TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
DAY 1 - 12 AUGUST 1996
AMNESTY APPLICATION
EUGENE MARAIS
MR WILKINSON: The third applicant, Mr Eugene Marais.
EUGENE MARAIS: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR WILKINSON: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Marais on the 9th of October 1990 you committed an offence which led to a violation of human rights. A few days later you were arrested. Who arrested you?
MR MARAIS: By the security police.
MR WILKINSON: Was there a specific branch involved?
MR MARAIS: The people who arrested us are known as the special rights investigation unit as we understood it. That was a branch of the murder and robbery unit which investigated political matters.
MR WILKINSON: Now in terms of what legislation were you arrested?
MR MARAIS: The day after we were arrested we were informed by the security police that we were being held under Section 29 and also Section 29 of the Internal Security Act for a period of about 96 days.
MR WILKINSON: Did you - you immediately pleaded guilty?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: On what charges did you plead guilty?
MR MARAIS: There were seven charges of murder, 27 attempted murder and the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition.
MR WILKINSON: You received clemency from the State President?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: And you also applied previously for indemnity in terms previous legislation’s?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: Why were these not successful?
MR MARAIS: The crimes which we were charged with took place on the 9th of October 1990. During November of 1990, during negotiations between the ANC and the then National Party Government, The Pretoria and Groote Schuur Minutes were issued and it was decided that amnesty would be granted for crimes which had taken place before the 8th of October 1990.
MR WILKINSON: So today you are before this Committee to apply for amnesty, not only for the murder charges but for the other charges?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: Thank you. Your history, your links with right-wing politics?
MR MARAIS: These are part of the application.
MR WILKINSON: In your own words, step by step, please tell us step by step what happened on the 9th of October which led to this incident.
MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman, I really only began to become interested in politics in 1980 while I was at university in Bloemfontein. That year there was a general election, and we as students were recruited to help with this election. Former Minister Kobie Coetzee stood there for the National Party and I served in his team to work on voting day. In fact he won that election and that was a great pleasure for all of us.
After that I went to the defence force for my national service. In 1983 there was a referendum. We were in the defence force and we had a very restricted knowledge of what was going on outside. On a particular morning we were told here’s a referendum, you’re are in the defence force, you vote for the Government so you must say "Yes".
And so then I did vote yes without really knowing what was going on. After the completion of my national service, I became increasingly involved in politics and particularly right-wing politics. It became very clear to me that what the National Party had promised before the referendum of ’83 had not been complied with or achieved. On the contrary, certain things that they said, they had gone on to do precisely the opposite. This upset me greatly and I listed increasingly to and became increasingly involved in the Conservative Party and in conservative politics.
I joined them, and in the next election I worked for them. I canvassed for them and went from house to house and I also acted as an electoral agent on various occasions. In about 1987 I was approached by a friend who invited me to an AWB meeting. I attended it and I found it most interesting.
What was said there was very interesting, and it was precisely reflected my feelings and I became convinced that I should join the AWB and I did so. I also progressed in the AWB. At Kempton Park I even became the leader of the so-called Burgerraad. In 1990 I moved from Witwatersrand to Richards Bay where I began my own business.
I became acquainted with a person, and from our conversation it became clear that he was a member of the AWB and that is how he introduced himself to me. A little while later he introduced me to Mr Botha as the local leader/Kommandant of the AWB.
MR WILKINSON: Who was this person who introduced him?
MR MARAIS: That was Mr van Wyk. I discussed the situation with Mr Botha and because I had a business and I was dependent on business from the public and large business enterprises, I decided that I didn’t want to act in public as a member of the AWB. In other words I didn’t want to be visible, but I would make myself available for anything which he had to do for me - had for me to do.
We thought this was a good idea, because at that stage the AWB had been so infiltrated by the security police that I thought there were more security police than others in the AWB. I attended an AWB meeting in Richards Bay, incognito because I was a photographer and I went there without a uniform and I took photos and I looked like any other person attending. It gave me the opportunity to be there. During September 1990, Mr Botha approached me - excuse me?
MR WILKINSON: What was Mr Botha’s rank in the AWB?
MR MARAIS: He was a Kommandant, also the local leader of the AWB in Richards Bay.
MR WILKINSON: Did he regularly visit your business?
MR MARAIS: He visited me very regularly. We discussed politics frequently when we had the opportunity. Obviously I was running a business and sometimes clients were present and we either moved to the back of the shop or waited till the people had left, but politics was definitely on the agenda.
MR WILKINSON: When Mr Botha visited the shop, how did he greet you?
MR MARAIS: If the situation justified it and it was possible and the public wasn’t present, I would greet him in a military way and addressed him as Kommandant.
MR WILKINSON: So did you have any doubt about his leadership position in the AWB?
MR MARAIS: During September 1990, Mr Botha approached me. He told me about the Orde Boerevolk - more or less what it was about, what the objectives were, and he handed me a form - one which you’ve already seen. I filled it in and signed it. After that about two or three weeks passed and then it was the 9th of October. I didn’t listen to the news on the radio in the morning, but it was about half past eight when Mr Botha came to my shop.
He was very upset and he asked me if I had heard what had happened in Durban. I said I hadn’t, and he told me. Immediately I switched on the radio, and for the rest of the day I listened to every news bulletin.
MR WILKINSON: May I interrupt you? Everybody who visited you in the shop that day, the ordinary people - that’s what everybody was talking about that day in Richards Bay, it was about this attack in Durban?
MR MARAIS: That’s right it was big news. Everybody was very upset and literally every person whom I met then and in the days afterwards was talking about it. I just want to make it clear - I heard in the previous testimony, previous evidence to the "alleged" PAC members. You must understand that on that day, we were reacting to news reports on the media.
The first report I listened to that morning referred to members of the PAC breaking into a shop, stole knives and summarily attacked Whites. In other words it’s not that we - hadn’t heard that it was possible, or hoped that it might be so - this is what we believed happened and that was how the news was relayed to us. For the rest of the day I saw Mr Botha a couple of times. He told me that I should come to his home that evening, and that is what I did.
MR WILKINSON: What did you take with you?
MR MARAIS: I brought my rifle.
MR WILKINSON: What kind of rifle was it?
MR MARAIS: An AK47.
MR: WILKINSON: Where did you get the AK47?
MR MARAIS: I’ll just have to take you back. In 1988 or thereabouts, I was attending an army camp. We, in cleaning-up operations in Kempton Park area, we went to a shebeen and while we were raiding the shebeen we came to a squatter camp. It was pretty well hidden, you couldn’t see it from anywhere, it was only when we were on top of it that we noticed it, so I believe that very few people were aware of the place.
The local residents saw us approaching because we were in uniform and in military vehicles and so they fled. We did a sweeping operation in the squatter camp and we found a number of items, things such as typewriters and various equipment - a tremendous amount of equipment. At a particular stage I entered a shack. I was alone. There was a plastic sheet under the bed on the ground. I picked it up and under that there was a bag - a plastic bag, and I found inside it an AK47 with magazines and ammunition.
Because I am quite a rifle enthusiast I wanted to keep this weapon to myself and I didn’t want to tell anybody about it, and I took the rifle and I hid it in the grass outside, it was quite near the main road. That afternoon we returned from the camp. At that stage we could go home every second evening. I went to my car and went to pick up the AK47 and I took it home.
MR WILKINSON: So that’s the firearm that you took to Mr Botha’s home that evening?
MR MARAIS: That is correct. On the 9th of October in the evening I arrived at Mr Botha’s house with the firearm. There I met Mr Smuts and I was introduced to him. Mr Botha said then, now that the three of us had met, had come together there were enough people present to take the oath of allegiance to the Orde Boerevolk.
MR WILKINSON: What was the oath of allegiance?
MR MARAIS: I don’t have it in front of me, I can’t quote it but the form has been distributed.
MR WILKINSON: What can you say off the cuff?
MR MARAIS: It says that you are committed to the Orde Boerevolk. Basically that you declare war against the National Party Government and that you would strive to bring it down. Furthermore that any organisation or party or person who should stand in the way of the ideals of the Boerevolk should be combated within all one’s ability. It goes on to say that one - we should not inform on one another and that no secrets should be revealed to anybody about the Orde Boerevolk or anything connected with it.
MR WILKINSON: So the purpose of the meeting was to make the existing relationship more formalised?
MR MARAIS: That is correct. During our meeting at Mr Botha’s house it was decided that there should be a reaction to the events of that morning in Durban. At that stage there wasn’t a precise decision on what action we should take. The feeling, however, was that what had happened in Durban that morning had signs of what we were actually fearing - that the conflict would increase and ... [intervention]
MR WILKINSON: May I interrupt? Mr Botha was a Kommandant in the AWB?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: Did you ever dispute his role as a leader in the Orde Boerevolk?
MR MARAIS: As I said, we thought that what we feared and what had been propagated at right-wing meetings of that time namely, that the day would come when Black on Black violence would - that we are so well acquainted with in this country would move to Black on White violence. We also saw it as a direct consequence of the National Party Government’s decision on the 2nd of February 1990, to unban the so-called liberation movements and to free the present President.
We believed that this would not only lead to the destruction of the Afrikaners, but that it would also cause violence and we would be literally obliterated. At that stage we thought that what had happened after colonialisation, or after decolonisation in other African countries, Uhuru - that would happen here. We got into the car and left for Durban.
On the way we decided amongst ourselves that we would have to identify a suitable target. That sounded like a good plan, that we should attack a minibus taxi. We arrived in Durban and we saw a taxi and followed it. We followed it into a residential area, but the circumstances were not conducive to a successful attack, so we abandoned the plan.
We turned round. It was very late and we were about to go back to Richards Bay - we presumed at that stage that we wouldn’t find a target because the next day was going to be a public holiday and there wouldn’t be anybody left in town.
We stopped at a petrol station to buy cooldrink, at that point a bus drove past and it seemed to us to be a suitable target. We followed the bus, and on a quiet road where there were no other cars, we overtook the bus. Mr Botha gave the command "Fire" and we shot at the bus. ... [intervention]
MR WILKINSON: If Mr Botha hadn’t given the order "Fire" do you think you Smuts would have fired?
MR MARAIS: No, we would not because we were under his direct command and we were engaged in a military operation, one does not use one’s own initiative - one does not do what one feels like on a military operation. We fired, we passed the bus. About five hundred meters further up we turned around and we passed the bus again. We got onto the highway, the freeway N2 North and we returned to Richards Bay and we arrived back at about four in the morning.
MR WILKINSON: Why did you launch such an attack on the same day and in Durban?
MR MARAIS: The entire idea of the operation was - let me put it like this, rather - our operation was entirely a reaction to what we believed was a PAC on Whites that morning. In other words, what I am trying to say is that we didn’t have a party that night and then decide, oh, let’s go shoot a few people. We wouldn’t have done it the previous evening or the following morning. What we did was precisely a reaction to the morning’s events.
MR WILKINSON: So the offense was for no other reason than as a reaction?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: Why didn’t you rather demonstrate with posters and placards at the PAC’s offices?
MR MARAIS: We believed at that stage, and I want to underline this, that this was the beginning of the onslaught against Whites. We could see afterwards that there were a number of attacks, and we all know about this which became worse and worse. We knew that it wouldn’t help to demonstrate.
At that stage I believed, I truly believed that a peaceful solution was not possible in this country. And co-operation among the people in this country was not possible and that the Whites - the Afrikaners, the Boer - that they were all confronted with - with obliteration.
MR WILKINSON: The time of the attack, that was the PAC liberation organisation - were you aware that they had registered as a political party?
MR MARAIS: Yes, I am aware of it.
MR WILKINSON: Can you say about when it happened?
MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman, I can’t - in any case it was before 1994 election. You must understand that at that stage, from 1991 we were in prison so we weren’t acquainted with the news.
MR WILKINSON: But in 1990, that obviously was very revolutionary?
MR MARAIS: Yes, we were very fully aware that day of statements. I’m not just talking about us, the media werefull of this at that time. A great deal of attention was given to the fact that these people were shouting "Kill the Boer, kill the farmer" and when they finished that, they said "One settler, one bullet" and for us that could only mean one thing. And at that stage I felt like a settler and we were referring to ourselves at that stage as Boere.
MR WILKINSON: And the Afrikaner community then felt very threatened?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR WILKINSON: Now linking up with my previous question - why these innocent victims?
MR MARAIS: You must understand, Mr Chairman that the bus - the victims that evening - they weren’t the true end. They were perhaps the means to the end, it was a suitable target. We didn’t go out with the intention of shooting a bus full of people, we wanted to make a political statement. To strike a blow in the struggle which our people were waging at that stage.
MR WILKINSON: Thinking back now - with a an armchair view - do you think you would have succeeded?
MR MARAIS: It’s difficult to say, but I - I believe not, because at that stage our aim - we were aware that the road that South Africa was on, was the full democracy that we have today. We knew at that stage that we were on the way to a multi-party democratic election. We reacted against that and that’s the message, that we rejected that, that the Government of the day, the National Party Government was on the wrong path.
That was not what the White Afrikaners of the country wanted and I don’t believe we succeeded because in view of the election, even if you tried to stop it with bombs - that election in 1994 - it did take place.
MR WILKINSON: If I recall correctly, the press at that stage reported that one White would die as a result of that attack. You took seven lives. How can you justify that?
MR MARAIS: It has already been testified that the Orde Boerevolk’s policy has been mentioned, that if one White should die in organised political violence, then ten Blacks would have to die in response. Today I can say that on that day we didn’t decide when we left Richard’s Bay that we would should ten Black people. We looked for a suitable target. Thinking back from today’s perspective, I can ascribe it to nothing else but fate that seven people died.
MR WILKINSON: Why do you say that?
MR MARAIS: Although we shot with automatic assault rifles and because of the conflict of the past we were fully aware of the destructive abilities of such weapons. You must understand that when we attacked, it was at night. The stretch of road was pitch dark, there were no street lights. We were shooting at a moving target from a moving vehicle. We were shooting blindly into the night.
Anybody who knows anything about automatic arms, is that when you use such a weapon, the barrel climbs, in other words you don’t shoot straight. The longer you shoot, the higher you shoot. The duration of this attack, because we shot with automatic weapons, and if one looks at the rate at which these rifles fire, this attack took about two and a half to three seconds. What I am trying to say is that we couldn’t predict - we couldn’t foresee that seven people would die - it could have been more, it could have been fewer.
MR WILKINSON: If you were quite aggressive in carrying this out, why didn’t you stop and shoot at an even more helpless bus?
MR MARAIS: That’s the point I am making. We didn’t set out to shoot people, we went to make a political statement. If we’d wanted to kill people on a large scale, if we wanted to create large-scale destruction, we could have shot at the taxi. We would probably also have hit homes and pedestrians. That’s been testified already and I want to repeat it because the person who’s asked the question - it seems to me, didn’t understand it at all. In a taxi there is a terribly high concentration of people sitting close to one another. In a bus they are more widely dispersed, there’s more space between the people.
If we wanted to kill more people we could have stopped there. We could have because at that stage when we passed the bus again when the bus was standing still and the people had already begun to get out, we could have fired at them again. We could have gone and looked for another target, but we didn’t.
MR WILKINSON: Did you have any bullets left in your magazine that evening?
MR MARAIS: Yes, I did.
MR WILKINSON: I know this is a difficult question - how many bullets did you have? Can you remember?
MR MARAIS: We had approximately eighty rounds between us in magazines, and as far as I know, in total, I think 32 two rounds were fired.
MR WILKINSON: In a matter of seconds, and that’s between the AK47 and the FN.: Are there any other facts that you want to reveal to the Committee today about this incident?
MR MARAIS: No, I’ll answer questions.
MR WILKINSON: Is there anything you want to say in addition?
MR MARAIS: What is your political view?
MR WILKINSON: I can put it to the Committee like this. My arrest was a shock, it was the first time in my life that I had a clash with the law. I literally, before that I had never even got a traffic ticket. The Section 29 detention period - during that time I was in tremendous conflict - I was wrestling with myself and I came to the view that we had done something terribly wrong, and I also realised after conversations with a number of people that violence was not the solution to this country.
And that truly it could lead to the obliteration of all the people in this country, and not only the White Afrikaners. After our detention under Section 29 I was granted bail. On the first opportunity after that I broke off my membership of all right-wing political parties, and since then I have had no political alignment.
MR WILKINSON: Why was it necessary to do that?
MR MARAIS: The most important reason for that was that I realised that I had done something tremendously wrong, and I knew that I hadn’t done it entirely of my own volition. I felt if that’s what they wanted me to do, then I didn’t want anything more to do with them.
MR MARAIS: Do you think the retribution and revenge and victimization are the key to prosperity in this country.
MR WILKINSON: No, I don’t wish anybody the fate of going to jail, but sometimes it is a good thing because in prison I learned to live with people and that there is a place for everyone on this earth. During my sentence I, in 1994, I experienced the election. I saw that peace and reconciliation could truly come in this country when the right-wing parties already approached the negotiating table and today I know that there is a place for us all on this world.
MR MARAIS: Good, and what else do you have to tell the Committee?
MR WILKINSON: Today I’d like to ask this Committee to grant me amnesty, not because I want to justify what I did or I want to try to say that there was anything good about it, on the contrary, I want to ask for understanding not for retaliation. I would ask for restoration rather than retaliation and not for victimization.
I would like to refer you today to the words of our present State President when he said at his inauguration this year, that we should forget the past, what is past is past. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: No questions?
WILKINSON: No further questions, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WLKINSON
MR BRINK: Will you answer in Afrikaans?
MR MARAIS: I will be replying in Afrikaans, Sir.
CROSS -EXAMINATION BY MR BRINK
MR BRINK: You, speaking for myself, strike me as a very intelligent man. You went to university?
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir,.
MR BRINK: You got your degree?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
MR BRINK: And just clear one thing for the record. In answer to my colleague you said that you pleaded guilty at your trial?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
MR BRINK: Is it not true that at the first trial you pleaded "not guilty" and the trials were separated?
MR MARAIS: So that was under the advice of my legal ... [intervention]
MR BRINK: No, no, ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: Yes that’s true.
MR BRINK: I just want the facts. I just want to clear things up. You pleaded "not guilty" ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: At my very first appearance ... [intervention]
MR BRINK: At the first appearance ...[intervention]
MR MARAIS: That’s right, yes.
MR BRINK: Then the trials were separated. It was thereafter you pleaded "not guilty"?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
MR BRINK: Now what I want to know is this, that having regard to the fact that during your incarceration and detention before your trial, you realised you had done a great deal wrong and you were full of remorse.
MR MARAIS: That’s right.
MR BRINK: And you wanted to come clean.
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
MR BRINK: Why did you plead "not guilty" initially?
MR MARAIS: Sir, that was on advice of my legal team at that stage to get the separation of trials on which they insisted.
MR BRINK: Right, all right. Now, you say it was the Orde Boerevolk’s policy to retaliate if White people got killed.
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR BRINK: How did you know that was the policy?
MR MARAIS: That was told to me by Mr Botha, Sir.
MR BRINK: When you left Richards Bay that evening to travel to Durban.
MR MARAIS: That’s right.
MR BRINK: What was in your mind, what did you think was going to happen?
MR MARAIS: I don’t know, Sir.
MR BRINK: Well you and Botha and Smuts had discussed the matter at Botha’s house.
MR MARAIS: I can give you a bit of history which might substantiate my answer. During my stay in Kempton Park where I was an active member of the AWB, at that stage the members of the AWB were very much against Black people moving into the White townships - White suburbs, and especially going into White hotels and visiting White entertainment areas, and we would have gone some nights on trips looking for these people and chasing them around and chased them out of the suburbs.
MR BRINK: Yes.
MR MARAIS: And I must honestly tell you, Sir, when we got into the car that night leaving for Durban I thought it would be a similar exercise.
MR BRINK: Well, I - can that be right, Mr Marais? You see, you say the fact that these Whites had been attacked that day was the talk of the town. Botha had called you to his house and told you to bring your rifle, correct?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR BRINK: Now that surely wasn’t with a view to chasing people out of hotels or bars or whatever - people of different colour. That can’t be the case, can it?
MR MARAIS: I know what it sounds like, Sir, but I can tell you whenever we went on these little excursions and wherever we went one always took every available weapon with - it was the show of being macho, the show of force, and you’ve got a weapon if you should ever need one.
MR BRINK: Well, when you left Richards Bay for Durban, you didn’t think that anyone was going to be attacked or killed?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
MR BRINK: But you were going down to make - I’ve heard it said - some sort of political statement.
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
MR BRINK: What sort of political statement? Chasing people out of hotels and pubs?
MR MARAIS: Sir, at that stage I was under the command of Mr Botha, and I knew that the decision on our actions was going to be taken, and that he was going to give us orders, and I knew I was going to do it.
MR BRINK: Are you saying when, when you came to shoot at the Putco bus, was that the statement you were making shooting - the political statement you were making by shooting at the Putco bus without the intention of injuring or killing anyone.
MR MARAIS: Sir, it might sound contradictory if I answer it wasn’t our intention to kill or hurt anybody, because shooting with an automatic weapon one must assume that that’s going to happen.
MR BRINK: But that wasn’t your main intention?
MR MARAIS: Our main intention was to make a political statement.
MR BRINK: By damaging the bus?
MR MARAIS: Sir, yes and the political statement was twofold. Firstly it was to show the Government that the road which they’ve taken in February 1990 was wrong and it was leading to conflict in this country. The second objective was to show the PAC and any other freedom movement that if you mess with us you are going to get hurt.
MR BRINK: Yes, is that by taking revenge and killing people or merely by damaging the Putco bus? That’s all I want to know.
MR MARAIS: Sir, I’m sorry if I sound weary, but I have seen what happens with the word revenge and weerwraak ... [intervention]
MR BRINK: Well, I don’t want to prejudice you ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: The argument about terminology ... [intervention]
MR BRINK: Let me put it another way. I don’t want to prejudice you. Was the political statement for whatever reason you wished to make it, was the political statement that you wished to make, to kill people or to damage the Putco bus?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir, you must see it as a whole. It was shooting at a bus with people inside to make the statement.
MR BRINK: You knew that they would be killed?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, yes, we wouldn’t have fired on an empty bus. If that might clear the question.
MR BRINK: But you see, you - earlier in your evidence you did say that at Botha’s house you decided that there should be a reaction.
MR MARAIS: That’s right, yes.
MR BRINK: And the reaction was to go to Durban and kill people.
MR MARAIS: That was the result in the end, yes, Sir.
MR BRINK: Didn’t you endeavour to tell Botha that a far better way of making your political statement would be to possibly to throw a bomb at the Durban PAC offices?
MR MARAIS: I did not Sir, and you must take into consideration that we had to make use of whatever we had at our disposal at that specific time. As it was heard in evidence earlier, it was decided that we had to do something immediately.
MR BRINK: You see, it strikes me that not withstanding the fact Botha was your superior, you strike me as being the more intelligent of the three people who have given evidence here today. Wouldn’t you have been in a position to say to him "Listen, Botha, we can’t just go and kill people indiscriminately.
Let’s rather gather our thoughts. Get some ammunition or bombs and let’s attack the PAC offices, that will make a statement. That will show the PAC"?
MR MARAIS: Well you can conclude that, Sir, but as I said, our intention was to react immediately. We did not have our hands on bomb-making material. The only thing we had was the firearms, number one, and number two is, I was not in a position to question Mr Botha’s authority at that stage.
MR BRINK: You’re putting all the blame on him?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir. I take full responsibility for what I did, and that’s why I am here today.
MR BRINK: Yes. Now, did you not think perhaps that if you wanted to make a statement there were other ways of doing it - a political statement - other ways of doing it?
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir, I am sure we could have thought that way, but we didn’t.
MR BRINK: Did you ever consider the repercussions which, thank heaven, never took place? The possible repercussions of your having wantonly murdered innocent people, Black people. Did you think of any possible reaction - enormous reaction that that might have led to.
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir, and I can tell you what we thought the reaction would be. We thought the PAC would stop attacking innocent people.
MR BRINK: You didn’t think they would go forward and kill even more innocent White people ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: No because ... [intervention]
MR BRINK: And you would go back and kill and it would be a never ending spiral of violence.
MR MARAIS: In retrospect, Sir, I can see that it would have led to a vicious circle but what I am trying to tell you our state of mind that night, and that is what we truly believed.
MR BRINK: And are you sincere in your repentance?
MR MARAIS: I beg yours? Pardon?
MR BRINK: Are you sincere in your repentance?
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir, I am.
MR BRINK: Thank you.
JUDGE WILSON: Mr Marais, I’ve got a - who do you think was organising this attack ... [intervention]
INTERPRETER: The speaker’s microphone.
JUDGE WILSON: On whose behalf was Botha acting did you think?
MR MARAIS: Sir, at that night I did not question Mr Botha whether this was under the authority of the AWB, the Orde Boerevolk, the CP or whatever. I took it on authority from him as a person being the Kommandant of the AWB and also the cell leader of the OB at that specific stage.
JUDGE WILSON: Well what did you think it was?
MR MARAIS: Sir, at one stage I considered that I actually thought that it was under the auspices or the clearance of the AWB. After the attack, during the days before we were arrested, it was made clear to me then by Mr Botha, that this was actually - was - and that was after he told me that he phoned the media to inform them that this actually was an OB operation.
JUDGE WILSON: So you knew that?
MR MARAIS: I beg your pardon?
JUDGE WILSON: You knew it was ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir.
JUDGE WILSON: Because it appears that you gave evidence saying that it was an AWB aksie.
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
JUDGE WILSON: And you knew that wasn’t true.
MR MARAIS: Sir, I knew it was not true, and if you would permit I can give you the reason why I did that.
JUDGE WILSON: Carry on.
MR MARAIS: All right. You will also see that in my court case, we only gave evidence in mitigation. And under orders of my legal team at that stage, it was felt that we should not put too emphasis on the politics. I’m sorry, I’m going to switch to Afrikaans at this point.
JUDGE WILSON: With pleasure.
MR MARAIS: The feeling, as I’ve already said - we didn’t have a trial. We pleaded guilty, and the only evidence we gave was in mitigation and my legal representatives felt that if we laid too much stress on the political aspect it would be aggravating, and not mitigating. That was the first reason, the second reason was oath of allegiance that I’d sworn to the Orde Boerevolk, that also prevented me from saying too much about it in my trial.
JUDGE WILSON: In your evidence you said "I asked him why?" and he said to me that it was a revenge. That we as the AWB should stop this uprising. Did you say that?
MR MARAIS: I just want to put it this way -if I had known that day what happened six years later - that I would be sitting here, then I wouldn’t have used the word "revenge". Because that’s from that date, perhaps I used the word revenge in the previous application. I’m waiting to be confronted by that, but I’m saying now that it’s just terminology then I said there, it was in reaction.
JUDGE WILSON: You said you didn’t want to talk about politics but you said "No Your Honour, I wasn’t told that the order had come from Ventersdorp, but that’s what I assumed because Piet had direct contact with Eugene Terreblanche and that it was an important decision, and it was the kind of decision which wouldn’t have been taken at local level." That’s political.
MR MARAIS: No, I didn’t say that we weren’t going to bring politics in, but I just want to say that we were told not to make too much emphasis on it.
JUDGE WILSON: As a result of the speeches of Mr Terreblanche in which one heard constantly of the total onslaught that was coming, the Black uprising, I thought that this was the beginning of that onslaught which turned the Blacks not only against one another, but would make them fight against Whites. Here you’re referring to Mr Terreblanche again. That’s not true and you knew it wasn’t true.
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
JUDGE NGOEPE: In, - it is reported on the, on the record that you said that you took the AK47 upon the insistence of the, of Mr Botha?
MR MARAIS: That is correct.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Was it in fact upon his insistence. Does that mean that you were not keen to take it along?
MR MARAIS: It was more than six years ago. He told me bring the rifle and I brought the rifle. It was standard practice. Wherever we went we took our firearms with us.
JUDGE NGOEPE: I do ot understand what is it in fact you can’t remember?
MR MARAIS: You asked me whether he told me to bring the rifle, and I maybe objected or insisted or whatever. He told me to bring the rifle and I did not even answer him, I brought the rifle.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Were you reluctant to take it along?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Why did he have to insist that you bring it along if you were not reluctant to do so?
MR MARAIS: I’ll tell you the standard procedure. I did not normally ride around with the AK47. We all had licensed firearms and normally when you go to an AWB meeting or get someone to go somewhere you will take your licensed firearms. So it was not standard practice that I drove around with the AK47 and that’s why he told me to bring the AK47.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Well I thought earlier on when you were asked about the carrying of firearms you said it was standard practice to go around with firearms as a show of force.
MR MARAIS: Yes, that’s right, yes. But you couldn’t walk around with an AK47.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Did you say that you did not know at all as to why you had to take your AK47 along?
MR MARAIS: It was not specified, no Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Mr Botha did not tell you.
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Did you ask him?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Why not?
MR MARAIS: I didn’t think it was necessary, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Why was it not necessary to ask him to carry something that you normally don’t take along?
MR MARAIS: I just felt it wasn’t necessary, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Isn’t the reason that he really told you? Isn’t the true explanation that Mr Botha in fact told you the purpose of your taking the AK47 along that night? You knew why you had to take it along.
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairperson, just two aspects. Did you again personally from this incident?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
MR PRINSLOO: Was it out of malevolence?
MR MARAIS: No, there was no malice.
MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Mr Chairman. No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
JUDGE NGOEPE: Mr Botha, sorry, can I just ask you this which is troubling me? Is it correct that you told the trial court that Mr Botha said to you "Take the firearm along, we are just going out for a drive"?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir. Like I explained earlier, that was policy and we did it all the time. That is the first time it would have been for me in Richards Bay but it was standard practice here where I used to be in the AWB before.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Did he tell you where you were going for a drive?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: He didn’t even tell you, you were going to Durban?
MR MARAIS: No, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: When did you realise that you were going to Durban?
MR MARAIS: When we got into the motor car, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Did he tell you then?
MR MARAIS: Yes Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Well then he told you.
MR MARAIS: I beg your pardon?
JUDGE NGOEPE: Then he did tell you that you were going to Durban.
MR MARAIS: Yes but maybe I didn’t understand you correctly, but ... [intervention]
JUDGE NGOEPE: Well you have just said to me earlier on that he did not tell you that you were going to Durban. You were going for a drive.
MR MARAIS: Well that is what he told me earlier in the day. Earlier in the day he told me to come to his house, bring the rifle and that we are going for a drive.
JUDGE NGOEPE: All right, let’s start at the stage of when you are already in the car. When you were in the car he told you are going to Durban?
MR MARAIS: Now we are going to Durban, yes Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: He told you the purpose of going to Durban?
MR MARAIS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: What did he say?
MR MARAIS: He said that we’re going to exercise some form of attack in reaction to the happenings of that morning.
JUDGE NGOEPE: Some form of attack?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: That’s vague, isn’t it?
MR MARAIS: That’s when we started discussing what we are going to do and eventually a target was selected or identified, that’s when we got to Durban.
JUDGE NGOEPE: And then that is when he also explained this, what the nature of this "some" of attack was?
MR MARAIS: That’s right, Sir.
JUDGE NGOEPE: And so when you left with him at Richards Bay, when the car drove off ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: Yes?
JUDGE NGOEPE: You, you knew that you were going to Durban? You knew what exactly was going be done in Durban?
MR MARAIS: That’s right.
MS KHAMPEPE: Can I ask something, Sir. When were you told by Mr Botha that for one loss of life there should be seven Black lives lost?
MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman that would have been around, if I look at my application form or the oath that I signed, it must have been more or less the 24th of September when he handed me the form and explained to me what it was about. And he also then explained to me the policies of the Orde Boerevolk.
MS KHAMPEPE: So you knew during that day of the 9th of October that was the policy of the OB ... [intervention]
MR MARAIS: Yes, ma’am.
MS KHAMPEPE: To give such a reaction. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes, thank you.
MR MARAIS: Thank you, Sir.
MR BRINK: What about this chap? Mr Chairman I don’t know whether Mr Purshotam wishes ... [intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BRINK: Oh, he doesn’t.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Are there any other witness you propose calling on behalf of the applicants?
MS VAN DER WALT: No further witnesses.
MR WILKINSON: No further witnesses.
UNKNOWN COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR PRINSLOO: No further witnesses.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink do you propose calling witnesses?
MR BRINK: No, I don’t Mr Chairman. I don’t know whether Mr Purshotam wishes to do so.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Purshotam, do you propose calling any witnesses?
MR PURSHOTAM: Yes, Mr Chairman, I propose calling the victims of this attack.
CHAIRPERSON: How many witnesses do you propose calling, Mr Purshotam?
MR PURSHOTAM: Well I haven’t ascertained exactly how many witnesses are here but as I mentioned earlier this morning, I wish to make attempts to contact all of them who are presently in the rural areas in order to bring them to the hearing and relate their experiences to the Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: My question related to how many witnesses do you have that you propose calling now?
MR PURSHOTAM: At the moment, two.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, it might be convenient for us to make a beginning tomorrow morning. Can we start at half past nine?
May we commence tomorrow morning at half past nine, if it is convenient to all of you?
MR PRINSLOO: Certainly, Mr Chairman
MR WILKINSON: Certainly, I should think so.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Purshotam, can you manage it at half past nine tomorrow morning?
MR PURSHOTAM: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. This meeting will now adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. Thank you.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
