CHAIRPERSON: Right we continue with the Ellis Park incident. What stage have we now reached?
MR PRIOR: Thank you, Mr Chairman. The hearing proceeds on the 13th July, the parties are represented as yesterday. We are in the situation that I think Mr van den Berg needs to clarify what his position is. At the last adjournment, that was last year, we had stopped during Mr Dumakude's evidence. He had been cross-examined and I think Mr van den Berg needed to take instructions at that stage, so we hadn't concluded Mr Dumakude's evidence.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, that is indeed correct. The matter was adjourned and it's reflected on pages 150 and onwards in the record, Mr Chairperson. I was at the point where I was going to re-examine Mr Dumakude, but arising from certain questions which you put to him, it became apparent that there was additional documentation which neither my client nor I had had access to and you then afforded us the opportunity to have insight into that documentation for me to take instructions in respect of that documentation. So I suppose we're really at a point where I must bring an application to supplement Mr Dumakude's evidence so that we might deal with the documentation and particularly the two aspects which you had raised with him and with me at the close of the proceedings last year.
CHAIRPERSON: It is not really a case of re-examination, you're not going to deal with matters that were raised in cross-examination, you are going to deal now with matters that you had not been afforded an opportunity of consulting your client about before, is that the position?
MR VAN DEN BERG: That is the position Mr Chairperson.
Mr Chairperson, there's one small difficulty which I must bring to your attention and that is the fact that Mr Dube, the fourth applicant in this matter, his legal representative is not present at the moment and I'm not sure what prejudice would be caused if we were to proceed in Mr Koopedi's absence. I am in your hands in regard to that, Mr Chairperson.
MR PRIOR: I have had no contact, or I don't know if Ms Cambanis wants to say something, but he hasn't contacted me at all regarding why he's not here.
MS CAMBANIS: No I have no information Chair, but I can, if you would excuse me from the hearings, I could go and telephone to find out.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we'll adjourn for a minute or two because it seems to me, if he just hasn't bothered to be here, is his client here?
MS CAMBANIS: Yes, he is.
CHAIRPERSON: Does he know where his legal adviser is?
MR VAN DEN BERG: He indicated to me that he didn't, Mr Chairperson, but he was expecting him.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, could we adjourn for a minute or two and you can all try to telephone him and find out if he has just abandoned all interest, if he'd like to go and continue to explain his conduct later to the Law Society ...(indistinct - microphone not on) and can continue.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson. With the leave of the Committee I would then recall Mr Dumakude. He testified previously in Zulu, Mr Chairperson.
LESTER DUMAKUDE: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude on a previous occasion when you testified in this matter, you had not had access to two bundles of documents, one relating to damage caused to property and the second relating, it was a series of statements by persons who were injured at the time of the explosion. Can you remember that that was the situation?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I still remember.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can we deal with the question of the houses in and around Ellis Park at that particular time. You testified previously that you had been there on the Friday to confirm the reconnaissance done by the co-applicants Matshididi and Shoke. Do you recall that evidence?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you tell the Committee what you observed when you were there on the Friday in respect of the houses?
MR DUMAKUDE: Since we were already informed that those houses, they were not houses which seemed like the houses which were inhabited by white people.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Could you expand on that a little please, Mr Dumakude? When you say they were not houses that appeared to be inhabited by white people, what do you mean?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think there were people of colour staying in those houses. They looked like they were dark in their windows and also the corrugated iron and in accordance with the white people's standards, I could see that they were inhabited by black people, mostly. To add, as Dr Luyt explained, he said if slums collapse and it's obvious that they were not inhabited by white people.
MR VAN DEN BERG: During the time that you were there, did you see anybody enter or leave those houses?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, I didn't. I stayed there for a long time. There were no people staying in those houses and there were no people coming in or getting out of the houses.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Did you observe any signs of life like for example washing?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will repeat again. I said I stayed there for some time, waited for sometime, there wasn't any living thing around there.
ADV SANDI: For how long were you there Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE: I would say a long time, because I had to do a reconnaissance to confirm that there isn't anything I mean which goes against what we're supposed to do in that particular place.
CHAIRPERSON: Why should that take you such a long time, Mr Dumakude? You had sent other people beforehand. They had reported back to you, you now came to a deserted scene, how long does it take you to look around at that scene, confirm what you'd been told?
MR DUMAKUDE: Reconnaissance one was done by myself and also to confirm things that were told. I also had to take my own time in confirming what I've heard at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that your explanation?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, could I ask the interpreter to repeat that? For some reason it didn't come through my headphones, I don't know what the answer was.
INTERPRETER: Should I repeat exactly what he said?
MR VAN DEN BERG: As far as you could, please.
INTERPRETER: He said he stayed there for a longer period because he himself he had to confirm exactly what he'd been told before by the other people who had been at the scene and to make sure that whatever was told to him is correct.
ADV SANDI: Mr van den Berg, I thought you were referring to the very last part of what he was saying. He said something about reconnaissance one was done by myself and then I did not follow what he said there.
MR VAN DEN BERG: I'm afraid I didn't hear any of the previous answer at all. I heard the question by the learned Chair, but the rest of the answer I didn't hear at all, so I don't have a record of it. I heard what the interpreter says now and I seem to have sorted out the problem with this headphone.
INTERPRETER: Can't you ask him maybe the question, you might repeat and then.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude the learned Chairperson of the Committee asked you why it took so long for you to, why it took so long for this second reconnaissance to take place? You already had the information, why did it take you so long to confirm it?
MR DUMAKUDE: The reason why I was supposed to be there was to confirm the reconnaissance which was done before and to confirm, it was to make sure that what has been told to me, from where I was standing, it's correct and I confirmed that and it was necessary that I should take time to make sure that what has been told to me and what I see is the same, I mean reflect the same situation and I have to be content with what I see and what I've been told.
MR VAN DEN BERG: The reconnaissance which was carried out, was that purely in respect of the area at which the car was later left, or did it cover other areas as well?
MR DUMAKUDE: I had to look at the whole area. It wasn't only the place where the car was supposed to be placed. I had to look at all the places, places which had been told to me and also see if there is any alternative place which could be used.
DR TSOTSI: Mr Dumakude, I didn't hear your answer to the question put to you by your counsel, namely whether or not there were signs of life in the buildings, the houses that you inspected, like washing for instance hanging on the line.
MR DUMAKUDE: As I've already stated, those are some of the things that I looked to find out in order to be sure whether there were people staying out or not.
CHAIRPERSON: From the evidence which I gather has now been accepted, by all the statements there were people staying there.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I've read that from the papers before the Committee.
MR VAN DEN BERG: There seems to be something with my headphones, perhaps if I could arrange to get another set or something.
INTERPRETER: Testing 1, 2. Is it clear now Mr van den Berg? Can you hear the interpreters, Mr van den Berg?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Yes, I can, thank you very much.
Mr Dumakude, the last questions was, you were asked to comment about the fact that there were in fact people residing in those houses. What was your comment?
MR DUMAKUDE: To my knowledge, it's after I have read the papers before the Committee, that it came to me that there were people living there.
MR VAN DEN BERG: If we could then, Mr Dumakude, move on to the second aspect and that was the question of other people injured in the street at the time of the explosion. Your evidence was that you saw two people in the street and it appears from your evidence that those are the two people who subsequently died in the explosion. Did you see anybody else in the street?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will repeat that the people that I saw, the people on whom I was focusing are the people who were there, two.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Did you see anybody else in the street?
MR DUMAKUDE: I didn't see other people, I only saw the two and I focused on the two people. Whether there were other people near the area, I didn't see them at the time.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you give an explanation for why that is so?
MR DUMAKUDE: The two people that I saw, they were the people who were disturbing me on my work, the work that I was supposed to be doing there and that's the reason why I had to concentrate on them and that is the reason why I am able to remember them today.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you suggesting Mr Dumakude that you stood at the corner of I think it is Beit Street and Upper Meyer and you looked up there and you only saw two people in that narrow street going away from you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, Chairperson, you are repeating what I've said.
CHAIRPERSON: And you must have been in a state of some alarm, you must have been wanting to keep watch to see if other security people were emerging, whether you were in danger, weren't you?
MR DUMAKUDE: As you say, Chairperson, I had to make sure that other people don't come near the scene.
ADV SANDI: Which people are you talking about when you say other people, you had to make sure that they don't come to the scene?
MR DUMAKUDE: To come back, I've already explained that the intention to plant the bomb was not to kill the black people and the two people - the aim was not to look for people or to kill people, but unfortunately there were two people who were there and I was keeping guard as to make sure that there were not other people who were coming nearby.
CHAIRPERSON: That is where, Mr Dumakude, I have the greatest difficulty understanding you. You say you were taking guard to see there were not other people. We're told that there were 31 people injured by this explosion, of people near by, we are told there were lots of young boys standing by the bus. If you were keeping guard to see nobody was coming by, why didn't you see these people?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wouldn't be able to answer that question because I've already mentioned that the only people I've seen there were the two people, those were the only people I've seen and these are the only people I can give testimony on behalf, because they were the only two people I saw in the nearby area.
ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Dumakude, this is not very clear to me. At that stage when you see these two people, what was the position with the match inside the stadium? Was that still in progress?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, the game was still on. As I've already mentioned when I boarded my car, I waited outside, I waited as someone who was there to collect people who were at the game. I was told or I only left the vicinity because these two people came to my direction and after that I kept watch, especially I was looking at these people as to what they were doing. These were the only two people who were at the vicinity of the scene.
ADV SANDI: You had to estimate the time. How would you say it would have taken from the time you leave these people, these two people, you leave them there, you say that they are disturbing you, to the point of the actual explosion? Are you able to give any time estimation of that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will try my best. I think it can be two to three minutes, that's how long it took before the explosion.
CHAIRPERSON: Why was that delay?
MR DUMAKUDE: I alighted the car and I pretended as if I was dusting the car or wiping it. When they came to my direction, I left the car. I went away from the car and they followed me. One of them came straight to me and I started walking fast and he walked faster as well and it happened that at that time he decided to go back to his partner. His partner was at this time going to the car. I'm estimating the time when I'm saying two to three minutes but this is what happened. I am not certain about the time, as to whether it was really two to three minutes. This is only what happened. I alighted the car, I walked away and one of them followed me. I walked faster, he followed me. I am just estimating the time as to two to three minutes.
ADV SANDI: Thank you.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson those were the two aspects which we needed to canvass. I had a number of questions in re-examination, but as this is new evidence, I'll hold those questions over so that's as far as we can take it at this point. Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG
MS CAMBANIS: Nothing thank you Chair.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS
MR KOOPEDI: We also have no questions for this witness.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chairperson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: Mr Dumakude, according to your evidence given on the previous occasion, this bomb was manufactured that morning and put into the car, is that not correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct, we made the bomb during the day, not in the morning.
MR RICHARD: Now, if I recall correctly, it consisted of some limpet mines, or mine, how many limpet mines? One or more?
MR DUMAKUDE: It wasn't one, there were many limpet mines.
MR RICHARD: Approximately how many?
MR DUMAKUDE: As I've already mentioned, this happened 11 years ago, if I tell you the number, I wouldn't be telling the truth. I cannot recall. I don't remember the amount.
MR RICHARD: But you say many, that means more than three or four?
MR DUMAKUDE: When I'm saying many, I'm saying that there were more than two, but I'm not sure as to how many. There were more than two but I cannot say whether more than four or more than how many, except to say more than two.
MR RICHARD: And then in addition you put in some explosives, correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: If you can clarify the explosions, what explosions are you talking about?
MR RICHARD: You put in, I don't know whether it was plastic explosives or whether it was dynamite, or what sort of explosive did you put in in addition to the limpet mines?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wouldn't be able to answer that one, but what I can tell you is that there were limpet mines and the cylinders, as to whether there were other explosives, I don't know, I don't remember.
MR RICHARD: Well, when you collected materials from your dead letter box, did you ever collect explosives?
MR DUMAKUDE: I would like you to clarify the explosives to me, because I don't know the difference between the explosive and the limpet mines.
MR RICHARD: Now, when you went to buy the bottles of gas, what size bottles were they?
MR DUMAKUDE: If I remember very well, I think they were 19kg.
MR RICHARD: So that meant they took you to about your armpit, when you stood next to them?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think when I'm referring to kilograms I'm referring to weight and now when you estimate as to up to my armpit, now you're talking about the size as in a distance and I cannot be able to give you exactly, but I'm talking about a 19 Kg.
MR RICHARD: Well, I put it to you that a 19 Kg or 18 Kg bottle is the big one that you put outside and you connect stoves to and to run a house on.
MR DUMAKUDE: As I understand, as you're putting to me, I cannot dispute that.
MR RICHARD: Now you bought two of these?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I bought two.
MR RICHARD: And when you bought them they were full of gas, correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: Did you empty the gas?
MR DUMAKUDE: There was a reason for me to buy them with the gas, there was no reason for me to buy with the gas and then throw the gas away.
MR RICHARD: What was that reason?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wanted to put the shock waves, to make the bomb.
MR RICHARD: Now, you knew that that gas would catch fire, didn't you?
MR DUMAKUDE: I knew that.
MR RICHARD: And you knew that that gas would also explode?
MR DUMAKUDE: That was the aim.
MR RICHARD: And you knew that the gas bottles would fragment and blow all over the place?
MR DUMAKUDE: I didn't know that the whole area was going to catch fire.
MR RICHARD: Now, there were limpet mines with the gas, weren't there? You've said so and they would also blow up and scatter shrapnel all over the area because that is the purpose of limpet mines.
MR DUMAKUDE: I'm only hearing this from you, but I know other reasons why people use limpet mines. Maybe what you just said is another reason.
MR RICHARD: Now, you told us, you told the Panel last time that you had three timing devices, a clock mechanism, the limpet mines' timing device and the radio controlled mechanism, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, if you're referring to the three, that is so.
MR RICHARD: Now, is it correct that the car that you had the bomb in had a radio?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it had a radio.
MR RICHARD: And you were listening to it, you were monitoring the progress of the rugby match?
MR DUMAKUDE: First of all before I parked the car I wasn't listening to the radio. When I arrived there, when I was listening to the radio I was in the kombi and then when I alighted the kombi to go to the car which had the explosives, I wasn't listening to the radio.
MR RICHARD: Now, what is common cause between yourself and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: When was this that you alighted from the kombi and went to the car?
MR DUMAKUDE: When I alighted the kombi I took the car, the one with explosives, to take it to the area where we planned to leave the car and explode the bomb.
CHAIRPERSON: So where was this, how far away from where you intended to explode?
MR DUMAKUDE: It is not that far. As I've already explained we left the car, we went back to the area where we were going to park the car to do our final reconnaissance. It wasn't that far. One could leave the car and go and make your final reconnaissance as to find out whether the things were still going to go according to our plan, and then go back and fetch the car.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't seem to want to tell me where you had to go back to fetch the car, Mr Dumakude. You have now told us you did a final reconnaissance, was that on Saturday afternoon?
MR DUMAKUDE: My final reconnaissance was minutes before I could take the car and go and park it in the area. The reasons were because we wanted to make sure that things were going to go according to our plan. The reason why we did our final reconnaissance was to make sure, it was on Saturday just before we could explode the bomb.
CHAIRPERSON: So you went in the kombi to the Ellis Park rugby ground on the Saturday afternoon while the match was being played?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will help you so that you understand or you get the full picture as to how it happened. We took both cars from Diepkloof. I was in a car, the one which had the explosives and there was also a kombi. There were other people, in other words my group, in the kombi. When we arrived at Ellis Park, there was an area nearby where newspapers were being sold. When we arrived there we left the car which had the explosives and then I boarded the kombi, that's when I went for my final reconnaissance. When I left Diepkloof, I left with the car, the one with the explosives, but when we arrived at Ellis Park in the area nearby we left the car with the explosives and I boarded the kombi and I went for my final reconnaissance. At that time I wasn't in the car with the explosives.
CHAIRPERSON: And what did you see when you got to Ellis Park? The place that you'd reconnoitred before, did you see the security guards standing there, did you see all the cars parked there?
MR DUMAKUDE: There were no police when I arrived there, I only saw traffic inspectors and they were waiting at gate no 4, the gate up and our aim was not to park the car up the north gate, our aim was to park the car where initially we planned to park, so in that vicinity there were no police guards.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair.
ADV SANDI: Sorry. Now just to go back to this thing about the radio. You were sitting in the, did you say the kombi or the car, listening to the radio. What did you pick up from the radio about the match?
MR DUMAKUDE: The game was still on and we knew about games and they were telling us, they were giving us updates in the radio as to whether the game was still on and the score and when to expect the game to be over.
ADV SANDI: Was there any education from the radio that the match, the game was now about to come to an end?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I think they told us as to how many minutes were left to the game to be over.
ADV SANDI: How many minutes did they say were left before the game could come to an end?
MR DUMAKUDE: I do not remember because it's a long time, but listening to the minutes which were left, we knew that we still had enough chance to park the car and to explode the bomb. We knew that I had enough time to go back and fetch the car with the explosives and drive the car and park it there in the area where we planned to park the car.
ADV SANDI: From where you were, that is outside the stadium, could you see what was happening inside the stadium? Could you see with your own eyes what was happening there?
MR DUMAKUDE: There were walls, therefore you couldn't see people inside the stadium.
ADV SANDI: Thank you.
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair. Now for how long were you at the stadium after you had parked the car at the place where you say the newspapers were sold, from then on?
MR DUMAKUDE: I would like you to repeat your question, I do not understand very well.
MR RICHARD: You say you parked the car bomb, the bomb with the car in it, at a place where newspapers were sold and then you went for a final reconnaissance. From that point in time until the bomb blew up, how much time passed?
MR DUMAKUDE: What I can say is that when I parked the car and go to do my final reconnaissance, as I've already mentioned that I have difficulty in estimating as to how long because it happened a long time ago, but the time was enough for us to conduct whatever we needed to do or to do whatever we needed to do. I knew at the time that I had enough time to go and do my final reconnaissance and come back and take the car and go and park it to the area where we planned to park the car.
MR RICHARD: So did you walk around the edge of the stadium, past the north-east gate? Where did you walk?
MR DUMAKUDE: When I did my final reconnaissance I did it, I walked on the street which I was going to drive the car. ...(tape end) and I alighted the kombi to see as to whether it was going to be easy for me to drive the car to the area where I was going to park the car, then we went back. I boarded the kombi again and we drove to the area where we left the car with explosives.
MR RICHARD: So you did this on foot? You walked around?
MR DUMAKUDE: I did both. There were times where I was in the kombi and then I alighted the kombi and I walked by foot.
MR RICHARD: And while you were walking, where were the others? There were four of you in total, where was Mr Matshididi, Mr Shoke, Mr Dube while you were walking around?
MR DUMAKUDE: I left them in the kombi. I was in the kombi. They dropped me at a turn off and I walked by foot to see whether there was something which was going to disturb me when I come back driving the car with explosives and then I came back. I got inside the kombi again. They dropped me to the area where we left the car with explosives.
MR RICHARD: Now, once you had parked the car in Upper Meyer Street, for how long were you there with the car? Was it a very ...(intervention)
MR VAN DEN BERG: Sorry, Mr Chair, can we just clarify which car that is?
MR RICHARD: Once you parked the silver blue BMW with the bomb in it's boot, how long did you stay with the car?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will go back, because I do remember the Chairperson asking me how long it took for everything to happen and I said I will estimate as to two to three minutes because I said when I alighted the car it was after I've connected the chords. I pretended like someone who was waiting for someone who was in the game and at that time, this is when two gentlemen came to my direction. This happened between the minutes which I gave as an estimation, I'm not saying that this took exactly three minutes or two minutes, but I'm saying it was around there. It can be plus or minus.
MR RICHARD: Did you have a watch on?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And you knew that you had set the timing devices (plural) so that's more than one timing device, to blow up the bomb and detonate the explosion at precisely 5 o'clock.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I knew that.
MR RICHARD: And the bomb blew up, we've heard, at 10 past 5, 13 minutes past 5, do you dispute that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I'm hearing you saying so. You're putting it to me, I don't know.
MR RICHARD: My question was, do you dispute it? If you don't know, you don't dispute it.
MR DUMAKUDE: I set everything according to my watch and the radio which I was listening, broadcasting the match. Whether it was 10 past or 13 minutes past I cannot comment on that.
CHAIRPERSON: But you hadn't been listening to the radio for some time, had you?
MR DUMAKUDE: You have told us now that the radio was in the kombi which you left some way away when you fetched the car with the bomb and you drove back and you parked the car and set the bomb. Is that correct so far?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, you're correct, I couldn't listen to the radio because at that time I wasn't with the radio or nearby a radio.
CHAIRPERSON: So when you said in your evidence in chief "I can't answer to that because",
this is page 109
"the material I tuned it not only according to my watch like I have indicated. We were concerned about the time, we were listening to the radio, the proceeding of the rugby match and when I left the material in the car park, I tuned it according to the match, my watch and the radio"
That is not correct now you tell us. You no longer had the radio when you tuned the bomb in the car. Is that correct, Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will say when I was in the kombi I was listening to the radio in that kombi. When we left Diepkloof I was in the car, the one which had explosives and that car, the one with explosives, had a radio that car, and when I left Diepkloof I was listening to the game.
CHAIRPERSON: The car with explosives had a radio in it you say now? When you left Diepkloof you were listening to the radio?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, the car with explosives had a radio as well, so when I left Diepkloof I was listening to the radio.
CHAIRPERSON: But I understood you to have told us here this morning that the car with the explosives didn't have a radio, that you only listened to the radio in the kombi, but you now say it did have a radio. Is that correct Mr Dumakude, are you changing your version?
MR DUMAKUDE: I didn't say so. Let me go back.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr van den Berg, didn't he say that the car with the explosives didn't have a radio?
MR VAN DEN BERG: I'm just checking my notes Mr Chairperson, I must say that that's not my recollection. My recollection is he said that he wasn't listening to the radio when he was in the car with the bomb.
MR PRIOR: According to Ms Cambanis' notes, he said that the car had a radio. He was asked whether the car had a radio and his answer was yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry I had misunderstood it. I had understood he was not listening to any radio in the car with the bomb.
MR VAN DEN BERG: I think that that is correct, Mr Chairperson, that he wasn't listening to the radio at the time that he drove the car from the point at the newspaper area to the point at which it was left. That is as I have it Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, we can always check the record later on.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chair.
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair. Now whatever the situation, you knew that the clock activating the bomb in the boot, your watch and the radio all corresponded with each other and neither was fast or slow in relation to the other?
MR DUMAKUDE: Would you please repeat your question?
MR RICHARD: You had a number of methods of keeping time. The watch on your arm, the radio and you also had the clock which was set at 5 o'clock to activate the bomb, were they all precisely synchronised with each other?
MR DUMAKUDE: I do not really understand your question. I do understand that you're talking about time. I don't really understand what exactly you want.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, if the radio, while you were listening to the radio they said it is 14 minutes to 5, did you check and see that your watch also said 14 minutes to 5?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, my time and the game's time and the clock watch, if you're asking me as to whether they were corresponding, yes, they were.
CHAIRPERSON: That's what you were asked.
MR RICHARD: It was very important to you that the bomb went off precisely when you knew it was going to go off, you couldn't have it going off a little before or a little after, it had to be precise, correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it was important to us that it should explode at the time which we set it to explode.
MR RICHARD: Did the timing device malfunction in any way?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wouldn't say that because there is no reason that can make me say it was malfunctioning.
MR RICHARD: Now I'm going to display and give you an aerial photograph of the Ellis Park Stadium. The roads are still in the positions they were then, but it's taken after a number of buildings have been demolished in the vicinity and there's a scale at the top of it. I purchased the map yesterday afternoon from an institution known as Map Studio and the cartographer put the scale at the top of the map. I have handed my learned colleagues copies of the map.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Richard, just for my own clarity, when we went there last time to see the place, I understood that it had changed very drastically, how could this be helpful?
MR RICHARD: This map, Chair, was based on a photograph taken before the athletic stadium had been built and before the alterations were effected to that area. In fact the roads are as they were at the time. When I went to the supplier map office, I asked specifically for a map of that vintage and to corroborate what I am saying, it corresponds exactly with the photographs displayed yesterday and now before the Panel. What is different is that it's drawn precisely to scale and the cartographer inserted the scale in metres at the top of the map. Mr Dumakude, have you had an opportunity of examining the map?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And does it correctly reflect where the roads were at the time the bomb was detonated?
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if Mr Dumakude can see where the roads are, I must say I am having difficulty. If you could perhaps explain to us where you say they are. 4th Street is marked in as a road.
MR RICHARD: If we take the northern access of the map - I will withdraw that question, I accept that - there's Port Street, there's the stadium, you see a road going along the north side of the stadium.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the road starting from the 4 of 4th?
MR RICHARD: Correct. Now that, according to the map on pages 69 is North Park and then if we take the north-east corner, there's a road leading straight up from north-east and then there's one block down, which is Upper Meyer, one block to the east, it's unnumbered but it's again one block to the west of the extension of Port Street.
CHAIRPERSON: Does 4th Street become Beit Street?
MR RICHARD: No, 4th Street joins with Beit and goes off to the West.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I said it becomes Beit.
MR RICHARD: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: That which swings off to the left and the first street going up from Beit would be Upper Meyer.
MR RICHARD: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: It's got a slightly lighter colour square to the right of it.
MR RICHARD: Correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And lot's of little houses on the left.
MR RICHARD: And then on the western side of Upper Meyer one can see the vacant stand described in the map as " 'n oop standplaas". Now Mr Dumakude in that block - have you identified which is Upper Meyer Street now?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I do, I think I do.
MR RICHARD: Now according to that map which is at page 69(b) of the bundle which starts with index, there's a point A there in Upper Meyer Street which describes where the bomb went off, where the crater was. Now, that would be in the upper half of Upper Meyer Street between Beit and North Park.
MR DUMAKUDE: I would like you to repeat because I'm also trying to look at the map and identify the areas you're referring to.
MR RICHARD: If one looks at page 69(b) of what I've numbered the first bundle, which is headed index, there's a map there, a plan, a sketch plan. There's a position on that map described as A which according to the legend and key is the bomb crater. Have you found that?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And you agree that that is a fixed point in what we are discussing today and that position, when one corresponds it to the map which I put in front of you, the aerial photograph, which is drawn to scale, is approximately mid-way between Beit and the road below it, which is North Park. Do you dispute that that is more or less exactly where the bomb crater is or was in 1988? What's your comment?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I do agree.
MR RICHARD: Now, if one takes the scale of one in 5 000 at the top drawn by the photographer yesterday afternoon by the name of Apple, would you dispute that that point is 50 metres away from the north-east gate, which is less in fact?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wouldn't accept or deny that because the person who measured this may be accurate in his measurement, I can only say maybe so.
MR RICHARD: Now, I put it to you that from that position in Upper Meyer Street, when you parked the car and stood there for two or three minutes, you could see directly to the north-east gate, it was very near you, very near. Do you deny that?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, in fact the aim was for me to see the gate.
MR RICHARD: And, if one takes into account that there were other cars parked in the road at Upper Meyer, you could not in fact have got the car much closer if you were to park the car in Upper Meyer? That's the bomb car.
MR DUMAKUDE: Where I parked the car it's exactly the area where I planned to park the car.
MR RICHARD: Now,...(intervention)
MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Chair, before Mr Richard continues, can I just get clarity. Is he saying there that it's 50 metres down Upper Meyer? If you could just clarify. Mr van den Berg and I are just trying to work out the 50 metres which doesn't seem right.
MR RICHARD: I take the point at the north-east corner of Ellis Park and then I take a ruler, or if I refer to the scale at the top, one will see that 50 metres equals 2 cm on the ruler and that takes us in linear distance to the middle of Upper Meyer.
CHAIRPERSON: Well the middle is the middle of that portion of Upper Meyer between Beit and Ellis Park.
MR RICHARD: I have a ruler which I can lend to my learned colleagues.
CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't it perhaps save a few minutes if we took a very short adjournment now, if you got together and you marked these points on this plan with red ink or yellow or something, if it is all agreed, rather than have to work our way around. We'll take a short adjournment.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
LESTER DUMAKUDE: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: (cont)
You can see where I've made a cross on the map in Upper Meyer Street.
INTERPRETER: He doesn't have a copy with an X marked.
MR RICHARD: Are you happy that the cross is in the correct place?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, I can't see the cross.
MR PRIOR: Mr Chair, if Mr Pika can just show the witness where the cross is.
MR RICHARD: Have you seen the cross yet?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: Are you happy that it's in the correct position?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, according to these sketches it looks like it is the correct place.
MR RICHARD: Now, Mr Dumakude, earlier this morning your counsel said he had now had an opportunity to consult with you in relation to the bundle of documents titled Persons Injured, which I've numbered number 3. Is that correct? Have you read those statements?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: Do you dispute what is said by the people who made the affidavits in the various statements in that bundle?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, I do not dispute.
MR RICHARD: Now when one uses the scale on that plan, map, it's also correct to say that Upper Meyer Street is 50 metres or less than 50 between North Park and Beit, there's less than 50 metres between the two corners?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will just agree according to what is written here in the map, I cannot dispute what is written on the map.
MR RICHARD: Now if we go to page 9 of the bundle, there one finds a statement by Janine Stander.
MR VAN DEN BERG: In which bundle is that Mr Chairperson?
MR RICHARD: That is the bundle of injured persons.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
MR RICHARD: Janine Stander in that statement says that she walked up Upper Meyer street on the left-hand side, that's the western side and got to the corner of Beit street and she did that after exiting from the north-east exit. Do you dispute that?
MR DUMAKUDE: She wasn't telling me this, she was telling you and why should I dispute it, if she was telling you something which happened to her?
MR RICHARD: Because she would have walked straight past you, that's why Mr Dumakude.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, can we lay a factual basis for that. He says - it's put to the witness that this person walked straight past Mr Dumakude. At what point? We haven't ascertained where Mr Dumakude was at the time when allegedly this person walked past him, there's a whole host of assumptions built in to that and I think my learned friend needs to break it down so that we can get clarity before we come to the conclusion which my friend is driving at.
MR RICHARD: Very well. Mr Dumakude, is it correct that you stood next to the car for a couple minutes before the bomb went off, the BMW, pretending to be a chauffeur waiting for somebody to get in, is that correct? Is that not your evidence?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, if you're referring to my statement, yes, I only spoke about what I did.
MR RICHARD: Then you went up in a northerly direction in Upper Meyer street to the corner of Beit Street, correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: When you're talking about me walking you're talking as if I was just walking. The reason I was walking is because I was disturbed by the two people as I've already mentioned and I was walking fast.
MR RICHARD: Your evidence is that you went to the corner of Beit Street and Upper Meyer. I didn't say whether you walked or ran or crawled. Did you go to the corner of Beit Street, yes or no?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And it was there, that is where you were when the bomb went off, is it not correct?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, there are four corners. If I remember the evidence correctly he was on the, quite close to the spot which is marked O on 69(d), if I remember the evidence correctly.
MR RICHARD: Mr Dumakude do you have page 69(d) in front of you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I do.
MR RICHARD: Can you see the position O?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes I do.
MR RICHARD: Were you at or near position O?
MR DUMAKUDE: Near position O.
MR RICHARD: And it's also correct that to detonate the bomb by means of the radio controlled device you had to be in line of sight of the bomb?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that is so.
MR RICHARD: So that means you saw the bomb go off?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I did.
MR RICHARD: Now we go back to Janine Stander's statement. She said she left the stadium via the north-east exit, walked up Upper Meyer Street on the left-hand side and got to the corner of Beit Street. Do you challenge her statement?
CHAIRPERSON: I gathered he had already accepted the statement and said he did not challenge them.
MR RICHARD: She must have been in your immediate vicinity at the corner of Beit street when you detonated the bomb?
CHAIRPERSON: If she walked up the left-hand side of the road, wouldn't she have been on the other side? If you're walking up a road on the left, she's not walking down the road, she's walking up the road.
MR RICHARD: She's walking in a northerly direction from the stadium.
CHAIRPERSON: She's walking away from the stadium.
MR RICHARD: That's in a northerly direction.
CHAIRPERSON: And then she would be coming down on the left-hand side of the road, that would be the opposite section to O.
MR RICHARD: Correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Not next to O.
MR RICHARD: On the curb.
CHAIRPERSON: On the other side of the road.
MR RICHARD: Correct, I'm not disputing that.
CHAIRPERSON: You were saying right next to him.
MR RICHARD: Well, in his immediate vicinity. Did you see her? No, you didn't. Then we go to another group of three people.
ADV SANDI: Mr Richard, before you go on to something else, can I just come in on something? Mr Dumakude, you say you saw the bomb when it went off. Were there any people around the car when it went off?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, there were two people, the two people I've been referring to all along, these were the only people I saw.
ADV SANDI: And that is the time when it went off.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
ADV SANDI: You only had these two people around the car?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, these were the only two people that I saw.
MR RICHARD: Just to compress cross-examination, what I've done, with the assistance of Mr Pika, is summarised the various injured persons' statements into groups. I believe it might be useful if I had up the document to my learned colleagues and allowed them to consult with their clients on the document and then resume after the tea adjournment. It must be more or less 11.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. If there are any other documents ...(indistinct - speaker's microphone not on)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
MR RICHARD: I have no further documents.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the short adjournment now.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
LESTER DUMAKUDE: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: (cont)
Mr Dumakude, I distributed copies of my summaries of
the various statements, or most remaining statements in the bundle and I've discussed it with your legal representative and I may now say that it's accepted that in those statements 11 people put themselves to the north of point A on the map, that's where the bomb went off and that is within 25 metres of the corner. Your version is you didn't see any of them. Is that correct? Your version is you didn't see any of them?
DR TSOTSI: What about the two people that died? Are you including them?
MR RICHARD: I beg your pardon?
CHAIRPERSON: The two people who died were not in Beit Street, they died in Upper Meyer.
Have we given a designation to this?
MR RICHARD: I haven't given a designation to either the map that I handed in or ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Have we got exhibits here?
MR RICHARD: I wasn't part of the first hearing.
MR PRIOR: Sorry Mr Chairman, with respect, I don't think any of the bundles were marked.
CHAIRPERSON: They were just put into bundles? There were no exhibits.
MS CAMBANIS: There only was the statement of Lester Dumakude that was handed in.
MR PRIOR: That was put into a bundle, subsequent to the handing in, so there are no separate exhibits given.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, subject to correction later shall we call the plan Exhibit A and the this B.
MR RICHARD: For the sake of clarity what I've done is I've numbered my bundles. I call the first one, that's the Index, which contains the amnesty applications, that's 1, the bundle of transcribed evidence, is 2, the injured persons is number 3 and the damaged property is number 4 and then for the sake to the record, the aerial photograph which is according to scale is Exhibit A and the list of injured persons and property which is my summary of bundle 4, that's damage to property is Exhibit B and may I confirm with the Chair that that is in order?
CHAIRPERSON: Okay.
MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair.
MR RICHARD: Mr Dumakude, I put the proposition to you, your version is that you didn't see those 11 persons, other than the two deceased, in the first 25 metres to the North of Upper Meyer, from Beit, between the bomb site and Beit Street, in Upper Meyer.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I didn't see other people, my focus was on the two persons.
ADV SANDI: So what is that supposed to mean? Do you mean to say that these people may have been there but you did not see them, or are you saying that there were no such people at all at the scene?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will not dispute that they were there, if they are saying that they were there, but what I can say is that my focus was on these two individuals and I couldn't see any other persons except for the two.
ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Richard. If these people were there, Mr Dumakude, what would have prevented you from seeing these people?
MR DUMAKUDE: They were not nearby the car. Maybe I need to ask a question, with due respect, I'm saying I only saw two people and I'm saying to you if these eleven were nearby the car they would have died, they were not going to be injured because if they were nearby they were going to die, the explosives were detonated in a way that if they were nearby the car they were going to die, but I only saw two people nearby the car and that's why they died.
CHAIRPERSON: They say they were walking down Upper Meyer Street, which is not a wide street. They were on both sides of Upper Meyer Street, walking towards Beit Street where you were standing. Do you understand? You have read this, you have consulted with your lawyer. You have accepted the truth of these statements and yet you say you didn't see a single person, except the two who you thought were security people. Do you persist with that Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE: I only saw two people. These were the only two people I saw.
MR RICHARD: And lower down there was entire rugby team waiting to get on to the bus, did you see the bus?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I did see a bus and I parked nearby the bus.
MR RICHARD: My question was did you see the rugby team waiting for the driver of the bus to unlock the bus so that they could get in? This is a rugby team not one or two people.
MR DUMAKUDE: I saw the bus, but I did not see people outside the bus.
MR RICHARD: And from Exhibit B, do you dispute that individuals in that crowd had time between the final whistle of the match, to walk from the south side of the stadium round the swimming pool to the bomb area, from the other side of the rugby stadium?
MR DUMAKUDE: I don't know what you ...(end of tape)
MR RICHARD: Amongst those statements are people who describe themselves as sitting on the south side of the rugby stadium, that's the side furthest away, exiting through the south-east gate, walking past the swimming pool, towards the bomb area. All that between the time that the final whistle blew and when the bomb went off. Do you dispute that?
MR DUMAKUDE: You are just putting this to me now, how can I dispute or not dispute this because these are versions of other people. They are referring to things that they've seen and I'm talking about what I personally saw.
MR RICHARD: I don't understand your answer. Are you saying that these people are lying?
CHAIRPERSON: He is saying as I understand it, I cannot say they are lying, but I'm just telling you what I say I saw.
MR RICHARD: Very well, I proceed to the next point. Where was Mr Matshididi at the time the bomb blew up?
MR DUMAKUDE: He won't be able to give you an appropriate answer because when the bomb went off, I was watching there therefore I don't know where he was.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, where did you last see him?
MR DUMAKUDE: Where I last saw him is when he alighted the car and when I took the corner before where I parked the car.
CHAIRPERSON: And his job was to stand some distance away so he could watch you and see if anything happened to you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it is true, this is how we planned.
ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Richard. Just explain something here. You say these two people were walking quite fast behind you and you also said you were not really walking, can you explain that? Is that a situation where you were actually running away from these two people?
MR DUMAKUDE: After I parked the car I alighted the car as if, and I pretended as if I was waiting for someone. They came to my direction and that's when I left, but then I didn't want them to be suspicious to think that I was running away from the car. I passed the car, or he passed the car coming to me as someone who wanted to see as to why he was following me. I tried to walk faster and then I realised that he was walking faster and then I increased my pace a little bit faster again and then he did the same. Eventually I don't know, for some reason he stopped and then went back to this other person who was with him and that's when I realised that something wasn't going according to our plan.
ADV SANDI: Is it the picture here that these two people here were your main focus of concentration?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's why I focused on these two individuals because of what happened, because after he tried to walk behind me, then I focused on them, on both of them.
CHAIRPERSON: Was this when you were standing on the corner of Beit and Upper Meyer, as you've indicated near point O?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that is so. After this happened when I went to the corner, I focused on them because they were talking to each other nearby the car, so my focus was on them and the car.
ADV SANDI: Would I be correct in my impression to think that perhaps the reason why you did not see these other people is because you were concentrating on these two people who you say were suspicious?
MR DUMAKUDE: Maybe so.
CHAIRPERSON: But surely if you were looking up the road, even if you were concentrating on two people in the middle near the car, you would have noticed people walking down on the pavements on both sides and a football team arriving to get into the bus which was very close to where the car was parked?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes as I've already mentioned, my focus was on these two individuals. It is so difficult for me to even tell one if I saw people waiting next to the bus or even if you can ask me where, what side of the bus or what clothes they were wearing, I don't remember these things at all. I am not sure whether I have seen these things. I don't remember seeing people, as to where they were waiting, and all I can say is that if they are saying that they were there, I cannot say they were not there, but I will strictly say something that I do remember, that I do remember seeing two gentlemen who were nearby the car.
ADV SANDI: Thank you.
MR RICHARD: Would you please turn to page 60 of the bundle, that's volume 1, of the photograph at page 60. Now do you see point A on that photograph? That's the top photograph. Is that where the BMW with the bomb was parked?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I would think so.
MR RICHARD: Now would you agree that from the position of the bomb crater which is position A, which is now where the blue BMW was parked, it's not near the pavement?
MR DUMAKUDE: Would you please clarify that? Clarify this, whether near the pavement or in the middle of the road, but what I can tell you is that it is near the pavement.
MR RICHARD: Have a look at page 62, the top photograph there. There's another photograph of where you say the car was parked. It doesn't seem as if it was properly parked at all. It seems as if it was positioned some way away from the curb.
MR DUMAKUDE: Maybe I need to ask a question. If you can just tell me the width of the street, like how many centimetres from A to the pavement, that will give you an answer whether where the car was parked, was near the pavement, or away from the pavement.
MR RICHARD: Now in relation to point A on page 62, where were the two deceased? Did they have to walk around point A? Were they on the pavement or in the road? On which side of the road?
MR DUMAKUDE: If I remember very well, one of them was on the side near the pavement looking inside the car. The other one was on the other side, in other words the right-hand side inside the road, in other words.
MR RICHARD: Can you describe what they were wearing? Were they young or old?
MR DUMAKUDE: This happened 11 years ago. What I am going to give you is something I'm not 100% sure about, but it's something that I think I can recall. I think they were wearing jeans and that's why I will say it can be true and it can be disputed by someone, but I think they were wearing jeans, navy jeans and this colour it's still sticking in my mind, but if someone can come and dispute this it may be so, but this is sticking in my mind, that they were wearing jeans, blue jeans.
MR RICHARD: Were they young or old, or both the same age or different in age?
MR DUMAKUDE: I cannot commit myself as to comment whether they were different in ages.
MR RICHARD: Let's turn to another point. Mr Matshididi and Mr Shoke both say that you and Mr Dube came to their particular cell and announced that there was going to be a rugby match later in the week and you had an operation. Do you remember giving that evidence?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Is the proposition that my client gave this evidence or is the proposition that Matshididi and Shoke gave this evidence.
MR RICHARD: That is what Matshididi and Shoke said, in summary. Do you remember that evidence by them?
MR DUMAKUDE: I do remember.
MR RICHARD: So it's correct then to make the proposition that neither Mr Shoke nor Mr Matshididi invented the plan, or originated the plan to put the bomb at Ellis Park, it must have been either you or Mr Dube or both of you. Correct? Yes, or no?
MR DUMAKUDE: I myself came with the plan.
MR RICHARD: Now did you discuss the plan with anyone?
MR DUMAKUDE: I discussed this with the three persons we executed the operation.
MR RICHARD: In other words who did you discuss it first with, Mr Dube, or Mr Shoke or Mr Matshididi?
MR DUMAKUDE: I discussed this with Mr Dube because Mr Dube was the Commander of our Units.
MR RICHARD: When you say our units, how many units did Mr Dube command?
MR DUMAKUDE: One unit. I'm talking about this one unit and the unit I'm talking about is the unit which executed this operation.
MR RICHARD: Did Mr Dube command any other unit beside this particular unit?
MR DUMAKUDE: Before I answer this question I would like from this Committee, if my answer will help the Committee if I tell them whether Dube was a Commander of other units or not? In other words, whether my answer will help the Committee about this incident, or about this application?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, it was on the tip of my finger to ask what the relevance of the question was. I didn't object and I hear that my client is now taking that point. I'm not sure what the relevance of the question is.
CHAIRPERSON: Is you client, or is your client indicating to the Committee, unless there is some specific reason, he's not going to comply with the requirements of full disclosure?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson if it's your ruling that it is relevant, then ...intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what the relevance is as of yet.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Then he should be directed to answer the question, Mr Chairperson.
MR RICHARD: The relevance is, if it could be put to him again and he afforded the opportunity to answer it, did Mr Dube command any other units, yes or no?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, he did, he was a Commander of other units.
MR RICHARD: How often did you see Mr Dube during the year of 1988?
MR DUMAKUDE: It is difficult for one to answer how often, I do not understand, this happened in 1988, even if I answer you I will not be certain that what I am going to tell you is the certain answer.
ADV SANDI: Mr Dumakude I think this is a very fair question. Did you see him once every 6 months, once a year? How regularly did you see him and talk about what you were involved in?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will try my best. When I arrived, the first person I saw was Mr Dube. When I arrived, this was before this operation, I used to meet Mr Dube and we had meetings and discussions because my reasons for coming back to the country was to do discussions with other members and Dube was also responsible for those things. This is how I used to see Dube, we used to have discussions.
MR RICHARD: When was that that you came back to the country?
MR DUMAKUDE: We are talking about the Ellis Park incident. I arrived in 1988, I don't remember the day but it was in 1988. I think it was before May.
MR RICHARD: So are you saying that you were in and out of the country but you came back some time in May 1988?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And from then on you were in regular communication with Mr Dube?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, maybe I do not understand the word regular as you understand it. Maybe I understand regular differently from the way you understand it but the truth is that we used to see each other, me and Mr Dube, it was because he was the Commander of the unit and we were supposed to do this operation.
MR RICHARD: Now, it is also correct that you had, during 1988 taken over Aboobaker Ismail's position as chief of Special Operations and therefore Mr Dube was accountable to you, he had to report on what operations he did to you, it was his duty to.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, in 1987 I succeeded Rashid Ismail but if you're saying something about Dube reporting to me, I will not agree to that because there are Commander's channels and once one's position has been changed and the responsibilities, they change as well and the issuing of orders changes, depending on the channels.
MR RICHARD: Is it not correct that you were in a position to give orders to Mr Dube?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is so.
MR RICHARD: And if you gave an order to Mr Dube, wasn't he responsible to account to you and report what he did with his order?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it is so, but sometimes it depends on the situation. Sometimes, if he is in a position to come back and report he will do so, but if he is unable to come direct to me and give me the report, then he will send others to give me the report.
MR RICHARD: So then to restate it, you were the person to whom he had to account and report for his activities, whether it was this operation or any other operation, whether it was through him or through people he sent to you, you were Chief of Special Operations.
MR DUMAKUDE: When you say he was supposed to bring back the report to me, I will not agree with you, it was not a one man's command.
MR RICHARD: Well, then who else did he have to report to besides you?
MR DUMAKUDE: There are front line Commanders, but they were under me but they were in the line of command. In the command structure there were people with different responsibilities and also they are a part of the command, but with different responsibilities.
MR RICHARD: Well, my question was very straight forward and simple. Please provide me with the full names of each person to whom Mr Dube had to account, between you and him.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I don't want to curtail or object unnecessarily to my learned friend's cross-examination. I'm not sure whether what my learned friend is trying to ask relates particularly to this incident, in which case it's quite clear as to the line of command, or whether it relates to other incidents. If it relates to other incidents I don't see what the relevance is.
MR RICHARD: With the greatest of respect, I do believe that the chain of command between the local operation through to the top in Lusaka is highly material and germane. For instance in the bundle of papers, there's reference to Hein Groskopff and Alfred Nzo and someone, and to understand the relevance of those references, we need to understand the chain of command.
CHAIRPERSON: Does this relate to the question of whether these actions were being carried out for and on behalf of the ANC, or whether they were, for some reason best known to himself, an operation only by himself which he was covering up from the ANC?
MR RICHARD: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was in the normal course of events, Mr Dube's Commander?
MR DUMAKUDE: I was the overall Commander. As I've already mentioned, under myself there were people who wee in the line of commanders, there was a Chief of Staff, there was a Chief of Operations, there was a Commissar, and there were front line Commanders. This is what I'm trying to clarify, that there was a chain of Commanders and anyone who was in the organisation or in the unit will report to other people and maybe the report will come back to me via others, not direct from the person, but if the individual feels that the situation is not in order, then he will leave that thing there.
CHAIRPERSON: I repeat the question. Who would Dube report to direct? The first person he would report to, to start the chain?
MR DUMAKUDE: As an overall Commander I will say myself.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, why are you then saying he didn't report to you, he wasn't to report to you directly, now you say he was. Mr Dumakude, I don't understand your evidence, I think you're being deliberately evasive and you're trying to conceal information. Carry on.
MR RICHARD: Are you prepared to name the people that you've outlined between yourself and Mr Dube, or do you refuse to give us that information?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will give you names, there's no secret. This is the structure of the movement and this happened. If you had a chance to look on the submissions of the movement, the documents will clarify this, but I will give you. Chief of Staff MK Johannes Molefe, Chief of Operations ...(indistinct)
CHAIRPERSON: Would you repeat that please. Sorry, Chief of Operations?
MR DUMAKUDE: Hein Groskopff, his MK name is ...(indistinct)
MR RICHARD: And then below him?
MR DUMAKUDE: There was a front line Commander, Botswana front line Commander was Harold Pule.
MR RICHARD: And below him?
MR DUMAKUDE: There were units who were inside.
MR RICHARD: Now who was the Commissar?
MR DUMAKUDE: His surname, his real surname is Galadi, I've forgotten his MK name. We used to call him 26 Vendisesh.
MR RICHARD: Now however, if you were dealing with Mr Dube on any basis and he had something to report, he would have been expected to report to you? That's all my, where I started. Now, to whom did you report in turn?
MR DUMAKUDE: High Commander of the MK under former Minister Joe Modise.
MR RICHARD: Now, when you formulated the plan to plant the bomb at Ellis Park, did you discuss it with anyone above you?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I did.
MR RICHARD: With whom?
MR DUMAKUDE: It is so unfortunate that I will quote somebody who is not alive today and that's why I'm saying it was my responsibility because I took the order from him. I discussed this with someone who was above me at the time and he is no longer alive today.
MR RICHARD: And who is that?
MR DUMAKUDE: The late Chris Hani.
MR RICHARD: So where did Chris Hani fit into the structure?
MR DUMAKUDE: He was the Chief of MK or Chief of MK staff at the time, if I'm not mistaken.
MR RICHARD: And once the bomb blew up that evening at one minute past 5 or thereabouts, sorry at 10 past 5, is it not correct to say that the event was very widely publicised, it was on the radio, television, various newspapers and in fact it was world news?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is so.
MR RICHARD: And you had discussed what was going to happen and taken orders from Chris Hani before the bomb went off?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: So that meant the entire structure of the ANC would have known all about what was happening.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, that's a conclusion which my learned friend wants to draw. There's no factual basis. He hasn't laid a factual basis for it, with respect Mr Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: I thought Mr Dumakude had said he reported to the MK High Command, but he didn't say who those people were who were in the MK High Command and he goes on to say that he had discussed this matter with the late Mr Chris Hani. It's not clear as to whether Mr Hani was part of the MK High Command.
CHAIRPERSON: I think he said he took orders from Chris Hani, who was in fact in charge. He was Chief of Staff.
ADV SANDI: Who were members of the MK High Command? Who were these people?
CHAIRPERSON: If you look at the further submissions by the ANC dated the 12th May, 1997, this is set out at page 52 and 53, is that correct Mr Dumakude? Is the ANC, the Military High Command, set out in these submissions of the ANC?
MR DUMAKUDE: That is so.
MR RICHARD: Now what is a political military council? Please describe to us.
MR DUMAKUDE: MK was a military wing of a political organisation which was ANC. MK was just one of the means which the political organisation used to achieve their goal in the struggle, the liberation of this country what we are having today. The people who were in this committee were there to direct the arms struggle. It was their duty to direct the military struggle.
MR RICHARD: Now, what did the letters MHQ stand for? Military Headquarters, correct? And then I draw your attention to page 20 of the first bundle and it says the military headquarters representatives on the political military council were at that time, Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, Ronnie Kasrils, Jop Kobane and he left in 1987, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think you're reading the same document I'm reading and I think this is so.
MR RICHARD: Now where did Siphiwe Nyanda fit into this structure?
MR DUMAKUDE: It will be much better if you ask Siphiwe, he will tell you more.
MR RICHARD: Was or was he not the Chair of the Transvaal PMC?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think if you can ask the General he will be able to tell you if he was, at that time.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chair, it's set out on page 53 of the further submissions. There's a paragraph 6.4 headed Regional Political Military Committees and then Swaziland RPMC and just above 6.4.2. it says Military Committees, Siphiwe Nyanda headed the Transvaal structures, Tommy Zulu headed the Natal structures.
MR RICHARD: Did you report to them?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, my learned friend has not had the benefit of hearing the amnesty application of Abubaker Ismail in which all of this is set out in quite considerable detail. The evidence there, Mr Chairperson, was that ...(intervention)
MR RICHARD: I object Chairperson. My learned colleague is answering the question ...(intervention)
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I finish please?
CHAIRPERSON: We're not here to waste time, we're not here to hear stuff we've heard before Mr Richard, allow him to continue.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chair that evidence was that Special Operations was a separate portion as it were of MK and that it reportedly differently to the normal MK military structures which are set out in this document.
CHAIRPERSON: It did not form part of any of those provincial structures, as I read the document, if one looks at it, it is part of the military headquarters itself, Special Operations falls under Military Headquarters and not under the provincial organisations.
MR VAN DEN BERG: That is correct, Mr Chairperson, I'm prepared to make the transcripts of Abubaker Ismail's application to my learned friend, if it will help him you know, and to curtail this line of cross-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: What is the point of this? We are not going to hear a repeat at each hearing of a Committee evidence that has already been hear at other Committees.
MR RICHARD: That is not my objective, with respect Chairperson. We do know from the evidence has been led yesterday and today that Dr Louis Luyt consulted with various persons amongst whom are the names that I have mentioned on page 20. The version we hear today is that Mr Dumakude took orders as to this operation from the late Chris Hani. Mr Hani was alive at that stage and we also know ex Dr Luyt and ex various other submissions that at the time responsibility was not taken for the event, however that's argument, I pass.
Now as Chief of Special Operations, it was your function and prerogative to have a very clear understanding of the ANC's policy on its operations was it not? You were a very senior person.
MR DUMAKUDE: It is so.
MR RICHARD: Now without labouring the point, if I summed up the policy by saying that at no stage was it ever the policy of the ANC to commit attacks on pure civilian targets, am I correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: You're telling the truth.
MR RICHARD: So if the purpose of the bomb was to kill spectators leaving the Ellis Park Stadium, that would not have been within the ANC's policy?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD: And there was no question that amongst those that could theoretically have been a target at the rugby match that afternoon, there were military personnel, or police...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: There's been no suggestion of that in any of the evidence led by this applicant or any other.
MR RICHARD: I am aware, Chair. So to ask this question, would it be possible for you to answer why the ANC did not take responsibility shortly after the incident? Would you be in a position to answer that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I wouldn't be able to answer that.
MR RICHARD: You said you reported to Mr Joe Modise, at what, how long after the incident did you report to Mr Modise?
MR DUMAKUDE: Let me just correct you. I never mentioned anything about reporting back to Joe Modise, but to answer your question, I think I reported this in September 1988 after the operation when I left the country, that's when I reported this back to the ANC after I left the country in September 1988 and went back to exile, that's when I gave them the full report.
MR RICHARD: Who did you report to then?
MR DUMAKUDE: Like I'm said before, it's unfortunate because the person I gave the report is no longer alive, it was the late Chris Hani.
MR RICHARD: Mr Dumakude, did you receive any requests for reports on what you did from anyone and if so when did they come? Did anyone ask you for an explanation about Ellis Park?
MR DUMAKUDE: No-one asked me. I don't know exactly what you want when you say to me did anyone ask me. Why would anyone ask me about Ellis Park bombing? Why would anyone think that I was the one? I don't understand you question, unless I told the person.
CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't it be a logical thing if somebody thought this may have been an ANC Special Operation, to ask the person in charge of Special Operations?
MR DUMAKUDE: Let me just clarify something. In the MK, what happens is that one would know something and that thing is going to go with you in your grave and the less you know about something, the better for you because it's for your own safety, therefore other members wouldn't ask any member about an incident because the less you know it was safe for you, therefore ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dumakude, if senior members of the ANC who were indulging in political negotiations wanted to find out about something, I am quite sure they would ask. I do not believe that the senior members of the ANC who were engaged in political activities, thought it better not to take the information to their graves, so they would never ask. I just don't believe that, Mr Dumakude. I can understand it about people of the lower levels, the need to know policy, but if some senior ANC people were being questioned about this, surely the logical person for them to get information from would have been the Chief of Special Operations?
MR DUMAKUDE: Now I do understand your question. You are clarifying the question for me. If you're referring to the senior structures yes, if they wanted to know they would have asked me, they would have called me, the senior structures of the ANC and there's no way that I would have refused to go and meet with them and explain to them because those were the people who were controlling me, whom I was reporting to.
CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, that's all the question was about. Did anybody ask you?
MR DUMAKUDE: My apology there. When I was asked did anybody ask me, I thought anybody can be anybody, it can be my colleagues, but you asked the question correctly when you said the senior members or the leadership, did they ask me. I will not tell any other person and it is not easy for any other person to just ask me, but the senior people of the movement, but there was no-one who asked me.
MR RICHARD: Mr Dumakude do you know a person by the name of Ronald Desmond Bezuidenhout, also known as Ronnie of Tok? Page 91 of Bundle number 1. You also have the MK name of Cyprian Stallone.
MR DUMAKUDE: I don't know him, but I've heard the name. I think I heard the name in Zambia and he was a white guy, if I'm not mistaken. But the name sounds familiar to me, I think I know the name but I don't know the person.
MR RICHARD: He describes an event where Chris Hani, the Chief of Staff, Special Operations, took some credit for the Ellis Park bomb.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, is it the intention to call this Mr Bezuidenhout? The last word we had of Mr Bezuidenhout was the final chapter of Jacques Pauw’s book, In the Heart of the Hall, at which time he was receiving treatment of some sort. I don't know what weight we can attach to this statement, if any.
MR RICHARD: I would like to hear Mr Dumakude's answer.
CHAIRPERSON: What are you referring to?
MR RICHARD: Alfred Nzo gave credit to Chris Hani for the Ellis Park bomb according to Mr...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: It's a seven page statement you have referred to, what passage are you referring the witness to?
MR RICHARD: I beg pardon Chairperson, I summarised it and didn't cross-refer. If one refers to page 94, starting paragraph 2, there's an event described as Hearer's Day on the 16th December 1988 where at 25 it's outlined that Mr Nzo was the chief speaker, the meeting was attended by Mr Hani and at page 26 what I have summarised is stated. Mr Dumakude, do you know anything of that event?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I don't want to object unnecessarily. This is at paragraph 26 of this affidavit by M Bezuidenhout and he says the following
"Alfred Nzo het in volgende woorde gespreek oor 'n luidspreker wat ek kon hoor en as gevolg aanhaal, naamlik "dat die boere kan skiet maar hulle kan nie tel nie, hulle beweer dat net twee mense dood is by die Krugersdorp Magistraatskantore en volgens hulle inligting is daar 10 tot 12 mense dood en dieselfde by Ellis Park"
and then it carries on and it says,
"we need cadres like Akino in MK"
it carries on
"Akino is dieselfde persoon as Groskopff"
Now Mr Chairperson, there has been an amnesty application in respect of this bomb blast at the Krugersdorp Magistrate's Court where a unit under the command of Abubaker Ismail took responsibility, the Dolphin unit, I'm sorry I forget the names of the members of that particular unit and it was the testimony there Mr Chairperson, that there was a campaign in the local media to vilify Mr Groskopff and to pin as many of these activities on Mr Groskopff. My submission is that this statement is merely part and parcel of the same campaign and I don't see what, you know without Mr Bezuidenhout coming to confirm this, what the relevance or what weight one can attach to this.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought this was about Chris Hani.
...(indistinct - microphone not on)
CHAIRPERSON: And on page 96 and paragraph 35 he says,
"Dit was nooit spesifiek gesê dat Groskopff vir die Ellispark bom, of dan die Krugersdorp bom persoonlik verantwoordelik was nie"
MR RICHARD: I leave it for argument. I don't want to burden the record further at this stage. The next point is, do you know the name Stanza Bopape?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, this is an amnesty application in respect of an incident at Ellis Park on the 2nd of August 1988, July, my apologies, July 1988 and I don't know what the relevance of the late Stanza Bopape is.
CHAIRPERSON: Nor do I.
MR RICHARD: At one stage in the early 90's it was claimed by the police that Stanza Bopape was involved in the Ellis Park incident and that was by Mr Adriaan Vlok, the then Minister of Police. Do you know the name Stanza Bopape?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, I would like to explain something before I answer this question. I came here before this Committee knowing very well that people didn't know the details of the bombing and I came forward and I told you what happened and who were involved and now I am being asked about questions whom other people thought they committed this incident and now I am here because I want the people to know the truth about the Ellis Park bombing. Now I don't see any reason why I'm being asked about other people I never mentioned as people who took part in this incident, because I think this is time wasting, what I'm saying is that we were involved, myself and the others I've already mentioned and anybody who is claiming now that he took part in the Ellis Park bombing, he was not telling the truth, or if they suspected that somebody took part, it is not true, because the only people who took part in the Ellis Park bombing are us, the people I've already mentioned and please, I do not want to be asked about Stanza Bopape and his actions.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dumakude it would be much quicker to say yes, I do know the person. He had nothing whatsoever to do with it. Do you know the person?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, I do not know him.
CHAIRPERSON: Right.
MR RICHARD: I'll leave it...(indistinct - microphone not on)
CHAIRPERSON: Is it really very relevant, something the police said some years later? I presume you're not going to call the policeman? You're not going to seek to prove that these gentlemen didn't commit the offence and shouldn't be granted amnesty because they are not guilty of any offence?
MR RICHARD: Chair, I asked one question and as has been pointed out a simple no, I don't know the man, was quite sufficient to end that.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't see the relevance of the question. I think I should warn you now that we have a right to limit questioning, particularly to persons other than applicants and I am getting very tempted Mr Richard, unless you get down to what we are dealing with here.
MR RICHARD: With respect, Chairperson, I accept.
CHAIRPERSON: Are there any further questions?
MR RICHARD: Where did you meet Mr Matshididi after the event?
MR DUMAKUDE: After the bombing I met him where we were supposed to board the car to go back.
MR RICHARD: And how did you get there?
MR DUMAKUDE: I walked.
MR RICHARD: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RICHARD
CHAIRPERSON: Did you walk with Mr Matshididi?
MR DUMAKUDE: After the explosion I met Mr Matshididi and we walked back.
CHAIRPERSON: Because he has given evidence before us as you know saying ...(indistinct)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on
CHAIRPERSON: He has given evidence before us saying we went back to Checkers, just before we got into the kombi at Checkers, we heard a sound from the bomb and we drove off to Diepkloof. What do you have to say as to that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I am saying that I met him on our way back and when I met him, the bomb had already exploded.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, there's just one or two items I'd like to canvass with leave of the Committee. Mr Dumakude, the composition of the bomb, just for the sake of clarity. You made up the bomb which was placed into the vehicle on that day, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Your question is not so clear. When you are talking about making - I don't understand, you're talking about making the bomb?
MR PRIOR: You used two large gas cylinders, 18 or 19kg each full of gas.
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that is so.
MR PRIOR: How many limpet mines were used?
MR DUMAKUDE: We're going back. As I've already mentioned in the morning that there were more than two, but I did say that I do not remember the number, the exact number, but I said there were more than 2.
MR PRIOR: Could there have been more than 5?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will repeat again, I said more than two, but I did say I don't remember exactly how many after two, but there were more than two.
MR PRIOR: And the - if I understood your evidence at the last time and today, the intention was not to kill anybody but to create an explosion which would make people then sit back and think about the political future of the country? That was the intention of assembling that bomb on that day, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: I would like you to clarify to me as to when you said we wanted the people to sit back and think about the political situation, what exactly do you want me to say?
MR PRIOR: You wanted to explode a bomb at or near Ellis Park without any intention of killing anybody. It was to be an event which would cause the white population, the white people, to sit back and think about the political situation in the country and maybe to put pressure on the government, was that, that was my understanding. If I've understood it that way, is it correct or is it incorrect?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, but I would like to add on top of what you've just mentioned, these were the people who had a vote, they were liable to vote or they were allowed to vote, therefore they were the people with a weapon to use their vote as to fight the apartheid, to rectify the situation.
MR PRIOR: You were in total control of that situation on that day, you were at pains to explain to the Panel that you had kept a very close watch on the time, you had synchronised your watch against the radio, the commentary of the game and so forth, why didn't you detonate the bomb before the game had ended, while everyone was still in the stadium? Why didn't you do it then rather than detonating it when people were actually walking up Upper Meyer Street, as you did, if your intention was not to kill anyone?
MR DUMAKUDE: We have two statements now. Now you're telling me what you want to tell me. I told you exactly what was my plan and what happened and why it happened, what was the cause and now if you're asking me why I didn't do this and this, then I don't know what to say there.
CHAIRPERSON: The question is a simple one, why did you not plan to detonate the bomb before the game ended?
MR DUMAKUDE: Chairperson, like I've said at first, the plan was for the bomb to go off before the game was over and I'm hearing this for the first time that the bomb went off when there were people on the street after the game. This is new to me. Now I heard that other people are saying the bomb went off at 10 past, 13 minutes past, 1 minute past. I was there. I am saying the bomb went off when people were still inside the stadium. Now I'm being told that there were people who were so much and these people are still alive, but the truth is that if these people were outside, outside the stadium, nearby the car, they would have been dead. That's why I'm saying there are too many stories about this incident. I'm only talking about what I've done and what I've seen. What other people are saying, I cannot dispute or accept that. It's their version.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand that you are now saying is the plan was for the bomb to go off before the game was over, that that was your intention?
MR DUMAKUDE: So that the bomb goes off before the game was over, because at the time the people will be still inside the stadium, that was our plan. We wanted the bomb to go off before the people have left the stadium
CHAIRPERSON: So the bomb could have gone off at half past 4, or quarter to 5, while the people were still in the stadium, that was your plan?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, it wouldn't have at half past four because we had time, we didn't set the bomb to go off at half past 4. Everything went according to our plan.
CHAIRPERSON: Well why not set it to go off at a time when you would be certain you would not kill anybody? People would not be leaving the stadium. Why set the bomb to go off to coincide almost exactly with the end of the match?
MR DUMAKUDE: What I can ask is that I'm sure other people wouldn't take this question nicely. If I ask anyone in this hall today, what time do you think was the proper time for me to set the bomb to go off?
CHAIRPERSON: Because we've been told you set it for 5 o'clock by your colleagues, which would have been when people started coming out of the stadium. Why did you want to be so close to killing when you tell us the policy of your party was not to kill innocent civilians?
MR DUMAKUDE: Did I tell you that I timed that bomb to go off at 5? I am telling you about the precautions which I've taken. The truth is, I did take the precaution as to when the bomb goes off, there are no people who get killed.
CHAIRPERSON: But we know from all the evidence Mr Dumakude that that is not true. That the bomb went off after people were leaving the stadium, so your precautions were not of that nature. But if you want to persist in saying that was your version, you can do so. Shall we now ignore your evidence that you gave earlier that the reason for not setting the bomb off earlier was you didn't want to disturb the people enjoying the game? Do you remember giving that evidence, Mr Dumakude? Do we ignore that?
MR DUMAKUDE: I would like to take you back Chairperson. If we calculate from when I alighted the car after I parked the car, whatever activities which occurred after I alighted the car, if I say the bomb went earlier, what time am I referring to? That's why I'm saying that some of the questions, it is difficult for me to answer properly as to about time and time which elapsed from one incident to the other, but I just give an estimation.
CHAIRPERSON: I have certain questions dealing with another matter but I think we'll adjourn now and start again at 2 o'clock.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
LESTER DUMAKUDE: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior had you finished your questioning?
MR PRIOR: Yes, I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR
MS CAMBANIS: I have no questions thank you Chair.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS
MR KOOPEDI: Neither do I have any questions, Chairperson.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI
CHAIRPERSON: I have some questions but should I put them first before you re-examine?
MR VAN DEN BERG: I think that would be appropriate Mr Chair, I'm in your hands.
CHAIRPERSON: Alright, I'll do that and I don't know about my colleagues.
MR VAN DEN BERG: It may just counter any re-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dumakude, you have so far told us about this so-called bomb, about two gas cylinders and a number of limpet mines. Do you recollect that?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, I do.
CHAIRPERSON: Now will you tell us how you came to make a bomb out of these items?
MR DUMAKUDE: First of all I will talk about the limpet mine. It has a detonator and there's a metal blade which one uses to make a timing. This metal blade has a certain size, the differences between the thickness and it also depends on the temperature. There's a certain blade which one must use to cut through the metal blade and the resistance will depend on the temperature. For instance if it's too cold, the resistance is higher. As I've already mentioned they are in different sizes and different colours. A certain colour will represent a certain size and the time and if the temperature is hot or cold, it will depend. Then the watch depends on how you use it. We will remove the hour and remain with minutes. You will set the time according to the ...(indistinct). There will be wires, one will come from the arm hand and the other one will come from the pin which you will use as a time and then the other wire will lead to the battery. The size of the battery can be positive and it will come from the battery to the electronic detonator or electrical detonator, the one which you will connect to the explosive and then the negative side of it will go to the electrical detonator. When you time this - when you close the circuit it will close according to your timing. The third one will be the remote control. We were using walkie-talkie, two of them, so that we communicate with each other, but one walkie-talkie will be placed with the material and you will do the same sequence, you will join the electrical detonator in the positive and the negative and then connect it to the limpet. The other one who will transmit and the receiver will open this thing same time. When you transmit and as soon as the other person receives, it closes the circuit. That's how you will explode the whole thing. In short I am trying to explain all three devices which we used.
CHAIRPERSON: I thank you for it. I need a bit more detail though. The limpet mine, you have told us, has its own detonator, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: The watch, you told us, you connect the electronic detonator to the explosive. Now what explosive would this have been?
MR DUMAKUDE: You would use the detonator, the one that will ignite the charge. Here in this one we are referring to a TNT, therefore in order for the TNT to explode, you will use a detonator so that you detonate the charge so that it explodes.
CHAIRPERSON: Approximately how much TNT was there?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will be making a mistake if I will say exactly how much the TNT was, but it was more than two. If you allow me, you will give me a chance as to not to telling as to exactly how many it was, because I will be telling a lie.
CHAIRPERSON: No, 2, 20, 200? Which was the closer, do you think? About? I realise it's 11 years ago now, it's a long time. About how much?
MR DUMAKUDE: I think there were extended charges, about 8 and 1 of those 8 is about 6 Kilograms.
CHAIRPERSON: So you mean there were 8 charges of 6 kilograms each? One extended charge is 6 kilograms and you think there were about 8.
MR DUMAKUDE: That's correct. That's what I'm trying to say.
CHAIRPERSON: And the remote control detonator would also be fixed to this TNT, would it?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it is supposed to be connected to the charge so that when you transmit the wave and there must be another one which will receive the transmission.
CHAIRPERSON: And would the effect of the detonation of the TNT, the close on 50 kilograms of TNT, would that also blow up the two gas bottles and cause a ball of flame?
MR DUMAKUDE: Let me just ask the Chairperson to clarify about the spark, because I don't want to answer something which I'm not very certain.
CHAIRPERSON: No, you have just said the gas cylinders, once they receive the spark, they will explode and I was wondering where does the spark come from? You didn't have a detonator in the gas cylinder, did you?
MR DUMAKUDE: The spark will come from the detonator which is put inside the limpet. Immediately when the limpet explodes there's an amount of or enough ignition to detonate the gas cylinder. I will put an example like saying even the match spark is enough to cause an explosion when the gas is leaking.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DUMAKUDE: That's what I'm talking about.
CHAIRPERSON: Was the gas leaking here? Did you let the gas leak?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, it was not leaking.
CHAIRPERSON: So now, as I understand it, you fitted up the TNT, the limpet mine with a device that would set off in a certain time?
MR DUMAKUDE: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You then fitted up the clock which you had adjusted so it would go off after so many minutes?
MR DUMAKUDE: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And you then put in the photo - the walkie-talkie, you wired that up and these I presume would have been in the boot at the back of the car?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: But you then had wires coming into the car so when you stopped the car and got out, you could connect up these wires and that would close all the systems and they would all start working?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, but let me just clarify something. The watch was not in the boot because it was nearby myself next to the seat because I was supposed to set it at the time when I was ready to set it and leave. The metal plate, I was supposed to set it after I had made sure that everything was going to go according to plan and the time in the metal plate was giving me more allowance, more than the watch.
CHAIRPERSON: So that was a back-up?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And was that also set inside the car, the metal blade? Or was that wired up in the back?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, it was in the boot and then one will only set it when you pull the pin out, that's when it was going to start cutting the blade. It was in the boot, because it was supposed to be together with the material.
CHAIRPERSON: So you set the clock, get out, open the boot, pull the pin out and then it was everything going?
MR DUMAKUDE: No, let me explain something here. The limpet mine was in the boot. The blade was - when I removed the pin from the blade I didn't remove the pin on the spot where I was going to leave the car, but I removed it before I arrived at the place because the pin gave me enough time. The clock watch was ahead. It was the last thing I did when I left the car, in fact, to put back the clock, to fit the clock back and the wires. It is not safe to use the radio waves when you don't know that there were other radios around, that's why I said I wasn't using the radio, my radio was off at the time because I was afraid if I use a radio and another car is using a radio in the same frequency, then there will be a premature explosion, that's why my radio was off. I was supposed to do this when I was ready to leave the car and these others I've done earlier in time because there was still enough time.
CHAIRPERSON: Can you give us any estimate about what the time was for the blade?
MR DUMAKUDE: I will just estimate, I am not certain, but I think it was 30 minutes. If I had left this at quarter to and if I had timed this, if I were to drive the car and leave it there, it was going to give me 30 minutes.
CHAIRPERSON: From the time you set it off? So if you got caught in a bad traffic jam you had problems.
MR DUMAKUDE: I wasn't going to have problems because the time was ...(indistinct) leaving from the area where I took the car to the area where I was going to park the car, there was enough time to accommodate any delays.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr van der Berg, any re-examination?
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Just one or two aspects.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: You've testified at some lengths Mr Dumakude about the make-up of the bomb, what went into it and so on. If I'm not mistaken there are two types of bombs that could have been manufactured, one which was aimed at buildings and one which was aimed at personnel, is that correct?
MR DUMAKUDE: Yes, that's correct.
MR VAN DEN BERG: What's the difference between the two types of bombs?
MR DUMAKUDE: If you're putting an explosive to injure personnel, you use many things like splinters which can fly into 360 degree direction. Then if it meets anything which is alive, it can kill that thing and then the one directed to buildings, that one when you make this type, it's either you ...(indistinct) it against the wall or the building you're targeting, or you can dig and put it underneath. The difference is that the other one will destroy the building into small pieces and the other one will be destroying in waves.
MR VAN DEN BERG: The bomb that you made, what was it aimed at, personnel or at buildings?
MR DUMAKUDE: Buildings.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG
MR PRIOR: Mr Chair before we continue, the Committee did approach me this morning about the possibility of obtaining a bomb expert, explosives expert. Mr Zeelie has kindly come at very short notice. In fact he was the explosives expert involved at Ellis Park at the bombing. He has subsequently taken his leave of the police force but is available for the Committee, should the Committee want to ask him any questions about specifically the device that was used.
CHAIRPERSON: Has he been here and heard Mr Dumakude's evidence about what he did, what he made and how he made it?
MR PRIOR: I think he caught some of it, he never got all the details about the precise components.
CHAIRPERSON: The only purpose of calling an expert is if, to comment on the device and whether it was intended for that or other purposes and what could be done and I think rather you consult with him and tell him, than we call him as a witness now and put questions to him that he doesn't know what's been - what are your views?
MR VAN DEN BERG: I would agree with your proposal Mr Chairperson, that perhaps my learned friend Mr Prior consults with Mr Zeelie.
CHAIRPERSON: And tells him what's been said.
MR VAN DEN BERG: And if it takes the matter further, then obviously we could hear that evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that's - would you do that Mr Prior?
MR PRIOR: I can do that. It's just the sequence Mr Chairman, with respect.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you proposing we do it now?
MR PRIOR: Now and then we finish that aspect of it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the purpose is that we get a more clear picture of - it's largely because Mr Dumakude, he obviously is skilled in these things, hasn't had a chance to tell us all about it before. Now he has told us, you could tell the witness or the expert and see what comments he has to make. We've heard of three explosive devices, we've heard the quantity he used. I'm sorry we will once again take an adjournment.
MR PRIOR: I am indebted.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
MR PRIOR: I'm sure after consulting with Mr Zeelie, I'm sure the information that he can give to the Committee will be of assistance in understanding the dynamics of the explosion that occurred on that occasion and I would ask leave to interpose his evidence at this juncture.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr van den Berg have you got any objection to that? It seems to me only fair that if there is going to be any other evidence, it should be led at a stage when your client can then deal with it or explain, rather than evidence in rebuttal as such.
MR VAN DEN BERG: It sounds fine to me Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR PRIOR: Mr Zeelie is present. May he be sworn in?
CHARLES ALFRED ZEELIE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Mr Zeelie thank you very much that on short notice you join us at the hearing. You were called on a very limited aspect, that's the question of the explosive device that was used in this case and also the damage that was done by the explosive device. Now just some background. During 1988, you were in the service of the South African Police attached to the Security Branch.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
MR PRIOR: What was your rank?
MR ZEELIE: At that stage I was a Lieutenant.
MR PRIOR: And you were employed as an explosives expert?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, I was employed according to Article 28.
MR PRIOR: And as such you were an expert in this area?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: You were, after the explosion on the 2nd July 1988, about an hour and 40 minutes after the explosion you were called to the site.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: And because of your observations on the site and the investigations you did there, you made a report and made a statement about the issue.
MR ZEELIE: That is correct, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: You were told during the adjournment what the evidence of Mr Dumakude was. He made a statement concerning the explosive device that was supposed to be in the vehicle in other words, there were at least 2 limpet mines, plus minus 48 kilograms explosives, plus two big gas canisters, approximately 18 kilograms, and there were apparently three time devices or detonators, as he explained it. You were told about this, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR PRIOR: Can you shortly tell the Committee about the make-up of the bomb, if we can call it a bomb and the different aspects or combinations of explosive devices that was used? Can you please comment on that?
MR ZEELIE: What was told to me, I understand there were two or more limpet mines, those are SPE limpet mines. Each limpet mine consists of approximately a kilogram of high explosives, that would be a combination of TNT and RDX. These limpet mines have a detonator with a mechanical time switch, this switch works on led consistency. The detonator of this switch has, at the back end, a wire loop and then a little led piece goes through this loop, the wire, and then can be detonated by six different colour-coded led pieces of which each is a different thickness. The detonator is held under tension by a spring. Then when the wire is cut through - slowly the loop in the wire would then cut through the led piece and then the time here is very dependent on temperature, thereby each detonator comes from a table, the time comes from a table, this is attached to the different colour codes.
MR PRIOR: Just hold on. How many colour codes can be used to detonate the limpet mine?
MR ZEELIE: There's basically 6 colour codes.
MR PRIOR: Can you please name the colours.
MR ZEELIE: What we have on the table is green, red, black and white. These are commonly used, mostly. These times are measured at 40 degrees centigrade and -20 degrees. Then we have a time delay from the thinnest led piece to the thickest led piece. It's approximately 15 minutes to about 823 hours. Let's take for example, what is the time delay for such a detonator at approximately 20 degrees, which is a common temperature for a sunny day. At 20 degrees, if I would have used the green led piece, then that limpet mine would have exploded between 6 minutes and 40 minutes. Should I have used the red led piece, it could have exploded any time between 25 minutes and 2 hours and 45 minutes. Should I have used the black led piece, it could have exploded anywhere between an hour and ten minutes and 8 hours. Would I have used the white piece of led it would explode any time between 2 hours 25 minutes and 16 hours at 20 degrees.
MR PRIOR: And this table as I understand it, was brought out by the manufacturers of these limpet mines and these explosive devices?
MR ZEELIE: This is correct, your Honour. I will see that copies are made of these.
MR PRIOR: If I then understand your correctly, then according to this method there is no exactness or surety of a definite time that this bomb will explode?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, Mr Chairman, there's no way that you can say that this limpet mine would explode exactly at an exact time.
MR PRIOR: To ensure this, what needs to be done additionally to the activation of the limpet mine?
MR ZEELIE: For this you would use a time switch in the form of a watch.
MR PRIOR: And this is what Mr Dumakude testified to, that a watch was indeed used.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, I just want to add, your Honour, would a watch have been used as a time switch, then you would have used a second detonator because the detonator of the limpet mines would have been attached to the detonator of the limpet mine and would have been put into the limpet mine, therefore you would have had to use a second detonator which would then have been electronically activated.
MR PRIOR: Then the manner in which Mr Dumakude then combined the entire bomb, would you accept that it would have been done like this?
MR ZEELIE: I can accept that it could have been done like this, I just want to add, you have mentioned the aspect of two limpet mines which would approximately consist of two kilograms of explosives and then I picked up something in his evidence about 8 other bombs and I can only make the following deduction, then this would have been 6 demolition charges.
CHAIRPERSON: The 8 others were 8 packets of TNT estimated at 6 kilograms each.
MR ZEELIE: The fact that he mentions 6 kilograms, I want to give some evidence from the experience that we have gleaned from explosive devices in car bombs, mostly this would have consisted of 6 SEZ demolition charges and you could then make the deduction, which you described just now as bombs used to damage buildings or injure people, from this I deduced that this would have been 6 demolition charges and yes, the contents of these type of demolition charges would normally be TNT.
MR PRIOR: If I understand you correctly ...(indistinct) MR ZEELIE: Yes, the SEZ is demolition charges, the weight of this is approximately 6,0 kilograms. It is poured into a metal holder, I can give you the measurements. The length would be 40 centimetres by 13.5 centimetres and the height 9 centimetres.
MR PRIOR: We have heard evidence earlier from Mr Matshididi and Mr Shoke that it was placed on top of metal plates.
MR ZEELIE: I couldn't clearly understand what was meant by the metal plates. I can only mention that a limpet mine comes out with a metal carry-plate. The limpet mine was mainly designed to sabotage ships and therefore a limpet mine would have two magnets and the carry-plate for the diver, when he descends in water he would attach the carry-plate to his belt and the limpet mines would be attached to the carry-plate. When he then reaches the ship, he could detach the limpet mine and attach it to the ship. If the limpet mine is so designed then he would make a hole in a specific direction and he would make an air induced action to do the damage.
MR PRIOR: You say that the limpet mine was specifically designed to direct the explosion in a specific direction.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct your Honour.
MR PRIOR: Could you comment on the combination of explosives in the bomb.
MR ZEELIE: The reason for the combination or the addition of gas canisters is to cause additional burning and I have to add that should a gas canister be filled to the brim with gas, and I put a limpet mine next to the gas canister, then a liquid - then it's not necessarily that a fire would be caused. It would be the same as if I take a canister of petrol and use a tracer and shoot it right into the tracer, the petrol would not necessarily explode. If however I would have a gas opening, or where there is only gas, if I then put the limpet mine next to a place where there is a gas area, a fire would be caused.
MR PRIOR: We know that in this case there was a big fire caused and that also houses were burned.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: Could you comment on the hole in the road, the crater that was caused by the explosion?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, your Honour. There was quite a big crater formed in the road and therefore at that stage I made a deduction that approximately 60 to 80 kilograms of high explosive must have been used, from experience of previous sites that I visited. The reason why such a crater was formed was, should the explosive be placed in the boot of the car, and I use the detonator and place it in the top, my first reaction would be a direction of detonation downwards and as I've already testified, your explosion works in an active way and in a reactive way. It would therefore make a hole in the ground first and then explode upwards. This is the same effect that a land mine has and thereby you would see that with any land mine explosion, there's a detonation direction first downwards into the ground and then you have this air burst reaction and of course due to the fact that this was placed in the boot of the car, the direction would have been downwards first and to the sides and therefore the incredible amount of shrapnel, the vehicle breaks into small pieces, some pieces will be as big as matchstick heads and there would also be quite large parts of the car thrown around and some of these pieces of metal could be thrown away as far as 300, 400 metres from the vehicle.
MR PRIOR: In your experience of other cases, and your observations and investigations, the investigations that you did at Ellis Park, could you come to any conclusion what the real target was? Was it to damage buildings? If that was the case, would you have expected something else? Or was the reason to injure people or to kill them?
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour, firstly, a car bomb, we have coined the word car bomb from our own because of the amount of explosives that was placed either in the boot or in the cubby-hole of the car, this is why the word car bomb was coined and this bomb was specifically manufactured, but generally it is there to cause injury to people, to maim people, to injure them badly, for no other reason that this. Would I just want to scar people, I would have used a small amount of explosives and would have exploded it somewhere where it could be heard hundreds of metres away. I can guarantee you if I made an explosion with 200 grams of TNT, 200 metres from TNT, everybody inside Ellis Park would still have heard it, therefore you will find with fireworks, when fireworks take place kilometres from people, and some of these firework devices is merely 500 grams, half a kilogram heavy, if I would simply have wanted to scare people I would have used such a device.
I would have used pure explosives that wouldn't have caused any shrapnel. We hear of the example of different types of handgrenades. There are two types of handgrenades and if I can clear this up for you, for example the F1 Russian handgrenade is poured into a pewter holder and should that detonate, it breaks up into definite pieces of shrapnel. The you have the RGD5 handgrenade, which is plate metal into which the explosive is poured. Not to say that this wouldn’t cause death, but if this is thrown into an open area 20 metres away and that plate metal is so thin and the temperature at which this explosive detonates that the plate basically disintegrates. You would probably ask as to why would we be using two different types of handgrenades. If I wanted to launch an attack and say for instance this is in an operational instance, I want my people to move forward, then I would say to the use an RGD5 handgrenade. My people can then get up and move forward. Should I, on the other hand, want to kill the enemy, or eliminate the enemy, I would throw the handgrenade that makes the shrapnel. I would tell my people to lie down and this is the comparison that I want to make between a very small amount of explosives and a very huge, big amount that is used in a car bomb. This is specifically used to cause death.
MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no more questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR
MR VAN DEN BERG: May I take an instruction, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you want an adjournment?
MR VAN DEN BERG: No more than 5 minutes Mr Chairperson, you can time me.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I am indebted for the opportunity to take instructions in respect of this evidence.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: (cont)
Mr Zeelie, did you do an analysis of the remains of the bomb after it had exploded?
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
MR ZEELIE: It was done by the experts of the forensic laboratory in Pretoria.
MR VAN DEN BERG: And was a report made about what they found there?
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour, I accept the report would have been made but I can say from experience that due to the high burning effect of high speed explosives, we cannot, with any amount of surety, say what explosive was used.
MR VAN DEN BERG: You testified about the two detonators, or you testified about two of the three detonators, you testified about the detonator in the limpet mine and the detonator in respect of the timing mechanism, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour.
MR VAN DEN BERG: I don't recall hearing any evidence in respect of the detonator on the remote control device.
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour, the remote control basically this works, Suid Afrikaanse control detonation, that's just where you have a radio sender and the transmitter is taken away from the bomb and the explosive that was also attached to the detonator, there is a receiver and at a given moment you would then explode the bomb. If you wanted to explode the bomb you would activate it from a distance. It is controlled from the sender to the receiver which was then placed in the explosives.
MR VAN DEN BERG: From the remains of the bomb, would you have been able to determine, or would the forensic laboratory have been able to determine which of the detonators was the one that went off first?
MR ZEELIE: There is no way to determine this.
MR VAN DEN BERG: To a large extent my client agrees with your evidence and with the assumption that you'd made at the time or that you related to us now. He does however say that had he aimed this device at people or at personnel, he would have made out the bomb in a different fashion. He would have directed the limpet mines and the thrust of the explosion towards the entrance of the stadium. Do you want to comment on that?
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour, as I have already testified, the effect of the explosives is action and reaction working. For him to say that he can put it in a specific direction, I cannot accept because that explosive was restricted in the boot of a car which means that the airburst effect of the explosive would look for the easiest way. There's no way that he could have detonated it into a specific direction, because I can take explosives and I can take this piece of paper and if I want to restrict explosives, I would place this piece of paper around the explosives, then this explosive would be restricted and the explosive would then thrust to the front and react to the back and there is no way that he could tell me that the explosive would be sent only in one specific direction.
There is a kind of explosive that you can put on a pedestal and blow in a specific direction. There are little balls in these types of devices and there would be nothing on the other side that would cause the detonation to come back. This is called a claymore mine, that is the English denomination. Your Honour, I can also mention in connection with a question that was asked of me which one would have detonated first, the explosives were in a boot of a car and if we look at temperatures, then I can assure you that if the temperature outside was 20 degrees and those explosives were in the boot of the car for half an hour, then the temperature inside the vehicle would be very close to 40, 50, 60 degrees Celsius, which would have caused the explosives to go off in a very short time and that the applicants would not have really been able to determine what the temperature was in the boot at that moment. I just want to mention why I am testifying about this. There were in the past, there have been people who have blown themselves up and that is why we have made a point that these explosives must have been placed in the boot of the car and due to this the led piece of the limpet mine would have cut through much quicker and due to this reason many people have blown themselves up in the past.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Have you come across the terms extended, separate term hollow, and a separate term concentrated limpet mine?
MR ZEELIE: I don't understand the precise terms mentioned here.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Let's put it this way and so that we don't waste time. My instructions are that these are different types of limpet mines and that the use of a different type of limpet mine, can impact on the direction of the explosion, would you agree with that?
MR ZEELIE: No, all limpet mines are designed specifically for penetration, sabotage of ships, which needs to be detonated in a specific direction.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG
MS CAMBANIS: Nothing thank you Chair.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS
MR KOOPEDI: We have no questions either, Chairperson.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI
CHAIRPERSON: I have one question to ask. Once you have set this limpet mine plate cutting action on the go, can you stop it?
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour no, there is no way to stop this because the limpet mine's detonator is at the top end where the lead piece is, if you could look at this from the top you would see a round piece and that round piece would have been cut through in this fashion as the speaker is mentioning, and the lead piece is placed - as the loop cuts through the metal there would be no way to put something in between the mine and the cutting through mechanism to stop this. Specifically with the SPM limpet mines, this detonator has a mechanism inside that if you would pull out the safety pin, then the whole detonator would jam and it wouldn't be able to go off. If you would then forget to put a led piece in here and you would then pull the safety pin out, you would have immediate detonation. This is one fashion in which many people have blown themselves up.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand that once this has been set off, there is not way the applicant could have stopped it?
MR ZEELIE: There would be absolutely no way, your Honour. Some of our experts have designed have a nipper. Should the limpet mine be there you would place the nipper over the limpet mine and then fire a pin down which bends the firing pin and this was designed a limpet mine in cases where they wanted to do this, this would then break the safety pin and would prevent the limpet mine from going off.
CHAIRPERSON: But this is exceptional. In the ordinary course of events there is nothing you can do to stop it.
MR ZEELIE: Absolutely no way to stop that mine when the safety pin has been drawn out.
MR RICHARD: Yes, thank you Chair.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: I have four points. During Mr Dumakude's evidence in chief, he made mention that he had to be in the line of sight of the car to use the radio control device. Do you have any comment on that statement?
MR ZEELIE: Not a specific direction, but your senders do, in a certain way, have to see the line from the receiver. It works in the same way as your garage door. It's not always necessary that you have to see the receiver. I could, from the inside of my house, open the garage door. This is basically the same principle.
MR RICHARD: The second one, when we look at the crater in the road, referred to as point A on the various plans and I show you page 55, is it a reasonable assumption to assume that the car was vertically above that hole?
MR ZEELIE: It was definitely above that hole, Your Honour.
MR RICHARD: And how far, from your own observation, was that hole from the curb? Do you remember?
MR ZEELIE: From the corner of the road?
MR RICHARD: From the sidewalk.
MR ZEELIE: It was right next to the sidewalk where the vehicle was parked. You will see that on some of the photos there is a water pipe that runs there right next to the sidewalk.
MR RICHARD: Now what was the necessity for having three timing devices?
MR ZEELIE: Your Honour, I would say that this was to make absolutely certain that people would indeed be injured. The aim of the limpet mine's detonator doesn't make sense to me. The watch switch, yes, that makes sense. One Could basically say that the rugby match would end at 5 past 5, 5 minutes later many people would be around and I would set it to go off at that time, but there are other factors, for instance the injuries during a match which might mean that the time that you would want the bomb to go off might not be correct and in this case you might need a control detonation, or the match could have ended earlier. The control detonation would therefore be to ensure that there would be injury to people during detonation.
CHAIRPERSON: If you had more injury time then your explosion would go off before they came out, your control detonator didn't help you at all, did it? It didn't stop the time detonator going off?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour, I agree with you. I have mentioned a case where you would have worked out time, but normally before a match ends, you will play with time, it might have meant that there were many more people before. If you would then see that there are a lot of people at that specific stage, you would then use the watch switch to detonate the bomb. It's not to say that the people knew exactly what time the match would end and therefore as I say you could have detonated the bomb before the time that you have set it. If for instance you had set the time too late, you would then use the control detonation to explode the bomb before the time you had worked out before.
MR RICHARD: My last question is, I make this proposition, apart for the error that the lead pins on the land mines create between the clock and the radio control, the applicant Mr Dumakude had total control over exactly when he wanted the bomb to explode?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour, absolutely.
CHAIRPERSON: He had absolute control when he chose the time. Having chosen the time and left the car he no longer had control over the timing device.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, may Mr Zeelie be excused from these proceedings and once again we'd like to thank him for attending.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be excused.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR ZEELIE: Thank you, your Honour.
MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, we're still in the hands of the applicants. Unfortunately we have gone a bit haphazardly, but I don't know if Mr van den Berg has got witnesses to call, but he'll address the Committee.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson, there aren't any further witnesses on behalf of this applicant. You will however recall Mr Chairperson, that this applicant joined the proceedings after the first day, after he had become aware that these proceedings were on-going and during the course of his evidence it emerged that there were possible contradictions between his evidence and that of the other applicants and to that extent, if I recall correctly, I was entitled to ask for the recall of the first two applicants, Mr Shoke and Mr Matshididi. I would submit Mr Chairperson that it would be appropriate that we dispose of that right at this point in time. I have no intention of recalling Mr Shoke. I would however like to recall Mr Matshididi. I understand from my learned friend Mr Richard that he also has questions which he would wish to ask Mr Matshididi. That would bring us to a point where we would then have completed the evidence of all three applicants before we then move on to Mr Dube's evidence and I would submit that it makes sense to try and get us all up to speed so that we can have some normality of proceeding in this matter, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well is Dube on record now as one of the applicants?
MR KOOPEDI: He is on record now as one of the applicants, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So you can question, if witnesses are recalled now you can question them now and there will be no suggestion that they should be recalled again after Mr Dube has given evidence?
MR KOOPEDI: I must say Chairperson, I was part of a discussion in terms of who to come first and I agree with what my learned friend has said that we'd rather bring all the proceedings up to speed and then only call in the last applicant when we've disposed of the other applicants.
Ms CAMBANIS: Yes, we agree with that suggestion.
MR PRIOR: It seems a practical way of dealing with it thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, no objections. So it's only Matshididi.
MR VAN DEN BERG: It's only Mr Matshididi whom I wish to recall.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson I can certainly finish with him in the 15 minutes, I see that it's quarter to 4, I can certainly finish with him in the 15 minutes that are left. I don't know what Mr Richard's position would be.
MR RICHARD: Chairperson, I've been asked the question whether I would like to question Mr Shoke as well. My attitude depends on how Mr Matshididi goes, but at the moment my indication is it would appear unlikely but I'd like to reserve my options.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought you were going to say something.
PREVIOUS WITNESS RECALLED
MR VAN DEN BERG: Does Mr Matshididi need to be sworn in again?
CHAIRPERSON: I think he should be reminded that he is still under his former oath.
HAROLD MATSHIDIDI : (s.u.o)
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Matshididi the reason I have recalled you is really quite simple and it was raised again pertinently this morning during Mr Dumakude's cross-examination. You will recall that Mr Dumakude testified that he joined you after the bomb had exploded. Do you recall that evidence?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Yes, I remember.
MR VAN DEN BERG: And having read the record, because I wasn't present when you testified, your evidence was to the fact that the two of you were together and were going back to the rendezvous point when the bomb exploded. Have I summarised your evidence correctly?
MR MATSHIDIDI: That was my evidence.
MR VAN DEN BERG: You understand the difference between the two versions, do you?
MR MATSHIDIDI: I do understand.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you comment on why there's a difference? Would you like to explain why there's a difference?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Chairperson I want to respond to this question in this manner. It is true, I said we left simultaneously with Dumakude to the car, but that was a mistake. I want to rectify it. When the device exploded I was not with Dumakude. He joined me to the car after the explosion. That was up when we were supposed to join the road leading to Checkers.
MR VAN DEN BERG: When you testified earlier, the evidence that you gave, was that your recollection at that time?
MR MATSHIDIDI: When I mentioned this, it was how I recalled it then. I want to mention one other reason,
Chairperson, we must now remember, we will say this repeatedly, this took place over ten years back, I remember when we appeared before the TRC on the 3rd of August, I was from Cape Town, I was attending courses down there. When I arrived on that Friday we called our legal representatives to make an appointment on Sunday so that we can meet with Dumakude and Dube and things did not materialise but we requested them to inform you that we cannot come together, we cannot appear if we don't come together first and remind each other as to what happened on the day of the incident, but when we arrived here we were requested again from our legal advisers to act on our behalf, that we be given a time to meet together and discuss this. That's why there are discrepancies between our testimonies.
CHAIRPERSON: I think I'm correct in saying Mr Matshididi, that you volunteered this information but it wasn't explored in any depth by questioning. Is my recollection correct?
MR MATSHIDIDI: I do not understand, are you referring to now or then?
CHAIRPERSON: Then.
MR MATSHIDIDI: You were telling your story of what happened in, somewhat briefly and you just said,
"we went back to Checkers, just before we got into the kombi at Checkers, we heard the sound from the bomb and we drove off to Diepkloof".
At the top of page 14. I don't think there was any questioning about it.
MS CAMBANIS: That is correct.
MR MATSHIDIDI: Yes, Chairperson, that's how I recalled the events then, even though it was still a mistake. We must remember this incident happened a long time ago.
MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RICHARD: Mr Matshididi, at page 14 of the transcript you answer a question,
"He was already out of the car coming towards me. I didn't have time to go back and check and he told me about 5 o'clock"
Where were you when you say you didn't have time to go back and check?
MS CAMBANIS: Perhaps in fairness, if Mr Richard will put what the question was, just to give some context of what's being spoken about.
MR RICHARD: The question asked was
"Were you able to check whether he in fact had set the clock for 5 o'clock?" Your answer was "He was already out of the car coming towards me. I didn't have time to go back and check"
Where were you when you describe him as coming towards you?
MR MATSHIDIDI: If I recall my evidence on that day, when we were in - I mentioned that I alighted at the corner of Beit and Upper, that's where I was, but after a few minutes I went up after realising that he was already out of the car.
MR RICHARD: Up to where?
MR MATSHIDIDI: I walked up to Beit Street and towards the robots.
MR RICHARD: In which direction is that, east, or west, or north, or south?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Towards Hillbrow, when you're moving from Ellis Park.
MR RICHARD: And where did Mr Dumakude join you?
MR MATSHIDIDI: After the bomb exploded he followed me, he joined me when I was towards the robots in Beit Street.
MR RICHARD: Now you heard this morning it being described that there was a place where newspapers were sold, where was that?
MR MATSHIDIDI: When you come in Harrow Road, there's a small street and I think it deviates from Harrow Road, you turn to the left and it forms Vaderland.
MR RICHARD: Now you say you were present when the boot was packed, is that not correct, with the explosives and bombs and land mines?
MR MATSHIDIDI: That is correct.
MR RICHARD: How many land mines were put in the boot?
MS CAMBANIS: Mr Chair, I think they were limpets.
MR RICHARD: Beg pardon, how many limpet mines were put in the boot?
MR MATSHIDIDI: I will request the Committee to indulge with me, I cannot respond to such questions. Dumakude is an expert when it comes to such things. I do not know how many there were.
MR RICHARD: But you were watching him, weren't you?
MR MATSHIDIDI: It is true, I was watching him.
MR RICHARD: Now when he had finished was the boot full, or was there still space to put more stuff into it?
MR MATSHIDIDI: What I noticed was that there was still space in the boot.
MR RICHARD: But how full was the boot? Half full, three- quarters full?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Chairperson, I do not want to commit myself about the three-quarter full, what I am saying is there were things in the boot, the bomb was in the boot, but I would not estimate as to how much space was left. I do not want to commit myself as to spaces.
MR RICHARD: Correct. Now, how many times did you go to that particular location in total?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Which place?
MR RICHARD: The place where you put the bomb.
MR MATSHIDIDI: The first time it was myself and Agi, the second time it was with Dumakude and Dube and the third time it was on the day of placing the bomb there.
MR RICHARD: Now on the day of placing the bomb there, how many times did you go to that particular place?
MR MATSHIDIDI: We drove from Diepkloof and parked the car containing the explosives in Vaderland. It was myself, Agi and Dumakude. We got into the kombi and we drove to the vicinity and it was discussed where it will be placed and we went back to fetch the car that was containing the bomb. We went once.
MR RICHARD: Now where was Mr Shoke at the time that you were standing in Beit Street?
MR MATSHIDIDI: When we came back from the final reconnaissance we agreed with them and Dube that after completing the job we will find you at Checkers. When I was in Beit Street, Shoke and them had driven away already.
MR RICHARD: And them, who's them?
MR MATSHIDIDI: It's Shoke and Dube.
MR RICHARD: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RICHARD
MR PRIOR: I have just one question.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: I'm just looking at a portion of Mr Shoke's evidence. You say that you now made a mistake about your evidence. You now bring it in line more with Mr Dumakude's evidence today. Mr Shoke, when he gave his evidence, he said that after he left Ellis Park, he went up to Checkers where the pre-arranged meeting place was, had been agreed and he was asked by his counsel at a that time
"Did he in fact wait there for you?" and he then said "Yes, he waited" and he said "later Dumakude and Harold later came to the vehicle"
that was the kombi and after they arrived he heard the explosion. Sorry, I'm referring to the TRC website, can I just get the transcript?
ADV SANDI: I think what you've just referred to Mr Prior commences right at the bottom of page 44.
MR PRIOR: Yes, thank you Adv Sandi, I'm indebted, and proceeds on to page 45 of the transcript. And you were asked
"Do you know what time the explosion was " by Mr Landman, Mr Shoke said "I think it was about 5 o'clock, yes, about 5 o'clock"
CHAIRPERSON: He doesn't say whether that was before or after they came.
MR PRIOR: It was after they came there.
CHAIRPERSON: No, he doesn't.
"Did Dumakude and Harold later come to the vehicle, to the kombi?" "Yes, they arrived"
MR PRIOR: "Did you hear the explosion?" "Yes, I heard the explosion"
CHAIRPERSON: It could have been before or after they arrived.
MR PRIOR: It's certainly given in sequence, with respect.
CHAIRPERSON: The question was put in sequence. Nobody bothered to check it.
MR PRIOR: Well certainly at the time when they were giving evidence, no-one realised there was the contradiction, it's only through the fluctuation of time and with all the problems we've had in this matter, that this is the first time we hear of the explanation of Matshididi, that he had made a mistake. It wasn't raised at the last adjournment, at the Methodist Centre. When we were at the last hearing, did you mention to anybody that you had made a mistake about your evidence?
MS CAMBANIS: There was no hearing.
MR PRIOR: There was a hearing, with respect, and the Council all withdrew. It was at that time, the hearing was scheduled for that time.
MS CAMBANIS: Chair, with respect...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: When did he have an opportunity of saying something Mr Prior?
MR PRIOR: I'm asking him whether at that time he was aware of his mistake.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
MR PRIOR: Did he inform anybody on that occasion, I forget the date now, it was February of this year, Mr Chairman when we were at the Methodist Centre.
ADV SANDI: That was on the 15th February.
MR PRIOR: Thank you, Mr Chairman. At that time was he aware that he had made a mistake and if he was aware did he tell anybody? We all know the hearing never got off the ground, but the question, I submit, is a fair question, because the contradiction was certainly on the table as of last year. Could you just answer please.
MR MATSHIDIDI: I did not talk to anybody, I did not discuss it with anybody, it's my first time to say it. I never had a chance to mention it.
MR PRIOR: And no-one ever suggested to you that you should say you made a mistake and in fact, Mr Dumakude's evidence is the preferred evidence?
MR MATSHIDIDI: Nobody convinced me to come and mention it, I've realised during Mr Dumakude's evidence that I made a mistake and it's my obligation to rectify that.
MR PRIOR: And you haven't even discussed it with your legal representatives until now? You've just given evidence and up until this stage you've never discussed it at all with anybody and not even your legal representatives?
MR MATSHIDIDI: There was not need to talk about this with my legal reps. It's a mistake, I am supposed to discuss it with them anyway.
MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRIOR
MS CAMBANIS: Nothing thank you.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS
TAPE BLANK FOR 35 SECONDS
INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.
TAPE BLANK FOR 40 SECONDS
MR KOOPEDI: I happen to know that the people involved, particularly applicants, in tomorrow's matter will be here early. What I do not know is whether the matter will be a short one. I also know that the matter is opposed. I would suggest that in fairness to everyone here, this hearing should be adjourned to at least 2 o'clock tomorrow, unlike having people come here and tell the go back, come back after 2.
MR PRIOR: Yes, I was unaware of the extent of the opposition. I haven't been informed about that but I hear what Mr Koopedi is saying and he is acting for the applicants and he would know so possibly that is a good suggestion.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - microphone not on) ...2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS