 at paragraph 9(a), you were asked to state the acts, omissions or offences for which you applied and without going through the contents of those paragraphs, is that correct that you gave a general description of the acts without specifying specific acts for which you apply?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And can you tell the Committee at that time of filling in you gave such a general description of the acts?
MR LALLA: At that time when the TRC process came into being, there was a lot of confusion about the degrees of responsibility that members of command should accept. After some discussion with the ANC in Shell House, Johannesburg, with Mr Matthew Phosa ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: If I can interrupt? Is that of the ANC, the ANC leader of the party?
MR LALLA: Yes, Mr Phosa of the ANC legal department. The initial recommendation of that stage was that as members of the command, we should apply for amnesty in a very general sense.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes and anything further that was said about a client for amnesty in relation to commanders?
MR LALLA: Oh yes. In regard to commanders is that we were told that we must take responsibility for all operations which were carried out by members of units under our command and basically that's it.
MS CAMBANIS: And in relation to the operatives who acted under your command?
MR LALLA: I was tasked and I was instructed to try and get hold of all people that I considered to have been part of the structures of the ANC and request them to apply for amnesty and I just want to add here, that is why in the applications for Butterfly there was a rush in terms to actually meet the deadline. One of the problems that we had was basically there was a lot of misunderstanding, communication breakdowns in terms of people who had come out from the Island, do they apply for amnesty? What were the levels of responsibility do they take and if you were in a command, if you were not involved in the operation, what responsibility do you take? Those areas were pretty grey at that time.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. But Mr Lalla, as a result subsequent to that there were court cases as so on resulting in so-called blanket amnesty and you were requested by the TRC to give further particularity for the acts for which you apply today?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And you in fact consulted with me regarding this matter and a document found at page 6 and 7 of bundle 1 is the result of that consultation which was forwarded to the TRC?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you will see that in the bundle, pages 6 and 7 are in fact not signed. You recall that you in fact signed this before a Commissioner of Oaths?
MR LALLA: That is correct, I signed it before a Commissioner of Oaths. I can't remember the date but I did sign it.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have only a photocopy of the signed further particulars that was commissioned which I will hand in afterwards. I'm not sure how this happened.
MR LAX: Do you in any event confirm the contents before us?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. So when we get to the further particularity, is it correct that today you are asking the Committee to grant you amnesty in respect of three broad categories, namely one, relating to Operation Butterfly in respect of all acts that were carried out by the operatives under the command of Operation Butterfly?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And those are the incidents that are detailed in the summary of bundle 1, incidents 3 to 18? You have had an opportunity to peruse the summary?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And the details of those incidents, you've been present and you've heard the acts that were performed by the various operatives and you accept that that is the modus operandi and the motives of carrying out those operations?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And then secondly, you apply which is stated in the summary at page 1, the car bomb at the Victoria embankment on the 3rd April 1984?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And thirdly you apply for the car bomb in Jacobs on the 12th January 1984?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if you can start with the car bomb incident one at page 1 of the summary, the Victoria Embankment car bomb. If you could please tell the Committee your involvement in that incident?
Just hold on. Chairperson, I don't know the pagination, it's not paginated. It appears ...(intervention)
MR LAX: It's the first page of the summary.
MS CAMBANIS: That is correct, yes.
MR LAX: Which is in the beginning of the bundle.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes.
MR LALLA: In early 1984 ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, just hold on?
MR LALLA: Okay.
MR LAX: Okay, please proceed?
MR LALLA: Sometime early in 1984 in Swaziland I was told by the commander of the unit, Tami Zulu, of a special operations unit that will operate within the Natal command.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I'm going to interrupt you, I'm sorry. You were stationed in Swaziland during the period 1984?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: And as a member of ANC and Umkhonto, what position did you hold in Swaziland at that time?
MR LALLA: In 1984 I was the commander of - not the commander, I was a member of the command but I was the head of military intelligence within our structure.
MS CAMBANIS: Tasked for which area?
MR LALLA: Tasked for the greater Natal area.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes and Mr Tami Zulu that you refer to, what was his position in the Natal machinery?
MR LALLA: He was the overall commander and he was also the representative of the command on the RPMC in Swaziland.
MS CAMBANIS: The RPMC meaning?
MR LALLA: The Regional Political Military Council.
MS CAMBANIS: For the Natal?
MR LALLA: For all forward activities that were responsible, that operated from Swaziland into South Africa.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes, sorry just to clarify that and then if you can go back? You met in 1984 with Mr Tami Zulu? Please proceed?
MR LALLA: Yes. I think perhaps let me go a bit earlier. In 1983 I was abroad and I had undergone training. During that period there was an incident that took place which resulted in the death of our Chief of Staff, Zwelie Nyanda, who was the Chief of Staff of Natal Command and why I'm saying this is that I only became aware of the decisions of the structure in early 1984 because I only came back to Swaziland in early 1984. Tami Zulu informed me that there was a structure that will carry out special operations within the Natal Command and that the structure initially was under the command of Zwelie Nyanda and unfortunately, due to the death, of the assassination of Zwelie in Swaziland the project got delayed.
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry to interrupt again, Mr Lalla. The Committee is aware in the submissions by the ANC that there was a part of the ANC that dealt with special operations as such. There's a whole submission on that. Are you referring to something that fell under special operations or are you referring to something different?
MR LALLA: No, this did not fall under special operations. I learnt from Tami Zulu that Zwelie Nyanda was responsible and they had the go ahead from the RPMC - not the RPMC, from the structures in Mozambique at that stage that there will be operations that will be carried out but will be managed directly by Zwelie and may not necessarily fall under the command of Natal Command. There will be very special and very specific operations.
Subsequently, Zwelie unfortunately died and Tami Zulu gave the responsibility for those operations to Ralph who is known as Fear and who was also part of the command. Ralph was also the Chief of Operations in this structure.
MR LAX: His name, just for the record, was Raymond Lawrence.
MR LALLA: I think Raymond Edgar Lawrence, yes.
He was the ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, I just want to interrupt? In the submissions by the ANC to the TRC, the persons to which you now refer had been set out and the structures and positions they held at page - Chairperson, I thought I knew the bundles better. Chairperson, I will give you that reference later.
Do you recall seeing the structures set out in the submissions?
MR LALLA: I recall seeing the structure and I agree with the structure as drafted by the ANC.
MS CAMBANIS: And the names to which you refer have been set out in the submissions made by the ANC?
MR LALLA: Yes that is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Please proceed?
MR LALLA: And that fear was now going to have the operations but had really done some preliminary work before he had died and one of the candidates that Zwelie had selected to do the operation was a person known as Rabbit and subsequently later on I have come to know his real name as well and that due to Zwelie's circumstances, the operation got delayed and subsequently Fear took over.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, what were the details, what operation? What was supposed to happen, what was the separate operation that was being undertaken?
MR LALLA: The operation was basically to detonate remote control device which is basically a car bomb and the reason why these stringent measures were taking place was basically to, by the command, to identify the suitable person and not to make it public knowledge and not to allow this kind of device to be used randomly.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if I can just summarise? A decision had already been taken by Mr Nyanda that a separate operation involving car bombs would take place in the Durban area, is that correct?
MR LALLA: That is correct. Subsequently, with Tami Zulu and Rabbit and Fear there were numerous meetings that did take place. When I mean numerous, I mean two or three meetings that did take place and the meetings did not take place in the form of minutes in the conventional sense when we talk about meetings. It's normally discussed in a conspiratorial manner.
MS CAMBANIS: Where did these meetings take place?
MR LALLA: In Swaziland.
MS CAMBANIS: Were you present at these meetings?
MR LALLA: I wasn't present at all the meetings but because of my specialisation as head of intelligence, I was requested to brief him on a range of military targets in the country, in specifically Kwa-Zulu Natal.
MR LAX: Who was him, sorry?
MR LALLA: Rabbit.
MS CAMBANIS: You've just spoken about your specialisation in your structure. To what do you refer?
MR LALLA: As head of intelligence I would have in that process of my capacity have had sufficient information, reports regarding to military, Police structures and also as head of intelligence, I would be able to be in a better position to give advice, technical advice on reconnaissance, on confirmation of movement of target. Not in terms of the operational sense but to tell the operative how to behave and how to understand that environment that he is going into.
MS CAMBANIS: But would you also have gathered information about where the military targets were situated?
MR LALLA: Yes, we had information about where military targets were situated. Yes, I did discuss with him I think a range of about six or seven targets that were based in the Durban, Pietermaritzburg areas and I'm not sure of all the specific targets but some of them I do remember.
MS CAMBANIS: But you were certainly involved in discussing the selection of targets for the car bomb?
MR LALLA: I was involved in giving him a framework to look for a specific target. I was basically telling him these are the military options. The operational requirements in a country in that present situation could not be governed or could not be managed or controlled totally by people on the outside. All we would do was to say these are the options, these are the targets and the operational plan of it, or the implementation of the operational plan would have been done at the localised level and the selection of it, I would not have been involved.
MS CAMBANIS: But the intention was to hit military target?
MR LALLA: The intention was to hit a military target.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes and do you recall which targets were canvassed with Rabbit?
MR LALLA: Yes, the targets were the Natal Command, C R. Swarts, military institution barracks - not barracks, but a military office in Pietermaritzburg, the Bluff Military Base. There was a training college in the Jacobs area. There was also some maintenance depot, which I'm not sure, in the nearby area which was discussed with Rabbit. But there were a few other targets as well.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes.
MR LALLA: And I can't recall some of them.
MS CAMBANIS: And you've just mentioned Jacobs. Is that one of the, in fact the second incident refers to a car bomb in Jacobs?
MR LALLA: Yes, I drew the conclusion that possibly the target that I had suggested was the target that Rabbit had hit.
MS CAMBANIS: Sir, is there anything further that you can tell the Committee. You were assisted in the selection of targets, of possible targets? That is your involvement in relation to the car bombs. Is there any other information or facts that you can disclose to the Committee relating to the actualisation of these missions?
MR LALLA: In relation to the actualisation of the missions is not much but I think I should just put on record here that in 1994 or 1995 I was temporarily based in Pretoria and I was working for the PAC. I met Rabbit on occasions at Shell House, two occasions and I told him to apply for amnesty. I don't know why he hasn't applied. He had given me the assurance that he would have applied for amnesty. But what I must say, he was in a state and I think he was intimidated by the process.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes, then Mr Lalla, if we can then move on to the operation, what I call the third set of acts for which you apply for amnesty, namely Operation Butterfly. If you would please brief the Committee on the events leading up to the formation?
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps it would be better if you were to do that after the adjournment, in regard to the time. How long do you want the adjournment for?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, we've had many adjournments. As short as possible.
CHAIRPERSON: Did the time yesterday suit you or forty minutes or do you think we could take thirty minutes?
MS CAMBANIS: At the risk of alienating everyone, I'd say thirty minutes.
CHAIRPERSON: Would that suit you?
MR MAPOMA: I would prefer forty five, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we'll settle between and say forty minutes. We will adjourn till twenty to two.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chairperson.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
RAYMOND LALLA: (s.u.o.)
MS CAMBANIS: (cont) Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Lalla, previously I couldn't refer the Committee to the pages where the structures to which you refer are set out. During the lunch adjournment we have looked at the ANC's second submission to the TRC and if you look at page 46 of that submission you'll see the structures set out, 83 to 85. Page 46 of the second submission to the TRC and at page 48 of the same second submission, at the bottom of the page "Natal Urban refers to Mr Tami Zulu," is that correct?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And the structures for the period 1985 to 1990 are set out at page 50 of the same submission and at page 53, again the leaders are set out and again Tami Zulu's name appears at that page?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: And that is the structures to which you referred in your evidence?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, when the further particulars were prepared there was also an annexure to those particulars referring to the car bomb at the Victoria Embankment which should have been annexed as annexure B to the further particulars and which refers to page 102 of the ANC's second submission to the TRC.
Chairperson, in the third column, it's got the date the 3rd April 1984, where it is listed as the car bomb at Victoria Embankment. It's appendix 5, it reads:
"Arms actions for which target category and/or responsibility is uncertain is listed"
Are you aware of that Mr Lalla?
MR LALLA: I'm aware of that.
MS CAMBANIS: And the bomb referring to Jacobs Street could not be, as far as our perusal, where it was not located in this ANC submissions?
MR LALLA: I'm aware of that.
MS CAMBANIS: Before the adjournment we were turning to the acts in terms of Operation Butterfly, Mr Lalla, and I was asking if you could just brief us on the events leading up to the formation of Butterfly, Operation Butterfly.
MR LALLA: Operation Butterfly started round about 1982/1983. In fact at that stage no conceived it to be as big as what it was eventually. In 1982 a medical student left the country and his name was Charles Ndaba and he met with the chief of staff of our command who was also a former medical student and Natal University.
MS CAMBANIS: To whom do you refer?
MR LALLA: Sorry?
MS CAMBANIS: With whom did he meet?
MR LALLA: He met with Zwelie Nyanda who was also a former medical student at the University of Natal and in the process the name Butterfly emerged because Zwelie passed a remark, "it's time the medical students stopped dissecting butterflies and get involved in political activities". That's how the name emerged to Butterfly. I was present when that discussion was taking place, I was present when we conceptualised the Butterfly process at that time and the Butterfly issue at that time was basically to centre around creating structures, underground cells in the great Durban area but using the Alan Taylor Residence as perhaps some sort of headquarters and in that earlier period Charles met up with various individuals together with Zwelie who had come from the Natal University. I'm not sure of all of them and I think some of them have fallen by the wayside in the sense that they got interested and they later got disinterested. But eventually a corps remained and I think that corps comprised of Vejanand Ramlakan, Vulameni Khate and a few others and because they had set up some embryonic structures or cells in the area, at that stage they had no mandate to carry out military operations, they did not have the infrastructure or the training to have military operations. A decision was taken by the command, that is by the commander Tami Zulu together with all of us. We felt that it would have been suitable to send a trained cadre into the country. The trained cadre that we sent into the country was Mduduzi Sithole.
MS CAMBANIS: That is the person who is also referred to as Belgium?
MR LALLA: Yes, that's the late comrade Belgium. He had gone into the country and he had further developed the structures into a wide range of networks but at this stage I'm not sure whether arms were sent into the country to the infrastructure or not because it was being managed between Charles Ndaba and Zwelie. Subsequently, the structure began getting into some sort of formation. By that I mean is that from the reports, from the verbal communication we were getting is that we had some sort of large grouping of people who have basically followed certain principles, underground working principles and which we could regard as a fully fledged structure.
Belgium, while he went into the country, was also instructed to train and to teach people how to create DLBs, to train people in terms of showing them how to use explosives and on that basis I can say that explosives were sent into the country but I didn't know about it.
MS CAMBANIS: So at that stage, the late Mr Sithole was engaged in training people inside the country?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: And probably explosives and arms were being brought into the Natal area?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: That time as well, yes. Please proceed?
MR LALLA: Subsequently there was a major chain of events in Southern Africa within the ANC itself and internally within the South African environment. When I mean internally, the political situation internally. We found that a mergence of popular and actions that were taking place. These are the formation of the UDF, COSATU, all beginning to take some form of semblance at that stage. Externally we are pressurised by the signing of the Nkomati Accord and the repercussions the Nkomati Accord, on our very presence in Swaziland, in Mozambique and perhaps to other front-line States and on the basis of that, we had to speed up the process of trying to create an environment whereby the leadership that was based in Swaziland and in Mozambique will be located into the country. Subsequently, due to various reasons we felt that due to sometimes unclear responses of target selection, you must take into account that you never had reports coming out on a daily basis, telling us what these operations were about, but we would get reports via the media, via a few weeks later, sometimes months later and what have you and we had to try and clarify. So sometimes, with due respects to my comrades, in the Butterfly project we at that stage didn't have the privilege to know what they have said over here today and yesterday. We at that stage felt that there were some shortcomings within the structure in terms of target selection. On the basis of that, one of our most experienced cadres were sent into the country in the name of Sibosiso Ndlasi who is also known as Sihle and he was sent into the country to try and ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if I can just interrupt? In this application he is listed as Mr Mbongwa?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes.
MR LALLA: Okay, I'm sorry about that. He had his briefing and his mandate was clear in terms of the operational command was based - the operational mechanics was this, was that TZ would brief them on aspects of what was required.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, TZ refers to?
MR LALLA: Tami Zulu, sorry. Tami Zulu would brief them on the overall intention of the Butterfly Project. We would come in on certain aspects and I will discuss my aspects. I met with Sihle and I subsequently also met with Vejanand Ramlakan and Lulamele Pate at different periods and different times to discuss with them the whole concept of cells, how cells should operate, what are the security precautions that needed to be taken and also reconnaissance and target selection and that was basically my role with the Butterfly project.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you confirm the evidence of Dr Ramlakan and Mr Mbongwa that they did meet with you in Swaziland whereas Dr Ramlakan says the theory of targets was discussed with you?
MR LALLA: Yes I concur with that.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Did you want to follow up on your contact with Mr Mbongwa before I interrupted you?
MR LALLA: No, not really. I think when Mr Mbongwa went in, I can't remember the times and the dates but I would think most probably mid to late 1985. I was present at one meeting where he was briefed about the APMCs and the structures and how the command visualised how the structures should unfold. But right throughout the period I think it would be fair to say that one must not exonerate itself from the responsibilities but we factually couldn't discuss each and every target while we were there. A lot of discussion was left from the individual head to take those target selections but we knew they were going into the country, we knew they were armed and we knew they were going to carry out explosions and we knew they would engage in operational activities and tragically we also in some ways knew that civilians would lose their lives in the process.
MS CAMBANIS: Even although the objective was to avoid and minimise, it was inevitable and you foresaw that deaths and injuries could result from these operations?
MR LALLA: Yes, I think one thing, perhaps my other comrades and colleagues have not raised and which I think should be raised over here, is that we gave our lives. It wasn't just we were involved in operational activities, we are prepared to sacrifice our lives to liberate this country and I salute all of them. They were the most disciplined, organised formation and I'm proud of them. The tragic reality was that we were engaged to remove the apartheid order and unfortunately, we live with people and that's the painful reality.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, from that can we gather that you yourself did not receive any personal material gain as a result of the activities within the ANC and Umkhonto?
MR LALLA: No, we haven't and in this point as well as a member of the command I would also say that to my comrades and to my colleagues who have been part of this structure, that you have sacrificed a lot. Sometimes I cannot imagine the difficulties that you have been through, you'll have left families, some of you, most of you were very young and you got arrested. You went to the Island, you left breadwinners - some of you were breadwinners and I sympathise. I'm saying that while I sympathise with the casualties, I think on the ANC part and the mass liberation part, we had casualties as well.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, you have perused the submissions by the ANC and the further submission submitted in which the ANC set out the political objectives. Do you associate yourself and is that how you understand the political objective of the ANC and MK?
MR LALLA: Totally.
MS CAMBANIS: And in all these, would that be the car bombs or the acts performed in terms of Operation Butterfly, was there any personal agenda on behalf of yourself of the operatives?
MR LALLA: Absolutely no personal agenda.
MS CAMBANIS: No personal malice?
MR LALLA: No personal malice.
MS CAMBANIS: Finally, Sir, we are aware that the families of persons who tragically died in the car bomb explosions at Victoria Embankment and Jacob Streets are present and regarding their pain and loss you've spoken about your comrades' pain and loss. Is there something you would like to address and the other side?
MR LALLA: I think for me to justify the taking of any live and this is my personal opinion. It goes perhaps even slightly beyond the ANC's perception. I cannot justify the taking of anybody's life but I have to contextualise it. I won't find any excuses. All I would say is that I deeply regret your losses and if somewhere perhaps the lives could have been avoided and pain could have been removed, I just don't know what to say but perhaps just plainly sorry.
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Lalla, if you can inform the Committee that one of the difficulties amongst the families is a personal difficulty with you, that you did not inform them of these operations prior to your applying for amnesty, is that the information that you perceived?
MR LALLA: Yes. I think what you must understand that the structures, I'm accountable to certain structures and I've tried to follow the rule by the law. I also know that there was a lot of enemy penetration but I won't be able to justify it but from the very submissions that have been put at different intervals at the TRC level. But what I can say is that whether at some stage in the future these things are either proven otherwise or one way or the other, I must accept that responsibility at that time and on those facts.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Mr Lalla. That is the evidence of Mr Lalla, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MOERANE: Mr Lalla, I will just focus on one issue and that concerns the matter have touched on, that's target selection and target organisation. Now what principles or policies informed target selection?
MR LALLA: I think basically to prevent loss of lives, to look at moments whereby we can create the biggest impact but with minimal damage but what I must clarify over here, I fully appreciate the question that you asked. I am not saying that Butterfly's choice of targets were incorrect but what I was saying, I did not have the privilege to hear the submissions that were made today. Some of the members of Butterfly were able in a very coherent way to justify their own operational circumstances and I can understand the difficulty in operational situations that they made these choice of targets. But at that time when it came out in the media and we didn't have that frequent report back, we viewed certain things as perhaps without not having the full information as something is wrong somewhere along the line and therefore we brought in Sihle into the process.
MR MOERANE: Would I be correct in saying that firstly the target selection would have to fall within the parameters of the policy of the African National Congress?
MR LALLA: Correct.
MR MOERANE: And the starting point would be political?
MR LALLA: Correct.
MR MOERANE: In other words the target would have to be politically justifiable?
MR LALLA: Correct.
MR MOERANE: And now some of the targets were economic targets, so to speak?
MR LALLA: Correct.
MR MOERANE: Now please tell the Honourable Committee here, what the justification for selecting those targets was?
MR LALLA: Basically to try and sabotage the country in economic terms. These are the oil pipelines, the power installations, which had an impact onto the environment at that specific time.
MR MOERANE: Now at the time and subsequently up to the present time, the ANC is in an alliance with the workers' movement?
MR LALLA: Correct.
MR MOERANE: Did some of the targets have anything to do with an expression of solidarity with the workers' movement, the workers' struggle?
MR LALLA: Correct. In fact as I've reflected with the information that has been presented in the past two days that I would say that all the targets fell within the parameters of the policies and guidelines of the ANC and that I must take responsibility thereof.
MR MOERANE: Yes and finally in the area of command and control, for each target did there have to be some person or persons who were charged with the responsibility of authorising the particular target?
MR LALLA: Not necessarily. Although the commanders, in terms of as both Mr Mbongwa and Mr Ramlakan have indicated, although they had as commanders were able to provide the resources, the logistics and even referrals of targets, for example, because of labour action, the choice of the targets were sometimes and other times dependant upon the individual operative who reconnoitred the scene. The specific choice of the target. But they all fell, in this case, within the parameters of the ANC.
MR MOERANE: Yes, do I understand you therefore to be saying that incident number 17, that's the Chatsworth Magistrate's Court explosion, for instance, incident number 18, Minister Rajbansi’s house is damaged by limpet mine, the incident number 8, two mini-limpet mines exploded at OK Bazaars, limpet mine explosion, incident number 9, Game, incident number 10, Spar Foodliner, 27th September, incident number 11, incident at Checkers, incident number 12, Executive Hotel. I'll skip 13 for the time being and incident number 14, the Mobeni Post Office, incident number 15, VW Kombi, that you have heard about. Are you saying that all those were perfectly legitimate targets and they fell within the policy, aims and objectives of the African National Congress?
MR MOERANE: What I'm saying is that in the circumstances in which the individual operatives explained this, you must take into account that I came to know of the operations after it had happened but in the circumstances in which the individual operatives have explained it, I cannot distance myself from those operations because I was in command, I knew that arms were going into the country, I knew that trained personnel were going into the country and I'm saying in those circumstances, I would say they fell within the parameters of the ANC policy.
MR MOERANE: Yes, well as you know the Grosvenor Girls School incident was a bit of a mishap because the people who were going to plant that limpet mine got themselves blown up. In any event it appears that the intention was to disrupt the polling station?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR MOERANE: Had they succeeded in planting that device there and then at night before the polling would begin the following day, would that have been also within the policy?
MR LALLA: That is correct. I think what I must point out over here is that during my application process I've made specific references to me communicating with the individual commanders and if the individual commanders take responsibility of the operations that took place under their command then I will accept such responsibility. If Dr Ramlakan and Sihle have accepted responsibility and I have communicated with them to carry out operations, I'm saying I will accept that responsibility.
MR MOERANE: Yes, Sihle is also a doctor. No, no, Dr Dlomo, I'm sorry.
MR LALLA: Dr Dlomo, yes.
MR MOERANE: Yes. No further questions, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOERANE
MS MOHAMED: Chairperson, I have no questions, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS MOHAMED
MR LAX: Mr Govansamy, you look as if you are going to ask some questions, do I get it correctly?
MR GOVANSAMY: Yes.
MR LAX: Would you just state your full names for the record please?
MR GOVANSAMY: I'm Hugon Adam Gary Govansamy and I'm being assisted by my family friend, Clive Govender.
MR LAX: Just for the record, you are the brother of one of the deceased in incident one, is that correct?
MR GOVANSAMY: Yes.
MR LAX: Please continue?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GOVANSAMY: Raymond Lalla, we want to remind you that you are under oath. Remember there cannot be reconciliation without truth. We urge you to tell us the truth. I've been battling for sixteen years to find the truth. I come to the TRC regularly. I report on it. I speak to all kinds of people from comrades to the enemy to find the truth. If you don't want to tell us the truth we will oppose this application of yours, demand for your suspension from the Police Force where you are a very big man and demand that you be prosecuted and charged for murder.
Mr Lalla, do you know me?
MR LALLA: I've got to know you today.
MR GOVANSAMY: As head of Intelligence in this province, Police Intelligence?
MR LALLA: I don't know you, it's not my job. I mean I think we must not be paranoid to some degree, that expect how the old Police Services worked, we would work that way. But I'm aware of the circumstances around your family, I'm aware and like you are, you are also aware of my background as well.
MR GOVANSAMY: I'm still trying to find out some of your background.
MR LALLA: Okay.
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, why are you applying for amnesty?
MR LALLA: I am applying for amnesty - firstly, firstly let me just start off this. I think perhaps I can understand your apprehension, I can understand your anger, I can understand the questioning. I was in the Natal Command until 1985. I left in 1986, 1985, 1986. I left the Natal Command. Then there were a series of other people that were with those structures. When we came back home, unfortunately most members of that command were killed, were killed in one way or another and I had to try and pick up the pieces because I had to ensure that my colleagues, the comrades that I worked with will not be left out of the process of amnesty. I was aware of the incident, I'm not denying it.
MR GOVANSAMY: When did you become aware of this incident?
MR LALLA: I was aware of the incident I would say around about 1987. No, 1984 to I would say '84/'85. '85, early '85. I knew there was an explosion. I did not know the casualties. I was arrested in Swaziland and I was sent to Tanzania.
MR GOVANSAMY: For what?
MR LALLA: When we lived in the front-line State we were all regarded as illegal immigrants. We did not have - you must think of it as we were all regarded as refugees. The pressure on the South African Government on the front-line States to arrest us, detain us, harass us and if you go to track the Swazi Prison records, Police records, you'll be able to notice certain - in that period of time I was in Swazi jail and I was deported to Tanzania. I'm not saying at the time of the operation, I'm saying subsequently after that. I knew Rabbit went into the country. I knew there was going to be an operation. I'm not denying that.
MR GOVANSAMY: When did you decide to apply for amnesty?
MR LALLA: Sorry?
MR GOVANSAMY: When did you decide to apply for amnesty?
MR LALLA: I applied for amnesty in terms of the instructions of the ANC before the amnesty, on the basis of what my role as a commander, I applied for amnesty. I don't have the exact date but I would think it's in ...(intervention)
MR GOVANSAMY: You had the first application?
MR LALLA: The first application, yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: And then subsequently you applied after?
MR LALLA: Yes, which I mentioned in the hearing on the process.
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, you mentioned meeting Rabbit on two occasions in Shell House?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: And both those occasions you tried to get Rabbit to apply for amnesty. Why did it stop at two occasions?
MR LALLA: He told me he had applied for amnesty. What you must take into account, that now we were at home, there was no Umkhonto weSizwe, there was no structures, there was no commanded control. We are now left on our own to pick up the pieces. How do I have responsibility of an individual when the structure legally has folded?
MR GOVANSAMY: No, fair enough. Surely as a commander, as a man from Intelligence, whatever that may mean in your terms, ...(indistinct) people, surely in you have some recourse to finding those people again? Your soldiers, people who you put into place?
MR LALLA: I have said that I went to him, I told him to apply, he told me he had applied. In the process be there a year, two years later or three years later, I learnt he never applied because we were waiting for the process. On numerous occasions, through my lawyer, we tried to pressurise the TRC to bring these hearings as soon as possible. Now I can be held responsible to some extent. Maybe you can ask me the question, is that why didn't I come to you?
MR GOVANSAMY: I will come back to that, I will come to that at some stage.
MR LALLA: But I think it's important that we deal with it here because there are a lot of other people who have suffered and I'm think I'm not taking away the suffering from you and I fully share and I fully appreciate your circumstances. The reality was that do I pick and choose or do I wait for a legal process to take it's course. I took the choice for whatever right reasons, for whatever wrong reasons, to allow the legal process to take its course and that's what I have done.
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, we are talking about a process of reconciliation. How on earth do you expect me to believe you want to reconcile with me, which I totally believe in, I believe in the system of reconciliation. How do you tell me that you are waiting for this process to come sixteen years after the death of my brother? Eight years after you came back from exile, five years after we went to the TRC and made an application to say that we're looking for the persons responsible for this atrocious act. How do you tell me you're waiting for a process when Mrs Pillay here says she's got no food in the house to eat? How do you expect me to believe that you want to reconcile when you never cared about us?
MR LALLA: Well let me answer the question and once again I'm saying that I understand your anguish, pain and suffering. I think you must also understand that we have suffered a lot and perhaps nobody can equate the sufferings but everyone has suffered and I think reconciliation is a two way process as well. I think we can't have accusations put on one side and ignore the other. But what I want to explain to you over here, to put your mind at ease. I was released in 1990. I was in detention for about I think six, seven, eight months. I had moved out of the structure, I didn't know where the individuals who were in that former structure were based and I, in the process of time also decided to adopt an approach of say let the facts come out. I was not sure and I was honestly not sure whether by applying for these operations whether I am in fact - whether I should apply for amnesty for this operation. Why was I, I'm not sure. Our command was infiltrated in terms of the ANC submission, that Fear, the chief of operations, worked for the State. I was also aware that both Fear and Rabbit were detained by the ANC but I did not have the privilege of knowing what took place within those interrogations or interviews or whatever. Now what I'm saying to you, you must contextualise. This incident happened in 1984. 1984, I'm not sure?
MR GOVANSAMY: Yes.
MR LALLA: 1986 I'm out of the structure, I am now dislocated to Zambia. From Zambia I am tasked to go back into the country, not to go back but to go into the country in 1990 during the time when just for the court purposes of Operation Vula. I had cut off all links because of the way we operated and perhaps, unfortunately, if you were present yesterday, you would have seen how the structures, in fact the principle of need to know, how people would know where they were deployed, what they would know and how they would behave. So I lost contact with Rabbit and the Natal structures effectively from 1986 onwards. And - sorry?
MR GOVANSAMY: You say it's a two way process. You say it's a two way process, you are the perpetrator of the act, you must make that move to go and reconcile with the victims and the victim's family, the next-of-kin?
MR LALLA: I am doing it through this process but I didn't have, subsequently through all the TRC hearings, I wanted to me sure in my own mind. Is it do I apply for amnesty for this? What happened? And I will read here from the ANC's submission, appendix B
"Armed action for which targets category and/or responsibilities uncertain"
I was not sure and I will read the note on the aspect of car bomb at Victoria Embankment. It's on page 102 of the ANC's second submission to you, I'm not sure whether you're aware of it?
MR GOVANSAMY: I know of it.
MR LALLA: Right and I am saying at this stage I am in the same dilemma as you. I would like to know the truth but the truth to where I am is that I knew there was an operation planned. I did not know the specific targets, I also did not know tragically that your family and other civilians would be present at that scene at that particular time. I cannot explain that. I will not run away from my responsibility, I want to be honest to you and I want to be frank to you and I want you to understand that, that in fact the tragic situation is that both of us and I'm sure all my colleagues over here who worked in Butterfly, all of us want to know the truth about what happened in our command. But for the circumstances I'm saying I was there, I knew the operation and maybe the truth will take two years, maybe the truth will take five years, maybe the truth will take ten years. Maybe the truth is what I say today, I don't know, but what I say today is the truth as how I know it.
MR GOVENDER: Mr Lalla, when did you first become aware that Mr Ramsamy and his wife were killed and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we can have two people questioning him at the same time. You have not been placed on record and I don't think you can interrupt Mr Govansamy as you did. If he has finished his questioning, that's a different matter but at the moment he is the person responsible for the questioning and he was, we were told, being advised by you.
MR GOVANSAMY: Perhaps we should set the record straight, Mr Chairperson. Mr Govender is here to help me in this process and perhaps we should apply to the Committee to allow Mr Govender also to ask questions because my brother needs to ask questions as well.
MR LAX: Mr Govansamy, we don't want to limit you in any way but we also want you to bear in mind that some of the questions you're asking are not pertinent to the process of amnesty. I fully understand they're pertinent to a process of reconciliation and we accept that but we also are a Committee that has huge time limits on our work as you're well aware and I would urge you to try and stick to the issues relevant to the amnesty process as much as possible. I understand that you have your own agenda and I'm not wanting to detract from that but this may not be the appropriate forum.
MR GOVANSAMY: I don't have an agenda as you say, Sir, but I need to find the truth about a matter which is of close concern to me and my family, with a bit of respect.
MR LAX: Yes I understand, I do understand and that's why I'm urging you to couch your questions in a particular way that is germane to this application.
MR GOVANSAMY: Fair enough, thank you.
MR SIBANYONI: Or maybe another thing, if he interrupts you, these proceedings are going to be produced to be typed. Now the people who are producing it are not familiar to your voices, they wouldn't know that it's now the other brother, not the one who started asking. That's why it would be better if you finish and he then comes thereafter and then places himself on record.
MR GOVANSAMY: Thank you, I appreciate that.
Chappies Morabe, do you think we'll be able to find him at some stage?
MR LALLA: I am confident that he is in the Johannesburg area and you'll be able to find him.
MR LAX: Sorry, who is Chappies Morabe?
MR GOVANSAMY: Chappies Morabe, as I understand, is the person ...(intervention)
MR LALLA: Who is known as Rabbit.
MR GOVANSAMY: Better known as Rabbit.
MR LAX: Thank you, that helps us.
MR GOVANSAMY: Sorry.
MR LAX: I beg your pardon, it is here on page 1 of the summary.
MS CAMBANIS: Yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: How well did you know Fear and Rabbit.
MR LALLA: Relatively quite well. I worked with them from I would say 1981 I worked with Fear, Rabbit I got to know him around about '82/'83, round about that period but fairly well in the sense that I didn't know the background. They came into the ANC and we were told this is your structure, these are your colleagues and we worked and we respected each other. But if you're asking me about the family backgrounds and what have you, ...(intervention)
MR GOVANSAMY: I'm taking about their bona fides, political bona fides.
MR LALLA: Well at that stage, you must also take into account that we were also in a growing phase. It would have been difficult and impossible for me to question anyone bona fides at that stage because they could equally question mine.
MR GOVANSAMY: In terms of the target selections, did you trust them, being chief of intelligence?
MR LALLA: In terms of target selection and in terms of the way we operated in the ANC, I think one thing you must never misunderstand over here is that while we were in exile, in fact the comradeship of the way we got to know each other, even if we didn't know each other from a bar of soap, we had one thing that was uniting us, that one thing that was keeping us alive was to liberate this country and come back home. So the friendship we developed and the comradeship that we developed in those countries wherever we were and under difficult times and under difficult conditions, was something we just didn't look for a spook around every corner. We just, unfortunately the liberation processes, deals with trust, deals with winning over people and sometimes there were shortfalls. We made mistakes in our judgement, in our personal judgement. So if you're asking me did I trust Rabbit? Yes at that stage I did trust Rabbit, I cannot deny that.
MR GOVANSAMY: Sorry, one second Sir?
Do you think there was a shortfall in perhaps the selection of the target at Victoria Embankment?
MR LALLA: I have had subsequently, I tried to follow this thing up. I realise the pain all the families were undergoing and for me to come up over here and say that I'm leaving you an opening to tell the truth, is it that I'm reaching out to you. In relation to the target selection I was informed some years later. I'm saying some years later that the target was a military convoy that was going in both the incidences. In the incident in Victoria Embankment and Jacobs but unfortunately in my briefing and in my preparation for target selection I never did preparation for a moving target. All my preparation was about targets that were physically based at specific locations.
MR GOVANSAMY: Would you have regarded that particular incident as a success?
MR LALLA: No. No, I wouldn't have and I cannot even - it's beyond my wildest imagination if I regard both those incidences as a success. Something was wrong but I was aware of an aspect of it.
MR GOVANSAMY: The ANC wanted to claim responsibility for that particular blast. They told the media we'll issue a statement in a while. When the media contacted them, as I understand, the ANC refused to accept or deny responsibility. Do you know about that?
MR LALLA: I subsequently became aware of the confusion around the incident. But let me tell you how the communication system worked in the ANC, is that for example even if a bomb blast takes place in any place, some chief rep in Tanzania or some chief rep in Nigeria will be phoned and of course, at that stage, the tendency within our structures was that with a little information that you know of this, it was an ANC operation. So if you're asking me did I report to anyone it was an ANC legitimate structure or illegitimate structure, it was the responsibility of the commander at that stage who was Tami Zulu to report to the ANC structures. But what I want to reassure you, is that it would have been too quick if you understand the context of how we worked in the front-line States for us to deliver that message to perhaps the president of the ANC at that stage.
MR GOVANSAMY: You've chosen targets. Now your targets were in many instances soft targets, it was totally contradictory to the ANC policy. How do you explain this?
MR LALLA: I think you must substantiate. I think we went through a process over here where I tried to say how the structure unfolded and I've also tried to give you an understanding that I was at a particular level and that my level where I was I could make certain interventions but I must also appreciate the fact, as the structures, as the underground cell formation evolved, people in those operational situations would be able to explain the specific operations they have done. But for me to just comment on, that they were all wild targets, I think we're far from it. I think my colleagues and my comrades in the ANC have a proud track record of showing that under great pressure, under very, very great pressure that we have resisted that but the tragedy is that like in any war situation, whether it's in Europe, the unfortunate reality is that when Nazi Germany was bombed nobody asked questions. Unfortunately the whole German population were regarded as enemies. I'm not saying for one moment this happened in our case. What I'm trying to make you understand, the tragedy of conflict and the tragedy of war. For me to say to you that this is the ANC and there are clear
boxes and there are clear steps I think will be giving a very simplistic view of how the operational culture worked.
MR GOVANSAMY: Here again I'm talking about the whole reconciliation process. We made that submission at the TRC hearings.
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: When we went there, we said please come along, tell us what happened.
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: You never found the audacity to come to us and say Mr Govansamy, may I speak to your family?
MR LALLA: Mr Govansamy, Mr Govansamy ...(intervention)
MR GOVANSAMY: Hang on a moment, let me speak.
MR LALLA: You're asking three or four questions at the same time.
MR GOVANSAMY: No, no. Okay, answer the questions.
MR LALLA: Yes ...(intervention)
MR LAX: Sorry, what is the question if I may ask because ...(intervention)
MR GOVANSAMY: He's going to answer a question, ask him what he is going to answer.
MR LALLA: He asked me I never found time to visit his family.
MR LAX: What is the point you want to make Mr Govansamy because you've said this to him before already.
MR GOVANSAMY: Yes, I'm emphasising the fact that he didn't come forward. In other words they haven't claimed responsibility as yet for this particular incident.
MR LAX: But that's what this amnesty application is about, it's to claim responsibility for that and I understand that you may have in your own mind and heart a particular timing at which you would have liked that to have happened, but he has given you an answer as to why he didn't do it in the past and it's not going to help to keep asking the same question.
MR GOVANSAMY: It seems like Chappies Morabe, Rabbit, may have to be charged for murder?
MR LALLA: It seems so, yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: What are you going to do as head of Intelligence and this incident happening in your jurisdiction?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I'm very sensitive to the difficulties suffered by the families and I'm reluctant to interfere. Sir, this is an application for amnesty. The family member has indicated that he will oppose my client's application on the basis I assume of not disclosure in that he is lying. I'm not sure what he is supposed to be lying about. That hasn't yet been put, he hasn't told the full truth but I'm objecting to this question because what happens to persons who haven't applied for amnesty is really not within Mr Lalla's knowledge to comment and what his responsibility is to catch non-applicants, Chairperson.
MR LAX: All I can tell you, Mr Govansamy, is that there's a separate section of the National Directorate of Prosecutions based in Pretoria. One of the deputy directors of prosecutions is tasked with following up cases that emanate from this process and that is the appropriate authority to which to put that kind of question. It wouldn't be proper for Mr Lalla to disclose that kind of detail of his workings in his job here in this forum. You can appreciate that surely?
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Chairperson, I'm talking to you not as a lawyer, I'm talking to as a layman. It's very well to speak about the legal terms and all that goes with it because he's got a legal advisor, perhaps even he's got a senior counsel sitting next to him to advise him on this but I'm talking to you as an ordinary person. Will you help in bringing to book the people who committed this act? That's what I'm saying.
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR GOVANSAMY: Thank you. No questions for the time being, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GOVANSAMY
MR LAX: Mr Govender, is there anything you may want to ask?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GOVENDER: Just a few questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you put yourself on record? Your full names please?
MR GOVENDER: My full name is Clive Govender.
You said in your earlier testimony that this was the most disciplined organised formation and you were proud of them, yet you admit that the Victoria Street Embankment bombing was not a success so is it just possible that ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, can we just clarify? He was referring to that in relation to Operation Butterfly. That was the evidence, in relation to Operation Butterfly.
MR GOVENDER: Would that include Fear and ...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: These are separate incidents that he's testified, the two bomb attacks is not part of Operation Butterfly.
MR GOVENDER: I'm aware of that, what I mean is Fear and Rabbit, would you consider them organised, would you consider them well-disciplined?
MR LALLA: I think at the time, at the time when perhaps without hindsight about information and in our naiveté, I think the answer would be yes.
MR GOVENDER: You were quite young at the time that you were head of military intelligence, you would have been about 24, 25? Is that not an unusual age to become head of military intelligence?
MR LALLA: I can't comment on that.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, sorry, I'm going to have to object again. We're dealing with the South African history which has been repeated ad nauseam, people - we have all seen pictures of eleven year olds and nine year olds who were engaged in the struggle in the '70's who were killed. What the age is ...(intervention)
MR GOVENDER: Ma'am, with due respect, the reason I asked this is, I'm trying to establish whether Mr Lalla perhaps was too young at the time to have made decisions on military targets and that's why there were mistakes made?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, my objection stands.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't have to ask him, you know what his age is. It's on his application, you know what his age would have been at that time? If you wish to argue that someone at that age is too young to have made such decisions you can argue it.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, it was perhaps my fault, I'm one person who didn't ask how old Mr Lalla was.
CHAIRPERSON: Well it's on his application form.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Well it should be.
MR LAX: Mr Govender, if you want to put to the witness that he was too young to exercise the kind of judgement and authority that someone in that position may have - you can put it to him and then argue it in due course. He may comment on it.
MR GOVENDER: I'd just like a response on whether, with hindsight, do you consider yourself as too young perhaps at that stage to have made such a decision?
MR LALLA: In the struggle for national liberation, people made choices. They were choices at very young age. People died, people were killed, people made sacrifices and I for one moment do not doubt that perhaps in the context of greater military theory that perhaps I would have learnt more. But what I'm saying here is that if you question that, you have to take into account that I gave my life at a very young age to the national liberation of this country and I was prepared to do it at any cost. So I think my age in this matter perhaps to appease you to answer the question that the way you want it answered, I do not think I was too young. I think I made the right choices at a very early age to liberate this country.
CHAIRPERSON: If one compares your age with the other applicants you were by no means a young man, were you?
MR LALLA: No.
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Lalla, just for clarity sake, was it standard operating procedure to send your operatives to bomb ostensibly military targets without you knowing the specifics as a commander?
MR LALLA: As I reflected in both the situation of Butterfly and in this specific incidences, it was very hard for us to advise people on the ground which way to approach the target which we got. You must take into the account we were living outside, thousands of miles away and that the terrain, the operational situation changes and when there are opportunities to do such an operation, we would expect that the cadres that carried out the operation carry out with all the necessary precautions and that's my answer.
MR GOVENDER: You're saying you knew their military backgrounds, you trust their political bona fides. There was no communication between these operatives and yourself at the end of the day? They basically did - the target selection was their own selection?
MR LALLA: No.
MR GOVENDER: And there was no come back to you? You had no knowledge they would place this bomb on Victoria Embankment for example?
MR LALLA: I would know it after the fact. That's how all the modus operandis worked, is that in some cases perhaps some people under certain specific conditions could have preplanned certain operations that fell generally within the mandate of the special operations unit. But in the cases where we were developing cells and armed struggles and a lot of the responsibility lied on the individual and on his capacity to actually look at the vulnerable points at a specific target and to take that right decision at that right moment. I do not for a fact know that perhaps 6 o'clock in the morning would have been ideal, I could say in probabilities of generalities of in the sense, in a broad sense, that I would say we try and minimise civilian casualties but the person who will determine that would be the operative that actually does the situation, that carries out the operation.
MR GOVENDER: But you would have advised him or them, nonetheless?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR GOVENDER: That placing a bomb at 7.30 in the morning would endanger civilians particularly seeing that this was the rush hour, this was community traffic?
MR LALLA: Placing a bomb at any time would cause the loss of lives of civilians. I would say that to them. I would also say to them try and minimise - not minimise, try and avoid the loss of lives. But I have to understand the context and you have to understand the context that we - you can't limit war. War is something that no one can limit and it's something that all of us must hate but the tragic reality, we had to liberate this country and these were the forces that motivated me.
MR GOVENDER: Mr Lalla, when did you first become aware that Mr Ramsamy and his wife were killed and the fact that Mr Ramsamy was a black consciousness activist, a member of the BBC and SASOL?
MR LALLA: I would say round about '85/'86 at the time when he made the submission to the TRC.
MR LAX: Sorry, you said '85/'86, you mean ...(intervention)
MR LALLA: Oh, '95/'96. Sorry, sorry, my apologies.
MR GOVENDER: And according to your testimony you returned in 1990 so you would have - you first became - sorry, I've just lost the dates. When did you first become aware? In '94/'95?
MR LALLA: I knew there was an operation. I did not know the casualties of the operation but I came to know the casualties of the operation in 1995, I'm not sure when you made your submission, and 1996.
MR LAX: It would have been 1996. The Truth Commission only started working in this province from about April 1996.
MR LALLA: I would say 1996.
MR GOVENDER: I think what my colleague, Mr Govansamy, was trying to establish earlier is that you knew about it in '96, you knew about his submission to the TRC and it's taken you four years and you've never made any overtures towards his family, particularly seeing that this was an anti-apartheid activist that was killed by one of your operatives?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I object. He has answered this question at least on two previous occasions.
MR GOVENDER: Just for the sake of clarity?
MR LALLA: I think I've answered it in different ways. I think perhaps if you want to know why didn't I come to you ...(intervention)
MR GOVANSAMY: Particularly in this case, seeing as his brother was an anti-apartheid activist. You know even if he was a torturer, for example, then I'd understand your reluctance in seeking reconciliation, but here was an anti-apartheid activist who was killed, who was an innocent victim of a bomb by one of your operatives. So surely that reconciliation process should have taken place even sooner, the minute you found out for example, that's what I'm trying to establish.
MR LALLA: I understand your grief in this matter but I want to refer to my earlier - I was not sure whether this was a false flag operation, I was not sure whether it was an operation that went accidentally wrong, but what I'm sure is what I know and what I did was that I asked Rabbit to apply and I did not know at that stage his application, he did not send in an application. So what I'm saying is that I tried to pursue the matter about - I'm not sure, I think it's over a year ago, to find out what is happening about the case. I even pursued our lawyers, my lawyer. I also tried to put pressure on the TRC to facilitate in rushing up this thing so that perhaps it would help, but I found it slightly uneasy and hard and difficult to come up and say to one specific family and there are other people who have lost their lives and there are other people whose contributions I may not know about. So I thought the best thing to do was to come open, be truthful and open at a forum like this where everyone has the same sense of understanding as to what happened about the problem because my own experiences show me that sometimes you discuss with one individual here and one individual there and one individual there and there are various interpretations of these things and my own personal background, I thought this was the correct forum to raise it.
MR GOVENDER: Did you at any time send anyone to speak to the Govansamy family? Did you instruct anyone?
MR LALLA: I have approached people to speak to the family.
MR GOVANSAMY: Perhaps you can give the Commission details?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, Chairperson ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: This has nothing to do with his application for amnesty, that is what we are hearing?
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, if I can suggest, it's been mentioned that they do not have legal representation. Mr Mapoma is present. Perhaps if we could take an adjournment, Mr Mapoma would be able to instruct the family more fruitfully on how to proceed in opposing this application?
MR LAX: Can I make a subtly different suggestion that it certainly seems to me as a person observing this from a neutral position, for the parties to have a discussion would be a useful thing and to do that privately, perhaps with the other victims being present. I would certainly - and I've seen these processes work in other hearings. If you would all be willing, I would suggest that you do that as soon as we finish our proceedings today. It may be a much more intimate and useful exercise than trying to do it in the glare of the public eye where people find themselves unable to say things that they may be willing to say in private for a whole range of reasons. I would urge you to consider that possibility.
MR GOVENDER: We accept.
MR LAX: You'd be happy with that? Would you like to take a few minutes to discuss any other issues with Mr Mapoma that are material or relevant to the actual amnesty application itself? He may just give you some advice on the legal technical issues that you may want to raise or not raise as opposed to issues of reconciliation?
MR GOVENDER: That is why we said in the very beginning that we are not lawyers, ...(indistinct) reconciliation process.
MR LAX: No, no, we understand that. So I mean would it assist if we took a ten minute adjournment and you spoke to Mr Mapoma about that aspect?
MR GOVENDER: Perfect.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAPOMA: Mr Lalla, I understand that these two operations, that is the bombing of the Victoria Embankment and the car bomb in Jacobs are said to be operations of MK?
MR LALLA: Yes.
MR MAPOMA: And from your evidence you said the intended targets that you discussed was Victoria Embankment and a military base in Jacobs, am I correct?
MR LALLA: That's not correct.
MR MAPOMA: What is the correct position?
MR LALLA: I said I discussed fixed targets in and around the Durban and Pietermaritzburg area but I did not discuss any target about the Victoria Embankment.
MR MAPOMA: Okay. There are targets that you did make a list of, now when you were giving evidence in chief that they were discussed. I mean they were talked about. What are those targets if I may remind you?
MR LALLA: I think it was Natal Command, it was CR. Swarts, it was a military office in the Midlands area, it was the Bluff military base, it was the training college, a police training college in the Durban area and it was also some maintenance, army maintenance depot in the Jacobs area.
MR MAPOMA: Now ...(intervention)
MR LALLA: I'm sorry, in the Meerbank area.
MR MAPOMA: Okay. Nothing in the Jacobs area?
MR LALLA: No there were, I recall that we discussed the Police Training Base in the Jacobs area.
MR MAPOMA: Yes and that was agreed to be the target, well the legitimate target so to speak?
MR LALLA: What I will consider that all the targets that we highlighted were military and police targets and they fell within the parameters of legitimate targets within the ANC.
MR MAPOMA: Yes and now this car bomb, how far is it where it took place from the - I'm talking about the car bomb that took place on the 12th July 1984 in Jacobs on Bluff Road. How far was it from the target that was talked about in Jacobs?
MR LALLA: Okay, I wouldn't know offhand but I what I want to say is that I discussed the physical target and the operative subsequently has said that he hit a moving target, but what I'm saying here is that he determined the target itself.
CHAIRPERSON: I think you told us that you did not select any moving targets?
MR LALLA: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: The targets you selected were fixed?
MR LAX: Perhaps I could correct that? You didn't select any targets, you gave them a range of possible targets and intelligence about some of those targets, you also said there were others that you couldn't even remember that you may have discussed. But you made it clear, as I understood your evidence, that individual selection was to be done on the ground at the appropriate time?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR MAPOMA: Yes, you see I'm asking this question because I want to get it. What link is it, that you have, you yourself personally with these particular incidents? What liability can be attached to you?
MR LALLA: I think the liability as I explained earlier on is that I was aware of car bombs that were going to take place in the Durban area. I was aware of the individual who was going to - I discussed with him some targets. My liability stems from the fact that at the end of the day I cannot deny or I cannot lie and state that I was unaware of all these details and therefore I have no liability. I was aware that these operations were going to be conducted.
CHAIRPERSON: Does being aware give you liability?
MR LALLA: I think it's debatable, I won't try and tread onto some legal dynamics, I'm sure that you are more au fait with it, but in this particular situation is that I am also presently a Police officer and when a crime is committed and when you know that you conspired to commit a crime and suddenly half way along the line you say that no, I didn't do this but I did that. If there are three robbers going into a shop and one robber says "oh, it's the others, the three of them robbed the shop", at the end of the day what I'm trying
to put to the Commission is that I consider it in this case being aware, being actively aware of it, knowing the individuals, knowing that these operations did take place,
I consider it as having liability in the circumstances.
MR MAPOMA: And you knew of it only after these incidents took place, not before?
MR LALLA: I knew there was going to be a car bomb. I'm saying I knew beforehand there was going to be a car bomb.
MR MAPOMA: No, no, no, what I'm ...(intervention)
MR LALLA: What I'm not saying or what I concede is that I may not have known that this is the specific target but I knew there was going to be a car bomb or two car bombs.
MR MAPOMA: I see and Fear and Rabbit, were they reporting to you?
MR LALLA: No, Fear reports to Tami Zulu and Rabbit was reporting to Fear because Fear was the Chief of Operations.
MR MAPOMA: And naturally you did not instruct Fear and Rabbit to conduct these operations?
MR LALLA: No, that's not naturally. Well in a way I did not have any powers to instruct them as such but as being part of a grouping that conspired to carry out operations, I accept my share of responsibility in that process.
MR MAPOMA: I see and now from the victims point of view they want to find out that if your intended targets were fixed targets, how come then that moving targets were bombed?
MS CAMBANIS: Surely - sorry, Chairperson, I must object. Surely that is not a question properly put to Mr Lalla. Surely that is a question that can only be answered by the operative that was on the ground as Mr Lalla has explained repeatedly.
CHAIRPERSON: Unless Mr Lalla was told by the operative?
MS CAMBANIS: I think ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lalla, were you told why they decided to choose moving targets?
MR LALLA: No.
MR MAPOMA: And if your intended targets were fixed targets, how come that you take responsibility for that which was not intended?
MR LALLA: Because I knew there was a car bomb going into the country and whether the car bomb could have been either at a fixed place or here at mobile place, there could have been casualties.
MR MAPOMA: Can it be fairly put that these targets which were ultimately hit were in fact wrong targets?
MR LALLA: I think it's a bit difficult for me to answer that question. I think the best person to answer the question was Rabbit himself and Rabbit perhaps could provide some explanation as to why and whether the legitimacy of it or not, but in my personal opinion, looking from afar, a lot of civilians lost their lives and personally I'm not sure whether I can call it a legitimate target.
CHAIRPERSON: You say a lot of civilians lost their lives, were more than one cars involved in this car bomb?
MR LALLA: In the cases I'm talking about ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Victoria Embankment?
MR LALLA: And Jacobs. In the Victoria Embankment I think there were three people who lost their lives and in the Jacobs ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Well there were three killed and twenty injured according to the summary we have?
MR LALLA: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: So it would seem that there were a number of vehicles involved?
MR LAX: Sorry. I don't know if there were a number of vehicles involved but the bomb certainly injured a great many people. Do you know the specifics of that bomb? If we take the Victoria Embankment one, do you know how that bomb was manufactured and what went into it and what was actually used?
MR LALLA: All I know is that a remote control device was used to detonate the bomb.
CHAIRPERSON: I think while we're talking about this, we put on record that the Jacobs one killed five people and injured twenty seven?
MR LAX: Yes, what I'm asking is were there more than one car bomb?
MR LALLA: I think ...(intervention)
MR LAX: I mean in each incident?
MR LALLA: No, no, to my knowledge there were two separate car bombs on two separate days and at two separate places. So when I'm sort of responding, I'm unfortunately making the ...(intervention)
MR LAX: Making assumptions about what happened?
MR LALLA: Just giving the ...(indistinct).
CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell me, I may be wrong on this. As I understand car bombs, it means a car filled with explosive devices and a detonator or detonating device of some sort. It is not a simple bomb, the whole vehicle is part of the car bomb, a great deal of explosives can be used?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: Mr Lalla, while Mr Mapoma is busy. As I understand it, looking at the generality of what you're applying for, to put it very simply, you were part of a team that briefed an operative or operatives?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: You sketched the policy parameters, you sketched some of the detail of potential targets?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: And you gave them a general instruction to go in and do what soldiers do?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: And for that you're taking responsibility?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did you go further than that? I also see that arrangements were made to supply the firearms, explosives or whatever was needed?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: Yes, when we use the word "you", you and the rest of your command structure?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR LAX: That's how I understand your application?
MR LALLA: That is correct.
MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, I have no further questions but I would like just to place it on record at this point that when time comes for the case for the victims I have got one of the victims who wants to make a statement before the Committee, addressed to the applicant. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA
MS CAMBANIS: No re-examination, thank you Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS
CHAIRPERSON: I take it that in the light of what we've just been told you are not asking for this applicant to be excused at this stage?
MS CAMBANIS: No. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any more evidence?
MS CAMBANIS: No, that is the entire evidence in relation to this applicant's application, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that concludes all the evidence led on behalf of applicants in connection with what I think should be regarded as one series of applications. Do you agree, Mr Mapoma? Do you agree that we consider all those applications as one, one of a series?
MR MAPOMA: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And that the question now becomes, do the victims or implicated parties wish to give evidence, make
representations or anything of that nature and you have informed that at least one of the victims wishes to give evidence?
MR LAX: Or to make a statement.
CHAIRPERSON: Make a statement or give evidence, which is it.
MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, I'm calling Mrs Pillay to the stand. She's a mother to one of the deceased persons.
MR LAX: Mrs Pillay, do you want to make a statement under oath or do you just want to make a statement from where you sit? It's up to you?
CHAIRPERSON: He said he is calling her.
MR LAX: Your answer please?
MRS PILLAY: I want to speak to Mr Lalla.
MR LAX: You just want to make a statement to Mr Lalla without taking the oath? You've not going to testify as such?
MRS PILLAY: No.
MR LAX: Could we just have your full names for the record please?
MRS PILLAY: Mrs G Pillay.
MR LAX: G for?
MRS PILLAY: Govindamma Pillay.
MR LAX: Would that be G-O-V-I-N-D-A-M-A-H?
MRS PILLAY: M-M-A.
MR LAX: M-M-A?
MRS PILLAY: Yes.
MR LAX: Please go ahead, Mrs Pillay?
MRS PILLAY: Mr Lalla, I would like to ask you these questions but I don't want to do it because already Mr Govansamy asked you so it's senseless me asking you the same thing over and over. You know I've lost a son at the age of 18 in a bomb blast. When I saw it over the T.V. I didn't realise that it was my son because I saw him split, not realising that it was my son. But afterwards, after he didn't return home I went looking for him and I couldn't find him but the next thing they said I must go to the mortuary but unfortunately I couldn't go, the members of the family and my husband went. But it was so bad, because I saw it on the T.V. and I knew that when they came back and they told me, I said I saw my son the way he was split because the bomb was so heavily - and after they said okay, they must arrange for the funeral. They arranged for the funeral but my heart was so sore. I don't know what they raked up whether it was my baby, my son or whether it was just stones because it was sealed in a box. In any case we did his funeral. At that point of time I was actually battling, I had to stop my son from school to go and work and support me and there were twin boys. I'm not saying you were blamed for the other boy also. After three years my other son was murdered. That's his twin brother. He was also murdered and up till today I never get the killer and neither for the first one but today only I got to see you after sixteen years. My pain is brought all back, my memories, losing those two boys. I want you to tell me what am I supposed to do because I don't have no sons. Every parent has a hope in their sons. In my case I don't have a son, I don't have a husband that is working. What am I supposed to do? I want you to tell me what am I supposed to do in a case like this.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, with your indulgence if Mr Lalla would like to respond to the family member?
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chairperson.
MR LALLA: To both Mr and Mrs Pillay and to the Govansamy family and to others. You'll have experienced tragic loss and tragic set of circumstances in terms of your well being and I wish I could find answers but all I want to say to all of you, I apologise for your personal loss and it's very difficult for me to express it but I'm honestly and deeply sorry. Thanks.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I on behalf of the Committee and I am sure on behalf of every person in this hall extend our deepest sympathies and wish that we could do more to comfort you in your tragic circumstances. You will always be in our thoughts and in our hearts and I wish you to think of that.
MR MAPOMA: There's another next-of-kin who wants to make a statement, Chairperson.
MR CHETTY: Mr Chairperson, my name is Ramsamy Stanley Chetty. I am the brother of the victims of the Victoria Embankment car bomb blast and I wish to make certain comments of what I observed and statements made by my colleague, Director Lalla.
Sir, it is sad, very, very sad to know that I've been a member of the Police Services for the last 23 years. On the day of the incident I had to go to work, pass that point where the explosion took place. On questioning my colleagues who attended that scene, I was informed that it was blacks and a white person that was killed.
I went to work on that particular day. My mother phoned me at work and she told me "son, this is problem, your sister-in-law was killed in a bomb blast". I reckon "no Ma, no Indians are killed in that bomb blast." I asked the whereabouts of my brother and was informed that he was missing. I told her I'll get back to her. I then contacted my brother who was a journalist later in the evening and he confirmed only by identifying the
sandwiches and the tie that my brother had worn, that it was in fact my brother and his wife that were killed.
Mr Lalla, I personally think that you or your comrades had placed the bomb at the Police Station that I was working in which was 150 metres away from that place that you placed the bomb blast. My parents, who have now died because of all the grieving and the loss of my brother and sister-in-law, would have accepted that I was a policeman, I was a target and I worked for the so-called apartheid government of the time.
Furthermore, Mr Lalla, like you say you were a fighter, you wanted a change in this country. You wanted a change in this country with the intention of putting yourself and bettering yourself in the environment that you are working today. Mr Lalla, you've joined an organisation which was an anti-public organisation a so-called black organisation. But Sir, you are now eating the bread and butter of those people that died in this country and put yourself as a director of the South African Police Services, now making decisions for these people, here in front. You are making decisions for the Commissioner and his assistants. Mr Lalla, I am Inspector Chetty of Phoenix Police Station. Sir, tomorrow if I am working in execution of my duties, you are going to come and say charge Inspector Chetty for shooting that man. You are going to give an instruction. But who is now going to instruct that you be charged, your colleagues be charged? You have taken a decision, Sir. You have taken a decision outside the country to now tell your members go and use these targets. You had no control over your men. When I say you had no control over your men, your men did not comply with your instructions. I've spoken to one of your colleagues just now, outside. He asked me who was involved? Well it was my brother and sister-in-law. He asked me what would you have done or how are you going to accept the apology from Director Lalla? I reckon I will not accept his apology. I personally will not accept his apology because he said if my mother was killed - your colleague, your comrade said if his mother was killed or his brother was killed he will never accept their apology or he will never forgive the next person.
Sir, I am absolutely surprised how you are a policeman. You had no respect for the human being. You say in terms of war you expect lives to be lost. In terms of war the people of the country is informed that there is a turmoil in the country. You had no decency. You had no respect. I, myself, in the presence of the Commission, Sir, I don't feel that Mr Lalla should be given amnesty. He knew a long time ago that he is sitting in ...(indistinct) today. He met his friend, his colleague, his comrade on two occasions. He told him he hasn't applied. What was his duty? He was head of the organisation. He gave him instructions then to go and place the bomb at a certain place which he complied with. He has total control of him. The ANC is no more a banned organisation but the ranks still stand. I don't understand how Mr Lalla is going to police the whole of Kwa-Zulu Natal. To me, Sir, I personally say to my brothers, my families, to Mr and Mrs Pillay, my heart goes out to them. I am aware, I accept I was a policeman and I happen to be and I accept it. My brothers have accepted it but not the innocent going on the street.
Mr and Mrs Green's family or the late Mrs Green's family, I sympathise with them as well. But Mr Lalla, with all due respect Sir, even though you're my boss I cannot forgive you for what you have done and let's hope this doesn't have an effect on my job as a policeman. Thank you very much.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I understand that emotions are running high but the last comment was totally uncalled for and I would like this person to consider retracting and apologising for that.
MR LAX: Perhaps let's just leave it in the understanding of the emotional state at the moment?
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much.
MR LAX: Perhaps if we could just explain to you, Sir, that the process of amnesty is a voluntary one. Nobody can be forced to apply for amnesty. Everyone who has applied for amnesty have done so in the full will that if they comply with the requirements of our statute, that they may be granted amnesty, so I just want you to understand that.
MR RAMSAMY: Sir, if I can recall? In the opening statements of Director Lalla, he informed the enquiry that it is due to his overseers, his seniors, to come out and claim amnesty for the explosions in the Durban area, that is why he come out. He wouldn't have come out, Sir, on his own free will. It seems because he has been pressurised and failing to lose his seat as a Director in the Police Services, he has come here now to ...(intervention)
MR LAX: That wasn't his evidence, you may have understood it in that way but that wasn't his evidence. But again, on behalf of my colleagues and I, as we've already said we really do convey our deepest sympathies. We can't tell you how to respond. We just hope that you will find peace in your own heart.
MR RAMSAMY: Thank you Sir.
MR GOVANSAMY: Mr Chairperson, it is a difficult situation. I find myself - I'm sure you've seen me at these TRC hearing before, writing stories about other people, how they cry and I had instances where people cried when I wrote stories about other victims. They heard it and they cried. It is sad that in our family, I was left-wing, I had people here, my brother who was a policeman looking for a piece of bread, working, because that's the only job he could have found at the time and they were indoctrinated as well to believe that the ANC cadres or my comrades, as I call them, were fighting a just war, were not fighting a just war, that they were terrorists. I understand that. I supported the liberation struggle personally. I understood that people get killed in the cross-fire. I made those statements before. I made those statements at the time when my brother died. I had the guts to do so. My father worked for the railways earning a pittance and when he died twenty years and six months after my brother because he used to pass that place every day with his bicycle, he was a labourer. He worked for the railways for twenty years. They gave him R2000. I told other comrades, people who, emissaries which Mr Lalla sent to force me to ask me what do I intend doing in this hearing. They did that at the eleventh hour to ask me not to be too harsh on Mr Lalla, Mr Lalla is a comrade. Mr Lalla I've known from the 1970's. His comrades here will vouch for that but he wouldn't because it suits him not to.
Mr Green was sitting here in the morning, he was about the only white man, a victim sitting here. He was so frustrated with the process, he went down. He is a cripple man. He went down. We were going to have a meal. When I saw him standing as a lone ranger. He was standing alone. I went to him, I said "Mr Green, can I give you something to eat?" He said "no, no, I'm fine." He says "I'm so fed up with the situation, I want to go away. I don't want to see. I want to scream" he said to me. We wouldn't have had a situation like that here if people in the hierarchy of the ANC, an organisation which I supported, wouldn't have had a situation today if people like this here went and apologised to the families then. They knew who the victims were. They cannot for the life of me tell me, working in intelligence and they don't know who the victims are. Then you shouldn't be in intelligence. We wouldn't have a situation here where this mother will tell us she's got no food in the house to eat, her breadwinner, her son who she had stopped from working, from schooling, to go to work. You can object as much as you like. Let me say what the people think here. It's okay for you, you've got lawyers on your side. We can't afford lawyers. My mother and father had to borrow money to have the biggest funeral ever in the Indian Community in Phoenix when my brother died and my sister-in-law died. I had to work, I couldn't find a job. I was an activist, nobody would give me a job. But none of you cared because you live in a white area, you earn a fat salary. It's a fact. I'm a journalist, I know.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, unfortunately I have to fulfil these predictions, I am going to object at this stage. I think that it has already been canvassed. Mr Lalla has said what he can about these incidents and the defamatory comments that are going on here is just not acceptable no matter what degree of emotionalism.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think they are relevant to the application.
MR GOVANSAMY: But Sir, if we had solved this problem earlier this wouldn't have happened. Thank you very much.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought we had arranged, my colleague Mr Lax had arranged, that you were going to have a meeting to attempt to solve problems. From what we've heard in the last ten or twenty minutes it seems that would be pointless.
MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, there is no further witness but I think, Chairperson, for the sake of all the victims that are here it's important that I must make mention of this, that there are a number of, a lot of victims who have come here to attend to this hearing. Not all of them as reality allows have come to make statements to Mr Lalla and in any event, Chairperson, I must make it clear, whatever they had to say to him did not have any bearing to his application for amnesty, but they would simply show the Committee how they suffered as a result of that action and for that reason, therefore, I will not be calling them but I want all of them, even those who did not speak, that they must be aware that the Committee is going to have a list of all of them and they are going to be referred to the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the TRC for whatever had to be done. Thank you.
MR GOVANSAMY: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, if I may just one moment? My brother's wife's brother, my sister-in-law's brother is here. I'm sure he will understand because his family also suffered greatly in this here and I want you to understand that. I don't think he'll want to say anything more. Thank you very much.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. That concludes the evidence in connection with these applications, does it?
MS CAMBANIS: It does, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: The question now arises as to what procedure we should now follow. It is ten to four. I think Mr Moerane will have to kick the ball into play. He started proceedings. Do you wish to start an address now, Mr Moerane?
MR MOERANE: Chairperson, I'd prefer to hand in a written submission tomorrow morning.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, unfortunately I don't think that I have the facility or that time will assist me in my arguments. I don't know if I can now.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I think it would be fair to say after you have seen the written submission you can address argument.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Does that apply to you?
MS MOHAMED: Yes Chairperson, that suits me as well.
CHAIRPERSON: So we'll hear argument from all of you tomorrow morning, except one of you who will let us have it in writing. What I would like to say though, is as I've said at the beginning of this hearing and I want to repeat. We would require all of you to let us have, in writing, the precise details of what you are seeking amnesty for. That is that if we do grant your application and make an order, we want you to set out precisely what you want stated in that order and you have said you will give us a summary, well a list of all the victims?
MR MAPOMA: Those who turned up, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Those are the ones you've had contact with and they will be set out in regard to the incidents they were involved in?
MR MAPOMA: Yes.
MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, may Mr Lalla be excused from attending the proceedings further, please?
CHAIRPERSON: If you've got all the information you require from him.
MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: It would also help if those of you who are not giving written argument could give us a list of the names of people you are going to refer to. We have endeavoured to write all the names down but I'm not sure that I have got them all and that I have spelt them correctly. So if you could just give us the names of people you are going to refer to, we will be obliged. Thank you.
What time tomorrow? 9 o'clock? We will adjourn now till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.
WITNESS EXCUSED
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
