Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. I apologise for the late start, but time had to be spent in setting up the hall and also in obtaining certain documentation. We are due to be sitting in East London for the next four weeks, according to our schedule. This week we'll be starting with the applications of Christoffel Pierre van der Westhuizen and Johannes Lodewikus Griebenauw. Before we start, I would like to introduce the Panel to you. On my right I have Mr Ntsiki Sandi. He is a member of the Amnesty Committee. He is an advocate from East London. On my left is Mr Jonas, better known as JB Sibanyoni. He is also a member of the Amnesty Committee and he is an attorney from Pretoria. I am Selwyn Miller, a judge from the High Court attached to the Transkei Division of the Court.

I would like please for the legal representatives to place themselves on record at this stage. Mr Mapoma?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you, Chairperson. I am Zuko Mapoma, the Leader of Evidence. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mapoma. The legal representatives for Mr van der Westhuizen?

MR KNOETZE: May it please you, Mr Chairman. My name is Barnard Knoetze. I appear on behalf of General van der Westhuizen, on the instructions of Messrs Wagener and Muller of Pretoria, but I also appear on behalf of the following persons: Colonel Rusty van Rooyen. His initials are AW. General Johan van der Merwe, ex-Compol, General Johan Coetzee, ex-Compol, Brigadier Willem Schoon and Brigadier Sakkie van der Merwe.

Now on behalf of Colonel van Rooyen and Brigadier van der Merwe I beg leave to hand up sworn statements that have been prepared for your convenience - they are not present, and they deal in these affidavits with the incidents in which they are being implicated.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knoetze. If we could then perhaps mark these two affidavits. We'll mark the affidavits of Alexander Wagenaar van Rooyen as Exhibit A, and that of Izak Ferdinand van der Merwe as Exhibit B.

MR KNOETZE: As you please, Mr Chairman.

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CHAIRPERSON: Can we read this affidavit later, during the lunch adjournment? Is it not necessary to read it before we start?

MR KNOETZE: Yes, Mr Chairman, although we mean to deal with it at some stage during the evidence of General van der Westhuizen, so it depends whichever happens first.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And Mr Griebenauw's legal representative?

MR AVENANT: My name is Paul Avenant. I am an attorney from Bellville in the Cape and I appear on behalf of General Griebenauw.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Sir.

MR CLAASSEN: Mr Chairman, RD Claassen of the Bisho Bar, representing Mr PJ Fouche on the instructions of Squire Smith and Laurie. I will be mainly holding a watching brief in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Claassen. Any other persons representing any implicated people or interested parties etc., in this particular hearing? Mr Penzhorn?

MR PENZHORN: May it please the Committee. For the record, the name is Penzhorn, Ernest JV Penzhorn. I appear on behalf of the implicated parties, Mr PW Botha and General Magnus Malan.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you?

MR VAN DER HOVEN: Mr Chairman, my name is ABT van der Hoven from the Pretoria firm of attorneys, Rooth and Wessels. I represent the implicated persons, General JJ Geldenhuys, ex-Chief of the South African Defence Force and the late General AJ Liebenberg, also ex-Chief of the South African Defence Force. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van der Hoven.

MR NONTENJA: Mr Chairman, I'm SC Nontenja from SC Nontenja Attorneys in Umtata. I represent Chief George Matanzima and Chief Makoma. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nontenja.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Jansen from the Pretoria Bar, on instructions from Mr Julian Knight Attorneys. I appear for a Colonel Hugo, GC Hugo, and a Major Martiens Ras, parties involved in other incidents in the Eastern Cape and who are interested in the general evidence relating to the Eastern Cape. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Jansen.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I am Jan Wagener from Wagener Muller, Pretoria. I appear on behalf of a person who has an interest in these proceedings, Mr WH Willemse. He is a previous Commissioner of the Correctional Services Department.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, my name is PG Prinsloo, from Port Elizabeth. I am representing Brigadier John Moore and Colonel JPW Hall of the Defence Force. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Prinsloo.

MR VAN DER HOVEN: Mr Chairperson, van der Hoven for the record, could you just allow me to just to place on record what we have agreed? That our legal representatives here on behalf of the implicated persons, the fact that we will not take certain evidence in dispute or dispute that evidence will not necessarily mean that our clients agree with the evidence. That has been agreed at a previous hearing with Judge Wilson in order to shorten the proceedings. If that be in order.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, that will be in order. Right, that will be the legal representatives. Before we proceed, these proceedings will simultaneously translated into Afrikaans, English and Xhosa, depending on the language spoken by the witness.

CHAIRPERSON EXPLAINS INTERPRETATION EQUIPMENT AND CHANNELS

CHAIRPERSON: It's also going to get quite warm today, so please feel free to remove your jackets if you wish to.

We can then commence. I see from my documentation the first-mentioned applicant is Mr van der Westhuizen, so we will then proceed with his application.

MR KNOETZE: As you please, Mr Chairman. May I just also place on record that we have provided the Evidence Leader with a bundle of documents which we think it crucially important for our client's application and that he has undertaken to duplicate those and to distribute it and that he has been placed in possession of those documents already during the beginning of last week. We didn't give it to him this morning only. But, Mr Chairman, we also have further documents which are not as directly related but which we think he may perhaps think or yourself may perhaps think to be of relevance and that we've made available some further documents to him this morning with the purpose of entitling him to perhaps look through it and perhaps ask questions in that regard, should he so wish.

Then I would with your permission beg leave to call General van der Westhuizen.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR KNOETZE: General, your application as it appears in the bundle - I don't know, Mr Chairman, whether you wish to give this bundle an exhibit number as well.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I don't think it necessary. This is the bundle that has been issued by the Commission, no.

MR KNOETZE: We would like to refer to it as the bundle. The bundle contains your application from page 1 to page 40 and then 71 to 89 and 113 to 132.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR KNOETZE: Do you confirm the application?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do.

MR KNOETZE: I may just indicate that here and there we will make certain corrections to the document. If one looks at paragraph 8(a) of your application, under the heading of Section 22(b), in the light of the fact that you were a person who was in the service of the South African Defence Force at the stage when these acts were committed for which you are requesting amnesty.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Please refer to page 2 and please indicate when you took charge of the Eastern Province Command.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: From January 1983 to December 1986.

MR KNOETZE: And was it mainly whilst you were so in charge that these actions took place for which you are now applying for amnesty?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, we have also provided the Evidence Leader with a document which is the Brigadier's "bevelskrif", as it is known in Afrikaans. We would have liked to refer to it now. It is not a long document, but perhaps if you would allow the Brigadier to read that document into the record already, otherwise we will be missing ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is this part of this big bundle of documents that we got this morning?

MR KNOETZE: It is indeed, Mr Chairman, page 880. General, would you please read the document into the record?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is the command document giving me the command of the Eastern Province Command, given to me on the 31st of January 1983 by the Chief of the Defence Force.

"Your appointment is hereby confirmed as the Commander of the Eastern Province ..."

...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The interpreter requests the speaker to please slow down or provide her with a copy of the document, or both.

CHAIRPERSON: General van der Westhuizen, the Interpreters requested either a copy of the document or that you just read it a bit slower so that she can keep abreast with you please.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My apologies, Chairperson, I forgot about the interpreter.

"Appointment: You are hereby appointed as the Commanding Officer for the Command Eastern Province.

Situation: The policy of the RSA as far as the safety of the Republic is concerned, requires that Defence Force formations and units are deployed inside or outside the territory. The SA Defence Force operational strategy requires offensive actions in neighbouring countries.

My command or instruction in respect of the security of the EP Command: you have to ensure the safety with conventional onslaughts as well as by using counter-military insurgence and by dealing with these, whether they come from inside or outside the country.

Execution of Duty: paragraph 5(a) - General: The application of the SA Defence Force is subject to the Defence Force Acts, provisions, the regulations, the orders, the policy documents, the doctrines and various circulars, as laid down from time to time or proclaimed from time to time.

Paragraph (b) - Actions outside the borders of the RSA takes place in terms of policy as far as external operations are concerned, as laid down from time to time and as supplemented or amended from time to time.

6. Command and Charge: You have been appointed as the Commanding Officer of the Eastern Province and you are under my command. Forces needed for conventional operations will be allocated to you for that purpose by me.

Responsibility Area: Your area of responsibility is covered by the current borders of the Eastern Province Command.

Sphere of Influence: Includes the adjacent command areas, the neighbouring areas of Lesotho and Transkei. Those are your areas of responsibility, or border your areas of responsibility. Ciskei falls within your area of responsibility and the territorial waters bordering your command area.

Your Command Competence: SADF units are allocated to you in terms of the affiliation specifically indicated next to each unit, and temporary units or allocations in respect of the Eastern Province Command will also be dealt with by me in separate instructions or orders.

Joint Operations: Other Defence Force units will, either on a permanent or temporary basis be allocated to you to support you.

7. Training: I hold you responsible for maintenance of a high standard of training. In this regard you are responsible for:

(a) Training for the preparation of operational deployment in respect of units allocated to you for operations.

(b) The continued training of SADF formation units and staff allocated to you in order to maintain an effective military standard for combat.

8. Communications Operations: In respect of tactical communications operations and certain attitude areas of the local area, that is also within your area of command and this must be done in terms of the ..."

...(intervention)

MR KNOETZE: General, may I ask you to please turn to page ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Knoetze before you proceed. In my bundle I've only got the first page of that letter. It goes from page 880 and then my next page is page 883. I think it's the position with my two Panellists as well. So if we could just get copies of pages 881 and 882 please.

MR KNOETZE: We will rectify the position, Mr Chairman, a soon as we can.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, Mr Mapoma, have you got the same difficulty?

MR MAPOMA: Yes, Chairperson, unfortunately I've got the same problem.

MR PENZHORN: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to interrupt. Could I just enquire what the position will be in regard to the copies that have been produced, because as far as myself and my colleagues here are concerned we haven't got any copies of these documents and I think they are relevant, especially to myself and colleague, Mr van der Hooven. These particular documents as part of the evidence. It might just cause a problem if we have to get it at a later stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener, will copies be made available to Mr Penzhorn and those others requiring them? - at least of the documents referred to.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, these two bundles consist of about 1 000 pages.

CHAIRPERSON: I know, I'm well aware of that and that's why I'm saying if it could be of specific - are you going to be referring to all 917 pages or only certain of them?

MR KNOETZE: No, we will not be, Mr Chairman, but we will be referring to all the documents. We included the complete documents in order to give you a complete picture, but we will be referring to quite a number of pages from those documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think if arrangements could be made, Mr Mapoma, for copies to be made available to legal representatives. We don't want anybody to be prejudiced by not having some documents.

MR MAPOMA: Chairperson, perhaps I may have to explain. We have made copies of these documents which have just been referred to here now. In fact three copies are for the Committee and there's a copy for me, there are I think two copies which are available to whoever may want to have access to those documents. In fact those, volume 1 and 2 are the documents which have been referred to there. If my learned friend can just have a look on those documents and peruse, those are the documents that are referred to.

CHAIRPERSON: I think perhaps what we could do is, we can have those two volumes to be shared and then if copies could be made of specific documents that have been referred to such as this letter now, for the individual representatives particularly if they request them. So that will avoid making a number of other copies of the complete bundle. Mr Penzhorn, perhaps we can work on that basis. There is that document there that is available, and then if you require any specific document, if you could just request a copy and that will be made. Thank you. Mr Knoetze?

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General, could I take you to page 882, and please read paragraphs 13 and 14.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN

"The JOC: The JOC is the Joint Operational Management Centre. I hold you responsible for the effective functioning and management of the JOC. In this regard you must act within the framework of the State Security Council Secretariat's policy rules and regulations, orders and instructions. As far as JOC's activities are concerned, you have to liaise directly with the Secretariat. However, you must constantly keep me informed of those matters where the SA Defence Force is directly involved and you must pro-actively contribute to preventing a revolutionary climate in your area of responsibility.

14: The GBR: (That is the Joint Management Council) I hold you responsible for the effective functioning and management of the joint system as far as the Transkei and the Ciskei is concerned. In this regard you have to act within the policy framework and the orders and instructions as contained in this particular document.

INTERPRETER: The speaker is mentioning the number of the document of 15 April 1983.

MR KNOETZE: General, at that stage whilst you were in Port Elizabeth, in command, who was your commander or your chief?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was General Geldenhuys who was the Chief of the Defence Force and he was my commanding officer at the time that I received this order.

MR KNOETZE: And who was the Chief of the Defence Force at that stage?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was General Geldenhuys. He was Chief of the Defence Force in 1983, and he also signed as Chief of the Defence Force there. He was a Lieutenant-General. May I add that General Geldenhuys was later succeeded by General Liebenberg as Chief of the Defence Force.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then also if you would go to page 884 and please tell us briefly what that refers to.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that deals with the units and formations under my command in 1983. Those were the units and headquarters as indicated here and later further units and headquarters were allocated to me.

MR KNOETZE: Apart from the fact that you were the Commanding Officer of the Eastern Province Command, did you also wear other hats so to speak, were you also responsible for other things?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As already indicated in paragraph 14 of the command directive, I was also the joint Chairperson of the Joint Management System between South Africa and the Republic of Ciskei and the joint Chairperson of the Joint Management Council with Transkei. Apart from the GBR Chairperson or the Chair that I had there, I was also the Chairperson of the Eastern Province Joint Command System, the JOC.

MR KNOETZE: At that stage who did you have to report to in respect of those two systems?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: In respect of my Commanding Officer Eastern Province position, I was directly told to report to the Chief of the Defence Force. And in respect of my appointment as the Chairperson of the JMC with Transkei and Ciskei, I had to report to the Minister of Defence, General Malan. As my appointment as the Chairperson of the Joint Management System, I had to report to the Secretariat of the State Security Council.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, a copy of the document which indicates the General's tasks in respect of the "GBS Stelsel" is being made now. It will be available in half a minute I hope, and I would like to hand it in at this stage.

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MR KNOETZE: General, the document placed in front of you now, could you please refer to that and explain it to the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we should perhaps number this document seeing it's not part of the bundle. Would this be Exhibit C?

MR KNOETZE: It would, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And then - I'm just trying to think of what we can number these two big volumes. Perhaps they can be Exhibit C, the two volumes, the 917 pages. So we will refer to, if you refer to page 80, it will be C880 or C884 or whatever. And then we'll call this document that's just been handed in, I've got two here actually, one at the top there's a stamp saying "Geheim", will that be Exhibit D?

MR KNOETZE: As you please, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the other document? Oh that's page 881, sorry. These are just our missing pages. These two volumes will be collectively called Exhibit C and this document that's just been handed in now "Bestuursvoorskrif" will be Exhibit D.

MR KNOETZE: As you please, Mr Chairman.

General, could I please refer you to document D, and please in a nutshell explain to the Committee what it is.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is a document similar to the command orders which I received from the Secretariat of the State Security Council.

MR KNOETZE: And also in a nutshell could you explain to us what the task of the JMC was, or more specifically your task.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The JMC was a Joint Management Centre for the co-ordinating of the State Security Council's normalisation and stabilisation plans.

MR KNOETZE: And who participated in that system?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Each and every State department as represented in the particular region. They appointed a senior representative to serve on this JMC.

MR KNOETZE: And General, if we look at the sentence right at the bottom of page 2 of the bundle, it there indicates that since the 31st of May 1984 you, you retired as from that date?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR KNOETZE: And if we look at page 3 of your application in the bundle, you apply for amnesty today for any offences or any delicts which you may have committed and which is based on your involvement arising from Plan Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: And as far as Plan Katzen is concerned, the particulars of that plan are contained in a document which appears at page 9.

With your leave, Mr Chairman, I would prefer not to move on to that at this stage, but rather to deal with

the documents in bundle C.

I'd like to then refer you to page 693. Could you please start by telling the Committee what the nature and the status of this document is.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is a submission which was made by General Malan to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

MR KNOETZE: Are you referring to General Magnus Malan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And you've already indicated that he was your Minister of Defence during the time that you were in charge of the Eastern Province Command.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: I'd like to refer you to page 700 of this document, paragraph 3.2. It reads

"The members of the previous government, with a few exceptions such as Mr PW Botha, avoided taking a clear comprehensive, collective, political and moral responsibility for the actions of the South African Defence Force and its members.

I as former Chief of the South African Army, Chief of the South African Defence Force and Minister of Defence, wish to state clearly before this Commission that I take moral responsibility for the actions of members of the Army and the South African Defence Force during the respective periods which I was involved, and for the execution of the tasks of the South African Defence Force to uphold the then constitution and to preserve the sovereignty of the Republic of South Africa."

What is your comment, as far your own position is concerned, regarding General Malan's statement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I support and endorse what General Malan says here, and like him I accept responsibility for the actions of members in my command in the carrying out of their orders.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 703. Paragraph 4.2 of the submission reads as follows

"Judging the actions of the South African Defence Force during the conflict, one must keep in mind that it was a service organisation of the State and that it had to act in support of the State and the constitution of the day, just as the South African National Defence Force is obliged to do today."

Do you agree with that statement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: What is your personal experience of the international security fraternity in relation to this statement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: All Defence Forces served the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: Did you at any stage discuss this matter with members of other Defence Forces, especially relating to the conduct of the South African Defence Force during this particular period?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not during the relevant period because I didn't have the opportunity, but in later years, yes. And as I've already said, all Defence Forces support the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 704, paragraph 4.3. It reads

"Against this background members of the South Africa Defence Force gave, interpreted and carried out their orders."

What is your view of the matter?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the background to which reference is made turns on the revolutionary war in South Africa and against that background members of the South African Defence Force carried out orders and also interpreted orders as far as possible. This was part of the counter-revolutionary war, as part of the contingency planning for that war and for operations.

MR KNOETZE: You refer to interpret, the interpretation of certain orders, can one then infer from that that what you mean is that all instructions given were not 100% clear, they weren't all spelt out completely but it was expected from commanding officers like yourself to sometimes interpret the guidelines and then act accordingly?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. Most of the instructions which we received were in the form of guidelines, specifically because a revolutionary war is such a fluid situation and it's without precedent.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 705, a portion of paragraph 4.4. reads

"Members of the South African Defence Force and the MK are already working shoulder to shoulder as comrades in arms towards to the success of the South African National Defence Force, the past forgotten."

Can you comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. I think that is not only unique in our situation, you see that in conflict situations in other parts of the world where opposing forces afterwards join hands and work together, they participate in certain structures and participate in trying to obtain peace. And also in our case in this country that was the situation.

MR KNOETZE: And do you regard yourself as part of the group who after the war was prepared to make peace?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. I also had the privilege, during the preliminary talks with ANC members, to be part of that, participate in that.

MR KNOETZE: I read the last portion of the paragraph

"This I maintain originates solely from battle experience and a mutual understanding of the circumstances during the conflict. You who were not soldiers can gain such insight only by listening closely and objectively, and by trying to understand what the South African Defence Force and MK explain to you. Should you not do so, you will fail both to arrive at the truth and to achieve reconciliation."

Do you endorse that view?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to ask you, were you ever personally a target of terror attacks or were you never personally exposed to that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On two occasions, well the first one was in Uitenhage during the time that I was Commanding Officer in Eastern Province Command and I was trapped on a bridge by a bridge by a crowd of people. Fortunately nothing happened.

The second occasion was when I was at headquarters I was the Commanding Officer of Witwatersrand Command and a bomb exploded there and it destroyed the entire headquarters.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, the Committee can accept that if you say you're part of trying to make peace you are not doing so from your easy chair, you're doing so from experience?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 707, paragraph 6.1 reads

"It is of fundamental importance to keep in mind that the South African Defence Force was a creature of statute and as such bound by the provisions of the Defence Act, Act 44 of 1957. It was also a well disciplined professional organisation and not above the law and apolitical."

Would you like to comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct. I would just like to support that again.

MR KNOETZE: Especially the part about the apolitical nature of it?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. That is why we said we serve the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: And 6.2

"The South African Defence Force as an organisation had a decentralised command structure. This meant that authority and the responsibility in the execution and functioning of the South African Defence Force was delegated. This is a universally accepted philosophy of management and applied worldwide by military forces."

Do you endorse that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do. As commanding officer I had a certain delegated competence, which was also indicated in my document referred to before. I had certain authority to act and I had units under my command to be able to take such action. I was able to make my own evaluations and within the guidelines which I received I could authorise actions accordingly.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 708, 6.3

"The South African Defence Force played an important role in the combatting of the revolutionary onslaught on the Republic of South Africa. The utilisation of the South African Defence Force in support of the South African Police is a procedure that is not limited to the Republic of South Africa, it is an internationally recognised procedure and principle to utilise a Defence Force in the support of the police in combatting unrest."

Could you please explain that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Even in modern warfare it is the practice that the police and the Police Service of a particular State is utilised and when the situation becomes so bad that they can't manage, then the Defence Force will be called in support the police, and is exactly what happened in South Africa.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, what you're saying is that the Defence Force was placed in the position that they had to support the South African Police?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.

...(end of tape)

MR KNOETZE: ... portion of paragraph 6.6

"... 1985, the government was forced to initially employ the South African Defence Force in service in addition to the South African Police. In other words, the territory of the Republic of South Africa was declared an operational area for the South African Defence Force."

That confirms what you've just said?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: I beg your pardon, apparently I misread the word "internally", Mr Chairman.

Then on page 710, paragraph 7.3:

"The military community thus already realised the necessity for normalising internal relationships and took the lead in creating such a situation within its area of responsibility."

Would you like to comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the term "normalisation", that is part of the counter-revolutionary process which deals with the creation of a normal environment and it entails a secure environment, one in which there can be economic development and growth, and one in which the constitutional structures are well based, and one which is also socially orientated, which deals with man's life, his work and his movements. And in a normal environment you could say that that environment has been normalised.

MR KNOETZE: 7.4

"This essential direction of the South African Defence Force was not in all cases limited to only its own terrain. The South African Defence Force applied it wherever it could act independently. Here reference can be made to hundreds of community projects over the length and breadth of Southern Africa."

Do you have any personal knowledge of this principle?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. The Defence Force, and the Army in particular had a programme called Civil Affairs, and some of the conscripts who were professionally qualified were utilised in terms of this Civil Affairs programme. For instance, doctors, teachers, vets, hydrologists and sports coaches were all utilised in local communities, specifically to aid normalisation in a particular area. So it amounted to was that during his military service such a qualified person would use his skills and apply it in a particular community.

MR KNOETZE: Can the committee then infer that you were a strong advocate of that policy and that you utilised it to the best of your ability?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. In this programme we had people in the Ciskei and Transkei. Under this programme we also deployed people in my area of command, and I can only look back and say they did excellent work.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 713, paragraph 8.2

"In times of war and conflict, people's perceptions change and they act differently. To judge viewpoints and actions in times of conflict from a narrow peacetime is dangerous and negates the reality as experienced in times of conflict."

We have touched on this point, what is your comment on this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think, Chairperson, you always have to see whether you are judging a situation according to the context or the spirit of the time which reigned at that particular time and what the particular circumstances were at the time. I think that what it amounts to is that it's very easy to be clever with hindsight, as to what the situation was whereas when you were in that particular situation it was completely different to today.

MR KNOETZE: If we can be more specific in respect of your application serving before the Committee, what is your request to this Committee?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My request would be that you look at Katzen in the spirit and context of the middle '80's. That was at the time of the first state of emergency, when the revolutionary onslaught was at its height and where not only South Africa but all the TBVC countries. And Transkei and Ciskei in my case were also directly affected.

MR KNOETZE: Could I then take you to page 716, paragraph 9.1

"Although it is difficult to appreciate the threat which communism posed to the free world and South Africa in particular, especially after the demise of communism in Eastern Europe during 1989, it is necessary for purposes of a proper analysis of the policies and actions of the South African Government during the 1980's, to have a brief look at the actual position during that time. I shall endeavour to give a short summary."

Is that once again your view that General Malan's statement here is correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: What was your view at the time in regard to the threat of communism?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well in the middle '80's and just in the years before that Russian expansionism was seen in Africa in particular, and it was called the frontline States in Africa. In other words, the States surrounding South Africa, all those States to a lesser or greater degree had communist governments or regimes and there was the fear that all those communist States surrounding us, that that would actually spread to South Africa. And I can recall that at that stage we talked about a two-pronged war, an internal war, it was the revolutionary war, and an external front which spread out to also include the fight against communism.

MR KNOETZE: Do you have any comment regarding the ANC/SACP alliance and their involvement in that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The ANC/SACP alliance was regarded by us as a communist front in South Africa. We saw it as part of the internal threat. And to the extent in which it affected the frontline States, it was also regarded as directly affecting South Africa. The threat therefore was also seen overarchingly as a marxist threat.

MR KNOETZE: Now this view of yours, did that have any effect or influence on for instance your actions which are now known as Plan Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, Plan Katzen dealt more with the stabilisation and normalisation of the Transkei and the Ciskei, and was not so much aimed against the marxist threat.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 722, 10.4

"The psychological affect of the onslaught became visible in the community. Homes with walls had steel gates added to them. Schools were fenced with razor wire. Security measures in public places were intensified and security personnel exercised access control in buildings and shopping centres."

What was the situation in the Eastern Cape in this period, during which you were commanding officer?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The paragraph of General Malan actually describes the situation very correctly. Perhaps I can just add that there were not only those measures in place, but there were other measures and this all helped to create a certain psychosis of seige, a seige mentality in South Africa which was greatly strengthened also by our actions such as for instance, road blocks and searching for bombs, patrols, foot patrols or mobile patrols which were carried out, searching of certain areas and people and certain incidents in which we were involved. Of course all these things were given great publicity.

MR KNOETZE: The paragraph continues

"During this time the government's policy was clear; stop the perpetrator of violence at all costs, the carrier of the car-bomb, land-mine, limpet-mine from the neighbouring States had to be destroyed outside our borders or inside the country, before he could commit his atrocity. The destruction of the terrorists his base and his capacity was the mission of every soldier in the South African Defence Force and was also the policy of the government of the day. In this way the killings of innocent civilians could be prevented."

Were you aware at the time of what I've just read to you, that this was the government's policy?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. It was constantly brought home to us, either by statements made by politicians or in documents of the State Security Council and this was brought home to us by reporting also in the media.

MR KNOETZE: And this policy, did that have any influence on your actions?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Yes, we wanted to win the war, so that which was asked for here, that is what we wanted to do.

MR KNOETZE: So was that also seen in Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 724, paragraph 10.8

"It is against this background and these circumstances that the members of the South African Defence Force acted, right or wrong. They saw themselves as the shield between innocent citizens and mutilation or even death."

Would you endorse that view of General Malan's?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: From page 725 in General Malan's document there is a list of public statements by the ANC leadership - Mr Chairman, I don't mean to deal with this in detail.

General, were you at the time aware of some of these statements?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, many of these statements came from Radio Freedom, they were heard on Radio Freedom, and we knew about Radio Freedom and their propaganda. We knew about this by means of certain information surveys which were given to us by the Chief of the Defence Force and it was often quoted by politicians.

MR KNOETZE: And then specifically on page 728, as an example I'd like to read to you 11.9

"Our people must organise themselves into groups, manufacture traditional weapons which must be used against the enemy. After arming ourselves in this manner, our people must begin to identify collaborators and enemy agents and kill them. The puppets in the tri-cameral parliament and the Bantustans must be destroyed. - Radio Freedom broadcast by Mr Joe Modise on 1 December 1985."

What is your comment on this statement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that was typical of the kind of statements and quotes which we heard about in our information surveys. The puppets referred to are references to those black local councillors who were seen by the ANC as collaborators and collaborating with the government, for instance, the black councillors, the leaders of the TBVC countries, etc. And in my own area mention was made of the Matanzimas in Transkei, they were seen as collaborating with the government. To a lesser extent that was also said of President Lennox Sebe.

MR KNOETZE: And did your awareness of this attitude of the ANC, did that have any influence on what you did in Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. We had programmes to try and support local councils and councillors especially. I'm referring to programmes coordinated by the Joint Management System. Most of these councils were replaced by alternative structures and later became very ineffective.

MR KNOETZE: What do you mean by alternative structures?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Alternatives structures, as the word indicates is a replacement organisation so that it means that the original structure is then attacked and then replaced by this alternative. A good example is a local council instituted by our Department of Constitutional Affairs and maintained by us. Those councillors were then intimidated to such an extent that they simply couldn't function, they became ineffective. Then the M-Plan or the G-Plan, referring to Goniwe and Mandela, those plans were put in place and in place of the original black councils we saw a revolutionary alternative structure.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer to 729, paragraph 11.12

"Members of the South African Defence Force were kept informed of the statements by the ANC. Their sense of morality was obviously shaped and influenced by the sentiments expressed by the ANC leadership."

Do you support that statement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it is true, it influenced us.

MR KNOETZE: Then from page 730, General Malan deals with the category of statements, namely his own public statements regarding the ANC. Once again, Mr Chairman, we're not going to deal with this in detail.

Were you aware of the public statements made by your minister at the time?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, General Malan made a point of visiting the headquarters and units and during these visits he spoke to us and shared his views with us personally. Apart from that there was also wide publicity given to these statements, wide publicity given to it in the media. The Army Headquarters also had a programme known as Communication Bulletins and a lot of the Minister's were quoted in these bulletins.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 741, paragraph 12.9

"The government judged that it was not possible to withstand this onslaught only by normal and traditional military actions. In the process therefore, use was made of unconventional methods. These methods included cross-border operations, strategic communication operations (Stratcom), disinformation operations, other covert operations such as the CCB and support of anti-marxist liberation movements."

To start off with, do you confirm what is said there?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Yes, it's part of the counter-revolutionary warfare.

MR KNOETZE: And can Plan Katzen be regarded as an unconventional plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Is there any connection between what is said here in relation to the anti-marxist liberation movements and Plan Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, support for liberation movements manifested in the resistance movements or fronts, the actions such as for instance spelt out in Plan Katzen were unconventional methods unique to revolutionary warfare.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Mr Chairman, I would like to move to the SANDF's Representation, which is in the first volume of Exhibit C.

General, could you just tell the Committee at the outset what is it that starts on page 1 of this exhibit?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is a submission which was compiled by the Nodel Point of the South African Defence Force, made for the Truth Commission and it was presented by Major General Mortimer.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 100, paragraph 9(a). I read it for you

"If we look at the previous constitutional dispensation, I would like to just make a couple of statements. The old South African Defence Force served the government of the day and not a political party. We did the self-defence for the State and we protected its civilians, and our internal conduct was in terms of the then constitution."

Now General Malan also touched on that. Do you confirm that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 105, paragraph 19(a)

"We, as former Chiefs of the Defence Force and the Army, have no intention to evade responsibility for the Army's conduct and we will not place it on the shoulders of our sub-ordinates where they executed their duties in a disciplined way and in the execution of their duties. We will also not follow the dishonest way by trying to make it all the responsibility of the politicians. I repeat that the old South African Defence Force was not an unprofessional and undisciplined force which followed strategies without specific authorization."

What is your comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I endorse that. I can add that I was part of the team which compiled this document and I'd just like to reiterate that that is my feeling today as well.

MR KNOETZE: Page 119, paragraph 6 to 9

"Revolutionary war. This became the major form of conflict in the post-world war 2 period, and can be described as a modern adaptation of total war, with the progressive application of political, economic and psychological resources combined with varying degrees of violence and military action. There are numerous definitions for revolutionary war, which in essence all describe it as a conflict in which wide-ranging and radical change in the political, social and economic field are brought about through the use of violence.

Basically, revolutionary war is the pursuit of the policy of a politically inspired and organised group inside a country by all means available, also with outside support. Success is obtained by the creation of a situation of instability and political intolerability through a war of attrition, thus producing a climate of political collapse or acceptance of a negotiated solution, without necessarily defeating military opponents on the battlefield.

Strategically, revolutionary war is aimed at a total indirect strategy where the revolutionary forces as the weaker side, assume the tactical offensive at selected times and in selected forms and places. Armed action is used, but on a lower scale than in previous wars. The psychological weapon is a major factor because the conflict is essentially a struggle for the allegiance and active support of the populations."

MR KNOETZE: What is your comment on this definition of revolutionary war?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think it's very accurate, a very correct and concise definition of a very difficult concept, namely revolutionary warfare. It indicates once again that the State, the power base of the State, those are the targets of the revolutionary forces. That is the area which the counter-revolutionaries then try and protect and try and keep out of the hands of the counter-revolutionaries.

It is not like in a conventional war, a war where direct strategies are used, it is a war where the offensive is constantly in the hands of the attacker, the revolutionary, and the State and its forces are then reactive, they resist, and it's a war which directly affects the whole country and all its institutions and all its people.

MR KNOETZE: Do you think that with reference to this definition, that during the Katzen period there was a revolutionary war in the Eastern Cape?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Could you please elaborate?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Revolutionary war is there to try to replace an existing dispensation. It's mostly politically inspired, and that is aimed at the constitutional leg because the State is the ruler on constitutional grounds.

During the time of Katzen in the mid-80's alternative structures had already been established, especially at local level. There were major intimidation campaigns waged against the population, especially those who were not part of, or not seen as part of the revolutionary onslaught. There were incidents of terror in the province, there were skirmishes with terrorists, there was training given in a clandestine way to trainee terrorists and there was a whole diversity of revolutionary statements, which we have already touched on.

In certain areas, in the mid-80's, especially in the command which I was responsible for, there were already certain liberated areas which according to the statements of the ANC had to be made ungovernable.

MR KNOETZE: Yes, that's the one side of the picture, the revolution. Now what about the other side of the coin, the counter-revolutionary forces?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As we've already mentioned, the SADF was used to try to counter these attacks and operational areas were declared. The civilian forces and the commandos were placed on the alert. I may just add that those were the forces we were supposed to use in the counter-revolutionary war. A state of emergency was declared, I think in 1985 for the first time and it was renewed in '86. I think there was also a partial state of emergency declared before '85, in which only certain districts were declared to be in states of emergency.

Then according to our information, counter-revolutionary actions were waged by means of cordoning off of certain areas, roadblocks, searches etc. It was also in this period that we as the Defence Force started training people in all seriousness, in counter-revolutionary warfare - perhaps it was a bit late.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then on page 122, paragraph 16

"The situation that therefore confronted South Africa from the '60's onwards, was that of a Soviet backed revolutionary war with the aim of overthrowing the existing government and structures and the seizure of power by means of armed struggle. The continued pre-positioning of Soviet, Cuban and surrogate forces and heavy armaments in South Africa, posed for the first time the potential threat of conventional war on the northern borders of the subcontinent."

Was that also the position?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. You will recall that many of our Defence Force units were deployed in Namibia and Angola and by that deployment it was also seen that there was an external conventional threat against the RSA.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 127, paragraph 34

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We don't have that page, Mr Knoetze.

MR KNOETZE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: I say we don't have that page. We don't have page 127 or 129.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I'll make mine available the moment that I have read it into the record, if you agree.

137, paragraph 34:

"While the SADF was involved in South West Africa/Namibia, the ANC was also active in furthering its plans for actions in the internal struggle in the RSA. The ANC applied a new strategy based on the four pillars of the revolution, a strategy for people's war, which emphasised four major categories of action namely

(a) The allround activity of the underground structures of the ANC.

(b) The un-united mass action of the people.

... I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman:

The united mass action of the people, mass mobilisation.

(c) The armed offensive.

(d) The international drive to isolate South Africa."

What is your comment on that exposition there?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, we knew the four pillars of the revolution, the strategy for people's war. The first pillar was manifested by MK, to a lesser extent by APLA. This was more aimed at the ANC/SACP alliance. Those were the soldiers of the revolutionary forces. We call them terrorists.

(b) The united mass action was aimed at mobilising the population, because what is concerned here is the control over the population, and the aim was to get the people to take part in the struggle on the side of the ANC/SACP. No revolution can succeed if you don't have the population on your side. Perhaps that was the strongest pillar.

(c) The armed offensive. That joins up with (a), which dealt with acts of terror not only against the opposing forces but also against those institutions and bodies and people seen as collaborating with the opposing forces.

(d) And then I think everybody is well familiar with the international drive to isolate South Africa which affected South Africa on all levels, the economy, sport, even as far as diplomatic ties with other countries were concerned. It was to the great disadvantage of the Republic at the time.

These four pillars, even before they were announced and after they were announced increasingly so, formed a very strong basis for the revolutionary onslaught. And I think it once again indicates that revolutionary warfare, apart now from the ANC/SACP's contact with that, that revolutionary warfare is based on these pillars.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then page 132, paragraph 45

"The strategy set out, the philosophy of total war and total strategy. It also included details on the threat analysis, the national aims, objectives and policy, as well as the political economic, social, psychological and security policies of the RSA, the independent homelands of Southern Africa. The strategy emphasised the need for coordinated action on all of the above terrains and recognised the 80/20% requirement of the conflict. That is, that the greater accent should be placed on the political and other spheres, while the security aspects only made up 20% of the solution."

What is your view of this approach?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I may, Chairperson, the 80/20% principle is connected to the power bases of the State, the power bases of the State which are the targets of the attacker, of the revolutionary attacker. There are five of these power bases and psychologically or the psychological power base is the most important overarching one. The second power base is the security of the State. The third one is the integrity of the State itself, it's also called the political power base, the constitutional power base. The fourth one is the economic power base that deals with everything that gives a country its political impetus and growth. The fifth one is the social power base which deals with human beings in their daily life. The last three, so-called "sem" power bases are also known as the prosperity power bases.

As far as the 80/20% principle is concerned here, this principle was for the first time used by a Frenchman in the war in Algeria. It was identified by him as on the hand indicative of the fact that the counter-revolutionary effort as well as the revolutionary effort should be aimed at the 80%, namely economic, political and social, and that the security power base only rates at a 20% degree of importance. And in conventional war it is totally different because there the integrity of the Security Forces will be the most important power base. Here the issue is to gain control over the State and the economy and the entire social environment of the State.

MR KNOETZE: Were you at the time already aware of this approach, this 80/20% approach?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, yes, I was.

MR KNOETZE: And was that also manifested in Katzen and Strelitzia?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. If we look at the chief objective of both plans then we'll see that both plans were striding for normalisation as its end result. Perhaps if I may just define normalisation and stabilisation. Normalisation deals with the social area and you talk of a normalised community or civilisation where the whole populace is economically active and where there is an organised social system, then you can say such a whole system is normalised. Stabilisation on the other hand is a term which is used in connection with the security terrain. Stabilisation then indicates that a man or person and all his bodies and institutions are safe and secure and that he has freedom of movement.

There is another term which is used as far as the psychological power base is concerned, and that is dependability and lack of vulnerability and that indicates how prepared a country is to prepare itself. That is something we had to look at as well.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Paragraph 47

"The area of responsibility included the RSA and South African/Namibia and was therefore the main focus of defence and the base area for all military activities. The area of influence, also referred to as the tactical area, included the immediate neighbouring territories, some of which provided base facilities for hostile action against the RSA and Namibia. According to the national strategy the SADF had to have the capacity of conducting preventative and preemptive operations in those areas."

Now this principle, was this embodied in Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Transkei and Ciskei was within my sphere of influence, and the surrounding commands of Natal, Free State and Southern Cape were also within my spheres of interest and influence. The Southern Cape later became part of my area of responsibility. The area of responsibility was the Eastern Province, from East London, Aliwal North and later as far as Graaff-Reinet. The areas of responsibility also included the territorial waters of that area.

I was responsible for, as far as the area of influence was concerned, to also put place certain normalisation and stabilisation programmes in conjunction with those countries' Defence Forces.

MR KNOETZE: On page 134, paragraph 52 and 53

"This all developed at the stage that the ANC was vigorously applying its new strategy. The Regional Political Military Committees (RMPCs) with their machineries or military task groups were being established in Maputo, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Lusaka and later Zimbabwe. Violence in the country escalated. MK cadres played an important role in intensifying the internal onslaught, and the political and military training of MK members inside the country and in the neighbouring areas was ongoing. MK began to establish military structures and political cells in some of the township areas, which developed into base or so-called "no-go" areas. From 1984 onwards the internal conflict in the RSA started entering its worst and most uncompromising phase. There was a shift in emphasis from hard to soft targets. This shift saw the degeneration of the armed struggle and the destruction of the lives and property of innocent civilians. In the ensuing five years nearly 400 persons were necklaced and another 370 died, when their persons or homes were doused with fuel and set alight. More than 7 000 private homes and 1 700 schools were destroyed or severely damaged during rioting over the same period. In one year alone, between 1985 and 1986, damage of approximately R90-million was caused through rioting."

You've already referred to this before, but do you confirm that this was also a manifest in the Cape, in the Eastern Cape?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And you ask the Committee then to also take that into consideration when Plan Katzen is evaluated?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR KNOETZE: The same then also goes for paragraph 54

"It was also during this time that the SADF had to accept more responsibility for internal operations in support of the SA Police, and the Minister of Defence reported to parliament as follows

"The present situation in the RSA in which unrest is occurring on a larger scale than before, has made the employment of the SA Defence Force in support of the SA Police in the prevention and combatting of unrest inevitable. It is essential to create and maintain peaceful conditions in which the government's constitution initiatives may be developed."

You also ask the Committee to bear that in mind?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to take you to page 138, paragraph 62

"From the above paragraphs it should be obvious that the national and departmental planning process was ongoing and of a dynamic nature, with constant adaptations according to the actual and perceived threats."

Now could one regard Plan Katzen also as a plan of a dynamic nature?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, definitely.

MR KNOETZE: In what regard, in what way?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Plan Katzen addressed all the power bases in Transkei/Ciskei and the adjacent areas. It wasn't a standard and normal conventional Defence Force plan, it actually went far beyond the conventional Defence Force planning in order to establish a total normalisation of these areas. It was dynamic in the sense that it was a revolutionary situation which required a revolutionary plan, and there was no precedent for that.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Page 139, paragraph 68

"The SADF was acutely aware of the fact that the solution to the revolutionary struggle was only 20% military and 80% political. More importantly, it was often the SADF itself that warned the political leaders that the solution to the conflict in South Africa was not to be sought through military means, but by political restitution."

You have referred to this before, do you confirm it again?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And was that also embodied in Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Not only in Katzen but also in another plan which I wrote in the previous year, Plan Strelitzia. I think it was embodied in all the civil affairs programmes which we applied and ...(intervention)

MR KNOETZE: Please just stop there. What civilian affairs programmes were you personally involved in?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well as I said, the placing of doctors and vets and teachers and other professional conscripts which we had, especially in the Ciskei and the Transkei and also in other areas. So that those people could use their skills and share their skills to the advantage of the local community. Once again, to be able to establish a normal local community.

MR KNOETZE: Could you then also refer the Committee to the regional Development Advice Committee?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the Regional Development Advice Committee (SOAK) was, these were organs - this was Region D and probably still is Region D, this body had to look at the coordinating of the regional development. The Eastern Province was under the Chairmanship of Mr Louis Koch from the Department of Constitutional Affairs, and I also served on that Committee.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Page 140, paragraph 70

"Because of the lack of urgency of the 80% component and the sterility in regard to meaningful political solutions, the SADF applied itself in areas that were beyond its normal functions, and in the process infringed on the tasks and terrain of others, but not without government authorization."

Would you like to just explain that to us?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well, I can link that to the Eastern Province Command in this way: We were not a social welfare department, we were a security department but as a result of the very specific composition we had a lot of social welfare sources and capacity, and I utilised these sources and capacity in respect of the 80% part of the war. I tried, along with the Social Welfare Departments, to try and achieve normalisation on those areas.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 71

The military also made use of unconventional methods as part of its strategy. Those were not normal times, and the conflict in the RSA was not an isolated bush war. On the contrary, the ANC's position in this regard was clear: We do not have forests in South Africa, the military machine would smash us if we tried to send an army from outlying areas. Our masses have to serve as our bush. The black community is our bush."

Is that the way you saw it at the time?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. That is typical of revolutionary warfare, the population is the actual bush, the terrain, and we also moved on that terrain, we had to. And plans such as Strelitzia and Katzen may be regarded as non-standard, unusual or unconventional plans.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 161, paragraph 48

"The State Security Council (SSC) as the main focus of the National Security Management System, was instituted by parliament in 1972, Act 64 of 1972, as a result of the need to formulate national security policy and to create an active national security system. The SSC was preceded by the State Security Advisory Board ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze, we don't have page 162. We've got page 161, but not page 162.

MR KNOETZE: Is it only the one page that the Committee does not have? I'm sending mine up, Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: There are some, I think about two other pages but you did not refer to them. I'm not sure if it is necessary to get them. I think that was - according to my note here, that was 148, 152 and 154.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, could Advocate Sandi just please repeat the pages that he does not have.

ADV SANDI: That would be 148, 152 and 154.

MR MAPOMA: And 164.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Knoetze, you can proceed.

MR KNOETZE: General, we've already referred to this system, can you just once again confirm that in effect it had quite a material influence on your task at the time. In other words, you constantly had to juggle these three hats, you couldn't only be the Commanding Officer of the Eastern Province Command and do the easy thing and attack the terrorists or rig up roadblocks etc.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. I must say the military part of it was far simpler than the non-military part, and the Welfare Departments and programmes actually took up a lot of my time. I was personally involved in those things, that is the 80% part of the war.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 193, paragraph 7. It says

"The legal base for the SADF's involvement in internal and external operations stems from the following

(a) The SADF was the official instrument of the RSA Government, created in terms of the RSA Constitution with the object of protecting the sovereignty of the State, its territorial integrity and its people.

(b) The State President as Head of the State, was also the supreme commander of the SADF in terms of the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and had the authority to employ the SADF for service in terms of the provisions of the Defence Act 1957."

And then (c) on page 194:

"Employment of the SADF: The State President with the approval of parliament, employed the SADF for service in defence of the RSA in prevention of suppression of communism and for the prevention or suppression of internal unrest within the Republic of South Africa."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Knoetze, we don't have page 194.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I must say we find all this very surprising. I don't want to pass the blame but the copying of the documents done in your possession was not done by us.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm not blaming anybody, I'm just saying we haven't got it.

MR KNOETZE: General, you just once again request the Committee to be aware of that and to take note of that situation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And then 195, paragraph 9. That paragraph once again outlines the different responsibilities of the South African Defence Force, and are you asking the Committee to bear that in mind as well?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: 196, paragraph 11

"Both the revolutionary movements and the SADF realised the importance of the areas of tactical influence, i.e. the areas in neighbouring territories adjacent to the RSA, for operational and strategical reasons as explained in Chapter 1. Since the SADF was not allowed to permanently occupy these areas, tactics and capabilities had to be developed to conduct the operations efficiently into these areas from secure bases in the RSA or South West Africa/Namibia. Although external operations were directed against the armed elements of revolutionary movements, provision had to be made for possible intervention by armed forces of neighbouring countries. Being a landward threat, the Army, i.e. land forces, was the primary role-player in these tactical operations, supported by other arms of the service."

Would you like to comment on that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the paragraph deals with actions and spheres of influence, a sphere of influence which adjoins your area of responsibility. In my case the Ciskei and Transkei were my areas of influence, and I had a tactical interest in stability in those two countries.

There were two organs, namely the Transkei Joint Management System and the Ciskei Joint Management Council or System, which we used as the co-ordinating platform for promoting stability in these two countries.

MR KNOETZE: Can the Committee then accept that the mere fact that Plan Strelitzia and Plan Katzen involved those countries is not at all strange, but in the light of this fell within the broader guidelines of what was expected of you?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct. That is also spelt out in my command, letter of command. It was said that I was responsible for the stability in those countries.

MR KNOETZE: I then read paragraph 12 on that page

"Targets were however also identified in the so-called area of interest, i.e. areas beyond the reach of the SADF tactical capabilities, which were referred to as the enemy arrear areas. These targets were mainly targets for reconnaissance or interdiction activities and were typical Special Forces or Intelligence gathering assignments."

Is that also correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. The area of interest is actually, well what it says is the area of interest, which in my case was in fact the rest of South Africa where I didn't actually act, in the context of paragraph 12, the areas of interest were countries as far as central Africa. That is what is referred to here.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I note that it is 1 o'clock. It is convenient to adjourn at this stage if it is the time that you're intending to adjourn.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll take the lunch adjournment now for three quarters of an hour and start again at a quarter to two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze, you may proceed.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Chairperson. Chairperson, it seems as if there might be a problem with the concepts normalisation and stabilisation. Could we perhaps just interrupt for a moment and go to page 870 in the second part of Annexure C.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think there - was there a problem? In what way? I think the General defined both concepts fairly succinctly.

MR KNOETZE: Alright. Perhaps everybody's understanding isn't as good as yours, Mr Chairman. May I briefly? It won't take long to page 870.

General, would you briefly just refer to 870 and just explain what you've written down there and what it refers to?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is a schematic diagram of the essence of revolutionary warfare and the target area in this war are the elements of the State's power bases, which appears in the middle of that page, and those components of the power base we referred to as security, psychological, constitutional, economic and the welfare aspect. Those last three form a so-called welfare aspect of revolutionary warfare and the security component or the power base has an operational and information component. Overarchingly the security component was managed by what was known as the "FYKOM" or the Security Committee. Then there was a joint operational centre for operations, meaning the joint operations of the South African Police and the South African Defence Force or joint operations between the Defence Forces of the Transkei, Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa. In the same say there was a Joint Information Centre, the JIC, where information was collected and co-ordinated.

The psychological component of the power base. That typically, according to revolutionary warfare, had three components, namely the protection of the own forces, also of the population as a whole, and then the attack of the enemy's moral. This psychological component was mostly waged by means of discrediting actions and pamphlets, communication actions etc.

Then the 80/20% principle. The 80% was the welfare area of this war and the 20% was the security aspect of it.

Then the management of the power bases. That was what was important. The State or the public section tried in co-operation with other parties, tried to stabilise the security component and the psychological component, to prepare the populists to defend themselves, and on the welfare section, to normalise. And the enemy on the other hand, in this case the ANC/SACP alliance primarily, by means of violent actions and non-violent actions tried to destabilise the security component and tried to create an abnormal situation as far as welfare is concerned and also to undermine our moral psychologically. I think that is in the broad lines the revolutionary warfare aspect.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 196, paragraph 13 there

"Although the SADF was employed for service in defence of the RSA and in prevention of suppression of terrorism, no external operation could be conducted without government (political) approval."

Do you confirm that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. Once again the reference here is to the national context and to actions outside our national borders. In the Eastern Cape I was responsible for actions in the Ciskei and Transkei, I had to co-ordinate that from my headquarters and I had to obtain approval and authorization for any plans, or actions to be launched in those areas.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, was that also embodied in Plan Katzen? Is that a plan for which you needed this kind of approval?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. And for that reason I directed Plan Katzen personally at the Chief of the Defence Force.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 203, paragraph 24

"In SA Defence Force context the SA Army had the primary responsibility for the conduct of landward operations, which included counter-revolutionary operations, whilst the other three arms of the service played a mainly supportive role."

Do you confirm that as well?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. It was my responsibility to wage the counter-revolutionary war in the Eastern Province.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 210, paragraph (f). That gives an outline of the development of the unrest in the RSA. And are you requesting the Committee to also bear that in mind, to take note of that"

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 213, paragraph 31

"Counter-insurgency guidelines as explained in Chapter 2 of this submission. The counter-insurgency war was conducted on a decentralised basis, where regional command structures conducted operations within the framework of guidelines issues by the SADF Headquarters. The guidelines for counter-insurgency as contained in the strategy, according to which regional commands were to involve the SADF in internal operations, were briefed as follows: ..."

... and it continues in:

(a) "Evaluation of the nature and scope of the threat of subversion in co-operation with other organisations within the Intelligence community."

Now was that also done?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. That was done by means of the Joint Information Centre as well as the centres which we had in the Transkei and the Ciskei for information and Intelligence.

MR KNOETZE: Would you also say that that was embodied in Plan Strelitzia and Plan Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 216, paragraph 32

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Knoetze, we don't have pages 215, 216, 217 or 21 - wait, sorry, it's just 219 is in the wrong place. I've got it. They've put page 219 in front of 215, so I have got it.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, we sent out original down to Cape Town, and we've now made an arrangement with the Evidence Leader. I believe that he's now going to assist by handing up ...

CHAIRPERSON: We've got 216. I thought we didn't have it because 219 was out of place, and when I turned the page over from 215, it was 219. 216 followed 219, so I've got it.

MR KNOETZE: General, I'd like to take you back to 216, paragraph 32

"The SADF as an organisation, has a decentralised command structure, meaning that the authority and responsibility and execution and functioning of the SADF is delegated."

And then the last portion of that quote:

"Army Headquarters then exercised control and monitoring as well as liaison functions."

Is that what you've also referred to previously, as to how this system worked?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct. The Chief of the Army, after the plan was presented to him by me, sent one of his officers to Port Elizabeth. And at the stage when Katzen was referred to the Chief of Staff and a Project Officer was appointed, both of those officers, Chief of the Army and the Chief of Staff had to monitor and control or exercise monitoring and controlling functions on behalf of those bodies.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 242, paragraph 59. It concerns the involvement of the TBVC countries of the South African Army and also its involvement in the self-governing territories. Can you explain how you in your capacity with your three functions, how you were involved in this, broadly speaking.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. As joint Chairperson of the Joint Management Council I was responsible for the development, the Army's development of these countries was taking place according to schedule, that the budget was judiciously employed and used, and I was also responsible for, along with the Heads of the Defence Force of these countries and the GBR's, in terms of the GBR's, to ensure that the correct training was being given and when joint operations were necessary, that is was planned and that the carrying out of these actions were monitored.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, that is all that we wish to refer to in that part of Exhibit C at this stage. If we may now return to the other section please, more specifically to page 760.

General, please tell the Committee what is the nature of this document.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, this is a policy document which deals with the national or the RSA's interests, the country's government and the purpose or objectives of the government. And it also sets out certain guidelines for an eventual constitutional dispensation in Southern Africa. It was dated 4 March 1980, and it was approved by the Cabinet.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, may I just indicate to you that this is a document which is referred to in the presentation by the SANDF, and is indicated in paragraph 27(a) on page 15, to be Annexure A.

General, could we then go to page 761. Could you please tell us when this document was written, if you look at paragraph 1.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On the 4th of March 1980 it was approved.

MR KNOETZE: Now this was sometime before you wrote plan Strelitzia and Katzen. In your opinion, does it have any relevance to Katzen and Strelitzia?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it does. The contents of this is relevant to both Strelitzia and Katzen.

MR KNOETZE: Did those guidelines not change over that period?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was supplemented by several guideline documents which came from the State Security Council at the JMC, and was dealt with in that way.

MR KNOETZE: But the essence of it stayed the same?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR KNOETZE: The document says in 1.1, that the document was limited to Ministers and heads of departments. So how did you become aware of the contents of this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't recall that it came to me in the Eastern Cape Command in this form, but the content of this was made known to me by means of guidelines and documents from the Secretariat of the State Security Council.

MR KNOETZE: Yes. Can I refer you to, for instance, paragraph 3. What is the essence of paragraph 3?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The guideline must be employed immediately in the Management of the RSA's national security and social welfare systems. That was the task of the JMCs.

MR KNOETZE: Right. Then page 762, paragraph 1.1. Will you please read that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Southern Africa is currently in a situation of a total conflict and can, if there is no solution soon, can be destroyed completely.

MR KNOETZE: And despite the fact that the report had already been drafted in 1980?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. I may just add that this was the situation in 1980, that was the view of the situation in 1980. And in my experience, after 1980 it became worse, and by the mid-80's it was a very serious matter.

MR KNOETZE: Which then by implication required a more urgent to the problem?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Can we then go to page 763, paragraph 1.10 up to 1.11.2. Please read that.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: 1.10

"It is clear that the idea of a constellation of Southern African States offers the most hopeful alternative for the subcontinent and must be actively promoted."

1.11

"To establish a Southern African constellation of States, it is essential that the RSA firstly, in consultation with the leaders of all States in Southern African areas, areas of common interest, to develop these areas and use these as a means of averting the two-front attack. This means destabilisation and the normalisation processes. Joint action is an urgent essential on all four the power bases, namely economic, constitutional and social and security."

2nd point:

"As far as the black nations are concerned, these must be given self-determination based on ethnicity in order to consolidate the entire area and to motivate them positively."

MR KNOETZE: Once again the chorus that I keep asking you, was that embodied in Strelitzia and Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, especially the last paragraph, that is essential to Katzen and also Strelitzia.

MR KNOETZE: 764, paragraph 1.14.1, the last paragraph. It starts with

"Meaningful consolidation of the black states in areas and their incorporation into a South African league of nations respectively, as full members or associate members as well as the successful instilling of an own constitutional consciousness amongst the black people of South Africa will lead to greater trust and a relief of the internal conflict and tension which will be accompanied by a decrease in the internal threat."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Plan Katzen in particular wanted to give the Xhosa people a Xhosa country and to give them their own constitutional dispensation.

MR KNOETZE: And then 766, paragraph 2.1

"The RSA today is waging a war of survival to ensure the survival of its peoples and the enemy is making use of the means at its disposal to bring a black majority government to power. And during this attack, the enemy is making use not only of traditional methods of warfare, but also of co-ordinated and orchestrated actions on various areas or total war, total onslaught. The RSA must therefore also make use of a total strategy in which it uses all the powers at its disposal to realise its own aims and so to avert the threat and the onslaught against it."

Was that the chorus of the time, the total onslaught and the total strategy?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes Chairperson. It reflected the slogan or the motto of a revolutionary war.

MR KNOETZE: 768, paragraph 3.3

"The RSA's national objectives was to achieve the national goal and to ensure the survival of the RSA and all its people, and the government therefore places the following objectives in the picture:"

And then the political, economic, social and then the security objectives to which you have referred are set out there.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes. Both Plan Katzen and Plan Strelitzia promoted and strove to achieve these purposes and objectives.

MR KNOETZE: And then on the same page, 3.5.1.3

"The establishment of constitutional structures providing for full independence of the respective black peoples of the Republic, meaningful consolidation of black States and areas, and the acceptance of a socioeconomic program aimed at the effective development of these States and areas."

Now more specifically the meaning consolidation idea, is that what was also intended by Strelitzia and Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Katzen - in respect of the Ciskei and the Transkei, Katzen was aimed at that and it wanted to establish to Xhosa people in one Xhosa country, whilst Strelitzia wanted to establish the independence of these two countries and acknowledge their independence and wanted to join these two in a sort of a partnership with the Eastern Cape, as a power base.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Page 769, paragraph 3.8.4., under the heading: Social and psychological policy

"To allow the peoples of South Africa to live in peace and harmony and to foster respect for each other's way of life and to co-operate to achieve the national objective."

The harmony area or the harmony idea, is that something which you also dealt with in Katzen and Strelitzia?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the ideals spelt out in this paragraph were not visible on the ground. There was certainly no harmony between the Ciskei and the Transkei and these plans were an attempt at least to cause the Xhosa people to live together as one people.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 776. This time it falls under The Security Policy

"In consultation with the black State leaders to establish a military treaty organisation in Southern Africa."

Have you got the place?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. Plan Katzen, there you find the recommendation that an Eastern Cape Treaty Organisation be established between the countries in this area, in this region.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 780, under Psychological, Social Policy

"The image of the resistance movements, who fostered an anti-South African image, to topple the governments of these States."

Now the resistance movements, did that also form part of Plan Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was an inherent part of it. It was one of the initial phases of Katzen to establish a Xhosa resistance movement to achieve this aim.

MR KNOETZE: Then could we go to the next document, it starts on page 791. Could you please tell us what is that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is a summary of a book written by General Fraser. If I'm correct it was in the late '60's, maybe the beginning of the '70's. ...(end of tape)

... he wrote this based on a revolutionary war as a modern war which was waged in Algeria, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia in the century. The book that he wrote was actually our first introduction and text book as far as revolutionary warfare was concerned, and although during the writing and the use of the book there was a period of a couple of decades that had elapsed, it was still applicable for us.

MR KNOETZE: And the ideas reflected in this book were at the time also known to you, you'd read the book at the time and you'd studied the book?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Could you refer to paragraph 4 and 12. 4 says

"It is essential to create an environment that is not conducive to a successful revolution."

12

"The life of the people under the government must be made perceptibly better than that offered by the insurgents or that in areas infested or controlled by insurgents."

Were these ideas then embodied in your plans for Strelitzia and Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, Chair. It was almost impossible for a revolution to succeed if there was normal community life. If there isn't a place for alternative structures, to create a base for the revolutionary structures and both then aimed to normalise the abnormal situation in the community at this stage.

MR KNOETZE: Then the next document, page 795, Chair.

Could you perhaps just explain what this document is?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, this gives the schematic exposition of the National Security Management System, and then it draws the line from Cabinet through the State Security Council - there in the middle where you have the institutions, the Committee, the WK, the Working Committee to the Secretariat of the State Security Council. Those that I have mentioned are on national level. Then on the regional level there were 13 regions in the country. Each region had its JMS and then you also had sub-JMS structures, and then also you had mini-JMS, and that was based on the local magistrates districts.

MR KNOETZE: You then at the 13 JMCs, that is where you fitted in?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: Then we go to page 796. This document is dated 27 February '86. In other words, that was compiled at a stage when you had written on the one side about Strelitzia and on the other side about Katzen. Could you perhaps just indicate to the Committee what relevance this document has with regards to those two plans.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, this document or the content of this document was conveyed to us as Chairpersons of the respective JMCs, and as it is stated there it had to be utilised in this whole situation, in the unrest situation in the total onslaught in the country.

MR KNOETZE: Now just for detail, whose document is this, where does it come from?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is the document of the Secretariat of the State Security Council. It was usually compiled for the State Security Council and then on departmental level it was then given for execution or to take note of.

I could perhaps just add, it was also then given tot he different chairpersons on the national level.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 797, paragraph (e) to (h), could you perhaps just read that for us.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph (e)

"The RSA already has to do with a national revolution and cannot lose its power base internally. Something must be found that will be against the alternative structures, or then to establish it in the absence thereof. Should the current unrest not be brought under control, it would lead to open revolution where the youth would play an executing role. The RSA is busy losing the struggle. Black leaders say that in which they believe and it also has the necessary support.

(f): In the absence of an acceptable political structures for black people then makes the task of the enemy easier should structures such as Inkatha perhaps not be established for black people as a political way of expressing themselves and to act against radical action. The revolution is about power and the question is, if there are any credible black leaders who are still prepared to discuss the sharing of power on our terms. If that should not succeed the alternative would be an escalation in the physical power struggle. The security community's view is that the position has deteriorated in the past six months and the RSA cannot counter the revolutionary onslaught with physical power. The constitutional option should now be preferable in order to make this constitutional development process more visible. The accent should be placed on the role of the parliamentary political power so that they cannot then increase their power outside of the parliament. It is important that action be taken now because it can now still be done from a position of power."

MR KNOETZE: That is quite a bit. Let's look at paragraph (g) and the reference made to credible black leaders. Now did you try with your plans to involve such people?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, yes. There were quite a few Xhosa leaders in the Ciskei and the Transkei. Kaizer Matanzima, even in the period where he had retired he still had tremendous influence. His brother George as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence also had that kind of support.

Then in the Ciskei there were members of the blue blood chiefs such as Chief Lent Makoma, Ray Mali. I can remember Deputy-President Kaba, Namba Sebe, the brother of Charles Sebe. Now they were all political exiles. They had been accepted in the Transkei and they were figures of power for the Xhosa people. We considered them to be credible leaders. I can also include Charles Sebe on the security terrain.

MR KNOETZE: Now just to put it all together. Should your Plans Strelitzia or Katzen have been executed then these people would have been able to govern the Xhosas.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes I believe that, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: Just for interest's sake, the people that you have referred to now, have you seen any of these people here?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Chairperson, I greeted Chief Lent Makoma outside of the hall earlier this morning.

MR KNOETZE: If we can go to paragraph (i) on page 798, it says

"There must a distinction made between the prevention of conflict in the management or handling of conflict, or solving the conflict. Opportunities must be identified and used."

Once again, is that what you tried to do?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Strelitzia was primarily focused on the prevention of conflict by establishing the necessary structures. When Katzen was compile a year later, conflict had already escalated. And that was not only in trying to prevent it, but also managing the existing conflict.

MR KNOETZE: Now the first part of that paragraph is then confirmed, the ordinary actions of the Security Forces were not sufficient anymore.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: If we can turn to the next document that starts on page 799. Once again, could you perhaps just tell the Committee what the nature of this document is?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is a document from the Secretariat of the State Security Council, April 1986. It refers to the guidelines for a strategy against the counter-revolutionary war in the country.

MR KNOETZE: More specifically page 802, paragraph 15

"Then in the final analysis concerning the strategic situation, two aspects are clear and that is that the RSA is caught up in a spiralling threat and it cannot be contained by applying security aspects."

Does that confirm what you had already said? How did you have to get out of the spiral?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at that time we told one another that in our terminology we had to think outside of the fire to address the situation in the Eastern Cape. I can now perhaps think that it was quite desperate perhaps that we thought that we had to think radically different to address the problems that were in existence then.

MR KNOETZE: And then once again, Katzen is the result of that radical thinking.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I would also add Strelitzia to that, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: And then on the same page, paragraph 18(a)(1), the last part there

"The government also does not have a political model which would compete with the so-called freedom charter."

Do you confirm that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: But then again, those plans of your then had the aim to provide a workable alternative?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, on regional basis, yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 805, paragraph 4 and 5

"Neighbouring States then provide political and moral support to the revolutionary organisations and the ANC, and then also makes it a springboard for terror actions and the bringing in of weapons and equipment. The ANC as well as the PAC plans to develop Transkei and Ciskei as bases, whilst Boputhatswana would be used as a thoroughfare for both of them."

Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it is. It can also be linked to what Modise had said, that the black had to be the bush for the revolutionary. Now we had the fear that States such as Transkei and Ciskei would become part of this bush and then bases would be developed there for revolutionary action against the parts closest to them in South Africa.

MR KNOETZE: Page 806, 19(a).1

"The fact that at the moment there is not an overarching constitutional model within which the political aspirations of the majority of black people can be accommodated in an acceptable way does not take away the fact that there is a measure of friendliness among the blacks. Now this does not give the opportunity for this constructive development."

Now were there black people who had goodwill in your area of command?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson yes, there were people who had goodwill, they could understand the propels that I had made and to a large degree they had in fact co-operated insofar as we could then carry out these aspects.

MR KNOETZE: Now what were their constitutional aspirations with regards to the Xhosa nation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The life ideal of especially Kaizer Matanzima, the President, but also that of his brother George, was to unite the Xhosa people, to make it one nation. That was a threat continuing to all the different Chiefs.

MR KNOETZE: Just to state that once again, your plans would have assisted them in expressing their ideals?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it wasn't anything new, there were different thoughts expressed by the different leaders concerning one Xhosa State, one nation, one country. It was tried - they formulated and tried to carry it out, but in a counter-revolutionary sense it would have been to our advantage because it would have created a partner for us in this counter-revolutionary struggle.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then on the same page, 19(a).3

"The existence of anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha, a so-called cultural organisation or the ZCC that is religious, as well as the ethnic factor in the South African community makes the preparation for and the denial of a coherent revolutionary onslaught difficult."

Now you have already referred to it in Plan Katzen. In Plan Katzen there's also such organisation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is what we called the XWB, that is the Xhosa movement. There was also the name Ilizalomsa added to that or linked to it. And Chief Makoma also formed a party, that is the Ciskei People's Protection Rights Party and we also saw that as possible counter-revolutionary fronts.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 809, paragraph 20. There is states

"The aim, based on everything said above, was to win the revolutionary war."

Now what did you want to do there?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now at that stage, Chairperson, it was perhaps a bit ambitious because the revolution had progressed quite far but we still tried. And I think it was in Katzen that this aim is also expressed, and that is then that this war had to be won. I think it was in '86.

MR KNOETZE: The following document, page 821. On that page, item 4, the second part, the guidelines are approved and one has to read it then in conjunction with that which is said on page 822 and 823, and that is the strategy that is encountering the ANC. Now who gave this approval?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now this page 821 is taken from the minutes of the State Security Council, a meeting that was held. Item 4 just states that the guidelines to follow have been approved and it had to be sent to the different departments to be carried out.

MR KNOETZE: If we can then continue to 823, paragraph 3, the second part. It refers to the TVB States, the national States. Now these States are being identified as targets and as springboards and thoroughfares used, and that is to increase the terror actions and unrest in the RSA, so it also refers to Transkei and Ciskei. Can you just confirm that that was the situation at the time?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, especially with regard to the Ciskei. In comparison to the Transkei, it was more disorganised with regards to the Security Forces but also in the government. President Lennox Sebe got rid of several senior Ministers, many of them got asylum in the Transkei. But not only with regard to security but also constitutionally the Ciskei had problems in their whole balancing of the system, so it created opportunities for the ANC to establish itself there. The Transkei on the other hand was controlled by the Army as well as the State itself. So this more directed towards the Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: Page 825, paragraph (i) says

"The existence of the extension of the black political parties or groups, moderate parties, could be seen as a counteraction against the ANC."

Now that is then referring to those aims referred to earlier.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct. Our perception in the Eastern Cape at that time was that Inkatha and the then Natal Indaba could have been seen as partners for the counter-revolutionaries, the RSA Government. And on the smaller regional base the idea was then to establish the Xhosa Resistance Movement and then also to link that with Chief Makoma's party that he established.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then on page 829 there is an appendix to this document that we have just referred to. Can you go to page 832 of that annexure, paragraph 13. It says

"The ANC views the TBVC States as part of the RSA and then also tries to increase its revolutionary actions in the short term in these States. Although limited in scope there was also then an increase in the ANC activities in the TBVC States."

Do you agree with that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. The basic idea was to establish the Xhosa nation as a counter-revolutionary base against the ANC/SACP.

MR KNOETZE: Now at the bottom of the page, paragraph 14, the last sentence

"It is also envisaged that the ANC's onslaught in the TBVC and the national State will be increased."

Did that happen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it also happened, even before this was stated.

MR KNOETZE: Then we continue to the next document, page 837. Once again there is a document which appears to be minutes, Item 6 says

"With reference to the draft national strategy against the revolutionary onslaught against the RSA, that this document, Schedule 2 to the Agenda, is handed in and is also accepted with certain changes and its also accepted by the meeting."

Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And the document referred to is on page 838, that specific document. And then also there is one on page 839, is that correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 2, in the middle

"Through that normality and stabilisation should be established wherein the other components then of the power base should be applied with great efficiency and then also used on the longer term."

So it does seem as if they are now starting to think of the things that you referred to earlier?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. That is also the purpose and aim of this plan, that in '86 the whole issue concerning stabilisation had started disappearing and the view was that you could only win this on the social side. So the idea was that the social welfare departments or these departments of the government should also play their role and do their bit, and that you can only contain and counter this revolution if you also have or pay attention to the social welfare aspect.

MR KNOETZE: Now this links to paragraph 4. And the government then also committed itself to political power-sharing with all the groups in South Africa and they also have then this specific that they give there.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. So Plan Katzen and Strelitzia would then on regional basis create power-sharing.

MR KNOETZE: And then if we have a look at paragraph (a) on page 841, it says

The political aspirations of black nations in the RSA and the exclusion of the current constitutional dispensation is a strong base which is used by the revolutionaries. And that is then against the RSA government."

Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And paragraph (m) also says

"With hard intimidation and the development of alternative structures the revolutionaries had already succeeded in establishing free areas in certain black communities."

Were there such areas in the communities?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, there were. At that time there were already some of those, especially where the local councils were then substituted with other structures where there were school boycotts. And these so-called free areas were well established. Now our fear was that these areas would then also extend to the Transkei and Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: 842, paragraph 8(b) refers to the RSA's ability to counter the revolution. It is summarised by saying that

"The existence of anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha and the ZCC as well as the ethnic factor in the South African community makes the preparation for a coherent revolutionary onslaught difficult."

Did you also experience it in such a way?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. It just underlines what we said earlier, and that is that you have partners in a revolutionary war, and on regional basis we tried then with this resistance movement that we wanted to establish.

MR KNOETZE: 844, paragraph (c) which is part of the security aims. It is says

"That one of the objectives was to mobilise groups as individuals to protect themselves and then also to act against the revolutionary actions."

So am I correct in saying that we're now referring to the Xhosa resistance movement?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 847, is part of a document that starts on 845

"Objectives and overarching actions against the revolutionary powers."

At the bottom of the page there is a part that says:

"That on the psychological terrain the aim was to express self-determination for nations."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct. The idea was that there should be self-determination for the Xhosa nation as one nation.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 854, paragraph 3.1 and 3.2 - sorry Chairperson, paragraph 8.1.

"One of the actions suggested is moderate blacks should be assisted to organise politically for evolutionary development and then also the active combatting of the radicals, and also to prevent this political vacuum to be used by these revolutionaries."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Was that also one of your intentions?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that was specifically the plan with Katzen.

MR KNOETZE: The following document is on page 870. You have already explained that. 871, could you just tell us what type of document this is?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we - we don't need a lesson in military structures etc., if you can just explain it generally. Let's not spend too much time on it.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: 871 and the following pages is an extract from a doctrine for a counter-insurgency war. Now this is an umbrella document, and I think what we have already referred to is contained here. We as commanders have had some experience and we then formulated this. There isn't anything new, it's just a summary. On page 1 it refers to that there are two, they are trying to get the power. Now the institution who also controls the power war then wins the war. The other aspects we have in fact already discussed.

On page 874, now this is the recipe to win this and then to concentrate on the development of social welfare. I think it just underlines what we have already discussed. It is a summary. I was the chairperson of this committee who also compiled this part.

MR KNOETZE: You've now sketched the background against which we must see the way you performed your functions at the time. I'd now like to take you to page 529 of Exhibit C. Please tell the Committee what document is it that starts on this page?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On this page and the following pages as far as page 692, Plan Strelitzia is set out. The plan itself is from 529 to 667, 668 actually. And from 669 to the end follows the minute of a meeting held in Pretoria after Plan Strelitzia had been announced to the State Security Council.

MR KNOETZE: Alright, let's start with the idea. What is the idea that is embodied in Plan Strelitzia?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The basic idea was to establish a counter-revolutionary authority structure for the Eastern Cape, which would then join together the RSA and its allies and act as a counter-power base to the ANC/SACP alliance.

MR KNOETZE: On page 532 there is a foreword. Did you write the foreword?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Would you please read it to the Committee.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On page 532

"Plan Strelitzia was born from the Eastern Cape soil. Against the background of the reigning revolutionary climate, a plan was decided upon, a plan of action to mobilise the entire population of Region D.

As a point of departure a counter-revolutionary authority structure was used, which could serve as a defusing mechanism to bring about stabilisation on a multi-racial socioeconomic level. As a mirror for the counter-revolutionary authority structure we find the counter-revolutionary model which can be used as a practical guideline to combat the revolutionary climate in Region D on a psychological level.

And it is our considered opinion that the onslaught on the power bases within the RSA and specifically Region D, are currently taking place in an indirect way. We therefore are dealing with a revolutionary strategy which is being applied in an indirect way and where non-military means are chiefly used to enforce the desired outcome.

The principles which form the base of Plan Strelitzia is to within existing systems, to establish an authority structure for continuous co-ordinated action at minimal financial outlay.

Secondly, to achieve total mobilisation of the population by means of the orchestration of existing departments.

The mobilisation of the private sector or the involvement of the private sector.

Fourthly, discussions between all the racial groups.

Fifthly, counter-revolutionary measures at psychological level, with an accompanying decrease of the South African Defence Force profile. It was too high in our opinion.

Sixthly, the four pillars of strategic planning, namely social, economic, constitutional and the security power base.

Signed on the 11th of June 1985."

MR KNOETZE: That was about a year before Plan Katzen was born?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: Now this is quite a comprehensive document with many complicated structures, and with quite elevated objectives. Were you assisted by anybody to compile this document?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. As the Chairperson of the JMC, I established an Advisory Board which consisted mainly of people at the University of Port Elizabeth. And the idea behind this was to make use of advisory bodies and people outside the sphere of the State, especially on those non-security areas on which the war was being chiefly waged, namely the social and the economic area. The people that I consulted in the compiling of this Plan Strelitzia were mostly members of this advisory body. Professor Jacques Cilliers, he later became a member of the President's Council, and there was a Doctor Tertius Delport, he later became a Minister, and Doctor Johan van der Westhuizen, he was attached to the Public Studies Department of UPE. There was a Doctor White and if I remember correctly, he was a Professor of Economics. There might have been other people, I can't remember now, but they were the kind of people that we tried to involved in this planning.

MR KNOETZE: Now the principles in terms of which you drafted this, those appear on 535?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct..

MR KNOETZE: May I emphasise two, the fourth one says

"The establishment of a counter-revolutionary authority structure for peace and war."

And the 8th one:

"The decreasing of the SADF profile, scaling down of the profile."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's correct.

MR KNOETZE: And then if we can go to page 550. Once again we have the objective there.

"As part of the counter-revolutionary model for the Eastern Cape, the purpose was the defusing of the revolutionary climate on the physical and the psychological level."

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson. With the physical level we here refer to the certain power bases, social, economic, political etc.

MR KNOETZE: Page 665. There we find a summary and the last paragraph starts as follows

"The counter-revolutionary authority structure as instrument or component of a total counter-revolutionary model aims to establish a plan of action for a continuous co-ordinated employing of the total Eastern Cape capacity on all areas and terrains to achieve the national objective."

Page 666:

"The current JMC system in principle is contained within a sovereign State within the existing operational framework, and some changes to realise the counter-revolutionary authority structure may however be necessary to make the system effective and streamlined."

Could you please just explain that.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Chairperson, we did not from the outset want to create new structures, we rather wanted to involve the existing structures, the JMCs and the so-called "GBR" system, and the regional advice systems. So in other words, we wanted to work with the existing structures. The whole idea of Plan Strelitzia was on the regional level to join up all these bodies and structures so that it could jointly form a counter-revolutionary structure which also had to involve the Transkei and the Ciskei as independent States.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 686. The plan had been drafted and thereafter what did you and your co-compilers do with this plan?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: We then organised a presentation to an extended State Security Council meeting which was held in Pretoria on the 12th of June 1985, during which we, that is myself and members under my command and also members of the Advisory Board mentioned just now, we all went to Pretoria to present this plan.

MR KNOETZE: And 686, do we see there a list of the people present at that meeting?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Minister Vlok was the Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: How was the plan received?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: We were disappointed, Chairperson. It was quite clear after we'd made our presentation that there was quite a considerable degree of confusion and also lack of understanding. The plan was not approved and we went back to Port Elizabeth without our plan having been approved.

MR KNOETZE: Now without boasting, what do you think would have happened if the plan had been approved? How would it have affected this situation which existed in the Eastern Cape, or later existed in the Eastern Cape?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the idea was to establish a representative regional government which would then be involved in one structure. I can perhaps add that - maybe it will make it will make it clearer, we were convinced that the tri-cameral parliament at a national level could not combat the counter-revolutionary war in our favour. So the idea which you then see in Strelitzia is to, on a local and a regional level, to have a four chamber parliament in which all those structures are involved and joined in one structure and which would then form the basis of a counter-power base against the revolutionaries. That is why we presented the plan as we did with various options to the State Security Council.

Now I personally think that the plan was ahead of its time, the internal political climate was not yet receptive, ready for this.

MR KNOETZE: But certain portions of the principles and ideas that you've mentioned now, for instance the idea that an area should be governed by all four the population groups, the four chamber idea, was that every applied on a local management level? For instance I think here of the system which was in place in Adelaide.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. By means of an experiment we looked at certain of the smaller more manageable areas to try to find out how could such a local government system function as a fully representational system - Bedford, maybe Adelaide as well. In those areas we consulted the community leaders from all the population groups and we brought them together under the auspices of the white council at the time. And in that forum these people had a say on behalf of their communities and that worked very well and it also helped us to combat the alternative structures which sprung up everywhere.

MR KNOETZE: Alright. Now just to emphasis the other point, General. In Plan Strelitzia, were there any hard military options outlined?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No. No, it's a non-military plan and it's actually chiefly a constitutional plan which also has economic and social advantages.

MR KNOETZE: So, to get back to the explanation you gave earlier, it dealt with the normalising level?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: So could one then say, General, that you were absolutely convinced that normalising should take place before stabilisation?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. If you go back in history, the history of revolutionary war in South Africa, you will see that from the beginning the emphasis was placed on stabilisation or Security Force actions. That emphasis only started shifting in '85/'86, to the 80% welfare area. In that time we had the kind of slogan "stabilisation through normalisation". In other words, a normalised area would inherently also have stabilised elements in it, or normalisation almost automatically leads to stabilisation. Now the opposite is not true. Unfortunately that only started manifesting after the mid-80's.

MR KNOETZE: Well to get back to your situation, Strelitzia was written and it was approved of, it was not adopted? What plan did you make then?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well plans were being made constantly and as the commanding officer and also as the chairperson of the JMC I was aware of constant plans being made and also the situation was very fluid, so we had to make contingency plans and plans for different options. But in the year after we made Plan Strelitzia, we then gave birth to Plan Katzen or Plan Katzen was written.

MR KNOETZE: Could I then refer you to page 9 of the bundle. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, General. Where does the name Katzen come from? Who was Katzen or what is Katzen?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the first time when I wrote the plan, it didn't actually have a name. Afterwards the plan was re-written and in the re-written plan 2 as such, the name Katzen was added and the staff officers who re-wrote the plan, I think took the last "zen" part of my surname and joined it with General Liebenberg's nickname, "Kat" and gave the plan a name in this way. That's the only explanation which makes sense to me, because it's a strange name, an unusual name, not common in our country. So the "Kat" is "Kat" Liebenberg and the "zen" comes from my surname, van der Westhuizen.

MR KNOETZE: General, document A, what document is this?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This document which goes as far as page 70, is a document drafted by a group of people who in some or other way were involved in Plan Katzen. I don't think the entire document will be known to all the people involved. They did not all play a continuous role in this process. But I read it through and in my opinion it gives a very good overview, external idea of Plan Katzen, but it wasn't written by me.

MR KNOETZE: Just a correction, General, the document does not go up to page 70, it's only up to page 40. The rest is a translation. I take it that you don't take any responsibility for that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR KNOETZE: The background portion of it reads as follows

"The Eastern Cape was traditionally the cradle of black radicalism. Certain areas in the Eastern Cape, namely East London, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Queenstown and Cradock, were known since the '50's for a radical and even violent political actions. Certain families who traditionally had an important influence in the region, used revolutionary methods to achieve their political goals and played a major role in the revolutionary climate in the region, and the Calata family was particularly prominent in this respect. The church leader, Canon Calata was one of the founder members of the ANC, and during the '50's and the early '60's was actively involved in mobilising actions in the Eastern Cape. His son, Mr Fort Calata, in the '80's became actively involved in revolutionary activities in the Eastern Cape.

In the early '80's, the internal situation in both the former Ciskei and the former Transkei deteriorated very quickly due to bad administration as well as the pursuing of personal aims by the leaders of those countries. On the 23rd of May '84, a state of emergency was announced in the Transkei, which state of emergency was further extended for a further year on the 9th of July 1985.

George ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Knoetze, are you going to read all the 40 pages now, because we've read this document.

MR KNOETZE: Under those circumstances I won't read it, Mr Chairman.

General, you're already said that you've looked at this, do you confirm that this background is a correct version of how the situation was in the Eastern Cape?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, insofar as my involvement and knowledge is concerned, it is correct. There are portions which relate to times or periods when I wasn't involved or I had already left, but as far as I am concerned, it is a correct version of Operation Katzen, or Plan Katzen and the circumstances surrounding it.

MR KNOETZE: If we can then go to page 16 of that document, "The Idea". You've already indicated how it arose, now just to summarise, the idea originated with you?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's not entirely correct, the idea surrounding Katzen was broadly known in the Eastern Cape and was discussed in the Eastern Cape. It was definitely known to the Xhosa leaders that I referred to earlier, the basic idea of a Xhosa unity, unity as a nation. So it wasn't my original idea. Even white leaders also made statements to this effect. Most probably these statements were made in a slightly negative sense towards the Ciskei, which was not regarded as having the same viability as the Transkei. And also, from my own personal point of view it was regarded as two countries but one nation, just divided by a thin strip in the middle and neither of those two were viable as separate entities. It was only if they were joined together and upon inclusion of the portion in the middle, that they could perhaps survive as a unified Xhosa nation. That was the basic idea.

MR KNOETZE: Well the plan as such is described on, or in this document as from paragraph 20 on page 20, and it deals with the various phases and the objectives. Could we then turn to page 71. What is this document that appears on that page?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's in my handwriting, Chairperson. It's a submission which I wrote, dated 13th of June, and it's in connection with Plan Katzen. I presented this to General Liebenberg in Pretoria.

MR KNOETZE: Why is the document written in your handwriting and why isn't it typed?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The presentation as it stands here was regarded as highly confidential by myself because it spanned other departments as well, and didn't only relate to the military function which I had. I saw it as a politically sensitive document. Our government had created the Ciskei and this plan actually suggested that that creation or the creation of those two states be made null and void, that it be made one country, so it was politically very sensitive. I didn't actually trust a typist to type the plan, and it would have been counter-productive if the information or the proposals in this plan had to leak out. I wanted to clear with matter out personally with my direct superior, and I only consulted two staff officers in compiling this plan, in order to improve the confidentiality aspect of the whole plan.

MR KNOETZE: Is that also the reason why at the top in the right-hand corner it says: "Copy number 2 of two copies"?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct? I made one copy and kept that one for myself, and one copy was made for General Liebenberg and I handed to him personally in his office.

MR KNOETZE: Now the discussion between yourself and General Liebenberg, did that lead to something else in turn?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I present the plan as it's spelt out here, to General Liebenberg and he thought it wasn't a bad plan. He then instructed one of his staff officers, Captain Paddy van Wyk, to go to Port Elizabeth to convey certain amendments and supplements in the plan, and that is what then gave rise to the second plan.

MR KNOETZE: Alright. We will in time get to the differences between plan 1 and plan 2, but maybe for the time being you can take the Committee through this plan step by step. For instance "The Perspective", on page 71, what was that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Normally in military planning there is a formal structure or format in terms of which a plan is written, but this plan does not comply with any standard military plan structure, it's rather a letter from myself to my direct superior. That is why I started by outlining the perspective by saying that it was not a written evaluation and it was not a detailed military plan, but it was an idea, and that I wanted to submit this idea to him. If he found the idea acceptable, then experts had to be appointed to look at all the various aspects of the idea, they had to analyse the plan, evaluate it. And I said that the plan, due to its political implication, would have to be taken up with people at the highest political level, and by that I meant Minister Malan.

It also had to be in alignment with the other plans which had been drafted and which had already been carried out. And then, the plan was not written for the man in the street, it was not written for the person who actually had to carry it out, it was written to enable the person in a position of authority, to give that person a structured idea as to a possible solution for the problems in the Eastern Cape. That is what I tried to convey by a perspective, it was not a military plan. And to make it possible to carry it out, those four aspects, (a), (b), (c) and (d) first had to take place.

MR KNOETZE: Now paragraph 2, "The Emphasis", what did you actually try to emphasise?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I wanted to emphasise that we were striving for permanent normalisation of the Eastern Cape situation. So, we were aiming to win the revolution and it could only be won by normalisation.

MR KNOETZE: Then "The Objective", as reflected in paragraph 3 on page 72?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The purpose of this submission is to obtain approval in principle for a plan to permanently normalise the Eastern Cape by December '87. In other words it gave us 18 months time to achieve that objective. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: How was that date determined, General, or was that just your date?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, the State Security Council which got its instructions from President Botha - well we received instructions from the State Security Council to stabilise by December '87, so I was trying to incorporate that order into this. The December '86 instruction which we got from the State Security Council was an impossible time-frame for us to comply with. And here I tried to obtain approval in principle for a plan which would lead to normalisation over a longer period. I might add that even in terms of counter-revolutionary warfare, something like normalisation in 18 months is actually almost unheard of, it's a very short period of time, but we didn't have a lot of time.

MR KNOETZE: Then the purpose or objective that is in paragraph 4 on page 72, will you read that please? - I beg your pardon "The Ambit"

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 4 on page 72

"The plan was based on Xhosa national unity and pro-RSA resistance movements as it's infrastructure."

And then three possible ways of action are spelt out.

MR KNOETZE: Could you just comment about the implication of the words "three possible ways of action"? Could one infer from that that you didn't mean to say that everything that you mentioned here as possibilities had to be carried out?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct. It would be impossible to actually carry out everything that was just sketched very broadly in this plan. I simply gave a broad guideline or overview and that is why I called it an idea and not a plan which would contain real instructions and orders.

MR KNOETZE: On page 73, paragraph 5, you start with the background sketch. Could you please read or summarise the background for the Committee?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. It deals with the revolutionary struggle and the problem areas as we experienced it here, and the purpose was to address these problem areas. In paragraph (a) deals with the strong homogeneous population group resident in the Eastern Cape. It had a long history as a nation, from resistance against the Zulus and the whites and the urge for self-determination was very deeply rooted in the Xhosa nation. That was actually strengthened by these leadership or leader, leading figures that I referred to. The black councils which existed at that time actually did not work, they were unsuccessful and that there had to be another structure in the face of that, as an alternative structure.

We said a breeding ground was created for revolutionary soldiers in the Eastern Cape, and that left a vacuum, there was insufficient self-governance. And the Xhosa people at that stage, there were simply too many structures of authority. There was the RSA Central Government, the provincial authority, there were chiefs and there was a third level of authority as well. And in a way there was also the revolutionary structure of authority which existed. So there were far too many authorities.

MR KNOETZE: Would you like to comment on page 74, paragraph (d), about the inability to which you refer?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. In paragraph (d) I say that especially in the Ciskei, and the fact that they were not viable as a full independent country, that actually causes a problem for the RSA inasfar as its policy was concerned. In other words, it was a visible sign that the policy hadn't worked. In this State there was even more than latent instability, and of course that stimulated the revolution in this area.

In paragraph (c), there I say that the Ciskei and Transkei are part of the Eastern Province and things were not very sound in the Eastern Province at that stage. Then I say that in military terms the Eastern Cape should be seen as one theatre of war and should not be seen as three different military fronts.

Paragraph (d), there I refer to the inability of the government and its instruments, especially at a regional level, to combat the escalating and worsening situation of unrest in the country and in the Eastern Cape. And that let, in the Eastern Cape especially, to a growing feeling of defeatism, even amongst the whites.

At the same time, in the mid-80's, there was an economic collapse or decline, Ford and other factories closed down in the Eastern Cape. And as I've put it here, there as a whole aura of bankruptcy in the area, there was no feeling that there was a future, that there was something permanent here. There was a lack of confidence, whites moved away, the property market started collapsing. And I think the people today would be able to remember, the people who lived here at that time will actually remember how bad it was.

In paragraph (e), what I say is that we tried to activate resistance movements as a front to counter the revolutionary forces and we tried to keep this alive, the resistance movements which we tried to foster amongst the moderate blacks, but it didn't actually work. They were intimidated and infiltrated by the enemy. And then, it was really a disturbing thing for us to try and fight this political war in the Eastern Cape, because we didn't have very good dynamic National Party politicians in this area to help us fight this war. I just felt that I actually wanted to convey this to my chief.

So these factors in paragraph 6, well I said that they were eroding the prosperity and progress in the Eastern Cape and that like with an iceberg, it's the portion which is not visible, which is massive and the full extent of that, I don't think that was truly familiar and known to the people who had to make decisions.

Perhaps optimistically I say the situation is serious but not entirely lost and that things look darker than they actually are. Then I mention that aspect of the winning recipe and that we were trying to deal with the matter or the issue.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Paragraph 7 on page 75, you start detailing the personalities, namely the people who knew of this or who were partially aware of it. You've already to that. Then in 76 you refer to the Transkei and you outline the various personalities. Do you just want to deal with each of these personalities briefly.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well firstly, the chief figure was Kaizer Matanzima, the former President. He was very powerful, in that time as well, and I think he expressed the sentiment that he wanted to see this unity of the Xhosa nation during his lifetime. He felt very strongly about that, and it made quite an impression on me, that this old statesman still desired this unity of the Xhosa nation.

George, his brother was also very dynamic. He was a very good leader as far as I was concerned. He was the first Minister, Minister of Defence, and he endorsed his brother's sentiments.

Namba Sebe was the Ciskeian Minister of Transport. He'd been kicked out by his half-brother, Lennox Sebe and he sought asylum in the Transkei. He often told me that he hated his brother, or his half-brother. Charles Sebe was his blood-brother.

And then there was Reverend Kaba, he was the former Deputy-President of the Ciskei. Lennox Sebe also kicked him out and he also achieved or sought asylum in the Transkei. There were other figures as well, but those were the main figures on the Transkei side.

On the Ciskei's side there was Lennox Sebe, President Lennox Sebe. He was seen by us, the whites in the RSA, as a thorn in the flesh as a result of this demand for land and his various statements and his instability. He was quite an unpopular person, he was unpopular in his own country, and he was suspected of being corrupt and there were investigations done, and I think a case of corruption was investigated against him. He was very afraid of his brother, Charles. And then of course there was Charles Sebe who was the Chief of the Security Forces, half-brother of President Lennox Sebe. In August of '83, I think he tried to carry out a coup in the Ciskei, whereafter he was imprisoned in the Middledrift Prison for 12 years. The coup failed. However, he was a very powerful man and he had great status amongst the police and Defence Force of the Ciskei and even outside of the Ciskei. He was very popular as a result of his charismatic personality. I knew him personally and I had a very good relationship with him. He was very strongly pro the Republic of South Africa and he also said that he hated Lennox Sebe. And then there's somebody for whom I had a lot of respect, Chief Lent Makoma. He was a member of the aristocracy, he was a headman. He had several cabinet posts. Lennox Sebe saw him as a threat from the mid-80's, and kicked him out. Chief Makoma then went to the Transkei. There he established the party, the Ciskei People's Rights Protection Party, as apposition for Lennox Sebe. He was also pro the RSA and he was a very eminent Xhosa leader.

There was Ray Marley, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was also detained. He was moderate, also pro the RSA.

And then there was Sandile. He was seen as a future chief and he was a confidant of Chief Makoma.

And that was, in summary, the key figures on the Xhosa side.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 78 we deal with the modus operandi. You start with number 1 and you give a general sketch and say that

"It took place in three phases which overlapped and stretched from the date of the plan to December '87."

And then you say that phase 1 - well, please read out the purpose. GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This goes back to the original idea, and that is:

"To establish a pro-RSA resistance movement among the Xhosas of the Eastern Cape and to activate it before December '86."

And then the execution of this phase in broad outlines. I wrote that Charles Sebe was in the Middledrift Prison, had to be liberated from the prison. We saw Charles Sebe - as a result of his high profile in the Security Forces, we saw him as the man who would lead this XWB, the resistance movement, and who could mobilise them. The idea was that he should be liberated and freed. I wrote, by negotiations with the Ciskei authorities or by covert Security Force actions, which could include anything from obtaining the key or bribing the guards, or - I'm not sure what the Afrikaans term is, in other words to organise a jailbreak. I could perhaps just mention that the Eastern Province Command did not have the capacity to do that kind of thing.

Then after his liberation, in paragraph 2, his image had to be built up to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, General, why do you say the Eastern Province Command didn't have the capacity?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: What I said was the Eastern Province Command under my leadership, did not have the capacity to free Charles Sebe from prison. We only had the ordinary commando soldiers and the civilian force soldiers, and they would not stretch to obtaining of keys or jailbreaks or bribery and corruption. So my suggestion here to the Chief of the Defence Force is that we have this need, but that we couldn't actually, we didn't have the capacity to do it ourselves.

Paragraph 2 ...(intervention)

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can I interrupt you for a moment. A lot of this has been very general to me. I'm sorry I have to interrupt you, Mr Knoetze. Then in the end, how was the liberation of Mr Charles Sebe brought about? Did you play any role specifically with regard to the liberation of Charles Sebe from prison?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I did play a role in the sense that I recommended that he be liberated from prison. No, to the other part of your question, I didn't take part in the liberation of the man, I didn't have that capacity, and thirdly, he was liberated by the Special Forces of the South African Defence Force. Does that answer your question?

MR KNOETZE: General, further in respect of his liberation from prison, I'd like to ask you, were there personalities of the time such as politicians who were also in favour of the liberation of this man from prison?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. Charles wrote several letters from prison, and I know that he wrote to the Commissioner of Police and he also wrote to me, and he more than likely also wrote to politicians. General Viljoen at some point before he retired as Chief of the Defence Force or Chief of the Army, said to me that it was a pity that such a man was in prison. There were rumours that he was being maltreated, and of course that led to even more discussion. So given the profile that Charles had before he landed up in prison, yes there were many discussions and opinions voiced, and of course it was exaggerated and exacerbated by the rumours that he was being ill-treated.

MR KNOETZE: General, what about other politicians? For instance, do you know what President PW Botha's attitude was?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I'm not sure about President Botha's attitude. I know that President Botha had some trouble with Lennox Sebe, but I had no firsthand knowledge of what President PW Botha's attitude was towards Charles Sebe.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, you may continue, paragraph 9(a)2 ...(intervention)

MR SIBANYONI: I'm sorry, Mr Knoetze, maybe before he continues, as he was in a jail complaining about the conditions and ill-treatment, how were the letters possible to reach politicians and people outside the homeland, were they smuggled out?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I'm not quite sure how his letters were smuggled out of prison but I think, given what I know of Middledrift, perhaps the warders or guards wrote to his family and this was discussed in the letters, or this was discussed in broad outlines. But I actually know about the letters in which he wrote, and he complained in these letters.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR KNOETZE: Now, paragraph 9.2.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well that was the building up of his image. Then in the third paragraph, bottom of the page

"And simultaneously the psycho subtle denigration of Lennox Sebe had to take place, Lennox Sebe and/or his hangers-on. Also his power base had to be eroded, excluding the Security Forces."

MR KNOETZE: What did you mean by the attack to which you refer, that his power base had to be attacked?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well I meant it in the counter-mobilisation sense of the word, in the sense that he had to be discredited and the alleged corruption which he'd committed had to be exposed and publicised by means of pamphlets and reports in the media. There had to be reports etc., that he was not a good leader and Head of State and that his people didn't trust him, that he got rid of good Ministers. So what it amounted to was a psychological attack on President Lennox Sebe's person and his reputation, and also the power bases which he still controlled, excluding the Security Forces.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then on page 79, paragraph 4.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 4 deals with the resistance movement. There I say that it should be established and developed and should take place chiefly among urban blacks, and when Charles Sebe was freed it should be led by him, and there should be leadership given by the South African forces of this party, but it should be covertly done, and that this revolutionary movement or resistance movement should be similar to Inkatha - perhaps that was a little bit optimistic, and that it should form a joint power base together with us, against the revolutionary forces.

Paragraph 5 dealt with the existing but struggle Eastern Cape resistance movements, especially in the Cookhouse area. We reckoned that this resistance movement could join up with the XWB. It was the Reverend Mokoena's Black Crisis Centre, and there was the Action for Peace and Prosperity, Sport Resistance organisation etc. And the whole idea was that all these groups should be joined together into one unified front.

Paragraph 6 deals with the Ciskei and the Transkei Security Forces and bringing them closer to each other. I can remember that we had sport days, we arranged rugby days etc., so that these two security forces could see other as friends and not enemies, and that they could work together with us as an alliance to form a front against the ANC/SACP alliance.

Paragraph 7. We said that the XWB could probably be elevated in status to become the safety wing of Makoma's CPRPP, depending on the party's successes so that one could actually parade these groupings. As far as the XWB was concerned, there was also the thought of protection, protection for the Ciskeian leaders as bodyguards.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you. Then phase 2 on page 79, paragraph (b), please read that objective.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The objective was to, before June '87, unify, constitutionally unify Ciskei and Transkei before June '87.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 2, page 80, the execution in broad outlines.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that had to be aligned with phase 1. And paragraph 2

"XWB plays the major role in the unification of the Ciskei and the Transkei Security Forces and also co-operates with the RSA Security Forces, to achieve overall stabilisation of the Eastern Cape front."

Here the Eastern Cape Treaty Organisation is mentioned, this should be established. And the RSA, Ciskei and Transkei would become one formally, as far as security matters were concerned, so that there would be one unified force that could act jointly.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 3.

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 3. The idea of Xhosa unity must be promoted. There's very little motivation for this, especially as far as the Matanzimas were concerned. The Ciskeian leaders that had been in exile actually supported the Matanzimas and it would create a political future for themselves, whereas at that stage they had been deprived of their political positions.

Paragraph 4. We say that we should give covert support for Chief Makoma's party and that this party would represent the moderate Ciskeian person and represent such a person. And this party would not be limited to the Ciskei and could along with the XWB play a major role in achieving Xhosa unity for the people, the Xhosa people, but that it should be noted that the successful implementation of this phase was not dependant on the success of that party, that is the CPRPP.

Then paragraph 5. I say that the major stumbling block was Lennox Sebe and that he should be eliminated by means of the following methods, or a combination of the following methods: Chief Makoma should defeat him in an election, or if Charles was liberated he could remove him, the Matanzimas could get rid of him, the RSA Security Forces could act in a covert way against him, or the RSA could place him on pension.

CHAIRPERSON: So by that, General, the idea was to get rid Lennox Sebe anyway. Would one these, particularly (c) or (d), include the possibility of an assassination? - The Matanzimas get rid of him, or RSA Security Forces by means of covert action?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: At the time that this document was written it wasn't my intention that Lennox Sebe should be killed. Afterwards, and with great uncertainty in my mind, I realised that words such as "remove, get rid of, covert action etc.", could be interpreted, especially by persons who had not walked this road with me, other people who had seen the plan. It could be interpreted by such people as referring to President Lennox Sebe being killed, but that was never my intention when I wrote this plan. I want to repeat that. I realise now with hindsight that those words could be interpreted to mean that he should be killed.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but General, if you look at the option of Lent Makoma defeating Mr Sebe in an election, as far as I can remember Ciskei was a so-called one party State at the time, how possible was that?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Later in the plan we say that there should be a complete full national election, and this was regarded as one of the methods by which we could get rid of Lennox Sebe, that would remove him from the political terrain if a person with the stature of Chief Makoma could defeat him in a democratic election. When that would take place was not a foregone conclusion at this stage, it was simply put forward as a possibility. It was one of the methods whereby he could be got rid of, and the sooner the better, in the context of this plan.

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.

MR SIBANYONI: May I just ask one question. Why is the word "remove" put in brackets, does it not mean people should not give it its ordinary meaning but a different meaning?

GEN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think it appears more than once in the plan. In paragraph (e) I also say that he could be placed on "pension". That is because there could be other methods, and the method or way in which it was to be done had to be well considered. For instance, there were other methods such as discrediting him or by means of bribing him and then revealing such bribery. All those ways could be used to perhaps get rid of him. So "remove" is the overarching term, which could have several meanings depending on the context. We wanted to get rid of him as President of the Ciskei. I think that emphasises that surrounding the word "get rid of" or the phrase "get rid of", there should be quite a lot of consultation as to exactly how it should be done.

You will see - I don't know whether it's in this plan or later, we also suggest a coup d'état as a method of getting rid of him.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I note that it is 4 o'clock. I'm not sure till what time you intend to sit but it is a convenient stage to adjourn if you intend to adjourn at 4 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: What time would be a convenient time to start tomorrow?

MR KNOETZE: As far as we are concerned, at any stage that you would indicate, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Would nine or half past nine be convenient? 9 o'clock? We'll then adjourn now and we'll reconvene here tomorrow at 9 o'clock in the morning, to start at nine. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS