Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: You are reminded that you are still under oath, you realise that?

GARY JOHN KRUSER: (s.u.o.)

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, Honourable Members of the Committee, the legal representatives of the objectors came to some arrangement in regard to the sequence in which they will cross-examine. In regard to this particular witness the arrangement is that I will proceed that is now with the leave of the Chairman and the Honourable Members of the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may do so.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRETORIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Kruser, I first want to understand the nature of your application for amnesty to this Committee. Do I understand it correctly that you maintain that there was an attack by the marchers on Shell House on the 28th March 1994?

MR KRUSER: That's correct Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: In the words of Mr Bizos in his address to court is the nature of your application therefore that the shooting may have continued too long and you may have exceeded the bounds of self defence?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Thank you Mr Kruser.

Now, Mr Kruser, am I correct that everything that could be detrimental to the elections, the free and fair elections during April, March - April 1994 was of the utmost importance to you?

MR KRUSER: The elections was very important to me yes and my organisation.

MR PRETORIUS: You would therefore be aware of what the position was that the Zulu King took with reference to the elections as on the 28th March 1994?

MR KRUSER: I am aware of the IFP's position in terms of the election.

MR PRETORIUS: Were you or were you not aware of the position that the Zulu King, the stand that he took with reference to the elections?

MR KRUSER: The information at my disposal was that the King's version was the position of the IFP.

MR PRETORIUS: It is therefore, let me put it to you this way, the King at that stage encouraged people not to participate in the elections because he wanted his position set out in the Constitution, wanted his position entrenched in the Constitution, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I am just aware of the position of the IFP at that stage, I'm not aware of any individual position of the King itself.

MR PRETORIUS: But you just said that the position of the King and the IFP is the same?

MR KRUSER: That's correct as I say it's the position of the IFP, I don't know if it's the King's individual position, I assume they're the same.

CHAIRPERSON: Presumably they were the same to the extent that they were both against the elections but for different reasons?

MR PRETORIUS: I will accept that Mr Chairman.

Now in so far as the particular marchers from Nancyfield is concerned are you aware or do you deny the fact that they were traditional Zulu people?

MR KRUSER: I don't know. I don't know people from Nancyfield Hostel.

MR PRETORIUS: Are you aware of the tradition among the traditional Zulus, that the Indunas in other words the leaders of the Zulus, would call a meeting of their followers and inform them or direct them in so far as the wishes of the Zulu King is concerned?

MR KRUSER: I'm not au fait with Zulu culture.

MR PRETORIUS: I take it therefore that you wouldn't deny it either?

MR KRUSER: I can't, I'm not au fait with any Zulu culture.

MR PRETORIUS: I put it to you that with reference to the objectors that I represent in particular, they were traditional Zulus that were informed at Nancyfield Hostel by the Zulu Indunas that on this particular day, the 28th March 1994, there will be a meeting in support of the Zulu King, point one - and point two, they should attend that meeting. I take it you don't deny that?

MR KRUSER: What I can say is that information that we had at our disposal that the IFP was organising and mobilising people to come to the city to start the anti-election campaign. That's information which was at my disposal - that included Nancyfield Hostel.

MR PRETORIUS: Do you therefore deny the statement that I've just made that the Zulu Indunas called a meeting at Nancyfield Hostel and informed the traditional Zulu people there that there would be a meeting on the 28th March 1994 and that they were supposed to attend this meeting to support the King?

MR KRUSER: I can't deny they were.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Pretorius, maybe for me to be same wavelength with your line of questioning, what do you mean by traditional Zulus?

MR PRETORIUS: I mean people who according to Zulu traditions were loyal to their King and would follow the wishes of their King.

MS KHAMPEPE: Are you therefore saying that these people who were resident of the Nancyfield Hostel?

MR PRETORIUS: I beg your pardon?

MS KHAMPEPE: Were these traditional Zulus you are referring to residents of the Nancyfield Hostel?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes inter alia they are the objectors that I act for.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

MR PRETORIUS: Now, on the 28th March 1994, I want you to understand that what I'm asking you is the knowledge you had on the 28th March 1994, not what you obtained later in reconstruction of what happened. On the 28th March 1994 immediately before you gave the order to shoot, let's take it first the warning shots or the first shots were fired. What convinced you - I want you to relate all the factors that this was an actual attack that is taking place at that moment.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman I think the first and probably one of the most important factors that we received information that the IFP was to attack Shell House with the possibility of killing some of leaders - that was foremost in my mind. The events of the day after coming from Lancet Hall and reports were received from other activities around the...[inaudible] itself. The fact that these marchers were not accompanied by police unlike the other marchers, the fact that these marchers moved in a very different manner, instead of moving they were in my impression stationery and doing some type of chanting at the corner, the fact that gunfire emanated or my impression was that gunfire was emanating from the crowd itself and the impression I got that the shot hit the window to the right of myself, I think all these factors together convinced me that this was an attack being launched both at us and the headquarters of the ANC.

MR PRETORIUS: The information you had received, was that information pertaining to this specific group, in other words that this specific group of people would attack Shell House?

MR KRUSER: The information was to the fact that Inkatha would use the march to attack Shell House. There was no specific group.

MR PRETORIUS: So it was just information in general, not specific information relating to this group?

MR KRUSER: As I said the information was the IFP was going to attack, it didn't make a differentiation between which group, we didn't know how they would plan the attack itself.

MR PRETORIUS: We already heard that various other groups marched past Shell House on that particular day.

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: So according to the information you had, the attacks could also have been launched by these other marchers?

MR KRUSER: That's very correct.

MR PRETORIUS: I put it to you that in so far as the information is concerned that you allegedly received - at the very utmost it could have put you on the guard to be on the look out, in other words to intensify the security etc. just to take care that the march is not used as a decoy to attack Shell House, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't understand your question, could you please repeat it?

MR PRETORIUS: As you did not have any specific information in regard to a specific group of people that would attack Shell House, in other words you didn't have for the instance the time they would attack Shell House, the specific group that would attack Shell House etc. The information you had was of a very general nature or that it could do as far as you as a commander is concerned is to put you on the alert that you must intensify the security and be on your alert so that the march is not used as a decoy for an attack?

MR KRUSER: The fact that we never had details and the nature of the attack made the situation more intense and it meant we had to treat every group of marchers which passed as a potential group to attack Shell House.

MR PRETORIUS: But it also meant that you could not now shoot at any group of marchers that passed Shell House because you didn't have any information that this particular group would attack Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: In so far as Lancet Hall is concerned am I correct that you took the word of Mr Africa Khumalo and or other security guards at Lancet Hall that there was an attack on Shell House - on Lancet Hall, at least?

MR KRUSER: That is correct, that's what we discussed.

MR PRETORIUS: Did you consider the possibility that they were not telling the truth to you?

MR KRUSER: No I was not.

MR PRETORIUS: In so far as the other events of the day is concerned that you refer to in particular what other events of the day did you have in mind?

MR KRUSER: As I said yesterday we received the report that policemen were shooting at marchers from the T.E.C. building in town. We received updates of marchers causing havoc through city from our surveillance unit in town. We received radio reports from 702 and other radios about the destruction caused in town, the warnings for people to stay in their buildings - it was dangerous in town, so I think we had a combination of reports filtering to our office that day.

MR PRETORIUS: In so far as radio reports are concerned are you relying on the radio reports, that is the transcript of the radio reports as between the South African Police members?

MR KRUSER: No, I said radio reports, 702 and other radio stations, commercial radio stations.

MR PRETORIUS: All these factors that you mentioned now, they were all general aspects and the same thing applied or the same situation applied as would apply in regard to the information you had. In other words it would at best cause you to be more alert but it would not be a reason to shoot at a specific group of people?

MR KRUSER: No we'd have to make an analysis of every group that passed and then who didn't pose a threat in terms of attack we would not shoot.

MR PRETORIUS: In other words, what the most important aspect would be, would be the nature of the marchers or the attitude or what they did themselves. That would be the actual convincing or the reasons why you would give the order to shoot?

MR KRUSER: It would be a combination of things, you can't look at one thing in isolation, every march would be analysed with all the circumstances prevailing at that given time.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, the radio reports would have been applicable to all the marchers, your attitude to all the marchers would remain the same, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I said you cannot isolate one incident from the other you have to take the combination of all those factors which happened at the time of the incident, you cannot make a separation when you make an analysis of the event. Each march we had to take into effect all the factors that would be applicable at that given time. You cannot separate them at any given time.

MR PRETORIUS: Am I correct, if I put it to you that what actually convinced you to shoot was because you perceived these marchers to be different from the other marchers, point one and point two, that you perceived that shots were being fired from them?

MR KRUSER: As I said earlier it was a combination of all those factors I mentioned earlier.

MR PRETORIUS: During your evidence before Honourable Judge Nugent at the inquest, you repeatedly stated that your attitude was that you would only shoot if the marchers shoot at you and they pose a threat to you or to Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I think if you read my evidence, will show I say it's a combination of all those factors and I was very insistent at that in the trial.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I've read your evidence carefully, I can read a number of passages to you. For instance on page 2734 where you were asked: "and what would be the sign that an attack was now commenced, how would you know that an attack had commenced?" "If people started shooting at our security."

Are you saying that if any shooting started they would then fire back? "If shooting came to our side we would fire back, my lord."

MR KRUSER: I think you must look at my evidence more deeply. If anyone shoots that's an isolated incident, I also say in my evidence, that specific time there's a group of factors which I had to take in account. Someone shooting at me I think I have a right to defend myself, shoot back, that's a different incident itself. So I think we should look at the incident itself where I explained to the learned Judge all those factors had taken account and when he asks me if someone shoots, I'll shoot back. That's a separate incident, it doesn't mean that I would not shoot if someone shoots me back if the other factors were not there. But I'm saying that this specific incident there was group of factors which made me decide that this was an attack being launched at us and I stick to that which I told the learned Judge.

MR PRETORIUS: Now, as I've explained to you and you counsel will correct me if I'm wrong. You mentioned the other factors as well and in view of the fact that you mentioned the factors, which you've mentioned, the question specifically was asked to you which I read out to you just now and that is, what would be the sign that attack has now commenced and how would you know that an attack had commenced and your reply was "if people started shooting at our security." Do you stand by that?

MR KRUSER: If anyone shoots I'd consider that attack, but the incident itself involved all the other factors I mentioned to the learned Judge.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, this was with reference to this specific incident and you said with reference to this specific incident that the sign would be when people start shooting at you, then you would fire back?

MR KRUSER: I remember my evidence to be that there was a group of factors, I think I mentioned to the learned Judge there were a group of factors. If anyone shot at me I would also consider that to be one of the factors which would include attack.

CHAIRPERSON: You might cut this short, I think what is sought to be obtained from you was this - you had this particular group in front of Shell House, had nobody in that group fired a shot at Shell House would you still have ordered your friends, your people to fire at them? In other words, what triggered your decision to fire, was it the fact that somebody had fired at you first?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, this is what I'm trying to explain, I think that the shooting is only one of the factors and this as I understand because if they shot and ran away it would be very different to them shooting and charging towards us. So...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Shooting and charging towards you?

MR KRUSER: I think it is very difficult to separate because every incident you have to analyse all the factors, you can't separate the factors at any given stage because there were other marchers and some of the behaviour was similar to other marchers but there were other things which was not involved. The information I had wasn't enough to shoot so I say we have to take the whole package in terms of how I saw it for me to come to that decision.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I want to refer you to another passage of your evidence before the inquest court. You were asked specifically then with reference to the time when you would start shooting, because you mentioned all the other factors and you said now people are approaching etc. then you were asked "At what stage" my lord - I refer to page 2738 from approximately line 6 - "At what stage do you start shooting now?"

"That is the judgement you have to make at that given time"

"But at what stage?"

Your answer was: "That is the judgement you had to make at that given time."

You were then asked: "But at what stage, tell me, do you start shooting then before they get to the front door or when they get to the front door?"

And your reply is: "When they start shoot, when your life starts becoming threatened, my lord."

Do you read that Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: I read it.

MR PRETORIUS: Do you stand by that?

MR KRUSER: That is correct, I don't see any contradiction with that with my other answer.

MR PRETORIUS: So I then put it to you that the most important factor that one gathers out of all this is that when the marchers start shooting, when they attack you and your life is threatened, that is what we get out of all these passages?

CHAIRPERSON: The most important factor - there were other important factors as well.

MR PRETORIUS: What I mean, Mr Chairman, is that there may have been factors such as the reports such as information that he had but the crucial thing that caused him to give the order was the fact that he perceived that he was shot at or Shell House was shot at.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] there were other factors that there was a surge forward towards Shell House - people surging towards Shell House, is that an important factor?

MR PRETORIUS: We do not accept that, we will get to that at a later stage but thank you.

Mr Kruser then if you get back to the various passages, the final thing that convinced you, that is now the attack and that you've got to shoot, was the fact that shooting emanated from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: As I stated earlier, I said it's the whole combination of all those factors that made me come to that decision, I cannot separate them. If there was another incident where people just shot, I might have acted differently, I stand by my point of view that the combination of points I mentioned earlier, was the reason why I gave the order to shoot.

MR PRETORIUS: Let me just finally ask you and then I think it will settle the matter. You still stand by the passages that I have quoted for you of your previous evidence?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, the shot that hit the window close to where you and the other ANC guards were stationed, as far as the time factor is concerned, did that shot struck the window when you heard the very first burst of gunfire?

MR KRUSER: That was my impression at that stage, yes.

MR PRETORIUS: In various pages that I can refer you to during your evidence at the inquest you take it as a fact that the very first burst of fire that was fired at that particular time, was automatic gunfire that emanated from the crowd and that this bullet struck your head or the shots immediately close to your head or in the vicinity of your head, in the shops - is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, that's my recollection of the events, however Mr Chairman, I also have read the ballistic evidence now subsequently which tells me that it happened differently but on that given day and subsequent to that day, that's how I saw it, that's my understanding of the events and that's my impression what happened on that day.

MR PRETORIUS: The important thing is that the ballistic evidence prove, Mr Kruser, is that the bullet that struck the shop was actually fired by Mr Eddie Khumalo, your guard which was positioned practically next to you with an AK47?

MR KRUSER: That is correct, that is what the ballistics says.

MR PRETORIUS: It is therefore clear, Mr Kruser, that the very first person of automatic gunfire that was fired was not fired by the crowd, it did not emanate from the crowd but was fired by Mr Eddie Khumalo, the ANC guard standing practically next to you?

MR KRUSER: There's not evidence to prove that.

MR PRETORIUS: Well Mr Kruser, you only testified about one burst of automatic gunfire at that stage and we know now that the bullet that struck the window came from Mr Eddie Khumalo so the only burst of gunfire at that stage would have been that of an automatic rifle, being an AK47 fired by Mr Eddie Khumalo?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, it's very difficult for me, I can only recollect what I understand to happen on that day. We are dealing with seconds we're dealing with lots of firearms around us, we're dealing with a very hostile crowd surging forward, it's very difficult for me to accede to something I don't know, I can only recall what I saw on that day and at the same time I can accept the ballistic evidence put before me. I can't change - that's what I saw on that day, it might not be correct, I'm human, but that's what I saw on that day and that's my understanding of what happened on that day.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kruser, can you still remember how far Mr Khumalo was standing from you?

MR KRUSER: We were in the immediate proximity together, within a metre of each other.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kruser, was Mr Khumalo in front of you or were you on the same line in such a way that you could see him and observe him at all material times prior to your order?

MR KRUSER: Mr Khumalo was lying flat on the ground, I was standing back behind him, up with my - facing the crowd.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you Mr Pretorius.

MR PRETORIUS: Thank you.

Mr Kruser I want to read from you from page 2746 of the inquest court record, it reads as follows, it's at the bottom from approximately line twenty six. I can just place you in position, this is immediately after the policeman ran back towards you according to your evidence and then ran away. You were asked then: "What was the first thing that then happened, the first thing you remember?"

Your answer: "Almost immediately by that time, just as they were about to leave shots rang out from the group."

"Now, was it automatic fire or single shots?"

Your answer: "There was definitely automatic rifle."

It continues on page 2747 and you were asked then:

MR TIPP: Read in Mr Chairman, it's "fire" and not "rifle"

MR PRETORIUS: I beg your pardon. Continued on the next page you were asked: "Was it your impression at the time that those shots were aimed in your direction on the corner?"

Those shots referring to the automatic fire that's being debated at that stage.

Your answer: "My lord, one shot went into the window above me, that gave me the impression that they were aiming their fire at us."

MR KRUSER: That's my recollection of the events, Mr Chair.

MR PRETORIUS: You refer there only to one burst of automatic fire and it's quite clear that from that burst of fire, a shot struck the window just above you?

MR KRUSER: I think I also say there's a possibility the fire could have also been there.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't hear that, just say it again?

MR KRUSER: I think I also say in the statement that there was other - there could have, possibility of fire could also have been there.

MR PRETORIUS: Which statement, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: May I have the page again, can I have the page?

MR PRETORIUS: The page that I've read from you now is page -starts from page 2746 and carries on on page 2747.

MR KRUSER: The question is posed: "And was there fire, apart from the automatic fire?'" I said: "There could have been" it was difficult for me to make a judgement now on

that.

MR PRETORIUS: When you were however questioned and asked was it your impression at the time that those shots were aimed in your direction, those shots referred to the automatic fire that you heard and it referred - and you then testified that that is the shot from that automatic fire, a shot struck the window.

MR KRUSER: That's my impression of the events Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: I then put it to you Mr Kruser that it is very clear that the very first shots that were fired that morning was fired by Mr Eddie Khumalo who was practically next to you or immediately in front of you and it was fired with an AK47?

MR KRUSER: That is not my recollection, Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: Or do you dispute the ballistic evidence now?

MR KRUSER: I don't dispute the ballistic evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Then you ex...[intervention]

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't say who fired first does it? I can't imagine ballistics evidence being able to say who fired first, when.

MR PRETORIUS: This witness testified Mr Chairman, that there was a burst of automatic fire that was the very shots that were fired on that day and he deducted that those - that shots were fired at him because of the shot that struck the window. Now if that was the very first shot, that were fired, Mr Chairman and the ballistics states that the shot that struck the window was fired actually by Mr Eddie Khumalo who fired with an AK47 which is common cause, it would then mean that the very first shots that were fired was fired by Mr Eddie Khumalo which was immediately in front of him, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I don't know whether you have a copy of the record before you? May I just read out what is said?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos I think you can when you re-examine.

Yes please.

CHAIRPERSON: It's being put to you that the very first shot that was fired that day was with an automatic rifle that was fired by Eddie Khumalo, it was that burst of fire that damaged the window at that time, at that moment. That's what's being put to you because that is what appears on the record.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, as I say, I can just give my impression of that day - it's clear even from the ballistic evidence, my impression that day wasn't in fact of what happened, I can't say whether that was the first, maybe the fire was simultaneously, I don't know, I can only say what I recollected after the event itself, I can't now - I can accede that the ballistics says the shot was from Eddie Khumalo but I can't concede anything else, they must provide me with evidence to say I must concede to anything else.

CHAIRPERSON: What you're really contending is that whatever is said in the transcript of the inquest proceedings in so far as your evidence is concerned, that you abide by that, is that what you're?

MR KRUSER: What I'm saying, what I said there is what when I recollect the events and that's what I understood happened.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, you also accept now that not a single shot by the marchers were fired in the direction of the ANC guards where they had positioned themselves on the corner of King George and Plein Streets.

MR KRUSER: The ballistics says no shots hit the building anywhere in our vicinity but it did hit other parts of the building.

MR PRETORIUS: And none of the guards were injured or shot Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: So if we take it correct together that there were no shots that hit any building or structure in the vicinity of the guards and the guards themselves were not injured or shot, then there were no shots that could be found and you also accepted that in your supplementary affidavit because you there even went to far as to state that you accept that the shots were directed elsewhere?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Now Mr Kruser, according to your evidence in the inquest court, you only gave the order to fire warning shots after the bullet struck the window in the vicinity of the ANC guards, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, if you could not even hear or even now testify to the fact that we know now is established is a fact that before you gave the warning shots or the order to fire the warning shots, Mr Khumalo who was directly in front of you, fired shots?

MR KRUSER: I can only say what I recollect on that day, there's no evidence to say that it was the first shot, I don't - give me evidence to say that it was the first shot. I can only say what I recollect on that day.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I did not even refer to the first shot now, I referred to a stage before you gave the order to fire warning shots, do you understand that?

MR KRUSER: I understand that.

MR PRETORIUS: Now if you could not at the inquest at court when you testified there or not even now recollect or testify as a fact that Mr Eddie Khumalo shot or fired shots with his AK47 before you gave the order to fire warning shots, how can you give evidence to the fact that shots emanated from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I can only give evidence to what I recollect on that day, I can't give evidence for anything else, that's what I saw on that day, that's my impression what happened and that's the evidence I gave at the inquest and that's the evidence I can give to this Committee. However, there is objective evidence which doesn't confer with my recollection of the events and I accept that but I can't testify to anything else.

MR PRETORIUS: But Mr Kruser what I am testing is what value can one place on your evidence that shots were emanated from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: What I'm saying is, under that intensity, if I speak with my colleagues, every single one of us have a different impression of what happened in those few seconds, so I don't see anything I've said about the fact is that what I saw, that's what I saw that's what I'm going to testify it to, I can't change my testimony because that's my recollection.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, to cut it short, do you accept that if you cannot even recollect or give evidence to the fact that shots were fired from an AK47 one metre in front of you where you can even see the person in front of you with an AK47 - I put it to you then that one can place no value whatsoever on your evidence that shots emanated from the crowd which was at that ...[intervention]

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there is no evidence that Mr Khumalo was in front of him, he was near him on the ground, not in front of him, Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: The evidence was that he was on the ground in front of him. Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Kruser, I will then repeat my statement. Do you accept then that if you cannot even give evidence or testify to the fact that Mr Eddie Khumalo, who was on the ground in front of you in a position where you even could see him, shot or fired shots with an AK47? One cannot place any value on your evidence that shots emanated from the crowd.

MR KRUSER: The first point, Mr Chairman, is that Eddie Khumalo was flat, my attention was at the crowd, I was in command I had to make an assessment of what was happening from the crowd so I would not be able to see him directly.

The second point is, I can only - and I want to reiterate -I can only testify to what I recollect happened on that day. Might not be the true facts but that is my recollection and I can only tell the Committee of what I understood to have happened on that day.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, we will then have to take it one step further. Do you stand by your evidence in at the inquest court that you never observed a firearm with this particular marchers prior to the shooting taking place?

MR KRUSER: That's my evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Besides the fact that a shot struck the window next to you what else could give you the impression that shots were fired from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: Do you want my distinct impression that gunfire was emanating from the crowd?

MR PRETORIUS: That must have been based then on what you heard only?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, my recollection is that the bullet struck the window next to me, that's how I recollected the events.

MR PRETORIUS: Now we now know that you didn't even hear the shot that was fired one metre away from you or you perceived that shot to be fired by the crowd which was in fact at that stage 50 metres from you? How can we rely, on what else can we rely or could you indicate to us why can you say that the shots emanated from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: I can only re-iterate, that's my recollection of the events, I can't reconstruct the events any differently, the only thing that can change - tell me that things are different - is the ballistic evidence, tells me what I saw did not happen - I can't recollect something - I can't reconstruct something which I never saw. This is how I saw it, this is what I told the inquest, that's what I'm going to tell the Committee - I stick by that evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand your evidence to really mean that you have a distinct impression that gunfire did emanate from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, that's my recollection - that's my recollection of the events Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: But we do understand it as well that you gained that impression because of the fact that a bullet struck the window in front of you or just in immediate vicinity and otherwise, all that you had to gain impression from is what you hear?

MR KRUSER: I heard gunfire emanating from the crowd, that's what I recall.

MR PRETORIUS: But at the same time we now know that you say that you didn't even hear the fire by Mr Khumalo immediately in front of you - you didn't even hear that?

MR KRUSER: My impression that took place after I gave the order?

MR PRETORIUS: After or before you gave the order.

MR KRUSER: After I gave the order, that's my recollection of the events.

MR PRETORIUS: Your evidence in the inquest was - and that is what you said you stand by now - is that that happened before you gave the order.

MR KRUSER: Eddie Khumalo's gunfire after I gave the order.

MR PRETORIUS: The bullet that struck the window near your head, that happened before the order?

MR KRUSER: That's my recollection.

MR PRETORIUS: Then we come back to it Mr Kruser that that means that you didn't even hear that rifle that was fired before you gave the order?

MR KRUSER: I can just reiterate, I can only tell this Committee what I recollect on that day. The evidence now shows that it happened different and I accept that - but I can only reiterate what I saw and recollect on that day, I can't come to another finding, that's what I saw, my legal attorney showed me the ballistics, explained it to me and I understand that my recollections isn't a true reflection of what happened on that day, I accept that but the only thing I can testify to is what I recollected on that day - I can't testify to anything else. The evidence might prove differently and I accept that.

MR PRETORIUS: ...[inaudible] then that you accept in the first place now that no shots were fire by the crowd in the direction of the guards?

MR KRUSER: There was no gun, there was no evidence to prove that gunfire came to our direction, ja.

MR PRETORIUS: Secondly that you accept that the gunfire, or some of the gunfire you heard prior to you giving an order to shoot warning shots actually emanated from the ANC guards.

MR KRUSER: That possibility is there.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, not the possibility, the fact.

MR KRUSER: That's there, the ballistic shows it, ja.

MR PRETORIUS: And I therefore put it to you that you had based on the shooting that you perceived that day is now factually proved - you had no reason to give an order to shoot because there was no shots fired at the ANC guards at that stage.

MR KRUSER: I don't agree with you.

MR PRETORIUS: Must I now take it that you still maintain that there were shots fired in your direction?

MR KRUSER: What I say, what I say to the Committee and I say again, I testified in the inquest there was a combination of factors that gave me - that led me to take a decision to give an order to repel the attackers. That is my recollection - I say again the ballistic evidence and the medical evidence suggests that it happened differently - I still maintain that's what I recollect and I accept that the medical evidence is different but I can't reconstruct another event, that's how I saw it, that's what I can testify to this Committee.

MR PRETORIUS: It then means that we must now evaluate your evidence that this crowd surged forward. Exactly what do you mean by that, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: As I tried to say earlier, I took the combination of all those factors into account when I gave the order to shoot, I said after the warning shots the crowd surged forward, they moved at a much faster pace, the chanting became louder, gunfire intensified - that's what's the combination -that's what I meant by surging forward.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, even before you gave the order to fire warning shots, you testified that the crowd surged forward, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I testified the crowd started moving forward. After the warning shots that the warning shot had the opposite effect of what I intended to do - it made the crowd move much faster and that's the evidence I gave.

MR PRETORIUS: So initially before the warning shots were fired they merely moved forward, it's only after the warning shots were fired that they then started moving faster, is that ...[intervention]?

MR KRUSER: My impression initially the crowd was standing and chanting at the corner with this war dance as was explained to me - they then started moving forward. After the gunshot - the warning shots - they seemed to surge forward much faster and gunfire seemed to intensify at that state. That's my evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Did it happen practically simultaneously, the two facts that the gunfire intensified and the people started moving faster?

MR KRUSER: We're talking in a matter of seconds, it's very -they just - we're talking about a matter of a few seconds and it's very difficult to put it all in different types of boxes - this is a combination of events which I saw happening it's very difficult to put them into every second - we're talking about split seconds here when these things happen, we're not talking about a long event.

MR PRETORIUS: Is it therefore a possibility that the gunfire intensified and immediately thereafter, the marchers started surging forward or moving fast forward?

MR KRUSER: I think anything is possible, I can only say what my impression I gained on that day, anything is possible. If there's facts that, I can accept that - but I can only tell you what I recollect on that day, I can't change my evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, where did you perceive that gunfire that intensified came from?

MR KRUSER: My impression was from the back, at the back of the crowd at the corner of King George and - what's it - De Villiers Street - on the left side of the crowd, that's what I understood it to come.

MR PRETORIUS: You at that stage knew that there were ANC guards on the parapet standing right at the corner of King George and De Villiers Street?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, I knew there were people on the parapet - I could not see them.

MR PRETORIUS: You also well knew that they were armed?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: How could you distinguish at all between fire that was fired by that ANC guards and fire fired from the crowd, they were coming from exactly the same direction?

MR KRUSER: I had to make a decision with split seconds there.

MR PRETORIUS: That does not answer the question, Mr Kruser.

How could you distinguish?

MR KRUSER: I had seconds to make a decision and the decision I came to that gunfire was coming from the crowd, that's what I saw, that's how I recollect it.

MR PRETORIUS: In which direction was that gunfire fired, what was your impression?

MR KRUSER: I think I testified earlier I thought that it was in my direction.

MR PRETORIUS: Now we again know that that is incorrect as well, do you accept that?

MR KRUSER: What's incorrect?

MR PRETORIUS: That that gunfire was in your direction - as a fact it wasn't?

MR KRUSER: There's no evidence to support that as correct.

MR PRETORIUS: The ballistic evidence again, Mr Kruser, indicate that at no stage they could get any marks on any structure anywhere near you of shots that had been fired and no ANC guards were injured. So that indicates that shots weren't fired at you?

MR KRUSER: Shots were not fired at me but there is ballistic evidence that shots were fired into Shell House.

MR PRETORIUS: The only shots that were fired into Shell House was fired at the parapet, I'm referring to by the marchers, I'm not referring to by the ANC guards themselves, were fired at the parapet on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR PRETORIUS: That still means, Mr Kruser, that you were incorrect - those shots were not fired at you or the guards which was stationed at the corner of King George and Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: Ballistic evidence proves that, that's correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Right, now taking that out of the way now, we know now that is out of the way, how could you at all distinguish between shots fired in the vicinity of the corner of King George and De Villiers Street by marchers and shots fired by ANC guards which were also in the vicinity of King George and De Villiers Street, how could you at all do that?

MR KRUSER: When I was on the corner, I didn't have the privilege of having ballistic evidence. I heard gunshot, I recollect hearing gunshots, I was under the impression that the gunshot hit the window next to me and that's the basis on which I made my decision among with other factors. I didn't have the benefit of ballistic evidence which we have now. I can concede that now we have ballistic evidence. When I was on that corner I had to make decision in split seconds and I made that decision and that was my belief it was a correct decision to make at that time and that's my evidence here.

Ballistics proves me wrong, I accept that.

MR PRETORIUS: Still begs the question and I put it to you again that if you couldn't even distinguish between a shot fired a metre in front of you by an AK47 and shots fired from the crowd, it was impossible for you and you could never even attempt to distinguish between shots fired by the ANC guards on the corner of King George and De Villiers Streets at the marchers and shots allegedly being fired by the marchers on the guards, it's impossible for you?

MR KRUSER: I was a commander, I had to make an assessment of the situation, I had to give instructions and that's what I did.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, you still didn't answer my question.

MR LAX: Perhaps I can help you Mr Pretorius.

Mr Kruser, could you or could you not distinguish between where the shots were coming from based on your recollection. Not on the ballistics evidence but what you recollect at the time? Did you or didn't you distinguish between the different shots, just give us a quick answer on that and then we can perhaps move on on this issue.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, at that stage my recollection is the shots were emanating from the crowd, that's my recollection.

MR LAX: Are you saying you couldn't distinguish or you could distinguish?

MR KRUSER: My evidence is that I, from I recollect on that given day, the impression I got the shots were emanating from the crowd, that's my recollection. I never had doubt that it was coming from the crowd at that stage.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, I just want to place on record I'm still of the opinion that the witness doesn't answer the question - I will leave that for argument however at a later stage. It won't serve a purpose to repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that it's not that he's not going to answer your question, you can spend another hour questioning him and he'll tell you that I am talking about what my recollections are and he'll go on saying that each time you put the question to him so I don't think it will take us very far.

MR PRETORIUS: As it pleases the court.

Now, Mr Kruser, if I now state the following facts to you, I want you to - and I state it to you as a fact - I want you to say what objectively evidence you can give to deny this. I state it to you as a fact that the first bullets or fire that was fired on that day was fired by the ANC guards more in particular Mr Eddie Khumalo who was on the corner of King George and Plein Street. Do you deny it?

MR KRUSER: I'm willing to concede it's a possibility but I don't think there's any evidence to prove that.

MR PRETORIUS: What have you to state that that is incorrect?

MR KRUSER: What I'm saying is my recollection is there was gunfire emanating from the crowd but I accede if Eddie Khumalo shot first and that's not my impression that's a possibility.

MR PRETORIUS: Secondly that the next shot, if we accept now for the moment your evidence, I'm just stating we accept your evidence that the crowd at some stage moved faster forward. The second thing is that the guards at the top of the parapet of Shell House then shot at the marchers.

MR KRUSER: I think I testified in the inquest that was a possibility.

MR PRETORIUS: That even if the marchers did move faster forward it was all in an attempt to avoid being shot by the ANC guards on the parapet?

MR KRUSER: I think I testified in the inquest that was a possibility, I don't know the facts of that.

MR PRETORIUS: That the marchers that fired at the parapet at the ANC guards there, only fired because they were fired at by the ANC guards.

MR KRUSER: There's no evidence to prove that.

MR PRETORIUS: There was an independent witness who testified that he saw a marcher with an AK47 firing at the ANC guards on the parapet only after they fired first. So there are evidence to that effect but what have you got to state that that is incorrect?

MR KRUSER: I'm not aware of that evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: But what evidence have you got to state that that is incorrect, that scenario?

MR KRUSER: All I'm saying, I can't say we shot first, there's evidence, in the ballistic report there was lot of gunfire, lot of guns amongst the marchers itself, much more than amongst the ANC guards.

MR PRETORIUS: If what I've stated to you now is correct, the only inference one then can draw is that the ANC guards fired at the marchers without the marchers even attacking Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That's not my recollection of the events.

MR PRETORIUS: Now not if it's your recollection, but I'm asking you if we accept the evidence that as I've stated to you we accept that evidence, do we also then accept that there was no attack on Shell House and the guards fired without being attacked?

MR KRUSER: There's also evidence in the inquest from an independent witness that the marchers were attacking the guards.

MR PRETORIUS: Do you refer to Mr Von Eggerdy?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, I read his evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Even if you accept the evidence of Mr Von Eggerdy, Mr Von Eggerdy testified that the very first shots that were fired was fired by the guards on the corner of King George and Plein Street and those shots were fired directly at the crowd and they fell on top of him and even past him immediately after those shots were fired?

MR KRUSER: I accept that that's what he testified to, he heard gunshots coming from us first.

MR PRETORIUS: So even if we accept his evidence, even if he had the impression that they were attacking something we would get to that later, the shots that were fired still were fired by the ANC guards themselves first at the marchers and there were no warning shots, they were fired directly at the marchers, do you accept his evidence?

MR KRUSER: I can just say my recollection is there was warning shots, I gave the order for warning shots, warning shots were fired by V.J. Rama and that's how I recollect events.

MR PRETORIUS: But then now you've repeatedly also accepted that your recollection has been proven wrong?

MR KRUSER: There's objective evidence to say things didn't happen how I saw, as how I saw it, but that's how I saw it.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, how far were the marchers from the guards at the corner of King George and Plein Street when you gave the order to repel the marchers, in other words, not to the warning shots, to repel the marchers?

MR KRUSER: I think my evidence in the inquest after seeing the map, it was about 40 metres by the pharmacy.

MR PRETORIUS: For the record purpose, you originally testified that they were 15 to 20 metres from you, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct my lord, when I drew the statement I was sitting in the office of my attorneys and when recollecting it seemed much closer but I knew it was at the pharmacy. When I saw the map I pointed to the pharmacy and according to the scale map the pharmacy was 40 metres so the impression in a lawyer's office and a real scale map and I rectified that in front of the learned Judge in the inquest.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, in the inquest you first pointed out in the court as well, how far they were away from you before we got to the fact that I cross-examined you on the exact distances, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's right I pointed the back of the court if I remember correctly.

MR PRETORIUS: So just for the record purposes, your recollection was proven wrong in that respect as well?

MR KRUSER: I accept there's many of my recollection which is not correct, but that's what I recollect on that day.

MR PRETORIUS: As a fact we know now that the pharmacy you refer to is situated practically on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: It's 40 metres away from the corner of Plein Street.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, please answer the question. I referred you to the corner of King George and De Villiers Street and I stated to you that that pharmacy is situated practically on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street.

MR KRUSER: It's not on the corner.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Pretorius, we're looking at a - we were given a diagram page 254 Bundle B, from that diagram it's clear that the pharmacy is towards the middle of the block. Granted, closer to De Villiers Street than Plein Street, but it's certainly not on the corner, it's the third shop from the corner.

MR PRETORIUS: Honourable Member, this map was drawn at a later stage, it was not the position as on the date of the 28th March 1994. At that stage the pharmacy was situated on, practically on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street. There is video material available which is available on video 34 and if one looks at that video material it was clear that the pharmacy was situated on the corner.

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, can I confirm that that is correct - that was drawn up by an architect at the time of the inquest in 1997 and there really to give a layout of the streets and the location of the pillars the pharmacy was not in precisely that position.

MR LAX: Thanks for that explanation.

MR PRETORIUS: I've also now got a photo in my possession which was one of the exhibits which was handed in at the inquest which indicate that the pharmacy is on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street if the Chairman and Honourable Members would have - would want to have a look at it I could now present it to them?

MR LAX: No, I'm happy, I accept that I was just confused by this subsequent plan.

CHAIRPERSON: You accept that the pharmacy was practically at the corner of King George and De Villiers Street?

MR KRUSER: That's probably correct Mr Chairman, I think my evidence in the inquest was, when I was shown this scale map -that's where I pointed to where the marchers were more or less in terms of that scale map, that was my evidence. I was not referring to where the pharmacy was then, they showed me the map and I pointed to the learned judge that this where they were more or less.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kruser, it still begs the question, do you now accept that the pharmacy was situated as on the 28th March 1994, practically on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: And that you now accept that the marchers were in the vicinity of that pharmacy when you gave the order to shoot?

MR KRUSER: I think I tried to say when in the inquest the map was shown to me I pointed out to the learned Judge round about the pharmacy on that map, the specific map in front of the Committee, where the marchers are when I gave the order to shoot. I didn't say where the pharmacy was then, I said on that map, that's where I drew the deduction from. I was not referring to the 28th I was referring to the map on the pharmacy in terms of the distance.

MR PRETORIUS: We'll get back to that later but then even what according to what you state now, it was then explained by you that everything was measured, that the marchers were at least 40 metres away from you when you gave the order to repel them?

MR KRUSER: Based on that scale I acceded to that in the inquest.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, you at the inquest weren't afforded the opportunity, I'm now going to afford you the opportunity to explain why none of the marchers that were shot and killed were shot from the front. They were either shot from the back or from the side.

MR KRUSER: I think firstly, maybe I'm corrected, it's not -that's not entirely true. One - there is evidence in terms of the ballistics - one of the marchers could have been shot from the front - that's the first thing. I think even in my application for amnesty I accept that we probably fired for much longer than what I thought we fired and we could probably have ceased the fire much earlier. I accept that's probably the reason why they were shot in their back.

MR PRETORIUS: Can you give an indication which marcher you referred to that was shot from the front?

MR KRUSER: I don't have the medical evidence in front of me but there's one marcher which was shot with an AK from the front and the possibility from the ballistic evidence is that there was gunfire from the top of Nando's building opposite Shell House, there's even evidence that there was gunfire, AK gunfire from the top of Nando's so there is that possibility.

MR PRETORIUS: Do you even from what you state now accept that none of the people killed were shot from the front facing the corner of King George and Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: Besides the one, I accept ja.

MR PRETORIUS: If the Chairman and Committee Members could just bear a moment with me, I just want to look at the ballistic reports?

Mr Kruser, the person - there was only one person that was shot with an AK47 that was on the corner of King George and De Villiers Street. He had three shots, these are the shots as described by the ballistic people - first one is an 8 cm. gaping penetrating wound - you understand what a penetrating wound is?

MR KRUSER: I do.

MR PRETORIUS: With abraded edges over the anterior aspect of the right thigh. Do you understand what the anterior aspect is Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: Maybe you should explain to me.

MR PRETORIUS: Then there is a second wound which is also in the right anterior auxiliary line and that wound is also in the leg and the third wound is a 2 cm. over penetrating wound with a rim of abrasion over the postural lateral aspect of the right thigh.

Mr Chairman, I will then later refer to the specific medical evidence, the evidence actually was that what they reconstructed that that person was first shot in the thigh that then he fell and he then received a very specific wound through the body but the actual evidence was that he was actually shot from the back through the thigh first and thereafter he was shot as indicated.

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to intrude in my learned friend's examination but it may assist him to refer to pages 6744 and 6745 of the record which dealt with the deceased who may possibly have been shot from the front.

MR PRETORIUS: I'm indebted to my learned friend, I will later on then refer to that, I haven't got that particular bundle in front of me but be that as it may it's not particularly of concern.

The fact is then, besides that one have you got any explanation why none of the deceased were shot from the front and by the people or the ANC guards on the corner of King George and Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: I accede that the medical evidence shows in all probability that we shot much longer than we should have shot.

MR PRETORIUS: It may also show Mr Kruser, the other inference one can draw from that is that the people were really shot only - and the shots were only fired at the people after they started running away, that there was no real attack on Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I can't concur with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Because they were shot at the back there was no attack on Shell House?

MR PRETORIUS: Because none of the people were shot from the front Mr ....[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You then said there was no attack on Shell House? These events are fast moving events, people don't stand still isn't it? They move in all kinds of directions and the fact that the man was shot from behind might that at that time he had turned away from the movement towards Shell House so I don't think that you can come to any scientific conclusion that there was no attack or no surge on Shell House at that time. The suggestion made by this witness is that there is one possible explanation why people were shot at the back was because maybe the firing continued longer than it ought to have, in other words it was at a time when people had turned back, they were moving away in the opposite direction. Now that's a possibility isn't it?

MR PRETORIUS: I accept that Mr Chairman, but I also suggested another possibility to him so all I....[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] stage, without detailed evidence we have to accept these are possibilities.

MR PRETORIUS: I accept it on that very basis but all the possibilities we will weigh out at a later stage, Mr Chairman, I just want to clarify that that is a further possibility as is the possibility as set out by the witness.

Besides your impression that the crowd surged forward, what else was there in respect of this particular group of marchers that convinced you that they attacked Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I think I testified to that earlier and I will repeat again, I had information at my disposal that Inkatha was going to use this march as a decoy to attack Shell House and kill our leaders. I had information from my surveillance units and from the radio what was happening in and about town, the mass destruction caused by these marchers throughout town and the killing of people in town. The nature of the march was very different to the other marches, this march was not accompanied by policemen. The fact that my distinct impression was that there was gunfire emanating from the crowd, the fact that they surged forward, there's other information I never mentioned earlier - the fact that they shot at my surveillance units just prior to that event, I forgot to mention that earlier. They shot at Eddie Khumalo and Mondli Zuma which they testified to in the inquest. So those are the combination of factors that I had at my disposal and I had to make a decision in a split second whether we were going to shoot or not shoot.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, just pertaining to the information, you testified that the person who you actually obtained that information from was Major General Leonard Radu, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, the late Commissioner Giddy, that's correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Now, before he died Commissioner Radu made an affidavit which was also filed at the inquest report. Mr Chairman, I beg leave to hand up the particular affidavit and copies thereof to the Committee and I would beg leave that that will be included or added to the ANC's bundle of documents seeing that it is one of the ANC's members or their late members.

CHAIRPERSON: Form part of the papers - yes please.

MR BIZOS: But there is a conversation between the late Mr Radu, Commissioner Radu and General ...[inaudible].

CHAIRPERSON: This is the affidavit submitted by him at the inquest? Thank you.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, at the inquest it was submitted as Exhibit L37.

CHAIRPERSON: The exhibits - you want this to form part of the documents, the bundle prepared by the ANC?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, it would then appear it would be page 255 and onwards because the last page is at presently page 254.

MR LAX: Sorry, it will be 256 onwards, the two maps, the one plan and then the second map was 255, so it will be 256 onwards.

MR PRETORIUS: Thank you Mr Honourable Member.

CHAIRPERSON: A convenient stage to take a short adjournment?

We'll adjourn for fifteen minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GARY JOHN KRUSER: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRETORIUS: (continues)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Kruser have you got the affidavit of Mr Radu in front of you?

MR KRUSER: (s.u.o.)

I don't have one.

MR PRETORIUS: With the permission of the Committee, my learned friend Mr Van Wyk will hand it to the witness.

Mr Kruser with reference to the affidavit of Mr Radu that's now been placed in front of you, nowhere in that affidavit does Mr Radu state that he had information that Shell House would come under attack and that he had conveyed that information to you.

MR KRUSER: I cannot comment on Mr Radu.

MR PRETORIUS: The only mention Mr Radu made of what happened that morning is that he had a discussion with you or a meeting with you and thereafter came to the conclusion that Shell House could come under attack, do you agree with that or don't you?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I distinctly recall Mr Radu telephoning me on a Sunday evening.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser and Mr Chairman if I may refer you to the bundle of documents that is Bundle B that's the documents presented by the ANC. If I may refer you to page 105 thereof, that is the transcription of the telephone conversation between Brigadier Gouws and the late Mr Radu. It is typed at the top thereof as Leonard Rabie, it is actually Mr Leonard Radu. 105, Mr Chairman.

Mr Kruser do you have a transcription of or do you have this particular document in front?

MR KRUSER: I do not have a document.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, I unfortunately only have one copy of that I would ask my learned friends of the ANC if they could perhaps assist us by placing a copy of the document in front of the witness.

MR KRUSER: I have a copy now.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, have you read this particular document?

MR KRUSER: I haven't read it before.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, would it be in order if I give the witness an opportunity to read it?

MR KRUSER: I've read it Mr Chairman.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I put it to you that Mr Radu in this particular conversation or during this particular conversation did not express the specific fear that Shell House would come under attack, do you agree with that?

MR KRUSER: He doesn't mention it here, that's correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Furthermore, what Mr Radu said in so many words in this particular or during this particular conversation is that they would take the law into their own hands?

CHAIRPERSON: Refer him to where you are looking at please.

MR PRETORIUS: As it pleases, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: He's not familiar with the documents, he's just had a chance to reading it now.

MR PRETORIUS: Can you please look at the very first page, you'll find rather big paragraph with L next to it, do you see it? It starts with the word Brigadier Gouws, it is Leonard Radu, do you see it?

MR KRUSER: I see it.

MR PRETORIUS: About five lines downwards, it says, maybe a little bit more - let me begin: "Twice we've had these big groups of people, IFP people passing this place and one other time when they were passing here, they tore posters in front of our office and did all those funny things and I said to Van Dyk this morning if there is no one here we will take law in our own hands and we don't want to do that." Do you read it?

CHAIRPERSON: First paragraph, page 105 about one third of the way down, the paragraph - "Twice we've had these big groups" - you see that? Line 7 page 5.

MR KRUSER: I see that.

MR PRETORIUS: Just then to conclude, there was nothing in that particular, during that particular conversation to express the specific fear of an attack on Shell House and in addition that the threat is mentioned that they will take the law - and that is now the ANC guards - will take the law into their own hands. Do you accept that?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I think if you look at the time of this conversation, for me my ...[inaudible] is very clear, the late Commissioner Radu was raising his concern about what was happening out at Shell House at that stage. I'm also aware that in my presence he had conversations with other police officers early that morning just after 8 o'clock when I was in his office. So he might have conveyed that at an earlier stage, I don't know. What I'm saying is this, it's a clear indication to me that he's raising concern of what was happening out at Shell House and nothing is being done about it by the police. I think that's his concern he's raising - that's my interpretation what I read in this document.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you present when this conversation took place?

MR KRUSER: I was not but what he speaks about I know what was happening outside Shell House - I can see what he's talking about.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I've referred you to this specific conversation and I ask you with reference to this specific conversation. Do you accept that it does not express a fear of Shell House being attacked and secondly that he threatened to take the law in his own hands?

MR KRUSER: I think it's correct - in this specific conversation he doesn't state that Shell House might be under attack but he raises his concern about the threat around Shell House.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, you testified yesterday that you were charged and prosecuted during the previous regimes in South Africa, you were inter alia charged with being a member of the ANC. Is that correct?

MR KRUSER: Ja, I was charged in the apartheid era, that is correct.

MR PRETORIUS: You also testified that during that period you were acquitted because you denied that you were a member of the ANC?

MR KRUSER: I think you should listen to my evidence, I said I was acquitted, I never said I denied I was a member of the ANC.

MR PRETORIUS: Did you then admit that you were a member of the ANC?

MR KRUSER: I never went in at the box, I was acquitted before trial was concluded.

MR PRETORIUS: During the inquest proceedings you on several occasions admitted that you wilfully told untruthful things whilst you were under oath, do you recall that?

MR KRUSER: What I recall is and I think we should put a context over this cross-examination - into context to it - what I told the learned Judge is that I deliberately withheld information to ensure the safety of my colleagues and comrades.

MR PRETORIUS: We're not speaking now about the motive why you did it, but you admitted that you under oath stated things that were not true or be it now with your motive now we've said you want to protect people, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I think as I said in the court, although I was not given much time to explain, the type of cross-examination wasn't conducive for me to try to explain anything in that court in actual fact. What I do want to say here is that I was faced with a decision in terms of morality of whether the lives of my comrades and my colleagues are more important than divulging their names to the police and the Attorney General with the chances of them being assassinated and I chose the option of withholding their names from the Attorney General until such time that I was satisfied either that they consent to giving me their names or that I get to a court of law. That was the decision I had to take and that is the decision I took.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I refer to passages where you were examined by his Honourable Judge Nugent. Do you now take the view that Judge Nugent did not give you the opportunity to answer questions properly?

MR KRUSER: I think I was treated very unfairly in that court, yes that's true.

MR PRETORIUS: It is now also clear that what you told as facts or what you expressed as facts were later proved to be not true by ballistic evidence and otherwise, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: What I stated as my recollection of events is now - the ballistic evidence does not corroborate with what I recollect on that day.

MR PRETORIUS: The fact remains Mr Kruser as we stand here now, we now see that what you testified under oath was not true. What you now offer is an explanation in the fact to the extent that you say that "my recollection appears to be incorrect." Is that correct?

MR KRUSER: No I don't think it's correct - without the ballistic evidence, I would have still been of the opinion of the version which I gave the inquest court and the version which I'll give this Committee. However, as I stated earlier, objective evidence from medical and ballistic shows that what I recollect is not the truth - I don't think I went there to lie, I gave my honest opinion of what I recollected on that day. I think there's a difference.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we should quarrel about that, you realise what is the difference between a lie and what is incorrect, isn't it? You're not suggesting that he lied, what you're suggesting that the evidence he gave at that trial which he says were his impressions and his recollection of events as he saw them. There was other evidence to show that his impressions were not correct. Now are you saying that he lied because of that?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, I'm going to put it to the witness now that he in fact lied with reference to the previous occasions where it appears that he is willing to lie under oath if it serves his purpose and he conceded it and I'm going to quote it now from the record. Can I proceed Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes please do.

MR PRETORIUS: I'm quoting for you from page 2710 of the previous record, Mr Kruser. You are being examined by Judge Nugent at this stage. You were asked: "So what you said in these statements, these three statements, is the following

1. No record was kept in the firearm register.

2. In your second statement, I have no recollection of details concerning to whom firearms were issued.

3. If I look at the firearm register, they will not assist me to find out to whom I issued weapons."

Your reply was: "That is correct."

So you were referred to three different statements you made under three different occasions under oath.

It then proceeds: "And all of that is untrue?"

Your reply was: "Yes."

Now just to place the Chairman and Honourable Committee Members in the picture, at that stage the firearm register was presented and from the firearm register it in fact appeared that this witness did write in the names of certain people who he issued firearms to and what firearms he issued to them. In all three the previous statements that Judge Nugent referred to here - he referred to untruthful statements made by this witness concerning that particular firearm register and this witness then replied when he was referred to the three statements that he made "and all of that is untrue?" and his reply was "Yes." Is that correct Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: That's correct but I would like to say that I think the evidence you're reading from, I think it's important that - it's a pity we can't hear the evidence on tape to show - I think the contempt with which I was treated with by that Judge - that's my personal opinion.

Secondly, I've gone through that process and I even told the Judge on the next morning - if you look for it in my evidence - that I don't completely agree to him when I went there one night - I did not completely agree - I just want to explain the issue of the register itself. When I did the statement with my lawyers, which I tried to explain to the Judge, I then stated that the names were not recorded in the firearm register. That was the essence of my statement. When the books were brought to court it was recorded on another page in the firearm register but not under the normal circumstances which we normally record it because it was a rush morning, I took a page and wrote it. When I was with my lawyers doing a statement, my recollection at that stage was it was not in the firearm register but I knew I wrote it down somewhere. The facts when the book was brought, it was in the firearm register but not the normal procedure which we used and that was the debate with me and the Judge at that stage. After lot's of pressure from the Judge I conceded and I think if that - even if the Committee feels that my interpretation when I was with my lawyers and what happened when the book was brought is wrong or a lie then I concede but I was honestly of the opinion when I made this statement when I sat with my lawyers that I recorded it in a book or on a page at some stage because of the rush of the morning. It was not written in the normal fashion which we do guns as normal, you could see in the book how we normally would issue guns, there were just names and the gun number, no signatures, all those things that was the rush of the morning and when I did the statement itself my recollection at that stage was, you know sometime and I was busy with other things in my new job in government. We used to come to the lawyers in the evening, we never had the books with us, I recollected that I wrote it down somewhere. I knew we never followed the proper procedures we normally had to follow and that was my recollection. The Judge refused to even give me a chance, I mean to explain some of the things, I was just shouted down, but what I'm saying is I concede that is the truth, I wrote it in the firearm register, not in the normal fashion, in some other page, not with all the necessary requirements which is required for me when I hand out guns and that is the facts of the matter.

The other point is - I deliberately withheld names from the police and attorney and there were very good reasons for that. I was not prepared to expose my comrades and my colleagues to the mercy of assassination and that's a decision I had to make. I decided and we decided as a collective, that at some stage in this process when we come to court that we will tell what we know happened and I told the Judge that. I think my reason under the circumstances of the times when I know other colleagues and comrades of mine were killed in Natal when they testified as witnesses, I was not prepared to expose my colleagues to that.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser are you now saying that you actually did not lie, it was just your recollection that was incorrect at that stage?

MR KRUSER: On the firearm register, yes and that's what I tried to explain but I never got a decent chance to explain it in that court.

MR PRETORIUS: I think we'll then just proceed with the page. I read from approximately line 9 that is after you were confronted and I continue with where we read previously

"And all of that is untrue?"

And your reply: "Yes."

"And all of that was made under oath in statements in the course of these investigations, correct?"

Your reply: "It was made to protect the names of people."

The next question: "Now you say to me that the purpose of this was to protect people from being exposed?"

"That is correct." is your reply.

"Why did you not just decline to make statements, why do you give untruthful statements?"

"I thought it was important to us to inform the attorney what happened that day and to inform them untruthfully."

"Is that correct?"

"I think the idea was to conceal people's names."

What you said it was done deliberately to conceal the identity of people, do you accept that?

MR KRUSER: I think that is what I'm saying, I had to choose between the lives of my comrades or give them all the information. Whether - if the Committee thinks that's a lie, I'll accede, but I thought that's withholding information, I thought there's a difference between the two but if the Committee thinks it's a lie, I'm prepared to accede but I was not prepared to subject my comrades to that possibility of assassination.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I put it to you that it was proved previously that if it serves your purpose or the purpose of your comrades or the ANC you're prepared to lie under oath?

MR KRUSER: That's not true.

MR PRETORIUS: I put it to you that it's exactly what you did which I've read out to you now and I put it to you that at this stage after you've been proved that it was - your evidence is incorrect - you are merely trying to give a motive why it's incorrect in the sense that it's your recollection and sorry if you're mistaken but that the other is actually the fact that you are again lying to protect the ANC and your comrades.

MR KRUSER: I cannot confer with that.

MR PRETORIUS: If Mr Chairman could bear with me one moment please.

Mr Kruser, your evidence during the inquest was that the two policemen immediately prior to the shooting - that's Van Reenen and his colleague - went up to the marchers, addressed them in some form, then returned from the marchers, came back to you and then requested you to withdraw within Shell House. Is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR PRETORIUS: It was only after the policemen returned to you that the marcher actually moved forward or charged forward?

MR KRUSER: That's more or less correct.

MR PRETORIUS: Is it more or less or is it correct?

MR KRUSER: That's how I recollect it, ja.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, I find it strange that - my lord I refer to the questions posed by the ANC to the objectors, it is in bundle A, it is on page 10, it's paragraph 22 thereof - the question that your legal advisors put to us and asked us to admit is the following, Mr Kruser - that the marchers ignored the attempt by the two uniformed members of the South African Police to stop and or divert them and that as they charged forward one of these policemen was struck and injured with a sharp instrument. That is not your evidence, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I'm not aware that anyone was struck and injured, I think that's other evidence. I never gave that evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: And according to you evidence could not happen that way because the marchers did not charge forward while these policemen were still up there - it is only after they had returned back to you and addressed you, that they charged forward?

MR KRUSER: That's how I recollect it - we're talking about seconds now.

MR PRETORIUS: Are you aware of an ANC guard on that specific day who had a makarov pistol in his possession?

MR KRUSER: I don't remember anyone specifically.

MR PRETORIUS: Is it possible?

MR KRUSER: It's possible there were members who owned makarovs.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, during the inquest there was a number of photos taken from the various video material that was available and placed into an album. After this witness testified it was pointed out by the ballistic experts that one of the ANC guards that was in front of Shell House was in possession of an makarov pistol. It was clearly invisible on the particular photos that were taken. We could never ask this witness if he could identify that particular guard because at that stage he had already given his evidence. If I could just ask Mr Chairman to give me the opportunity to show the photograph of that particular ANC guard to the witness and ask him to identify him for us?

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, again for the assistance of the Committee, an affidavit was in fact submitted by Mr Ndlovu who confirms that he is the person seen on that photograph which was taken after the incident and stating that he did not at any time fire with that makarov. If necessary we can produce that affidavit for assistance.

MR PRETORIUS: If this witness can just point to us if it is Mr Ndlovu on the photograph, that's all.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Kruser, on the page in front of you there are six photographs - the three on the bottom and the second photograph the middle photograph that is on the bottom photographs - do you recognise that person?

MR KRUSER: Which person? There are many people on that photograph.

MR PRETORIUS: It's a person in a white shirt on the foreground of the photograph.

MR KRUSER: I do recognise him.

MR PRETORIUS: Who is he?

MR KRUSER: I know him as Madoda. Madoda - I don't know his full names.

MR PRETORIUS: Can you just inform us where he is employed at now?

MR KRUSER: I'm not sure but possibly in one of the intelligence agencies - I'm not sure.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions to this particular witness.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRETORIUS

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that you've done your work on behalf of your colleagues as a whole, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: No Mr Chairman. I've done my work in so far as it was agreed that I would proceed on examining the witness first. It was also our understanding that it is not the idea of the legal representatives of the objectors that they will repeat every single question that I have asked, in other words it's not for repetitiveness sake but some of my colleagues will have questions which I have not asked and if they would like the opportunity to do so.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DORFLING: Mr Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, may I be permitted to ask some questions to the witness?

Mr Kruser, I would just like us to at the outset put a time frame to this date on which you made application for amnesty. Looking at the documents contained in bundle C which is the actual application it would appear that your documents was drafted or the pro forma or roneo form was completed on the 9th May and was submitted to the Honourable Committee for it's consideration on the 10th May 1997, do you agree with that?

MR KRUSER: I completed it on the 9th, when it was submitted I don't know.

MR DORFLING: If I may be of some assistance, if you could turn in bundle C to the very first page to number 1 it bears the stamp of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Investigative Unit, dated 10 May 1997.

MR KRUSER: I don't have a bundle, but I'll accept that.

MR DORFLING: Am I correct in saying that at the time of your giving evidence at the Shell House inquest you had already completed these documents?

MR KRUSER: At the time of giving evidence? This was before I gave evidence.

MR DORFLING: So these documents were completed and submitted for consideration prior to you giving evidence at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Attached to the application the pro-forma or roneo form are three statements.

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: That were the three statements that was also submitted for purposes of consideration by the inquest court, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Did you at the time of making application for amnesty understand the position to be that you had to disclose all relevant facts pertaining to the specific acts for which you apply for amnesty?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Am I therefore correct in saying that at the time when these affidavits as attached to the roneo form was submitted to the Amnesty Committee for consideration, you were of the view that those documents reflect accurately all relevant facts pertaining to your Amnesty Application?

MR KRUSER: I was advised to by my lawyers, ja.

MR DORFLING: Were you satisfied in your own mind that they reflect or reflected all the relevant information, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: That's why I employed lawyers to advise me what is the correct way to follow.

MR DORFLING: I'm going to repeat the question the third time - were you satisfied in your own mind that they accurately reflected all relevant facts?

MR KRUSER: My lawyers gave me the guarantee that's what I needed to apply for amnesty.

MR DORFLING: Your lawyers may have advised you but were you satisfied that what was set out there was correct in as far as you were concerned?

MR KRUSER: Those were the documents I presented at the inquest, my recollection of events.

MR DORFLING: I'm not sure I understand your last answer?

Are you agreeing that in your mind it accurately reflected all relevant facts?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR DORFLING: At the time of you making your application for amnesty on the 10th May 1997 did you in your own mind or were you in your own mind justified in acting in the way you did on the 28th March 1994?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I would just like to explain what happened around this time when I made my application.

We had a meeting with our legal representatives about the inquest itself and our actions as we explained it to them. They advised us that the issue of self defence it's a very difficult thing because the objective factors might not be as how we saw it and that there might be a possibility that the inquest or another court both criminal or civil might find differently and on that basis and with that advice, I as an individual and my colleagues, chose to also apply for amnesty in light of the fact that our recollection might be different to the finding of the court.

MR DORFLING: Did you at the time of making application foresee the possibility that a court of law, whoever is to decide on that might find that your actions were unjustified on the day?

MR KRUSER: My own opinion was that my acts were justified, I was advised by my lawyers that a court of law might find differently.

MR DORFLING: Why would your actions not have been justified if that possibility existed?

MR KRUSER: As I explained, my legal representatives explained to me, my lawyers explained to me that our case was one of self defence and the issue of self defence they said under those circumstances, the objective facts might be very different to what I have seen it and based on that I think which is quite sound advice in hindsight is even more sounder. I followed the advice.

MR DORFLING: So the advice amounted to you receiving advice of the possibility that objective evidence might show that on the day you exceeded the bounds of self defence and therefore committed a crime, is that right?

MR KRUSER: If the court found it would be a crime, that's correct.

MR DORFLING: Would you agree with me that that gives even further reason for you disclosing all relevant facts so that when an Amnesty Committee considers it, all those facts should be properly considered and properly placed before an Amnesty Committee?

MR KRUSER: I think I submitted the documents which I thought were the facts at that stage.

MR DORFLING: So your position with regard to your application for amnesty was quite different from that of you with regard to your evidence at the inquest is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't think there's any difference.

MR DORFLING: You already under examination by my learned friend Mr Pretorius conceded that at the time of you giving evidence or up to the time of you giving evidence at the Shell House you were of the opinion you should not disclose the names and identity of your comrades, to use your words, correct?

MR KRUSER: Until they gave their consent or until it reached court, ja that's correct.

MR DORFLING: Was that also the position you maintained with regard to your amnesty application?

MR KRUSER: I don't think so.

MR DORFLING: Am I correct then in saying that as far as your Amnesty Application is concerned your position was different, you were prepared in your Amnesty Application to disclose all the relevant facts for purposes of consideration?

MR KRUSER: Ja, I'm disclosing - I've disclosed all the facts in front of the Amnesty Committee.

MR DORFLING: Now sir, can we look at your application for amnesty as contained in the papers as it was submitted on the 10th May 1997? It's in bundle C Mr Chairman at pages 1 - 29 is the actual document that was submitted on the 10th May. Mr Kruser, why aren't the names reflected of those guards that you perceived fired shots or might have fired shots at the marchers, why are all those peoples names not mentioned in your Amnesty Application?

MR KRUSER: I think I'm applying for amnesty for myself, I think they would apply for amnesty by themselves.

MR DORFLING: But why wouldn't you disclose to the Amnesty Committee who the shottists were on the day, sir?

MR KRUSER: It was not requested from me if it were requested from me I would submit it to them.

MR DORFLING: Would you say that that evidence or information is irrelevant for the Amnesty Committee to take it's decision? As the Committee pleases, Mr Chairman.

Do you agree with me sir that that information is not contained in your application?

MR KRUSER: I don't think they were contained, all the names are not contained in that, some are I think.

MR DORFLING: I want to revert back to a line of questioning by my learned friend, Mr Pretorius. It specifically relates to the firearm register kept on the 28th March 1994 at Shell House. With leave of the Committee I've prepared a bundle with four copies of documents which I intend to utilise during my examination of this witness. May I beg leave to hand it up?

I might just at the outset indicate to the Committee, Mr Chairman, that all these documents form part of the record of proceedings at the Shell House inquest and I trust that all my colleagues are or have access to these documents, I haven't made copies for all of them on all the documents.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR DORFLING: Indeed so, Mr Chairman. I'm not aware of whether they've already been submitted in front of the Committee for consideration and that's why I took the effort of having another set made up. As the Committee pleases.

MR BIZOS: ...[inaudible] but the record here and we anticipated that our learned friends would not have the full record and this is why when we put documents in like the bundle, we gave them copies. Merely a copy of those in order to follow the cross-examination. If there is at least one available, Mr Chairman. No that document.

CHAIRPERSON: This document?

MR BIZOS: This document, yes Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't we have a copy?

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, no, as far as we refer to documents contained in the inquest proceedings, we haven't ourselves also received copies of these documents. It's taken as given that the parties have access to these documents so thus far we haven't received copies of all the documents that was referred to by Mr Bizos either.

Mr Chairman, I suggest that we number it the next alphabet being Exhibit B. Mr Chairman, I would agree to that and I would think that the number should then be 258 in bundle B if my memory serves me correctly.

MR BIZOS: If any member those teams has a copy can't they share one between two of them so that we may have one and I don't know whether the witness has been given a copy of the documents, Mr Chairman.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, I haven't even got a spare copy for myself. I've just made four copies because they all form part of the documents in the record.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Bizos, may I offer you my copy and I can share with my colleague and I think it's up to 270 not 269.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, I beg my apologies, I would make further copies during the lunch adjournment and make them available after lunch. May I in the meanwhile proceed on the documents placed before the witness?

Mr Kruser you've got a copy of the document in front of you?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR DORFLING: Could you look at the very first two pages of that document for purposes of the Committee's background? This is an extract from the firearm register of Shell House pertaining to the happenings of the date of the 28th March 1994, Mr Chairman.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I have difficulty unless I get the books because this things runs over two pages the register itself normally runs over two pages the whole thing, it's very difficult for me to look at one page and get - which book, there were also two books which were handed in to the intelligence officer and to the inquest. On this alone I think will be very difficult for me to answer questions. It's four years ago, it becomes very difficult. There were two books handed in and I know the books were written over two pages.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright you are being told that this is a ...[inaudible]

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman I've got the actual copy that was handed in at the inquest proceedings which runs over two pages which I may beg leave to hand to the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] as extract from the register, all right? You may put your questions.

MR DORFLING: Do you agree sir that on the first page is reflected the names of a number of ANC security guards which was issued with firearms by yourself as against their signatures and as against firearms numbers on the 28th March 1994?

MR KRUSER: I don't see a signature of any guard here.

MR DORFLING: The names contained in the fourth column reading from the left hand side of the page - is that your own handwriting?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Is that the names of the guards you recorded yourself?

MR KRUSER: That's my handwriting?

MR DORFLING: Do you agree that this was done on the 28th March 1994 prior to what is now known as let's call it the main shooting event at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I would like to see the whole book, I can't work on one single page and make a decision. There was two books and all those things - I'd like to have the full things in front of me before I..[intervention]

MR DORFLING: May I beg leave to make these two double page documents available to the witness? It's actually a duplication but for his own purposes he can look at it.

The original is in the possession of the Attorney General, Mr Chairman, I haven't got that in my possession.

MR LAX: Mr Dorfling, are these pages, just so that we can clarify this, you've given us two single pages. It's clear from what you've just handed up as it passed I noticed that these two single pages seem to be sitting next to each other?

MR DORFLING: Indeed so, it's the left and right side of the open firearm register.

Are you satisfied that those are copies from the firearm register, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: They're copies from one of the firearm registers, ja.

MR DORFLING: Can we first of all concentrate on the left hand page which would be the first page in the bundle I've handed up to the honourable Committee, Mr Chair. Do you agree that they reflect the names of security guards which had been issued with firearms on the 28th March 1994 prior to the main shooting at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: They don't reflect it but I confirm they were issued on that date at the bottom.

MR DORFLING: Would you concentrate on the right hand side of the said page to the bottom of that page which would be the second page of the bundle I've handed up to the honourable Committee? There's a further number of firearms that was issued on that day and against the firearm number is recorded the name or names of the security guards to whom these firearms where issued, correct?

MR KRUSER: They were not issued by me, it's not my handwriting.

MR DORFLING: But do you agree it's a similar entry to the one you've made yourself, it reflects names of people that received firearms against the firearm number?

MR KRUSER: That's reflected there, ja.

MR DORFLING: Now Mr Kruser, can we now return to your actual application and see what you disclosed with regard to this firearm register in your application for amnesty?

May I specifically refer you to page 9 in bundle C, your Amnesty Application? Have you got page 9 of your application in front of you sir? It's actually page 2 of your - let's call it first affidavit. Now I would like you to consider what you've disclosed to the Amnesty Committee with regard to this firearm or to any firearm register for that matter and I would like to read to you from paragraph 6 of your affidavit.

"We feared that Shell House could come under attack at any time. Radu instructed me to issue weapons to all available security personnel and to deploy them as a matter of urgency. As result of the urgency, details of who took what weapons were not recorded and then entered in a firearm register in handwriting at that stage. Certain security personnel had their own licensed weapons."

These were the facts that you disclosed to the Amnesty Committee?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Why didn't you disclose the existence of the firearm register which would indicate the names, sir?

MR KRUSER: As I tried to explain earlier when we get a consultation around the statement my distinct recollection is that we wrote these names, as you can see it's just a number and a name, issued by G. Kruser - I wrote, in the court it was not even there and I wrote for the counsel to understand which guns I issued - that was not in the original document, it was not the normal procedure where I would have signed the document, get the member to sign, the date - none of those things are written there. When I did the statement my recollection was these documents were not in front of me at that stage - my recollection was that I wrote it down somewhere. I didn't specifically remember writing in the firearm register - I never followed the normal procedures as can be seen on this document. Normally we would say what type of gun it was, I would sign the issue of the gun, I would put the date of issue which was not even put here, I would get the member to sign for the gun. None of those things were done so when I did this statement I knew I wrote it somewhere, I wasn't exactly sure it was written in the normal firearm register.

MR DORFLING: Let me make perfectly sure I understand you sir? At the time of you making this affidavit, you knew that you had a note somewhere but you didn't recollect it to be in the firearm register, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Why didn't you disclose that Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: Disclose what?

MR DORFLING: The fact that there was a note somewhere which would indicate the numbers of firearms issued and regards to whom it was issued?

MR KRUSER: I think my statement reflects it was recorded, I don't think I denied it was recorded.

MR DORFLING: Would you care to indicate which portion of your statement you say reflect that it was recorded?

MR KRUSER: It says it was not recorded in the firearm register, I think the interpretation would be it was recorded.

MR DORFLING: In other words what you wanted the Committee to read in there was the numbers and details were not recorded in a firearm register but it was recorded somewhere else. Is that the interpretation you wanted the Committee to give to it?

MR KRUSER: That's what I thought happened at that stage when I did the statement. This statement was done at the time of preparation for the inquest and I was advised by my legal team that this statement is sufficient for me to apply for amnesty and I subsequently did so.

MR DORFLING: Now let's just test that proposition and see whether it makes any sense that you actually wanted to convey to the Committee that there was some record but it was simply not in a firearm register. Let's turn to your second affidavit that was attached to your application, sir. Let's particularly look at page 70. Page 70 in bundle C Mr Chairman. It was handed up at the inquest proceedings as Exhibit L15 in bundle 2 of volume 2.

Can you look at paragraph 6 sir, I would like to read it to you? "I have no independent recollection of details concerning to whom firearms were issued and when they were issued. To the best of my knowledge, all available registers and allied documentations have been supplied to the office of the Attorney General." Is that a true reflection of your state of mind at the time of making this statement?

MR KRUSER: Is this paragraph 5, firstly?

MR DORFLING: I'm referring to paragraph 6 which reads at paragraph 5, I'm referring to paragraph 6 at page 17 which reads at paragraph 5.

MR KRUSER: I think I stated here I had no independent recollection of details concerning the firearms issued to me -if I had the firearm register in front of me I would have - that is a question - question to reply to an answer from the Attorney General's office and that was my answer, I didn't have the books and independently I could not recollect any of these events. The books were not with me when I answered this question.

MR DORFLING: Can we turn to the ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Dorfling, just so we can understand the context, this looks like a set of replies to a request for further particulars. Is that request for further particulars part of our papers?

MR DORFLING: No Mr Chair, Honourable Members, it's actually a request that was forthcoming from the Attorney General's office requesting the witness to clarify certain aspects in his first statement and it particularly referred to the first statement I've referred to, it referred to paragraph 6 of the first statement in which the witness said as a result of the

...[inaudible]

MS KHAMPEPE: ...[inaudible] it can't be ...[inaudible] this refers to a request which was made with regard to paragraph 5 of Mr Kruser's application.

MR DORFLING: No it refers to paragraph 5 of the Attorney General's request.

MS KHAMPEPE: Do we have a copy of that request, do we know what actually was requested by the A.G. and to which Mr Kruser responded.

MR DORFLING: I would have to look but it is certainly available - I would be in a position to make that available. I would perhaps after the lunch adjournment, which be an opportune time, I will make that available.

May I just refer to the third statement at page 26 just a response and I'll then place it in context by also supplying the Honourable Committee with the question. Page 26, again paragraph 6 thereof. This is your third statement, Mr Kruser.

Do you see that? Sorry it's recorded here "to the best of my knowledge two registers have been furnished to the offices of the Attorney General. They are the only registers of which I am aware and to which I have referred. I was the person who kept these registers, I do not believe that the registers can assist me in adding anything to my statement." All the questions posed to you was aimed at trying to obtain information pertaining to which security guards were issued with which weapons and who actually or which security guards were actually utilised on the day, do you agree?

MR KRUSER: The gist is they wanted names of people who shot and as I said earlier I was not prepared to divulge the names to the Attorney General.

MR DORFLING: Why didn't you disclose it for purposes of your amnesty application?

MR KRUSER: I think if the Amnesty Committee wanted it and requested it, I would have given it to them.

MR DORFLING: But sir, up to now you haven't disclosed it.

MR KRUSER: Up to now I've not been asked.

MR DORFLING: But didn't you see that as a relevant factor for the Committee to consider?

MR KRUSER: I think if the Committee wants the names of people who shot, who I saw shot, I'll give it to them, I don't have a problem with that, I never ever had a problem with that.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there's an implied suggestion in this line of questioning that the witness kept back from the Amnesty Committee the names of the people to whom arms were issued and which were fired. If there's a manifest the unfair line of cross-examination, because our learned friend knows that with this application of this witness, twelve other applications were filed at the same time disclosing the names of the persons who shot and the firearm that they used. I had a note previously, I thought I would leave it until re-examination but I submit that the line of cross-examination is manifestly unfair to the witness and time consuming to the proceedings before you.

MR DORFLING: If I may respond?

CHAIRPERSON: Which firearm they were issued and which firearm they used - at the end of the day we'll have that full picture, won't we?

MR DORFLING: Indeed, the question being posed to this witness is why it wasn't disclosed in his particular application because it's relevant. With the greatest respect, Mr Chairman, the fact of the existence of the firearm register that would disclose the identity of the specific individual guards is not disclosed in any of the 13 applications and that's why this line of questioning is being put to the witness.

Mr Kruser, after the conclusion of the Shell House inquest proceedings, you were well aware of this problem, you were well of the two facts - that there was indeed a firearm register that would reflect the names?

MR KRUSER: I was.

MR DORFLING: Why then didn't you at that point in time in way of a supplementary affidavit disclose it to the Amnesty Committee?

MR KRUSER: I didn't think it was necessary, neither was I advised that it was necessary.

MR DORFLING: If you have regard to your application in total that the actual roneo form that was completed as well as the three affidavits attached thereto and do you agree you do not mention that any of the guards were issued with AK47 rifles on that day?

MR KRUSER: If I check, I think it's correct but I'm not sure.

MR DORFLING: Please take the time and see whether that proposition I put to you is correct?

Mr Kruser, maybe if I may just assist you, I think there's some reference to - in one of the supplementary affidavits - of an AK47. It does not reflect to whom it was issued and whether it was utilised. Why was the fact of - the fact that some of the security guards used AK47 rifles not disclosed in your Amnesty Application? To fire at the crowd -why was that not disclosed?

MR KRUSER: I think the people who shot with the AK's, I think they put it in their applications.

MR DORFLING: You as a commander of those members, why didn't you disclose that to the Amnesty Committee?

MR KRUSER: I didn't think it was necessary, neither was the advice that it was necessary.

MR DORFLING: You were aware of the fact prior to these proceedings starting that at least one of the deceased killed outside Shell House was killed by way of an AK47 is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That is correct, I'm also aware that it's not - it doesn't match the AK's we used. The ballistics didn't match any of the AK's that we used.

MR DORFLING: Why did you consider that information then not to be relevant?

MR KRUSER: I'm saying that I didn't think it was necessary for me to say that they used AKs, neither was I advised by my legal advisors.

MR DORFLING: So you explained that one of the facts that triggered your decision to give the order to reply was the fact that a glass window in your immediate vicinity was struck by a bullet which you perceived to have been coming from the marchers direction, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That with a list of other factors I mentioned earlier.

MR DORFLING: Would you mind to indicate where you refer to that fact in your Amnesty Application?

MR KRUSER: I don't think I mentioned it but when I was in court and if I had - if you look at my statement and you look at my evidence, my evidence of 350 pages - if I had to make a statement outlying every single fact that I mentioned in court, I think we would spend I don't know how long compiling a statement to the Attorney General and it's impossible for me to put every single fact in a statement. Besides that, when we met the legal advisors of the police at some stage, we were told by them together with my legal advisors - all they requested was the gist of what happened on that day and that's the nature of how we made our statements.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, the final trigger to make you decide to give the order to repel was the fact that bullets were coming from the direction of the crowd and that at least one of these bullets in your mind hit the glass window just to the right of you, is that not true?

MR KRUSER: That's not true, I said the reason why I gave the order to repel because of the combination of all the factors that I mentioned earlier. The one without the other doesn't make up my mind and I stick to that evidence, that's all those factors together, I don't think I mentioned all those factors in my statements either, but when I'm asked in court to explain, I think I explained to the judge what are the factors that drove me to that decision to open fire. None of those factors operate in isolation to each other.

MR DORFLING: I think we're back at the same debate you had with Mr Pretorius?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, you're taking us there.

MR DORFLING: Let me try and get some clarity in my own mind. Your decision was amongst others or your decision to give the order for the guards to repel was amongst others based on your impression that the surging crowd as you put it, were firing at the guards?

MR KRUSER: I said the decision for me to give the order was because of the combination of all the facts I mentioned earlier. I'm not prepared to testify to separate any of those facts in isolation from each other. I had to make a decision based on all those facts, I cannot - if you want to give me a different scenario with different facts, I'll maybe come to a different decision. At that given time those were the factors which gave me the impression that I had to give the order in order to ensure our lives and the lives of others were saved.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, that's why I specifically said those were one of the factors you took into account to give the order to repel?

MR KRUSER: It's one of the factors, ja.

MR DORFLING: And a very vital one, the fact that you were being under attack?

MR KRUSER: As I say I think they were all vital.

MR DORFLING: Why didn't you disclose that fact in your Amnesty Application?

CHAIRPERSON: He's disclosed it in his oral evidence, he doesn't have to give us a ball by ball account you know in his application.

MR DORFLING: Granted, Mr Chairman. The question I'm posing is why if it was such a relevant factor, why wasn't it disclosed at the time of him making the application?

CHAIRPERSON: If that is covered by oral evidence which satisfies this Committee you know, we don't expect volumes to be submitted by each applicant disclosing all of the details, you understand? These affidavits and the information is supposed to give us some idea of what the application is about. Oral evidence then is what we really look at.

MR DORFLING: I accept the proposition posed by the - the question simply relates to this. At the conclusion of these proceedings it will be argued that certain relevant factors which the witness knew to be relevant was not included in his statement for the simple reason that at the time of the Shell House inquest this was found to be fabrications and that's the basis on which I put these - to put me in a position to later argue it at the conclusion of these proceedings, Mr Chair.

Mr Kruser, you yesterday testified that certain enquiries were made to try and determine who of the guards used a makarov pistol and you said your investigation was fruitless, is that correctly?

MR KRUSER: What happened, I was informed by the lawyers that there was a photograph produced with someone with a makarov pistol. We then together with other members and the members who were on the corner, we first determined who the person was with a makarov, we then amongst ourselves, those people on the corner in terms of whether of that person was present at the time of the shooting. None of us saw the person present at the shooting, he also made a statement to us to the effect or informed us that he was not there and he did not shoot.

MR DORFLING: Why didn't you give this evidence yesterday when specifically asked what the result was of your enquiries?

MR KRUSER: I don't understand the question.

MR DORFLING: One of the Honourable Committee Members specifically asked you whether enquiries were made into guards with makarov pistols in their possession that day and your response was that certain enquiries were made and it all turned out to be negative, you couldn't determine who had makarovs on that day.

MR KRUSER: I think the question was around the corner itself, if anyone had a makarov at the corner itself, that was the question if I remember it. I think I admitted that there were many members who had their own personal makarovs registered in their own names.

MR DORFLING: If I remember correctly, the question was aimed at whether you from your own side tried to determine which of the ANC guards on the said day had their own personal licensed or unlicensed makarovs?

MR KRUSER: That's not how I understood it, I understood it if anyone fired from the corner with a makarov, that's how I understood it. That's my recollection of what the question was yesterday.

MR LAX: Mr Dorfling, I stand to be corrected, obviously it will be on the record, but my question was as far as I recall - it was whether they made enquiries as to who had used that makarov on that day, that was really the thrust in my own mind of the question but I may not have put it quite that way and I may not recall it very well now but go ahead anyway.

MR DORFLING: I'll leave it at that, I don't think there's much to be derived from that in any event.

Now Mr Kruser, one of the decisions to be taken by this Committee is whether in your application or be it your written application as amplified in your oral evidence in front of this Committee, you are being truthful and disclosing - making full disclosure - giving the full facts. Can I at the outset determine from you whether you at this point in time - it was asked by the Honourable Chairman at a stage, I don't think you properly answered the question. Do you stand by your evidence you gave at the Shell House inquest?

MR KRUSER: I stand by my recollection of the events which I presented to this Committee today.

MR DORFLING: Are you saying that today in your own mind your recollection of what happened at Shell House remains the same as reflected in your evidence at the Shell House inquest?

MR KRUSER: If I go on what I recollect, that's all I recollect although there's as I say objective evidence to dispute that recollection of mine.

MR DORFLING: Are you in agreement with me that at the time of the inquest proceedings you indicated to the Honourable Justice Nugent that the submissions made by Mr Justice Goldstone was based on yourself and Mr Radu compiling a report for that purpose, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't think that's a correct interpretation of my evidence.

MR DORFLING: What is the correct interpretation?

MR KRUSER: I said I played a role in the compilation of that evidence I was not central in that.

MR DORFLING: Were you in this regard assisted by the late Commissioner Radu?

MR KRUSER: Amongst other people.

MR DORFLING: I would like to refer you paragraph 31 of the Goldstone submissions. Mr Chairman, it's in the bundle I've prepared and have placed in front of you, it's the very next page, the one from - I'm not sure, it doesn't actually start from paragraph 31 but it gives the sequence and the context of it. Page 19 of the actual - in the - if we might just, looking at the preceding pages, Mr Kruser, at page 18 paragraph 29 actually gives the heading "The Attacks on Lancet Hall" and it goes on to describe the events that took place at Lancet Hall. You yesterday testified that you attended Lancet Hall and you determined there that two people were shot apparently in an attempt to enter Lancet Hall?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: Now can you look at paragraph 31 of the submissions made to Mr Justice Goldstone? It reads "it is not known whether anyone was killed or injured in this incident." How did that come into the report, that's obviously an untruth?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman can I just explain, I think I didn't get a chance in court although I tried to explain. When the lawyers or our legal team drew up the submission to Goldstone, I was called in, I was busy in Pretoria with the inauguration of the new President and all those things, I was called in for short periods to give them a background in terms of what happened at Shell House and I gave a verbal briefing to them in terms of what happened at Shell House and how I saw what happened at Shell House. The drawing of the final documents which I also tried to explain to the learned Judge was done by the ANC legal team and our legal representatives here. I did not see the final document, I did not see a draft document, the first time I saw this document it was when it was brought to me to my attention in court. So I can't testify to what's in the Goldstone document, I did not see the document, I just gave a verbal account of my activities on that particular day. I was not allowed to articulate that in court but I tried but I want to tell this Committee that is my contribution to that Goldstone document. I cannot comment on the document I did not see or did not draft.

MR DORFLING: Sir, but you played a vital role in instructing your attorneys and giving them advice as to what the particular facts were in order to enable them to draw up the document?

MR KRUSER: I don't know whether it was vital, what I say is my contribution with what happened around Shell House - I also said to the learned Judge, issues of Lancet Hall was left to people at Lancet Hall. Africa Khumalo was the head of Security and Intelligence Department at Lancet Hall and he had the responsibility to deal with all matters concerning Lancet Hall. I never dealt with any issue of Lancet Hall to the lawyers around the Goldstone Commission.

MR DORFLING: Let's then turn to the issue of Shell House in which you had an active role to play as far as your contribution is concerned. Were you aware of any of the marchers that were firing at the Shell House guards with AK47 rifles?

MR KRUSER: I'm not aware of it.

MR DORFLING: Can you now turn to paragraph 50 of the submissions made to Mr Justice Goldstone? It's at the typed page 24 of the Goldstone Submissions.

It reads as follows, sir: "The crowd continued to advance past the north western corner and towards the south western corner of Shell House. Can we just make sure that you're in agreement with me that this pertains to the actual main shooting incident?

MR KRUSER: I'm not aware - I never drafted the document.

MR DORFLING: Please Mr Kruser, read it in context, you can read from the previous page - page 46 of paragraph 46 to just put you in context - it describes how Sergeant van Reenen goes to the marchers and comes back?

MR KRUSER: That would probably be my evidence and other guards evidence that Van Reenen ran and came back.

MR DORFLING: Now let's then deal with paragraph 50. It says: "Shots could still be heard emanating from the crowd. At the same time the person identified earlier by Maduna to Calitz as a threat, fired his AK47 firearm at the security guards positioned on the first floor parapet of the north western corner of Shell House."

Now sir, if you were instrumental in drawing up this or giving an input on...[intervention]

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Dorfling, just be fair to this witness, he's made it very clear he didn't draft this document. Please stop putting to him he was instrumental in drawing it up, he didn't. He's making it quite clear - he may have assisted in giving some background but I really don't think it's that fair.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, if we can work on the premise that you made contributions together with the late Commissioner Radu with regard to this document?

MR KRUSER: And the other guards who were present, we all participated in this event.

MR DORFLING: Were you unaware of the person amongst the crowd firing at the guards with an AK47?

MR KRUSER: From where I was, I think it's my evidence in the inquest, I saw no firearms in the crowd. People on the parapet would have a better view of people with AK's and maybe that people gave that evidence. I couldn't see from where I was.

MR DORFLING: Did you obtain this information from any of the guards?

MR KRUSER: It was not my duty - I did not investigate the event as I testified in the inquest - Quest Dlamini was instructed by the National Directorate and the ANC leadership to investigate the whole event, it was not my responsibility.

MR DORFLING: Did you make no enquiries with your specific guards as to what transpired and what their version of the events were?

MR KRUSER: As I testified in the inquest and I repeat - Quest Dlamini was appointed by the National Directorate immediately after the shooting to conduct investigations. I gave him my version of what happened and all other guards gave him their version, that was his responsibility, not mine.

MR DORFLING: Could we lastly turn to paragraph 54 at page 25 of the Goldstone Submissions? It relates to the security guards positioned on the parapet at the time of the main shooting and it relates to whether any of them could have injured any of the marchers in what is referred to here as a retaliation. I'm specifically interested in the last sentence and it pertains to the guards on the parapet as I've said, it states "they are not likely to have injured anyone because of the difficult angle they were firing from as they were taking cover behind the parapet. Do you agree with me that that is an untruth, the evidence from the Shell House inquest shows exactly the opposite?

MR KRUSER: I agree, I was not on the parapet at that stage.

MR DORFLING: Have you got any idea of the origin of this statement in the Goldstone Submissions?

MR KRUSER: I don't know but even myself initially when I visualised the angle I also thought it would be difficult but it's not my evidence itself.

MR DORFLING: So whoever made that input with regard to the Goldstone Submissions told an untruth? I'll leave it at that Mr Chairman.

Mr Kruser dealing with the attack and the time immediately prior to what you call the search forward and the attack on the guards you made mention of a so called war cry? If I understand your evidence correctly, your evidence is that Mr Mondli Zuma actually explained to you that what the people are doing, they are doing a certain war dance or war cry - is that right?

MR KRUSER: That's my recollection.

MR DORFLING: I want to put it to you that this question was specifically asked to Mr Mondli Zuma at the inquest proceedings and he denied that this had taken place.

MR KRUSER: That's what I remember happened. I distinctly remember it happening.

MR DORFLING: I want to put it further to you that Mr Mondli Zuma said that at the time when the marchers came around the corner there was no hesitation - you virtually almost immediately had to retaliate?

MR KRUSER: That's his recollection not mine.

MR DORFLING: Are you saying his recollection is wrong?

MR KRUSER: What I'm saying is we all have a different recollection of what happened.

MR DORFLING: With regard to the evidence at the Shell House inquest pertaining to what the crowd was doing immediately prior to the shooting taking place, you've already been referred by Mr Pretorius to the objective facts which indicate that there's no proof of any shots having been fired from the marchers in the direction of the security guards, you've already accepted that proposition, is it correct?

MR KRUSER: The security guards in my vicinity, ja.

MR DORFLING: A number of witnesses have given evidence at the inquest proceedings and I can refer to the specific portions of the record but on the version of all the following witnesses, it is quite clear that the burst fire, the outbreak of fire emanated from the side where the security guards were positioned and not from the crowd. I can mention but the following names: Sergeant Goliath, Sergeant Potgieter, Sergeant van Reenen, Sergeant van Greunen, Mr Diaz, Mr Stevens, Mr Von Eggerdy and I can refer you to the portions in the record. They are all of the view at the inquest proceedings that when the burst of fire that occurred broke out it was coming from the side where you and the security guards were positioned on the south western corner of King George and Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: Firstly, Mr Chairman, I am prepared to concede that that's a possibility, I don't know the facts, I don't know the credibility of those witnesses, I can't comment on those witnesses versions, but I can only say is what I recall happened on that day and that's what I'm going to continue to say.

MR DORFLING: Are you prepared to accept that that is the evidence or should I read it to you?

MR KRUSER: I'm saying I don't know the credibility of those witnesses and what was found on theirs - I have not been in court, I was just in court when I gave evidence. All I'm saying the possibility is there, I'm prepared to accede to the possibility that the shot might have come from there but my own recollection of events is very different and that's the only thing I can testify to.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, I don't want you to unnecessarily make a concession, are you conceding that the ANC guards started firing first?

MR KRUSER: I don't know that, that's what I'm saying to you, I don't know. I can only tell you what I recollect on that day. I don't know that they fired first.

MR DORFLING: If all these witnesses are of that opinion is it your evidence that your recollection of what transpired is different from theirs?

MR KRUSER: If that's the case, that's so, I recollect different to them.

MR DORFLING: Now your own legal team placed strong reliance on the evidence of Mr Von Eggerdy at the time of the Shell House inquest. In actual fact at the time of the argument relied quite heavily on it for purposes of showing that there was an attack forthcoming from the marchers. I want to put it to you that on Mr Von Eggerdy’s evidence his impression was that the burst of gunfire that ran out came from the - as he called it - "defensive position" the position where you and your colleagues were positioned.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I've got my recollection, Mr Von Eggerdy’s got his recollection, I'm acceding to the fact there's a possibility that we might have fired first. I don't recall it happening in that manner that's all I can say.

MR DORFLING: If for purposes of argument it was to be accepted that the security guards fired at the crowd first would you agree with me that there would have been no justification for that?

MR KRUSER: Just put the question - I'm not a lawyer, put it?

MR DORFLING: If we accept it that the security guards fired at the marchers first, if that is given as an accepted fact, if that's our staring point - would you agree those were the facts that there would have been no justification for the security guards to fire at the crowd?

MR KRUSER: No I cannot confer with you.

MR DORFLING: Why don't you agree?

MR KRUSER: I think people, they were as I was saying, there were many security guards - there were people on the parapet I mean every individual at that stage made a decision based on what he saw that day. There are people who say that didn't hear the order to fire - they shot because they felt they were threatened and they would draw their conclusions from their own set of facts or why they do that - I don't think we can make a simplification of the fact that because we fired first -I think people fire for a reason, there's nothing wrong with firing first if you think you are under attack. You have to take into account at any given time and I think every different security officer and commander that day had different positions would come to a different conclusion at a different time, so I don't think you can just concede that one fact could change the whole difference.

MR DORFLING: So if this one fact is different, let's say the whole scenario was the same, you had the background information of what transpired earlier that morning, you had a different crowd that looked different, that surged forward, all the facts you've mentioned, but for one - that was not there being the fact that this crowd was firing at you first. That is taken out of the permutation. Do you say that under those circumstances you would think that it would still be justified to shoot at the crowd?

MR KRUSER: As I was saying earlier and I think I said in the inquest, the same line of questioning, it's very difficult to draw a conclusion if the facts differ because if one fact is not there all the facts change in terms of how you make a decision. You can't have the one without the other - I made a decision based on all those facts, I'm not prepared to go into theories where one fact was not there. That is my evidence - sorry all that facts that were there.

MR DORFLING: But Mr Kruser, I'm asking you to do exactly that - to tell us what the decision would have been if there was no shots aimed at the security guards coming from the crowd?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, a combat situation is not something you can reconstruct under these things, when you're under that sort of pressure, yes you have to make decisions on all those facts. I don't want to speculate on what would have happened if there was no shots or was shots, I can only say I came to that decision based on all those facts. If there was another fact, different scenario if I was put there I think I might come to another decision, I don't want to speculate on any of those things now. I can only tell you why I took that decision and they were based on all those facts I mentioned on more than one occasion here.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, can we deal with the ways of gaining access to Shell House - would you agree with me you've described basically three modes of access being the front door, the two roller doors at the garage at the back and then possibly I think you said two or three shops from which access...[intervention]

MR KRUSER: Three or four I said, I'm not sure exactly.

MR DORFLING: Do you agree with me that the marchers at no stage tried to gain entrance to Shell House via any one of the shops?

MR KRUSER: They did not.

MR DORFLING: Do you agree with me that the marchers at no stage tried to gain access through the garage doors, the roller doors?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: That leaves us with only one possible access route for the marchers being the one in Plein Street, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't think that's entirely correct.

MR DORFLING: No but was there any indication that they were going to enter at any other place?

MR KRUSER: I think they were in a position to.

MR DORFLING: So was there anything that you observed that made you come to the impression that they were going to perhaps enter at the garage doors or enter through some of the shops?

MR KRUSER: My impression is they were launching an attack. Access to Shell House could be gained via other entrances. I said to the court I'm not prepared to divulge that information in the open, if they pose - it would still pose a threat to Shell House. I am saying from where they launched the attack, I'm not sure what information they had and what information they had because we were also aware that plans were trying to be obtained from the City Council from sources within the IFP and the third force, we are aware of that fact therefore I think the front door was one option, I also think options from different shops was another option.

MR DORFLING: What access route did you try and protect on that day?

MR KRUSER: My lord, I'm sorry, Mr Chairman, when I felt that life and limb not only of myself but my fellow guards and comrades and also the building was under attack, it was not about the access it's about protecting firstly my life and the lives of the members of the ANC in the building and the leadership of the building. If I allowed, if I retreated to the front of the building, a crowd of that size and magnitude with the type of weapons among that crowd, I think the tally, the death tally would have been much higher not only from their side at the doors but we also would have suffered quite a few casualties from our side. The front entrance of Shell House is protected by ordinary glass door, a crowd of a thousand to storm down a door of that nature I think it's common cause what would have happened if a thousand people stormed those doors down and we were inside with AK47's - what would be the nature of death on both sides and injuries I think.

MR DORFLING: Am I correct in inferring from that answer that what you envisaged is the crowd could gain access through the front door by storming the front door and entering the building and in that way pose a threat to the leadership and the members of the ANC in the building?

MR KRUSER: When, the impression I got there was an attack, there was gunfire coming - I think my own life was also at danger, the lives of my colleagues were at danger. The other aspects just continues. After us, the members of the ANC - after that the leadership of the ANC, the destruction of our building, I think there's evidence in terms of what happened at Boiphatong when a group of armed Inkatha marchers marched through the township. There's evidence what happened at the Jo'burg Civic Centre when they broke down the doors in that march - so I think it's common cause and I think any trained security person would tell you that you need to determine where you last line of defence is - where you're going to face the minimum of losses when you're under attack. You cannot go to a point where you're going to face the maximum amount of losses and as a trained person I took that decision that that was the position I had to make my last line of defence if an attack was coming.

MR DORFLING: Let's just look at the factual situation, Mr Kruser. You were positioned with - together with some other guards on the corners of King George and Plein Street on the south western corner of Shell House?

MR KRUSER: That's right.

MR DORFLING: The other security guards were positioned on the balcony on the second floor of the building, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: There were people on the parapet, that's correct. First floor I think.

MR DORFLING: If there were no security guards positioned at the corners of King George and Plein Street it would allow the marchers to proceed unhindered at least until up to the corner of King George and Plein Street, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's what my planning made provision for that.

MR DORFLING: It would also provide for those marchers to then either turn westerly or easterly into Plein Street, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, Mr Chairman, if the marchers were marching like the other groups which passed the front of Shell House I don't think the potential referred to would have been there but I think with a doubt of the situation very differently. That march and other factors surrounding that march is very different to other marches. I don't think the fact that we were there is the cause of the shooting itself. All the factors I explained is the cause of ...[inaudible] - three other groups marched past Shell House - we did nothing although we were provoked to the extreme I think.

MR DORFLING: Would I be correct in saying that the main entrance of Shell House is about half way down the block in between King George and Plein Streets from the Plein Street side?

MR KRUSER: I would say it's stretches from the court - the entrance is very wide it's not one door, it's a lot of doors. It's in the centre of the street but it's quite wide.

MR LAX: Can I just clarify something, is it Plein Street that the main entrance is in because yesterday we thought it was "Klein".

MR KRUSER: It's Plein Street.

MR DORFLING: At what distance would you put the - what is the distance in your estimation from the corner of King George and Plein up to the entrance in Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: Repeat that?

MR DORFLING: At what distance would you put the distance between the corners of King George and Plein and the entrance in Plein Street?

MR KRUSER: Probably ten, fifteen metres I think to the nearest, I don't know, I think there's a map.

MR DORFLING: I've got a number of other questions I would like to put to this witness, I see that it's lunch time now, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn now and resume at two o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, I've made available some further copies of the document that was handed to the witness, the pages 261 to 270 - I believe one copy was taken from the Committee, may I just beg leave to replace the copy that was given to the witness?

MS KHAMPEPE: You can keep it because I already have another copy.

MR DORFLING: The Committee Member concerned seems to have another one already.

Mr Chairman, if I may just refer to the affidavits of the applicant and the specific responses relating to the questions put in the Attorney General's letter. I've now got the portions of the record that reflect the questions to which these responses was forthcoming and I would like to deal with that specifically.

Now, Mr Kruser, in your one supplementary affidavit you make reference to the letter of the Attorney General dated the 23rd of September 1996?

GARY JOHN KRUSER: (s.u.o.)

Can you just maybe indicate to me which affidavit it is?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DORFLING: (cont)

I'm dealing with page 17 of your Application for Amnesty and particularly paragraph 6 thereof.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Dorfling, it would appear that members of the public are not getting any translation.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, with reference to the Shell House inquest record, I would like to put to the witness the question that was posed in the Attorney General's letter and then have regard to the response and see whether that was a fair response and accurately and truthfully reflects his position.

Now the first supplementary affidavit makes mention of the letter of the Attorney General dated the 23rd September 1996 and that is contain at page 17 of the application and paragraph 6 thereof. In the letter by the Attorney General the following question was put to you Mr Kruser, to respond to via your legal representatives: "During the course of the above mentioned meeting, we request an urgent consultation with Mr Gary Kruser to enable us to clarify and or obtain additional information with him as a result of his statement." That's now as a result of your first statement and then in paragraph 5 it reads: "When were any armaments issued on the day in question, to whom and were the details recorded in a register, if not why not?" That was the question that was put to you to respond to by way of a supplementary affidavit, do you agree?

MR KRUSER: I have to agree, I don't have the letter in front of me.

MR DORFLING: That was put to you by Mr Justice Nugent at the inquest proceedings and you agreed to that? Your response?

MR KRUSER: I have to concede, I don't have the documents, I accede it could have been put to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Anyway, the question has been read out to you.

MR DORFLING: And the response is recorded as follows in your supplementary affidavit: "I have no independent recollection of details concerning to whom firearms were issued and when they were issued. To the best of my knowledge, all available registers and allied documentation have been supplied to the office of the Attorney General." It does not only refer to the actual register, it also referred to allied documentation, in other words a possible note as you perceived it to have been in existence at that point in time. A note somewhere else.

MR KRUSER: I think the statement reflects that all the documents which was in the possession of the armoury which concerns firearms, the dates of receiving firearms, how they were issued - everything relevant to that which was in the possession of Quest Dlamini who was doing investigation on behalf of the ANC was handed over to the Attorney General, that was the ANC's request. So everything which was in the armoury which was under my possession was given to the Attorney General I think via the attorneys, not via me. So all the documents was given then.

MR DORFLING: But Mr Kruser, why didn't you make reference of the so called, what you perceived to be a note somewhere else at that point in time which would reflect the information?

MR KRUSER: As I stated, we gave all the information which I handed over at the time of the investigation of the ANC to Quest Dlamini and he was instructed to give all that information to the Attorney General.

MR DORFLING: It goes even further than that Mr Kruser because the Attorney General addressed a further following up letter to you dated the 15th October 1996 trying to clarify the position and I make reference to the extract from page 2709 of the record of the inquest proceedings, Mr Chairman. The Attorney General in it's letter to you records the following: "Only one firearm register was furnished to this office together with loose documentation. A copy thereof is attached hereto. Brigadier Kruser must be requested to peruse it and confirm whether this is indeed the register he is referring to in paragraph 5. He must set out who kept this register and what were his orders in this regard." And then the important part: "He must also set out whether any further documentation was kept, he must state whether the register can assist him in adding anything to this statement." In other words, you're specifically requested to supply particulars of any further documentation that was kept pertaining to the issue of firearms to specific guards and then we turn to your response to that question - if the Honourable Committee would just bear with me for a second please, Mr Chairman. It's at page 26 of the Amnesty Application proper - your response is: "To the best of my knowledge two registers have been furnished to the office of the Attorney General. They are the only registers of which I am aware and to which I have referred. I was the person who kept these registers. I do not believe that the registers can assist me in adding anything to my statement." Why didn't you disclose the fact of the existence of what you perceived at that point in time, not to be a register but some other documentation that would reflect these particulars?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I think I said all the documentation which was available to me on the armoury was handed over to Quest Dlamini for the ANC investigation and he was instructed to give all those documentation to the Attorney General and I think I tried to state that in my statements. I did not give the documents or fax the documents, he was instructed by the ANC by the attorneys to hand over all this documentation to them. I did not see or participate in the hand over of all those documents.

MR DORFLING: But sir, to say in your response "I do not believe that the registers can assist me in adding anything to my statements" is an untruth. It could at that stage have assisted you to get the names of the security guards concerned and the firearms concerned.

MR KRUSER: I think I stated earlier, I was under the impression that it was not written in the firearm register, I think that's my evidence. But you were invited by the Attorney General to - if it's not in the firearm registers proper to refer him to other documentation. Why didn't you refer the Attorney General to the other documentation then?

MR KRUSER: All the documentation available was handed to the Attorney General, all our documentation in the armoury.

MR DORFLING: Are you maintaining that those answers in response to the letters of the Attorney General is true?

MR KRUSER: I think it reflects what happened.

MR DORFLING: I want to put it to you sir, that that is in conflict with your evidence at the inquest proceedings. At the inquest proceedings you agreed that they were simply untrue.

MR KRUSER: I think I agreed they were untrue based on the explanation I gave earlier and I said earlier the judge did not want to give me a chance to explain and I think I explained earlier to the Committee why I thought and I still think today that the fact that it was in the firearm register when I wrote it, it was not my impression - it was the manner in we wrote was not the normal procedure which we followed and I thought it was written somewhere else.

CHAIRPERSON: This ground has already been covered.

MR DORFLING: It has been covered, I had to revert to it to get the questions to put in the right perspective on request of one of the Committee Members, Mr Chair.

Mr Kruser, can we deal with the injuries sustained by the people outside Shell House and I'm specifically referring to the people that died on the said day. You make mentioned of a person that was shot from the front with an AK47, is that your evidence?

MR KRUSER: I've been informed by my legal representatives.

MR DORFLING: I want to put it to you that that is not the true position, that only one person in the vicinity of Shell House on the medical evidence, one of the deceased was shown to have been shot with an AK47. It reflects that he sustained two bullet wounds, one in the upper leg from behind with an exit wound in the front of the leg and another wound with an AK47 entering from his right side and with the bullet eventually being lodged on the left side of his neck. Do you accept that proposition?

MR KRUSER: I accept - I've been advised and I went through the evidence, I maybe don't recall it completely, but I clearly remember when going through it with my legal that one person was shot from the front, maybe the AK was wrong, maybe I've got it wrong in that sense but I remember that one of the people who died was shot from the front. I clearly remember that as part of the medical evidence. Maybe I got it a bit wrong the type of weapon but I remember after going through with my lawyers that was pointed out to me.

MR DORFLING: I want to put it to you that there was no evidence of anybody of the eight deceased having been shot from the front.

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, we don't believe that my learned friend is correct in that proposition. I referred earlier to the relevant pages, I remember distinctly the cross-examination of the relevant medical experts where is was accepted that it was quite possible that the track - the entry had been at the front and the track through to the back of that particular deceased. Mr Chairman, there's only one such person in question. The majority position is quite clear.

MR DORFLING: May I make the position clear, Mr Chairman, with regard to the person shot with the AK47, the evidence was quite clear that he had two bullet wounds, one in the upper leg coming from behind with an exit wound in the front and the other one from his right hand side with the bullet being lodged on the left side of his neck. Do you accept that Mr Kruser.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kruser says as far as his recollection is concerned one person was shot in the front, that's as far as he can take it. Now how does this impact on this entire application?

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, it is my submission with respect that on the evidence at least seven of the eight deceased were shot from behind.

MR KRUSER: There is a dispute in my mind.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this disputable, that?

MR KRUSER: He was stabbed.

MR DORFLING: As far as the people shot with firearms are concerned, I'm specifically dealing with the people shot with firearms at Shell House.

CHAIRPERSON: There's a dispute about that. ...[inaudible] the evidence, Mr Kruser says his recollection is that of the people that were shot and who died outside Shell House, one of them was shot in the front and you've dealt with that. Now I don't know whether there's been any dispute about the fact that the others were shot in the back?

MR DORFLING: Yes, I think the evidence of the witness initially was that this person was shot with an AK47, I'm putting the proposition that the person shot with an AK47 was not shot from the front.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Dorfling, he's already conceded to you that he might have been wrong about the AK47 - he said as much. Do we need to pursue it any further?

MR DORFLING: No it was indeed conceded in the last question and in that regards that there was initially a dispute and the witness has just in the last question conceded that and that's why this question was put.

Mr Kruser would you please have regard to the roneo form attached to your Application for Amnesty that is contained in Exhibit C at pages 1 - 7, Mr Chairman.

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR DORFLING: May I refer you to paragraph 10a, sir?

MR KRUSER: I have it.

MR DORFLING: That's on page 3, just for the record.

You are requested to set out the political objective which you sought to achieve by committing the act, in other words by giving the order for the security guards to shoot. Is that the way you understood the question?

MR KRUSER: Our political objective, yes.

MR DORFLING: Does the response to question 10a reflect your position correctly sir?

MR KRUSER: It's correct as I explained yesterday. My political objective was as a cadre of the movement, deployed in the ANC, I had the responsibility to protect the leadership and the people of the ANC.

MR DORFLING: Your objective therefore was to prevent physical harm or injury to the leadership and members of the ANC, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR DORFLING: Would you like to add anything to that?

CHAIRPERSON: He already said that damage to the ANC property, Shell House, as well in the evidence.

MR LAX: And on the form, with all due respect, if you look at it: "I was protecting the leadership and property of the ANC against the IFP" that's what it says.

MR DORFLING: I'm asking the witness, Mr Chairman, if there's anything he would like to add as far as his political objective is concerned, to add that now, I want to give him the opportunity.

MR KRUSER: I think what I've said, I'm happy with my reasons laid down.

MR DORFLING: I beg your pardon?

MR KRUSER: I'm happy with the reasons I've given, I don't want to add anything more.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser, I would like you to have the opportunity to respond to certain of the finding made at the time of the inquest by Mr Justice Nugent. This is not a re-hearing of the inquest, we're not reviewing the decisions, I just want you to make your own position clear with regard to the findings by Mr Justice Nugent. If you disagree with those findings, I would like you to state so and then once all the evidence has been placed before the Committee, the Committee has to decide whether those findings can be supported or whether your version should be accepted.

Mr Chairman, the findings is also contained in Exhibit C I'm going to be referring to the specific pages. Page 181 of the Application - sorry, that is incorrect -page 184 - page 30 of the typed record.

I would on behalf of the objectors at the conclusion of these proceedings make certain submissions and I would like you to say whether, or give you the opportunity to respond to that at this point in time. At page 184 at the top paragraph, Mr Justice Nugent deals with the so called information that was received by the ANC and which formed the background against which you gave your order for the guards to first fire warning shots and then to repel. He deals specifically with this so called information and he makes the finding on a prima facie basis. I read the last sentence of the first paragraph:

"Prima facie, in our view, the evidence to that effect has been no more than make weight which was fabricated after the event so as to bolster the explanations which have been put forward for the shooting which occurred at Lancet Hall and Shell House."

I'm going to argue in front of this Committee that having regard to all the evidence, the ANC and your version that you had information that there would be an attack is nothing more but a make weight which you designed afterwards to make it fit in with your version of what transpired. Would you care to respond to that, sir?

MR KRUSER: All I can say that I'm aware that I did receive information and we acted with the information we got.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it too, the information which the ANC had got, not the actual events of the gangs and marching, these groups marching, some of them armed and so on - doesn't relate to that.

MR DORFLING: It relates specifically to the information of the so called planned attack on Lancet Hall and or Shell House, Mr Chairman, yes specifically that.

Mr Kruser I want you to have clarity in your mind, in other words, I'll be submitting in front of this Committee that you had no such information beforehand that Shell House would be attacked?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I want to say again that we had information, I'm just reading through the judgement itself here now. The Judge also says it's likely that they would be rumours. Now there can be a big debate of what rumour is and what information is and what intelligence is because I see in his judgement, I haven't read it but, looking at it he says it's quite likely there were rumours of varying reliability. Now as a person trained in intelligence, a rumour for one person could be information for someone else and intelligence for the next person depends from which source you are getting it and what avenue the information comes to you. I mean even based on his own findings, if I just read it my own interpretation of it - he says it's quite likely they would be rumours. Now as an intelligence person as I say a rumour could be information, for the next intelligence officer it could be intelligence because intelligence is confirmed information. If it's from more than two sources it could be intelligence. I know I was informed by Commissioner Radu and later in the morning by other intelligence officers in the ANC that there was information to that effect. Now whether you want to call it a rumour or not it depends who's receiving the information. I mean even if I read the findings now myself there's a contradiction in terms of this whole thing myself how I interpret it and I don't think I'm a lawyer but that's how I see it as a lay person.

To go further, I'm just reading, he says, he talks about the state of mind and I don't know whether it matters or whether information or not and whether my apprehension was because of the information or because the activities of the marchers during the day - I don't see - I'm just reading, I haven't read it before but now I had time while you asked the question. I can't see the difference in apprehension although I know for myself that I got that information from some of my colleagues here sitting behind and from the Commissioner the late Mr Radu and I stand by the fact that I received that information but I find the judgement a bit contradictory itself as a lay person but I'm not a lawyer but I'm sure my lawyers will argue those things if they agree with me.

MR DORFLING: Mr Kruser the point I make is that your allegation that you had this, call it information, call it rumours, the so called factual basis for your background to react on that day was rejected as non-existent and as a make weight by Mr Justice Nugent.

MR KRUSER: I'm saying to you I received the information from the late Commissioner Radu and from other intelligence operatives, that is my evidence here today.

MR DORFLING: Could we move on to page 288 of the application page 134 of the actual judgement? At the bottom of page, last paragraph.

MR KRUSER: Sorry, could you give me the page of the typed version, I don't have that.

MR LAX: It's 134.

MR DORFLING: At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, Mr Justice Nugent at that point in time deals with three prominent features in the ANC's version of how things transpired on the day and he here deals with the first prominent feature. He says "What is perhaps the most significant feature of the evidence of all of them is that they alleged that they were being fired at from amongst the crowd as it was advancing towards them in King George Street. In our view the weight of the evidence is wholly against this. The evidence of both Mr Von Eggerdy and Mr Diaz was that the first sound of gunfire the crowd immediately disintegrated and fled. We have no reason to doubt this evidence and it is quite inconsistent with the version that the firing was coming from the crowd before the security guards fired. Mr Von Eggerdy had heard about three shots being fired earlier but that was before the group had yet even converged in the intersection. He also identified the main gunfire which he heard as having come from what he described as 'defensive positions' by which he meant the armed people he had seen south of King George Street. The evidence of the other witnesses is all consistent with the evidence of those two witnesses on this issue and inconsistent with the evidence of the ANC guards." Do you understand that dictum?

MR KRUSER: I understand, I think I also said here Mr Chairman that I'm prepared to - said if there's objective evidence which doesn't tally with my version of events, I'm prepared to accept that. I however maintain that's how I saw it on the day, there's objective evidence to say it happened differently - I accept that it might have happened differently.

MR DORFLING: Can I move on to page 290, that's 136 of the actual judgement at the last paragraph on that page in which Mr Justice Nugent makes the following finding: "The evidence of the security guards that they were being shot at from the crowd as it advanced up King George Street stands quite alone. Apart from this, the versions of these witnesses in relation to the gunfire which was alleged to have come from the crowd were in various respects improbable and irreconcilable in to say or with other acceptable evidence. Prima facie, the evidence on this issue was not truthful which inevitably casts doubt upon the remainder of the evidence as to how and why the shooting took place. The overall weight of the evidence point prima facie to the conclusion that the shooting was initiated by heavy firing by the ANC guards at the south western corner of Shell House."

You've already agreed that the objective ballistic evidence supports that conclusion, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't think that's what I said.

MR DORFLING: Let me rephrase it - the ballistic evidence shows no proof or shows no support for the version put forward by the ANC at the time of the inquest proceedings?

MR KRUSER: It shows no support for the fact that gunfire was directed in my direction.

MR DORFLING: It furthermore appears from the evidence of the witnesses which are mentioned here and which I've mentioned to you - some police officials, some army officials as well as outstanders or objective witnesses - Diaz, Von Eggerdy and Mr Da Silva - that the finding by Mr Justice Nugent is supported by those witnesses.

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, evidence is being placed before the Committee now in respect implicitly of the credibility of a number of witnesses who are being enumerated by Mr Dorfling. Other than Mr Von Eggerdy who was accepted by all parties as having been a credible witness and whose evidence could strongly be relied upon, the other witnesses were all challenged and Mr Chairman, I can assure you that substantial submissions were made in respect of their credibility and their contractions. We would be most loath, Mr Chairman, to be drawn into a situation in the course of these proceedings to cross-examination of this sort of having to debate all that unnecessarily and unproductively before this Committee.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, if I may just try and explain why I'm putting - I want the witness to have the opportunity to either disagree or agree with these findings. His version was found to be untruthful, his version was rejected by Mr Justice Nugent and this is now an opportunity for the witness to say those findings are not correct, I do not agree with that and the evidence will then at the end of these proceedings show whether the findings were indeed correct or not. I'm putting to the Committee that at the conclusion of these proceedings those will be my submissions I make and I would like the witness to have a fair opportunity to respond to these submissions I want to make.

CHAIRPERSON: On the understanding that the conclusions reached by the Judge are being put before you, you are being asked that on the basis of the way he has analysed the evidence, the conclusions he has reached are those that had been read to you and you are asked whether you agree with the Judge's conclusions in that regard.

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, I think in my affidavit, what do you call it, the last affidavit to the Truth Commission, I think I say that I respectfully disagree with many findings of the inquest court. I respectfully disagree with many findings of the inquest court - I think I say it in my application to the Truth Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 290 and 291 - is that one of those that you agree or disagree with?

MR KRUSER: The judge is saying that?

CHAIRPERSON: From the ANC guards at the south western corner of Shell House.

MR KRUSER: When I gave my evidence in the inquest my recollection of events at that time and based on which this judgement is made, I was under the impression that gunfire emanated from the crowd. I don't if this - I looked at the ballistic evidence, that doesn't show me where gunfire - we don't doubt that heavy gunfire emanated from our side - we agree to that. Whether that was the first shooting or not, I don't know if that is true, there's nothing to stand on besides witnesses I'm told now through my lawyers that we're not even sure these witnesses are credible. So I'm saying what other evidence besides the findings of the Judge which I don't agree with all his findings is that the first shooting came from our side - we agree we shot, I don't think that's in dispute, we agree that gunfire was not directed at our - I don't see anything and maybe the Committee must correct me because I'm not a lawyer, that shows me there's factual evidence the first gunfire came from our side. I don't - based on what I read and what I hear in front of this Committee, I can't see any factual evidence that the first gunfire emanated from, besides other witnesses. I can only say what I recollect on that day. I mean I'm not, I don't dispute that as a possibility that the first fire could have come, that maybe my recollection wasn't correct. So I'm not saying it's not possible.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Mr Kruser, what has been put to you is a finding by the Judge in the inquest. What you're being asked is to indicate whether you agree with that finding or whether you don't agree with that finding. Do you understand the question?

MR KRUSER: I understand the question.

CHAIRPERSON: In fairness I think it should be also told to him that this a record of an inquest, it was not the record of a trial, you understand? The record of a trial in which witnesses give evidence, they are cross-examined in detail, that's the evidence of a trial. This is the record of an inquest which the Judge himself says is not a trial. However, the Judge comes to certain conclusions on the information before him and you're being asked whether you disagree with those conclusions. You've told us, you've already said that there are some conclusions you disagree with?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And we've taken a lot of time to find out now because you've been asked whether this particular passage that has been read to you - whether you disagree with that. You either disagree or you agree with it, that's all?

MR BIZOS: May I just indicate that when he is asked to agree or disagree the full passage must be put and I submit that if one has regard to page 136 from the judgement, the typed, it is clear that shots were fired from amongst the crowd in the course of the shooting but there is nothing other that the evidence of the ANC guards to indicate that this occurred before the pandemonium broke out so that if he's asked to comment upon the judge's findings in relation to the shooting, he should be given the full text of the finding by my learned friend for - that is doing the cross-examination.

Further down, there were also four shots which struck the parapet at the north western corner. These were fired from De Villiers Street and might well have been interspersed with the shots which were fired from the balcony but there is nothing other than the evidence of the security guards to indicate that they were fired before the shooting which came from the south western corner. So that is the - we submit that you can't put what the finding was by leaving out the favourable part of the finding in relation to the witness's version. I'm sorry, this does not relate to the question of the learned Judge, I am merely saying that the full passage was not put by the cross-examiner and I did not intend to interrupt the learned Judge's question.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, the question relates specifically to the bottom of page 136, the last paragraph. What is being put to this witness is that Mr Justice Nugent found that at the time when the crowd was alleged to have surged forward in the alleged attack, at that time there was no shooting emanating from the crowd and he finds support for his view from the evidence of the witnesses. It might be that at other occasions there were shooting emanating from the crowd, that's not what's being put to this witness. It's been put to this witness that at the time when he ordered the shooting no firing was done by the marchers in the direction of the security guards.

CHAIRPERSON: Where the Judge says it is clear that shots were fired from amongst the crowd, all this must have happened in a very short span of time, you understand and I think that we must not take an academic view of this evidence, isn't it?

These are fast moving events and to take one little bit out of context, focus on it, we might get a distorted picture.

MR DORFLING: I perfectly agree, I think what Mr Justice Nugent is trying to convey here is at the time when the pandemonium started, the commencement of the firing at that time there was no other shooting being done by the marchers and that's what Mr Justice Nugent found and I believe that there's support for that view in the evidence which I'll submit to this Committee and that is the response I would like from this witness, he must say whether that is indeed correct - that there was no other shooting immediately preceding the order to fire by him to his guards.

CHAIRPERSON: Immediately preceding - do you mean one minute or 10 minutes?

MR DORFLING: Well there was no specific time frames given in the evidence, one can't put it to a specific time frame but as Mr Justice Nugent put it at the time when the pandemonium broke loose, at that time there was no shooting emanating from the crowd.

May I proceed to the so called second salient principle feature in the evidence of the ANC guards dealt with at page 137, the second paragraph? It specifically deals with the question as to whether the crowd was charging forward brandishing their spears and other weapons as if they were going to attack the guards. That was the ANC's version as put forward, is that correct Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: I think that's still the ANC's version. What I also find very disturbing - the Judge relies Von Eggerdy on his other points are - whether we shot first or not but on this point he doesn't find his evidence credible, because he supports the version that these people were attacking. I just find the judgement a bit...[intervention]

MR DORFLING: The whole judgement carries on and I don't want to be blamed for putting it out of context, it continues at the whole of page 137 - the full of page....[intervention]

MR BIZOS: My learned ...[inaudible] read half a paragraph, stop in the middle of a sentence and then proceed to another paragraph. I have already indicated that it cannot be regarded as credible witness but support for their evidence on this issue was sought in the evidence of Mr Von Eggerdy who described the crowd as being on full charge on his interpretation - they were on the attack. That's what the judgement says Mr Chairman. As to whether the learned Judge correctly interpreted the common cause evidence Mr Von Eggerdy or not, I think can be left to us and our learned friends to argue about.

MR DORFLING: I quite agree that...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You'll have the liberty to deal with all this in your address and make your submissions but to take bits and pieces and put it to this witness and ask him whether he disagrees with this or that can't take the matter much further. This is the Judge's view of the evidence. He says he disagrees with some of the conclusions the judge has come to and I've no doubt that you'll weld all this in your argument.

MR DORFLING: As the Committee pleases Mr Chairman. May I then just to conclude this point ask the witness to respond whether he agrees with the fact that it was found that there was no prima facie evidence to support the view that the crowd was surging forward in an attack mode on the ANC guards, do you agree or disagree with such a finding?

MR KRUSER: I disagree.

MR DORFLING: Lastly, it was found by Mr Justice Nugent that as there was, objectively speaking, in his view on the prima facie evidence no attack on the guards he had to consider whether the ANC guards might not possibly subjectively have foreseen that there was an attack. In other words, whether in their minds, although there was on the facts not an attack, whether they perhaps might have thought there was an attack. He considered that and he rejected the ANC's version that it could have been perceived as an attack. What is your response to that?

MR KRUSER: I was there and I saw attack.

MR DORFLING: Mr Chairman, if I may just for purposes of the Committee's reference, the last statement relates to the findings at page 139 - 145 of the said judgement. The previous statement relates to the findings at page 137 and 138. The last statement yes, as to the so called question of futitive self defence, if I may call it that. At pages 139 -145. I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR DORFLING: Prior to the lunch adjournment I was dealing with the access to the building and I actually went back to the Attorney General's letters and I forgot to finish that point. May I just conclude that point with your permission?

Mr Kruser, pertaining to the access at the main entrance to Shell House, you've already described the outside perimeter of the building at ground level at the entrance to be glass doors and glass windows, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That's right, doors with glass panels.

MR DORFLING: We know that they were not bullet proof glass but was it armoured glass or strengthen glass?

MR KRUSER: I am not sure but I know they were not bullet proof they were broken before.

MR DORFLING: Once one has gained access through those glass doors or glass windows is it indeed correct that after that there's a screening process and a desk where personnel sits and a person goes through or had to go through at that time an x-ray machine or a similar device which would detect any metal objects in a persons possession?

MR KRUSER: Once you go through the front glass doors you're in the - you're in Shell House itself, in the foyer of Shell House. From there, there would be an access control point yes, for people who have permission to visit and things like that.

MR DORFLING: Once you've gone past that point there's yet a further obstacle in ones way, there's revolving gates that allows one access to the lifts, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: Once you get to the front doors the revolving gates are at the other point which - there's only two, you have the doors which you come into at the front door, from there you have the revolving gates - that's the two points.

MR DORFLING: The revolving gates, how many people does it allow access simultaneously at one given point?

MR KRUSER: Under normal circumstances for visitors one but I'm sure you can go through many if you want to break it down.

MR DORFLING: Are they steel structures or metal structures?

MR KRUSER: They are fibreglass structures with rivets into it, you can see how many are broken at Shell House at the moment. They break just through normal wear and tear, they are not very strong.

MR DORFLING: Once you've gone through the revolving doors what access do you have to the upper floors of the building?

MR KRUSER: You have lifts and staircases to the top. Eight lifts and I think there are three staircases, I'm not sure. There's also a staircase in the building from the foyer up into the building.

MR DORFLING: So if we were to postulate a crowd of for example a thousand people entering Shell House they will have to break down the front windows and glass doors and then have to break down the revolving gates and then have to either run up the flights of stairs or go up with the escalators to the floors where the leadership of the ANC would be on that day, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I don't understand the suggestion, are you suggesting that we should sit and watch them breaking down the doors? I don't understand the suggestion at all.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] suggesting that, he's just suggesting that if there were a crowd of people that had entered into the building these are all the obstacles that they would have to overcome - they would have to take the lift after they have gone through the revolving door or take the escalator to go up - that's what is being put to you.

MR KRUSER: That's how they would get to the top or via the stairs.

MR DORFLING: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DORFLING

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN WYK: Thank you Mr Chairman, only a few questions I've got here.

Mr Kruser, I had a look at your application and I want to ascertain from you whether this application of yours is conditional or is it an unconditional Application for Amnesty?

MR KRUSER: I think I explained earlier that in process of consultation we were advised by our lawyers how a self defence case worked and there were probabilities that the court both civil and criminal and even the inquest might find that our recollection of the events would not - may not be the true reflection of what happened on that day. We were then advised that it would be much better, may probably wise to say that we probably exceeded, it was some sort of safeguard that if my recollection was not correct and I don't think it was conditional, that we would be able to continue with this process which is provision is made for in the statute.

MR VAN WYK: Why I'm asking this is that if I look at page 2 of the bundle of applications, your application reads "I apply for Amnesty if it is found that I exceeded the bounds of self defence." Now I'm asking you, do you concede that you exceeded the bounds of self defence or do you still deny that?

MR KRUSER: I think I said yesterday I accept the ballistic evidence, it's very clear from the ballistic evidence and more probably that we probably shot longer than we had to shoot. Which - can I just finish - which was explained to me that that constitutes exceeding the bounds of self defence.

MR VAN WYK: I therefore repeat my question - do you accede -do you concede that you exceeded the bounds of self defence?

MR KRUSER: Based on the ballistic evidence, yes.

MR VAN WYK: Do you then concede that your actions were not justified, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: I don't think we can answer the question - I am saying on the day when I recollected the events I thought I acted in a manner which is justified. The objective evidence however shows that clearly the guards shot longer than what we thought we shot or maybe I gave the order much - took too long to give the order, whatever, one of the two of that but it's very clear that we shot longer than we were supposed to shoot. I accept that that's - the objectives actually prove that and I accede to that.

MR VAN WYK: There is a history since 1994 in respect of your co-operation with the police and the investigation that there was several non-disclosures, do you concede that?

MR KRUSER: I refused to disclose names of my colleagues.

MR VAN WYK: So you concede that?

MR KRUSER: I've conceded that earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: That already.

MR VAN WYK: There were also certain untruths that you told either in your affidavits or at the inquest, do you concede that?

MR KRUSER: I withheld names of people, I concede to that.

MR VAN WYK: Do you concede that you were also under certain wrong impressions because your version was rebutted by objective evidence, do you concede that?

MR KRUSER: I concede that my recollection is not a true reflection of what happened on that day.

MR VAN WYK: And you only made the concessions when the specific evidence was tendered, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: As I said yesterday if I did not see the ballistic evidence I would still believe what happened on that day, my version was correct.

MR VAN WYK: Now the AK47 magazine contain 30 rounds, you concede that?

MR KRUSER: I concede that.

MR VAN WYK: Did you see Mr Khumalo exchanging his magazine at the south western corner of Shell House when he fired?

MR KRUSER: I did not.

MR VAN WYK: Is it your case that he did not exchange magazines?

MR KRUSER: I don't recollect him changing magazines.

MR VAN WYK: So if you didn't see it, you can't deny it, is that your answer?

MR KRUSER: I don't know if it happened.

MR VAN WYK: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear?

MR KRUSER: I don't know if it happened, I don't think it happened but I don't it happened.

MR VAN WYK: You don't think it happened - is it a denial that it happened or is it merely an impression today, Mr Kruser?

MR KRUSER: My recollection on that day is that he never changed the magazine. What is clear to me that my recollection could not be one hundred percent correct, so I can't admit or deny that he changed it, he would know better I think.

MR VAN WYK: Mr Chairman, thank you. Why I'm referring you to this question, Mr Kruser, just shortly I want to refer you to the inquest record at page 2752 where your evidence was the following - it was a question by the court "Yes he also told me that there were, I cannot remember exactly, there were bursts of automatic fire from this person with the weapon and he saw - it seemed to him the man was changing the magazine, putting a new magazine and then fired on single fire." That was question. Your reply "That is not possible, is was present with the person with the AK my lord, it did not happen, my lord." I'm sorry, are you changing your version?

MR KRUSER: I'm changing my version I'm saying what I saw on that day, that's my recollection, that's how I remember it. I'm saying there's objective evidence clearly to me that all my recollections is not the same as it happened so I accept maybe it didn't happen that way but on that given day and the time I testified, that's how I remember it.

MR VAN WYK: On that day you testified, is that reference to last year?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR VAN WYK: Why I'm asking you this is that I want to put it to you that your version is false and it's not correct because the ballistic evidence in the combined report was that there were at least 35 marks on the buildings which was compatible with the AK47 and which probably came from the south western corner - now that is more than one magazine, would you agree with that?

MR KRUSER: If the ballistics says that then it's true.

MR VAN WYK: I've no further questions, thank you Mr Kruser.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN WYK

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Mr Chairman, I still have a few questions to ask this witness. As it pleases the Chairman.

Mr Kruser, in your evidence you are referring to destruction and devastation that took place at the hands of IFP members in Boiphatong. It is clear from your evidence that you felt very badly hurt about what happened there, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I think any human being who sees women, children and people maimed and killed in that manner would feel very distressed about it.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: How did you in particular feel about the IFP and it's members at that point in time did you regard them as your enemy?

MR KRUSER: The IFP is a - has been a rival organisation of the ANC, I don't think they were enemies, they were a rival organisation of the ANC.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: But personally, how did you feel driving through Boiphatong?

MR KRUSER: As I said, doesn't matter who killed those people, I felt distress that human life could be taken so cheaply. It's not about who killed them, the fact that human life was taken so cheaply I think that was the point, who killed them was not the issue that day.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did you follow the newspaper reports after that incident regarding that specific incident?

MR KRUSER: I read newspapers quite diligently but I don't remember - I'm sure I read the paper.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Do you recall that it was said by I believe also your party that the police or other forces were involved in the planning and executing of the attack?

MR KRUSER: I don't recall the newspaper - I recall reading intelligence reports to that effect, yes.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did you believe that?

MR KRUSER: I had no reason not to believe it.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: In your evidence you're also referring to a specific attack that took place on you whilst visiting the rural areas in Natal. Were you attacked by IFP members?

MR KRUSER: It was in the early nineties, Mr Chairman, I was - one of my responsibilities was the protection of our president and when we went to big rallies at dangerous areas I would go and prepare the visit. We were in an area called Ensilini which was known as a no go area for the ANC and Winnie Mandela, the late Chris Hani, the late Harry Gwala all tried to visit that area and were refused access to that area by the IFP. Our president insisted in visiting that area and I was given instructions to prepare the visit. We armed ourselves with AKs and other assortments of weapons and went into the area to plan the ...[inaudible]. While the president was visiting houses which was burned down by IFP members, gunshots started emanating from the hills of the area and we had to evacuate the area.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Are there any other incidents where you specifically was attacked by members of the IFP?

MR KRUSER: Not me, but I know of many members of our party who were attacked.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: And how did you feel about that?

MR KRUSER: As I said earlier, I think human life injury to people is not about parties it's about humanity I think and that's the issue for me here.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Now shortly before the so called Shell House incident there was a report published in the newspapers and which was actually attached to the bundle of documents submitted by your legal representatives which deals with the so called unveiling of the third force activities. Are you aware of that, have you seen that newspaper report?

MR KRUSER: I don't exactly recall it but I'm aware of the Goldstone Commission report on the third force activities.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Do you know that it is mentioned in that report and or newspaper article that the IFP were probably in cahoots with the police and other forces?

MR KRUSER: I don't know what I must say but in the ANC structures it's almost common knowledge.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Can I just get that straight - it was common knowledge - can you just explain, what was common knowledge?

MR KRUSER: That the IFP were working together with third force elements.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: And that indeed, Mr Kruser, also ties in with your evidence where you testified that you did not want to disclose that list of weapons or the register to the police and or Attorney General because isn't it because you didn't trust the police?

MR KRUSER: I don't think we'll make any bones about it, if you look at the investigation you'll see very many good reasons why we shouldn't have had trust them and why I still don't trust them.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Mr Kruser, can you then explain why did you in your evidence yesterday, said that you trusted the statutory forces of the country to give you protection at that point in time?

CHAIRPERSON: There's more a hope than a trust isn't it?

MR KRUSER: Let me just explain that, Mr Chairman. I was in charge of security of all our leaders in our buildings in the country. One of the documents I wrote to the National Directorate around securing our leaders and other things was we faced a serious concern from right wing and third force elements in the process of doing that and I made a motivation which was rejected by the vast majority of regions in which I was in charge of all the regions which was eventually approved by our director, Mr Joey Ntlhantlha and the essence of my suggestion was that we involve police or state structures in all our security operations. The reason why I motivated that was I thought that elements of security forces would not attack their own members and that was the basis why I made a motivation to my leadership and throughout the process they set up liaison structures and we thought, although we knew the liaison structures were all security branch structures, we had to use those structures to the best of our ability as an organisation which didn't have the resources of which the state has and I think it worked very effectively for us. Whenever I needed a sweep - we never had dogs to sweep our bombs, I could phone Captain Wilkins and he would come and bring his dogs in there. If a bomb went off he would have taken that responsibility, I didn't think he would subject himself to those sort of things. If President Mandela went to any area we had two security branch policemen in the cars in the convoy, we didn't think they would attack their own members, so it was a strategy which worked very well for us and that is why in all the other events when we call them to assist us - they guarded our building at night previously when we thought there were attacks when we received information. They had regular patrols there at Shell House, they came to sign our O.B. book on a regular basis every hourly patrols - those things were taking place - we didn't trust them completely - we used what we could from the state structures because we also knew they understood where this country was heading and who would be the future government of the day.

So it was trust but we qualified the type of trust which we gave to them.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Are you aware of a large number of IFP cadres that arrived at Shell House from the Friday evening onwards - I beg your pardon - ANC?

MR KRUSER: I'm not aware of that. I was not aware of that.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did nobody inform you that there was a large number who were even present early the morning of the 28th?

MR KRUSER: They belonged to MK - they didn't have to inform me about anything - I belonged to the department of Intelligence Security - we were separate departments who dealt with things separately.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Are you saying that you would not have been able to utilise them in protecting Shell House on that day?

MR KRUSER: Our department operates on the basis that we only use members of our department, people who are screened and vetted by our department, like any other security department in the world at work. We don't just take members because they belong to army, you have to work with people who are vetted and people who you can trust.

Secondly, I was not aware of those people there so I couldn't even use them, I didn't know they were there and thirdly, no one came to tell me there was extra people there.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: You say that approximately at week before the 28th March you were aware through media reports that a march was going to take place. Did you at that stage try to get extra security forces in place?

MR KRUSER: I didn't think it was necessary.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: When was the first time that you received information about an attack on Shell House?

MR KRUSER: As I testified earlier, it was the Sunday evening.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did you enquire more particulars about the nature of the attack, what form it will take on?

MR KRUSER: The first thing, the information was conveyed to me by telephone so we would not discuss details over that. Secondly, we work on a need to know basis. My commander gives me information, I don't ask questions I use the information as best as possible to secure the organisation.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Wasn't your duty partly to attend to the security at the building and therefore wasn't it necessary for you to know to enable you to plan properly to put the security in place.

MR KRUSER: Exactly - I was informed there was a possible attack against Shell House and I think I put a very excellent plan in place to secure Shell House.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: That is a matter for argument but nevertheless - you didn't enquire whether the attack would take on the form of bombing, of people armed - wasn't that relevant to you?

MR KRUSER: I think, I'm not sure here or in the inquest, I think we discussed all possibilities that might exist. We discussed the issue of drive by shootings, we discussed the issue of the march being used as a decoy for the - we discussed of individuals going into the buildings with arms or armaments. Therefore we set processes in place to ensure that we take care of orders.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did you receive any information or become aware of any information or rumours that the police or high ranking police officers would be involved in the so called attack?

MR KRUSER: I did not at that stage.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: On the Monday morning arriving at Shell House what was the first thing you did, where did you go to?

MR KRUSER: As I testified I received a phone call and went to Lancet Hall.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Did you enter the building?

CHAIRPERSON: He's already given evidence on all that, do we have to traverse that ground?

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Mr Chairman, I indeed want to find out what was the first thing he did as somebody in charge of security it's important to know security wise.

So you in fact did not enquire as to what whether the police were indeed around the building to secure the place?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, maybe I should explain - our structure works in this manner - I think it's important to understand the structure, to understand what I was doing on that day - we have Commissioner Radu as the head of the security department who would sit on the National Directorate where they would take mainly polished decisions and give orders to us. I would be the Deputy Head who would be basically operational commander of all ANC security structures. Under me I would have a head of installations who would be in charge of all ANC installations, ANC offices, houses of the ANC members of the ANC and all other leaders of the alliance we thought needed protection. His primary responsibility was to ensure that Shell House was secured and that the offices of the provinces were properly secured and all those things.

I had a conversation with him on the Sunday evening, I gave him certain instructions, he came back to me, he was satisfied that he had spoken to the police and they would get protection. I, when I came to the office, I was not under the impression that I needed to do anything. I think it's a very experienced person, very long in the movement, very long in our security department, much longer than I am even and I think he was more than capable to take the necessary steps that's possible. What concerned me that I received information there was an attack on my arrival and I thought let me go there immediately and make an assessment because I thought that would have an impact on what I have to do at Shell House when I returned.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Why did you personally carry a firearm on that day?

MR KRUSER: I'm a security officer, I wear a firearm, we were in times when we were being killed like flies.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Will you use it for self defence?

MR KRUSER: I think that's why we carry firearms.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: As I understand your evidence you were shot at on that day, why didn't you use it?

MR KRUSER: My evidence is also to the effect that I was in command of a group of armed people, there was a potential attack coming from the corner and I thought that as a commander I should have our objective picture of what was happening, if I participated in the shooting I thought I would lose some of the objectivity and I was happy with the fire power around me and that I would rather be in a position to make the decision when to shoot and when to stop firing, I thought that was more important than for me to shoot because it was not about shooting it was about protection.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Have you observed or attended to other IFP marches before this day?

MR KRUSER: I've seen many of their marches in town, I don't attend their marches.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: How come you say this is a IFP, what made you decide that this is a IFP march?

MR KRUSER: I think it's common knowledge it's an IFP march.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: I'm asking you is there anything visible that made you believe that it's IFP who was members who were actually marching.

MR KRUSER: They were dressed in the IFP colours a lot of members had IFP regalia. All the previous marchers, there were many of them in IFP regalia.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Mr Kruser, I want to put it to you that from the video material it is clear that in fact the video material handed in at the inquest and used in evidence it's actually clear that very few members or very few gatherers were indeed clothed in IFP T-shirts or brandishing any other IFP flags etc.

MR KRUSER: I can tell you I saw many.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: I just want to ask you - regarding the people who were seeking shelter in the Shell House foyer, did you know where they were coming from whether they were part of this group marching?

MR KRUSER: There were many people who sought shelter as I testified and they were ordinary citizens in the country fleeing from the carnage which was happening in the city and I said yesterday we have an organisation which we think we had an obligation to the people of this country and to offer them protection even though it was very difficult. There were however, from the report I got, that there were I think two members from the marchers who fled into the building unknowing that they fled.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: I just want to put to you that there was indeed no attack on that day and that you and the guards basically attacked the crowd out of a deep seated hatred for the IFP members and your complete intolerance to other peoples opposing political views?

MR KRUSER: I think the ANC the organisation which brought intolerance in this country, we've brought human rights, we love life that's what why we went to war for it so that you can have a democracy, you have a democracy today.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: Mr Kruser, just to end off my questioning, there are many widows and many victims present in this building today listening to your evidence. Is there anything in particular you want to tell them about how you feel about what happened on that day?

MR KRUSER: I think I said that yesterday and I say it again. I think we regret the loss of any life. I regret the loss of any life because I was brought up in that culture and I know how those widows feel, I mean, like all other widows of the other people who were killed in the city on that day and I think for all of them and for people throughout the years of struggle and people who died in Natal - we are sorry for all those deaths that have come. It's unfortunate that this had to happen.

MS VAN HUYSTEEN: No further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN HUYSTEEN

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've only got one point I would just like Mr Kruser to clarify for me.

Mr Kruser, I just want to understand your position there that day, you were the commander of the people that accompanied you to the corner of Plein and King George, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: I think we never explained, what happened - I think I should just explain to give you an understanding of what happened on that day. The initial deployment of people under normal was done by Andrew Rishlabane who was the head of installations as I explained. Subsequent to that I - when I got down I was not happy because people, every time marchers came, people were running quite wildly around, there was no organisation because many people were joining from the other sectors of our department security. I then called another meeting of all the commanders itself and deployed commanders in various positions with groups of people with them, one on the right flank, on the left flank, one immediately, one in the foyer etc. When the surveillance units, Eddie Khumalo and Mondli Zuma came back to me round - after and reported they had been shot at - I went together with them to the corner and because of my seniority I automatically took commander over the commander who was supposed to be in command at that place.

MR HUMAN: That is what I'm getting at. Did you expect that the people that accompanied you to that corner would wait for you to give an order to fire?

MR KRUSER: No necessarily, I think there was a commander, there were trained people. If the situation arose and I was not there, I think they would have to make a decision on their own.

MR HUMAN: So what was the need for you to accompany them to the corner?

MR KRUSER: I received information, there's a group of crowd shooting at my members, advancing to the back of Shell House. As a trained person I think I had the responsibility to go and see what was happening there, I think it was the obvious thing to do.

MR HUMAN: But would you say that if we look at the ballistics report and Mr Khumalo did fire in fact before you gave the order for warning shots to be fired, that he would have acted without any order from his commander, he would have started firing on that day?

MR KRUSER: On that corner I had to make an evaluation but I think every individual on that corner, if at any stage he felt that his life was being threatened, I think he had the right to take a decision. I mean in any combat situation you have a commander but I think every trained security officer on that corner had to right to make an assessment of himself. If he saw a man aiming a gun at him, I didn't think he needed to wait for me to give him an order. Every individual had a right to take a decision based on the facts in front of him.

MR HUMAN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUMAN

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] to put to this witness?

MS PATEL: No thank you Honourable Chairperson.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: This is the telephone conversation between Mr - Brigadier Gouws and the late Commissioner Leonard Radu, page 105. It was suggested to you that the late Commissioner Radu made a threat that you would take the law into your own hands. I want to read to you two or three sentences there and ask you whether you consider that a threat and in the middle of the first paragraph: "And I said to Van Dyk this morning if there is no one here who will take the law in our own hands - we will take law in our own hands and we don't want to do that."

Do you perceive that as a threat?

MR KRUSER: I think what Commissioner Radu was saying that if there's no one protect us we'll protect ourselves.

MR BIZOS: Brigadier Gouws in the middle of the last paragraph

"Quite obviously if there is a direct attack on your people you can react to that and you can do what is necessary to safeguard the lives of the people on the attack but please I must urge it - do not take the law in your own hands as I have said we have already arranged that police should be deployed around your offices. Quite obviously in the political conflict situation of the moment it is possible that your offices may be a target of attack and we will see to it that you are protected as well as we can." and then he says what their ...[inaudible]. Now you said that you did not accept the learned Judge's finding that there was no information that Shell House would be attacked. Did the late Commissioner Radu have the sort of apprehension that is described in this conversation and was he given this assurance about police protection as far as you know?

MR KRUSER: As I said, he informed me the Sunday and again on the Monday that we would get police protection and when I left his office before going to issue firearms the last thing he indicated that he would continue to because I think he was going to phone someone in Pretoria because it seems like we're not getting luck in Johannesburg itself. But this thing is also late in the afternoon when I think quite a few marchers passed by ten o'clock, at least two of the groups, if not three had passed at that time already.

MR BIZOS: The last sentence under L on page 106 - "The police must understand the situation that in the case of protection we are forced to be deployed outside." Do you know whether this was the true belief of the late Commissioner Radu?

MR KRUSER: That is correct - that's how we discussed it that I would deploy people outside.

MR BIZOS: And then the last sentence on page 106 - "So a specific request - get them inside the building and I will see to it that police are deployed in the vicinity of Shell House that also will account for the PWV offices." Did that trust or hope or anything similar to it ever materialise?

MR KRUSER: The same Brigadier Gouws was inside Shell House when this happened and there was no police around securing Shell House.

MR BIZOS: Even though this promise was made at ten o'clock, one hour and thirteen minutes before?

MR KRUSER: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And finally the last sentence other than the greetings on page 1 of 7: "Okay, I will see to it that there is a policeman in the vicinity of Shell House as soon as possible, okay, okay, very well, Leonard." Did that materialise?

MR KRUSER: It did not materialise.

MR BIZOS: Now very briefly, I don't want you to take a long time about this, you've been accused of not making full disclosure and the only thing that has been drawn to the Committee's attention is what you did not say in your affidavits that were made during September, October - September '95 and October '96 during the period of the investigation and you've said that you did not give the names of the other guards or your comrades because you feared for their lives. What was the relationship between the police investigation team and the Attorney General's office whilst Mr Klaus von Lieres von Wilchau was the Attorney General - what was the relationship between your attorney, you yourselves and the ANC during that period.

MR KRUSER: I would say a probably very harsh trial towards us. I can give reasons. I also - I remember one day, I don't have the dates clearly in my mind - I accompanied my legal people, Caroline, I think Danny Burke was also with us to John Vorster Square to make statements to the police because we were asked by the leadership to go and make statements to start this whole process of co-operation which the president made public. While making the statements, the officers who were recording added things to our statements which we did not say and our legal representatives objected to them putting things in our statements which we're not saying. There was a very. very hostile exchange between our legal representatives, ourselves and the police. Eventually the police advocate had to come into the situation and try to resolve it. I think it was at this stage that the agreement was then reached by the police advocate that we only had to make statements about the gist of what happened and not specifics.

Additional to that the request from the ANC was always that this issue should be investigated entirely but if you look at the headings of the letter sent to us by the A.G.'s office it was always "Eight Accounts of Murder at Shell House" and that gave us a very clear indication that they were not interested at all in investigating the whole event of the day but taking us as accused from the very beginning of this thing. You can look at even in hindsight, you can look at it from each and every statement which was made to the police - it was never produced as evidence - until the Judge had to call for it. I mean there's so many incidents we can record of hostility of the police towards us in the investigation. They went to my secretary and lied to her to get information saying that I said they must give information. They came to me telling me other guards had made statements. These were junior police officers who were in charge of investigating, who were doing these type of things. I mean, there was just complete hostility during the whole investigation team and our lawyers and the ANC. Every information we gave them was leaked to the press. As soon as a statement was put it, you could read it in the newspaper the next day. I mean, could we trust this sort of investigation, both from the Attorney General and the police? It was very clear that we were still being seen as the enemy even though the new era has dawned and sometimes I think it still in that way today.

MR BIZOS: If you had given the names of the guards that had shot or given specific information where these names could be obtained, what did you think might happen to them?

MR KRUSER: I have - give evidence to the effect that two of our comrades in Natal, as I said earlier, were asked by the ANC and they were given assurances by the ANC leadership that if I testify in the trial, I don't have the specific details but I had it at that stage of the inquest, if they testify in the trial they would get the necessary protection. Those two comrades were killed very shortly after testifying. I was not prepared even though Mandela gave the assurance of co-operation to sacrifice my comrades.

MR BIZOS: One of the other issues - the accesses into Shell House - you were asked to name the accesses and you requested that it should be kept confidential and did you write out the accesses other than the front entrance and the two garage entrances on a piece of paper and hand it to the learned Judge?

MR KRUSER: That's correct, I informed the Judge.

MR BIZOS: The learned Judge had at some time - we're not sure whether it was before or after an inspection in loco at Shell House?

MR KRUSER: I was told that, I wasn't there.

MR BIZOS: Now you were told about or you were questioned about the political motive and a portion of your application was read out, could you please have a look at page 4 of your application? Page 3 is what was read out to you but not the supplement of page 4 and in which you've set out in greater detail and more particularly the last sentence that this would derail the elections as planned by the IFP?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, just for the sake of clarity, about the duration of the period of the shooting, once we deal with the learned Judge’s findings, on page 51, the type page Mr Chairman, I'm sorry that our copy hasn't got the - it's 205 I'm told Mr Chairman, of the large koki pen pagination. I'm sorry I mispronounced it but you mustn't expect too much from an uitlander. The last paragraph - "the shooting seems to have lasted for only a very brief time, perhaps about ten seconds according to one witness and when it had abated, eight people lay dead or dying on the pavement on the street opposite Shell House in the vicinity of the north western corner of the intersection of De Villiers and King George Streets and many others were injured." Do you accept the period found by his lordship of ten seconds?"

MR KRUSER: It's very difficult to recall but I can accede to that. It seemed like a lifetime at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Have you or did you before the inquest court and before this Committee make full disclosure of everything that you know about this event?

MR KRUSER: To the best of my knowledge, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] these groups that came towards Shell House prior to the last incident when the shooting occurred, did you see each of those groups?

MR KRUSER: I recall three groups prior to the event. I was either on the ground floor or on the parapet during that time. While I was there I kept on with observation.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR KRUSER: They were very hostile, they were performing mock attacks, smashing down the posters in front of Shell House, those sort of things Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Were any of them armed?

MR KRUSER: They were armed, various groups were armed with various different dangerous weapons, pangas, assegai, sticks. I specifically, in the one group, while I was on the parapet saw a man with an automatic rifle wrapped in a jacket with the top coming out, I could see. Other members of the department saw other guns, that's all I saw.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have a clear picture of the different groups, the three groups?

MR KRUSER: I recollect the one group going westwards, one eastwards and one down Plein Street, that's my recollection of that.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] time that lapsed between the first group and the second group?

MR KRUSER: I would say about twenty minutes, I not clear, I'd say around twenty minutes to half an hour.

CHAIRPERSON: And then the one after that?

MR KRUSER: The last group was round about tennish, I remember that the one which there was exchange of gunfire with Klein Street, round about tennish that one took place.

CHAIRPERSON: And how long after the previous group did they come?

MR KRUSER: Probably the same time I think the duration was probably about twenty minutes I think, more or less all the groups. Twenty minutes, half an hour, I'm not exactly sure. It's very difficult to recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you form any impression whether the activities of these groups was co-ordinated or were they completely independent of each other?

MR KRUSER: The previous three groups were led by police officers with a van and people - they seemed to be organised and moving somewhere with the police were at the front of the groups itself and I got the impression they were being led somewhere.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that that morning you went to Lancet House as well. When you arrived at Lancet House had the group already left there or were they still there?

MR KRUSER: There were just those people lying on the ground being treated by medics, there were no groups in that vicinity.

CHAIRPERSON: But the marchers or those who took part in the demonstration, they were not there?

MR KRUSER: I didn't see any people there.

CHAIRPERSON: The slogans that were being chanted - were there slogans being shouted or chanted by these people?

MR KRUSER: The slogans - I think it was mainly Zulu, I don't speak Zulu so I could not interpret - I was told by people some of the slogans.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know what they were saying?

MR KRUSER: No I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: The information that was received by the ANC the evening before this incident, when was that conveyed to you that there was going to be a march the next day?

MR KRUSER: No we were aware of the march beforehand Mr Chairman. Information I received on Sunday evening was to the effect that the march was a decoy to attack Shell House.

MR KRUSER: And this information, was that conveyed to you by members of the ANC?

MR KRUSER: The late Commissioner Radu was my immediate commander who conveyed that to me, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The news that Lancet House or Hall was attacked, how did that come to you?

MR KRUSER: When I came in from the basement to the foyer there was a phone call and the security guard in the reception indicated that there's someone on the phone and I still - I'm not sure I think it was Africa Khumalo, I'm not exactly sure -but I was informed by a phone there was an attack and shooting at Lancet Hall.

CHAIRPERSON: After the shooting and when the crowd had disappeared, were any weapons found on the road or on the ground?

MR KRUSER: The main incident Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Outside Shell House.

MR KRUSER: From what I saw, I saw dangerous weapons and things, I didn't go very close to the marchers, we stayed on the corner, we stayed on the corner, we didn't go very close to where they were. I never saw any guns or anything from where I was standing.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Kruser, the Chairperson has already questioned you about the difference between the earlier group of marchers that went past Shell House and the group that ultimately you gave an order to repel. What I am not particularly clear and I just need a little bit of clarity from you - how different was this last group from the other groups because from your evidence it is quite clear that particularly the Klein Street was quite a large group consisting of approximately 500 members, carried an assortment also of traditional weapons as well as automatic weapons, behaved in a provocative and intimidating manner and was also chanting. How different was that particular group from the group that you gave an order to repel? If I remember your evidence well and you may be able to correct me if I have not got your evidence properly - the Klein Street group also fired at the direction of your security officers?

MR KRUSER: The impression that they were firing at Lancet Hall - PW offices.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you for correcting that piece of evidence but how different was this particular group from the group that ultimately you gave an order to repel?

MR KRUSER: Mr Chairman, the first thing is that this group shot on members of my surveillance unit which were surveiling the back parts of the ...[inaudible] and they came back to report to me and that's when we went to the corner, that's the first distinction, none of the other groups ever fired any shots at any of my personnel.

The other groups moved constantly they were not congregating in a group, they were moving up and back but they were not moving forward. The other groups moved in like a toy-toy fashion past although one or two would run out and be provocative. This group - seems to be like two groups coming together and they were standing there and having this - they were shouting - as I say I could not hear what they were shouting but the tone which I could hear and their movement was not one where they were led and toy-toying past and being provocative in that sense. It was like a regrouping of people ready to do something, that's how I saw the group being very different.

MS KHAMPEPE: The dance that you were advised by Mr Zuma that they were performing, the war dance, could that also have influenced your perception about this group?

MR KRUSER: I think that played a role in cementing what I though what was happening at that time.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now you have also given evidence about secondary shooting?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: Can you just explain to me what in fact secondary shooting is or was understood to have been by the security guards who were situated on the parapet of Shell House?

MR KRUSER: Secondary shooting Mr Chairman is - we deployed a group of people among other functions was to do what we call secondary shooting. What happens if someone launches an attack at a specific point to say our guards at a specific point, it would be very easy for them to concentrate their fire if they had more fire power directly at us in advance but if we had a secondary line of fire of defence, it would be very difficult for these people to guard because they would have to concern themselves with another level of fire coming from another direction to make it easier for us to defend against a large group of people.

MS KHAMPEPE: Is it possible that the people who were located on the parapet, hearing the warning shots that you had ordered Mr Rama and other security officers to fire could have misconstrued or misunderstood that kind of fire to be coming from the crowd and to have then fired thinking that you were under attack?

MR KRUSER: I think I even conceded in the inquest that that was a possibility, Mr Chairman.

MS KHAMPEPE: At the time when you gave the order, ultimately to fire on to the crowds of marchers who you perceived were about to attack you, what was your state of mind, would you say you were agitated, you were anxious, obviously all these things happening at about the same time and within a short space of time?

MR KRUSER: It was a very stressful situation, I was very tense, very anxious, extremely anxious I would say, very tense, very worried and concerned.

MS KHAMPEPE: Had you been subjected to a situation like that before where both your leadership and the greater majority of the ANC were housed at Shell House were threatened with that kind of an attack, had you been subjected to something like that before?

MR KRUSER: We were never - not at Shell House.

MS KHAMPEPE: So that was the first kind of experience that you had in the circumstances?

MR KRUSER: That's absolutely correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: I want to ask one or two questions with regard to the extract that has been given to us, it's bundle B, it's page 261, starting from page 261. That contains the list of people who were issued with firearms.

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

MS KHAMPEPE: I am particularly interested to get your explanation on why we actually have dates which are ranging from the 3rd March 1994 to 24th March 1994 against the names of persons who were issued with firearms?

MR KRUSER: That would be the normal procedure how we issue firearms. Those firearms are issued in the normal line of duty, bodyguards and people who had houses or whatever normal line of duty.

MS KHAMPEPE: I though this extract was in fact a document which did not form part of the normal register?

MR KRUSER: I think that's what the debate is about. This is a normal - part of the normal register we had at Shell House. On the day itself, the names after the 24th, the eight names below that is names which people are issued firearms on the morning of the 28th in haste where we never had the dates or the signatures and I was saying when I was with the lawyers doing this, my recollection was done somewhere but I wasn't entirely sure it was done in the register, but subsequently to show it was done in the register.

MS KHAMPEPE: And lastly, Mr Kruser, during your ...[inaudible] evidence you stated that the order to fire warning shots was issued to Mr Rama however in your affidavit it appears that that order was not only issued to Mr Rama but was also issued to the guards who were at the corner of King George and Plein Street.

MR KRUSER: I think my evidence is I gave - I instructed the guards to issue - fire warning shots and I saw V.J. Rama - it's the only person I saw firing warning shots. I think that's my evidence, I don't say I gave him specifically an order because he was one of the people close to me.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you very much, Mr Kruser.

CHAIRPERSON: Please look at this document, 261 which is supposed to be an extract from the register? The dates in the right hand column, are they the dates on which these firearms were issued?

MR KRUSER: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] one was issued on the 24th March 1994 and one on the 23rd March 1994, is that correct?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And those two, did they have a bearing on this particular incident or were they not related to this incident?

MR KRUSER: My recollection they were guns issued in the normal line of duty.

CHAIRPERSON: In the normal line of duty?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you turn to the next page - the entries on that page of people to whom guns were issued - who were those issued by?

MR KRUSER: Our administrative secretary's Kumbile Kubeka, if I get the name right.

CHAIRPERSON: You had nothing to do with any of those entries?

MR KRUSER: You're talking about the bottom right hand corner, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR KRUSER: I had nothing to do with those entries.

CHAIRPERSON: So these names and the entries on this page, the second page, did they have anything to do with the incidents of the 24th?

MR KRUSER: They were also issued by her on that same day.

CHAIRPERSON: And to your knowledge were these issued within the ordinary course of events?

MR KRUSER: No they were issued at some stage during the morning after I issued the first lot of guns, I asked her to take over the armoury so I could go and help assess the situation downstairs. She took over that responsibility because she was one of the people who had responsibility over the armoury.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now you see there's a date, the 24th March about the middle of that page, this is the second page and then there are 25 rounds and 50 rounds and so on?

MR KRUSER: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I think that's the confusion which I tried to say - this is two pages next to it that's the continuation of these - upper part.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I beg your pardon, yes.

Alright, so now those dates, those rounds of ammunition, they deal with the firearms that were issued that morning?

MR KRUSER: No, that's not correct. I think if you look at the big copy which they gave me, you will better understand, these two pages come together in the book, the book runs like this.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR KRUSER: So they run right across.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, so then the record of these rounds RDS - is that rounds of ammunition?

MR KRUSER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And were they issued by you?

MR KRUSER: On the last eight people yes, that's all a box, we gave them each boxes of ammunition.

CHAIRPERSON: Then what is supposed to be the writing in the last column on that page?

MR KRUSER: Can you just repeat, I'm not clear, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: The last column on the right hand side, what is that supposed to record?

MR KRUSER: Units. Which he belonged to - Mac Maharaj Unit, President's Unit, Department of Information - we had units which looked after the V.I.P.'s as we call them - so it recorded as Popo's Unit which is Popo Molefe's unit, J.S. would be Joe Slovo's Unit, their's someone in admin, Joe Modise's Unit, Joe Ntlhantlha’s Unit that's how we would issue it.

CHAIRPERSON: And the last name?

MR KRUSER: I think it's personnel and training - the Unit of personnel and training under there.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that your writing?

MR KRUSER: That's my writing.

CHAIRPERSON: And what is the significance of all this scratching out that you see on that page?

MR KRUSER: They were done when the guns were brought back, I think, I'm not clear but I think that's how they were done because we then - after this we had to form a new register which we also handed in to the Attorney General because we could not continue and we had to rewrite all the things in a new register. So as we wrote them over we scratched them.

CHAIRPERSON: After the shooting was all over to whom were these guns returned?

MR KRUSER: In the process some to me, some to other members who were in charge of the process of the armoury and Commission Radu and Sibogone Kubeka.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there a reference here in this schedule of guns any reference to an AK47 being handed out?

MR KRUSER: I never dealt with any illegal guns, my responsibility ended with the guns registered in the names of the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't hear that, what did you say?

MR KRUSER: I was only responsible for guns licensed in the name of the ANC and it did not include any AK47s.

CHAIRPERSON: So the AK47 that we heard about that had been used, that was not given out by you?

MR KRUSER: The late Commissioner Radu was responsible for those firearms.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAX: Just one question, Mr Kruser, it might just be a matter of not hearing you clearly and I just wanted to clear it up - you spoke about something happening at the I.E.C. and I might have misheard you whether you said the T.E.C.? I beg your pardon?

MR KRUSER: I remember it to be the T.E.C. it was in town close to the Carlton Centre the building, I think it was the T.E.C. or I.E.C. I'm not sure but I know the building I just don't recall but I know the building itself. It was close to the Carlton Centre, just around the corner from the Carlton Centre.

MR LAX: And just remind me, what specifically happened there that had a bearing on your - you raised it as one of the reasons - just give us a - just remind me here?

MR KRUSER: We got the report from some of our guys who were in the vicinity that the police were shooting at marchers and the report I got they wanted to attack the building and they were shooting at the marchers - the police shot at the marchers, at the building itself.

MR LAX: That was obviously on the same day?

MR KRUSER: The morning of that day.

MR LAX: Thanks Chairperson, that's all.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR TIPP: Mr Chairman, learned Members of the Committee, the next witness will be the second applicant, Mr Zuma. Mr Chairman, Mr Zuma's first language is Zulu, he is reasonably fluent in English and in the interests of expedition will testify in English but he may require on odd occasions the assistance of an interpreter. The Committee's counsel has indicated that such a person is available if necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you just hold on please?

Mr Tipp, this might not perhaps be a convenient time to make a beginning, there's no likelihood of the evidence being finished this afternoon, or even his evidence in chief. In the circumstances, we would like to make a beginning tomorrow morning with his evidence and can we make it at 9.15?

MR TIPP: Certainly, Mr Chairman, we will be present.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we make a beginning at 9.15 tomorrow?

MR PRETORIUS: We will try our utmost to be here at 9.15, it is just a problem that we are travelling from Pretoria everyday and we will have to leave earlier, but the earlier traffic may catch us, My Lord, but we will try our utmost to be here at 9.15.

CHAIRPERSON: There's a Member of the Committee who bears you out as far as traffic is concerned. We still start at 9.30 tomorrow morning. In the meanwhile may I ask that there be a minimum of interruption of our proceedings from your clients. I don't know what their problems are and I'm sure you're in a better position to articulate their problems and if they have any will you tell me what they're about and things have gone fairly smoothly so far and I would like us to move as quickly as we can without too much interruption. I will now adjourn and we will resume at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS