ON RESUMPTION
ADV PRIOR: Ladies and gentlemen please rise. We move onto the other matter which is the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court Bombing. Today is the 5th of August and the Committee is as formally constituted in the other matter. Maybe for the transcriber's sake again we identify the members of the Committee and the representatives.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we should first identify the application. This is the application of Joseph Kgoele, Solly Zacharia Shoke, William Mabele and Dick Joseph Hlongwane. The Committee consists of myself Andrew Wilson, Chairman, Dr Tsotsi, Mr Sandi, for the Amnesty Committee Evidence Leader Adv P. Prior, for the Applicants Adv A.P. Landman, instructed by Nicholls Cambanis. Mr Chairman I'm Jan Wagner and I'm appearing on behalf of two victims in this incident, the one being Mrs M.S. Wilkens whose son was fatally injured and the other one is Captain C.F. Esterhuizen of the South African Police Services who was at the scene, who was injured and you will find the statement by him in - I'm not sure whether we're referring to the bundles as volume 1 or 2 but ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Let's optimistically call it the bundle at the present time. At page?
MR WAGNER: It is the volume, not the one containing the applications, it's the other volume, so I assume it's volume 2 then, on page 28 thereof.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't got a volume 2.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I have a second volume it contains supplementary documentation, the first one is a statement by William Khutwane (?).
CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm sorry Mr Wagner, in light of the information you have just given us, just call the one volume volume 1 and the second one volume 2. We were not aware of the existence of a volume 2.
MR WAGNER: Thank you judge.
ADV PRIOR: May I simply say that I also have one volume, I - when the volumes were prepared and sent to the committee members - I'm at a loss to explain it, however it seems that the legal representatives received other volumes. I'll make the necessary enquiry and see what ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Do you know where they came from?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I requested the relevant documents and I was sent those documents from your Committee in Cape Town.
CHAIRPERSON: You probably need your client's statement more than we do at the moment. I don't want to deprive you of the - what page is it, you said 28? Are there any other documents in this volume 2 which the applicant or the victims think we are going to be referring to today?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I doubt very much. You will see that volume contains a number of statements by policemen who were at the scene of the explosion and there's also a number of photo's and plans and so forth and nothing more than that Mr Chairman, so I think at this stage we should be able to proceed with volume 1 only.
CHAIRPERSON: Shall we just get pages 28 to 30 - 28 and 29. Is there any difference between the typed and the hand-written ... (inaudible)?
MR WAGNER: No.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman if I can intervene and just add this, that the photographs are of some significance because ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: We can circulate the photographs amongst ourselves till we get further copies but if we try to photostat the photographs we will not get anything worth looking at I don't think, that has been my experience so let us just rather do this and Mr Prior will be making enquiries with a view to finding out what has happened to the others.
MR SANDI: Can I ask something Mr (indistinct), what is the position about other victims, are they being represented?
ADV PRIOR: I wanted to place all that on record. I have all the correspondence and notices to all the injured persons that were captured in the course of the investigation, there were many. Of all the persons' statements in volume 2 and to the victims, that is the families of the deceased, note, proper notice was sent out in terms of Section 19 of the Act. I have copies of those notices with me. The only response has been via Mr Wagner's two respective clients, his victims and a Mr Erasmus who had his vehicle utterly destroyed. Mr Erasmus responded to the notice sent out to him by the Amnesty Committee. Furthermore there's been no other response.
In addition to the notices sent out as required, a notice was also put in the local media or via the media advertising the fact of the hearing today and inviting any persons who had not received formal notice to come forward and contact myself or the Evidence Analyst in Cape Town whose name was supplied.
Mr Chairman there's another matter, number four, applicant four on the, as it appears on the bundle, Dick Joseph Hlongwane, we will not be proceeding with that application today. He had referred to the Ellis Park Stadium, the tennis stadium and that was confused with the Ellis Park matter to some degree, I don't know, but it appears in the Jo'burg Magistrate's bundle. However, he's not an applicant in this matter, as I understand it.
CHAIRPERSON: I take it someone will be making contact with him to clarify what the position is. Are you representing him?
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Nicholls Cambanis (?) representing him. ... (Inaudible) take what steps are necessary to clarify the position.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman the position is that I was to represent him at this hearing. We consulted with him and it became clear that he is not an applicant in regard to a gross human right violation and that his application could well be dealt with in chambers and therefore we withdraw his application as part of this particular hearing. He is however ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: So his application for amnesty remains but it is not to form part of this public hearing?
MR LANDMAN: That is so Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman can I then also place on record that an implicated person, General Nyanda, has instructed Nicholls Cambanis to appear on his behalf at these proceedings. General Nyanda is present and we then do represent his interests as well. He is here as an implicated person and not as an applicant. Mr Chairman you'll recall the incident in which amnesty was afforded to 37 high ranking ANC members which amnesty was later set aside. General Nyanda falls within that category of 37 applicants and his application, as we understand it, is going to be dealt with on some basis to be agreed upon between his representatives at that stage, or the representatives of the 37 members and the Amnesty Committee, so he is here as an implicated person but not as an applicant. Mr Chairman before we proceed with the leading of evidence in this application itself, Mr Chairman would it be appropriate at this stage for Mr Wagner to point out the basis on which his opposing the application as that might give the applicant some idea as to what aspect of the application needs to be covered in particular detail.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any objection to that Mr Wagner?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman at present my clients are provisionally opposing these applications on the basis of whether a full disclosure has been made or not, that is Section 20 Sub 1 Sub a of your Act and in the second instance whether the applicants comply with the definition of an act associated with a political motive, as defined in Section 20 Sub 2. Of course Mr Chairman at the end of this hearing, once we've heard the evidence of the applicants, my clients will then decide whether they would proceed with their opposition or whether the applicants have at that stage, whether they can be seen as having complied with these sub sections of the Act.
MR LANDMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Then also in regard to this application, we would also ask that the ANC's submission which have come before, that they will too be regarded as part of the record of these proceedings. Alternatively that they could be referred to as if they have been admitted and are considered to be correct for purposes of this hearing.
CHAIRPERSON: As I have indicated we have at other hearings, and it is the practice I think where parties have made submissions to the TRC and they have been properly recorded, that we permit reference to them, but we would ask you to refer us to those portions you wish to refer to, not just say well you can find it in the ANC representations, and I'm quite sure as you have in other matters Mr Landman, you will tell us the pages, the references that you wish us to refer to.
MR LANDMAN: We shall do that Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman in - may we also then request that the applicants be called out of order in order to show the chain of command and the steps that were taken and in that regard I'd ask for leave to call Solly Zacherias Shoke, who has already taken his position at the applicant's microphone.
DR TSOTSI: Thank you Mr Landman, we'll have to swear him in. Can you please rise sir? Your full names please?
SOLLIE ZACHERIAS SHOKE: (affirmed states)
EXAMINATION BY MR LANDMAN: Thank you. Mr Shoke could you possibly, just for purposes of the record, tell the Committee how old you are?
MR SHOKE: 42 years.
MR LANDMAN: And then also for the assistance of the interpreters, will you be giving your evidence in English or any other language?
MR SHOKE: English.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke in 1987 were you a member of Umkhonto weSizwe?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: When did you join Umkhonto weSizwe?
MR SHOKE: In 1976, shortly after the June 16 uprising.
MR LANDMAN: ... (Inaudible - beginning of tape).
MR SHOKE: ... (Inaudible) part of the outfit that was serving under the commander, commander chief of (indistinct) Nyanda.
CHAIRPERSON: What - I didn't get the name of the commander?
MR SHOKE: Siphiwe Nyanda.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman that is the implicated person. Now Mr Shoke could you describe your position from 1985 onwards?
MR SHOKE: I can say I held different responsibilities at different times, but however I was part of the collective that was based in Swaziland under Siphiwe Nyanda and responsible for the Transvaal. Thank you.
MR LANDMAN: Does that appear in the ANC's submissions too?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I wish to refer you to the ANC's second submission to the TRC. That submission has various parts and part of that submission is headed "Appendix 1 - ANC Structures and Personnel, 1960 - 1994". Mr Chairman on page 9 of that appendix - possibly if I can just refer to it at this stage and I'll ensure that copies of the relevant pages are made for the Committee in the course of the morning. Mr Shoke have you got page 9 of that appendix before you?
MR SHOKE: Ja.
MR LANDMAN: A copy has been given to you. Now the sub heading there is "Regional Politico-Military Councils, 1983 - 1985", it's under paragraph 5.8. Do you see that?
MR SHOKE: (Indistinct).
MR LANDMAN: And further down the page there's reference to "Transvaal Urban". Do you see that?
MR SHOKE: Exactly.
MR LANDMAN: Would you read that out?
MR SHOKE: "Transvaal Urban lead by Siphiwe Nyanda, Shilo Mthau (?) and Solly Shoke.
MR LANDMAN: And you are the third person Solly Shoke, is that you?
MR SHOKE: Exactly.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, may I interrupt. I have in my possession a document, it's called "Further Submissions by the ANC" dated the 12th of May 1997. Is it this document that Mr Landman is referring to?
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I, the first page of my document I'm referring to in fact has that title as well, yes. Mr Chairman I can just make the point that I down loaded this from the Internet so it's possible that the page numbers and all the Appendices which appear on the Internet might not be part of Mr Wagner's bundle. If that's the case then I can make copies for him.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman no I think I will cope. I may add for the record that Mr Landman this document from page 34 onwards, the second part of those annexures headed "ANC Structures, 1960 - 1994" and I assume that the page 9 you are referring to will be somewhere in here and I'll try and find it.
CHAIRPERSON: We'd be obliged to you because I've got a copy of the same document as you and if you could give me the page reference?
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman could I then proceed and I'll get back to the documents and provide the Committee with the page references?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, the specific reference I find on page 49 at the top, where it is said "Transvaal Urban" and then the names, inter alia that of this applicant, page 49.
MR LANDMAN: Thank you. May I proceed? Mr Shoke what were your responsibilities as part of the command structure of Transvaal Urban?
MR SHOKE: I think like I said I had different responsibilities at different times. It was involved in training people politically, militarily and otherwise, ensuring the lines of communication between the leadership and the cadres on the ground and other related activities.
MR LANDMAN: When you talk about training people politically, could you elaborate on that?
MR SHOKE: I think it is a known fact that the ANC emphasised more on grounding it's cadres politically before it could engage them militarily and it was politics that guided our arms struggle and even the choice for targets. We therefore had to ensure that a person understand clearly the ANC policies before he could be sent into operation.
MR LANDMAN: How important was it to the ANC and MK that the operatives were fully educated as to what targets were legitimate and what were not?
MR SHOKE: In the first submission dated August 1996, I refer you to page 51 of that submission where the ANC in fact reaffirmed at the (indistinct), reaffirmed in fact, what it called legitimate targets. Page 51 of the first submission.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke could you read that out?
MR SHOKE: "The conference reaffirmed ANC policy with regard to targets considered legitimate, that is SADF and SAP personnel and installations and (indistinct) installations and infrastructure, but the risk of civilians being caught in crossfire when such operatives took place could no longer be allowed to prevent the urgently needed all-round intensification of the arms struggle. The focus of armed operation had to achieve towards striking directly at the enemy personnel and the struggle had to move out of the townships to the White areas". Thank you.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke could you deal briefly with the reasons behind the ANC's policy that the struggle should be extended beyond the Black areas into the White suburbs or what would formally be known as White areas?
MR SHOKE: I would like you also to refer you to page 31 in fact of the main submission.
CHAIRPERSON: 30?
MR SHOKE: 31 of the main submission by the ANC.
MR LANDMAN: That's the first submission?
MR SHOKE: The first submission. In that referred actually we are quoting now the former Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger. It was an article in fact on the 10th of August 1976 in (indistinct). "Unrest in Soweto still continues. The children of Soweto are well trained, the people, students have established student councils. The basic danger is growing, it's growing Black consciousness and an inability to prevent incidents with what (indistinct) they act. The Minister proposes this movement must be broken and thinks that the police should perhaps act in a bit more drastically and happy handedly, with all it entails more death, it will entail more death". It was the people in the townships who were experiencing police brutality and oppression and it was about time in fact that we had to shift the battle area, the battlefields, in fact into White areas where people actually could experience what's going on in the townships. Thank you.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke in regard to targets such as Magistrate's Courts. What was the ANC policy in that regard during 1987?
MR SHOKE: It was an apartheid symbol.
MR LANDMAN: Was it considered to be a legitimate target?
MR SHOKE: Definitely, positive. It represented the interests in fact of the then apartheid government.
MR LANDMAN: Mr ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I'm not sure of the function - things had changed by then. My recollection is that there were separate entrances to the Courts, there were separate seating areas and matters of that nature. That apartheid was very strongly visible in those Courts. Is that one of the factors that you take into account in is saying it was a symbol?
MR SHOKE: I think everybody in this hall is aware in fact of people who went through apartheid Courts to prisons, sentenced to hang and so forth, but I also want to make it clear in fact in this Commission for the point at issue here is not the Magistrate Court it was the bomb blast. That happened at the Magistrate Court, I think let us be clear on that.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke we'll get to the actual target in a few minutes. Possibly then we can turn directly to the bomb blast that occurred in the vicinity of the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court in 1987. Could you explain to the Committee what your ... (inaudible - problems with mike). Mr Shoke what role did you play in the planning of that incident?
MR SHOKE: As far as I can say I facilitated in ensuring that this operation takes place. We discussed the concept with General Nyanda who then briefed in fact our men on the ground and I had to ensure that they get all the necessary equipment for this operation.
MR LANDMAN: Now Mr Shoke when you say you discussed it with General Nyanda, could you give us more detail as to what you discussed, who the target would have been and how the operation would have been carried out?
MR SHOKE: First we studied the modus operandi of the police, how do they react to incidents. Based on that we also took into considerations that the target that we choose should be within the proximity where the police would react rapidly and we also took into cognisance that there might be other people who might not be military origin in nature and we felt that we've got to detonate a mini limpet mine so as to clear the area because normally as a procedure the police would have to cordon the area to clear it of unwanted people or civilians and that's when - and when the police are coming to the scene then we were to act against them (indistinct).
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, am I right in saying (indistinct), first of all you'd employ a mini limpet mine to cause the police to cordon off and clear the area and then you would cause your explosion?
CHAIRPERSON: Exactly, you're correct.
MR LANDMAN: Do I understand your evidence correct that that is the modus operandi of the police that you referred to, namely that if there is an explosion, they then cordon off the area?
MR SHOKE: That's correct, actually the guy that don't do that, they'd be irresponsible.
MR LANDMAN: Did General Nyanda and yourself discuss - Mr Shoke can I just ask you to wait until the question is over before you press your button otherwise my microphone goes off. Did General Nyanda and yourself discuss who should be, who from the ANC or from MK should actually carry out this attack?
MR SHOKE: Correct.
MR LANDMAN: Who was chosen?
MR SHOKE: It's one of the applicants, Joe Kgoele.
MR LANDMAN: How well did you know Joseph Kgoele at that stage?
MR SHOKE: We had been working with him for quite some time and he has been coming to Swaziland for both political and military training and briefings.
MR LANDMAN: Did you have a particular view as to his ability to carry out this operation successfully?
MR SHOKE: We never doubted that.
MR LANDMAN: When planning this operation, what importance did you attach to the possibility of civilian casualties?
MR SHOKE: We were to ensure that we do not in fact inflict civilian casualties and the importance was that it should be in line with the ANC policy that we should minimise civilian casualties, hence the mini limpet mine.
MR LANDMAN: According to the plan, how would the main bomb be detonated?
MR SHOKE: As soon as the police in fact had come in closer to where it is, there will be someone who'll keep watch at the police as they cordon the search area and as soon as they are on the target, you'd ambush them.
MR LANDMAN: How would he detonate the bomb?
MR SHOKE: By remote control.
MR LANDMAN: Did you have discussion with Joseph Kgoele as to how this operation should be carried out?
MR SHOKE: He was brief by General Nyanda at the beginning, but subsequent to that I did have more interaction with him.
MR LANDMAN: During your interaction with him, that's Joseph Kgoele, what did you and he discuss?
MR SHOKE: I trained him on the use of the remote devices.
MR LANDMAN: Did you supply Joseph Kgoele with the explosive needed for the blast?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: Could you elaborate as to how you supplied him with these explosives?
MR SHOKE: I gave him a sketch of a DLB that he had to go and empty.
MR LANDMAN: Is that a dead letter box?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: The remote control device that he was to use, who supplied him with that?
MR SHOKE: I'm not sure as to whether I supplied it to him or he got it from Mr Nyanda, but I think that is immaterial. He got it from us in Swaziland because he crossed the border with it.
CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us something about this device. How large was it, was it a small thing?
MR SHOKE: It is, it is a remote control the size of this gadget.
CHAIRPERSON: It's very much like what you use to turn on and off television sets.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke the mini limpet mine that was to be used in order to ensure that the police cordon off the area?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: What sort of impact would that sort of mine have, would it cause injuries to people?
MR SHOKE: Yes and no. If you are too near, yes on impact in fact yes it can cause some shock waves, but it is something like 200 grams, so it would even cause that much damage that is why actually it had to be used to clear off the scene.
MR LANDMAN: As part of the plan was it intended that injuries or deaths should be caused by the limpet mine, the mini limpet mine exploding?
MR SHOKE: No. I think the ANC policy is clear with regard to that, that we should try to avoid civilian casualties where we can.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Shoke you were not present when the bombs went off. Is that correct?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: You have however subsequently been told and you have read statements of people who were present when the explosions occurred. Is that correct?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR LANDMAN: Now bearing in mind those descriptions of the incident, can you comment upon the effectiveness of the plan which was planned and executed by amongst others yourself and Joseph Kgoele?
MR SHOKE: My comment can only be that that plan was well executed and the majority or millions of Black South Africans they were happy that at least those in fact who had been unleashing terror against them can also now taste the pain of their deeds.
MR LANDMAN: Knowing now the manner in which the explosions occurred and the casualties that were inflicted, can you inform the Committee as to whether or not that operation and the consequences of that operation fell within the policy of the ANC and MK?
MR SHOKE: It fell perfectly within the policies of the ANC and MK. Maybe we should also remember the fact that the people who were killed by this bomb are the very same people who had been sent to the townships shooting at unarmed innocent children and Black people.
MR LANDMAN: I believe Mr Shoke it's common cause that those killed in the bombing were policemen. Is that your understanding as well?
MR SHOKE: Those were the people in fact who had arms and who were defending apartheid.
CHAIRPERSON: Were they policemen?
MR SHOKE: Apartheid policemen.
MR LANDMAN: According to the statements there were some civilians who were slightly injured. Can you comment upon that?
MR SHOKE: I think in fact it's also stated in the ANC submission that as the struggle intensified, civilians would be caught in crossfire, but however we'll never go out of our own way to go and inflict casualties (indistinct) and I can refer you to page 51 of the main submission by the ANC.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I'm coming to the end of the evidence in chief as it were. May I enquire from the Committee whether the applicant's application is before the Committee, the signed and sworn application. I believe it is in the bundle from page 14 onwards?
CHAIRPERSON: (Inaudible).
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman you will find from page 30 and - on pages 30 and 31 an amplification of the initial application form. I understand that was sent in response to a request by Mr Prior for further particulars.
ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman may I just point out, I don't know if pages 30, 31 are the further particulars supplied by Mr Mabele.
MR LANDMAN: Thank you, I apologise for that if that's the case.
DR TSOTSI: What about the other bundle Mr Prior, is it not perhaps in the other bundle, these further particulars?
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman may I should just ask Mr Shoke whether he did supply further particulars, that might just resolve it.
CHAIRPERSON: There is the Annexure A.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman I am instructed that he didn't provide further particulars, all that he did supply was on the application form itself, as well as Annexure A as has been pointed out by the Committee member. And you'll note on page 22, part of Annexure A, he does refer to the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court car bomb. In that case Mr Chairman I have no further questions at this stage.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LANDMAN
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR WAGNER: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Shoke may I refer you to your written application as it appears in Volume 1 from page 14 onwards. Is this document completed in your own handwriting?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR WAGNER: Every part of it?
MR SHOKE: I concur with what is in this document. I don't know whether every part of it has got any relevance to this matter we're discussing here.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke will you please answer my question. Is the handwriting in this document yours?
MR SHOKE: I say I concur with the contents of this document and whether it is every part it's got no relevance with the matter under discussion here.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you answer the question Mr Shoke, it is not for you to determine relevance. You have been asked was the whole document filled in in your handwriting.
MR SHOKE: There are some parts that I dictated to someone if you're going to hand a submission that he should fill them in.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you tell the Committee which parts of this document you completed yourself and which parts were completed by someone else?
MR SHOKE: Page 16, B, C, C.1.i, ii, iii and iv and 10.a, that's it.
MR WAGNER: In other words the paragraphs you referred to now, were they not completed by yourself, is that no your handwriting?
MR SHOKE: I dictated to someone telephonically.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke did you sign this statement at a stage when it was completed as it is before us now or did you sign it and was some parts added afterwards?
MR SHOKE: I signed it.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke didn't you understand my question?
MR SHOKE: I say I signed it.
CHAIRPERSON: The question was when you signed it, had these paragraphs been inserted or where they inserted later?
MR SHOKE: I signed the statement before and then someone wanted to come to finish, to come and finish certain particulars and asked me questions and then I said fill in those particular details, that's all.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I want to make absolutely sure. Did you complete this form ... (intervention)
MR LANDMAN
MR WAGNER: Just give me a moment please. Did you complete this form and sign it and confirmed it under oath apparently and then afterwards you asked someone to amend the document, after you'd signed it and sworn to it under oath, is that what you're telling us?
MR SHOKE: I completed the document and left it in Shell House. Someone phoned me that the document is incomplete. I said could you please fill the following - he asked me portions and I responded to that, he read it to me and I said I concur.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke do you have problems in following what I am asking you. I'm simply asking you this, did you sign the form under oath and then afterwards have someone else amend the document? That's all I'm asking you.
CHAIRPERSON: Is the word amend correct Mr Wagner. I don't read these as being an amendment to the document, I read it as an addition?
MR WAGNER: Sorry Mr Chairman we may call it an addition.
MR SHOKE: (Indistinct).
MR WAGNER: I would like you to respond please.
MR SHOKE: I think I've already responded.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm going to argue at the end of this matter that you're not prepared to answer my questions.
CHAIRPERSON: He has told us that he went to Shell House, he signed the document, somebody later phoned him up and said it was not complete and he asked them to fill in the following. Hasn't he told us that? Isn't that an answer to your question?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman we will argue this. Can I refer you to page 16 Mr Shoke, paragraph b which apparently is not your handwriting. Now what stands there, is it correct in relation to the incident that you are now applying for amnesty for?
MR SHOKE: I think you asked me first (indistinct) which paragraphs were not my handwriting and I specifically told you that so I don't know really what you want now.
CHAIRPERSON: The question was are the averments in that paragraph correct or not? It's a perfectly simple question: "State whether any person was injured, killed or suffered any damage to property as a result of such acts, omission or offences", and what is contained is now: "I have no details thereof because I left the operation scene immediately without verifying whether victims injured or dead".
MR SHOKE: This does not relate to the case that we're discussing here, it's got no relevance at all. It's some other things that I've applied for indemnity for.
MR WAGNER: So are you saying that regarding other incidents - sorry me Shoke just give me an opportunity. Are you saying that in some other incidents where you committed some other acts, the answer there is applicable but not at all to the bomb at the Magistrate's Court Johannesburg?
MR SHOKE: I think if you could read in fact my Annexure to this application you will understand it quite well. There incidences where I've been directly involved and where I've been indirectly involved and this is one of the incidences where I've been indirectly involved. So there's no way that I can leave the scene in an incident where I've not been directly involved and I told this Commission that I was in Swaziland so I don't understand the nature of your question, maybe you've not read the submission.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke who is Julius Madiba?
MR SHOKE: Julius Madiba in fact has nothing to do with this matter and I think just rule him out.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I refer you to page 18 where you stated under oath that you were commanded regarding these activities by one Julius Madiba, who is Julius Madiba?
MR SHOKE: I say Julius Madiba has nothing to do with this particular matter, that what we're discussing. Julius Madiba is Mancheka (?), he was an overall commander of the Transvaal if you want to know him.
MR WAGNER: I thought you said that General Nyanda was the overall commander of the Transvaal. Can you please explain to us where does Mr Julius Madiba fit into your structure?
MR SHOKE: If you could read in fact the ANC structures, the submission by the ANC with regard to structures, I think you'll understand that.
MR WAGNER: Can you please refer us to the relevant page?
MR SHOKE: Sorry.
MR WAGNER: Can you please refer me to the relevant page of the document?
MR SHOKE: I'm sorry I didn't select the page but I'm trying to locate it here but it is in the submission.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke while you're looking I may be of some assistance, I've looked through the document and I couldn't find the name of Julius Madiba there.
MR SANDI: Does Julius Madiba have any other name Mr Shoke?
MR SHOKE: Mancheka.
MR SANDI: Mancheka.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman maybe I can also be of assistance, unlike Mr Wagner I do find a Julius Madiba who's also referred to Mancheka ... (end of tape)
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman maybe we should proceed but I would like to state for the record that regarding the part of these annexures referring to ANC structures 1985 - 1990, which should be the relevant part, I can't find the name.
MR LANDMAN: Mr Chairman possibly one should also bear in mind and Mr Wagner might not be aware, that because this application only deals with the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court bombing, that the present applicant does intend applying for amnesty for other acts, but they don't form part of this particular hearing so Mancheka's involvement might be in respect of other acts, possibly that should be cleared up first.
CHAIRPERSON: The heading of the page that Mr Landman has shown me is, starts "ANC Second Submission to the TRC Part 2, page 6 of 19. The following appointments were made in 1981: Director Mzwaye Pilise (?)", that's at the top of the page and this Julius Madiba is given as one of the - it's 461, paragraph 4.6.1 - "Maputo Senior Organ 1980 - 1983".
MR WAGNER: Yes Mr Chairman that seems to be in respect of the period 1980 - 1983.
MR SANDI: Yes but he says this Julius Madiba had nothing to do with this incident, didn't you say that Mr Shoke?
MR SHOKE: Exactly.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman may I enquire from you, do you intend having a short adjournment and if so at what time?
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you ready?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: May I refer you to your application page 21, please. You will see there you mention another name where you say that when you served in the Transvaal Urban Machinery you were under the command of a Mr Ramose (?). Can we then accept that he also did not play no part in this incident, or if not what was his position?
MR SHOKE: I think Mr Ramose died a long time ago and I doubt this (indistinct). When I started in the Transvaal Urban Machinery (indistinct) Ramose was the first commander of the Transvaal Urban Machinery and thereafter Siphiwe Nyanda took over from him and I think you should also bear in mind that structures change, people change their responsibilities at different times. Thank you.
MR WAGNER: So do I understand you that we may ignore the reference to him concerning the Magistrate's Court bomb of 1987?
MR SHOKE: I think I've made it clear during the beginning of this hearings and people who was responsible are the ones that I mentioned here and nobody else. Unless if you want to tell me that maybe the commander who died 8 years before an incident happened he can also now be held responsible for an activity that took place after his death. I spoke of Mr Nyanda that in fact he was already a commander and the brainchild to this operation. That's all.
MR WAGNER: Thank you. Can I then refer you to the ANC submission, the one that I have is dated 12 May 1997, and on page - my page 51 Mr Chairman, I think it's paragraph 6 Mr Landman, there's a heading "ANC Structures 1985 - 1990". Mr Shoke if you can get that in front of you. Do you have it there? Can I specifically refer you to paragraph 6.4, it refers to a body called the Politico-Military Committee, PMC. Do you see that in paragraph 6.4? Thank you. And then in paragraph 6.3.1 reference is made to a political headquarters and in 6.3.2 to a military headquarters. Do you see that? What role, if any, did this military headquarters play in this incident that we're here for today?
MR SHOKE: I think I don't understand your question because as far as I'm concerned, the military headquarters is responsible for all military activities in fact committed under ex-cadres and I'd therefore say whether they planned it, the operation, or not there's no political leader or military leader whose got self respect can deny or divorce himself from any activity that has been committed by subordinates and that as far as I'm concerned. When the ANC's made their major submission to the TRC it claimed responsibility for all activities that were committed by it's cadres, but that does not necessarily mean that those people were actually involved in the actual planning, but because they're leaders they've got a moral responsibility.
MR WAGNER: Thank you, so although you didn't answer my question, did I hear you to say that this military headquarters is responsible for the bomb at the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg in May 1987, all of them, is that what you're saying?
MR SHOKE: I say there's no self respecting leader who can divorce himself from activities committed by his subordinates, whether he was directly involved or not and the ANC in it's main submission to the TRC claimed responsibility for all activities in fact that were carried out by it's cadres, but that doesn't mean, necessarily mean that Thambo, even if he was in London, was involved in the nitty gritty, but yes because he's a leader, he's responsible for that. So what you must also bear in mind that the military headquarters was in Lusaka, we had long lines or channels of communication.
MR WAGNER: Can you explain to us, because we're not military men, an operation like this, this bombing of the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, would that have been planned at the level of military headquarters in Lusaka or not?
MR SHOKE: Unfortunately I was not liaising directly with the military headquarters, I had a commander who was liaising with them and if they were maybe, they did play a role with regard to that, I don't know and it was not my responsibility to know.
MR WAGNER: The way I understand your evidence, you were based in Mozambique at the time, or where were you based?
CHAIRPERSON: Didn't he say Swaziland?
MR WAGNER: Sorry Mr Chairman, Swaziland, you were based in Swaziland, is that correct?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: And was your unit, was that called the Transvaal Structure or what is meant by the word Transvaal Structure?
MR SHOKE: The structure is appointed to oversee activities in the Transvaal.
MR WAGNER: Which individuals comprised of this Transvaal Structure who oversaw these activities you're referring to?
MR SHOKE: Different individuals at different times.
MR WAGNER: On the 20th of May 1987?
MR SHOKE: Mr Nyanda was the commander by then, I think I've already said so.
MR WAGNER: Did the Transvaal Structure fall under what was called the Swaziland Regional Politico-Military Committee?
MR SHOKE: That's correct.
MR WAGNER: Does that mean that Mr Ronnie Kasrils was your overall commander, in other words was he the senior to General Nyanda at the time?
MR SHOKE: I was not sitting in the structure so I wouldn't know and what you must also bear in mind, people were just coming and going into (indistinct), Swaziland was a battlefield and I think you are aware of the assassinations in fact that were carried out by the South African Police in Swaziland.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you please tell us was Mr Kasrils the immediate senior to General Nyanda or not?
MR SHOKE: I say Mr Kasrils used to come and go in Swaziland, he used to be in and out. Obviously in the ANC hierarchy Mr Kasrils was senior to Nyanda, but like I told you that, people had different responsibilities at different times and people used to get in and out of Swaziland.
MR WAGNER: Now when Mr Kasrils visited Swaziland from time to time, did he have discussions with amongst others, you as a commander?
MR SHOKE: He had discussions in fact with his Committee and I think General Nyanda, Mr Nyanda was my immediate commander.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm not sure whether you understand my question. Did you at times have meet with Mr Kasrils in Swaziland on his visits as the, apparently from page 53 that I read, the overall commander of the structure?
MR SHOKE: I think when you look at that structure I was not sitting in fact in that order group so there was no way that I will go and sit with Mr Kasrils and discuss operations. Yes of course I would meet Mr Kasrils as a person when he's in Swaziland, or even accommodate him, but not go and discuss work because Nyanda was sitting on that structure with Mr Kasrils, not me and then Nyanda will brief us on behalf of the leadership. I think what you must bear in mind when underground organisation operating in fact in what I may call by then, the enemy territory and as far as we were concerned, Swaziland was not a safe area so it was no way that we could just have in fact a mass of people meeting.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I understand, I understand that response, but I'm trying to get a picture of what was happening in Swaziland. You referred the committee to what is called the Transvaal Structure and I'm trying to ascertain what this means. What I know now is that apparently Mr Kasrils was the overall commander, that is on page 53 Mr Chairman, paragraph 6.4.1 and then Mr Nyanda or General Nyanda was the commander and then I'm know that you were somewhere around. Can you help me with this Transvaal Structure, do you know how many commanders were there apart from yourself?
CHAIRPERSON: Does it say Kasrils was the commander or does he say he was the Chairman?
MR WAGNER: The Chairman Mr Chairman. I would assume that would mean he's at the top, not necessarily the commander.
CHAIRPERSON: Merely meaning that he was the Chairman of the committee.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm trying to find out how this worked, I'm not sure myself, I'm trying to ascertain from this witness if he can be of some assistance.
CHAIRPERSON: Well this document we have deals with the Regional Politico-Military Committees and dealing with the Regional Politico-Military Committee for Swaziland it lists the Chairman. It says Ronnie Kasrils until 1984, Ibraham Ismail Ibraham until 1986 when he was abducted, Siphiwe Nyanda 1986 to 1987/1988, Selimko Sukupa (?) 1988 to 1989. Do you see that? And then it lists under that what appears to be other members of the committee for various periods.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman sorry, maybe I've misread this, ja it seems as if General Nyanda was the Chairman in 1987 and not Mr Kasrils, that's my mistake. Mr Shoke, and I'm referring all the time to May 1987 so that we don't misunderstand one another on that, that is the time of this incident, May 1987. Do I understand you correctly, you were a commander in MK at that stage?
MR SHOKE: Before I answer you I also want to understand you quite clearly. You want to know the period 1987 during the 20th of May also. Is that what you want?
MR WAGNER: (Inaudible).
MR SHOKE: Yes I was a commander but what you must also bear in mind is that I was a commander of a particular area. I had someone above me, in fact who was the overall commander.
MR WAGNER: Thank you and being a commander, does that mean that you had a unit, you had a unit of a number of individuals and you were the commander. Do I understand you correctly?
MR SHOKE: I think you should (indistinct) we were a guerrilla formation, were dealing with people via remote control. A commander in the typical sense or in a conventional sense he will be with his troops in the battlefield but in our situation we were to ensure from the rear that we facilitate the processes ... (intervention)
(?): (Inaudible).
MR SHOKE: Can I continue? What you must also understand that guerrillas as opposed in fact to conventional forces, we exercise what we call command initiative, you rely on the initiative of the individual and everybody in MK was being prepared in fact to become a commander in the (indistinct) on his own. People functioned independently.
MR WAGNER: Thank you but I'm still not sure. Did you have people under your command, were you in command of a number of individuals and you were their commander and you can call upon them to obey your orders or not?
MR SHOKE: Individuals were (indistinct). Yes it's true we had underground units in fact that we had to cater for inside South Africa and people whom we could in fact liaise with on behalf of the ANC leadership.
MR WAGNER: And were you in command of this Mr Kgoele, who's a co-applicant in this matter. Was he one of the individuals under your command?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: Now I want to refer you a discussion you had with General Nyanda regarding the planning of this specific operation and I would like to ask you whose idea was it that this specific target should be the target of this operation?
MR SHOKE: Like I said earlier on that Nyanda was the overall commander in Swaziland and in any military situation the concept of operation is a concept of the commander.
MR WAGNER: Did General Nyanda tell you, Mr Shoke you and your unit should go and put a bomb outside the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg?
MR SHOKE: I think I said earlier on that Mr Nyanda brief the applicant Joe Kgoele and then after that I had to facilitate the whole process.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes but before that, before you had got to the stage of Kgoele, as I understood your evidence, you had discussion with General Nyanda?
MR SHOKE: Yes he did discuss the concept with me.
CHAIRPERSON: Exactly, that is what you're being asked about now. Who was the first person to suggest it because I can understand a commander saying it is time we did something drastic, it is time we took steps against them and one of the other people saying well what about attacking this place or that place and that is what Mr Wagner is trying to find out, whose idea was it. Not that you should continue to struggle against the apartheid forces, but that you should conduct this particular operation?
MR SHOKE: It was the commander's concept, Mr Nyanda.
MR WAGNER: Did General Nyanda say specifically that the attack should be launched at the Magistrate's Court. Did he suggest that in so much detail. Is it his idea in other words that a small bomb should be placed outside the Magistrate's Court as well as a bigger bomb to lure the police there and to kill the police there at the Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, was it all the idea of General Nyanda?
MR SHOKE: I think General Nyanda was not working in isolation. If he's got an idea we were there as his staff to say whether he's correct also, but that is his idea. And anyway like I said in any military situation a concept, it is the commander's concept, you cannot divorce that in fact from the commander.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I still don't know whose idea it was but I'll leave it here. The witness doesn't seem to understand or he's not prepared to answer the questions.
MR SANDI: Maybe you can put it this way Mr Wagner. In coming up with the idea that this particular target should be attacked, did Mr Nyanda give the specifics how it should be planned, how people should go about attacking this place or did he only go as far as making the suggestion that this target should be attacked. How far did he go?
MR SHOKE: He came up with the idea and he outlined his concept but now when it comes to the nitty gritty, I think it will be unfair (indistinct) the operation, not even to Nyanda himself that he can tell a person to identify a particular area but to go to particular point and say do the following, he discussed that with (indistinct) anyway and I was not party to that when he discussed the concept (indistinct) with Mr Kgoele.
MR WAGNER: So did you and Mr Nyanda merely discuss in principle that there should be some kind of operation, some attack within the Republic of South Africa and that a man by the name of Kgoele would be tasked and it was left for his discretion as to how the operation should be carried out?
MR SHOKE: I said I was not involved in the briefing so I wouldn't know. Mr Nyanda came up with the concept, like I said.
MR WAGNER: Did you have any discussion with Mr Kgoele regarding this operation?
MR SHOKE: Yes of course but that no, only as far as now giving him, facilitating because you know the material or the explosives that he got and in training him in the using of the remote controls.
MR WAGNER: So at the time of that discussion with Mr Kgoele were you aware that he would be coming to the Republic to, in the first instance detonate a small bomb and when the police were at the scene, detonate a much bigger bomb in order to kill them?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: Was the idea Mr Shoke that Mr Kgoele should come to the Republic of South Africa by his own or was he supposed to be part of a group of ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to interrupt you unnecessarily, but I understand the witnesses evidence that Kgoele was based in the Republic, that he paid visits to Swaziland, but that he was in the Republic, is that what you've told us?
MR SHOKE: Yes that's what I said.
MR WAGNER: Was Kgoele also a commander in some sense, did he have other individuals under his command that he could call upon to assist him?
MR SHOKE: That was not in my interest to know because it will have been dangerous, too much knowledge in the underground is too dangerous.
MR SANDI: You mean to - sorry Mr Wagner - you mean to say that it was not necessary for you to know who Mr Kgoele was working with?
MR SHOKE: Who Mr Kgoele was working with, yes.
MR SANDI: Would that have been on a need-to, what has commonly been referred to as a need-to-know basis?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: Mr Kgoele, was he what we may call an explosives expert and did he have a lot of experience in this specific field of explosives?
MR SHOKE: He had the necessary knowledge to enable him to execute his tasks.
MR WAGNER: Can I take that as a yes?
MR SHOKE: An expert is something different. I wouldn't like you to take it as a yes, yet there is thorough knowledge to allow him to execute his tasks. You question is, is he an expert and by that word an expert, you mean something different, (indistinct), definitely he was not a boffin.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you, do you have knowledge of explosives and can you be seen as an experienced, if not an expert in explosives?
MR SHOKE: I've got a fair knowledge to allow me to do what I'm capable of doing with explosives.
MR WAGNER: And did you train Mr Kgoele as to how he should conduct this specific operation?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke what did this training entail?
MR SHOKE: I taught him how to operate, like I said earlier on, remote gadgets of differences in fact and how to place explosives.
MR WAGNER: Did you help him with physical practice or what did this training entail. Was it merely a verbal training session. What did this entail?
MR SHOKE: It was a layman's training.
MR WAGNER: But if I understand you correctly now, wasn't there a great risk to send someone into the republic of South Africa on an operation like this merely based on a layman's training? To me that seems to have been highly risky. What do you say to that?
MR SANDI: Sorry Mr Shoke - a risk to who Mr Wagner, a risk to who?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'll try and rephrase. What we know now is that Mr Kgoele came to this country with a very powerful explosive device to be exploded in the midst of a big city. I put it to you that to send someone on a mission like this with only a layman's training is of a high risk, if not highly irresponsible. What do you say to that?
MR SHOKE: I think I said to you earlier on that he had been through thorough training to enable him to execute these tasks and that's that and I think that you are fully aware Mr Wagner by now that many people who were internally trained did execute operations and some were caught and sentenced (indistinct) and so forth, so as far as I'm concerned, Mr Kgoele had the necessary training to enable him to do his work.
CHAIRPERSON: It was put to you that he came to South Africa with a large supply of explosives, where was the dead letter box that he was to collect the explosives from?
MR SHOKE: It was somewhere in Soweto, I gave him sketch and I cannot say exactly where it was but I think when he comes he will explain that.
CHAIRPERSON: Somewhere where?
MR SHOKE: Somewhere in Soweto.
CHAIRPERSON: So it was not stuff that he brought in from outside the country is the point I'm making, he collected it here?
MR WAGNER: So if he is saying that the explosives were supplied by you is he lying?
MR SHOKE: He's not lying. I said I gave him a sketch of a dead letter box in my earlier presentation.
MR WAGNER: Can I come back to the exact particulars of this operation. This whole idea of first a small bomb and when there's a number of policemen at the scene, the second more powerful bomb with a specific and I must state it, with a specific intent to kill as many of them as possible, was this the first time that the ANC used these tactics?
MR SHOKE: I don't think I'm (indistinct) in fact to speak that on behalf of the ANC, I don't know if that is (indistinct).
MR WAGNER: Was the attack aimed at the building, the Magistrate's Court or at the individual policemen at the scene?
MR SHOKE: The police were the target.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke are you aware that the majority of the policemen killed and injured in this instance were merely doing administrative work within the Magistrate's Court building and specifically the son of my client, he was working as a Court Orderly, nothing more than that. Are you aware of that?
MR SHOKE: So are those kids in fact killed in Soweto, they were just merely students.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke can you please refrain from the political statements you're trying to make all morning. Answer my question?
MR SHOKE: That does not matter. The police were defending apartheid and they were up in arms and those were para-military forces as far as we were concerned and they fall within what the ANC describes as legitimate target. As where in fact that person was deployed at that point in time, it is immaterial.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke how does a Court Orderly defend apartheid?
MR SHOKE: It is also very difficult to tell how many times that Court Orderly was sent to the townships.
MR WAGNER: Please answer the question.
MR SHOKE: For the mere fact that person is wearing uniform and he's defending apartheid, irrespective of whether he's deployed in court or any other place, is that man, those people are carrying weapons and as far as I'm concerned, anybody here in this country who was up in arms tried to deny us the (indistinct) this new dispensation that we are enjoying today was a target and falls within the category of the (indistinct) described by the ANC.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke in your evidence in chief you said that the people killed in this incident were the very same people who went into the townships killing innocent children or youngsters I think you said. Now I put it to you that that is completely incorrect, specifically on behalf of my client. Her son never did that.
MR SHOKE: The fact of the matter is he was a policeman.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I've heard in previous hearings that your organisation, the ANC, specifically regarded the Security Branch of the South African Police as your enemy. Is that correct?
MR SHOKE: I think you are not correct when you say specifically, the special branch were part.
MR WAGNER: But the thrust of your anger, of you feelings were directed at the Security Branch of the South African Police. That's how I understand the evidence in previous hearings. Do you agree?
MR SHOKE: No I don't agree with that. The thrust in fact of the main effort was to deal with the police, in general the army or those people that the ANC in fact defined as legitimate targets. The ANC never specified to people that they must differentiate between a Court Orderly and a policeman because policemen are policemen.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I have to ask you this. Why didn't you and General Nyanda have the guts to attack people who could defend themselves? As a military man, why didn't you do that, why did you elect to commit this crime, to kill people in this fashion, where they've got no way whatsoever of defending themselves, whether they're policemen or I don't care. Why decide on this way of killing innocent people?
MR SHOKE: The police were part and parcel of this conflict. And they were part of the repressive machinery in this country. According to the (indistinct) of guerrilla warfare, you hit at your enemy when he least expects you.
MR WAGNER: Does that mean you attack someone who can't defend himself, is that your policy, is that what you ask us here today to accept?
MR SHOKE: If they're police in fact they were carrying arms, people who are carrying arms and fail to defend themselves in a battlefield situation it's too bad for them.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke what did you aim to achieve by this operation?
MR SHOKE: To pump some sense in those who were defending apartheid, that what I tried to defend is indefensible.
MR WAGNER: And who would that be?
MR SHOKE: Starting from apartheid politicians or infrastructure, that is the government of the day and even those that were misled by the previous government, that they were better than others and they've got something to defend as far as the status quo were concerned.
MR WAGNER: Now Mr Shoke if you want it, as you put it, to pump some sense into the politicians, why didn't you attack them? Why innocent people at the Court, I still don't understand that?
MR SANDI: Sorry Mr Wagner, just to ensure that I follow, when you talk about innocent people are you talking about the police who were killed at this incident or the civilians who were caught up in the fire?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm referring to both categories. Specifically I'm referring to my clients. I put it to this witness my clients were innocent people who were unable to defend themselves.
The question was why didn't you attack the politicians directly then?
MR SHOKE: I think I've got a problem with you Mr Wagner if you describe a policeman in South Africa during the apartheid era as someone who is innocent. Maybe you need to take a (indistinct) into any township here, aware now, you'll have the opportunity to interview the victims of police brutality and get to know (indistinct) in fact police really are indeed innocent.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke I'm not going to labour this point, all I'm telling you is the son of my client was never in a township, he was an innocent young man brutally killed by you and your colleagues. The question was why didn't you attack the politician if you wanted to pump sense into their heads?
DR TSOTSI: Mr Wagner you keep on repeating this question. Wasn't it ANC policy to fight against those who were the props of apartheid, including policeman, and wasn't the son of your client an informed policeman? I'm sure there are degrees of involvement of the police and the army in the struggle, some were who were not as deeply involved in the actual fighting (indistinct), but (indistinct). I'm not saying there's any justification in killing the son, it's just because you keep on repeating this question as if there is no policy. The policy of the ANC has been stated here as the policemen and they are legitimate targets. So I just wanted to try and clarify how you get over that definition or are you saying that the definition itself is wrong, the police - the ANC should not have agreed to kill all policemen indiscriminately ... (end of tape)
MR WAGNER: ... and how the mind frames of the murderers of her son work. That's why I'm asking these questions.
DR TSOTSI: (Inaudible).
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman if the Committee has a problem I will proceed with other questions, but I merely repeated the questions because there was no clear answer forthcoming. Mr Shoke can I refer you to a document, I think Mr Chairman it is the submission of August 1996 by the ANC, I don't know whether you have it there? May I refer you to page 86 of the document with the heading "Umkhonto weSizwe Military Code", at the top. Do you have it there? Now before I ask you the specific questions, this part of the document deals, amongst others, with the word people. Now I'm not sure what is meant by the word people in this part of the submission. Can you perhaps just help me and maybe the Committee where you say the people's army, people's war, word like, phrases like that. What is meant by the word people?
MR SHOKE: I'm sorry I'm unable to help you with regard to that, but my interpretation of the people's army is a army that represents the wishes of the majority of this country and that is Umkhonto weSizwe.
MR SANDI: So Mr Shoke if one understands you correctly that would be members and supporters of your organisation?
MR SHOKE: Can you repeat your question?
MR SANDI: Are you referring there to members and supporters of your organisation and perhaps even those who stand to benefit if those goals are to be achieved?
MR SHOKE: Yes that's what I mean.
MR WAGNER: Then more specifically Mr Shoke I have here on my page 87 a paragraph 5, it is in the top right-hand side. It's got a heading "Umkhonto Insists on a High Standard of Selfless Devotion to the Revolution on the Part of all it's Members". You've got that? On page 87 in the right-hand column at the top. Now what it says here is the following, is that from members of Umkhonto are required at all times to, and then there's an a, b, c, d and e. You see that? Now a says it is required of you to behave correctly to people. Who would that people be?
MR SHOKE: The people in general but not my enemy.
MR WAGNER: and in this instance where the explosion outside a Magistrate's Court in Johannesburg, did you and your colleagues behave correctly to the people?
MR SHOKE: Yes.
MR WAGNER: Even though it seems as if there were victims who could be part of what you classify the people?
MR SHOKE: I think I would like to refer you at this moment to page 50 of the same document that you have got.
MR WAGNER: You've done that earlier, I remember the passage if it's the same passage, I remember that.
MR SHOKE: Then it will seem as if, in you caution you chose to ignore this paragraph in the main submission.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm not ignoring it. All I want - I put it to you that to some extent you and your colleagues did not comply to what is said here in 5.a.
MR SHOKE: The answer is in the paragraph that I referred to just now.
MR WAGNER: Yes and in b it says you should have respect for their persons and property and I put it to you that you failed this test also.
MR SHOKE: I think it is your opinion.
MR SANDI: I'm sorry Mr Wagner I've not read this document. Isn't this really a general code of conduct as to how members of the organisation should conduct themselves in their interaction with people and perhaps not really about how military operations should be conducted?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I'm reading from a document of the ANC prescribing standards of conduct by it's members.
CHAIRPERSON: And on the column before it says: "The people support their army by providing it with recruits, their sons and daughters, food, shelter, information about the enemy. The people open the way for our guerrillas make the enemy's path harder. The ANC mobilises the people in support of the revolution through skilful combinations of all forms of struggle", and so it goes on. Mustn't one consider people in that context?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I think you're correct. I asked the witness whether he can assist but the only point ... (intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: ... (Inaudible) now engage in the interpretation of the document and mustn’t you read the document as a whole and there they are referring to the people who support them in saying that you must treat them, respect their property, refrain from molesting or interfering with their legitimate activities, assist them to solve their problems and where possible give material aid in their labour. Now that is surely aimed at a particular class of person in our community. Carry on.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke in terms of this Volume 2, the operation seemed to have cause prejudice to what may also be referred to members of the people, your people in that there have been injuries and damage to property, cars, vehicles belonging to individuals that, the way I see it, were members of your people. Do you agree?
MR SHOKE: I think the ANC has made in fact a statement that deals with (indistinct). I think that since this morning I referred you to the relevant paragraph more than 4 times. Please do read that paragraph so that you should understand it in it's proper context.
MR WAGNER: That's why the only reason why I asked you the previous questions was that it seems to me as if you and your colleagues failed to comply with any of these specifications under paragraph 5 a-e as members of Umkhonto weSizwe and this will be argued.
CHAIRPERSON: Which particular piece are you referring to in Volume 2?
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman if you merely look at page 41 and onwards there seems to be a list of victims and from then on, on the face value, it seems as if they may be, although I'm or I'm still not sure who would be this people, but on face value it seems to the position.
CHAIRPERSON: I take it you're not referring to Anglo American as one of their people?
MR WAGNER: Not at all Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: What you're referring to is the fact that the list there is of 62 vehicles which were apparently damaged in the explosion? Carry on. I'm just amazed, we've only just been given this book. I hadn't seen it before, about the two way radio that was discovered. Carry on.
MR WAGNER: Mr Shoke while the Chairman mentioned it, in the documentation before the Committee mention has been made to a radio that was found a couple of hundred of metres from the explosion which seems to have been connected to this incident. Would you know anything about that?
MR SHOKE: No.
MR WAGNER: Then only one last aspect Mr Chairman. What do you say Mr Shoke to this suggestion. I heard you to testify this morning that you wanted to, the way you put it, to pump some sense into the heads of the politicians, I think that's more or less what you said or rather I would like to ask it by way of a question. Why then to achieve that result, was it necessary to detonate a bomb of this magnitude in a public area, killing a number of individuals and injuring even more?
MR SHOKE: I think what you must bear in mind that the South African Government was at war with it's citizens, particularly the Black majority of this country and there were those on the side of apartheid who resorted to arms to sustain that system that was declared a crime against humanity and in our quest for freedom, we had to deal with them because they were in the frontline of apartheid defence.
MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGNER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Mr Shoke sitting here listening to you it seems to me that you were a committed person within the MK structure and the way you're giving your evidence you, it's something that struck me, have you ever at any stage at the time of the bombing or subsequent thereto, had any thought or regard for the people that were left afterwards, the families of the people that were killed and murdered, the people that were injured, be they White people or Black people. It seems to me that - have you had any regard for those people at all or not?
MR SHOKE: I think as a Black person in this country I have shed fountains of tears and we, were we are we've crossed rivers of blood and the blood that was spilt by the South African Police.
ADV PRIOR: May I just follow that up. You have no thought or regard for the people who actually suffered as a result of this particular operation. Is that, do I understand you correctly. You say you've shed all the tears that you can shed, so do I understand from that that you have no feeling, no thought for the victims, whether they be White or Black, but the families that were left after the killing of their children, do you have any regard for them?
MR SHOKE: It is unfortunate that the government of the day allowed the situation in fact to be what it was by them.
ADV PRIOR: I hear you, but you as an individual before the Amnesty Committee today, you've applied for amnesty. We know what happened in the past, we've heard many accounts and many many witnesses have testified. I just invite you at this stage to indicate whether you had any regard for such victims who were also victims of the madness or do you have no feeling for them as you sit here today?
MR SHOKE: Like I said (indistinct) it was unfortunate that I was trying in fact to take that route but if you were in my position I think you'd have followed the same route.
ADV PRIOR: Alright. Was there any consideration during the planning stage when General Nyanda was involved, when you were involved, Mr Kgoele was involved of the possibility that even the supporters of the struggle, supporters of the ANC may well be killed if you detonate an explosion at the Magistrate's Court and seen against the background that the Magistrate's Court was also frequented by people involved in the struggle, your supporters, your sympathisers. Were there any consideration given to that possibility that those people may well be killed in such explosions and if that was done, if that was considered, let me ask the second part, were they just expendable in the circumstances?
MR SHOKE: That possibility was considered.
ADV PRIOR: And the second part is, having considered that possibility, were they expendable in your achieving your ultimate goal, that was to pump sense into the apartheid government or their representatives?
MR SHOKE: To the best of my knowledge, precautionary measures were taken to minimise any civilian casualty and civilian in the true sense of the word of civilian because by then, Blacks in the townships were not regarded as civilians, people only spoke of civilians when there were White casualties.
ADV PRIOR: Yes I hear that but answer the question specifically if you can. Having made the assessment, as you've now conceded that possibility existed and there were precautions to minimise the casualty figure among civilians and there by civilians I include people from all walks of life not related to the army or police, private people who went to the Court for business or they were called there, were those people simply expendable in the overall objective of the operation. In other words if those people, despite the precautions, were in fact killed or injured, they were simply casualties of war, they were expendable. Is that how you saw it?
MR SHOKE: I think that aspect is also covered in paragraph 51 of the main submission. The ANC at strategic level did consider that.
ADV PRIOR: And you embraced that strategy in the specific planning of this event. Did you make it part of your mind set, your thought processes and the way you accepted it. You see you keep referring to what the policy was. Do you embrace that as part of your mind set in the planning of this operation?
CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it more simply. You saw that people might be killed, innocent people might be killed, you realised that?
MR SHOKE: Might be hurt ja or killed, that possibility existed and hence we took the necessary precautionary measures.
ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman I have no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
MR LANDMAN: No re-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Sorry, rather let me put a question arising perhaps from Mr Prior's last question. Is the position that on, in any warfare situation both sides accept the fact that when they carry out operations, some of their own supporters might get involved in the crossfire?
MR SHOKE: To the best of my knowledge all wars throughout the world in fact civilians have been caught in crossfire.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
