CHAIRPERSON: Today, the 22nd April 1998, in the various applications of Visser and others. The Committee is constituted as follows: myself, Judge Ngoepe and to my right, Advocate Bosman, to my left, Advocate Sigodi and to my far left Attorney Malan. Mr Brink?
MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, the various next of kin, victims have all been served, I have returns of service given to me by Colonel Killian. The only person who was not served was Mr Abel Sibohadi and I am told by Colonel Killian that the address given was impossible to trace. He is the only person who could not be served with a notice.
CHAIRPERSON: Is there an application in respect of him as well?
MR BRINK: No, no, no, he is one of those, the next of kin.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry?
MR BRINK: He was one of the, I think related to one of those who were killed.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I'm sorry, I had somebody else in mind, I'm sorry. Alright, we have taken note of that.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Chairman, may I just through you put a question.
Mr Brink, it would seem as though Mr Abel Sibohadi was a victim of an assault.
MR BRINK: Oh, he was a victim, you're quite right Madam. Anyway he couldn't be traced despite efforts.
CHAIRPERSON: So I was right in my thinking.
MR BRINK: I beg your pardon.
CHAIRPERSON: So well, in which case my question stands, is there any application for amnesty in respect for the assault on him? Mr Prinsloo? Miss van der Walt? Because I don't seem to recall that.
This is the gentleman who came with the bakkie, was stopped and then later the bakkie stalled and then it was pushed and then got stuck ...[intervention]
MS VAN DER WALT: It's part of that case.
CHAIRPERSON: It's part of it?
MS VAN DER WALT: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thanks. Anyway you say that despite diligent effort he could not be traced?
MR BRINK: I'm given to understand that yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Alright thank you. Yes, I suppose we can now proceed. Mrs van der Walt? Oh, sorry, place yourselves, let everybody place themselves on record please and as to whom they are appearing for.
MS VAN DER WALT: I am appearing on behalf of the first applicant, Mr Phil Kloppers and the second applicant, Mr Deon Martin.
MR PRINSLOO: Chairman, I am appearing on behalf of Matthews, the two Visser's, Badenhorst, Diedericks and Meiring.
MR KNOETZE: May it please you Mr Chairman, my name is Barnard Knoetze, I appear on behalf of Martinus Lodewickes van der Schyff on the instruction of Mr Jan Wagener of the firm Wagener, Muller and du Plessis of Pretoria.
CHAIRPERSON: Thanks. Mrs van der Walt?
MS VAN DER WALT: As we discussed in chambers, I would like to have called in the first applicant first, Mr Kloppers because I regard his evidence as the most important with regard to this application but as a result of the fact that certain legal representatives are not prepared as of yet to appear here, I will now call the second applicant, Mr Deon Martin.
DEON MARTIN: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed Mrs van der Walt.
EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: You have applied for amnesty ...
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MS VAN DER WALT: The events for which you are applying for amnesty appear in the Annexure, do you confirm the content thereof?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: Do you also confirm the content of Annexure B?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Martin, you were born on the 12th of December 1963, is that correct?
MR MARTIN: No, that's the 12th of May 1963.
MS VAN DER WALT: You were found guilty of which offences?
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, I was found guilty of murder, attempted murder, assault, assault with purpose and the possession of guns and ammunition.
MS VAN DER WALT: Do you also then apply for the offences for which you have been found guilty?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And what was your sentence?
MR MARTIN: I received the death penalty four times as well as 20 years correctional service.
MS VAN DER WALT: And has your death penalty been amended?
MR MARTIN: Negative, not at this point.
MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Martin, were you a member of the South African Police?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And the period of time in which you served as a policeman in the police services, during that time, against who did you act?
MR MARTIN: That was between 1981 and 1985 when I served in the police services and we acted against the ANC/SACP Alliance.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you ever do border duty?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: For what period of time?
MR MARTIN: I cannot recall the exact time period but I did perform border duty twice.
MS VAN DER WALT: And after you had left the military, did you join any other political organisation?
MR MARTIN: That's correct, I joined the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you joint the AWB?
MR MARTIN: I believed that it was the only movement which could resist the government of that time as well as the ANC/SACP Alliance.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you want to resist the government of that time and the ANC/SACP Alliance?
MR MARTIN: I believed that the AWB was fighting for the right to self determination and I believed that that was an important right for every nation, to determine themselves.
MS VAN DER WALT: What did you believe as a member of the AWB, would happen should the ANC/SACP Alliance come into power?
MR MARTIN: I believed that a black majority government would have oppressed the Afrikaner volk completely.
MS VAN DER WALT: There are just singular aspects regarding the affidavits of the applicant which I would like to bring to the Committee's attention. On page 27 paragraph 3, he says
"I underwent various courses with the AWB"
That should read:
"SAP"
and furthermore it reads:
"Other AWB courses"
that's page 27 paragraph 3. It is not that he underwent courses with the AWB, it was the SAP. And then the second sentence should be inserted:
"that other AWB and IFP courses were undergone"
and that has been omitted.
And then on page 27 paragraph 6, it is stated, and this is on the second line:
"every week"
it should read:
"every second week"
Furthermore, on the same page, paragraph 8, the 5th sentence or line should read:
"He informed us that the General's staff had an underground meeting place"
and it should be inserted:
"along with Constant Viljoen"
that has been omitted, it should be inserted. Page 35 Chairperson, the 5th line from the top of the page:
"we attempted"
it should not read:
"attempted"
that should be omitted:
"we picked up all the shells on the scene"
and the rest of the sentence:
"however it was not very successful"
should be omitted. And then just for the sake of completion furthermore it reads:
"I cut off the man's ear with a knife with the deceased, General Nick Fourie had given to me approximately two weeks before the incident"
Page 11, paragraph 28, page 37, paragraph 28, the 3rd line from the bottom of the paragraph should read:
"I was later also promoted to the rank of Colonel by General Oelofse"
that is how it should read. Thank you Chairperson.
Mr Martin, you then joined the AWB, did you undergo any courses or present any courses?
MR MARTIN: I did present courses but I did not undergo any AWB courses.
MS VAN DER WALT: Which courses did you present and to whom?
MR MARTIN: The courses which we presented were usually in preparation for war, the war which was being planned. We prepared the women and children to defend themselves and those who received training were AWB members.
MS VAN DER WALT: Your application indicates that you presented courses to the IFP, which courses were those?
MR MARTIN: The same courses.
MS VAN DER WALT: Which rank did you occupy within the AWB?
MR MARTIN: During the incident I was a Commandant in the AWB, second in command.
MS VAN DER WALT: Who was in command?
MR MARTIN: The Chief Commander, Phil Kloppers.
MS VAN DER WALT: That is the first applicant?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: Was there any General who was occupied with the area in which you were a commander?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct, it was General Japie Oelofse.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you fall directly underneath his command?
MR MARTIN: Phil Kloppers stood directly below his command.
MS VAN DER WALT: During 1993, was there any commentary - you were area 9, is that correct?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: Was there commentary regarding your actions in area 9?
MR MARTIN: Yes. General Oelofse, and when I speak of us I speak of myself and Phil Kloppers, he praised us quite often because of the regular and intensive activities which we undertook in our area and he was quite impressed with our area.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why were you stocking up on food?
MR MARTIN: That was for the war.
MS VAN DER WALT: You also attended a national summit which occurred in Klerksdorp?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: Can you tell the Committee what happened there?
MR MARTIN: It was basically an AWB National Summit which was held at which Eugene Tererblanche and Constant Viljoen were guest speakers. During their discussions with us I could clearly understand that war was imminent. Eugene Terreblanche himself said on many an occasion that he would appoint himself as Constant Viljoen's Corporal because the war was in fact so imminent.
MS VAN DER WALT: You are now speaking of the war, what do you mean by that?
MR MARTIN: Basically that was the resistance which the Afrikaner Volksfront had been planning. Constant Viljoen had certain Generals which he would have commandeered and it would have been a basic revolution which would be executed to take over the country.
MS VAN DER WALT: Are you aware whether the Defence Force would have delivered any input regarding this, was this discussed?
MR MARTIN: According to Constant Viljoen, the Defence Force would definitely been involved.
MS VAN DER WALT: And within the area where you operated, did you provide any further training thereafter?
MR MARTIN: Practically every weekend we provided intensive training to all the members.
MS VAN DER WALT: Was there ever any kind of secret conferences held by the CP, the AWB and other organisations as such?
MR MARTIN: I was present at one time, this was at the Embassy Hotel where we did some work for General Oelofse. He had booked himself in as Mr Smith and it was there where a conference was held with the CP and the Freedom Front.
MS VAN DER WALT: Which members of the Freedom Front and the Volksfront were there?
MR MARTIN: I can't say with certainty but I know that at a certain point Ferdie Hartzenberg and Constant Viljoen did attend but I was not there.
MS VAN DER WALT: Do you know whether subsequent to the conference any action was taken by the General's staff the AWB?
MR MARTIN: General Oelofse would call us together frequently and tell us to prepare ourselves for a war that we would not continue with the elections and that is basically the only commentary that I have regarding that.
MS VAN DER WALT: On the 12th of December 1993, approximately a quarter to 7 of that evening, could you please tell the Honourable Committee what happened then?
MR MARTIN: I was sleeping in bed, I had a great deal of pain because my left leg had been amputated. My wife awoke me and told me she had received a telephone call from the Chief Commandant Kloppers who had given her an instruction, told her to give me the instruction to contact certain members because we had a job to do that night.
I told my wife that I was going to have a bath and that she should study the list to see who she could contact and commandeer. I also told her that she should tell them that we would be meeting at Harry's Roadside Cafe in full uniform.
MS VAN DER WALT: What did you understand by going to work?
MR MARTIN: We often received such instructions, that we would be going to work and then we would guard certain institutions or we would accompany certain people, it could have been anything.
CHAIRPERSON: Could you repeat that for us please? What did your wife say to you exactly?
MR MARTIN: That Phil Kloppers had phoned and had told her to convey the instruction to me to contact some people, tell them to be dressed in full uniform because we would be going to work that night and that we would all meet at 9 o'clock at Uncle Harry's Roadside Cafe.
MS VAN DER WALT: Those were members of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: Yes, those were members of our commando.
MS VAN DER WALT: Very well, you may proceed.
MR MARTIN: My wife managed to contact a number of people, among them Jaco Badenhorst, Martin van der Schyff, Peter Matthews, Kallie Meiring, there were a number of them. She did not contact Andrč Visser.
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MR MARTIN: Might I just ask for a small break, I'm not quite certain of all those who were involved. She contacted Peter Matthews and Kallie Meiring, that's correct. She told them to prepare, put on their uniforms and meet at 9 o'clock at Uncle Harry's Roadside Cafe.
MS VAN DER WALT: Very well, continue.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was phoning all these people, your wife?
MR MARTIN: Yes, it was my wife, I was in the bath at that point. I dressed - pardon me, she also contacted Gert Diedericks. Gert Diedericks then came to my residence, he left his children there to be looked after and we left from that point. We picked up Badenhorst and Etienne Visser was with him, then we went to fetch van der Schyff and we then moved on to Uncle Harry's Roadside Cafe where we met the others.
MS VAN DER WALT: Very well, you may proceed.
MR MARTIN: At 9 o'clock Phil Kloppers arrived there. I brought the people to attention, we saluted. Phil Kloppers then told us that he was called from an order group, that he had received an instruction to go and work that night. I asked him what the work involved, upon which he told me that the General had said that he should apply hard options and that he wanted to see corpses because the revolution would expand on that evening.
MS VAN DER WALT: Yes?
MR MARTIN: Om rede ons soveel voertuie by ons gehad het, we decided to go to Jaco Badenhorst's residence as his parents were on leave at that time. We decided to leave some of the vehicles there. We decided to use my Mercedes and the Nissan Sentra. We changed the number plates by using insulation tape and changing the numbers as such.
From there, using the two vehicles, we went to Andrč Visser's flat which was about three to four blocks away from the residence. We all had a drink there. From there myself and Phil Kloppers and Matthews went in the Mercedes with the Sentra following us to my residence.
On the way there I asked Kloppers what we would be doing that night. I suggested that we attack squatter camps upon which he told me that General Oelofse wanted us to set up a roadblock. We arrived at my residence. I had all the equipment with me which I received from traffic officers, such as blue lights and reflectors. We handed them out to the members.
MS VAN DER WALT: Mr Martin, did you ever had firearms on you?
MR MARTIN: Always when we went out to work we had our firearms with us.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did everyone have their own firearms or what was the situation?
MR MARTIN: No, three members didn't have firearms and at the Roadside Cafe itself Phil Kloppers took out two shotguns or handmade shotguns. He handed over one to Etienne Visser and the other to Martin van der Schyff.
MS VAN DER WALT: Where did he acquire these shotguns?
MR MARTIN: Kloppers told me that he had received them from General Jaap Oelofse.
MS VAN DER WALT: You've also mentioned that on this particular evening it was said to you that the revolution would begin.
MR MARTIN: It would begin countrywide.
MS VAN DER WALT: Very well, proceed. You handed out equipment, what else was there?
MR MARTIN: The blue lights and reflector jackets. We went to set up the roadblock at the Ventersdorp/Pietersburg/Klerksdorp crossing. I don't remember who else was with me in the vehicle. The sentra was following.
We arrived and the crossroad and Phil Kloppers said to Kallie Meiring who was a security officer for the Krugersdorp Town Council, to set up the roadblock and make it appear as if it was a genuine roadblock. Phil Kloppers and myself would drive with the Mercedes in the direction of Ventersdorp in order to identify vehicles which we could pull over and those would be vehicles with black passengers. We did this in order to eliminate the possibility of pulling of SAP or Defence Force vehicles.
We would drive past the vehicle and if we could see black passengers inside the vehicle, we would drive back, pass them and the road had a slight hill and a turn, we would then have flashed our headlights and then Andrč Visser would have connected the blue light.
We managed to pull over a great many vehicles in this manner, I don't know exactly how many but I do remember that one vehicle wouldn't start again, upon which Phil Kloppers told them to set the vehicle on fire. It was our own people who set the vehicle on fire. We searched the vehicle, we asked the people certain questions.
MR MARTIN: Which questions did you ask?
MS VAN DER WALT: Questions such as: "Where do you come from, where are you going, to which political party do you belong"? Then we would search the vehicles and let the people go.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you question the people and then allow them to go? What was the purpose behind that?
MR MARTIN: Our objective was to target ANC/SACP members.
MS VAN DER WALT: Were you looking for the right or specific target?
MR MARTIN: Yes. It was conveyed to me that General Oelofse said that we should pull over ANC/SACP Alliance members.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did any incidents occur during the searching of vehicles and the questioning of the passengers?
MR MARTIN: Some of the people were unhappy because of the fact that AWB members pulled them over. Kloppers hit one of them with a baton and said: "Just go".
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you openly wear the AWB uniforms or did you attempt to disguise it?
MR MARTIN: No, we wore them openly with the symbols, camouflage gear and so forth.
MS VAN DER WALT: So if people had stopped there they would have been able to see that you were AWB members?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: You may proceed.
MR MARTIN: Phil Kloppers and I drove once again in the direction of Ventersdorp and we saw two vehicles approaching from the front, one was a Honda Ballade followed by a Toyota Cressida. We saw that there were black passengers in these vehicles. We turned around and drove past them and once again I gave the signal to those who were manning the roadblock, that would be the flashing of the headlights.
I pulled over off the road. The vehicles were approaching and approximately 250 metres away from us they pulled off the road suddenly after the blue lights had been activated. I could hear the door of the vehicle opening as well as the roof light of the Honda Ballade, I could see it going on and off.
I told the men to be careful because one couldn't be sure that people were dropped off or that they were planning an attack on us. The vehicle then proceeded very slowly and stopped at our roadblock. We ordered the passengers to climb out, they were searched and we told them to sit down on a small embankment on the side of the road while the vehicle was being searched.
Once again I posed the questions to the people, where they came from, where they were going, to which political party they belonged. Phil Kloppers walked on after them and if someone didn't want to answer he gave them a slight hit with the baton. Many of them or most of them answered that they were ANC members.
After that I called Etienne van Zyl and Jaco Badenhorst who were deployed to watch for vehicles. We decided that this would be the correct target to shoot at. We stood in a line, I fired the first shot, that would be the signal that the others should commence shooting.
Everyone except Kallie Meiring, Gert Diedericks and Andrč Visser fired at the people. Kallie Meiring couldn't fire because he was position in such a manner that he had to watch for those who would attempt to run away into the veld. If he had fired he would have been firing in our direction. The shooting occurred very quickly, it was a matter of seconds. And after that Kallie shouted that a vehicle was approaching. Some of the men jumped into the Sentra and then sped off in the direction of Randfontein. Kloppers still shouted after them to meet at the City Hall. It then came to light that a vehicle was not approaching and Gert Diedericks approached with a flashlight.
We held in over the people who were lying there very still, it appeared as if they were dead. Kloppers gave me the instruction to cut off the ear of a black man, which I did.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you have to do that?
MR MARTIN: It was according to the instruction of General Oelofse, he wanted a trophy. He wanted to show how things
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...[inaudible] of myself Phil Kloppers and Etienne Visser handed over a small steak knife with a black handle and he said that I should cut off an ear for him one day if we were to encounter a corpse and that indicated to me that the war was very imminent.
It was not the same knife which I used to cut off ears, the knife which I used I won in a lottery in Durban with Nick Fourie who is now deceased. We picked up the shells on the scene, Etienne Visser was involved therewith. We managed to pick up all the shells so that we wouldn't leave any evidence behind.
We set the vehicles alight, once again to disguise any clues and from there we travelled back in the direction of Randfontein. We could hear the sirens so we knew that paramedics and ambulances were on the way. On the way back to Randfontein we dropped off Diedericks at my house where he fetched his vehicle and his children.
After that we went to the City Hall and we found that the other men weren't there. From there we went to Jaco Badenhorst's residence where we found the others. On the question, Phil Kloppers' question who shot everybody, he said affirmative and Phil Kloppers sent someone, I don't know who it was, to take the ear from the vehicle.
All of us left there and we didn't have an opportunity to get in contact with each other.
MS VAN DER WALT: And after that, did you speak to any of the members?
MR MARTIN: I spoke with General Oelofse, we visited him the next day and he congratulated us, myself and Phil Kloppers. He congratulated us with our activities the previous evening and he suggested that we shave off our moustaches and cut our hair short and I had to get rid of my Mercedes because the Mercedes was noted. I didn't want to do this because I believed that the revolution was at hand and I decided to keep the Mercedes because as I understood it war was at hand and it would - on the 16 December.
MS VAN DER WALT: You mention the 16th December, this revolution, this particular evening of the 12th, would it have started then?
MR MARTIN: That's how I understood it.
MS VAN DER WALT: And General Oelofse, did he mentioned anything, if in any other areas there were any incidents?
MR MARTIN: Negative. At that stage he didn't say anything. At a later stage he mentioned to me that the other areas were quiet and he was angry and the area commanders because they did not act on the instruction.
MS VAN DER WALT: Do you know of any bomb explosion during that time?
MR MARTIN: That's correct. There were explosions on the West Rand.
MS VAN DER WALT: Do you know if any persons were arrested for these explosions?
MR MARTIN: At later stage, I can't recall the precise date but it was close to the New Year, General Oelofse and some other members were arrested for these explosions.
MS VAN DER WALT: And the 16th of December of that year 1993, where were you then?
MR MARTIN: I was a the Voortrekker Monument.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you go there?
MR MARTIN: This was the day of commemoration day, the day of Covenant.
MS VAN DER WALT: And you as AWB members, did you meet there? MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And what happened there?
MR MARTIN: General Oelofse came to our tent, he called us to his tent and he congratulated us again. He asked us to form a guard of honour for the leader Eugene Terreblanche and we did that. The Generals formed a line in front and we stood behind them and he congratulated us once again with the work that we had done.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you have to form a guard of honour, what was the reason fro that?
MR MARTIN: I believe it was because he felt that he was proud of us and to give us some recognition for the work that we had done.
MS VAN DER WALT: And on the 6th of January 1994 you were arrested?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you make any statements to the police?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I was tortured and so I had to give a statement.
MS VAN DER WALT: How were you tortured?
MR MARTIN: Murder and Robbery and Crime Information Service took me into a bush close to Soweto and held me on the ground and they used a tube method, as they call it, and they tried to strangle me, I've got a mark on my nose and I made the statement as they wanted me to make the statement.
MS VAN DER WALT: And in your statement you mentioned what had happened there, is that correct?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I was protecting many.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why do you say you were protecting many? Who were you protecting?
MR MARTIN: At first I wanted to protect myself, I tried to protect General Japie Oelofse as well as my comrades.
MS VAN DER WALT: The statement of the applicant is in bundle one, page 154 to 159.
And in the statement you did not mention or you do not make any mention for any reason why you shot these people?
MR MARTIN: Negative, that was to protect.
MS VAN DER WALT: And during the Court proceedings, did you testify?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you tell the Court then what you are telling us now?
MR MARTIN: No, there I mentioned what the advocate at that time wanted me to tell and we lied in Court there.
MS VAN DER WALT: Why did you tell those lies then?
MR MARTIN: This was to try to protect myself to get off as well as the General's staff.
CHAIRPERSON: You were accused number 6?
MR MARTIN: I'm not sure.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so?
MS VAN DER WALT: Yes, the applicants were all together initially but then they divided the hearings and the first applicant and the present applicant, their hearings were held separate. The one case was concluded first.
CHAIRPERSON: Do we have a copy of the Judgement?
MS VAN DER WALT: Yes, we have a copy of the Judgement, I think it's in the second bundle. It seems to me as if we just have a Judgement of an Appeal of Kloppers and Martin. The Judgement of the hearing in the Supreme Court we do not have.
CHAIRPERSON: The copy that I have here is only in regard to the other persons and not in regard to him? ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MS VAN DER WALT: That is correct. It seems it's just a Judgement on Appeal.
You mention the General's staff, what does that mean, who is that?
MR MARTIN: One can say they are a panel who take decisions with regard to what would happen when and where.
MS VAN DER WALT: And Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the AWB, what is he of this General's staff.
MR MARTIN: He's supposed to be the leader and his word would be law.
MS VAN DER WALT: While you were in prison, did you meet with Japie Oelofse, what was the situation?
MR MARTIN: Yes, we were in the same section, he for the explosions in West Pretoria. I can't remember how many times Japie Oelofse congratulated us, but just about everyday he would encourage us and tell us not to be concerned because we would receive amnesty, it was a political deed and he even promised us medals.
MS VAN DER WALT: And any of the General's other staff, did you meet them in prison?
MR MARTIN: After we were sentenced, this would have been 1995, we were at Diepkloof and Eugene Terreblanche the Commander and some other officers visited us.
MS VAN DER WALT: Yes, what happened there?
MR MARTIN: And during these visits Phil Kloppers told Eugene Terreblanche straight: "Listen I want to speak to the leader" in front of all these other people, we were all present there. He told Terreblanche there: "Listen, I did not act on my own, I had an instruction from Japie Oelofse and Japie Oelofse did not deny this", Eugene Terreblanche said he was aware of that.
MS VAN DER WALT: You mention on page 37, paragraph 28 in your application
"During the visit Eugene Terreblanche made mention: he said: Commander, if everybody nationwide did what they had to do, you wouldn't have been in prison today"
MR MARTIN: That's correct, that is what he said. This was after Phil Kloppers told him: "Listen here, we did not act on our own". There were many rumours that we acted on our own accord.
MS VAN DER WALT: When you spoke to him there, what do you think, was he aware of this instruction?
MR MARTIN: Definitely.
MS VAN DER WALT: This deed, did you do this for your own convenience or why did you do this?
MR MARTIN: The reason why we did it was to establish political resistance and not to let the general election continue. And the acts which would take place nationwide, and we were told that it would take place nationwide and we cause a revolution in this manner, we could install fear in the general public.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you believe that when you acted, did you believe that similar deeds would occur nationwide?
MR MARTIN: That's what Kloppers told me and I believed him.
MS VAN DER WALT: The objectives of the AWB is set out in Annexure B under political objectives that you wished to reach and you've confirmed this?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I have.
MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Mr Martin, if I understand your testimony, General Oelofse was the general commander, here he was the commander of the whole Witwatersrand, that included your area?
MR MARTIN: That's right.
MR PRINSLOO: Are you aware that the leader of the AWB, Mr Eugene Terreblanche on the 26th of November 1993, had a meeting in Port Elizabeth and he mentioned a few aspects about the coming election and this was broadcast on TV, on the 8 o'clock news of the 26th of November?
MR MARTIN: Mr Terreblanche delivered a speech at the hearing. I can't remember what the content of this speech was.
MR PRINSLOO: If he would have said that he would make sure that there would be no election even by using the barrel of a rifle?
MR MARTIN: No, he said this often.
MR PRINSLOO: You say that he said this often, was it your impression that Mr Terreblanche did not want this election to take place?
MR MARTIN: Definitely.
MR PRINSLOO: And according to you, if the election did proceed, would the ANC and it's alliance, the SACP, have gained the upperhand?
MR MARTIN: Definitely.
MR PRINSLOO: Was it acceptable for the AWB and other rightwing groups?
MR MARTIN: Negative.
MR PRINSLOO: These acts of yours on this particular evening while you were dressed in uniform, you say that there were people who were searched, they were stopped, they were aware that you were AWB members?
MR MARTIN: That's right.
MR PRINSLOO: Now according to you this message, after these persons were killed, would this have been carried over that this was the act of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I believed that Japie Oelofse would have released a press statement.
MR PRINSLOO: Japie Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR PRINSLOO: That's the General you're speaking of?
MR MARTIN: Yes, it's General Japie Oelofse.
MR PRINSLOO: But in the acts themselves, the public who were stopped there on that same scene who knew that you were AWB members, did you believe or did you not believe it that it was the work of the AWB, the killing of these people?
MR MARTIN: Yes, they would have done so.
CHAIRPERSON: Only if they survived.
MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, I refer to the people who were stopped beforehand who were not killed. This was before the other people were killed, that was the question. Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
CHAIRPERSON: Maybe it's a convenient stage to adjourn until half past eleven.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
DEON MARTIN: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KNOETZE: Mr Martin, my client Mr van der Schyff says that he joined the AWB on the 15th of October 1993 and a while after he was introduced to you and to Commander Kloppers, can you confirm this?
MR MARTIN: I can't confirm the dates but I can confirm that at some stage we met.
MR KNOETZE: Can you confirm that he joined as a member of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: Definitely.
MR KNOETZE: And he mentions that he was asked by you and Kloppers if he was interested in becoming an officer and he indicated positively and he had to do and examination which he passed?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: And then a while after he was appointed as an Assistant Area Commander of Area 3?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: And as such he was under your command?
MR MARTIN: He would have been under the direct command of Commander Kloppers.
MR KNOETZE: Under whose command were you?
MR MARTIN: Phil Kloppers.
MR KNOETZE: And under whose command was he?
MR MARTIN: Under General Japie Oelofse.
MR KNOETZE: If you look at page 156, paragraph 4 of the statement, it mentions that
"Kloppers told us that he received instructions to go to work. He usually gets his instructions from General Oelofse"
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: Is that how it worked?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that was the procedure.
MR KNOETZE: My client also states that he received training as a member of the AWB, can you confirm this?
MR MARTIN: Yes, he was there.
MR KNOETZE: Training was given by Carel Meiring who was the instructor there?
MR MARTIN: Carel Meiring was the training officer, so he would have given the training.
MR KNOETZE: Can you confirm that he underwent training?
MR MARTIN: Yes, he did.
MR KNOETZE: And as training and the camps were held in such a manner where for example strict military discipline and training was given with reference to handling of weapons?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: And it was also mentioned that the reason for this training was that the people would be able to take back the country?
MR MARTIN: That's correct, for war, yes.
MR KNOETZE: You used the word I did not want to place in your mouth but that was the point, preparation for war?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: My client also states that he participated in marches and he attended meetings and at some points he accompanied General Oelofse, he was an escort to Vereeniging? Can you confirm this?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that was part of our duties.
MR KNOETZE: Can you remember and if you can't remember you must tell me, was he specifically with?
MR MARTIN: Yes, he was with.
MR KNOETZE: What was your impression of him as a member of the AWB, how did you see him, as a person who - was he negligent, did not ...[no English translation]
MR MARTIN: Mr Chairperson, no I would not say that he was a negligent person, he was a good officer. If an instruction was given to him he complied, he was a good officers.
MR KNOETZE: That is what he will say, he will say he was complimented for his behaviour and he got the impression that his commanders, of which you were one, were satisfied.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: He would also say that on the evening when you met at Uncle Harry's Roadside Cafe you acted openly as AWB members, for example you saluted, you saluted Chief Commandant Kloppers, he saluted back to you, you called the other members to attention almost as if it were a military parade?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
MR KNOETZE: Did these things happen in view of those who were present?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR KNOETZE: So you were dressed in full uniform, you had weapons and you did not intend to disguise it at all on that evening?
MR MARTIN: No, not at all.
MR KNOETZE: He would also say to the Commission that Chief Commandant Kloppers used the words: "Hard option" as one of the messages brought back from the order group.
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
MR KNOETZE: What did you understand under the concept: "hard options"?
MR MARTIN: Commandant Kloppers said that he had received instructions to execute hard options and when I asked what he meant by that he said that the General wanted to see corpses.
MR KNOETZE: Could you please speak up?
MR MARTIN: He said that the General wanted to see corpses and those were the "hard options" to which he was referring.
MR KNOETZE: Therefore, not only you but the other members also in attendance, such as Mr van der Schyff were aware of exactly what that meant?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR KNOETZE: What was the exact purpose behind the operation, why was it necessary to see corpses?
MR MARTIN: Phil Kloppers told us that the revolution would have broken out countrywide on that night.
MR KNOETZE: Did you believe that?
MR MARTIN: Yes, because he had come from an order group meeting and the highest rank in attendance there was General Oelofse and he said that this instruction came from the Generals and staff, that the revolution would break out on that night.
MR KNOETZE: Did it come to you as a surprise that they said that the revolution would break out on that evening? I don't mean it in the sense that it would break tonight but that a revolution in itself would be breaking out?
MR MARTIN: No, because we had been preparing for a long time for the revolution.
MR KNOETZE: Which type of instructions did you receive before which had to be undertaken in preparation for the revolution?
MR MARTIN: For example stockpiling of food, generators and such because it was said to us that the country would find itself in darkness.
MR KNOETZE: And what about weapons?
MR MARTIN: It was said that if we didn't enough weapons we would have to go and steal weapons, that came from the General's own mouth.
MR KNOETZE: That is what I was hoping you would say because those were my instructions. Mr van der Schyff said that it was said that you didn't have enough weapons you'd have to go and steal them.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: And that was an official order from the AWB's command structure?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR KNOETZE: A hard option meant that you had to see corpses, why did there have to be corpses on that evening? I understand that you say the revolution had to be initiated but what other objectives were there?
MR MARTIN: I believe that the AWB had acted nationally as they had said to us and if the general public had seen that a revolution was imminent, they would have put the elections to a stop and we would have been able to establish our own Boerestaat for our Boerevolk.
MR KNOETZE: You said that the elections would have been stopped, so therefore one of the objectives was to prevent the elections?
MR MARTIN: That's right.
MR KNOETZE: So therefore I understand you correctly that the objective was to create chaos in the country to stop the elections from happening?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: You were also looking specifically for illegal firearms which might be in the possession of those who would be apprehended by the roadblock?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that was also part of the operation, to look for firearms and ammunition.
MR KNOETZE: And he said that it was said to them that at all costs it should be prevented that those arms be used against innocent whites by the people carrying them or otherwise that you yourselves should use them during the revolution.
MR MARTIN: Correct.
MR KNOETZE: Were there vehicles which were apprehended before the Cressida and the Ballade which were stopped and searched and of which the passengers were questioned? You've answered yes.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR KNOETZE: Why were those people let go?
MR MARTIN: Various vehicles were stopped, I can't exactly remember how many and the questions were: "To which political party do you belong"? and not one of them stated that they belonged to the ANC. Our targets were people who belonged to the ANC/SACP Alliance, for example one vehicle that we stopped stated that they belonged to Inkatha and we let them go. Our target was the ANC/SACP Alliance members.
MR KNOETZE: So that would answer my next question. Why did you decide to make targets out of those in the Cressida and the Ballade, was that because they were members of the ANC/SACP Alliance?
MR MARTIN: Upon my question they confirmed that they were members of the ANC/SACP Alliance.
MR KNOETZE: Who then decided that that specific group of people would be the target for the evening?
MR MARTIN: Kloppers and I discussed the issue and called everyone together and after we had formed the group, we formed the lineage and we fired at them.
MR KNOETZE: Are you sure of that fact? Was every applicant physically present or was it simply a core group?
MR MARTIN: I would rather say that it was a core group of the members, I can't say exactly who were physically present.
MR KNOETZE: Because my client, Mr van der Schyff says that another applicant came to him and told him to prepare because they would be shooting.
MR MARTIN: I cannot answer that.
MR KNOETZE: You have already testified that you fired a shot and that that shot was meant as a signal or an order to commence with the rest of the actions.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: There are two question which were asked of you, was it an order to the others to commence the firing?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I would have fired the first shot and then it would have indicated to the others to commence with the shooting.
MR KNOETZE: You would have fired the shot and that shot would have served as an order to others to commence with the shooting?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
MR KNOETZE: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNOETZE
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?
MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Martin, I'm going to put my questions in English for the benefit of those I represent but please answer in Afrikaans. You are relying on orders which you were told had come from General Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: I didn't hear that question.
MR BRINK: No, you answer in Afrikaans please.
EXPLANATION OF CHANNELS
MR BRINK: You are relying on orders which Kloppers told you came from General Oelofse? You tell the Committee that you were relying on order which Mr Kloppers had told you had come from General Oelofse, correct?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR BRINK: What would your attitude be if General Oelofse were to tell the Committee that he never gave such orders?
MR MARTIN: I carried out the orders given by General Kloppers who was my supreme commander at that point.
MR BRINK: But you'd had a few drinks, all of you had a few drinks, can you tell me what you drank, where you drank it and how much you drank?
MR MARTIN: I've stated that I had one drink and that's all.
MR BRINK: What was the nature of that drink?
MR MARTIN: I think it was whisky.
MR BRINK: Did you have it neat or with water or soda?
MR MARTIN: With water.
MR BRINK: Do you remember what the others had?
MR MARTIN: It was the same, it was one bottle.
MR BRINK: Was there brandy involved as well?
MR MARTIN: Not as far as I can recall.
MR BRINK: Were you at any stage under the influence of liquor?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: And to your knowledge, were any of your colleagues under the influence of liquor?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: I want to pass onto another matter. You were told that the revolution would start countrywide, that is as I understand it a revolution which in the main would involved members of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR BRINK: And that this revolution would be countrywide?
MR MARTIN: That's correct, those were the orders.
MR BRINK: Now we know that the AWB were fairly strong in the, what was then the Transvaal, Western Transvaal and so on, can you possibly tell the Committee how strong the AWB was in let's say, Natal?
MR MARTIN: No, I think those answers could only be provided by Eugene Terreblanche.
MR BRINK: Not very many people.
MR MARTIN: I don't know.
MR BRINK: Can you indicate how strong the AWB was in the Eastern Cape?
MR MARTIN: No, that's completely external to our area.
MR BRINK: Insofar as your knowledge of the Western Cape goes?
MR MARTIN: Right across the country.
MR BRINK: You're only aware of the strength of the AWB in your Province, am I right?
MR MARTIN: According to computer print-outs which we had, Randfontein was about 1 400.
MR BRINK: But the AWB was strongest in the Transvaal?
MR MARTIN: I believe so.
MR BRINK: And you can't comment on how strong it was in other Provinces?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: Because I want to suggest that the AWB didn't have a very strong following in any of the other Provinces apart from the old Transvaal.
MR MARTIN: I attended a year-end function of South Natal and the level of strength was quite high there.
MR BRINK: Do you know how many more or less?
MR MARTIN: The hall was packed with 150 to 200 people.
MR BRINK: 150 to 200 people?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR BRINK: Now, would you agree with me that an ordinary roadblock - and you were a policeman as I understand it, that an ordinary roadblock is set up to detect drunken diving, the detection of stolen property, stolen vehicles and that sort of thing?
MR MARTIN: That's correct but that was not our instruction on that evening.
MR BRINK: No, I understand what you're saying but you agree that that's the purpose of an ordinary roadblock?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR BRINK: Have you been in a police roadblock before, in the sense of taking part in the block?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: I think you'd agree with me that it would be most unusual for members of a roadblock to make enquiries as to people's political affiliations?
MR MARTIN: Whether it came from out side or the police's side?
MR BRINK: The police side. The conventional roadblock, one wouldn't expect members of the roadblock to enquire of people that they're questioning, they wouldn't enquire as to their political affiliation.
MR MARTIN: I myself was never involved in a roadblock but I think that that would have been extraordinary.
MR BRINK: When you on your evidence, started to question inhabitants of these two, or occupants rather of these two vehicles, you said they told you they were supporters or members of the ANC.
MR MARTIN: No, the answer was that most of them said that they were members of the ANC.
MR BRINK: Wouldn't these people, these occupants of the motor cars, have been terrified when they were told to get out after being hit about, being told to get out, asked their political affiliation, surely they would kept silence and said: "We're not members of any political organisation". I find that incredible Mr Martin, that people, terrified people would admit to you that they were members of the ANC.
MR MARTIN: They did do so.
MR BRINK: Very well. There was a child involved?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I later heard that there was a child involved.
MR BRINK: Do you know who shot that child?
MR MARTIN: Unfortunately not, we stood in the line, I don't know what the child's position ...[intervention]
MR BRINK: So it was just a random massacre of innocent people?
MR MARTIN: No, the shooting incident involved shooting ANC members as per our instructions from General Oelofse.
MR BRINK: Yes, but a child was killed and that child couldn't have been a menace to society as far as you're concerned surely, it was a child?
MR MARTIN: Well, we see this on a daily basis on TV, how 9 year olds run around with guns. The child must have got in the way, I can't answer.
MR BRINK: Was the child not on the wall with the other people?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: Was this just random shooting or was it an execution style killing?
MR MARTIN: No, our objective was to kill everybody.
MR BRINK: Whether they were women or children?
MR MARTIN: That's correct. As Eugene Terreblanche said to us that if they can carry a gun we would shoot them.
MR BRINK: Now you know of course that money was stolen in this incident?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR BRINK: You don't that?
MR MARTIN: No, I don't know of any money that was taken.
MR BRINK: Did you not hear about that?
MR MARTIN: During the trial a witness said that money was taken from him. There were two witnesses but I don't know about any money that was taken.
MR BRINK: And tape cassettes and tape recorders and that sort of thing, you knew nothing about that?
MR MARTIN: I later came to hear of it, after the incident when we had been arrested.
MR BRINK: And clothing stolen, do you know anything about that?
MR MARTIN: I didn't steal any clothes.
MR BRINK: No, I don't know whether you did but surely you must have knowledge? You must have discussed afterwards, R100 here and tape cassettes and clothing and - surely?
MR MARTIN: No. I heard about it for the first time in prison.
MR BRINK: Who discussed that with you?
MR MARTIN: The co-accused.
MR BRINK: Can you name then?
MR MARTIN: No, unfortunately I'm not quite certain. Kallie Meiring had the equipment, Matthews had the cassettes and about the leather jacket and the money I can't give you an answer.
MR BRINK: You see, I'm going to suggest to you and argue before the Committee that this was a mindless brutal racist murder without any genuine political objective.
MR MARTIN: I don't agree. Our objective on that evening was to go out and create chaos. This would have occurred on a nationwide basis and the objective was to secure the Boerestaat for the Boerevolk.
MR MARTIN: Did you ever think to make enquiries from Mr Kloppers whether any other Generals in the organisation or indeed the leader, Mr Eugene Terreblanche had given orders in this regard to Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: Terreblanche visited us in Diepkloof and he said that if everybody had acted countrywide as we had acted on that night, we wouldn't be sitting in jail on that day.
MR BRINK: But of course that would have been nonsense Mr Martin surely, because we know that even if you take Southern Natal, not the whole of Natal, Southern Natal with 150 or 200 people, surely that sort of number of people couldn't ...[indistinct] revolution?
MR MARTIN: I believe that if you act in small groups in various towns it might very well happen.
MR MALAN: Mr Martin, the first question from Mr Brink was whether you ever asked Phil Kloppers whether or why the other leaders had not acted and your answer to that was that Terreblanche had said to you in Diepkloof, that if everybody in the country had acted that way you wouldn't be in prison, is that correct, is that your answer?
MR MARTIN: No, then I would like to rectify that. I heard from General Oelofse myself that he was angry at his other commanders for not acting in a similar fashion. Phil Kloppers and I visited Oelofse together when we asked the question what had happened, that nothing else had happened.
MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Malan.
MR MALAN: Can you tell us when Mr Kloppers asked this question?
MR MARTIN: I beg your pardon?
MR MALAN: Can you tell us when you and Mr Kloppers asked General Oelofse this question?
MR MARTIN: It was in the afternoon at approximately 3 to 4 o'clock.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
MR BRINK: You see, you held a fairly senior position in the AWB at that time, is that correct?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR BRINK: You must have been very concerned about the orders which Kloppers was giving you?
MR MARTIN: No, I believed that Mr Kloppers received the orders from the Generals and staff and that we would initiate the revolution.
MR BRINK: And you made no further enquiry?
MR MARTIN: No, because we went out ourselves on that evening and it was decided as per instructions of the Generals and staff that the revolution would begin. We departed and went out and did the necessary.
MR BRINK: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BRINK
ADV BOSMAN: You said Mr Martin, that you had suggested that the squatter camps be searched, what did you have in mind?
MR MARTIN: We had to identify squatter camps and kill people there.
ADV BOSMAN: So therefore by searching you meant to identify people?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
ADV BOSMAN: ...[inaudible] mention amongst yourselves that there was a child in the group?
MR MARTIN: No.
ADV BOSMAN: Were you at that point aware of the child?
MR MARTIN: No, I was not aware of the child.
ADV BOSMAN: Did you notice any women?
MR MARTIN: I heard subsequently that there had been women and two other little ones which I had not noticed. I must mention that it was very dark that night.
ADV BOSMAN: Would it have been a factor of consideration to you had seen women and children?
MR MARTIN: Well seeing as the revolution had broken out, it wouldn't have been a factor.
ADV BOSMAN: Just one further question. You've said that you also had to search for illegal weapons and ammunition with a dual purpose, firstly to use the weapons and secondly to destroy these people. Regarding this first objective, why did you not take that a little bit further?
MR MARTIN: The AWB did not have weapons and ammunition ...[intervention]
ADV BOSMAN: One moment, I think you're misunderstanding my question. You've said that you had a dual purpose in setting up the roadblock, firstly you had to search for weapons and ammunition - I understand that you wanted to use those items, but my question is, why didn't you continue the roadblock further in order to get more weapons and ammunition, why did you decide on this specific group?
MR MARTIN: We pulled over a number of vehicles but this specific group were members of the ANC and therefore complied with our specifications for a target as per our instructions.
ADV BOSMAN: But the point was that they didn't have any arms and ammunition with them.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
ADV BOSMAN: So what happened to the first part of the purpose?
MR MARTIN: We tried to achieve the first part of our objective and we couldn't and that is why we went over to the second part.
ADV BOSMAN: Can you perhaps indicate how long it took from when you began pulling over vehicles until the shooting?
MR MARTIN: I would have to estimate, it would be about an hour and a half to two hours.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Chairperson.
ADV SIGODI: I'll put my questions to you in English. You mentioned that after this whole massacre you went back to collect the shells in order to destroy whatever evidence there was, why was it necessary for you to destroy the evidence?
MR MARTIN: We did not want to draw attention to a specific group, it was just a handful of us and that is why I believe it was necessary to destroy evidence.
ADV SIGODI: If it was a political instruction, I mean it was common in those days, if a particular political group did something it would account for it and say: "We were responsible for that", why was it necessary for you to hide this as if it was just an ordinary crime and not a political activity? Why wasn't the AWB interested in making it publicly known that this was an AWB action?
MR MARTIN: My perception was that General Japie Oelofse would contact the media the following morning and tell them that the AWB was involved and would say that the AWB was involved in this area.
ADV SIGODI: But then why was it necessary for you to want to destroy the evidence, the taking of the shells and the burning of the motor vehicle?
MR MARTIN: So the finger could not be pointed the commando, that was our objective. They had to know that the AWB was involved but not us as a group.
ADV SIGODI: Did the AWB take responsibility for that massacre?
MR MARTIN: Afterwards, after we were sent to prison and Eugene Terreblanche told us that we were freedom fighters, "we see you as freedom fighters", and that is the time when hey took responsibility for the act.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martin, you've just mentioned - let me put it this way, the previous evening you removed all the shells but now you mention that the AWB the following day would take responsibility for the act, I cannot reconcile the two.
MR MARTIN: The AWB as a whole would accept responsibility for this.
CHAIRPERSON: But then the police would come to you and say you accept responsibility, you know who did this?
MR MARTIN: Yes, but that was a long time afterwards that the police came to us.
CHAIRPERSON: That is my problem, you attempt to erase evidence and then a few days afterwards the AWB accepts responsibility for the act and then the police came to the AWB and told them: "You accept responsibility, so you know who did it"?
MR MARTIN: The AWB in that time did not take responsibility, it was much later.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought, upon a question from my colleague that you mentioned that you would have expected that the AWB openly accepted responsibility for the act.
MR MARTIN: Yes, I expected that but it never happened.
CHAIRPERSON: How do you expect this and on the other hand you do everything in your power to prevent that the police and the people of South Africa know who did this?
MR MARTIN: The press release would have been released and it would say that it was the AWB that was responsible, the political crime.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR MALAN: Mr Martin, let me kick off at the same point. You are sitting in a bath and you have pain, your wife tells you there is a call and you give an instruction that she call the men and you go out to Uncle Harry's, you pick up some people along the way, you drive back to another house to collect vehicles, you go to your own house, you have a drink, you drive out and you discuss with Mr Phil Kloppers the possibility of targets, you suggest a squatter camp and on your way home it was told to you - according your evidence, that your instruction was to set up a roadblock.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: You were already in the car when you asked this question on your way home?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's right.
MR MALAN: Why did you go back home?
MR MARTIN: The place where we met again was outside of the town.
MR MALAN: Would you try to explain it to me because the first meeting place was Harry's Roadside Cafe, you were all together, you all drive from there to a second place, Mr Diedericks or Mr Badenhorst's house and there you meet again?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: All of you?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: You did not discuss the target?
MR MARTIN: Not yet.
MR MALAN: All of you leave from there to your house.
MR MARTIN: First to Andrč Visser's house and then to my house.
MR MALAN: Why every time do you go to another place and as yet you still have no instruction or a target, can you explain that to us?
MR MARTIN: We went to Mr Visser's house to have a drink.
MR MALAN: You are commanded and you were that the revolution would start, that you know already at Harry's Roadside Cafe but first you go and have a drink?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: And you move to four different points before you go into action.
MR MARTIN: It's three separate places, Badenhorst's house, Visser's house and ...[intervention]
MR MALAN: Harry's Roadside Cafe was the first place you moved to?
MR MARTIN: Yes, but that's a meeting place, it's a general meeting place. ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MR MALAN: But you are already all there, then you move to three other points.
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: Did you at any stage discuss any of the action or the nature of the revolution.
MR MARTIN: What we discussed, at the meeting place we did not discuss anything like that but it was when we were driving from Andrč Visser's house, it was a patrol through the area to ensure that it was safe and then we went to my place and this is where Phil Kloppers told me that need to set up a roadblock.
MR MALAN: And you were already on your way home when he made this suggestion?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: It was not decided on before the time?
MR MARTIN: No, I made the suggestion to attack or to search a squatter camp and then he said: "The instruction was to set up a roadblock".
MR MALAN: He mentions this the first time when you were in the car with him on your way to your house?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: Never before was anybody told of this instruction in spite of the fact that at three different places you met?
MR MARTIN: I don't know if he told anybody else but that was the first time he told me, on my way home from Visser's home.
MR MALAN: At the other points Mr Martin, were all of you not present there at the same time?
MR MARTIN: Yes, we were all present but one had to change the number plates.
MR MALAN: Now in these loose meeting before you acted, and you tell us with great conviction that you were under the impression that General Oelofse would release a press statement the following day, why do you say this?
MR MARTIN: The fact that the revolution would start nationwide and the AWB was involved with these actions, that is why I accepted that he would release this statement.
MR MALAN: If it was a nationwide act, why would General Oelofse release the statement, why not Eugene Terreblanche?
MR MARTIN: I just assumed it was General Oelofse.
MR MALAN: Did you expect a nationwide action or did you expect that he was going to release a press statement to take responsibility for the act?
MR MARTIN: I believed it was going to be a nationwide action because we had prepared and we warned and we were told to prepare for this.
MR MALAN: Mr Martin, you said that you were in the South African Police Service from '81 to '85.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: Your advocate asked you what was your tasks there and you said
"My task was to act against the ANC/SACP Alliance"
Which division of the police were you involved with?
MR MARTIN: At the Detective Branch, I was at Koevoet and that's where I ended my service.
MR MALAN: And the Detective Branch, were the operations also against the SACP/ANC Alliance?
MR MARTIN: When we received information yes.
MR MALAN: Were you only used in political matters? What was the other nature of your function in the Police Service?
MR MARTIN: Investigation of crime.
MR MALAN: You've mentioned secret meetings at the Embassy Hotel where you say you don't know who was present but then you say at a later stage
"Hartzenberg and Viljoen were there"
MR MARTIN: That is what I heard.
MR MALAN: Where did you hear this from?
MR MARTIN: From Phil Kloppers. They were the escort for the General to the secret place.
MR MALAN: When your wife gave the instruction to call these people on the list, did you say how many people to call?
MR MARTIN: She said - no, I just told her just call most of them.
MR MALAN: How many names were on that list?
MR MARTIN: I cannot remember, this was four years ago, it was quite some time ago.
MR MALAN: Mr Martin, approximately 10 names, 100 names, 1 400 names? You were referring to Randfontein, how many names on that list?
MR MARTIN: The list just consisted of the names of officers, approximately about 60 if I recall correctly.
MR MALAN: You did not tell your wife how many of them to call?
MR MARTIN: I told het to just call some of them as the instruction was.
MR MALAN: The issue of the stopping of this roadblock, when my colleague next to me put a question to you you said it was pitch dark, you couldn't see whether there were any women or children.
MR MARTIN: I did not see, I myself personally did not.
MR MALAN: But you did the questioning.
MR MARTIN: Yes, I was standing here in the middle and then I just asked a general question and then they just answered from the side.
MR MALAN: Did you ask them one by one?
MR MARTIN: Yes, basically, I cannot remember that we questioned any women and children otherwise I would have remembered it.
MR MALAN: You asked them one by one and if you say basically, what do you mean? Did you ask all of them or did you not ask all of them?
MR MARTIN: I cannot remember. I cannot recall whether we asked all of them but I believe we did but I cannot be sure.
MR MALAN: But you say most of them said they were ANC supporters, how do you know this was the majority?
MR MARTIN: We can deduce this from the answers that were given to us.
MR MALAN: Do you know how many people there were?
MR MARTIN: I think there was about 10, yes.
MR MALAN: The pattern as you stopped these vehicles at the roadblock, can you describe this? How did you handle this? You stopped the vehicle, you walked to the driver?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: And you asked the driver: "Where do you come from"?
MR MARTIN: No, we got them out of the vehicle and then asked them: "Where do you come from"? and then we searched the vehicle.
MR MALAN: This signal which you gave, where did you agree upon this signal.
MR MARTIN: We formed a group when myself and Phil Kloppers decided this was the target, we formed a line and I gave them the signal.
MR MALAN: How did the others know this was the signal?
MR MARTIN: We told them, if I fire the weapon they should also fire.
MR MALAN: They did not know beforehand that they would shoot?
MR MARTIN: They knew already that Uncle Harry's that we were going to shoot.
MR MALAN: This issue of the cutting off of the ear of one of the persons, you were asked before and you said that this was on instruction from Phil Kloppers.
MR MARTIN: Correct.
MR MALAN: And it was asked what the purpose was of this instruction and you said he wanted to show the other areas how to go about the task. Did General Oelofse tell you this or Phil Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: General Oelofse said ...[intervention]
MR MALAN: No, no, I'm talking about this incident, the instruction to cut off the ear, did it come from Phil Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: Then my question would be, did he - then there was asked of you: "Why"? and you said you wanted to show the other areas how to go about this task.
MR MARTIN: The ear would have been handed to General Oelofse, that is probably what I incorrectly - the ear was handed over to General Oelofse. ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MR MALAN: I just want to understand the instruction at that stage, that is what I'm trying to understand.
MR MARTIN: He told me the ear was intended for General Oelofse to show the other areas how things are done.
MR MALAN: In other words he wanted to go and brag by General Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: It would have been a trophy from Mr Kloppers to General Oelofse.
MR MARTIN: I cannot answer on that.
MR MALAN: Why can you not answer on that?
MR MARTIN: I can't.
MR MALAN: But why can't you, you can answer from a distance about this trophy but you cannot answer on the issue of the trophy with Mr Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: I know that on a previous occasion General Oelofse asked me that he wanted and ear so I knew that he wanted one as a trophy. ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MR MARTIN: And you've also said that you used the knife or you received a knife from Oelofse but you said this wasn't the knife that you used, you said the knife that you used you won at a lottery.
MR MARTIN: Correct.
MR MALAN: Why do you say from General Nick Fourie?
MR MARTIN: It was South Natal, I was there for a year-end function and that is where I got it.
MR MALAN: So Nick Fourie did not give you this knife, you won it at a lottery?
MR MARTIN: But he gave it to me.
MR MALAN: Oh, he handed it over as the prize for the lottery?
MR MARTIN: Correct.
MR MALAN: And you say that Mr Oelofse at a previous stage said if you come across a body, cut the ear off, now how do you find a body that you can cut the ear off?
MR MARTIN: I saw that war was close, it was at hand and the revolution would start soon ...[intervention]
MR MALAN: So he wanted an ear as a trophy, he didn't want you to kill people?
MR MARTIN: No, he said if we find a body and I saw this as when we were at war.
MR MALAN: And this ear, what did you do with the ear at the scene, how did you handle this? Who cut the ear off?
MR MARTIN: I cut it off, it didn't bleed profusely. I took him to the Mercedes and I put him there and I cut his ear off.
MR MALAN: And the plastic bag?
MR MARTIN: I gave it to Phil Kloppers.
MR MALAN: What did he do with it?
MR MARTIN: He took it out at Jaco Badenhorst's house and he showed it to them.
MR MALAN: Was this immediately after this incident?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: The same night?
MR MARTIN: Yes, the same night.
MR MALAN: What time did this incident occur?
MR MARTIN: If I have to guess it was about 12 o'clock.
MR MALAN: The statement you refer to, that you gave to the police, on page 152, page 153 of the bundle. Will you help me please, page 155, 154/55 of the bundle. You said that the statement is correct, you confirmed it?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: What is incorrect in there?
MR MARTIN: I don't have the statement in front of me but there are many things that I omitted.
MR MALAN: Mention something. If you can remember so much then you will be able to say what was not correct in the statement.
MR MARTIN: At no stage did I mention that we received instruction to shoot, that there had to be bodies and that the revolution would start that evening.
MR MALAN: The shortcoming in the statement, it's not a falsehood, are there faults here? Did you say things that were not as such?
MR MARTIN: If I had the statement in front of me but I don't have it ...[intervention]
MR MALAN: But you answered on your advocate's question, that in the statement you tried to protect yourself and your comrades, now point out where in the statement do you protect yourself and your comrades. Let's start with you, where did you protect yourself?
MR MARTIN: At no stage did I mention that I shot people that evening, I mentioned that I heard shots.
MR MALAN: Yes?
MR MARTIN: I mentioned that everybody was armed and that was false, everybody was not armed, Diedericks was not armed. And I also mentioned that the purpose of the roadblock - this in paragraph 7
"to stop the kaffirs and to hit them and to intimidate them
that was not the instruction.
MR MALAN: Just on that point, the statement you made, the protection, was this more just to say that it was a criminal act?
MR MARTIN: No, I think it was better than murder.
MR MALAN: And you've also said that you met Japie Oelofse in prison, I believe this was early in '95 and he congratulated you there once more and just about every day and he told you that you would receive amnesty?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: And at that stage there was no legislation on amnesty, why did you talk about it then?
MR MARTIN: I cannot answer this. He told us that we'd receive amnesty but I don't know why he that we would.
MR MALAN: Let me ask you a general question. I can understand that you were under instruction from Commandant Kloppers and that you took your instructions from him. If there was a disciplinary structure as you would tell us there was definitely one, then I can understand that you would expect in this process that those who are under you would comply with the orders. What's difficult for me to understand is why you want to involve General Oelofse according to Mr Kloppers' testimony, are you trying to protect Mr Kloppers at all?
MR MARTIN: What I am saying are facts, General Oelofse did this what he did. I do not have to protect Phil Kloppers.
MR MALAN: Most of your testimony with regard to General Oelofse is based on information that Kloppers gave to you. Most of it is firsthand witness. I refer to the incident.
MR MARTIN: The incident which was issued said that we would go from Kloppers' residence, I did not doubt his orders for one moment.
MR MALAN: That's what I said to you in the beginning. I accept the fact that you accepted his orders and that you did not question his testimony therefore, if he had said to you that General Oelofse said so, you would not have questioned it?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: But with regard to this incident, you had no first hand knowledge regarding General Oelofse's involvement?
MR MARTIN: Except that which General Oelofse himself had said to us, that he was angry with the other areas who had not acted.
MR MALAN: That is after the fact?
MR MARTIN: Yes, it was afterwards.
MR MALAN: Thank you very much Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't forgotten about you Miss van der Walt, I just thought it would be more convenient if you were to re-examine after members of the Committee would have put questions so that you come right at the end.
MS VAN DER WALT: I accept that.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martin, it could very well appear that an impression may be created that you people were drunk that evening and then decided to go and put up a roadblock to assault, harass and intimidate black people.
MR MARTIN: That's not true.
CHAIRPERSON: Did the AWB ever adopt as it's policy, that violence be used and in particular that people be killed?
MR MARTIN: That's correct Chairperson, I would like to refer you to phase 1. This was training material which we gave to people who were undergoing training. It was compiled by General J L Oelofse. All the officers below us completed these exams.
MS VAN DER WALT: Might I just tell the Committee that I wanted to submit it, we can submit it right now. I have made copies and I also have the original copy with me.
CHAIRPERSON: Read to us what you consider relevant to my question.
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, on page 12 under the heading
"Organisation and Planning for Unconventional Warfare"
I'm referring to 3(c):
"The following phase is the action of guerilla fighters simultaneously sabotage, terror, revolts, strikes, assassinations and soforth are used to create political and social chaos"
CHAIRPERSON: Well I don't understand this to the extent that - I'm sure that I understand you, but to the extent that I understand this particular portion, it's looking into the future.
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, it had then already been decided by the Generals and staff that night would be the outbreak of the revolution and I believe that this is part of the revolution. If we look at terror, strikes, revolts, sabotage and soforth ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: What is the meaning of
"namate omstandighede dit toelaat, neem hierdie fase in hewigheid toe"?
MR MARTIN: I cannot answer that because it did not happen that certain circumstances contributed to that.
CHAIRPERSON: The heading thereof says
"Organisasie en Beplanning vir Onkonvensionele Oorlog Voering"
Did you ever attend a meeting of the AWB where they said: "Well, we've been planning for the war and the like, we now hereby adopt the resolution in terms of which the was must now start"?
MR MARTIN: No, I never attended such a meeting apart from meetings which were held by General Oelofse in which he stated that war was imminent, that it would break out at any moment.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you not think that for an organisation like the AWB to resort to that kind of thing, it would have needed shift of policy?
MR MARTIN: No, I did not see it as such. The only place where I was where war was continuously discussed was with General Oelofse and it basically involved that we should prepare ourselves, prepare our people, store food and soforth. That is what he told us, nothing further.
CHAIRPERSON: Well the fact that besides a bunch of you who were there that evening, no other members of the AWB resorted to doing that sort of thing that night, doesn't that show you that that was not a decision of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: I don't know. Afterwards Eugene Terreblanche stated that if all of us acted that way on that evening we wouldn't be in prison. He admitted it to us, especially to Kloppers, that if everyone had acted the way that we had acted, we wouldn't be in prison.
CHAIRPERSON: Be careful with what you're saying Mr Martin. The words, you are just adding the words: "soos hulle moes", that is not what you told us Mr Terreblanche told you. He did not, according to your evidence, he did not add the words: "soos julle moes". Because if you are using those words you are really saying a lot more than what you are telling us.
MR MARTIN: I will read from my affidavit
"Commandant and everybody had acted the way they should have acted, you wouldn't be in prison"
CHAIRPERSON: Well, you didn't mention that to us earlier on but nevertheless, let's leave that aspect. As I read the criminal record in respect of some of your colleagues, on your way to the roadblock you came across two black people, do you remember?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: They were assaulted?
MR MARTIN: I heard that they had been assaulted, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you not see that?
MR MARTIN: No, I did not see it.
CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that?
MR MARTIN: The vehicle stopped a little way ahead and we were waiting for the people.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you consider that also as part of the revolution?
MR MARTIN: No, Phil Kloppers told the men that this was not what we had been commandeered for.
CHAIRPERSON: Now what do you mean: "revolution was on"?
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, I would say it would be to establish a political revolt and in so doing prevent the government of the time from conducting elections during which the government would be handed over to a black majority. By bringing about a revolution fear would be driven into the hearts of the people and that would prevent them from participating in the elections.
CHAIRPERSON: Revolution against who?
MR MARTIN: That would be the government of the time as well as the ANC/SACP Alliance.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you regard the roadblock and the killing of a few people there as a revolution against the government?
MR MARTIN: I believe that if there had been groups such as our committing this kind of an act on a nationwide scale, it would have caused large scale chaos. We were not the only ones who were acting.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you not remain there at the scene and continue to kill as many black people as possible and create chaos?
MR MARTIN: As I have stated, we held a torch over the people and it appeared as if they were all dead.
CHAIRPERSON: But that's what you went there for, to do and kill isn't it? What was surprising about that? Wasn't that the precise purpose?
MR MARTIN: Everybody appeared to be dead to me and I didn't know what else to do on the scene. They were all lying very still and it appeared as if they were all dead.
CHAIRPERSON: You regarded that as part of the revolution?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Now why did you not continue the revolution and kill as many as possible if you regarded what you did as part of the revolution?
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, the following day at Japie Oelofse's we decided to lay low. He didn't give us a reason therefore but I assumed that it was because he realised that his people hadn't acted the way he thought they would. He even issued an order telling me to get rid of the Mercedes and that is why we stopped the whole story at that point, the revolution that is.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm trying to understand your behaviour as a group that night. You went out to go and kill people, in fact you wanted to attack the squatter camp to kill people, there would have been many people to kill there.
You went to put up the roadblock to kill people in pursuit of a revolution, now you only kill four or five and then you leave the place and you are not continuing with the killing as planned. If that was a plan I fail to understand your behaviour.
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, we identified the enemy as the ANC and we attacked them and after that we left. If we had acted further, visited squatter camps and so forth, we would have to identify further targets. Our objective was to attack the ANC/SACP Alliance and those who appeared before us that night were members of the ANC/SACP Alliance.
CHAIRPERSON: You were at a point where you were able to find a few of the kind of people you wanted to kill and then you killed them, why not continue to kill more if that was the plan?
MR MARTIN: If we consider the timing, it was also quite late and we believed that every group countrywide would be acting in the way that we were acting and if that had happened it would have created large scale chaos and it would have promoted the revolution.
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it correct that you people ran away when you thought there was a vehicle coming?
MR MARTIN: No, I wouldn't say that they ran away, they climbed in the vehicle and drove away but they didn't run away as such.
CHAIRPERSON: The fact is, you decided to leave the scene because there was a vehicle coming.
MR MARTIN: Some of the people left the scene, I didn't leave the scene.
CHAIRPERSON: You didn't remain there, you also left.
MR MARTIN: I left after we had set the vehicles alight and that was quite some time after.
CHAIRPERSON: Where were the vehicles set alight?
MR MARTIN: On the scene.
CHAIRPERSON: Why?
MR MARTIN: In order to disguise any clues.
CHAIRPERSON: Why worry about things of that nature if the following day you shall have taken over the country? Why worry about such trivialities when you are busy with something huge, a revolution?
MR MARTIN: As I have mentioned earlier, we would not want to be identified as the Randfontein Commando and if we had left any traces on the scene, they would have detected us and that is why we left the scene and set the vehicles alight.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, is it not so that you people left the scene because - I mean, when you saw the other vehicle coming, because you were worried you might be arrested? And isn't the reason why you removed the cartridges, burn the car, was to avoid being arrested by the South African Police who would the following day still be very much in power and control?
MR MARTIN: Where we were standing it was difficult to see a vehicle approaching from afar, so the vehicle was rather close to us at that point. While we were busy on the scene - I'm not referring to the group which had already left, a vehicle was approaching and I agree with you that the police would definitely still have been in power the next day and that is why we had to collect all the shells.
CHAIRPERSON: At that stage, did you really think that you were busy with a revolution to take over the country?
MR MARTIN: Definitely. I believed that such incidents were occurring on a nationwide level.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you say that you did not see the child and women or did you say you don't remember whether you saw the child and/or the women?
MR MARTIN: I can't remember that I saw the women and children.
CHAIRPERSON: How can you manage not to remember whether a small child was there, under those circumstances?
MR MARTIN: The child who was shot was quite grown, it appeared to me to be a grown person. The other little children who were present I did not see.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, while I'm looking to try to find out as to what his age was, the nature of the injuries inflicted on the child were such that it is difficult to accept, it would be difficult to accept that he was hit by accident, half his head was blown away, isn't that so?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I saw the photo's, that is correct. As I heard he had been sitting on his mother's lap. It's very difficult for me to explain, however he was caught in the cross-fire and that is why he was shot.
CHAIRPERSON: Doesn't that show that quite possibly intensive fire was inflicted on him?
MR MARTIN: No, as far as I know we fired in a general direction, we formed a line and we fired.
CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] the child was harassed and assaulted before he was killed, did you not see that?
MR MARTIN: I can't remember that.
CHAIRPERSON: Would that have bothered you, to see a child of that age harassed and assaulted?
MR MARTIN: At that point we were involved in a war and it didn't bother me at all at that point, only much later can I admit that I do have deep sympathy for the family but at that point in time it would not have bothered me.
CHAIRPERSON: The Judge remarks in his Judgement that these people were questioned and some of the white people who were there, that is amongst you, said that these black people: "respekteer nie die base nie", and that was also a source of irritation to you people.
MR MARTIN: Nothing of that sort happened. It wasn't about who was the boss and who wasn't, it was about finding out to which group these people belonged.
CHAIRPERSON: What precisely were you told to do about people who belonged to the ANC, at the roadblock? What orders were you given in that regard?
MR MARTIN: We formed the group and decided that we would regard these people as the target and undertake our instructions.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking about a possible order that could have been conveyed to you from, as you say, General Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: General Oelofse told us to look for ANC/SACP people as targets, those were his instructions and furthermore we had to kill such people.
MR MALAN: Excuse me Chairperson.
You said that General Oelofse said to: "us", you choice that specific word, why are you choosing that word because you testified earlier that you weren't present and that you'd heard it from Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: I beg your pardon I will correct myself and then say Kloppers.
CHAIRPERSON: You told us that you were advised to get rid of the Mercedes Benze but you didn't want to do that, why?
MR MARTIN: I believed firmly that the revolution was definitely breaking out and we believed that Eugene Terreblanche would make his declaration of war on the 16th but it did not happen and I realised myself that it was simply too late because the Mercedes had been seen on the scene of the offence and everybody knew that I drove a big Mercedes, it would have been pointless to get rid of it.
CHAIRPERSON: You seem no to be having more than one reason for not getting rid of the Mercedes, because earlier on I thought that your explanation was that you thought that the revolution was on anyway.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, I don't understand why you would still have been under that impression when it must have been clear to you the very following day that you must have realised that other AWB regions did not on the previous night do what you people had been doing.
MR MARTIN: I waited and believed until the 16th of December which was three days away, that something would happen and for that reason I did not conceal my Mercedes. After the media reports appeared and mentioned the Mercedes which had been driving in the direction of Randfontein, I realised that it would be pointless to try to conceal the Mercedes.
CHAIRPERSON: And you say another reason was, at any rate people had noticed or come to know that there was a Mercedes Benze and they probably would know that it was yours.
MR MARTIN: That's another reason.
CHAIRPERSON: You said one of the objectives was to search for illegal weapons?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And if you found then you would take them away?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: What about legitimately possessed weapons? If you had found that one of the people you stopped had a firearm for which he had a license, that you would not remove?
MR MARTIN: I can't answer that question because it didn't happen. Our instruction was to look for unlawful firearms and that is what we looked for.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, you would not have gone against the order would you because the order said: "Remove illegally possessed weapons, so if you had to follow the order it would mean that the weapons legally possessed would not be removed?
MR MARTIN: That is how I understood the instruction.
CHAIRPERSON: And then you put up a roadblock, you are in the middle of a revolution, somebody comes with a weapon lawfully possessed, you let him go with the weapon?
MR MARTIN: As I've said, I can't answer that because it did not occur.
CHAIRPERSON: I just want to clear something with you, when I raised the question of the child you said something like, I thought you tried to estimate to us as to how big the child was or am I mistaken?
MR MARTIN: I can't remember.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you not a few minutes ago try to indicate to me that it was not such a small child and try to indicate how big the child could have been?
MR MARTIN: Yes, that's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Does he come into the picture, does that mean you are no able to recall the child and you now see the child in your mind?
MR MARTIN: I can remember one thing and that is that he appeared to me to be a young man rather than a child.
ADV BOSMAN: Is that the one who was seated on the mother's lap? I beg your pardon. You've referred to a child at a later stage, that the child was seated on the mother's lap.
MR MARTIN: That is what I found out afterwards, I can't answer to that.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that in your view this child or however you describe him, are you saying that he was a legitimate target?
MR MARTIN: When we listened to Eugene Terreblanche's social speeches, the child was definitely a target.
CHAIRPERSON: When you people decided to go and put up a roadblock, was it planned as to how this revolution would be carried out?
MR MARTIN: I don't know, the information was not conveyed to me by Phil Kloppers.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you told how long your operation was going to last?
MR MARTIN: No, it was not mentioned.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you told what time it should start?
MR MARTIN: All that was said was that it would occur on that evening and we therefore acted on that evening.
CHAIRPERSON: Was it planned as to what should happen the following day?
MR MARTIN: No, we didn't discuss any further plans before the time, we simply decided about the roadblock and executed it.
CHAIRPERSON: As a policeman and possibly also somebody who was an officer in the AWB, don't you thing that when people go on a military operation they plan properly?
MR MARTIN: The planning which was conveyed to me was based upon information which the General gave to Kloppers regarding the roadblock. Apparently a similar roadblock had been held before and he was aware of the fact that we had the equipment to undertake a similar operation and it was from there that we executed this operation.
CHAIRPERSON: In your view you were going to kill people, what did you as an individual Mr Martin, what was planned for example as to what to do with the bodies of the hundreds, perhaps thousands of people that were going to be killed?
MR MARTIN: Chairperson, I believed that it would create the fear among the general public to not participate in the elections and that the revolution would initiate there.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, what was to happen to the bodies, the dead bodies? What was the plan? You were going to kill so many people, what was the plan? What plan was there as to how or what to do with those bodies of the many people you were going to kill?
MR MARTIN: According to my instructions the corpses would simply remain there countrywide. There would be corpses and the corpses would remain there in order to create that fear.
CHAIRPERSON: But you said: "according to the instructions", were those the instructions that you received, that the corpses of all the people who would be killed had to be left there or was that simply what you thought?
MR MARTIN: That's what I thought.
CHAIRPERSON: Please, then you must not tell us that that was an instruction because then I'm going to ask you who issued the instruction and then the situation will become rather problematic.
MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Chairperson, before Advocate van der Walt proceeds I have two questions in follow-up. Firstly you've said that during the questioning you couldn't determine who were men and who were women and who were children, that it was very dark.
MR MARTIN: Well, I can't remember if everybody was questioned.
MR MALAN: That's not my point. You undertook the questioning?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: But you couldn't really distinguish between men, women and children?
MR MARTIN: It was dark, I couldn't see it.
MR MALAN: But you did have a torch?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR MALAN: Where did you find the torch to ensure afterwards that everybody was dead?
MR MARTIN: With Diedericks.
MR MALAN: Couldn't you use it during questioning?
MR MARTIN: I didn't use the torch at that point.
MR MALAN: The torch wasn't used when you stopped the cars?
MR MARTIN: Yes, it was used when we stopped the cars.
MR MALAN: Very well, and then you've said that you took the road back to Ventersdorp to identify vehicles with black passengers, that you would turn around, take over, issue the signal and stop them at the roadblock, that was the modus operandi. In the dead of night you would take over a car, you'd be driving in opposite directions, the lights of both vehicles would be on but you'd be able to see who were black passengers and who weren't?
MR MARTIN: Well, when one drove past one would clearly be able to distinguish.
MR MALAN: Very well. The issue of the ear, I'd like to follow up this issue, what happened to the ear after it had been presented to Phil Kloppers? You placed it in a plastic bag, gave it to him and placed it in the Mercedes.
MR MARTIN: I assumed that he had given it to General Oelofse and that this would be confirmed.
MR MALAN: When did you find out from Mr Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: He said it to me himself on that evening, that this was the ear for General Oelofse.
MR MALAN: No, the question is, you have said that the ear had been given to General Oelofse, that that had been executed.
MR MARTIN: That was the following day.
MR MALAN: And that Kloppers had confirmed with you that he had done this.
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MR MALAN: When did he confirm this to you on the following day?
MR MARTIN: During the day we gathered and we went to General Oelofse's small holding. He told us to cut our hair short and he told me how he had been horrified by the ear which he had received.
MR MALAN: So therefore you had seen him before you and Kloppers had visited him again the next day? Did you report any information?
MR MARTIN: Yes, I believe so.
MR MALAN: I'm not asking whether you believe it, I want to know whether you had information.
MR MARTIN: It was conveyed to me.
MR MALAN: By whom?
MR MARTIN: By Kloppers.
MR MALAN: When did he tell you this?
MR MARTIN: When we gathered on that day.
MR MALAN: Why did you go to Oelofse again on that afternoon after having reported to him?
MR MARTIN: We were often at Oelofse's small holding. We went there for the purpose of meeting as we always did, to find out what would happen next and he told us to conceal the Mercedes and so forth.
MR MALAN: You described it earlier as an order, wasn't that advice, to get rid of the Mercedes?
MR MARTIN: He did not say it to me on one occasion only, on quite a number of occasions. I suppose one could have considered it as an order.
MR MALAN: No, when I say to you that it was an order, did you understand it as an order, to get rid of the Mercedes?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: Why didn't you do it because you had carried out all instructions?
MR MARTIN: It was pointless to me to conceal the Mercedes.
MR MALAN: Therefore, regarding the order to apprehend ANC/SACP supporters, to identify such supporters and to kill such supporters was an order which you obeyed which you could not ignore.
MR MARTIN: Correct.
MR MALAN: But you received an order to get rid of the Mercedes, something which is quite smaller and you didn't carry it out, but a much greater order to kill people you carried out because of the strength of the order?
MR MARTIN: As I have already stated it seemed pointless to me to get rid of the Mercedes at that point.
MR MALAN: But that's my point.
MR MARTIN: When we received the orders to kill people we were busy with the revolution according to Kloppers.
MR MALAN: And you carried out an order or did you simply believe in the revolution and do it because you believed it would contribute to the revolution?
MR MARTIN: I believed in the revolution and I also carried out the orders which were given to me.
MR MALAN: Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martin, according to the records, I'll try to get the precise page, the age of the child is given as 13, do you have problems with that?
MR MARTIN: No.
CHAIRPERSON: And I should also mention to you that according to the expert evidence given to the Court, this child was shot at a very close range and also that he had, apart from the fact - as I've already said, half his head was blown away or blown off, he had several other shot wounds.
MR MARTIN: I cannot answer to the other wounds but I know he was shot with a shotgun. They were close to him, they were not far from him, maximum of about two metres.
CHAIRPERSON: That can hardly be an accidental shooting.
MR MARTIN: I did not say it was an accident.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Let us adjourn until 2 o'clock, I'm sorry I didn't realise that we are well beyond 1 o'clock. We will start at 2 o'clock.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
DEON MARTIN: (s.u.o.)
MR MALAN: Mr Martin, how long were you in Koevoet?
MR MARTIN: Just a few months.
MR MALAN: How many months?
MR MARTIN: Approximately 6.
MR MALAN: How long do you know Mr Kloppers?
MR MARTIN: I met Mr Kloppers in the beginning of '93.
MR MALAN: How did you meet him?
MR MARTIN: I had a butchery and he was a client of mine.
MR MALAN: Are you house friends?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: What was your relationship as friends?
MR MARTIN: It was good, we played chess together, we braaied together, we had a good relationship.
MR MALAN: Social relationship?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: In this social relationship there was no hierarchy?
MR MARTIN: No.
MR MALAN: You were at the same level?
MR MARTIN: Yes, we were.
MR MALAN: So if you were not under his command then from time to time you would have taken initiative in your social relationship?
MR MARTIN: Yes, for example I would have told him: "Let's play some chess" but I couldn't give just any instruction to him.
MR MALAN: No, I'm not talking about instruction, I'm talking about social: "Let's go to the movies, let's go for a picnic, let's play chess"?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: So he would have taken the same initiatives with you?
MR MARTIN: Definitely.
MR MALAN: There was no relationship where the one was more important than the other?
MR MARTIN: Not as friends, no.
MR MALAN: When you moved around in the AWB structures, would you have argued with him with reference to instructions, would you reason with him?
MR MARTIN: No. In certain instances he would have asked me to discuss something with him but I would not have opposed him in any manner.
MR MALAN: And the AWB relationship, if he gave you an instruction, would you carry it out always?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MR MALAN: You would not question it?
MR MARTIN: Negative.
MR MALAN: Why then did you not carry out the instruction that was given to you by General Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: Which order was this?
MR MALAN: To shave your hair, to take your moustache off?
MR MARTIN: I did that.
MR MALAN: To sell your Mercedes?
MR MARTIN: As I've said before to the Commission, my Mercedes was already identified in this incident and there was no need for me to hide it.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Miss van der Walt, are we taking this as Exhibit A?
MS VAN DER WALT: I would appreciate it as Exhibit A.
CHAIRPERSON: The document entitled
"Fase een"
and then:
"Kommando Offisiers Kurses AWB"
is admitted as Exhibit A, thank you.
MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you.
You were asked about the revolution and you said that you believed that the revolution would continue, that was specifically when you were asked about the Mercedes and soforth, why did you say that you believed that the revolution would continue?
MR MARTIN: At that stage some bombs exploded on the West Rand and in Pretoria itself and there was always something happening and therefore I believed this was part of the revolution.
MS VAN DER WALT: So it did continue? It is not that it would continue but it did continue, bombs exploded in Pretoria and on the West Rand?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And this was under the command of Japie Oelofse?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: And the vehicles, I don't know if it's quite clear but at the scene after the incident occurred, you have testified that somebody shouted: "There's a car approaching" and the vehicle disappeared, what did you do after you heard that a vehicle was approaching?
MR MARTIN: I could see that a vehicle was not approaching. The road was open, I could see there was no vehicle approaching. The Nissan Sentra of Andrč Venter was used to transport these people but we stayed behind with the Mercedes at the scene.
MS VAN DER WALT: Is it at that stage when you picked up the shells?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: You did not leave the scene and come back, you did it at the same stage?
MR MARTIN: That's correct.
MS VAN DER WALT: The order as you interpreted it, it was put to you that: "What would have happened with the bodies if hundreds of people were shot dead", how did you interpret the order when it was said to you that there should be bodies?
MR MARTIN: As I understood him, the Randfontein Commando, our Commando, we should attack a specified target which was the ANC/SACP Alliance and from there onwards we should leave. It was just one blow and then leave, we shouldn't move around.
MS VAN DER WALT: And this order for this particular evening, you had to set up a roadblock, identify a target, kill these persons and then fall back?
MR MARTIN: That's correct, that's how I understood it.
MS VAN DER WALT: Your relationship with Commander Kloppers socially, do you have the same respect or did you show the same respect to him that you showed him as your commander?
MR MARTIN: Yes, there was a measure of respect but not such as when we operated in the hierarchy.
MS VAN DER WALT: Did you look up to him still?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CHAIRPERSON: You referred us to page 12 of Exhibit A, do you remember you are the one who drew our attention to that? What point did you want to make there?
MR MARTIN: It was point (c).
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what point did you want to make there?
MR MARTIN
"The following phase, actions of guerilla fighters simultaneously would be through sabotage, strikes and to put the government of the day into chaos"
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't this a discussion document, you know which the author discusses various methods that can be used to get power and then for example, through revolution?
MR MARTIN: That's correct, that's how I see this document.
CHAIRPERSON: I think you produced this document when I asked you questions about the policy of the AWB. Now, did the AWB then at some point adopt this as it's policy?
MR MARTIN: This is phase one over which we had to write exams. All the officers involved already wrote this exam and they knew the contents of it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I'm sure if you read books Mausetung you'll still find these theories about revolution, how it can be carried out and the like and I think the author of this book is expressing his views as to how power can be grabbed in a State, how you can stage a revolution or whatever, which is not what I'm asking. What I'm asking is, did the AWB adopt as it's policy the killing of people for the purpose of achieving ...[intervention]
MR MARTIN: What I can answer is that the whole phase was adopted as part of exams. I would then say yes, it was the AWB's policy.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know whether you would know that but even members of the security branch when they are trained, they receive lectures to be told how terrorism is launched and all that kind of thing, they are told as a teaching material. Is this not a teaching material, a reading material or is this the policy of the AWB?
MR MARTIN: As I've told you, I believe it's definitely the police because it was written by the General and it was adopted and everybody writes about it. And what I want to say is, the evening it mentioned to us it was revolution, in other words everybody knew what was written in paragraph 3. I then see that this would be adopted by the AWB as policy.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that done? Did you ever attend a meeting where the AWB - I'm asking you these questions because you are not the first member of AWB to apply for amnesty and I want to know from you whether it is your evidence that the AWB - I mean, I know, we know that they would issue militant statements that if the time comes they would be prepared to, if the time comes, they would if the need be, resort to whatever actions. Now, I'm asking you, did the AWB at some point sit down and say: "Now the time has arrived, we are now resorting to military struggle"?
MR MARTIN: All that I know of is that before this incident with us occurred, that we had several discussions with amongst others, General Oelofse, and it was always revolutionary talk and we all wrote this exam, we knew what the revolution was about.
CHAIRPERSON: But this is the material, I'm talking about the material, I understand what you are saying. Possibly at meetings they said: "If the need arises, we will go over to the military struggle" and at any point, was such a resolution taken?
MR MARTIN: In my opinion it was taken yes, it was adopted. This whole phase was incorporated so I am of the opinion yes, definitely it would be the policy of the AWB.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the reason why you think so or that you say so?
MR MARTIN: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You say that because this document - this appears in this document?
MR MARTIN: And that the officers had to write an exam about it, yes.
MR MALAN: Chairperson, if I could just ask here, this document was not dated but if we look at the contents of it, it should be around '85 at the latest because it refers to the President's attempts with the National Council and the UDF's activity. It's not a new document, it's a document from round about '85.
MR MARTIN: It's possible, I cannot five you a definite answer to that.
MR MALAN: When did you see this document for the first time?
MR MARTIN: 1983.
MR MALAN: And you refer to 3(c), tell us how does this act that you apply for amnesty for, how does this fall under (c), under which parts, under which words? ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MR MARTIN: The fact that it says that simultaneously there should be sabotage, assassinations, strikes, so that social chaos and political chaos could be established.
MR MALAN: So this falls under etc? ...[Transcriber's own translation]
MR MARTIN: Yes, I would say that, yes.
MR MALAN: So you base your case on the word: "etc" under 3(c) of this whole document?
MR MARTIN: To put the government into political chaos, yes.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
MR MARTIN: Mr Chairperson, if I could just refer to page 11, the last paragraph
"Middele tot Ons Doel vir die Volkstaat"
he talks about guerillas and guerilla warfare. He says:
"Guerillas are small groups less bound to the strict work methods of any army, more manoeuvrable than an army, less bound to specific area which must be defended or conquered and uses much lighter weaponry. The guerilla is not conditioned therefore to win on a specific battle. If for instance he could attack the enemy, can shoot some of the enemy and escape, he would consider his actions as successful. The victory van die guerilla lays in the successful carrying out of the revolution or the independent war as a whole. ...[Transcriber's own translation]
I wish to bring your attention to this point.
CHAIRPERSON: But the impression one got from your evidence was that this was not be a guerilla-like type of operation, the whole country is to be - that very night, the whole country is supposed to be under revolution, a real conventional type of situation.
MR MARTIN: I see us as groups acting as guerilla groups and I would have believed that nationwide it would have been the same, that the small groups would have acted as guerilla groups and acted as guerilla fighters.
CHAIRPERSON: Mrs van der Walt?
MS VAN DER WALT: No questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Martin, you may stand down.
WITNESS EXCUSED
