Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: We are at the stage where we have one more applicant left?

MR BOOYENS: Correct Mr Chairman, Mr Du Plessis.

CHAIRPERSON: He is the last one?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume he is going to speak in Afrikaans?

Mr Du Plessis, will you rise please?

MR DU PLESSIS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: You can proceed Mr Booyens.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Du Plessis, you have your application before you as it appears on page 55?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Regarding paragraph 7(a) and (b) of page 55, whether or not you were a member of any political organisation, it appears not applicable, but were you a member of any political organisation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I was a member of the National Party.

MR BOOYENS: Only a member?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR VAN ZYL: I beg your pardon Mr Booyens, but which page is that?

MR BOOYENS: Page 55 Chairperson, I beg your pardon. And just for clarity sake, at the top of page 56, paragraph 11(b), 12 and 13, are actually of application to another application because various applications were consolidated in one document and they don't actually belong here?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Could that just be noted Chairperson, you will see that it doesn't make sense within the context within there is another 11, 12 and 13 which appears later.

CHAIRPERSON: This application is incident three, is that correct?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Du Plessis, you are applying for amnesty for the death of the four deceased, Mr Calata, Mhlauli, and so on, as set out in the application, this took place in 1985?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: If you look at page 57, the nature and particulars. You provide some background in the first paragraph as it appears there, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: You mention the role which CRADORA played in the alternative structures?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Could you perhaps elaborate what the alternative structures were and what their importance was?

MR DU PLESSIS: The alternative structures were established to eliminate or get rid of the third level government and to take over the functions of the third level government.

They succeeded in tackling aspects of second level government such as education and police. Regarding the enforcements of instructions given by leaders of authority, such as boycotts led to the fact that people wouldn't go to work, they also enforced consumer boycotts.

In short we could say that they were responsible through these actions, in establishing anarchy in the residential areas.

As a result thereof a good foundation was established for MK to infiltrate the area for political training internally, as well as military training internally. The youth were politicised through these actions.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, let us move to the second paragraph, which begins with this state of affairs was enjoying much attention towards the end of 1984, during JMC meetings. Did you attend these meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not attend the JMC meetings.

MR BOOYENS: How do you know that it enjoyed attention?

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Snyman at times and the now Gen Van Rensburg, attended these meetings. From my desk on a day to day basis, we had to compile summaries regarding the situation in the area and feedback returned to us via them.

MR BOOYENS: You continue in the next paragraph which begins with it was clear, until the subparagraphs, paragraph 4. Is that the feedback which you received from the JMS?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How would you have received the feedback?

MR DU PLESSIS: From the JMS, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: If Colonel Snyman or Gen Van Rensburg had returned from the JMS, they would have informed me or informed the relevant officers regarding the problems with the JMS and stability in the area and what they expected us to do regarding this.

CHAIRPERSON: But would the feedback have occurred on a daily basis or only when one of them encountered you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I can't really remember. The mini-JMS activities took place on a daily basis. There were a lot of differences especially with regard to circumstances in different areas, sometimes they would have more regular meetings. I don't think that it was lightly discussed with us because we were responsible for information and the gathering of information in the area and also we occupied a position of consultation regarding the solution of the problems in the area, so they would come to us for solutions and suggestions.

ADV BOSMAN: When you speak about we or us, who are you including in that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I include my entire unit which was responsible for Black Affairs in the area.

MR BOOYENS: How regularly did the officers and the members of the Security Branch meet for information sessions, meetings and so forth?

MR DU PLESSIS: Every morning.

MR BOOYENS: And were all relevant matters discussed on such particular days?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Including things which came from JMS or Head Office or wherever?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The paragraph below those four points says that political activists were identified and prioritised. What are you saying by this?

MR DU PLESSIS: A priority list was placed for attention regarding those people who had to receive more attention than others.

All the Executive Members of the organisations were on that priority list. As far as I can remember, it would be a case depending upon where the unrest was or who was causing the unrest, priority would be attached to those specific persons who had been highlighted.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. Then in the next paragraph it says the objectives at this point, you refer to methods and the increase of anarchy, what are you trying to say there?

MR DU PLESSIS: The only legal methods at that stage were to gather evidence in order to establish a criminal case according to the law, and submit this to the Attorney General. This didn't work because in most cases, we couldn't obtain any decent evidence and other methods would be restriction which according to my humble opinion, gave people much more of a victim status. Detention per se according to the security legislation, was not effective.

We all know that the following morning indeed that would happen, the cliche would be used, the cliche of release of charge, it didn't work, it was not productive. More unrest spread as a result of that.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. The next paragraph which begins at this stage immense pressure was placed on the Security Forces, you refer to political leadership such as P.W. Botha and Magnus Malan, regarding the total onslaught and other such issues, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Du Plessis, you have given reasonably thorough evidence regarding the Pebco application, pertaining the political background, what the politicians said then, what they are saying now and so forth, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Is that which have just been placed before you an instruction of the translated version of the transcription of this matter?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I ask leave to hand this in. I think it will substantially shorten proceedings, instead of leading all that evidence again.

Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And what is said in this paragraph?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I have copies available for the Commission and for my learned colleagues. Chairperson, I beg your pardon, I think that we have a shortage of copies here, I didn't realise that we would have more members on the Committee than what we have today.

CHAIRPERSON: Has a copy been given to the evidence leader and to the representatives?

MR BOOYENS: I will use the same one as my client just briefly, then I will give it to Mr Bizos and we will make copies for our friends on this side of the table, Mr Chairman. We need one more. Okay, we will make a copy later on.

Mr Du Plessis, just very briefly ...

CHAIRPERSON: Will this be Exhibit OO?

MR BOOYENS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Probably be the exclamation one makes when you look at the number of Exhibits.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I will treat that with the necessary circumspection Mr Chairman.

Sorry, can we just clarify the Exhibit number Mr Chairman, my learned friends say they think it was interpreted as LL, I think it must be OO.

CHAIRPERSON: The last one I have in my file is NN.

MR BOOYENS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Then it is OO.

MR BOOYENS: OO, yes. Mr Du Plessis, basically you were discussing how politics worked in the Port Elizabeth area from the side of Pebco?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was that comparable with the situation in rural areas?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then you discussed the statements of among others Adriaan Vlok, Leon Wessels, Roelf Meyer and Willem Schoon which were submitted at that stage, regarding what they had to say?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Among others where Mr Vlok would have said that words such as eliminate and neutralise and so forth, did not mean what you understood it to mean?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then you also just for clarity sake, discussed the fact that some of the Pebco members had disappeared and that there was quite a bit of hesitation regarding this matter, or at least that that was your impression. It was possible for the police to determine whether or not the people were out of the country, and that question was never properly asked.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At the top of page 59, paragraph which begins with by means of sharpened JMS action, what are you trying to tell the Commission with this?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is the information regarding the mentioned persons which we gathered. I must mention that although Mr Mhlauli was not very familiar to me, at that point I was aware of his actions.

I can't recall the exact details of his actions and activities, but I know that his name had been mentioned at various sections and then the names of the others, Mr Goniwe, Calata and Mkhonto, their activities at that point were very familiar to us and they were also responsible for the expansion of unrest as well as the alternative structures in the rural area.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, do you confirm what appears in that particular paragraph?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Just for clarity sake, the next paragraph begins with 27th of June, the information which you have given us, is that regarding what happened before the 27th of June?

MR DU PLESSIS: Some of this I knew before then, and some afterwards.

MR BOOYENS: For example specifically the name of Mr Mhlauli which is one of the greatest points of contention, was the name familiar to you before Mr Van Rensburg spoke to you, or did you only come to know of it after he had spoken to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, it was before that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, you say that the name of Mr Mhlauli was mentioned before the death of these persons from various sources of information. What type of information did you receive?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, with respect it is very difficult to give you an adequate answer, but I would like to bring it back to one point.

When the instruction came from Gen Van Rensburg to focus on Goniwe and his cohorts, and Captain Van Zyl and the others began to question and gather information intensively, this person's name was already familiar to me, I was aware of his activities, his liaison with UDF, his liaison with Mr Goniwe.

The seriousness and the correctness of his information regarding whatever his activities were, are no longer familiar to me, but I can assure you that this was not the first time that I had heard his name and I did not hear his name for the first time from Captain Van Zyl.

MR BOOYENS: Then you mention in your next paragraph on an unknown date, before the 27th of June 1985, Gen Van Rensburg came to you. How long if you had to estimate?

MR DU PLESSIS: It would be approximately three weeks before the time.

MR BOOYENS: What did Van Rensburg say to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: By implication his words boiled down to the fact that he had received an instruction from Colonel Snyman to speak to myself and Captain Van Zyl regarding the elimination of Goniwe and his direct cohorts, who were responsible for the unrest situation. He also mentioned that because I had not been available, he had informed Captain Van Zyl.

MR BOOYENS: What instruction did he give you? What were you supposed to do?

MR DU PLESSIS: Firstly to determine the absolute narrow liaison with persons around Goniwe, in other words those who were in close cooperation with him and thus responsible for the unrest situation in the rural area.

He also mentioned that we shouldn't do anything until we had received final approval from Colonel Snyman, that we should submit that which we know, that we have at our disposal to Colonel Snyman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you and Mr Van Zyl have any discussion regarding this matter, after that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Shortly after that, I can remember that Captain Van Zyl came to me and that I informed him that I already knew about it, and that he could proceed and compile a team and gather the necessary information.

MR BOOYENS: And after your discussion, did you have any other contact with each other?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, at various other instances. I believe that it occurred on a daily basis, sometimes more than once a day.

MR BOOYENS: Is that regarding this matter?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: During these discussions, what would you and Captain Van Zyl discuss?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mainly the activities of these people, their movements and so forth.

MR BOOYENS: At that point, did you know who was helping Van Zyl?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was aware if I can recall correctly, let me put it this way, I knew who was ultimately involved. I knew at that stage that Mr Eric Taylor and Gert Lotz were assisting him with the gathering and interpretation of information. As far as I can remember I did not have any liaison with him regarding this incident.

MR BOOYENS: Is this with Lotz and Taylor?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: So therefore as far as you can remember, your liaison occurred consistently with Van Zyl?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you collect the information personally or did Van Zyl bring the information to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Van Zyl brought the information to me.

MR BOOYENS: You then mention in the same paragraph Captain Van Zyl and I discussed the matter with Colonel Snyman thoroughly, a few days later. How long afterwards was this?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was approximately two to three weeks.

MR BOOYENS: What did you discuss with Snyman then?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can recall, and I would like to rely on my memory, we first went to Van Rensburg, after which he took us to Snyman. I accepted at that point, because Colonel Snyman, or at least Gen Van Rensburg understood that the order had come from Snyman, that Snyman was well informed regarding the activities of these persons. Not only these persons were submitted to Colonel Snyman, but the names of others as well.

I believe that I provided a short summary or version of that which they were busy with, that which they were responsible for, and the alternatives would have been discussed with him, that these were not viable alternatives and that there was no other alternative, but to take certain steps.

MR BOOYENS: Was it only you and Van Zyl and Snyman at that stage?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And after you had made your submission, let's call it a submission, what was his reaction, what was Snyman's reaction?

MR DU PLESSIS: He said that we should continue in the interest of the country.

MR BOOYENS: How did you understand that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I understood it very clearly, or let me put it this way, my submission was about elimination. I believed that that was the intention when I received the order, that is why I understood it that way. That is why I understood it that I had to continue with the elimination.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then return to Van Rensburg after your discussion with Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What happened then? Was it then about the physical planning of the operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: We first informed him that Colonel Snyman had given approval, and then it was about the actual physical planning, the modus operandi of how they would be eliminated.

MR BOOYENS: What was discussed there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Van Rensburg suggested that it should appear to resemble a vigilante or robbery attack, that they shouldn't be shot, but that they should be murdered or killed by using other methods.

MR BOOYENS: What was your reaction to this?

MR DU PLESSIS: Regarding the modus operandi I was completely opposed to it and I clearly stated it to the then Colonel Van Rensburg.

MR BOOYENS: Afterwards with the further planning and continuation of the operation and the execution of the operation, did you have anything to do with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I had nothing to do with that.

MR BOOYENS: Was that just reported to you later on?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, by Captain Van Zyl. If I could remember clearly, during the next morning.

MR BOOYENS: If you talk about the next morning, was that the morning after the elimination?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did he say to you who were involved?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, he did.

MR BOOYENS: You make the statement on the last paragraph of page 59, the operation and possible elimination of the Cradock 4 was discussed at an earlier opportunity, etc. What do you mean by that?

MR DU PLESSIS: You must just remember and please give me this opportunity to say this, we are in 1998 at the moment and we see in the circumstances, but in 1985, Port Elizabeth did not look like this as it looks today. It was a focal point and for a security person to work in this area, it was unfavourable and very difficult. The whole area was chaotic.

In discussions in the security offices between officers and colleagues, one could not stand the circumstances any more. With these opportunities people said if nothing is done now, then they must be eliminated because it was truly a very difficult situation, and that is what I meant by this paragraph.

MR BOOYENS: In other words it was in the hallways that you discussed these matters, it was not in formal meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it was mentioned in the hallways more than in meetings.

MR BOOYENS: Just for clarity, the last sentence that starts with I was part of the overhead planning, within context must that be a separate paragraph if you look at it in context?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have already given the evidence that you were opposed against the operation and that you had nothing to do with the execution of the operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct yes.

MR BOOYENS: Then the paragraph that says that information was received from physical and non-physical sources from Port Elizabeth, that is now tapping devices, etc?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: When did you receive that information, was it before or after the operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was before.

MR BOOYENS: I would like to deal with some of the Exhibits.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, before you continue, there is something that I do not understand. With what did you not agree?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you mean when we spoke about the modus operandi?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not agree with the manner in which they wanted to eliminate these people.

CHAIRPERSON: But you did agree that they must be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I agreed with that. But the manner in which they wanted to eliminate them, I did not agree with them because of various reasons.

DR TSOTSI: What reasons were these Mr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: People may differ from me, but in the first instance to go over to such an action, step, was very difficult for me and to do it then in such a way, in unacceptable to me and I apologise or I am sorry for the person who must execute such an instruction or command.

I do not want to do and I don't feel like giving such a command to any of my colleagues.

DR TSOTSI: Precisely to what do you object in the operation, in the modus operandi, precisely what do you object to, what is the manner of the operation to which you objected?

MR DU PLESSIS: That they would use blunt knives or other objects to kill these people.

DR TSOTSI: What method did you prefer?

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you repeat please.

DR TSOTSI: What method of elimination did you prefer?

MR DU PLESSIS: For me the easiest and quickest way to eliminate a person, would be ...

CHAIRPERSON: We didn't get the full answer.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry Mr Chairman, the answer didn't come through the interpreter. What was the preferred method?

CHAIRPERSON: We didn't get the full answer.

MR BOOYENS: Repeat your answer please.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would prefer to shoot somebody, rather than use another method.

MR BOOYENS: If you look at Exhibit H in front of you, this document is part of numerous documents, H, I, K, etc out of which it seems there were negotiations and my learned friend mentioned it in his cross-examination, about the possibility to reappoint Mr Goniwe as a teacher in the Cradock area?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any input in this documentation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Now for the first time.

MR BOOYENS: No, I mean earlier on?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have knowledge of formal negotiations about the re-institution of Mr Goniwe as a teacher?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not that I can remember of, no.

MR BOOYENS: Let us suppose that you did have knowledge of that, did you have anything to do with the execution of the action?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

MR BOOYENS: If it came under your attention, would you have mentioned it to someone?

MR DU PLESSIS: I doubt it Mr Chairperson, because if you read this document you see that the government sided or was locked in a check mate situation with Mr Goniwe and that he must be placed again in a situation where all the problems started.

That would have been a temporary solution and he would not have halted his actions or stopped what he was doing. And that would have brought no stability to the country.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had prior knowledge of the contents of that document, would that have made any significant difference to your support in killing these unfortunate people?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am sorry, no, I don't think so. I doubt that it would have made any difference.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, if we then look at Exhibit K. It is from the Commissioner of Police about specifically this matter. If you then look at page 2 of Exhibit K, more specifically paragraph 6 where reference is made of a speech of Mr Oscar Mpeta at Cradock and what he said, and what Mr Goniwe's reaction was, did you have any knowledge of that then?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not have knowledge of this report, but I did know about the content of this meeting.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, the report seems to be a report that was sent to the Commissioner and not to you, it was about his appointment?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mention was made by my learned friend, that Mr Goniwe was a peacemaker and continuously tried to prevent any violence, do you agree with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, if you look at this written piece on page 3, I would say that he was not a peacemaker.

MR BOOYENS: Exhibit K1, there is a summary given of Mr Goniwe's action, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I would say it was only some of his actions.

MR BOOYENS: And in Exhibit K2, there is the so-called, or the recent activities of Mr Goniwe, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Without going into detail, according to you, does that indicate that Mr Goniwe was a peacemaker or does that prove the opposite?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would say it is the opposite.

MR BOOYENS: Mention was made of the fact that Mr Winter said basically two things, that he did not know Mr Mhlauli.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: According to you, how long have Mr Winter been there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Between two and three months Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: That is now at Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And that Mr Winter said that he supports the reappointment of Mr Goniwe and that would bring peace?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot believe that he said that, but if he said that, it would be a sign that at that stage he did not know precisely what was going on in his area.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, why would you disagree with that, what did you know that he didn't know?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that we had all the information or that we had the same information that Mr Winter had, or was supposed to have.

We also had information from other sources in the Port Elizabeth area as well as from other areas, and I believe that we had a larger picture regarding Mr Goniwe's actions. That is point number one.

Point number 2 is the Task Commander who in three months finds his feet in an unrest situation, it is not easy. It is a difficult task.

CHAIRPERSON: And you would have based your views and opinions on the information that you got from informers? Am I correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And you ranked that information above the opinion of a trained policeman?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I also wanted to believe that Mr Winter only could have based his opinion on the reports from Cradock.

I think I had a wider spectrum to form an opinion from.

MR BOOYENS: If we can refer to Exhibit U is a summary of events that occurred in Lingelihle in Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you look at this document?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Does this document indicate or does it reflect a peaceful area or that it shows that it is an unrest area?

MR DU PLESSIS: Definitely not a peaceful area, there was a lot of unrest. If I look at this document, I had a personal experience regarding this.

MR BOOYENS: So does your personal experience correlate with what is in this document?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: I would just like to refer to one single aspect here and that is Exhibit GG. It is a crypto report coming from the Commander Swartz?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct yes.

MR BOOYENS: In paragraph 4, just explain something, if you just read paragraph 4.

MR DU PLESSIS: On 1985-06-28 in the Cradock district, Goniwe S4/14532 and Fort Calata, S4/63442, Sparrow Thomas Mkhonto S4/66386 as well as Sicelo Mhlauli was found unknown.

MR BOOYENS: Could you just stop there, that unknown, could you just explain that?

MR DU PLESSIS: The person was unknown.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just repeat that answer please.

MR DU PLESSIS: The word unknown after the name of Mr Mhlauli's name means that Mr Mhlauli was unknown to Brigadier Swartz.

ADV POTGIETER: Or to his office?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: If you look at Exhibit HH, that is a fax from Colonel Roland. The GL after the name of Mr Mhlauli means that there is no file?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: He does mention in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his activities?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Your comment regarding Port Elizabeth, what would your reaction have been on the question regarding him not having a file?

MR DU PLESSIS: For me it would be strange that he did not have a file, and it is also unacceptable to me.

MR BOOYENS: Why?

MR DU PLESSIS: Because a person who liaisoned with Oliphant and the District Organiser of, we know that to liaison, or we do liaison with them from time to time and you must be involved in the struggle to be part of that.

If you liaisoned with them, we would have opened a file.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, can I just for personal reasons, just ask for a two or three minute adjournment please?

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

MR DU PLESSIS: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (continued) I am indebted to the Committee Mr Chairman. Mr Du Plessis, regarding the Exhibits, we have discussed that enough.

Within the stipulations of this Act you need to determine whether or not there was a political objective for these offences?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were a member of the Security Police at some point?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did you regard as the primary objective of the Security Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: To protect the government of the day.

MR BOOYENS: And what did you regard as the objective of the liberation movements?

MR DU PLESSIS: To topple the government of the day and to establish their own dispensation.

MR BOOYENS: What was your duty as Security Policemen in this regard, in other words regarding their actions?

MR DU PLESSIS: In order to prevent that they win the struggle against the government of the day.

MR BOOYENS: Regarding yourself, or let me rather put it this way, the organisation such as CRADORA and other such organisations, did you regard these organisations as part of a threat to the government?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Why?

MR DU PLESSIS: We must not look at the organisations per se but we must observe the consequences of the actions of these organisations and through their actions, they were combatting the government of the day and the machinery of the government and they were succeeding in toppling the government.

MR BOOYENS: In terms of a war, who was winning in your opinion?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would say that the ANC along with its organisations such as the UDF and other affiliates, at that point, was winning the struggle.

MR BOOYENS: The role in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was the same there, it was expanding all the more as well as combatting the general administration in the smaller areas.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have anything personal against any of these four persons?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can state this unequivocally, absolutely not.

MR BOOYENS: To the extent that you were involved in the fact that they lost their lives ultimately, why were you involved?

MR DU PLESSIS: Because I felt or had the opinion that it would prevent the anarchy, that it would disempower the state of anarchy and I also believed that it would be able to tackle the onslaught.

MR BOOYENS: Which onslaught was that?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was the onslaught of the SACP/ANC alliance.

MR BOOYENS: According to what you believed and the information which you had, you spoke of the ANC/SACP alliance, the organisation in which they were involved, the activities with which they were involved, was there a connection between these activities and the ANC/SACP alliance?

MR DU PLESSIS: They were definitely members of the ANC. I don't have precise facts about their activities any more, but I know that they were all buried under the flag of communism.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. And for which reason did you personally become involved in these matters?

MR DU PLESSIS: In this case I received an order to become involved. I also felt that it would be the only way to attempt to stop the onslaught.

MR BOOYENS: You speak of the onslaught, I think you have mentioned it before, but just for the sake of thoroughness, that was during the days of P.W. Botha's total onslaught and Roelf Meyer's anti-strategy which has been submitted?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Du Plessis, today it is almost 15 years since what happened. How do you feel now about what happened?

MR DU PLESSIS: One is indeed sorry and I am speaking for myself that a person as a result of one's job, was compelled to such steps.

For us who believed in the struggle of the National Party, we also believed that if the ANC/SACP alliance were to take over, it would signify the end of the white in Africa.

Right or wrong, that is what we believed. It is a great pity that two political parties such as the NP and the ANC could not sit down and discuss this matter and sort it out and that we and the MK cadres had to sort it out, and as a result thereof, some of us and some of them, died in the struggle.

I am sorry, especially for the families. I am sincerely sorry, not only for the sake of the families, but for the families of the members of the Security Branch to which we had to give orders. Families of members of the Security Branch who suffer as a result of this, but we were given orders to do this, and we tried to do it to the best of our ability.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of what appears in your application?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, I would just like an explanation regarding your final answer. You stated that you were sorry for what had happened and that several members of the Police Force had to take these actions in the name of their jobs.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand correctly that if it had not been for the nature of the work, that none of this would have happened?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that, in fact if the ANC and the NP had not entered into this conflict, it wouldn't have occurred.

CHAIRPERSON: Apart from that sir, as part of your work or the work of the Police members, if it hadn't been for the nature of the work, this wouldn't have happened?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was placed in a situation where I believed that this was the only way out. If I had been in a different position, perhaps I would have regarded the situation differently and believed something different, but I can tell you in all earnesty that that is what I believed to be the only viable solution.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hugo, do you have any questions?

MR HUGO: Not at this stage, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: .

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: You said that you didn't know about the efforts that were being made to reappoint Mr Goniwe as the principal of the Cradock school. Is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. Are you referring to the

report, the Exhibit?

MR BIZOS: Did you or did you not know, leaving aside the Exhibit for a moment, that steps were being taken to decide whether or not to reappoint Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is possible Chairperson, but today I can't recall it. I cannot pertinently recall that I had knowledge thereof.

MR BIZOS: Mr Du Plessis, we have a document before the Court which was referred to as the "nooit ooit" document, Exhibit C.

You surely know about that document, because it expresses the views of the Security Police at a GBS meeting, which was regularly attended either by Mr Snyman or Mr Van Rensburg. What is your answer to the question?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can confirm that Van Rensburg and Snyman indeed attended the meeting, but I don't know exactly what was discussed at those meetings.

MR BIZOS: Mr Du Plessis, you were the Head of the African or Bantu as you would refer to it at the time, section of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You were the office desk man that controlled information and reported on it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You were the man who would have reported to the Head Office at Kompol in Pretoria?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You are the man that would have reported on the activities of the persons such as Goniwe to the Commissioner of Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well not always myself.

MR BIZOS: No, I am talking about you being at least one of those persons.

MR DU PLESSIS: It could have occurred that I wasn't there.

MR BIZOS: No, we are talking about the beginning of May, June 1985 when you were there, please try and be responsive to the questions I ask you.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am saying once more that it could be that I was not present at certain instances, because I was in control of all investigations in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Were you in Port Elizabeth during May, June 1985 Mr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Surely this was the period during which there was intensive investigation into the alleged affairs of the persons you called Cradock 4?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. A day has 24 hours.

MR BIZOS: How could you have been away? I am not talking about 24 hours' attendance Mr Du Plessis, we are talking about your Branch saying to the GBS on the 23rd of May, that under no circumstances that Mr Goniwe be reappointed. When did you first hear about his proposal by your Security Branch to the GBS?

MR DU PLESSIS: Let me ask you why you are saying that my Branch told them this?

MR BIZOS: When did you first hear about this proposal by your Branch to the GBS that Goniwe must never be reappointed?

MR DU PLESSIS: But why are you saying that my Branch, my Unit said this to JMS.

MR BIZOS: Whose view was it that he should never be appointed, was it the Security Branch or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that it was the Security Branch, but I don't think it was my Branch.

MR BIZOS: But you were a part of that Branch, don't quibble with words Mr Du Plessis, please respond to the questions. When did you first hear of this proposal that Mr Goniwe must never, ever be reappointed as the Headmaster of the school?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I am not saying by implication that I have never heard it before, but I stated it very clearly during this hearing that I can no longer place it.

MR BIZOS: Have you finished?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Is it possible that the Head of the Section dealing with Mr Goniwe's fate at the end of May 1985, would not have known what the Security Police view was about the future of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: Absolutely, quite easily.

MR BIZOS: Well, that means of course that the left hand could not possibly have known what the right hand was doing, is that what you want to tell us about the efficient and all powerful Security Police of 1985?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is your opinion, I didn't say that, but what I did say by implication was that I could deliver information to Commanders or a Commander and what this Commander would say during a JMS meeting, was his issue.

Whichever decision they reached there, had absolutely nothing to do with me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, you say you were Head of a certain section relating to the security of the country here in Port Elizabeth and the Eastern Cape in general.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now it appears that Mr Goniwe himself was relieved of his appointment as a teacher at some time prior to his death?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would he have been relieved? Who caused his release?

MR DU PLESSIS: I wouldn't know. If he had caused it himself, it would have been a possibility. We know that because of his activities at the school, he was suspended or transferred.

CHAIRPERSON: The Security Police had nothing to do with him losing his job?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not asking that.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what I am asking, do you know?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you not busy, did you not acquaint yourself with the contents of his file?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you meant at that time?

CHAIRPERSON: That time, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it not have been in his file that he had lost his job or had been suspended or ejected from the school?

MR DU PLESSIS: I stated it clearly, if you had asked me these questions in 1985, I would have been able to tell you at midnight even, but what I am saying by implication is that I can't remember exactly what happened any more.

I don't wish to say that I didn't submit the information, if I can't recall what happened pertinently. You can't expect that from me.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us today whether the Security Police had anything to do with Mr Goniwe loosing his job as a teacher?

MR DU PLESSIS: I listened to the evidence which was given here during the previous hearing, and I think that one can make the inference that that was in fact the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Would I be wrong then to stem that argument to say that if that were the case, the opinion of the Security Police would have been sought by those who wanted to reinstate him?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: The Committee wants evidence, not amnesia Mr Du Plessis. Were you asked whether or not Mr Goniwe should be transferred without consultation with him from his school in Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember whether that was ever asked to me.

MR BIZOS: Is it likely that the Head of the section responsible for that section of the population, would not have been asked what his view was?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so.

MR BIZOS: So you would have been ignored you say on the question as to whether or not he should be forcibly transferred.

MR DU PLESSIS: I was not approached regarding that.

MR BIZOS: Is it possible that you did not tell either Mr Snyman or Mr Van Rensburg that represented the Security Police in Port Elizabeth, to oppose the possible reinstatement of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never said that.

MR BIZOS: Did either Mr Snyman or Mr Van Rensburg ask you, the Head of the Department responsible for monitoring Mr Goniwe, whether he should be reappointed or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am sorry that I am going to answer your question as follows, but firstly I don't have any knowledge thereof.

I would just like to say that either Snyman or Van Rensburg received all the information for which they asked, information regarding a person. They didn't really ask us our opinions.

MR BIZOS: You told us that you had daily meetings. Did Mr Snyman and or Mr Van Rensburg come to any one of these meetings, early morning meetings where enemy number one was being discussed, and say hi, there is a proposal that they should reappoint this man as principal of the school?

MR DU PLESSIS: They did attend meetings but I can't remember that such a proposal was made.

MR BIZOS: What does this I don't remember mean about matters relating to an individual, that you were planning to murder Mr Du Plessis? How can you not remember?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you want me to lie?

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I didn't hear that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you want me to lie, when I say I don't know, then I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Well, except that you possibly are lying in order to avoid the inevitable consequences that follow as a result of your knowing.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, that remark is unjustified. I don't know what was interpreted, but what the witness said is do you want me to lie.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I received that (indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Neither do I. The proposition is that one of the reasons for not remembering is that he is lying. The witness can deal with that and say yes or no or whatever.

MR BIZOS: Have you any answer?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't.

MR BIZOS: Right, now you know Mr Du Plessis, it is about time that you came clean sir because you told us that you wanted to protect the government of the day by killing Mr Goniwe and his associates.

Would you please turn to volume 2 of the documents before the Committee?

MR BOOYENS: Give us the Exhibit number please.

MR BIZOS: Have you got this document? Van Jaarsveld's application, I don't know whether you have that before you. It is the second document Mr Chairman, page 279 of the paginated papers before you. Mr Du Plessis, your colleagues - are you listening?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I am listening.

MR BIZOS: Your colleagues told us that the plan to kill Mr Goniwe was hatched approximately three weeks before the 28th of June, would that be correct more or less?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is approximately correct.

MR BIZOS: Now when you hatched this plan or were busy hatching this plan, no less than 33 other people charged with the safety of the country and its government, met on the 6th of June 1985 at the Head Office of the Security Police or the South African Police on the 6th of June 1985, at nine o'clock in the morning.

Who would you say was in a better position what was in the interests of the government and the State, the 33 people listed on that list or your little bunch in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, it is quite difficult. I don't know what the information was, I would suppose it would be them.

MR BIZOS: Surely. Let's see who they were. Deputy Minister Vlok, you are not for one moment suggesting that you would for one moment, impose your opinion above that of your Deputy Minister of Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: Definitely not.

MR BIZOS: There are 32 others, six of them from the Police. Three of those six from the Security Police, do you see that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, three of the Security Branch as far as I can see.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and three others from the Police, that makes six in all?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And there were people from the Army?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: There were people from the National Intelligence?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And there were people from the Secretariat of the Security Council?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, that is really, that is really a powerful body is it not, to look after the interests of the country?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now they decided if you turn to the next page, page 54 of this document, paragraph 5, Mr Strydom reports on his visit and interview with Matthew Goniwe. Do you know who Mr Strydom was?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't place him.

MR BIZOS: He was a high ranking official from the Department of Education.

MR DU PLESSIS: I will accept that.

MR BIZOS: A decision in relation to the reappointment of Mr Goniwe or not, the situation in Cradock is reasonably quiet. First decision of this august gathering of security people, after discussion of the Goniwe affair, it is decided that a Committee under the leadership of the Security Council Secretariat in relation to Goniwe's fate, will decide and make a proposal on the Chairman, on the 12th of June 1985. That was the decision and if we turn to the previous page, the Chairman of the meeting appear to be Deputy Minister Adriaan Vlok.

Are we to understand from you that this document never came to your attention?

MR DU PLESSIS: Definitely not.

MR BIZOS: Or the decision that a Committee of the Security Council must decide on the fate of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I've got no knowledge of that, no.

MR BIZOS: Or that the Committee had in fact been appointed for that purpose?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot place it today Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But I can't understand this last answer sir. How could you whilst you were preparing to put this man to death, expect the Committee to accept an answer that you cannot remember whether this came to your notice or not? Please explain yourself.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very easily, I cannot remember it. I do not think that the Committee would like me to lie to them or sketch a false picture.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, when you get to a convenient stage we will take the tea adjournment.

MR BIZOS: As the Committee pleases.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

MR DU PLESSIS: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

We come back to this meeting of high ranking officers Mr Du Plessis of which you say you can't remember hearing about, but let us see whether you heard about things nearer home, about the reinstatement or not of Mr Goniwe.

You know that Mr Snyman made an affidavit for the purposes of the inquest held before His Lordship Mr Justice Zietsman, do you know that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe he did. I don't believe I read it, but I believe he did.

MR BIZOS: You believe that he made? Did Mr Snyman at these meetings that you had every morning, refer to the burning issues in the Eastern Province?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did he ever report to you what is contained in his affidavit that was handed in at the inquest as F6? Mr Chairman, it was put to Mr Snyman in evidence and I am reading from page 1010 of the record.

We have made a bundle of the pages which we are going to refer to, but the machine to make the necessary copies, is apparently not here. It will be page 81 of that bundle. It is also handed in as Exhibit V Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: V?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR BIZOS: It is page 1010, page 1010. Have you got that page Mr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: This is what Mr Snyman told, said in his affidavit. This information during a visit by the Minister on the 23rd of May 1985, that is the Minister of Law and Order to Port Elizabeth, carried over the information verbally to the Section Commander, that is Mr Snyman, isn't it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. No, it was the other way around, he was the Commander.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the Commander, yes. It goes on to say that the Minister immediately came into contact with the Minister of Cooperation, Development and Education with a request that the question of the reappointment of Goniwe should be held back until the late Min Le Grange had an opportunity to discuss the matter n the 24th of May.

The Minister requested that the contents of this message should be handed over to him by Major Gen Schutte where he presumably the Minister, would be attending a Cabinet meeting. I hope that I have not done violence to either language Mr Chairman, but that is what was said.

Now, did Mr Snyman ever tell you that he considered the reappointment or not of Mr Goniwe, so important that he raised it with the Minister of Law and Order and who in turn considered it sufficiently important not to go and speak to the Deputy Minister De Beer, but to the Minister himself of Education, who was then Dr Viljoen or Prof Viljoen. Did he ever tell you anything like that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, he did not.

MR BIZOS: But what was more important than this at your daily meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not see the importance of this Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Are you serious Mr Du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is about the reappointment of Mr Goniwe if I understand you correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Du Plessis, it is about the reappointment of a person who will possibly be killed, that is why it is important.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, if you look at it like that, yes, but the appointment of him was not discussed with me and was not conveyed to me.

MR BIZOS: Mr Du Plessis, are you in a serious manner expecting this Committee to accept that what was deemed of sufficient importance to engage two Ministers, the Minister of Law and Order and the Minister of Education, that it was not unusual or necessary for the Head of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth to report the matter on a daily, at a daily meeting, when he that is Snyman, you, Van Rensburg, Van Zyl at the very least, were busy putting into operation an appropriate plan to kill him.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember such a discussion Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well, what had to come? I mean did we have to have an earthquake to destroy half of Eastern Province for you to remember, Mr Du Plessis? What could have been more important?

You tell us that there were discussions, you tell us that they were every day, you tell us all sorts of things. What could have been more important than that two Ministers had become involved as to whether or not Mr Goniwe was to be reappointed or murdered?

MR DU PLESSIS: The reappointment was discussed by the Section Commander or Section Commissioner and the Ministers, I did not have any part in that.

MR BIZOS: But now there are only two possibilities. Incidentally that the carrier of the message, Major Gen Schutte, does his name appear in the list of 33, I just want to check Mr Chairman?

Yes, number 5, I've got it marked, I couldn't see my marking. Yes, you see here you are you see, there seem to be coordination in the matter. Can I possibly try and suggest a way out of your difficulty Mr Du Plessis?

Either you and your colleagues outside the system and without authority decided to murder Goniwe, that is the one possibility. The other possibility is that you did have instructions from above, but these documents were really produced as sham documents, in order to protect the people above who directed you to do the killing.

Can you think of any other possibility to explain this conflict between what was going on above you and what was going on at your level?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot explain it.

MR BIZOS: Can you think of any other than those two possibilities that I have put to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: There are probably various possibilities, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Try, if you say there are many other alternatives, give us one which will reconcile your evidence and these official documents that have been produced before the Committee?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, firstly it could have been that Mr Snyman felt that it does not belong with us here on the ground level.

MR BIZOS: Oh, so you say that the third possibility is that Snyman was doing all this behind your back?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying that.

MR BIZOS: What?

MR DU PLESSIS: They were at the JMS and at the JMS the reappointment of Mr Goniwe was discussed. His reappointment was not discussed with us on the grassroots level, not as far as I know.

MR BIZOS: Are you saying that Mr Snyman deliberately failed to inform you of these important matters when he gave a nod for the plan hatched by you to be executed?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying this.

MR BIZOS: What are you saying?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am saying that he did not inform me personally about this reappointment, or possible reappointment.

MR BIZOS: Now, you told us in your evidence in chief and in answer to your Counsel, that whether you knew about the existence of a document and more particularly, Exhibit H, which was the recommendation of reinstatement of Mr Goniwe, do you remember that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And you told us you didn't remember it and you didn't know about it and then you were asked would it have made any difference to you in relation to the planning of the murder of Goniwe and your answer was, that it would make no difference to you, do you recall that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Is your answer the same that if you knew about the meeting of the 33 people, it would have made no difference to you either?

MR DU PLESSIS: If I had to give the command, yes. In this case, I didn't.

MR BIZOS: Let's just ...

MR BOOYENS: Let him just finish the answer please Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Yes?

MR DU PLESSIS: In this instance I did not give the command, I received the command.

MR BIZOS: We will deal with that later, but let us just get one thing clear. Even if you knew about this meeting and this recommendation, do you say that it would have made no difference to you the same as Exhibit H would not have made any difference to you if you knew about it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: All right. So that you say that you were ordered to do it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: First of all I don't know whether that is quite correct because you told us that you and Mr Van Zyl went and told Mr Snyman that there was a plan to kill Goniwe and he said do the best for South Africa.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I never gave evidence in that line.

MR BIZOS: I see. Mr Van Zyl said so, is he wrong?

MR DU PLESSIS: We did go to Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: Mr Van Zyl said that the answer of Mr Snyman was do what is best for South Africa, and I think other witnesses went further that they said that Mr Snyman was so soft-hearted a man that he couldn't really order a killing and this is why he used the euphemism do what is best for South Africa.

Do you say that that evidence is incorrect?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying that, I also gave evidence.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I didn't hear the last bit of your answer.

MR DU PLESSIS: I also gave evidence in that line or in that regard.

MR BIZOS: So leaving you a discretion as to what is the best for South Africa, you considered to be an order?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would just like to start from the beginning yes, number one on the question you asked and number two, the instructions I got from my superior or the Commander was that he received instructions from Colonel Snyman to tell me and Mr Van Zyl to eliminate Mr Goniwe and his cohorts.

MR BIZOS: We'll come back to the question of whether it was an order or not, but you had had the minutes of the meeting of the 33 before you. Would you not have queried Van Rensburg and or Snyman and say hi, who are you a mere Colonel and a mere Major to order me to commit murder when 33 of the top security people in the country say that they are discussing as to whether or not Mr Goniwe should be reappointed, would you not have asked that question?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know. I do not think I would have asked that question.

MR BIZOS: You see, so that when you say that this document would not have made any difference to your thinking, is inexplicable is it not, for you to receive such an order in whatever terms it may have been? Do you agree?

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you just repeat your question please.

MR BIZOS: Yes. What I am suggesting to you that if you did indeed have the document of the minutes of the meeting of the 33, you would have of necessity have queried it, queried the order?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't think so Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Why not? When you know that 33 of the top security people in the country say that they must consider whether they must be reappointed and somebody says to the best for South Africa and leaves an apparent discretion to you, why would you not have queried it and said hi, there is something wrong here?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is speculation that one could have asked these questions. On the other hand it is also true that he is placed again in a situation where he was, and for me on ground level it would have made no difference regarding his activities.

MR BIZOS: Let me see if I understand that last answer correctly Mr Du Plessis. You say that you saw no conflict between the enquiry called upon Deputy Minister Vlok and a direct order to kill the person before they had even made up their mind whether he should be reappointed or not.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, what I am saying is if they decided to reappoint him, and that was brought under my attention, would that not have changed my decision if I had to give that instruction.

MR BIZOS: I see, let me see if I understand you correctly that even if he had been reappointed and he was teaching the 1 000 odd children at his school in Cradock as a result of consultations between the Minister of Law and Order and the Minister of National Education, you would still have killed him?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, because his activities would not have stopped.

MR BIZOS: So you thought that the Minister of Law and Order and the Committee consisting of nine top security men of the Security Council Secretariat, that their opinion would have been of less value or less weight than yours in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying that. If I was aware of that and they decided to reappoint him ...

MR BIZOS: It wouldn't have made any difference to you, you would have still have killed him?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Well ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, where did this order to kill Mr Goniwe and his friends, come from?

MR DU PLESSIS: In the first instance I received it from Colonel Van Rensburg to look at this, and the instruction came directly from Colonel Snyman to Gen Van Rensburg with the direct implication that after we have gathered information, we must go back to Mr Snyman for the final approval.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you suggesting that the first command to kill Mr Goniwe and his friends, came from Snyman and nobody further up?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is how I remember it and how I know it.

CHAIRPERSON: And you did not enquire as to whether this order came from higher up?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not enquire. I however believed that it came from a higher level.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you believe that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, in that situation where we lived, if we could place ourselves in that now, with all the options that has been exhausted, I believed that it came from the top level, because I did not believe that Mr Snyman could have made such a decision out of his own.

I am not saying that he did not do it, because I do not know who gave him the command, but I wanted to believe that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you ask him? He has asked you to commit a crime?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I did not ask it Mr Chairperson. I cannot explain it further. I might add that a long time after that, I am not sure exactly how long, right or wrong my suspicions or I believed that I was right when I accepted it at that point.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Du Plessis, indeed you never received a direct order to kill Mr Goniwe or anybody else?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did.

ADV POTGIETER: From whom?

MR DU PLESSIS: Firstly from Colonel Van Rensburg.

ADV POTGIETER: That is not what you were saying. You said that Colonel Van Rensburg told you that you should look at the matter.

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Van Rensburg said that Colonel Snyman had said that they had to be eliminated, Goniwe and his cohorts.

For us it was about who could be identified around Goniwe and that the names surrounding Goniwe who had to be eliminated, had to be cleared finally with Colonel Snyman.

ADV POTGIETER: So therefore are you saying that the specific order which you had, was to kill Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and his cohorts.

ADV POTGIETER: But they hadn't been identified, you still had to carry out some work to do this?

MR DU PLESSIS: In all earnesty, they were familiar to us at that stage. We knew who Goniwe's associates were.

ADV POTGIETER: Had they been specifically identified, were there any of your officers who were in command of this?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, they were not directly mentioned.

ADV POTGIETER: Did you make any conclusion gradually after your discussion with Snyman, that you had to kill them?

MR DU PLESSIS: We could look at it as a conclusion, but I was satisfied that it was an order.

ADV POTGIETER: Therefore in other words the words of Colonel Snyman to do what is in the best interest of the county or whatever it was, were interpreted by you that they had to be killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, because it was about killing and elimination.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: That is what was happening above. In view of your amnesia in relation to what was being said about Mr Goniwe's reinstatement, to whom did the Cradock Security Police report about Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: The Commander in Port Elizabeth who would send the documents to my desk.

MR BIZOS: So for the African section of the population, you were the person in charge?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, in May 1985, did Cradock report to Port Elizabeth that Mr Jaap Strydom, the Director General of the Department of Cooperation, Development and Education had come to Cradock in order to have discussions about the reinstatement of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is entirely possible, but I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Well, have you any reason to query a paragraph in Colonel Snyman's affidavit, F6, which is reproduced on page 3067 of the record and will be page 96 to 97 of the bundle that we have to hand in ...

MR BOOYENS: Sorry, what is that page number?

MR BIZOS: It is 3067 of the record. 3067 to 3068.

ADV POTGIETER: Is it Exhibit W Mr Bizos?

MR BOOYENS: We've got Exhibit W here, if I can just enquire from my learned friend, is that the one marked on the top F6 and start with "Ek, Harold Snyman, verklaar onder eed as volg"?

MR BIZOS: It is not in the bundle, it is not in the bundle. It is on page 3067, we will hand in, in the bundle pages 96 to 97. Have you got page 3067 there?

Let me just give you the effect of it. I am going to give you a summary that this matter apparently was discussed in Cradock on which the Security Police was represented, was it not in the mini GBS in Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: You don't know whether the Head of the Security Police at Cradock was a member of the mini GBS?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that I do know.

MR BIZOS: That you know?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now did Mr Winter ever report to you the visits of Mr Strydom in order to try and negotiate with Mr Goniwe his reappointment as Headmaster of the school?

MR DU PLESSIS: Never with me.

MR BIZOS: Did he ever report that the good officers of Mrs Molly Blackburn were to be used in order to arrange a meeting between Goniwe and the Education Department and if need be, with the Deputy Minister?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Again, if this is to be found in Mr Snyman's affidavit, can you think of any reason why this apparently important development that was taking place on the 13th of May 1985, should have been kept away from you by Mr Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think of any reason, but I also can't think why that would have been of any importance to me.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, I am going to put to you that the reason why you deny knowledge or clear memory of these documents, is because you know that admitting them, would negative your assertion that you had authority from above to kill Mr Goniwe and his colleagues?

MR DU PLESSIS: All I can tell you and the Committee is that that is not true.

MR BIZOS: Well, I won't argue that particular matter with you any further Mr Du Plessis.

Now, you have already told us that the discussion about the death of Mr Goniwe started taking place about three weeks before the death occurred, do you stand by that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We know that the signal by the EP GBS was sent at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 7th of June 1985, proposing that Goniwe, Calata and Matthew Goniwe's brother should be removed permanently from society as a matter of urgency. You know that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now ...

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Du Plessis, the decision in the Eastern Cape to kill Mr Goniwe and his friends, was that plan already drafted before that document came through?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you mean the document ...

ADV POTGIETER: The document wherein which it was said that Goniwe and certain other people who are mentioned by name...

MR DU PLESSIS: Should be removed from society?

ADV POTGIETER: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not certain about the dates Chairperson, honestly. I don't know what the date is.

ADV POTGIETER: The date is the 7th. The 7th of June.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Goniwe was taken out on the 7th of June?

MR BOOYENS: No, they were killed on the 27th.

MR DU PLESSIS: They were killed on the 27th of June.

ADV POTGIETER: Yes, the plans in the Eastern Cape, you said that you received them from Snyman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Approximately three weeks before that. It fits in approximately.

ADV POTGIETER: Round about the same time. That is why I am asking you.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot bind myself to certain dates. I am speaking of approximately three weeks.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chairman, I am not asking for dates, I am asking whether or not you are in a position to tell me whether or not the plan of Goniwe and his friends' death in the Eastern Cape, had been finally drafted before that document came through?

MR DU PLESSIS: The only way, I hear what you are saying, if that document had been sent on the 6th and they had been murdered on the 27th, so there is a difference of three weeks, that leaves us on the 6th, if we calculate it as that, I wouldn't be able to tell you which came first. They are quite close to each other.

CHAIRPERSON: If I were to tell you that the date on that document is the 7th, would you then be in a position to tell me?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I won't be able to because I don't know the exact date. I am speaking of approximately three weeks, it can mean anything.

I would like to help you.

CHAIRPERSON: Either which way, you said that you didn't know about the document at that time?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I didn't know.

CHAIRPERSON: So regarding you, the plans to kill Mr Goniwe and his friends were independent from that document?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We know that early in the morning of the 7th, there was a meeting of the "binnekring" so to speak of the EP GBS. Do you know anything about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: The what of the EP GBS, Mr Chairman? The "binnekring"?

MR BIZOS: Yes, there was an inner sort of circle that talked about these things, do you know anything about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't.

MR BIZOS: You see, I want to refer you to page 59 of your application, the bottom of the page.

You say that the operation and possible elimination of the Cradock 4 was discussed on various occasions previously in the so-called security community, but the details and dates of these discussions are unknown at this stage, do you stand by that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, you see that is a statement of a general nature, but I want to ask you for some specifics and I would urge you please to try and remember and also that the Committee is not interested in possibilities, but facts.

Now, when for the first time were there discussions about the elimination of Mr Goniwe, prior to obviously the occasion in question? When was the first time when there were discussions about the killing of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot bind myself to any dates, because I don't know any dates. What I am saying by implication is that in the security community and that would be the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth, among black and white members alike, it was affected as alternatives because we did not see any other alternative.

MR BIZOS: Please answer my question Mr Du Plessis, and I will persist in asking it until you have given an answer.

You say earlier, must be prior to the occasion on which you described in paragraph 2 on page 59, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We know that that discussion was approximately three weeks before the death occurred, that discussion in the second paragraph of page 59?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Therefore there must have been discussions prior to those occasions and there must have been according to the last paragraph, a number of discussions.

Now, let's take them one by one. When for the first time, were there discussions in the security community, not in the Security Police, the security community about the death of Mr Biko. I am sorry, I was involved in that case as well, I get no pleasure out ...

CHAIRPERSON: I was going to say it is a good question, wrong forum.

MR BIZOS: When for the first time was there talk about the death of Mr Goniwe and the Cradock 4 as you say in the last paragraph on page 59?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't give you an exact date, I can only tell you that it took place before the three weeks.

MR BIZOS: Please, you say that there were a number of discussions. We are dealing with the murder of four people, please tell us, try and tell us when that was broached for the first time for discussion, please do that?

MR DU PLESSIS: If I could do that, I would do it. I have told you expressly that the dates are not known to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, are you in any position to say approximately how many weeks, months or years before the meeting three weeks before the murder?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, Chairperson. All I can say is that was when the unrest situation was a burning issue, when the rural politicisation was at its highest point.

When the options were exercised to detained, to restrict the application of security legislation, when that became impossible, that is when the discussion started to take place.

MR BIZOS: You have told us, let's leave out years out of the equation, was it a number of weeks or was it a number of months when it was broached in the security community that Mr Goniwe, or the Cradock 4 had to be eliminated, was it weeks or months?

MR DU PLESSIS: It could have been months, it could have been weeks.

MR BIZOS: It can be months or it can be weeks? Well, we know that from the end of 1984 there was an emigration from Namibia to South Africa and particularly in the Eastern Province of Koevoet members. Did their arrival have anything to do with the discussions about the killing of the Cradock 4 as you say in the last paragraph?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: Right. You don't speak about the Security Police, you speak about the security community, so-called. What did the so-called security community consist of?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I meant here, these words are not my own they are the words of my Attorney, what I meant was the security community. If you look at the term Cradock 4, that is the name which the media gave to these persons, and it is used generically ...

MR BIZOS: Well, you blame the press and you blame your lawyer, but you, yourself signed the affidavit.

MR DU PLESSIS: I agree with that.

MR BIZOS: What did you mean by that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have already told you what I meant by that. I have already told you what I meant. The Cradock 4 indicates Goniwe, Mkhonto, Mhlauli and the others and the security community as the term indicates, is the Security Police in Port Elizabeth.

MR BIZOS: Why did you use this expression of security community?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well they were members of the security community, it is simply a phrase, a term, it didn't have any other meaning that I wanted to attach to this.

MR BIZOS: Isn't the security community or the security operators, mean a combination of the Police, the Security Police and the Army, isn't that was security community means?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I don't wish to become involved in linguistic matters. The fact remains I can tell you what I meant.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever see the word security community used in order to include all those involved in the security of the State, that is the Police and the Army?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, or some of them.

MR BIZOS: Well, before signing this affidavit, did you use an expression which you say the press is responsible, or your lawyer?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not say that. I said that Cradock 4 has become part of language.

MR BIZOS: Well, now let's just deal with the Cradock 4 part of the statement. Cradock 4 means the four victims of your murder in this case?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Were they identified, the four of them, weeks or months before the beginning of June?

MR DU PLESSIS: They were identified a long time before that.

MR BIZOS: They were?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: So that when you were talking about the murder of Mr Goniwe, weeks or months before the beginning of June, you were talking not only about Mr Goniwe, but Mr Fort Calata, Mr Mkhonto and Mr Mhlauli?

MR DU PLESSIS: I wouldn't say all of them, but definitely some of them.

MR BIZOS: Well, now that is not what you said here under oath. You said the Cradock 4 and we know who the Cradock 4 are. The question is why did you say that these persons were being discussed for a number of weeks or months before, if those four had not been identified as your probable victims?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, they were identified before the time, but I stated clearly that I can't recall exactly when these discussions took place.

MR BIZOS: But you told us weeks or months?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is pure speculation on your behalf as well.

MR BIZOS: You chose to give that statement, that last paragraph and not I Mr Du Plessis. You don't want to correct it or change your mind about it, you stand by it do you?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will stand by my statement that I did not know when.

MR BIZOS: No, you stand by the contents of the document that you signed under oath?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: That is what I was asking you about.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that I don't know when.

MR BIZOS: Yes, now let's proceed. Now ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, the discussions which you have referred to in the final paragraph of page 59, were those discussions initiated before Winter was placed in Cradock or after that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't believe that I ever discussed this with Mr Winter.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not my question. These discussions in terms of the chronological placement, were they initiated before Winter was placed in Cradock or after he assumed his duties there?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: ... question further, was Mr Winter ever asked on the desirability or otherwise, or for the good of South Africa or good for Cradock, whether it would have been a good thing or a bad thing to kill Goniwe and the other three to make them Cradock 4?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You speak about the Cradock 4 and that could possibly have been discussed before Mr Winter came to Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: We were told by way of contrast of your Cradock 4 that the discussion was not about specific persons other than Mr Goniwe, but that it would be left to your discretion out of a list of six or seven, as to who would be the hangers on, to use your language, that would be identified to be murdered. Which portion is correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't believe I said that. I do know that it was testified here by Mr Van Zyl and other members that it was six to seven names, but I can't remember that correctly. I can't remember what the names were of those who were identified.

MR BIZOS: Was the death of people not sufficient for you or the possible death of people, not of sufficient importance to you to even remember at least of their names?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, it may be a convenient stage.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn till half past two.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

MR DU PLESSIS: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Look at the last page of Exhibit H, particularly paragraph 43 right at the bottom.

The last page of H.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am there, yes.

MR BIZOS: We there read that Goniwe is to be appointed, well first of all it is recommendations, Goniwe to be appointed to a teacher's post at Cradock and (b) no conditions should be imposed save those relating or the requirements of the Education Department, do you see that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: If you go to the first page, you see that that is sent to the GVS Action Committee. Do you see that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: What does GVS stand for?

MR DU PLESSIS: Joint Security Centre, I accept.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and we know who was on that because if we have a look at volume 2, at the meeting of the 6th June 1985, it is the 33 high ranking people that this report was sent to.

We know that this was sent by to Major General J.F.J. Van Rensburg and obviously intended for the eyes of these 33 people. Can you explain why none of them would have brought that recommendation to your notice, including the three high ranking Security Police officers?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I can give no explanation.

MR BIZOS: You were the person who controlled the information that was coming in from Mr Goniwe, did you?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes, it appeared on my desk.

MR BIZOS: And if you have a look at the report of the Commissioner of Police, Gen Johan Coetzee, and more particularly at page 11 of the second schedule, it contains entries of the monitoring of Mr Goniwe, right up to the 16th of June 1985.

MR BOOYENS: Is that K2?

MR BIZOS: Your Counsel referred you to this document in your evidence in chief, I am assuming that you have been through it, have you?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, where in all the monitoring of Mr Goniwe, in schedule B do we see him described as the dangerous terrorist that you want to make him out to be?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will not say that it is described here, but his activities do explain it very clearly.

MR BIZOS: Let's take the last thing for starters, and that the people in the homelands must cooperate with people overseas in order to bring about change in South Africa. Are those the words of a terrorist according to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying that, but remember that is a compact summary of his activities.

MR BIZOS: But one would have thought that in making submissions to the Commissioner of Police, you would not sanitise the information, you would not make it, you wouldn't put sugar coated, you would speak plainly and you would speak about the information that this dangerous person was indulging in.

MR BOOYENS: Maybe I misunderstood the question, but is my learned friend suggesting that the witness was the author of Exhibit K2, because there is no evidence to that, because it said why would you sanitise it, in what sense?

MR BIZOS: Why would the information that you were gathering, be sanitised?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not saying that it happened, but there are various reasons for it. I can say that a lot of information that was sent to the Head Office, if I can just finish.

MR BIZOS: Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have requested to be allowed to answer the question, you have asked me a question and I would like to answer to that.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Du Plessis, have you finished?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: You haven't finished?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: I find it difficult to hear ...

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, he has told my learned friend just now that he hasn't finished the answer, can he just ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, is having difficulty listening to the answer.

MR BIZOS: I don't hear the last bit of your sentences because you drop your voice, I am sorry, I don't intend to interrupt you, please finish.

MR DU PLESSIS: Various information that I was aware of, but in my career in the Security Branch, information like this would not have been contained in documents like this.

I am satisfied that everything that is contained in this document does not reflect the activities of Goniwe fully.

MR BIZOS: I think you are missing the point of my question Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is possible, yes.

MR BIZOS: If there were serious matters that do not appear in this schedule, why should they be kept away from the Commissioner, if you had recorded it properly and whoever drew the document must have of necessity have had access to the information that you had gathered?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will now know. Maybe there is supplementary documentation.

MR BIZOS: I am sure that if there was an extra document, the people representing the Police at the inquest or the people that investigated the matter, would no doubt have had this document. Who would have had the motive to put an incomplete document before His Lordship, Mr Justice Zietsman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't comment on that.

MR BIZOS: You can't? You see the issue is can we believe you when you say that you had that information, or not, and I am going to suggest to you that the absence of that information from the schedule, clearly shows that you are not telling the truth about the nature and the extent and seriousness of the information. You now, after the man is dead and buried, say that you had.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am satisfied that we had the information and I also believe Mr Chairperson, that if you look at statements from the ANC, that they also admitted that.

MR BIZOS: If you have a look at Exhibit U, have you had an opportunity to study this document coming from Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is a possibility, Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember or recall, I believe that I have read it.

MR BIZOS: This sets out what happened with CRADORA and who its office bearers were and what the local people thought as important information to be communicated. Can you find anything as serious as you suggest that the man was to be a candidate for murder, to be murdered?

MR DU PLESSIS: Maybe not in this document.

MR BIZOS: So that we have nothing in any of the documents dealing with the subject matter, to corroborate what you say the information was? We will leave it at that for the time being Mr Du Plessis.

I want you to please turn to the file dealing with the applications of the applicants for amnesty. Would you please turn to page 26. I don't want to read it and I don't want to translate it, I want you to read the second paragraph on page 26 of the application. This is Mr Van Rensburg's application.

Please read it to yourself.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have read it.

MR BIZOS: Have you read it, please turn to page 37 and read the last paragraph of that and which continues on to the third paragraph on page 38. Last paragraph on page 37, paragraph three of page 38 Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have read that, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Please read Mr Van Zyl's paragraph, the last paragraph on page 47 going on to the top of page 48.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Would you please look at your own application, the second paragraph on page 59 and read that to yourself.

MR DU PLESSIS: Which paragraph?

MR BIZOS: The second paragraph.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, now could you please tell us whether you disagree with anything in any of the paragraphs that I asked you to read?

MR DU PLESSIS: At this stage, no, I do not differ.

MR BIZOS: Is it correct that these paragraphs were written and sworn to as correct at the time when you and your follow applicants did not know of Mr Snyman's terminal condition?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Is that why we cannot find anything in any one of these paragraphs that there was a suggestion or a feeling, some evidence that the order to kill Mr Goniwe and the others, came from the top?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I can't remember that we ever thought of that.

MR BIZOS: Well, please try and come to terms with the question. We have heard in the evidence of your colleagues and a suggestion from you this morning, that the order came from the top. Is that not an embellishment which you and your colleagues thought out when you knew or you came to know that Mr Snyman would not be given evidence and he could not be asked whether the order came from the top or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: Definitely not.

MR BIZOS: Well then explain please why there isn't a single suggestion in the evidence before the Court in your written application, saying that the order came from the top?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well in the first instance I cannot factually say that that was the case, number one. And number two, it was suspicions that I still have today.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you then not make the statement that you have got reason to think that the order came from the top?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I do not know. Colonel Snyman would have testified here and told you where he got the order from. That is the first thing. At that stage I didn't believe that it was necessary.

With all honesty, this was a statement we made with the amount of information we had, and it was also said to us by our legal team that we will get the opportunity to clarify these matters later on.

MR BIZOS: ... other opportunity to try and explain, here we have in the four affidavits, no mention whatsoever of the order coming from the top. Once we know that Mr Snyman is terminally ill, we have a chorus of suggestions that the order must have come from the top and different reasons given why that must have been so.

Can you explain that apparent contradiction on a basis other than taking advantage of Mr Snyman's condition of health in order to change your story to make it better for the purposes of this application?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can just repeat definitely not, and I am also not intending to use Mr Snyman's illness as an excuse.

MR BIZOS: Well, if there is another explanation that you can think of, you can perhaps tell us about it later. But let us look at Mr Snyman's own words, at page 137, with which you have agreed.

MR DU PLESSIS: 137?

MR BIZOS: 137. Look at it, on a certain date Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl came to my office to talk to me, discuss with me. They said that as a result of the latest information concerning the actions ...

MR DU PLESSIS: No, but that is Pebco.

MR BOOYENS: Just a moment, we seem to have two different applications here. I see, we've got that. My apologies to my learned friend, Mr Chairman, is that the paragraph starting on a certain date?

MR BIZOS: ... as a result of my attempted translation. At a certain date that I cannot remember, Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl came to my office. They provided me with the most recent information regarding the above-mentioned activists and indicated to me that the security situation in the Eastern Cape was declining and was getting out of hand, because of these people's activities.

Various options were discussed, but after thorough consideration, no solution was found. I experienced extreme pressure from the South African Police Headquarters as well as the JMS to act drastically in order to control the situation or bring it under control.

It was clear that after this presentation, these people had to be eliminated as soon as possible, in order to deprive this organisation of their leader element and prevent them from acting politically.

Then please let's go to the third paragraph. I had a struggle with my conscience that an operation had to be established or started in order to kill these four activists to stabilise the unrest in the Eastern Cape. At this stage there was no reason for me to doubt the presentation of Major Du Plessis, because Major Du Plessis had a safety record and that prevented me from doubting his presentation, and to question his version of the unrest in the Eastern Cape.

Now, is that correct? You have already said that it is, do you want to change your mind or is it correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Does this not indicate that the initiative for these deaths came from you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, definitely not.

MR BIZOS: Well, Mr Snyman isn't saying that he got an order anywhere else, but he is full of praise for you and the articulation of the proposal.

MR DU PLESSIS: But the order that I got was from the now Colonel Van Rensburg, and that is to make a presentation regarding Mr Goniwe and his cohorts, and that these people who were killed as well as others, and that was the order from the start or onset.

MR BIZOS: Now, let's look at Van Rensburg. On page 26 far from him saying that he told you what to do, he supports Mr Snyman that the initiative came from you.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you continue Mr Du Plessis, this last paragraph on page 37, when would that meeting have taken place?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I already said Mr Chairperson, that was approximately a week before the elimination. That is when we went to Gen Van Rensburg and Gen Van Rensburg said or gave us the final approval, or that we must get the final approval from Colonel Snyman.

CHAIRPERSON: Explain to me then please, because then I've got it wrong, in the middle of that paragraph and I am reading it to you now, various options were discussed but after thorough consideration, did not provide any permanent solution.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So, I understood your evidence the whole morning that three weeks before the incident, there was talk about the death of Mr Goniwe and his friends. How does this fit in with this sentence that there was no permanent solution?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, with the presentation Mr Chairperson, other options were discussed and I believe that is what Colonel Snyman means here. I didn't see any other options presented. It could be that he had doubts.

CHAIRPERSON: It is said here that there was no permanent solutions, it is not another option. I am not trying to mislead you, I am just trying to find out how your evidence fits in here.

Do you understand?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't understand.

CHAIRPERSON: As I have understood all these things, three weeks before the time at least, an order was given that Mr Goniwe and his friends should be killed.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is how I understood it from Gen Van Rensburg.

CHAIRPERSON: This meeting which has been described on page 37, it says that a week before the time during this meeting, various options were discussed and after thorough consideration, no permanent solution was arrived at?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't believe so.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you please explain what you mean then?

MR DU PLESSIS: After thorough consideration no permanent solution was offered, that means that no other solution was arrived at other than the solution to eliminate.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that how you understood it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is how I understood it.

MR BIZOS: We are going to go to Mr Van Rensburg, who you said ordered you to make a plan, but he says something different on page 26, doesn't he?

On an unknown date, before the 27th of June 1985, Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl, under direct orders of Major Du Plessis, approached me in my office regarding the possible elimination of the Cradock 4. This was discussed with me upon which I as a result of the previous motivation and principles, agreed subject to approval of the Commanding Officer.

I referred both these members to Colonel Snyman, after their visit to Colonel Snyman, they returned to me and notified me that the proposed operation for the elimination of the Cradock 4 had been approved by the Commanding Officer. On the same day Colonel Snyman told me that he had given approval to Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl for the elimination of the Cradock 4.

Is it not crystal clear that Mr Van Rensburg turns the thing around? He says that you and Van Zyl initiated the suggestion, clearly?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that is not how I understood it.

MR BIZOS: No, but well the Afrikaans language is a precise language for these purposes and many others, so we won't argue with you how you understood it.

We are more concerned what the plain meaning is.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can only tell you what happened, I can only tell you what I know.

MR BIZOS: Well, you don't agree that there is any contradiction between what I have read to you as a paragraph of Mr Van Rensburg's affidavit and your evidence here today, that you got an order from Mr Van Rensburg to kill the people?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, definitely not.

MR BIZOS: All right, let us just go on to another aspect and that is the question of alternative solutions.

Mr Mkhonto had never been warned by the Security Police to cease his political activities, was he?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Well, didn't you think that it was something that you might have tried to find out before you agreed to murder him?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Was he detained in any way?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know if he was ever detained, it is a possibility, I can't remember those details.

MR BIZOS: Before deciding whether or not death was an appropriate punishment for him, why didn't you try to find out?

MR DU PLESSIS: If you had asked me these questions in 1985, I would have been able to answer you much better.

MR BIZOS: Why would you ask the question now, now that you have killed him and not before you killed him?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is not what I am saying, I am telling you that if you had asked me this in 1985, I would be able to answer you much better then, but right now, I can't tell you anything about the activities of that time.

MR BIZOS: Did you try and find the record as to whether he was issued with a banning order or a restriction order as the Security Police preferred to call them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that Captain Van Zyl would have tried to get hold of such information.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you bother to find out?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you mean now or then?

MR BIZOS: At the time before you arranged his death?

MR DU PLESSIS: We had all the information that we could possibly obtain at that time.

MR BIZOS: The question is specific sir, did you bother to try and find out whether he had been restricted in any way?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that if he had been restricted or not, I would have been aware of it then, but I can't remember it now.

MR BIZOS: Well, if restriction orders related to movement and attending of gatherings and such matters, do you know whether he moved about freely to the knowledge of the Security Police and he attended gatherings to the knowledge of the Security Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember, yes.

MR BIZOS: Can we therefore assume that you did know that he hadn't in any way been restricted?

MR DU PLESSIS: We could accept that perhaps.

MR BIZOS: Was it not within your experience that some people, if they were restricted, actually withdrew from political activities?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think of one case in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think of one case in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Well, how many people were restricted in the Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: Quite a number.

MR BIZOS: How many?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know how many.

MR BIZOS: A dozen, oh no, I am putting it too high. Give us three people who were banned and who you say continued to carry on with their open political activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember the names any more at this moment.

MR BIZOS: Give us the occupation of any one of them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Once again, I can't remember any of this, but I can ask the same question, of whom of them stopped. It was announced by the ANC and they said it in public, that restraining orders simply weren't effective.

MR BIZOS: In relation to Mr Mhlauli, you were shown the two documents by your Counsel this morning. Do you remember them?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Your reason for saying that Mr Mhlauli was unknown was that he didn't know about the activities, is that right?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, or that his S-number was not familiar to the Branch.

MR BIZOS: Will you have a look at paragraph 15 on the last page of this document. This document or telefax was compiled in cooperation with the Security Branch.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Who was in charge of the information in relation to African suspects in the Security Police, Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: Myself, but I didn't compile this.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: Myself, but I didn't compile this.

MR BIZOS: No, it is not a question of you drawing it up. If the sender of this document after all, the Head of the South African Police in Port Elizabeth, writing to the Headquarters in Pretoria, do you think that it could have given incorrect information to Pretoria, without checking with the person in charge of the information in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I don't know who they checked this with. I can't comment on this because I don't know under which circumstances this document was compiled.

MR BIZOS: Here he was writing a person who had been found dead, and he found it necessary to report fully on the event. Wouldn't everybody by the date of this document being sent, have wanted to know who this Mhlauli was?

Here is a person who is found dead, there are three other people that are found dead. We know that the bodies of Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata were only found on Monday. It looks as if it was written on the 30th, that would have been how many days after the night of the death?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I have it, it was written on the 05-06-1985.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it has a date of 29-06-1985, that is two days later, but there is a stamp in Port Elizabeth, apparently on the date on which it might have been sent on the 30th of June, do you see that on the second page of the document?

MR DU PLESSIS: To us it appears to be the 29th Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: To us it appears to be the 29th, if one looks at the date stamp.

MR BIZOS: Isn't it the 30th, but anyway, 29th or 30th. Two days after the death or the bodies of these persons were found, wouldn't everyone in the Security Police, once the Police Head found it necessary to send off such a document to the Headquarters wanting to know who Mhlauli was?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so.

MR BIZOS: How did he become to be unknown to the Head of the Police in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: Really you can't expect me to comment on this.

MR BIZOS: Because you see in truth and in fact, I am going to suggest to you, that the reason why he was described as unknown was because nobody knew anything about him, that he was killed because he happened to be there.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is not so.

MR BIZOS: Very well, we'll carry on. But now Exhibit HH, who would have sent the request to Somerset-West?

MR DU PLESSIS: To the South Western Districts?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: South Western Districts?

MR BIZOS: South Western Districts, I beg your pardon.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, let's try to determine this. It appears to me ...

MR BIZOS: Yes, but who would have made the request for this reply to come?

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Swartz.

MR BIZOS: Brigadier Swartz? Let us see if we can work out what the question was from the answers.

MR BOOYENS: If I may assist my learned friend, if he looks at the last page of the previous Exhibit, I think there is the question.

MR BIZOS: Are the questions there?

MR BOOYENS: I think so. That is C1 right at the bottom of the last page of Exhibit GG. C1, right at the bottom of the paragraph.

MR BIZOS: Why would Mr Swartz want to know it is asked what Sicelo Mhlauli's organisatory connection is, something or other.

The question that is asked clearly indicates that Port Elizabeth after consultation with the Security Police, didn't even know whether this man was a school teacher and didn't know what his organisational questions were.

MR DU PLESSIS: It must have been some kind of administrative issue, I don't know why they didn't ask it. I don't know if they didn't have enough information at that point. At least I believe that they didn't.

MR BIZOS: Do you have any doubt that Mr Swartz spoke the truth when he said this telefax has been undertaken in cooperation with the Security Branch?

MR DU PLESSIS: I see that they refer to him and Colonel Snyman, I agree the telefax states it as thus.

MR BIZOS: You know, for people that have to decide whether you and your colleagues are telling the truth, do you agree that these documents clearly show that the Security Police and the Police in Port Elizabeth did not know that, whether or not he was a school teacher and they certainly did not know what his political organisational connections were.

MR DU PLESSIS: That might appear, but it is not the case.

MR BIZOS: You know as they say, what appears to be, usually is.

MR DU PLESSIS: It could be the converse as well?

MR BIZOS: Yes, but unfortunately we only have your side, which you can change at will, but this can't be changed.

MR DU PLESSIS: I promise you, this is not my intention.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Mhlauli have a file?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't believe that he would have had a file in Port Elizabeth. I am referring to circumstances which I can remember, still can remember. In PE he would have had an index card.

MR BIZOS: How do you decide that a man should be killed without even bothering to find out from the District that he comes, before you kill him, not afterwards, what was he all about?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I think what the SWD would have had on him, would have been the same as our information, and I think that we would have had more available information on him than what the SWD would have had.

MR BIZOS: When did you find out that there was a change of date for the meeting with Mr Swartz in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember that at all.

MR BIZOS: From whom would you have found out that there was a change from the Wednesday to the Thursday?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know. I believe that this would have been through informers or by means of tapping devices, I can't remember the details any more. Personally I would have heard it from Captain Van Zyl, but that is my personal opinion.

MR BIZOS: Very well. Did you have any information that you can recall that there was this change of date?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember, at this point I can't think of anything pertinent.

MR BIZOS: Try and think, did you get any information early on the morning of the 27th as to who was going to be in Mr Goniwe's car?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Well, when did for the first time, was become known to you as a member of the team referred to as Cradock 4?

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you please repeat the question?

MR BIZOS: When did you start referring to Mr Mhlauli as one of the members of the Cradock 4?

MR DU PLESSIS: The Attorneys began to use this phrase when they started writing this document.

MR BIZOS: So, when you referred to the Cradock 4 in your application, you say that that is the Attorney's language. How would you have put it in relation to who was in the motor car early on the morning of the 27th as it left Cradock, did you know?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't know. I could be Goniwe and others.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: It could be Goniwe and others, that is another description.

MR BIZOS: Who could it have been, I am sorry, I didn't understand you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Goniwe and others.

MR BIZOS: Goniwe and others?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: I see. Now the Goniwe and others, may not have been Goniwe and Fort Calata and not Goniwe and Mkhonto and not Goniwe and Mhlauli, it could have been one more, two more, three more or possibly four more?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: I see. And then arrangements were made to kill whom, Goniwe and three or four others?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't understand what you are playing at.

MR BIZOS: No, you said as far as you knew the people in the car were Goniwe and others.

MR BOOYENS: No, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: I never said that.

MR BOOYENS: My learned friend asked the witness what other description than the Cradock 4 could have been used. The argument was why the term was used in his application, the Cradock 4. He asked him what other term could have been used, and he then said you could have talked of Goniwe and others.

But surely that is a long way off from saying that is the term that was used.

MR BIZOS: Please, it could have been, there was a lot between that and what your Counsel have said Mr Du Plessis. It could have been Goniwe and one other whose name you did not know?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I used this example. You put a question to me and you asked when I referred to the Cradock 4 as such and I told you that that was my legal Counsel's description. Then you asked me how else one could describe them and I said another interpretation could be Goniwe and others.

MR BIZOS: That was part of the answer, the other part of the answer was that you did not know whether it was Goniwe and Calata or Goniwe and Mkhonto or Goniwe and Mhlauli.

Let's leave aside the meaning of the word others, you did not know whether Goniwe was with this three or three or four other people?

MR DU PLESSIS: I didn't know who was in the car with him.

MR BIZOS: Right, therefore you prepared for the killing of Goniwe and a number of other people, unknown to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Chairperson, that is not what I planned. That planning was undertaken by Captain Van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: No, but just one moment, just one moment please. You did not know who was in the car that morning, presumably you only found out who was actually killed after the success of the operation was given to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: When did you find out?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember Captain Van Zyl informed me that they had been to Swartz' house.

MR BIZOS: When did he tell you that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember whether it was the day of the elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis, it could only have been on that day?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that it was that day.

CHAIRPERSON: Because as I understand the evidence, that morning they had left Cradock, in fact the previous evening.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember that.

CHAIRPERSON: That very same day, thus if you had been informed that these four people had been driving from Cradock, it could only have been on that day?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. I can't hear what he is saying.

MR BOOYENS: He says refer to your application on page 60, I think was the question.

MR BIZOS: Is it clear that you said there that the identification was given to you of the people who would attend the meeting of Swartz, at Swartz' house, not information of people who were there.

MR DU PLESSIS: It says here on the 27th of June 1985, it was confirmed that these four identified activists were to attend a meeting in PE at Derrick Swartz' house.

MR BIZOS: Would attend, even my Afrikaans helps me to the extent that that was the information of what was to be, not what had happened.

MR DU PLESSIS: But then it continues. Observation of this house confirmed this, and final arrangements were made to initiate the operation.

MR BIZOS: Let us stop where I stopped and we will deal with where you want to deal afterwards.

You told us that you had no information as to who these persons were, when they left Cradock, was that correct or incorrect having regard to it being contradicted in your own application?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think that I said that.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think that I said that I didn't know.

MR BIZOS: The record will speak for itself. You remember you told us that it could have been Goniwe and any three or four other people, why do you say you didn't say it?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I never said that.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was referring to Goniwe and others in response to a question of yours. It was an explanation of the interpretation of the phrase Cradock 4, it had nothing to do with this.

MR BIZOS: We have been along that path and you agreed that you didn't know who was in the car, sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: I myself didn't know who was in the vehicle, but the information which I had, told me who would be in the car.

MR BIZOS: Well, the operation was set in motion without you knowing in the morning who was in the car?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You were senior to Van Zyl, Taylor, Lotz. You were senior to those three, correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And the operation was put into motion in the morning? Yes?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: So an operation to kill the occupants of the car, was initiated without you knowing who was in the car?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, what authority did you or anyone else have to kill Goniwe and any other persons that may have been in his car on that day?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, this operation itself, I have clearly stated, I did not take part in it, we left that to Captain Van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: I can understand if the identity of the people was known, that you had authority to kill four particular people and not a choice of a number out of seven, that you didn't have to bother to find out who was in the car.

But if there was no knowledge on your part as to who was in the car, how could you not have taken steps to check who was in the car, and whether or not it would have been just and equitable even in your, what I may call perverse morality, whether they should be killed or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: In the first instance I believe that Captain Van Zyl knew who was in the vehicle, or made certain who was in the vehicle.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, the first part of your answer you are not certain whether Mr Van Zyl knew?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I said he possibly knew who was in the vehicle as a result of the information that he had, as well as the information that he obtained at the meeting, or gathered at the meeting.

MR BIZOS: I am going to put to you that as a senior officer, even if everything else may be correct, that this conduct of yours in allowing a carte blanche to people, to kill people in the car, was completely contrary to your own authority, even on your own terms.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I feel and I am very clear about it, that my task had been completed after I came from Colonel Van Rensburg.

MR BIZOS: Who did you say they must kill?

MR DU PLESSIS: Specifically Goniwe, Calata, Mkhonto and Mhlauli.

MR BIZOS: Oh, so that it was a very happy coincidence?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, that was a completely confusing, was the question who did you say he must kill? This witness never said that he told him to kill anybody.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, why did he answer then?

MR BOOYENS: Because my learned friend, with respect, is badgering this witness Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know about that, if he is, then you must raise the objection.

Mr Du Plessis, please tell me why were you informed that morning that this car will come from Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that this operation would have been executed that day, or that it was planned to execute that operation that day.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there a confirmation asked from you that the operation must continue?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, the order was given at a previous opportunity, they looked for an opportunity to do it.

CHAIRPERSON: That morning the car with four people came from Cradock, you were then informed that the car left with Goniwe and others?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Why were you informed, you have given the order?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I said that I believe I was informed, I cannot remember if I was informed or not. I don't believe I said it.

CHAIRPERSON: So you did not even know that the meeting will take place on that day when this vehicle left Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is possible that I knew it, I cannot remember it today. I believe that they did tell me that the people left and that the operation will take place that evening, or that a possible operation will take place.

You must also remember that Captain Van Zyl worked under me and if he is not there, I would have liked to know where he was.

MR BIZOS: Let's go to the next sentence on page 60. Observation of this house confirmed it and final arrangements was made in order to execute the operation. This house is Derrick Swartz' house, right?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He was a high profile activist?

MR DU PLESSIS: In the UDF, yes.

MR BIZOS: If by any chance he got into the car, did they have authority to kill him too?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, his name was not mentioned as far as I know.

MR BIZOS: Who was more important, a man from South Western Districts or the leader of the UDF Executive in Port Elizabeth, why would you have spared Swartz and killed Mhlauli?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am also speculating.

MR BIZOS: I didn't hear.

MR DU PLESSIS: I didn't have an order regarding Derrick Swartz, that is speculating.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Why do you say that it was in Derrick Swartz' house?

MR DU PLESSIS: (No translation)

MR BIZOS: Yes?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I accept that if it says, it stands here because information I received from Captain Van Zyl or someone else.

MR BIZOS: Would Mr Swartz' house have been monitored?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe it would have been, yes.

MR BIZOS: And would it be the monitoring procedure that really told you what the meeting was and who attended the meeting and everything else?

MR DU PLESSIS: We are speculating now.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am speculating.

MR BIZOS: Well, you see because, let us speak about the things that you are not speculating, that the meeting was at Derrick Swartz' house. If I were to suggest to you that probably knowing of your efficiency in monitoring houses of high profile activists, the meeting wasn't held there at all, what have you got to say to that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no problem with that.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is possible that it could have been another house.

MR BIZOS: Yes, you may not have any problem, but if you do not have any problem, how reliable was your information that you recorded under oath that the meeting was at Swartz' house?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was my information that I received at that stage, and if the meeting was moved, they would have indicated that.

MR BIZOS: Yes, because in truth and in fact the meeting was held at the house of Mr Michael Coetzee. Can you deny that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I can't.

MR BIZOS: So that if one portion of your information is incorrect, it is possible that the fact that the occupants of the car were confirmed, may also be incorrect?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, it was not wrong. We had authorization for these people and they were killed in the end, I do not understand.

MR BIZOS: And if I were to tell you that the, not all four persons attended the meeting, what would you say?

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you repeat your question please?

MR BIZOS: If I were to tell you that out of the four persons that occupied the car, not all of them attended the meeting, what would you say?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will not argue that.

CHAIRPERSON: And if that person was Mhlauli, what will the position be then?

MR DU PLESSIS: If he hadn't been there?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairperson, he was in the vehicle, I cannot comment if he was in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not the point that you are making now, that he did attend the meeting and it was confirmed, or it confirmed his connection with Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If it is proved that he was not at the meeting, how do you place yourself regarding his murder?

MR DU PLESSIS: Firstly, number one, there were various meetings between Mhlauli and Goniwe. My information on that day was that Mr Mhlauli will be at that meeting again.

That is the information that I had, or that was conveyed to me.

MR BIZOS: When were the four identified as the would be victims of your murderous plan?

MR DU PLESSIS: We got authorization from Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: When?

MR DU PLESSIS: Approximately a week before the elimination.

MR BIZOS: A week before ...

MR DU PLESSIS: A week before they were eliminated.

MR BIZOS: But I thought that Colonel Snyman spoke only of one meeting, when his permission was sought, which would have been approximately three weeks before?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, approximately three weeks before the incident we were informed about it, and approximately a week before it, we made a presentation to Colonel Snyman, after which we went to Colonel Van Rensburg and that is where the modus operandi were discussed.

MR BIZOS: When was Mr Mhlauli's name mentioned for the first time in your discussions as a would be victim?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, from the beginning from Captain Van Zyl with the information that we gathered or that they gathered.

MR BIZOS: Give us a date please, an approximate date.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't tell you, I said to you it was approximately three weeks.

MR BIZOS: Good, that is good enough for my purposes, thank you. Mr Mhlauli's name was agreed or mentioned or was it agreed between Mr Van Zyl and you to be a would be victim?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, where was Mr Mhlauli three weeks before his death?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember where he was. I went on the information from Captain Van Zyl, and I also acted on information that was gathered long before then or that appeared on my desk.

MR BIZOS: Was your, were your discussions in these, discussions that you had about the death of Mr Goniwe and others, based on a plan that you would try and get them together and get rid of them all together?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think so. It was a case of where we got authorization, and that is what we did, for people around Mr Goniwe that was responsible for the destabilisation of the rural areas.

MR BIZOS: Now, I am going to ask you please to name the names of the others that were potential victims?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have said to you already if you had asked me in 1985, I would have been able to tell you, but unfortunately we are in another year, I cannot.

MR BIZOS: Very well. You see, at the time that you say Mr Mhlauli was identified, was before the school holidays, was it?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Well, didn't you want to know where was this man, where was this man at the moment that you were proposing him as a candidate for death? Didn't you ask yourself where is he?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I believe that I asked various questions, but I think it is unfair to think that I can still remember them now.

MR BIZOS: Now you know, I have read your applications and the applications of your colleagues carefully. Your main concern was restoring peace to the Eastern Province, correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: How would the death of a school principal that the Chief of Police in Port Elizabeth did not know what his occupation was, or what his political affiliations were, help to pacify the Eastern Province?

MR DU PLESSIS: Your Honour, I can only say at that stage, we knew what his activities were. We also knew what his connection was with Mr Goniwe.

I do not want to say that he showed the same activities as Mr Goniwe, but I saw him as an activist in the rural areas and who could activate unrest in these areas.

MR BIZOS: At the time that these four were identified, was it before or after the abduction and murder of the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe it was after.

MR BIZOS: When did your discussions in relation to the death of Pebco 3 start?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot pertinently remember that.

MR BIZOS: How long before their deaths?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, it is difficult to say, it was quite a while before that.

MR BIZOS: How long more or less?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, let us say it was three months.

MR BIZOS: Three months before the death of the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: Did we discuss the Pebco 3 or the Goniwe matter?

MR BIZOS: No, how long before the Pebco 3 deaths, did the discussions about their murders start?

MR BOOYENS: I think for clarity sake, is my learned friend asking how long before the Pebco 3 people were killed, did the discussions about the killing of the Pebco 3 start, not these people, not the Cradock 4?

MR BIZOS: How long the Pebco 3 were put to death, did you start discussing the death of the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot exactly remember.

MR BIZOS: Well, please tell us more or less.

MR DU PLESSIS: It could have been a month, two months before.

MR BIZOS: And how long after the Pebco 3 were murdered, was Goniwe and the other three, murdered?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot exactly say, I cannot remember the dates.

MR BIZOS: More or less? Don't you remember the date that the Pebco 3 were killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I can't remember. I've got it in the documentation somewhere, I can look it up, but I cannot remember it.

MR BIZOS: Let us say then, would it be fair to say that murder as an option for solving the problems of the Eastern Province, had been going on for a number of months before Goniwe was killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: You can make that inference, yes.

MR BIZOS: And we know that you were discussing Goniwe you told us, discussing it before a final decision were made, for a number of months?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct yes.

MR BIZOS: And was there an overlapping of - in the discussions at the same meeting or at successive meetings in relation to whom to murder in order to pacify the Eastern Province?

MR DU PLESSIS: It could be that some of the names appeared during that period of time, but I cannot remember if Goniwe and them were pertinently discussed with the Pebco people.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Please tell us the first meeting, this is important please listen carefully, the first meeting when you and your colleagues said let's murder some of these activists in order to pacify the Eastern Province, when was that first said by anybody?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Try and remember.

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know.

MR BIZOS: It is what politicians call a qualitative difference in one's thinking, you know murder is murder, up to then, you just detained people, you questioned them at great length, you did all sorts of things, but murder, when was that introduced into your thinking, into your vocabulary or elimination if it makes you feel better?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: ... patient, because it is very important that we should actually see how your thought process went about and who gave authority for what and for what reason. When was murder or elimination - first crossed anybody's lips in your offices?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to say something Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the witness has twice said he doesn't know. Really, to persist with a question like that, if I don't know what the answer is, it is like asking me in a maths test to answer a question that I can't answer, I can't answer it.

CHAIRPERSON: This question can be asked, as far as your memory serves you Mr Du Plessis, who was the first person killed while in physical Police custody?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think it was Mr Kondile.

CHAIRPERSON: When was that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am thinking of the date, I am not quite sure. It was 1981 or 1982.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that near enough Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that is an educated guess I would assume.

MR BIZOS: It was in 1981.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: In what context was elimination considered as an option, by whom in your offices?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well the order came from now Colonel Erasmus. People who were involved were Mr Van Rensburg, Gen Erasmus and myself.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And who was the victim?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kondile.

MR BIZOS: What was your role in that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I transported him, I made the presentation to Colonel Erasmus and Van Zyl and myself transported him.

MR BIZOS: So, mid 1984 and you see this is the reason why I wanted some date from you, by mid 1984 that is a year before, it would not have been strange for discussions to be taking place and contingency plans being made in order to murder Goniwe once the path of murder had been opened way back in 1981. There is no reason why there shouldn't have been plans to kill Goniwe during 1984.

MR DU PLESSIS: It remains a difficult decision.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you repeat the question please.

MR BIZOS: Once murder as a matter of policy was committed in 1981, there would have been nothing untoward in there being discussions about killing Goniwe in 1984, in mid 1984?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I would not say it was policy to kill people.

CHAIRPERSON: What was it then?

MR DU PLESSIS: Circumstances lent itself to that, but I do not believe it was policy, it might have been an unwritten rule, there were no other options, but I cannot say that it was policy.

MR BIZOS: ... Kondile, wasn't there Mtimkhulu and Madaka?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, but I once again say that it was not policy.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not want to see it as a policy.

MR BIZOS: When was Mtimkhulu and Madaka?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember the dates.

MR BIZOS: More or less, how long after Kondile, how long before Pebco 3, how long before Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, probably a year or two before.

MR BIZOS: Would it have been 1982, 1983?

MR DU PLESSIS: If you say it was that period, I will accept that.

MR BIZOS: Did you or your colleagues have a part in that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, I did yes. Gen Van Rensburg and myself.

MR BIZOS: Well, by mid 1984, can you deny that there were discussions about killing Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is possible.

MR BIZOS: Do you know Mr Van Jaarsveld?

MR DU PLESSIS: Which Van Jaarsveld Mr Chairperson?

MR BIZOS: Jaap van Jaarsveld, the one that came down in order to check out what the probabilities were, of success were in murdering Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't think I know him.

MR BIZOS: You say that it is possible, did you yourself take part in those discussions?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not understand.

MR BIZOS: Did you yourself take part in discussions to kill Goniwe in 1984?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, this witness never admitted that he took part in discussions, he said it is possible that there were discussions. Surely to jump from there to asking him did you take part in the discussions, it is not a proper question.

MR BIZOS: ... Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it this way. In 1985, you were Head of a certain section dealing with a certain section of the population of South Africa that time, in respect of security?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is not unknown that members of the United Democratic Front came from that section?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As people were classified those days?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you not have been consulted at least about plans that are described by Mr Van Jaarsveld?

MR DU PLESSIS: I didn't read Van Jaarsveld statement.

CHAIRPERSON: He said he went to Port Elizabeth in 1985, to discuss a strategy, or to work out a strategy against the UDF and what can be done, etc, that is what he said.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I cannot say that number one, I do not know him and you will know that in 1985, we had court cases far from Port Elizabeth.

I was not informed about that.

MR BIZOS: You see, he specifically says in Annexure A to his application for amnesty, at page 277, approximately in the middle of 1984 I received an order from Craig Williams, if it was possible to eliminate Matthew Goniwe, that means to kill him.

I want to take up the question by the Judge presiding at this proceedings, would there have been any such talk without you as the Head of that section, been made aware of the investigation that was requested by Major Craig Williams?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so. It is not necessary for them to know me.

MR BIZOS: You know, if there isn't a full coordination, you may kill the wrong man?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I am not the only person in Port Elizabeth. As far as I know in 1984, I was not available during that whole year.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I don't know how late you want to sit. It may be a convenient stage, I am going on to a new topic.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn till half past nine tomorrow morning.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION ON 2 JUNE 1998 - DAY 2

CHAIRPERSON: Are we ready to proceed.

MR DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Mr Du Plessis, whilst you and Mr van Zyl were planning the murders, did you envisage that the bodies of the deceased would be burned.

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think that I was in such a discussion.

MR BIZOS: Well, we know that the bodies were burned, and particularly - particular attention was paid to the faces of the deceased. Was that in accordance with the plan, or was that a refinement to which you were not a party?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was not part of it, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Would Mr van Zyl, who was the chief of the operation of actually killing them, have done anything like that, like burning the bodies, and particularly the faces without any purpose?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot comment on that. I do not know why their faces were burned. I also did not take part in a discussion concerning this.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, there was a time when the modus operandi of the killings were discussed. You said that you did not agree with that modus operandi, that opportunity or occasion was it discussed that the people will be stabbed and be burned with petrol?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, there were words as far as I can remember that it must look like a robbery. I can ...(indistinct) say that at that stage the burning of the bodies was not discussed in my presence. I cannot that it was not discussed at a later stage, but at that stage, not.

MR BIZOS: Well, you were present when Mr van Zyl gave evidence were you not?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: He contradicts you on page 16 of his evidence. He says,

"I understood it that it would the final approval for the procedure of the elimination. We returned to Colonel, Colonel van Rensburg..."

The "we" means you and Van Zyl.

"We returned to Colonel van Rensburg and informed him of this and we discussed the matter or modus operandi of operation with him."

Will you please tell us about that. Colonel van Rensburg proposed and gave order that the attacks should appear as if it was a vigilante or ...(indistinct) attack,

"In other words we should use sharp objects to eliminate the individuals and that we should burn their bodies with petrol. Advocate Bones that would be the method that would be followed that you then again investigate, etc."

And what do you say about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, if Captain van Zyl said that then ...(indistinct) it like that, it was said, but I cannot remember it.

MR BIZOS: We know as a fact that the bodies were burned. You yourself say on page 27 that you were party to the modus operandi discussions, top of page 27 of the bundle of applications. Please tell us - so then it's the evidence of Mr van Rensburg again, and sorry about that. And he says that he had a discussion with you.

MR DU PLESSIS: I had a discussion with both Du Plessis and Captain van Zyl concerning the planning or to do the planning.

MR BIZOS: Once van Zyl says that, and once Van Rensburg says that, how is it that you don't remember that you were party to the discussions as to how it should be done?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not saying that I do not remember it, I am saying that I in the first, or what you put to me was that I admit that Colonel van Rensburg came to me and gave me the order. I can remember that Van Zyl and I went to Colonel van Rensburg, but I cannot, the implication, remember it was said that they must be burned.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, that was the question. Can you explain why you cannot remember that you were present or part of the discussion?

MR DU PLESSIS: I agree and said that I was present, but I couldn't remember that if General van Zyl said that I was there and that it was discussed there, I will accept it.

MR BIZOS: On your own application on page 59 you speak of a conversation between Van Rensburg, Van Zyl and yourself and you say,

"This discussion was mainly about the modus operandi of the operation."

Van Zyl says that the operation was discussed and burning of the bodies was part of it. You're not in the position to contradict what van Zyl says?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not.

MR BIZOS: Right, then we'll proceed on that basis. Mr du Plessis, what purpose would the burning of the bodies, and particularly their faces, serve?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Please, Mr du Plessis, try and be frank and honest with the Committee. Here we have a horrible act of burning dead bodies, and particularly their faces. Mr van Zyl says that this was discussed and you cannot deny it, please, sir, be honest with us, in relation at least to this detail, what purpose would it have served? MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, all that I can think, and this is speculation, if a body is burned out completely, it cannot be recognised. But then it must be burned out completely.

MR BIZOS: Well, when we have the evidence that we actually know that the T-shirt of one of them was put over his and obviously soaked in fuel and burned, was that not an attempt to disguise the identity of the deceased if the body was found? Can you think of any other reason why this gruesome bit of activity was indulged in?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot think of something else. It may be so. I did not look at the photographs. I do not believe that their hands were burned out, but if they were were not burned out, it would have given away their identity ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: It may be that a not perfect job was, as very often criminals do not do perfect jobs, but we are talking the intention of the criminals. What was the intention of the criminals in burning the bodies, and in particular in one case that we know for certain that the T-shirt was filled up, soaked with petrol, so that intense fire could be, could disfigure the body to an extent of being unrecognisable? Why was that done?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, like I said, I can only speculate, in order for them not to recognise the face. On the other hand, I cannot remember with the attacks of AZAPU, was it UDF members. I know there were cases there where people were burned and it could have been part of that to make look like a vigilante attack, because at that stage the modus operandi, or it was the modus operandi of the other parties.

MR BIZOS: Let's just stick to what you and your colleagues planned to do and did. Now, also, what was the purpose of burning Mr Goniwe's car with false number plates on it?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know. You're asking me to comment on things that I had nothing to do with.

MR BIZOS: But please, you were party to this act. Please tell us what purpose do you think was intended to be served by burning Mr Goniwe's car with false number plates on it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I can only go back to the evidence that was given here, that the false number plates was put on in order to transport the vehicle to the place where it was burned. I can think of no reason why it was burned out.

MR BIZOS: Well, no, the number plates being identified as Mr Goniwe's car during the abduction process, if anybody did see the numberplates in the middle of the night with a police car or which was identified, and if the numbers were taken, it would have been nothing unusual, I mean, you know, Mr Goniwe had been detained before, he received the attention of the Police. Surely the main purpose of burning the car with false numberplates on it was that even when the car was found, that the investigators would be put off the scent and they would not know this was Mr Goniwe's car. Isn't that the obvious, why don't you admit the obvious so that we can make some progress, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot think that it is a possibility because you do not need the number plates of a vehicle to identify who the owner is, but there is other serial numbers.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but are we are supposing that people would go the trouble of looking at the engine numbers, isn't the obvious, one of the obvious reasons why the car was burned, was in order to put the investigating officers off the scent so that it would not be known that Goniwe could have been abducted and murdered?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I can speculate about it, but I did not ...(indistinct) it to them, I was not part of them. I think we should have asked them that when they gave evidence.

MR BIZOS: We'll note that you are not prepared to concede the obvious and we will proceed.

ADV POTGIETER: You said that you did not agree with the modus operandi, why was that discussion held?

MR DU PLESSIS: The discussion was held, that was to be authorization to eliminate these people and it had to be decided how and when. That is why the discussion was held.

ADV POTGIETER: And this planning of the plan was executed by people who was under you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Captain van Zyl, well everybody did, but I'm talking about the discussion, but the planning and the execution of that was left to Captain van Zyl.

ADV POTGIETER: Especially because you did not agree with these initial plans, was he not supposed to come back to you and say to you, but we're going to do this and that, and that we are going to burn out a vehicle.

MR DU PLESSIS: Something that we didn't discuss beforehand, but you can make reference that he should have done, but with all respect, if Captain van Zyl did not work under me, I would not have been informed about this operation and after it was decided how to do it, I left it to him completely. That is why I today cannot remember that he told me. I believe that inform me that evening, but I did not ask him the details of how he did, or executed this operation.

ADV POTGIETER: It's exactly those details that you did not agree with?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, any detail or any manner of elimination where a person would be killed in a painful way or - I did not agree with that.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, were you not worried about doubts of the modus operandi of the people you will execute in this act?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was worried, yes. They said that they're going to make it look like a robbery and I realised that a robbery never looks, or is never a nice picture.

ADV POTGIETER: But he was a rank under you and he had to report back to you.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV POTGIETER: And it is because you said that he kept you up to date on the activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would say when the operation will be executed, but not the details of the operation. I can give you the assurance.

ADV POTGIETER: But see that is exactly the point, you came forward with a suggestion and you were worried about the specific modus operandi. Were you not interested in what Van Zyl will do, did he say or did you ask, you going to kill these people tomorrow, but how.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, yes, that is so. We ask today the questions, but I can give you the assurance, right or wrong, I did not ask that.

ADV POTGIETER: You do remember it very clearly?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do remember it very clearly, I did definitely not ask him. I did not want to minimise it, I didn't want to know about it.

ADV POTGIETER: Is your position that you could not reconcile yourself with the people and the modus operandi that comes to the front now, that you could not reconcile yourself with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Do you think it was unnecessary and not done in a proper way?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: The bodies were found at four different places. In one instance some seven metres away, I beg your pardon, seven kilometres away from the other. Was the disposal of the bodies or the place of killing discussed that it the four bodies must not be found together?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, it was never discussed.

MR BIZOS: Again, let us try and save time by stating the obvious, did you expect the hue and cry to go up once Mr Goniwe and his friends didn't turn up at home?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so, yes.

MR BIZOS: Three other activists didn't turn up home, the Pebco 3, they were seen by witnesses whom you falsely accused of being liars. Being arrested by the Police they disappeared, there was a hue and cry, and your story was, they must have gone to join Umkhonto weSizwe, do you recall that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would just like to say that I do not quite agree with you and that is the saying that I told them that they told lies.

MR BIZOS: And you denied this when you knew it to be true?

MR DU PLESSIS: At the end they did not tell the truth, but I'm satisfied they did not tell the truth.

MR BIZOS: They may have, well let's see, they may have had their details wrong as to where exactly you picked them up, but you knew that you had picked them up, and you knew that you killed them, and you made affidavits to the Judge and said that these people are lying, we never arrested them, we never had anything to do with it.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, we told lies, and they also told lies.

MR BIZOS: No, ...(inaudible) are details from which corner they saw them, and lying about whether you abducted them and whether you have killed them you say, is that an excuse for your purgery?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not saying that. I'm not agreeing with the statement that you just made.

MR BIZOS: But you admit that you committed purgery?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Right. Purgery in order to avoid the wrath of the people of South Africa, or the majority of the people of South Africa and the wrath of the world that you became kidnappers and murderers.

MR DU PLESSIS: I've lost you on this.

MR BIZOS: The reason why you committed purgery and why you had a deck story, a cover story, was because you wanted to avoid the anger of the world and the majority of the people in South Africa that you behaved like kidnappers and murders.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: The objective for abducting and killing the Pebco 3, and the objective of abducting and killing Goniwe and his three colleagues, was that the same objective?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: What was the difference?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember, Mr Chairperson, that's why it would have been a vigilante attack, that it would not be the same as the previous one. In other words their bodies had to be found.

MR BIZOS: Was the political objective that you wanted to achieve the same for abducting and killing the Pebco 3 and abducting and killing the Goniwe four?

MR DU PLESSIS: The political goal, yes, was that to be in opposition or to eliminate opposition of apartheid, that is correct yes.

MR BIZOS: If you succeeded in your purpose in hiding the fact, or rather hiding the identity or preventing the identity of Goniwe and the other three from being identified, you would have put out the same deck story or cover story, would you not?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: So that we can assume that these three factors that I have mentioned to you, of which you try to avoid personal knowledge in the planning, that is the motor car, the spreading of the bodies, the burning of the bodies, was in order to have a cover story that Goniwe and others went and joined Umkhonto weSizwe, go and look for them there, don't ask us, that was the purpose.

MR DU PLESSIS: I promise you it was not the intention of, I can speak for myself ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Well, if you speak for those who did it, would they have had any other purpose in ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: That's, that with respect is not a proper question, I can't speak for others what they thought, unless my learned friend suggests they told him what they though, he can't look in somebody else's mind.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Booyens, isn't the question put in a context of that plan that was discussed?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, if the question is, was the plan discussed to make the bodies unidentifiable so that you can tell the world, well they have also gone to Lesotho, then I will not object, but my learned friend has said speak for the minds of the others. That is not fair.

MR BIZOS: If we accept the evidence of Mr van Zyl about the burning, about the spreading of the bodies, about the burning of the motor car, would you not agree that if that was successful and the bodies were not identified of being Goniwe and the others, South Africa and the world would have heard a similar story to the one relating to the Pebco 3.

MR DU PLESSIS: If that was the case, yes, but it was not the case.

MR BIZOS: We will rely on Mr van Zyl's evidence in that regard and we will proceed. Now, you've already told us that the reason for killing the Pebco 3 and denying that you had them, was in order to eliminate people, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: And the reason for killing Mr Goniwe and his three colleagues was the same. Inconsistent would be the suggestion that you really killed these people as an example to others so that they would become afraid and cease their activities, would you agree with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is one of the versions or sides.

MR BIZOS: Yes, so there was no intention to hold out the deaths of Pebco 3 or the Cradock four as an example to other activists to behave themselves?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And that was never discussed? Is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: What was never discussed, Chairperson?

MR BIZOS: I become nervous whenever I take a volume of evidence before me and you want further particulars, I'll give them to you. Was it ever discussed that the reason why you should kill the Cradock four or Mr Goniwe and one or two others, was for the purposes of frightening all the activists off from their activities? Was that ever discussed?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that we discussed it and this was one of the things which led it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well, you say that that was discussed or taken into consideration, that if you killed those people it will frighten other people off, and that that was a political objective, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And what you hoped to achieve in that way was to save South Africa, is that right?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, how did you achieve that political objective by killing people, burning them, denying that you had them or that you killed and taken every step to conceal the fact that you killed them, but falsely holding out that they had gone out of the country in order to become soldiers. How do you do that, how does it make sense?

MR DU PLESSIS: I hear what you're saying, but we denied that we had murdered them at that stage, that's what it was about.

MR BIZOS: Try and come to terms with ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: That's the point, how could the people then have been frightened or deterred. I think in the beginning one had to believe that they would put two and two together, but ultimately it came out that we directly murdered them, because that's how it was.

MR BIZOS: If you're going to commit seven, well, first of all, let's split them up. If you're going to commit three murders on the Pebco 3 in order to frighten off people, it doesn't serve your purpose to lie, and say that they were not killed, they're going to become soldiers of the MK, doesn't help, does it.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And you similarly, or you say it was the same objective in Pebco and Goniwe, trying to disguise the bodies, the murder car, the event, would it have helped anybody because you would have mislead the people of South Africa. You would have told them that we didn't abduct them, we didn't kill them, they went out of the country. How would that have achieved your political objective?

MR DU PLESSIS: Are you speaking of Goniwe? I never said that I was aware that that was the intention for those people to be burned to such an degree that they would be unrecognisable, that their vehicle would be unrecognisable.

MR BIZOS: Let me read to you what your colleague, and close collaborator in these murders says on page 17 of the record,

"Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall whether this was actually discussed whether it would only be one operation. I think it is logical that we at that stage though that we should first see what the effect of such an operation would be, and the situation was so desperate that if the effect had been positive, it might not have been necessary to proceed further, but the facts of the matter was at that stage, we reasoned that the head of the destabilisation process should be chopped off, so to speak."

Do you agree with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know what they're saying. I agree with that, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Would it have helped you if you if you chopped the head off, but lied about it, and gave out that he actually went outside in having regard to his efficiency probably to become a commander of MK, how would that have helped the achievement of your political objective of giving out that you chopped the head off?

MR DU PLESSIS: It wouldn't have helped at all.

MR BIZOS: Well then, where does the fault lie? Where does the fault lie, what facts have you not disclosed? What facts have you not disclosed in order to make some logical sense of your evidence?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I can't think of anything which I have not discussed.

MR BIZOS: How would it have helped your political objectives as saying that as Mr Winter knew early the next morning, and he hasn't explained how he knew it, "AZAPO got them". Now that was a pre-arranged deck story, was it not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't it?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't the idea of the discussion that you would make it appear as if AZAPO was responsible?

MR DU PLESSIS: That Mr Winter would have said it.

MR BIZOS: There is evidence that he did say it, but let's leave that aside for the moment. If the deck story was going to be that AZAPO did it, how would that have frightened the people in the UDF from doing what you thought they were doing?

MR DU PLESSIS: It could be that it would have forced them to exercise greater caution.

MR BIZOS: Would you mind repeating that?

MR DU PLESSIS: It could be that it would have forced them to exercise a greater degree of caution. I don't think that it would have been to any great effect.

MR BIZOS: I don't understand, would you explain please?

MR DU PLESSIS: The fact that AZAPO, or that a cover-up using AZAPO and the UDF fighting with each other and being responsible for these deeds wouldn't have made a very great impact on the situation. It might have led to further attacks between the two groups.

MR BIZOS: The question wasn't directed to that, but once you've said it, we might take it a little further. In giving out this deck story, did you and your colleagues not think that you were really, by using lies create a situation that there would be unbridled of what you call black on black violence, that the UDF people would attack AZAPO people for believing your story that they AZAPO were responsible for Goniwe's death. Didn't you take that into consideration that the whole of the Eastern Province might have gone up in flames as a result of this false story that you were giving out?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I don't believe, or at least I can't remember that we considered that.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR DU PLESSIS: We could ask this question now, but I'm telling you that I really can't think that we considered that.

MR BIZOS: But why not, then I would suggest one answer to you, because lives meant nothing to you.

MR DU PLESSIS: I promise you, that's not the case.

MR BIZOS: Well give me another reason then why you didn't take it into consideration, why you didn't take that obvious factor into consideration? Just us one, please.

MR DU PLESSIS: There are many reasons, but I can't think of one.

MR BIZOS: It's no good saying that I deny the one that you have suggested and not being able to offer any other, is there?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't help you any further.

MR BIZOS: Yes, not helping me ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis, the vigilante story, who would have been the vigilante group in the story?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think at that point, if I recall correctly, the AZAPO group was controlled by Rev Matlena, and they were rather small as a group. I didn't say that we considered him in the vigilante attacks. There weren't that many vigilante attacks, they were very few and far between. I don't think that if there had been at attack they would have been able to make such a great impact.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) I want answer, because, you know, we went through your evidence and the other evidence in this case, and we couldn't get clarity, but please, now, we've got you here now, please give us a clear answer. Did you and Mr van Zyl have only one meeting with Mr Snyman in relation to this, or more that one?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember, we only had one meeting.

MR BIZOS: Just one?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, let's try and fix it. Was it approximately three weeks before the death?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: When do you say it was.

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember, I speak under correction, it was approximately a week before the killing of these people.

MR BIZOS: So it would have been during the week of 20th/21st of June?

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Right. Now, from the period of three weeks, that's about the 6th to the 20th, that's for a period of two weeks, were preparations being made for the killing of Goniwe and the other three?

MR DU PLESSIS: On a list of persons which was approved by Colonel Snyman information was gathered before the time, and after that arrangements were made to eliminate them.

MR BIZOS: During the period of two weeks, from the 6th to about the 20th, were enquiries being made and plans being discussed for the murder of the Cradock four?

MR DU PLESSIS: The information was gathered and I accept that that would have been part of the planning for the operation.

MR BIZOS: So is the answer to the question, yes?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Right. So, for approximately two weeks we were enquiring into and making plans for the murder of the Cradock four, and that is Goniwe, Calata, Mkhonto and Mhlauli without any consultation with Mr Snyman.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's what I said. We could accept that as part of it.

MR BIZOS: No, just yes or no, please. From the 6th to the 20th enquiries were being made and plans were being prepared for the murder of these four without any consultation with Mr Snyman.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would say that the murder was not planned during that time.

MR BOOYENS: The meeting which was held with Mr Snyman a week before the incident, is that where the final order was issued?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This meeting where the modus operandi was discussed, when did that take place in relation to the meeting with Mr Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: After we had been at Mr Snyman's.

MR BOOYENS: That's during the last week?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Admit or deny that, in your presentation to Mr Snyman, you said that one of the objectives was to frighten off the remaining leaders from continuing with their political activities. Do you admit or deny that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I made a submission to Colonel Snyman, and I can't remember exactly whether I said that or not, the fact remains, these people in that point of time represented a very great danger to me. I believe that that could have been said.

MR BIZOS: Let us just get this down on record. Will you please look at page 37, Mr Snyman's application. Now, before I read it to you, did you go at this meeting to Mr Snyman with specific people, or an indefinite number of people?

MR DU PLESSIS: With a list of names. I carried out my order to submit the cohorts of Goniwe to him.

MR BIZOS: So, you didn't go with the names of the Cradock four to him?

MR DU PLESSIS: Among others, yes.

MR BIZOS: And you didn't go back with him once you decided, I'm sorry, I saw you grimace, it isn't my fault, it may be the machine that picks up erased voice at times, I didn't attempt to put you into any sort of discomfort. You didn't go back to Mr Snyman to say, well, these are the four that we have decided on?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: So that the decision who was to live and die, or die was yours and not Mr Snyman's?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Colonel Snyman gave authorization for the list which we presented.

MR BIZOS: I see.

MR BOOYENS: How many people were on that list?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, Chairperson, I only heard what was testified today. I could estimate approximately, we heard here that seven names were mentioned. I don't want to bind myself to anything, I would not like to mislead the Committee. MR BOOYENS: What happened to the balance, were they also killed at some point?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I know, I'm not certain.

MR BOOYENS: Why not?

MR DU PLESSIS: It didn't happen, I suppose one can be glad about that today.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I'm sure.

MS PATEL: Mr du Plessis, in your submission to Colonel Snyman, did you say that all these people should be eliminated or did you say that we should eliminate a certain proportion of these people, or did you say, here are the names of people who can be eliminated. What was your approach?

MR DU PLESSIS: Let me try to answer it on a longer fashion. I was under the impression, I was brought to this impression by Colonel van Rensburg, that Colonel Snyman had given an order to eliminate these people. We gathered the particulars about the identities and activities of Goniwe's cohorts and I went to him in co-operation with Captain van Zyl with the information which had been gathered surrounding the activities of these people and we informed him regarding the activities of each and every one of these persons, so that he could make a decision regarding the list which we had compiled. He was at liberty to say, a, b, c or d would not fall into this category.

MS PATEL: Your understanding then was that all these people ought to be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: If you can explain the submission of Mr Snyman on this issue and the issue that I was looking at previously, because they appear in the same sentence, please have a look at the last sentence of page 37 of Mr Snyman's application, read it out aloud please.

MR DU PLESSIS: "It was clear after the submission that these four persons had to be neutralised urgently in order to take away the leadership elements of the Organisation Cradora, and to frighten off the other leadership elements so that they would not be politically active."

MR BIZOS: Now do you agree that you have just contradicted Mr Snyman's statement under oath on two aspects?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't agree.

MR BIZOS: What does one do with a person who will not admit the obvious Mr du Plessis? You told us that you took to him a list of a number of people, this says 4 people. You told us earlier that you were never a party to a discussion about frightening off people and Mr Snyman says that this was part of the presentation given to him by you and Captain van Zyl. Now, why don't you admit the obvious that Colonel Snyman said precisely the opposite of what you said a minute ago in one instance, and five minutes ago in the other instance. Why will you not admit that?

MR DU PLESSIS: What must I admit, what must I admit that was wrong?

MR BIZOS: Let me try and explain, because you seem to either to not understand or not to want to answer. In fairness to you we want to ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: I'll answer your questions, but just please tell me what your problem is with these paragraphs?

MR BIZOS: First of all, don't you see that there it says four persons and not a list of persons, there's a difference?

MR DU PLESSIS: But this list was compiled after the four persons had been eliminated. It was about those people.

MR BIZOS: He said that "it was clear after the first submission that these four persons"

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, it's about these four persons for which the application is. He's referring only to these four persons. Therefor I can't understand what the problem is.

MR BIZOS: Well, you are saying that, they brought me a list of seven or eight people is the same as that it became clear that these four people were to be eliminated, that's the same. Is that what you're saying?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that's not what I'm saying, I'm saying that the statement made by Colonel Snyman in this instance was made as an attempt or as a statement to the Amnesty Committee, and it was about four people who were killed, Mr Goniwe and the others. It wasn't about a list of names of others.

MR BIZOS: You see, there is another contradiction at the bottom of page 37, and that is that the political objective that was sought to be achieved was to frighten others. You told us that you were not party to such a discussion, but here Mr Snyman says that you were.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, what I'm saying is that we couldn't have achieved much through that. It might have been discussed, I'm not saying that it was never discussed. But I would also like to add if we eliminated the people as you said we did, then I cannot say how we would have been a deterrent.

MR BIZOS: Now, let's go to Mr van Zyl's application on page 48. Let me ask you this first, when the Eric Taylor and Gerhard Lotz come, when did they come in to be briefed, was that three weeks before?

MR DU PLESSIS: I accept it so, I did not brief them.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but my question was that they should be briefed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, you see, at paragraph 10,

"I put Taylor and Gerhard Lotz, who both worked on the De Swart Branch. I gave them separately the orders to help me to monitor the three activists from Cradock in order to help us to finalise our operational plan."

Now, do you agree that that is contradictory to what you have told us?

MR DU PLESSIS: If you look at the paragraph, yes. He only speaks of the three, I do not know what his evidence was.

MR BIZOS: Well, do you agree that that is a contradiction to what you're telling us.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, this is.

MR BIZOS: And far from Mhlauli being known it goes on to say that he only came to the fore at that stage, but that's another story which we're going take up later. And Mr Taylor on page 5 of his application, he amended the second application, makes it very clear,

"Approximately after three weeks before the 27th of June..."

You got it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: "Approximately two to three weeks before the 27th of June in '85, I got the order from Captain van Zyl to monitor the three activists from Cradock, as they indicated that they were responsible for the spiral of violence and the anarchism or the growing anarchism in the area."

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Is that right?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Right, can you explain that contradiction?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not see as a contradiction, I think you must look at the evidence in a global way or as a whole ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Now, you see I am going to suggest to you that this list and the contradictions relating to it, together with other probabilities would show, I would submit, that you - the investigation that took place during the period of three weeks did not relate to the activities, because you've already told us yesterday that there were discussions at least a year before about killing Goniwe, that this investigation much have been by necessity have been, how best to catch them and kill them, Goniwe and whoever may have happened with him, that was the investigation. You didn't require to be persuaded that they were guilty of activities to marry death. You were merely investigating what is the best way of catching them in a lonely place in order to kill them. What do you say to that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not agree.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, you not denying that there were discussions over a year before to kill Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not say it was decided then to kill him, it was talkings in the hallways.

MR BIZOS: Well, I would have thought that all discussions about murder were seriously made, and not something that is tea party talk.

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not say it was planning to murder him, it was just talk that it was the only alternative, and I can give you a few examples.

MR BIZOS: Now you said, I want to ask this in relation to Mr Mhlauli and how he was known to be the dangerous activist. Who is Mr Edgar Ngoyi, or who was he in '85?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Edgar Ngoyi was an activist in Port Elizabeth, I cannot exactly remember, I accept in UDF, or maybe Pebco. I told you, If you asked me then I would have been able to tell you, I am not willing to make a statement now about people's activities in those years.

MR BIZOS: Who was Mr Stone Sizayi?

MR DU PLESSIS: He was also active here, I cannot remember his activities.

MR BIZOS: What organisation was he in?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember.

MR BIZOS: Mr Roland White?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember, I cannot remember everyone.

MR BIZOS: Can't you remember his name?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, not at all.

MR BIZOS: Mr Dennis Sneer?

MR DU PLESSIS: I could remember Mr Dennis Sneer, as far as I know he was part of trade unions.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Prince Msoto?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Prince Msoto was either Xhosa, or something else.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Thabo Ndubu, Thabo was it, who was he?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember.

MR BIZOS: And Dr Marele?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot place him at all.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Henry Faze?

MR DU PLESSIS: Who was that last name, Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Mr Henry Faze?

MR DU PLESSIS: Henry Faze I can remember.

MR BIZOS: Who was he?

MR DU PLESSIS: He involved in Pebco, possibly also at UDF.

MR BIZOS: Yes, he was a very high profile person, wasn't he?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He had served 12 years on Robben Island, he's in the law reports, ...(intervention) an important case. Now, compared to all these activists in the Eastern Province, if you were to put them in order or sequence, where would Mr Mhlauli fit?

MR DU PLESSIS: ...(inaudible) in political importance in the Eastern Cape particularly, because that was your concern. Where you put him on the list of importance?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think I can make a statement now, because I cannot remember what the activities of the people were at that stage. I would have been able to tell you those in '85.

MR BIZOS: No, but surely you see, if you had a brief to kill "deurlopers" who were going to bring about - in order to bring about, firstly to set as an example, and secondly in order to bring about peace to the Eastern Cape, you surely would have looked for and chosen people who had a high political profile, because the higher the profile, the more the political objective would have been served.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, I ask again, in relation to the Eastern Cape, where would you put Mr Mhlauli on this list?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, if I look at the whole of the Eastern Cape. If I look at the rural areas he would have been higher up the list.

MR BIZOS: Sorry, I don't understand that. Just explain to me what you mean please.

MR DU PLESSIS: If you look at the whole of the Eastern Cape, his name would have been higher on the priority list, sorry, lower on the priority list. If you look at the rural organisations, if you take that into consideration, he would have been higher on the priority list.

MR BIZOS: Now, the Eastern Cape had problems in Port Alfred, isn't it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is what I call the rural areas.

MR BIZOS: Did you consider anybody from Port Alfred for elimination rather than going to a place outside your jurisdiction?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember any of the names on that list?

MR BIZOS: How many of the persons that I have read out to you did you take for the consideration of Mr van Zyl, I beg your pardon, Mr Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have already said that I can't remember the list of names, I do not want to speculate.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now, the role that Mr Snyman played in the decision for the murder of the Cradock four, was it a similar role that he played in the murder of the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, he gave the order, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well, who took the initiative in the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you repeat the question, please.

MR BIZOS: Who took the initiative in the Pebco 3?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think the only difference with the Pebco 3 was that I made the presentation to Colonel Snyman. The difference here is according to Colonel van Rensburg, well, let me put it this way, the initiative here came from Colonel Snyman via Van Rensburg to me.

MR BIZOS: It seems to me when we read your application for amnesty in the Pebco 3, that one has to remember which case one is dealing with because, let's have a look at page 322 of your application.

MR BOOYENS: We don't have that here Mr Chairman, we've dealt with that case, perhaps my learned friend had better read, or make a copy available to us.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the application in the Pebco 3 you are referring to?

MR BIZOS: That is so. It's page 22 and 23, and there are only two paragraphs that I want to read. Perhaps if you want to press the point, you can do that afterward and refresh his memory.

MR BOOYENS: Perhaps you can read it out in the absence of the record, so that you could refresh his memory.

MR BIZOS: "After consideration of the above situation and facts, I told Colonel Snyman that the ordinary options for the control of these activities of the activists was unsuccessful, the reign of terror in the Eastern Cape was extreme and in the light of that drastic measures had to be taken in order to rectify the stability in the province. According to me the information, the prioritised politics indicated that the Pebco 3 was one of the problem areas which directly or indirectly"

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, may I request something, that I could get a photocopy of it, because I don't understand what he's reading.

MR BIZOS: Perhaps, it's two pages Mr Chairman, if we could have a short adjournment. I don't want the witness to rely on my pronunciation of the words. He's entitled to look at his words, so, could we just have a short adjournment to make copies of these two pages?

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we take the adjournment now?

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Page 22 of your Pebco 3 application, last paragraph, have you read it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 22?

MR BIZOS: Yes, last paragraph.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: And have you read the paragraph on page 23, saying, "Although Colonel Snyman didn't give specific orders", that is how it begins.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: If you look at page 7 of Mr Snyman's application, would you read the middle paragraph please?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that these three passages, two in your application and in Mr Snyman's application are to the same effect as to who initiated the proposal for the deceased to be killed, who was asked to confirm it, and why it was confirmed? It's as if the script, so to speak, was written for both instances by the same author.

MR DU PLESSIS: It appears as such.

MR BIZOS: And what appears usually is, I think. That is so, you take the initiative, you discuss it with Van Zyl, you go to Colonel Snyman, he has a lot of respect for your ability as an experienced security man, and he puts the stamp of approval on, to the Pebco 3.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is how it appears.

MR BIZOS: Therefor to present the decision-making process as something new and original which had to have serious consideration in relation to the Goniwe matter is a completely artificial exercise, is it not?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, it isn't. I testified here, exactly what happened.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I know, but you had been through this process before.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You had got a death warrant from Colonel Snyman before because of your expertise in these matters, surely when you went back it would just be, please act to the same, just put your stamp on, let's go. It wasn't necessary to go through explaining the situation in the Eastern Cape and the dangers and that sort of thing. All that is embellishment in relation to the goniwe matter, is it not?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, but the list of associates as per my order was received by Colonel van Rensburg and Van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: Let's leave out the list for a moment. The motivation and what had to be done to try and persuade the Committee that this was a serious weighing up process, is a completely artificial way of presenting your Goniwe application, because you had been through it all before.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And you use the very same words. Now what was it that made you repeat what you had said in the Pebco 3 when you went with the proposal that you should kill the Cradock four. It was unnecessary to put that sort of thing down on paper. If you were honest you would have said murder was on our agenda. We had gone through it all before for Pebco, we went to the Colonel and said, you authorised Pebco, please authorise Goniwe and others. That's what happened, that's what you should have said, and not all this embellishment which never happened, would not have happened. It was unnecessary that it should happen in relation to Goniwe.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, it happened that way.

MR BIZOS: It happened. Did Mr Snyman suffer from a measure in that you have to repeat to him the motivation that you had presented a month before?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not saying that. I did what I was told to do.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon.

MR DU PLESSIS: I did what I was told to do.

MR BIZOS: Now, you're not coming to terms with the question, sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm trying.

MR BIZOS: Yes. If you had been through the whole exercise as to why activists had to be eliminated when you went there, took the initiative and went for the Pebco 3, it was unnecessary to go through the whole rigmarole when you went there for the Goniwe four.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Therefor all this embellishment in your application was incorrect. It wasn't necessary to have the sort of discussions that you say that you had.

MR DU PLESSIS: Whether it was necessary or not, it happened.

MR BIZOS: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the last bit.

MR DU PLESSIS: Whether or not it was necessary, it happened. I went to Colonel Snyman ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: I know, we know that you say that you went, but what I am putting to you is that it was not necessary to go through the whole debate as to whether or not it was advisable to eliminate activists from Cradock because the whole scenario had been discussed in relation to Pebco.

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct.

MR BIZOS: Well, I've done my best, we'll leave it at that. Now, do you agree that the death of Goniwe, whatever your intention may have been, in fact led to a declaration of a state of emergency?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember when the state of emergency was announced. I don't know when in the process this took place, if it was after that, then it might have led to it, but all I want to say is that I don't have the facts before me which would enable me to say, yes, it definitely led to that.

MR BIZOS: Well, it was declared on the 6th of July 1985.

MR DU PLESSIS: But what I'm trying to say is that I don't I can tell you that the death of Goniwe definitely led to that.

MR BIZOS: Well, what do you say if your purpose was to frighten people from ceasing the political activities, did it have that effect, or the opposite effect?

MR DU PLESSIS: Once again, I can't remember exactly what happened, but if it was a state of emergency which led to an increase in unrest, it was unsuccessful.

MR BIZOS: Can't you remember that we went through the worst possible period we've ever had from '86 to '88. 30 000 were detained without trial, weren't you aware of those facts.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not saying that, I think you should try to listen what I'm saying, and I tried to say this yesterday as well, there was total chaos and anarchy in the Eastern Cape while I was here. What I'm trying to say by implication is that I can't remember from the death of Goniwe and the announcement of the state of emergency whether or not conditions worsened or were aggravated or what happened. It was so difficult to determine how conditions would be from day to day.

MR BIZOS: Had you heard of McEwan's statement that when the State engages in terrorism the decision must be made at the highest possible level and that the consequences must be looked into before any act of terror is committed by the State. Did you hear about that in your trained as a Security Policeman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never heard anything like that.

MR BIZOS: Have you heard of the definition of murder by the Head of the Army that it is not murder if it is done by unconventional means, and in the manner in which innocent people do not suffer, and there is no boomerang against the State. Have you heard that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have heard it put that way here at the Commission.

MR BIZOS: Had you heard it at the time?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never heard it at that time.

MR BIZOS: Yes, now do you know that in the signal the proposal to kill Goniwe, Calata and the brother, or cousin of Mr Goniwe also sets out that consideration should be taken what the effect would be in relation to protests and the fall-out that may occur as a result of the death of Goniwe and the other two mentioned we mentioned in the signal?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember, but if you say that, I'll accept it.

MR BIZOS: In making a decision as to who should live and die here in Port Elizabeth amongst you, Van Zyl, Van Rensburg and Snyman and Taylor, Lotz, where the consequences considered of taking this very drastic act?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't think that that which you are putting to me was considered. I believe that we might have thought about it at some point, what the consequences would be.

MR BIZOS: What did you think the results would be?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm telling you, I can't remember. I believed that it would have a positive effect, to their detriment and to our advantage.

MR BIZOS: The provisions of section 29 were used in order to obtain confessions from people, was it not?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't think that that was exclusively the purpose of section 29.

MR BIZOS: Well, it's very words were said that they would be kept in detention until they made a statement to the satisfaction of the investigating officer above the rank of a Lieutenant-Colonel. You know that, you were working with it.

MR DU PLESSIS: A statement would involve him answering questions, but a confession is something completely different.

MR BIZOS: Until that person made a statement to your satisfaction, he didn't have a chance of being released.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and then furthermore, it also says that if this person's detention did not serve any further purpose ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Yes, but who was to decide whether it was going to - whether it would serve any purpose, the Lieutenant-Colonel.

MR DU PLESSIS: In this case, Head Office. The Lieutenant-Colonel could detain this person, but the ultimate decision lay with Head Office.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but the Head Office wouldn't do anything against the wishes of the so-called investigating officer and the Lieutenant-Colonel, would they?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't agree.

MR BIZOS: Well, anyway, was there any consideration given to detaining any of these people, particularly those who had not been detained before, in order to gain information from them, or to possibly frighten them off any continuation of what you considered that dangerous political activities?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that time it was practice that if one was detained under section 29, this person would be granted a greater stature and secondly, the consequences were very well known in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and the deaths led their funeral at which you told us that 70 000 were present.

MR DU PLESSIS: I didn't say how many people exactly attended the funeral.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and you also spoke about the banner of the Communist Party.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: Was there a banner from the Black Sash?

MR DU PLESSIS: There were various banners.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) a banner from various community organisations throughout the country,

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, but overall the funeral and the eulogies delivered were delivered under the Communist flag.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well, you mentioned only one, I just wanted to place on record that the solidarity shown Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata, Mr Mkhonto, Mr Mhlauli for the horrible murders was universal, well, almost universal, and not confined to the Communist Party.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: You chose only to mention one banner, and that's all I was concerned with. Now, where were you during the day of the 27th?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Try and remember.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no idea. I would like for anyone to tell me where they were on that day.

MR BIZOS: I'm sure that if they had planned to murder four people, they would remember.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I would have been either in my office or in a million other places.

MR BIZOS: What I am saying to you, that if anybody had planned the murder of four people to take place on a particular day, one would have expected them from our common experience, that he or she would remember where they were. Now, please tell us, where were you on the 27th of June 1985?

MR DU PLESSIS: I've already told you that I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: You don't know?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: You don't know what you were doing?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: You were not concerned whether the plan was going to be satisfactorily executed or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have already testified that the execution of this plan was left to Captain van Zyl and it was entirely in his hands.

MR BIZOS: But what I would have expected that if it was you were the father, one of the fathers of this scheme, that you would want to know how the brainchild really got on.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, that one would have heard ultimately, and I did hear ultimately that it was successful.

MR BIZOS: Did you see Mr Winter from Cradock on that day?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Was he not at the Security Police building?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: How far were the offices of the Security Police from the Murder and Robbery Squad in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: They were in opposite wings?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon.

MR DU PLESSIS: If I remember correctly, the La Grange Square was in a LOT formation, the building was a T formation, and Murder and Robbery was on a completely different set of wings.

MR BIZOS: How far were the Murder and Robbery prescribed offices from your offices?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know. If I had to estimate, approximately 300 metres.

MR BIZOS: In the same building?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, in the same building.

MR BIZOS: Same floor?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't know exactly, I think that they occupied the second and third floors of that wing and we were in a completely different wing, on different floors.

MR BIZOS: Do you know anything about a telephone call that was made by Mr Winter early in the morning, as soon as Mr Goniwe left Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't recall such a telephone call.

MR BIZOS: But try and remember. This was - the whole operation could not really have been carried out, could it, without Goniwe leaving Cradock.

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that a telephone call was made, but I can't recall pertinently what happened.

MR BIZOS: Why do you believe that there was a telephone call made?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have the idea that we found out that they were coming to Port Elizabeth that day.

MR BIZOS: Have you ever considered that these murders could take place at Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never participated in the planning.

MR BIZOS: Was that one of the possible placed where the murder would take place?

MR DU PLESSIS: I wouldn't be able to say, I don't know.

ADV POTGIETER: Why wouldn't you know?

MR DU PLESSIS: It wasn't discussed in my presence.

ADV POTGIETER: At the meeting where the modus operandi of the operation was discussed, wasn't this discussed there?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I can't even remember the exact wording any longer, but I understood that whichever place they could use with the greatest of ease would be used. I don't know exactly what the words were that were used, but that was the effect. I would rather return to the fact that Captain van Zyl had to decide about this on ground level.

ADV POTGIETER: It couldn't have been planned to be undertaken at Louis Le Grange?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I don't think we should go to the extreme, we have to accept that they wouldn't have undertaken it there.

ADV POTGIETER: Well, doesn't that give sufficient reason to discuss it, where it would happen, when it would happen and how it would happen?

MR DU PLESSIS: The "when" would have to present itself, the "where" would have to present itself when the "when" was available. The "how" was discussed that it would have to appear to be a vigilante attack.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, the "where" and the "how" must surely be connected?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but you can only connect it when you know when and where exactly.

ADV POTGIETER: But that's exactly the question. The planning, didn't that all aspects?

MR DU PLESSIS: It can't. It could have been the case that Mr van Zyl received information that these people were on their way to Johannesburg and he could have done it there. It wasn't said to him, as far as I know, where I was involved, it was never said to him that he had to exercise this at a certain place, or in a certain place.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, where did the Pebco 3 incident occur?

MR DU PLESSIS: The elimination took place in Cradock area.

ADV POTGIETER: Where was the area where Mr Goniwe's vehicle was stopped?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not very certain about that, they said that it was in some kind of pass in the Olifantshoek Pass.

ADV POTGIETER: I estimate that that's about 160 to 200 kilometres away. Is it closer from that pass to St George's Beach, or to Postcharmers?

MR DU PLESSIS: It's much closer to St George's Beach.

ADV POTGIETER: If we regard this geographically Komga is about 30 to 50 kilometres away, and after that it would be 10 kilometres over the Olifantshoek Pass, so it would be about 45 - 50 kilometres. I know that Kwirkat is 110 miles form Port Elizabeth, and approximately 45 - 50 miles from Cradock, and the other places would be approximately 20 kilometres from Cradock

MR DU PLESSIS: It's further then, yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS: Your discussion during the planning as to whether this would be one operation or, let us assume that you got Goniwe alone, would you have eliminated him?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so.

MR BIZOS: If you had eliminated him alone, what would you have done then?

MR DU PLESSIS: You're asking me to speculate. I do not know, we probably would have continued.

MR TSOTSI: ...(inaudible) than speculation. There was an order to kill these four people, you testify?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR TSOTSI: The question is put to you, that if Mr Goniwe with occasion presented itself where you were going to kill Mr Goniwe only, what would be the position of the others then?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember that I discussed this, but I believe that one of two things could have happened. Firstly, we could have stopped right there, or if an opportunity appeared for the other three, the operation would have been continued.

MR BIZOS: What would have happened if your calculation that, if Goniwe's head was chopped off, everyone else would bend a knee and be an obedient subject in the opinion of the Security Police of the Government, what would have happened then?

MR DU PLESSIS: Then I believe nothing would have happened to them.

MR BIZOS: You have already said that you were not able to deny that Mr van Jaarsveld came and gave advice, do you recall it filtering through that the killing of Goniwe should not take place at or near Cradock because he was always accompanied by people, that the consequences would be grave if he was killed anywhere near Cradock? Do you remember hearing about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you mean that when we were busy with our planning.

MR BIZOS: Are you asking a question or are you making a statement?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm asking when do you mean.

MR BIZOS: After discussing the death of Mr Goniwe, you say that it could have been as early as the middle of the previous year, where they had discussions about not killing him at Cradock as was advised, that it should not happen, by Mr van Jaarsveld?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot place that. No, I cannot deny this.

MR BIZOS: Now, during the course of these proceedings I'm going to suggest to the Committee that you have attempted to minimise your part in the planning of this action and its manner, and I want you to please deal with the evidence of Mr van Zyl, who speaks about the role that you had played. Can you please turn to page 16 of the evidence. Now, towards the bottom,

"Colonel van Rensburg proposed or gave order that the attack should appear as if it was a vigilante or AZAPO attack. In other words we should use sharp objects to eliminate the individuals, that we should burn their bodies with petrol.

ADV BONES: That would be the method that would be followed, that you then begin to investigate the "how" component of the operation?

MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. We felt that with our information that we had at our disposal, the best method will be to place them in a deserted road. They moved around a lot because of their activities they were often travelling. It would be impossible to eliminate them in a concealed fashion.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr van Zyl, whose plans were these, was this the result of one person's innovation, or was this an actual discussed plan, a plan discussed by a number of people?

MR VAN ZYL: It is difficult for me to say at this stage, Chairperson. It would be that I proposed it, but it was discussed between myself and Mr du Plessis and also with Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz. They had the smaller share in the planning and the proposal, so it actually came from myself and Mr du Plessis."

Do you agree with this evidence?

MR DU PLESSIS: Captain van Zyl talks about "we". I do not know if in all instances he's talking about me.

MR BIZOS: Chairperson, it says "It is difficult for me", it means he doesn't know. "It could be that I proposed it, but it was discussed between myself and Mr du Plessis and also". Now, you see, he says he doesn't remember who actually made this proposal, but the discussion is in the plural, that we decided this, and if you have a look at page 16, "We returned to Colonel van Rensburg and informed him of this and we discussed the matter or modus operandi of the operation with him". Who is the "we" that he refers to there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it is me and ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: And "twee" to the other places that we have, how did the dramatis persona change, why doesn't "we" mean the same thing right through?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but later on he also talks about Taylor and Lots ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: But he says they didn't have very much to do with it, but it was Du Plessis and I.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is with the discussion of the modus operandi at Colonel van Rensburg, but we can read further on and may find another insight.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree of disagree with the evidence of Mr van Zyl as it stands?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, if Van Zyl said we discussed it, it is so, but I cannot remember it today.

MR BIZOS: Do you have knowledge of Mr van Zyl's evidence as read out to you, yes or no?

MR DU PLESSIS: I repeat, if he says so, I do accept it.

MR BIZOS: Did you fly to Pretoria in order to see high ranking officials in relation to the death of Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: Did you go to Pretoria during July 1985?

MR DU PLESSIS: I could have been there for a meeting, I don't know. I definitely did not go to Pretoria regarding Mr Goniwe.

MR BIZOS: In 1985 with Mr van Rensburg?

MR DU PLESSIS: Definitely not.

MR BIZOS: But now, were you concerned when the bodies of Mr Goniwe and the others were identified?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I wasn't. I was scared that it would lead them to us, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, do you remember that Krappies Engelbrecht came here in order to sweep the place clean, or possibly try to do so?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot say that.

MR BIZOS: Did you see Mr Krappies Engelbrecht after the death of Goniwe in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes, but that was a long time afterwards. I do not know, I think Brigadier Engelbrecht, or now General Engelbrecht, I saw him '89 for the first time in Port Elizabeth, or '88.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) but no difficulty about remembering?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can tell you why, it was before I was transferred to Head Office.

MR BIZOS: The number plates on Mr Goniwe's car were used on a Security Police vehicle in Port Elizabeth, were they not?

MR DU PLESSIS: It think the evidence says that, yes.

MR BIZOS: Parking tickets had been issued to this vehicle bearing these numbers, to a vehicle or vehicles bearing these numbers in the immediate vicinity of the Security Police offices.

MR DU PLESSIS: If you say so I do accept.

MR BIZOS: Yes, there's evidence of it in the inquest proceedings. All those prosecutions were withdrawn by the Senior Public Prosecutor at Port Elizabeth, do you know that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot place it, but I accept it.

MR BIZOS: Was it the practice of the Security Police Officer whenever parking tickets were issued to them to say that they were there on official and sensitive duties and upon that assurance the Public Prosecutor, and it was necessary for them to park, and upon that assurance the parking tickets were withdrawn?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so.

MR BIZOS: Did anybody in the - when did you become aware of that fact and that the junior investigating officers from the Murder and Robbery Squad, that is Mr Els and Mr Mark Whale had hit up on this bit of evidence?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember when. Yes, I heard about it.

MR BIZOS: Incriminating bit of evidence wasn't it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Who was the Senior Police Officer that habitually went to the Senior Public Prosecutor to withdraw the tickets?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know. I believe you would be able to investigate that at the Justice offices. You would probably be able to find it, because when they squashed the ticket it was done in someone's name.

MR DU PLESSIS: ...(inaudible) were responsible for having tickets withdrawn?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well everybody sent it in, it was sent through the post as far as I can remember.

MR BIZOS: Those documents disappeared. Those documents in the Traffic Police's and in the Prosecutor's possession disappeared. Did that come to your notice?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, it did not.

MR BIZOS: Did you hear that Mr Krappies Engelbrecht had come down in order to protect you, the Security Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not hear that.

MR BIZOS: Did you destroy any documents after the 2nd of February 1990?

MR DU PLESSIS: Personally, no.

MR BIZOS: Did you have any connection?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, do you know whether any documents, Security Police documents were destroyed?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, while I was still in the Security Force a decision was taken, it was taken at a very high level, I cannot exactly remember who was responsible for it.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) to the Goniwe deaths are destroyed?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot say.

MR BIZOS: Well, there had been an inquest in 1988, was it not?

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you repeat the question.

MR BIZOS: There was an inquest in 1988, three years after the event.

MR DU PLESSIS: I accept that, yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you know what the reason was for the almost three year delay for this inquest?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't.

MR BIZOS: Where were your ...(inaudible) being held in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: In 1988?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: I was in Port Elizabeth.

MR BIZOS: I suppose you have an answer as to why you didn't volunteer any information at that inquest in the interest of justice.

MR DU PLESSIS: Please repeat.

MR BIZOS: You didn't volunteer any information that you had about the death of Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: You were there during 1992 and 1993 when the inquest conducted by Mr Justice Zietsman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was in Pretoria in 1992, I was operated on in 1993. I resigned when I was a Colonel.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) Judge Zietsman for anyone that has any information to come forward?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember it, but it is possible.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone approach you from the Attorney-General's office to ask you whether, firstly to tell you that there was a suspicion that you may have been involved, did anybody come to ask you that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, after I retired, members of the Attorney-General's offices came to know if I wanted to give evidence against members. It was not just about Mr Goniwe, it was also about others, and my answer to him was that I denied anything and that I will appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

MR BIZOS: Did they ask you to come clean in relation to any of your activities, in particularly in relation to the death of people?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, there only was Mark Boyle that came to me. It was about my consideration to give evidence against some members if I knew something.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe Goniwe was mentioned, yes, it was one of the cases.

MR BIZOS: And did he tell you that he represented the Attorney-General's office?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: The Attorney-General was capable of giving you indemnity if you truthful evidence in relation to the killings of Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I heard that the Court can do that.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) of the Attorney-General to whom you would have to make a statement and be completely, so Mr Mark Boyle made that offer to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe he did, yes.

MR BIZOS: Why did you refuse it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I did not have - I haven't got any reasons, I just did accept it.

MR BIZOS: Why did you apply for indemnity for you, Mr du Plessis, to clear your conscience, to speak publicly about the murders that you and your colleagues had committed, to express regret by telling the truth and liberating yourself from this heavy burden. Why did you refuse the offer?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well I didn't do it, because at that stage we were already invited to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) was before the Commission was established. When did you apply for amnesty?

MR DU PLESSIS: They were there about three weeks before I applied for amnesty. I cannot remember the specific date, but it was just before that.

MR BIZOS: All the reason, if you had decided to speak anyway, why didn't you co-operate with the Attorney-General, wouldn't that be that you would co-operate with the administration of Justice, wouldn't that have been the most cleansing process?

MR DU PLESSIS: We can debate that yes, but it did not happen and I'm here today.

MR BIZOS: Now, I found your answer in relation to your grief for the people who had to commit these gruesome acts, was I right in hearing you express that?

MR BIZOS: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: What did you think was more gruesome, what the victims suffered, or what the perpetrators committed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, both. Both sides is very difficult, the families suffer a lot. I do not think that you must attach a degree of 1 to 10 to that. I think it's still, it's difficult.

MR BIZOS: Were you aware of the recommendation of the recommendation by the Commissioner of Police a number of days before you executed these murders that the Commissioner of Police recommended that Mr Goniwe should be dealt with with a type of banning order. You're aware of that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I did read the documents, yes.

MR TSOTSI: Are you saying that that type of document never landed on your desk?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not saying that, Mr Chairperson, I just think we must see a few things in perspective, and I turned to this court, and some of the Commissioners here is aware that in four years I was for three years in courts, where I was not in my office, and that is why I'm saying that various of these things could have crossed my desk while I was not there while other people saw it. I could have been informed about that at a later stage, but I cannot remember any banning order regarding Goniwe, and if it did pass my desk, even if it was from the Commissioner or not, I would not have recommended that. Something would have been attached to that saying that this Port Elizabeth branch is opposed to that, because it would have been unproductive.

MR BIZOS: You recently said that the function could only take place on the decision of the Head Quarters, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not say that.

MR BIZOS: Now, ...(inaudible) for a detention order, ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Section 29 or what?

MR BIZOS: Yes, well section 29 depended up in Head Quarters after a while, detention under other provisions depended on Head Quarters.

MR BOOYENS: No, Mr Chairman, I think my learned friend got the answers interpreted wrongly to him perhaps. Mr du Plessis said that a Lieutenant-Colonel could decide to detain somebody under section 29, but the release from the detention could only by done by Head Quarters, that was the answer.

MR BIZOS: But could it be ...(inaudible) reasons, further detention after a period had to be controlled by the Head Office?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is true, yes, but we had rules in the Security Branch that said we know what the law says, that Colonel-Major said that you can be detained under section 29. We had to write a motivating letter where we explain why we had to detain them, and then they would have authorised the ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Mr du Plessis, that your authority to attack was limited, in relation to continued detention, release and things like that. Why was it, and why did it take discression to kill people than to detain people? Why did you think that you had carte blanche to kill people without the authority of the Head Quarters?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is true, I do not want to say that I did not have power, I was only Major at that stage, but if circumstances ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: The witness interrupted himself when my learned friend was speaking to his junior and said, "hy gaan nou sê hy't my nie gehoor nie" and he obviously didn't because the witness was still busy answering. Perhaps if you would could just give him an opportunity to finish answering.

MR DU PLESSIS: What I said was that the circumstances was as follows, that we were in a war situation, we cannot deny that. Someone who denies in this country, and I'm talking about the Eastern Cape, and they unfortunately had psychological, or because of the psychological effect of it, we turned to drastic steps, and that is why I'm sorry what happened, but at that stage I believed that if Colonel Snyman, or whoever, General Erasmus, decided to do it, that he would have organised that.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) and Officer and a Gentleman you might know the answer to the question, what happens to people who in a war murder handcuffed prisoners and burn their bodies, in a war situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not know.

MR BIZOS: You don't?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not know.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible) the Geneva Convention as to how people are supposed to behave, even in a war.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, then I must tell you that this was not an ordinary war situation. This was not fought with the rules like that, it was not a declared war.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I have not further questions. We promised to hand in a bundle of documents or extracts of the record. In view of the answers of this witness, particularly relating to Mr Winter, we believe that it isn't necessary to put the details to him, and I will not ask any questions about it, but we will hand the bundle in and we'll refer to the specific pages that have a bearing on the matter during the course of argument, Mr Chairman. Thank you for a patient hearing, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yesterday my learned friend asked you what proof existed in exhibits "KH" and "H2" that Mr Goniwe and my learned friend specifically used these words that Mr Goniwe was "such a terrorist" as you described him. I think exhibit "U" is also relevant. Exhibit "U" is the report from the mini JMS. The documents speak for themselves to a certain degree, but just for

the sake of clarity, are there any indications of Mr Goniwe's activities and contribution that he made to the unrest situation in these documents?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Could you possibly, and I don't think it would be all of them, but would you indicate to the Committee where this is?

MR DU PLESSIS: In Exhibit "K1". Here he began to establish to Organisations. Paragraph 8 and 9, at the bottom,

"These meetings drew large crowds and gradually led to a level of resistance against authority and authoritative institutions among the residents."

And on page 11, for example,

"Various teachers, scholars and residents under his influence were involved in these activities, among other to gather funds for a lawsuit and given the climate which is building up in the country on JMS level, concern was expressed regarding the situation and that Goniwe's removal be considered."

And so we can continue, paragraph 15,

"Meetings and school boycotts were planned by him"

Paragraph 16, the same

"The class boycotts which began"

Paragraph 22,

"All schools in Cradock would support the boycotts, and those who did not participate would be forced out of the classes. Goniwe himself did not proclaim this, but his speeches influenced the members of the crowds to do this."

That should read "residents" not "people in attendance".

Paragraph 24, it was about his activities. Sharpeville Day, 21st March, paragraph 28 in this Exhibit,

"Matthew Goniwe delivered a speech, and other speakers delivered speeches with insulted the masses. Matthew Goniwe told the crowds of things that would happen in the forthcoming week, something was in the air, that many would still die in the struggle for liberation."

That's all regarding this document, that was document, Exhibit "K1".

MR BOOYENS: Is there anything else?

MR DU PLESSIS: "K2" discusses the activities of Matthew Goniwe.

MR BOOYENS: They don't have numbers, I think you should just refer to the date which appears on top.

MR DU PLESSIS:"At Somerset-East he held a house meeting in Somerset-East for the establishment of the Somerset-East youth congress and then on a later date in length of second '82, requested all teachers connected to black schools to continue with the struggle."

16th March '85, you can see that these things were happening just about every other day,

"...his speeches were about the history of the ANC, among others, saying that the ANC during the 1960's was banned because it was busy with a struggle for freedom and reclaiming the land which was stolen from us by the whites."

On the 21st of March

"At 22h00 the same day, with his two associates he went to the Bedford black residential area to deliver a speech to the children living there to burn down the two schools, Community Hall, and such. He went Mangali in Adelaide and requested to gather youths who could be used as leaders at this home for a meeting regarding the establishment of an Adelaide Youth Congress. The request was granted and subject held a meeting with youths. At 20h00 a group of approximately 500 youths moved to the Community Hall in Adelaide for the first meeting. During the march a member of the Police Force's home was stoned."

26th March

"It's clear that the Government has used R4 million in order to buy weapons. We are currently engaged in a civil war and that is why young people are leaving the country. Defectees said that if we did not give their country back that they would return. There were women who were trying to prevent their husband from going, but they wanted freedom as well. They weren't prepared to sacrifice members of their family going to Prison, because such a member would be killed. Subject refers to the struggle for liberation and freedom in Angola and Mozambique, and that those countries today are free."

MR BOOYENS: Perhaps, just to make things a little shorter, if you could just mention the dates, I don't think that it is necessary to read onto the record, but if you could just indicate the dates, because everybody has access to these documents.

MR DU PLESSIS: 27th March; 8 April; 15 May; 22 May, second paragraph and this discusses Youth Organisations in towns where he acted as Speaker and which experienced problems thereafter; 5th June, second last paragraph.

MR BOOYENS: You are also referred to Exhibit "U", that is the mini JMS. There's no indication that he was occupied with terrorist activities?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, but from this document we can extract certain matters which emphasised his role as an activist.

MR BOOYENS: I think we should just do this in the same manner in which we managed the previous documents.

MR DU PLESSIS: Paragraph 4(b); paragraph 6(c); and (e).

MR BOOYENS: And then we have the summary or conclusion of his activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: What are you referring to now?

MR BOOYENS: That is Annexure "B" to this document.

MR DU PLESSIS: Which paragraph?

MR BOOYENS: 11(a), (f) and (h).

ADV POTGIETER: It was a look at the activities which had been annexed according to the sequence of events, that's (a) and (b) which you are referring to, which is a basic summary of the unrest occurrences in Cradock, which are pretty much obvious.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, my learned friend made quite a lot of the idea that the educational authorities who wanted to re-appoint Mr Goniwe and that also at the same time, that the man was murdered. The decision as you understood it, which was taken to kill him and his cohorts, did this have anything to do with his educational activities or his political activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: His educational activities, that would be my inference. No, the decision to kill him, the educational authorities.

ADV POTGIETER: You've said, and let us just put it again briefly, the first time that you heard, and I'm not referring to the conversations or small-talk about this, I'm referring to the first time that you heard of a decision to kill Mr Goniwe and his associates, when did this occur?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was when General van Rensburg informed me that he had already spoken to Van Zyl about it.

ADV POTGIETER: In the principal decision, in other words the decision to kill Goniwe and his cohorts, did you have any input to that decision?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I didn't.

ADV POTGIETER: The input which you delivered at a later stage, approximately a week before the incident?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think I've stated it clearly that it was connected to the cohorts and their activities, that's correct.

ADV POTGIETER: According to what you could observe, was this news to Colonel Snyman, did he talk to you about it, what was the situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was definitely nothing new to him.

ADV POTGIETER: My learned friend at a stage also asked you why you were now saying that the order came from above, and I assume that when you mean from above, that's higher than Snyman. We'll refer to page 37 of Mr Snyman's application. Mr Snyman refers to a conversation with Louis le Grange, I'm not going to repeat everything. Did you know about this?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I did.

ADV POTGIETER: How did you find out?

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Snyman informed me about it.

ADV POTGIETER: When, can you remember?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't remember the date, but it was before the Pebco and Goniwe incidents.

ADV POTGIETER: Is there anything else which you would like to add?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have nothing to add.

ADV POTGIETER: I have no further questions.

MR BIZOS: Mr du Plessis, you were asked ...(intervention)

MR VAN DER MERWE: Sorry, Mr Chairman, can I just make a request on behalf of my client, I know it's - he says if we adjourn at 13h00 it may be a bit late, just for a two minute adjournment for personal reasons.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o.)

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

You were asked during the course of my examination to point things out in Exhibit "K1" and "K2" and I'll accept for the purposes of this question that you didn't have time to go through it, as you had last night, and you pointed out what you think were terroristic activities. I don't want to debate that with you, Mr du Plessis, but "K1" and "K2" were placed before the Commissioner of Police, you know that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BIZOS: The conclusion of the Commissioner of Police on page 8 of Exhibit "K" is

"It would appear as if the choice lies between a conditional re-appointment as teacher, or restriction that should be borne in mind that if Mr Goniwe refuses the condition offer, a conduct of referralty thereafter will be placed under suspicion. This had been pointed out by the South African Police and in any way which had been acted against Mr Goniwe in the light of the familiarity which he has achieved externally and internally, it will elicit criticism."

Did you and your little group in Port Elizabeth think that if you could decide contrary to the view of the Commissioner of Police after careful consideration?

MR DU PLESSIS: I wasn't aware at that point of this document. I didn't keep it in mind at all.

MR BIZOS: It took place before the death, now that you know it, now that you know that the Commissioner of Police would have had him teaching at Cradock instead of a burned out body, are you prepared to concede that the Commissioner was right, and that you were wrong?

MR DU PLESSIS: If you read this entire piece and place it into context, this one is "K1" and "K2", you will realise that there was no other solution because they were arguing the advantages, the disadvantages and the solutions, and not one, if read in context, there is not a single solution on any side. I would still have reasoned in the same way.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR BIZOS: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tsotsi, have you got any questions?

MR TSOTSI: Mr du Plessis, did I hear you correctly to say that the decision to kill Mr Goniwe had nothing to do with his educational activities, or something?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I didn't say that.

MR TSOTSI: Do you concede that the decision to kill Mr Goniwe is inconsistent with the decision to have him re-appointed as a teacher?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR TSOTSI: ...(inaudible) that he can't teach. Now, if you consider also that the decision that he should be re-appointed came from higher up in authority, the Commissioner of Police ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: I accept that he went along with it, but I thing it was more a case of Education and Training. He would have made this decision in order to get the children to get the children to go back to school. I don't think that it would have been a solution for the amnesty situation at that point.

MR TSOTSI: ...(inaudible) otherwise of the decision, I'm just talking about the fact that that this is not made, and I'm saying to you, do you concede that that decision made by the Commissioner of Police and other high ranking officers, including the Deputy-Minister, that decision had no authority that the decision that you made to kill Mr Goniwe.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR TSOTSI: So, but you still say that regardless of the fact that this decision was made, and if it was brought to your attention at the time, would you still have proceeded with the

question of killing Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I'm saying by implication, in the light of what was happening at the time, the unrest and other conditions, it was not a solution. I think that we should replace ourselves in those days. It wouldn't have been a solution at that stage, it would not have ceased or brought a halt to the anarchy which reigned. In fact, it would have aggravated the situation and by appointing him as a teacher back at the school, it would not have had any kind of influence on the unrest.

MS PATEL: Just to recap on what Dr Tsotsi has asked, I just want clarity, you say that you would have ignored the recommendation by the Commissioner and proceeded to kill?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I didn't say that. I said that I didn't know about it, but that it would not have offered any solution to me if I had to make the decision. I didn't take the decision, but if it was in my hands, I would still have taken the decision to eliminate him, because at that point I regarded that as the only solution for that which was happening in the unrest situation.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: ...(inaudible) interpretation, but I understand you as saying that this would not have been a solution, therefor you would have looked for a solution. Do I get you correctly?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MS PATEL: In other words you would have eliminated Mr Goniwe despite the fact that there was a higher authority which recommend that he be re-instated?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MS PATEL: In other words, ...(inaudible) any higher authority to give you a direction to eliminate Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not saying that.

MS PATEL: No, no, I mean in ...(inaudible) you did not need, it wasn't necessary to have had direction for a higher authority for decision to have come and to have been implemented.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MS PATEL: You could personally decide to eliminate Mr Goniwe and that order would have been carried through?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that's not what I said.

MS PATEL: Is it a possibility that you would have made that decision yourself and given instructions that he be killed without the need for a higher authority and that would have been carried out?

MR DU PLESSIS: But I think we should stick to what happened. I said that it would not have influenced me if I had to take the decision or give the order. I didn't take the decision in this instance.

MS PATEL: Can I ask a personal question, please, if you had to take the decision, you wouldn't have needed any, being in your rank as you were at the time, you wouldn't have needed an authority or a higher up person to give you the authority, if you looked at the situation as it was at that time, you would have proceeded to give the order to kill Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think I would have taken any decision to put an end to that situation, because I didn't have any other solution, nobody had any other solution.

MS PATEL: Dit it in fact fact halt the - did you actually achieve what you wanted to achieve? Did it halt the unrest in the Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: If I think back, it did not have the necessary effect.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, just to summarise the situation, do you accept that your actions was criminal?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I do accept that.

ADV POTGIETER: And it seems as if your colleagues who also appeared here have got the same opinion?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: You cannot say if Mr Snyman approached any higher authority?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, if you see it as authority or authorization from a higher level, I haven't got that experience, I cannot say.

ADV POTGIETER: You cannot say from personal opinion, or comment on that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Except to say that the interpretation that he found or got, received from Mr le Grange, to do something else. You see, Mr Chairperson, we must look at it further, at these things. If I say to you that we considered everything, and I'm talking about the security platforms, we considered everything, we repeated this thing every single day, weekly.

ADV POTGIETER: But then the politicians come back to you, higher authorities in the Security Forces come back to you and say, irrespective of what you tried, they know that you tried, what you suggested does not work and that they still say to you the Government wants you to make a plan, and you must find a solution. The one starts to ask the question like, or this is Colonels Snyman's and my inference, or what he could have interred from that was, that he must make a plan, a drastic plan?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, we're talking about the Cradock four incident, I'm talking specifically about that.

ADV POTGIETER: With regard to the Cradock four incident, can you from your personal knowledge know if Mr Snyman approached any higher authority?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot.

ADV POTGIETER: And it seems as if in the documents that was placed before us, as if a higher authority did indeed consider the matter, chaired by Mr Vlok at that stage, and seemingly they had opposing decisions concerning that decision that you made.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I think it was a recommendation that they made. I would just to make a statement about that, I do not know what happened behind the scenes, what he said in a meeting, and what he says outside of a meeting are two different things. Irrespective of that we can only go on evidence that was given, we cannot speculate.

ADV POTGIETER: So in other words that which is placed before us now, it seems as if there was a structure that was seemingly higher than the level of Mr Snyman, let us call a recommendation at this stage, that is opposing to what you have done?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would say that, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you very much.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry, could I come in here to ask just one single question, irrespective if the answer is yes or no, it would be important. Mr du Plessis we've heard now that you've said that after the incident, the killing of the Cradock four, you yourself was not in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: I would like you to think very carefully before answering the following question, do you know if anybody else of the Port Elizabeth branch did go to the Head Quarters of the South African Police Headquarters in Pretoria?

MR DU PLESSIS: I know, Mr Chairperson, that at one stage Colonel Snyman, and I do not know what his rank was at that stage and he retired as a Brigadier or Strijdom, that was the Head of the Robbery Unit, but I would just like to make it very clear, I'm not sure if it was, or I've got an idea that it was after the Goniwe incident, it could be after Pebco, but I think it was after Goniwe, the purpose of their visit in Pretoria I do not know, or the reason for them going there.

MR BOOYENS: According to you or, as far as you remember was it about the Goniwe incident, do you know with whom they discussed this incident in Pretoria?

MR DU PLESSIS: I accept, I do not specifically remember, I would say it was General van der Merwe.

MR BOOYENS: You see, Mr du Plessis, according to me, this is very important information to this Commission, do you not think that it was supposed to be included in your application?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know what he was going about, it's difficult for me to say.

MR BOOYENS: You see, if you had made a full disclosure, we would have been able to have summonsed these people about this discussion that took place. Don't you think that it is important?

MR DU PLESSIS: I kept to what I knew, I cannot say that they went there to go and pertinently discuss these things. You can put two and two together, but I cannot say what they discussed or what it was about.

MR BOOYENS: If you put two and two together, what answer do you get, what did they discuss?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I don't know.

MR BOOYENS: I've got no further questions.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr du Plessis, the idea that Mr Goniwe had to be killed, where did you hear this from for the first time?

MR DU PLESSIS: From Colonel van Rensburg.

ADV POTGIETER: Well, that was approximately three weeks before the incident?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: You've heard evidence that this idea was hatched or discussed before that date, although not with a plan, but there was talk that these people had to be killed. Do you remember that you gave evidence in that line?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I do.

ADV POTGIETER: Well, in the light of that, where did you get the idea from to kill Mr Goniwe, or where did you hear about it for the first time, or was it your own idea?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairperson, I think we know all about talk in the hallways, when you haven't got any solutions, you say something that you may not really mean, but it does appear, unfortunately.

ADV POTGIETER: Who in the hallways gave you this idea?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, it's not as if someone gave us the idea, and the unrest is continuing, alternatives are discussed. Day and night you have to work, then one would say that a plan must be made because nothing else works, and the members was under my command, many of them had that idea, I believe, and many of them had their own views, or discussed their own views. It was a revelation of what was going on in the heart.

ADV POTGIETER: This plan to kill these four people, was it supposed to happen in one incident, or could it have happened individually?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know if that was discussed. It had to happen according to what the circumstances allowed.

ADV POTGIETER: What did you then discuss when the modus operandi was discussed? Did you discuss it as if they had to be killed in one incident, or one by one, because you said you would prefer that they be shot, and the others said they are going to be stabbed with knives?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was suggested that the elimination must look like a vigilante attack. After that Captain van Zyl will do the finer planning of how and where, he would do that on his own.

ADV POTGIETER: You talk about a vigilante operation, and I correct if I said as one operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm talking about the modus operandi, it had to look like that. We could not foresee at that stage that one would be in the car, or that someone would be in a bus, or something.

ADV POTGIETER: As I understand your evidence is that the killing of these four people from a list of seven or eight or how ever many it was, approval was only given for the four and no approval was given for the whole list? The commands that you received, why was that not adhered to?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot say today why not. I think because it did not have the necessary results, so we decided to stop, or not continue with them, I cannot think of a specific reason at this stage.

ADV POTGIETER: Will you concede that in the higher hierarchy or in the rank, your position was to influence or to stop the murder of Mr Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that even a junior person could stop that.

ADV POTGIETER: After that decision was made, who could that person have been who would have convinced you to stop this thing?

MR DU PLESSIS: Who would have convinced me, or who I were to convince?

ADV POTGIETER: Who would have influenced you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, if I had go and inform Mr Snyman, I would have had to tell him to put a stop or an end to it.

ADV POTGIETER: As I understand your evidence that this business of people who were against apartheid, to kill them, and this started in '81, am I correct if I accept that all the murders that we've mentioned now was committed in order to stop the problems or prevent the problems.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Let us say in '81 someone was killed for that reason and approximately in '82 and '83 Nkuli and his friend was killed. Then we get to the Pebco 3 , it seems as if this concept did not help because the people had to be killed continuously. Did that not help - it was not a solution for these problems.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I hear what you say, but I think we did influence their speed, but they were replaced by others.

ADV POTGIETER: Like Goniwe?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, he was replaced.

ADV POTGIETER: At the time, when you decided to kill Mr Goniwe, did you not think, that this is not going to help, we've got so many examples of the past where it did not help.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, politically the politicians had to solve this thing. I believe that they had to foresee a long time ago, and they probably did, that this is a political solution, it cannot be a military solution. But we were instrumental in the solution, that's what they expected of us, we worked for them, and we were indoctrinated in the circumstances to do this, and I also just did my duty and so I believe everybody in the Security Forces did their duties, to do then what we thought was right and to protect. Today one realises something else, and it may be difficult for you or anybody else to be placed in our position, but I would not hold that against you. We believe that that was the only solution, and the only way out.

ADV POTGIETER: Do I understand you correctly, that at that stage to kill Mr Goniwe, did you not think that this is not going to help, because it did not help before?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not say it did not help before, we did make them stop to a lesser extent.

ADV POTGIETER: Concerning the burning of the bodies, as I remember things, it was confirmed that Mr Goniwe's body was burned out, as well as the Pebco 3's. Although it was not claimed in the case of Mr Goniwe, did you not think or foresee that it would happen?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not foresee that. For me, I did not foresee it. It could be that I overheard it when it was discussed, but today I can't remember, because I don't see the purpose it in.

ADV POTGIETER: Tell me, after the incident, did any Minister of Deputy-Minister or high ranking official ultimately ask to know what happened here?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, I believe that there were certain questions from the Ministry, but I cannot pertinently think of an incident.

ADV POTGIETER: But as head of unit or section under which our people were classified, were you not called in and asked, this is under your office or desk, do you know what's going on.

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that I would have sent a report, but I cannot remember the contents of that, but I believe that I would have informed them. Possibly they did ask my opinion, that is why I say that, but I cannot remember the details about what and how it happened. They would have asked inputs.

ADV POTGIETER: So it would have been a secret document?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

ADV POTGIETER: Would you have told them the truth?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I would not have.

ADV POTGIETER: If it was not for the order that you received and complied with, would you have taken part in the planning of the deaths?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I would not have.

ADV POTGIETER: So, you yourself did not approve the death, you just followed an order? Why didn't you just walk away and say, I don't want anything to do with that?

MR DU PLESSIS: It's easy to say it, but it's difficult to do it if you work in the Security Community.

ADV POTGIETER: I don't understand, why can't you just walk away? I'm not working for the Security Forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: It is a culture that I cannot describe in words, it just does not happen. If you're approached to do something, you are approached in a poised situation, and you just do it.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you. Mr Booyens have you got any questions?

MR BOOYENS: No, none.

MS BOSMAN: Mr du Plessis, I would just like to clear up of the issues in something that you've just mentioned, did you in 1985 realise that the problem that you as a Security Policeman wanted to solve had to be felt by the politicians?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MS BOSMAN: At that stage you did realise that, that the solution lies on a political level, and that what you are doing now is not the true solution or the real solution?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, yes.

MS BOSMAN: Thank you.

MR NOLTE: ...(inaudible) which may, it's coming from Uitenhage, it's an affidavit of Mr Snyman's doctor as to his present state of health and so on. They were supposed to fax it to my attorney yesterday, but apparently they had some difficulty in getting the doctor to sign it, we have been told that the affidavit will be signed, or has been signed, but we haven't received it yet, it was sent to my attorney's office. Subject to that, but I understand there is some other witness here, sorry I forget the surname now, the man that was involved in the Craig Williamson incident, ...(intervention)

MR VAN DER MERWE: Van Jaarsveld, he is here.

MR NOLTE: But subject to the handing in of that affidavit, that's the evidence I would propose to call.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll bear that in mind, and I'll allow the affidavit in as soon as it's available. Mr Bizos, can we break for lunch?

HEARING ADJOURNS