Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabethe, what is the roll like from now on?

MS THABETHE: From now onwards, Chairperson, we move to the matter of Andre Cloete.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) it seems to have a Port Elizabeth interest. When are we likely to start with that.

MS THABETHE: I have advised, Chairperson, that the parties be here tomorrow morning to start, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, to those members of the public who specially come here to listen to the Dlongwane matter, it is only starting tomorrow. You're at liberty to stay here the rest of the day if it interests you. We'll adjourn for fifteen minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: Thank you Chairperson, we are proceeding with the matter of Andre Cloete.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nel, what language would your client prefer to use?

MR NEL: English will be fine, Chairperson.

ANDRE CLOETE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Chairperson, at the outset there are certain amendments to the application before you to be made. I would request that the application for amnesty refers specifically to the murder of the persons mentioned in counts 2 to 14 as set out on page 21 of bundle number 1 and also to the attempted murders of the persons referred to in counts 15 to 18, also on page 21 of bundle number 1 and also to any offence which may have been committed relating to the incident to which this application refers and that being incident as dealt with in the State vs P.Msani and others, relating to the kwaMakutha trial. With your leave?

CHAIRPERSON: All of those offences stem out of the same incident?

MR NEL: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand it correctly that the incident referred to in his initial application is clearly referred to in that application as being the one that occurred at kwaMakutha?

MR NEL: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, those amendments are granted.

MR NEL: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, in order to possibly reduce the length of this matter I would ask my client firstly to confirm his application as set out in form 1 which forms part of the bundle.

Mr Cloete, do you confirm the contents of your application?

MR CLOETE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: You also attach an annexure to this application with certain information. Do you confirm the contents thereof?

MR CLOETE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: In response to a letter received from the Amnesty Committee, page 10 in the bundle, certain information was forwarded to the Amnesty Committee as set out on page 11 of bundle 1. Do you confirm that information?

MR CLOETE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: Then in response to a letter from the Evidence Analyst on page 12 of the bundle 1, a response by yourself was forwarded in the form of an affidavit as set out on pages 15, 16 and 17 of bundle 1. Do you confirm the contents thereof?

MR CLOETE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: On page 16 of bundle 1, page 2 of your affidavit and specifically paragraph 9 thereof, the second last sentence reads as follows

"Capt Opperman and I then left Ulundi for Durban after informing the participants of where they were to meet us late the following morning."

Is that correct or is it wrong?

MR CLOETE: That is incorrect.

MR NEL: What should it be in fact?

MR CLOETE: Earlier.

MR NEL: Early the following morning?

MR CLOETE: Yes, that is correct.

MR NEL: Mr Cloete, in amplification of your application can you briefly tell the Committee how, firstly in what capacity were you involved with the SADF of that time?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, I was employed by the SADF as a sergeant in Military Intelligence, Division Special Tasks. I was also involved in training these people in the Caprivi and after they'd been trained we just monitored their movements and things that they did afterwards.

MR NEL: How did you specifically get involved with what was later on referred to as Operation Marion?

MR CLOETE: The people were looking for instructors and I was available. I, together with a lot of other instructors, we trained the people up in the Caprivi.

MR NEL: What did this training or the training you provided, what did this amount to?

MR CLOETE: First of all, the first phase of the training involved basic military training and then the second phase involved specialised training.

MR NEL: What is meant by specialised training?

MR CLOETE: It's basically minor tactics, sniper training, weapons training, demolitions, urban terrorism, house clearing and so on.

MR NEL: In the kwaMakutha trial extensive reference was made to what was called house clearing. Can you describe to the Committee what you understood by house clearing and what your training of the trainees which I referred to amounted to with regard to what you called house clearing?

MR CLOETE: House clearing is normally in an urban situation where you enter a house and move from room to room eliminating all the targets inside the house.

MR NEL: Now the form of this ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just explain that? Removing all the targets of the house?

MR NEL: Basically when you do a house clearing, you move into the house in pairs and you clear each room from the entrance, the place that you entranced until you are finished and you shoot all the targets in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly that the targets that you would shoot in the house would be people identified before you get into the house?

MR CLOETE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then, I mean, please explain?

MR CLOETE: When you enter the house you are supposed to shoot all the targets in the house, you're not supposed to leave anybody behind as evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Even if they were not targets?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So if you decide to enter a house for house cleaning, then you leave no prisoners?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

Now the form of the training that you conveyed to these trainees of yours, who taught you the form of this training, where did the orders come from?

MR CLOETE: Well we did the same training beforehand and that's what we carried over to them, Mr Chairperson.

MR NEL: Was this part of standard operating procedures or not?

MR CLOETE: That is standing operating procedures that when you enter a house you shoot everything and you leave nothing, nobody alive behind.

ADV SANDI: Just explain to me, normally what would be the purpose of such an operation where you get into a house you just shoot everyone who is there?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Committee Member.

ADV SANDI: What would be the purpose?

MR CLOETE: The purpose is to eliminate everybody and leave no evidence behind, Mr Committee Member.

JUDGE POTGIETER: I'm sorry, sorry Mr Nel?

You say and leave no evidence behind? What do you mean, you leave no witnesses behind or what?

MR NEL: I actually mean witnesses.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Witnesses? So you don't leave anybody behind who could possibly be a witness against the perpetrators?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Committee Member.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Now if you talk about a witness, you're talking about somebody who is likely to give incriminating information against the perpetrators, would that be correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Committee Member.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Information that could possibly be used to effect an arrest and a possible successful prosecution?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Committee Member.

JUDGE POTGIETER: So that your purpose in house clearing would be to eliminate any person you find inside that particular house that would fall into this category that we spoke about?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Committee Member.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes. Thank you. Sorry Mr Nel?

MR NEL: Thank you, Sir.

Now coming back more specifically to this kwaMakutha affair. How did you get involved in this?

MR CLOETE: I got involved as I only heard about the attack about the day before it took place and I was handed a sketch of the house, I didn't even know where the house was and with the sketch I drew up a model of the house and I taught the participants how to enter the house. I did not teach them, I just rehearsed it with them before the attack.

MR NEL: You say rehearse? Rehearsing?

MR CLOETE: How to enter the house.

MR NEL: In accordance with the training they had received earlier?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: In the Caprivi, in this instance?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Now the weapons to be used, can you just briefly for the record explain to the Committee where the weapons were obtained?

MR CLOETE: We were on our way to Ulundi, we went via the Drakensberg and we picked up the weapons there at Fern Tree and ...(intervention)

MR NEL: What was Fern Tree?

MR CLOETE: It was a base, a military intelligence base.

MR NEL: And then.

MR CLOETE: When we left there we went to Ulundi where we met the participants.

MR NEL: The participants being the people who were to execute the attack on the house?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Were you ever involved in the intelligence side of the identifying of the victim or the address of the victim, something like that?

MR CLOETE: No.

MR NEL: What were your orders when you arrived at Ulundi, the orders you received from - firstly, who did you take orders from?

MR CLOETE: From Capt Opperman.

MR NEL: And what were your orders?

MR CLOETE: I was to prepare the people how to enter the house and doing some shooting exercises.

MR NEL: And that was then done on the site there?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: And what happened after that?

MR CLOETE: After that Capt Opperman briefed the people where to meet us and we took all the weapons and put them in the car and we left for Durban.

MR NEL: And then?

MR CLOETE: We met the participants in the early hours of the next morning, just outside Louis Botha Airfield. We handed them the weapons and we waited for them to return. When they returned we took the weapons back again and we followed them to just outside Durban and then we returned to our hotel.

MR NEL: Did they report back to you or Capt Opperman after the attack?

MR CLOETE: Well there was a lot noise, the people were very excited and they said to us the attack was a big success but we did not know really if it was a success until the next day.

MR NEL: And what happened the next day?

MR CLOETE: The next day we saw in the newspaper that a lot of women and children were killed and not the victim.

MR NEL: And what was your reaction to that?

MR CLOETE: I was disappointed.

MR NEL: By what?

MR CLOETE: I was disappointed that a lot of women and children were killed and not the target that we had initially identified.

MR NEL: Looking back now with the hindsight that you have now, if you were involved in the intelligence side of this operation and you had known that there were women and children involved and you are in command of this exercise, would this

have taken place or not?

MR CLOETE: If I was in command of this exercise or the identifying of the target, this attack would never have taken place because the people who did the identifying of the target and the intelligence gathering, did not do their work properly. If they had done it properly they would have found that there were only women and children at the night of the incident in the house.

MR NEL: Mr Cloete, it's clear that a very tragic affair transpired during this exercise and obviously there are families present, people left behind. Do you have anything to say to them today?

MR CLOETE: I would just like to say to the families that I am very sorry about what happened that night and I ask them for their forgiveness.

MR NEL: You also testified in the kwaMakutha trial, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: You also gave your co-operation to the State as far as you could with regard to that matter?

MR CLOETE: Yes that is correct.

MR NEL: That is the evidence, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MOODLEY: The name is Ms Moodley and I represent the victims in the opposition to the application for amnesty.

I want to take you back briefly to the incidents that occurred prior to kwaMakutha affair. I talking about a period of about a month or two that you had spent with your commanding officer, Mr Opperman, who is also called J.P. Would you like to tell us a little about the time you spent together with him in the country, in particular in the province of KwaZulu Natal?

MR CLOETE: Okay, we travelled quite a few times down to Natal. I can't remember how many times. Capt Opperman used to meet people, normally in the hotel ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Please Mr Cloete, would you answer the question and not whom did you meet or who did Mr Opperman meet. Yourself and Mr Opperman, what was the work that you were doing with Mr Opperman in KwaZulu Natal at the time?

MR CLOETE: I was driving the car.

CHAIRPERSON: What were you people doing, you and Opperman?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman was meeting various people and I was never present at the meeting, I used to always leave the hotel when he met somebody.

MS MOODLEY: Please listen to the question and take your time but answer it, don't evade it. My question to you is, the time that you spent with Mr Opperman in KwaZulu Natal, you said now that you were driving him around. I'm asking you what did you do in relation to people that you met and would you tell us a little bit more about that aspect?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman met the people and he spoke to them. I don't know what he said to them.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know who he met?

MR CLOETE: Yes, he met Mr Luthuli various times and some of the people who worked for the intelligence group.

MS MOODLEY: Would you like to mention the names of those people?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember all their names.

MS MOODLEY: You can't?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS MOODLEY: Are you being selective about what you can remember or can't remember or you simply can't remember?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember, he met various people.

CHAIRPERSON: Well can you remember the names of some of them?

MR CLOETE: Well the only person I can remember because we met him a lot of times was Mr Luthuli.

CHAIRPERSON: Are we talking about the intelligence people?

MR CLOETE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Not a single name?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS MOODLEY: You can't remember a single person from intelligence that your commanding officer met in KwaZulu Natal?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS MOODLEY: Are you saying this at this late stage of your application for amnesty, having gone through a trial, having had sufficient time to think clearly and make full disclosures here today? You say you're here about full disclosures, you say you have not met any other person from intelligence?

MR CLOETE: I can maybe remember faces but I can't remember their names.

MS MOODLEY: Maybe if I can assist you a little bit? Did you do a turn at the Natal Command when you were down in Durban?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: Now does that help you jog your memory a bit?

MR CLOETE: No, it doesn't help.

MS MOODLEY: I doesn't help?

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Moodley, maybe you can suggest names?

MS MOODLEY: I'm going to suggest it now.

Victor, the name Victor, does that ring a bell?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: Would you like to tell us more about Victor?

MR CLOETE: He was in the SADF, he wasn't the intelligence ...(indistinct).

MS MOODLEY: Alright, fair enough. Maybe that is not the proper label to put on him but these were some of the people that you met?

MR CLOETE: I only met him after the attack.

MS MOODLEY: You did not meet him before?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS MOODLEY: Let's leave that for now, Mr Cloete. For the time that you spent in Durban, you were driving Opperman around. Can you tell us where you went to, what did you do?

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Moodley, we're talking prior to the attack.

MS MOODLEY: This is about ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking you.

MS MOODLEY: Yes, prior. Prior to the kwaMakutha attack.

MR CLOETE: Well we visited Richards Bay, Hluluwe, that's normally where Opperman met Mr Luthuli.

MS MOODLEY: And you drive around and you don't discuss anything with your commanding officer about possible targets, about possible operations that one could consider?

MR CLOETE: He said that they were gathering intelligence but he didn't tell me who or what it was.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, you are a person from Special Forces, aren't you?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: You were trained. You were described by Judge Hugo as a "deskundige", you have expertise?

MR CLOETE: I knew that something was going on but I didn't know what the target was.

MS MOODLEY: Alright, you say you knew something was going on?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: More than that you didn't know?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: But you had been training 200 people at Caprivi?

MR CLOETE: I only trained 30 people.

MS MOODLEY: Well there were a group of 200, possibly you trained 30, I concede that. You're busy training people in Caprivi with a particular objective. You drive around KwaZulu Natal for the best part of two or three weeks with your commander and you're simply a driver. Is that what you're trying to tell the Commission here today?

MR CLOETE: No, that's not what I'm trying to say but ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: I think let's be a bit more honest and circumspect and robust about saying exactly what you were there about. This is your opportunity to do so.

MR CLOETE: I knew that Capt Opperman's people were gathering intelligence on targets but who the targets were I did not know.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think anybody asked you yet about targets. For the last ten minutes you've been asked about what was actually being done. Not to identify targets. Are you able to help us?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman was meeting people, I presume the people were gathering intelligence for him and that was that.

MS MOODLEY: I put it to you, Mr Cloete, you're being selective with your memory now. If you were going to be honest with us today you would tell us why you were actually -you were training people up at Caprivi, you knew what your operation was about, the overarching operation, this was a military operation, it was something that was within your ranks common cause, it was not something that took you by surprise? Maybe and that is another debate we'll come to later on today, my question to you is when you were travelling around for two or three weeks in KwaZulu Natal you had already had behind you a period of training with 30 men and in terms of the Marion Operation there was a specific objective that was going to be implemented. Maybe specific targets at that point had not come to hand but you cannot tell me that you were simply driving around your commanding officer. I would like to have a response to that, Mr Cloete?

MR CLOETE: I repeat again. I knew what was going on. I was driving around a captain, I was never present at any meeting.

MS MOODLEY: I'm not asking you what meetings, please listen to the question. What did you do for the two to three weeks that you were there in relation to the training that you had already actually subjected your 30 people to in Caprivi. You were not just driving around, you were actually in your mind you were thinking about what you people were going to do next? That's the logical conclusion that any normal person must make?

CHAIRPERSON: Is that so?

MR CLOETE: I repeat my answer, that the time that we were in Natal I was driving Capt Opperman around where he met various people and that was what I did there. I never had anything to do with any planning or intelligence gathering.

CHAIRPERSON: No okay, let me put it to you this way. We've heard many cases and before 1994 a lot was said about the Caprivi scenario, the Vlakplaas scenario, etc. It seems to me that you were an expert in training these people in preparation for these horrendous offences, not so?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were relatively high up in the rankings, is that not so? Albeit a sergeant but you were training people?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now you must have been a trusted member of that unit, correct? Otherwise he wouldn't have given you that job, to train people?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How long were you in that unit training people?

MR CLOETE: Approximately a year.

CHAIRPERSON: A year. That's prior to this attack that we're talking about now?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now surely you must have realised as you testify that while you were driving around with Opperman, at the very least it crossed your mind that there moves afoot in preparation for one of these, the commission of one of these offences that we've referred to?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now what did you think was happening when you were driving Opperman around knowing or thinking that we are busy with preparing for one of these attacks?

MR CLOETE: I was aware of that, Chairperson, that something was going to happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what were you thinking? We know you were aware of it. How did you fit into this whole attack?

MR CLOETE: My role was to prepare the people to enter the house or to rehearse them.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that while you were driving Opperman around?

MR CLOETE: That's right, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, I just want to go back to your period of training at Caprivi. There is a Col. Blaauw that comes to mind. During the course of the trial evidence was led that you seemed to have a special relationship, there was an issue raised about your rank, that you were a sergeant but that in relation to your commanding officer you seemed to occupy a very pivotal position of influence? You were no ordinary sergeant, you had really a special preference in Caprivi. Your commander in the trial in Durban, in the Peter Ramsany matter speaks of that. What comment do you have to make on that?

MR CLOETE: I gave all the specialised training in the Caprivi, Mr Chairperson. The other instructors did the basic training and the specialised training I was the instructor.

MS MOODLEY: Yes but you were Col. Blaauw's blue eyed boy were you not? Did you not share a special relationship with Col. Blaauw?

MR CLOETE: We were house friends.

MS MOODLEY: House friends and in fact the perception had gained currency at the time, that despite your rank you had risen. You were the one now being tasked to go out back to South Africa to actually implement that had trained at Caprivi, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, that's only for training.

MS MOODLEY: Yes, but you don't deny what I said, I put to your earlier on, that you enjoyed a special relation - you were house friends with Col. Blaauw and also the ordinary sergeant would not have got the kind of attention and work description that you eventually secured for yourself?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, Opperman and yourself, there seems to have been since the beginning of the kwaMakutha trial, a certain kind of gap that had developed, there didn't seem - what came across during the course of the trial was that you were at loggerheads. There was very little that was common cause between two people that had worked for some considerable time together on an operation? Can you give us some kind of information or shed light or ventilate that aspect of this intransigent attitude in regard to anything that was before trial. Every issue became - every non-issue became an issue, every bit of evidence because a cause for different views and conflict. Can you shed some light on that?

MR CLOETE: Are you asking me to ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: I'm only asking you to answer the question, that is all.

MR CLOETE: Can you please repeat the question?

MS MOODLEY: Your commanding officer, Opperman and yourself, there seemed to have - you know if I had to reconstruct the evidence that was led, it would seem that both of you were from different planets, that you both were never involved in the same operation. What was this complete different versions that emanated from the trial, what did you put it down to?

MR CLOETE: It happened a long time ago and I couldn't remember everything exactly how it happened?

MS MOODLEY: No, I didn't ask you if you couldn't remember. My problem is this, you know, an intrinsicate different version of what happened in that operation. Your commanding officer and yourself told two completely different stories. Now I know you must be cautious here, we're talking about two witnesses. My difficulty is this, you know you can't lie a little bit. You're either both liars or - because neither of you are talking the truth there?

MR CLOETE: Okay, what I said in the court I told the truth. What he said it's his story.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's not be generous about it, if you told the truth then he is lying, isn't it?

MR CLOETE: What I said is the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it follows then that he lied?

MR CLOETE: Then it might be so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Not might be, it is or it isn't, both can't be right. So if you told the truth in court then he lied? It follows, it's logical. Is that not so?

MR CLOETE: I told the truth in court, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are you not prepared to go further and say he lied?

MR NEL: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, if I may just come in? If we could just possibly clarify one aspect? Nothing specific has been put to Mr Cloete. He may not even have heard or read Opperman's version of events and I would ...(indistinct) my learned friend to be more specific when she comes to these issues.

CHAIRPERSON: Well did you not read the record of what Opperman said? It is germane to your application?

MR CLOETE: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Not at all?

MR CLOETE: Not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Was your attention not drawn to the fact that there is some discrepancy, to say the least, between what you say occurred on that day on what he said in court?

MR CLOETE: I only read my own evidence in the court.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you like to have an opportunity to read his version? Or maybe we can save time, Ms Moodley, maybe you can perhaps put certain issues to him. I don't know if it's going to help you but we are under time constraints also.

MS MOODLEY: My difficulty is this, the trial record is replete with various counsels putting to Mr Cloete the version of his commanding officer and the simple responses, the one you have given here again today, you don't go far enough to say that he is lying but you go carefully and you go cautiously and you say you're talking the truth. It takes us nowhere, I'm not going burden the Commission unnecessarily. It is the record itself, it's peppered with it. If I had to look now through my record I'd have to be turning pages upon pages. Mr Maritz put it to you, various other counsels put it to you at length and they put the versions to you because Mr Opperman's evidence was led before yours and you did not give a reasonable answer?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to respond to that?

MR CLOETE: Well all I can say is my version of my testimony is what happened, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Let's move on, Mr Cloete. Let's go to the time when you left Pretoria with Mr Opperman. This is now a day or two before the kwaMakutha attack. You travel with Mr Opperman, I don't know if you do the driving again, but you travel from Pretoria, you make your way to Fern Tree in Drakensberg - but before we even move further on there, during the course of the evidence when that particular portion of the travel was discussed with you at the trial, you said even then there was no discussion that ensued between you and Opperman about the operation or the work that you were going to be doing in Durban, there was no discussion?

MR CLOETE: About the targets, specifically who the target was. I knew that something was going to happen.

MS MOODLEY: I'm putting it to you that you knew more than just something was going to happen. Let's just wait for me to finish. I'm saying, that leave aside the target for the moment, but there was more that happened in your - there was more that was discussed between the trip from Pretoria and Fern Tree than you would have us believe. This is your opportunity now to tell us exactly what was discussed during that - how long does it take to drive from Pretoria to Fern Tree?

MR CLOETE: Approximately about three hours.

MS MOODLEY: For three hours you had an opportunity to discuss with your commanding officer. Tell us what you discussed there?

MR CLOETE: He said to me there was an operation that was going to happen and they've identified a target. Who it was I did not know at the time.

MS MOODLEY: What else did he tell you about the operation. Let's leave the targets alone. Tell us about what you discussed, not about what you didn't discuss?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember what we discussed.

MS MOODLEY: I need to jog your memory again?

MR CLOETE: Yes please.

MS MOODLEY: Did you talk about the torches that you people bought in Pretoria? Who bought the torches?

MR CLOETE: No, but we didn't discuss it while driving down ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Answer the question. Who bought the torches in Pretoria?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember.

MS MOODLEY: You can't remember? I see in your application that you've amended this morning, that appears before us this morning, you talk about rendering - there's a particular term you use with regard to equipment and torches and the like and ammunition. Page 16.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 9.

MS MOODLEY: Paragraph 9

"I also rendered aid to the participants in the attack with the provision of weapons, ammunitions and various other equipment like torches."

Now I'm going to ask you to remember what you said at the trial about torches specifically. Do you remember what you said at the trial?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember.

MS MOODLEY: So what version do you believe, what you can't remember at the trial, which I will try to find this morning or do you say this is what the truth is now, that you rendered all this equipment to these people?

MR CLOETE: Are you asking me who bought the torches?

MS MOODLEY: I'm asking you whether you bought the torches?

MR CLOETE: Or Opperman?

MS MOODLEY: Yes.

MR CLOETE: I can't remember, it could be me or him or somebody else.

MS MOODLEY: At the trial you didn't have a problem remembering? I'll tell you why I'm asking about torches. I mean why do - you are a special force person, you're trained. You are buying ten torches. If you say you can't remember but by that time you knew, I mean you people purchased ten torches? Already the next step that I'm going to take you through is that you knew that there were ten people that were going to be involved in the operation and at the very least you're going to need torches and that would have been an attack at night?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: And that you also bought - did you buy the masking tape?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember.

MS MOODLEY: But masking tape was purchased and it was one of the items in the car that you travelled in from Pretoria to Fern Tree, yes or no?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: So now there's a picture emerging, it's not simply a person who on the morning or the day before has been actually given a sketch by a commander and say prepare an attack to penetrate a house? Here's a person, a special force person with his commander, leaving Pretoria on his way to collect ammunition to Fern Tree, on to Ulundi to do a mock run, a dry run if you want to call it that and who sits here and says to this Commission that he didn't know anything until the morning or the day before the attack was imminent or what the targets were? I see you're shaking your head, would you like to explain?

MR CLOETE: I did not say that, I knew that something was going to happen long before the time but what I said is I did not know who the target was.

MS MOODLEY: So what did you know? Tell us what did you know?

MR CLOETE: I know that something was going to happen and that ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Isn't it more than that? You knew that something was going to happen which required ten people to be armed together with ten torches and at the very least that attack was going to take place at night?

MR CLOETE: But that is correct, that is what I just said, I knew something was going to happen.

MS MOODLEY: Well something and what I told you is two different things. I could have told you a million things here. I wanted you to tell me what happened. I'm not here trying to extract tooth from you, Mr Cloete, you need to give us of your own volition.

MR CLOETE: Excuse me, are you waiting for an answer?

MS MOODLEY: Yes, is there an answer?

MR CLOETE: Like I said I know - because all the people that we trained were divided in groups of ten, so ten people would have been used in the attack, that's why there were ten torches and ten weapons.

MS MOODLEY: Why didn't you put all that into your application?

MR NEL: Sorry Mr Chairperson, just to come to the assistance of my client. I just wish to refer to his application. He has right from the start referred to the trial that took place. We did not have, although we asked for the record, in April of 1998, in writing, we only received Tuesday a week ago but we referred specifically the evidence given in that case. Insofar as any reference to the application refers to the case I would ask my learned friend to consider that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nel, the last question is, has those details about how many people were scheduled to participate in the attack and what equipment was given to each was within the knowledge of the applicant, whether he said so in the trial or not. The question that is last directed at him is why he never said that in his written application before today? Whether he said it in his testimony in the High Court or not is neither here nor there. As I understood the question, Ms Moodley?

MS MOODLEY: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR NEL: I will argue the matter, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Moodley, are you at a point where we could adjourn?

MS MOODLEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Till 2 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MS MOODLEY: (continues) Mr Cloete, I want to take you back to what was put to you by the Judge earlier on in the day in regard to the, what you called, house penetration. I think in Afrikaans the term is "huisopruiming".

CHAIRPERSON: House cleaning.

MS MOODLEY: In response your answer and correct me if I'm not right was that one did this with a view to eliminating possible witnesses and that is what the objective is in that kind of operation, is that correct?

ANDRE CLOETE: (s.u.o.) That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: And I'm doing this simply because I want an explanation from you. I've looked at the record on page 1582 of the trial, Peter Msani, and round about line 18. I'll just read a bit and then you can tell me the reason for the difference in the answers that you've given. To a question put by I think it's Mr Maritz about on this aspect, line 20

Question: "That implies somebody must be in a position to fire back."

Answer: "That is correct."

Question: "If you attack somebody in a hospital where everybody is bedridden, the same considera-tion would not count."

Answer: "That is correct, your Honour."

Question: "If you attack a nursery, the same considera-tion would not count?"

Answer "That is correct."

MS MOODLEY: The answer which you gave was that people must be in a position not to return fire. Now in the operation at kwaMakhuta, you had planned an attack and you were the person with the expertise? You have consistently said that you didn't know who the targets were and that's been like ...(indistinct) that we've been hearing repeatedly. I put it to you, Mr Cloete, that you were an experienced military person. This was standard operation procedure. It would have been within your knowledge that in a township anywhere in South Africa, a four roomed house, the possibilities of women and children being within the confines of that house was a real possibility and that you as a seasoned expert should have known better and when you sent people into an operation like this, you would have foreseen as a reasonable person would have foreseen, with your expertise, the possibility that women and children could have been in a home like that. I'd like to have your comment on firstly, the responses you've given this Commission today, the response you gave to counsel at the

trial and what I put to you now?

MR CLOETE: My answer is I did not plan the attack, I did not do the reconnaissance on the house. I didn't even know where the house was, who lived in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you do a rehearsal then?

MR CLOETE: They gave me a sketch of the house the day before the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and how did you do rehearsals then, only with a single target or with many people in the house or what?

MR CLOETE: We rehearsed that they would enter all four rooms in the house, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you must have known there would be more people?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is why you had ten people to attack the house?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You made provisions for ten people to be armed?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now who would these other people be besides Mr Ntuli that you made provision for to be attacked?

MR CLOETE: I did not know, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now how many people did you make provision for to be attacked then?

MR CLOETE: According to Capt Opperman it was Mr Ntuli.

CHAIRPERSON: Only?

MR CLOETE: Well if the people enter the house they will automatically eliminate everybody inside.

CHAIRPERSON: No, listen to the question. Did you in your plans make provision for the killing of Mr Ntuli only?

MR CLOETE: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I take it you must have made plans and provisions for killing more people than Mr Ntuli only?

MR CLOETE: That is right, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: How many other people?

MR CLOETE: I cannot answer that Mr Chairperson, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: But you were the one who did the rehearsal?

MR CLOETE: It would not have mattered how many people in the house because they would have cleared all the rooms, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, Mr Cloete, it does make a difference, it does matter, because if there were fifty people in the house then you would have had to make other arrangements, no so?

MR CLOETE: We would have to make other arrangements, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Correct. So all I want to know is for how many people did you make provisions to be killed?

MR CLOETE: I cannot answer that Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why were these other people had to be killed?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, it's standard operating procedures that when you enter a house or a building that everybody is eliminated inside the building.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, what I can't understand and you need to explain this. Before I put the question to you this Mr Ntuli that was a target, was he the same Mr Ntuli that you and Opperman used to meet prior to this attack?

MR CLOETE: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who is the Mr Ntuli that Mr Opperman meant?

MR CLOETE: That's Mr Luthuli.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, Luthuli? Oh, I'm sorry. Now why was Mr Ntuli a target?

MR CLOETE: According to Capt Opperman he was the paymaster for the UDF.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and was he a high-profile person?

MR CLOETE: According to Capt Opperman, he selected him as a target, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But was he a high-profiled person?

MR CLOETE: I don't know that, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in your preparation in which you used your expert knowledge, to prepare for this attack, did you question Mr Opperman as to who was going to be killed and why?

MR CLOETE: He did tell me that Victor Ntuli is the target.

CHAIRPERSON: That's all?

MR CLOETE: That's all.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why did you then prepare to kill more people than Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: Not to leave any witnesses behind, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but why couldn't alternative arrangements be made? You were an expert in teaching people how to snipe. Now why didn't you consider sniping and killing Mr Ntuli in that way?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, I was not involved with the planning of this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: No?

MR CLOETE: I had nothing to do with it.

CHAIRPERSON: You were told to prepare for the killing of Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: I was told to prepare them to enter the house and shoot the people in the house. That's what I was told to do.

CHAIRPERSON: So who were the targets then? You no longer now were told to kill Mr Ntuli, you were told to kill the people in the house, which is more than one. Now who were you supposed to prepare people to kill?

MR CLOETE: Mr Ntuli and the rest of the people that were present in the house, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: How can that be? I mean if the State President was in that house would he be killed?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, if he was in the house he would also have been killed.

CHAIRPERSON: F.W. de Klerk? Or I don't know if he was a president that time. Whoever was a president in 1986. It was P.W. I think. Would he be killed?

MR CLOETE: Yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure about that answer?

MR CLOETE: Everybody that was in the house would have been killed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Even if it was Mr P.W. Botha?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Cloete, you people weren't robots? You were human beings also, you could use your discretion? Are you telling me that if Mr P.W. was in that house, P.W. Botha, he would because of the order also be assassinated? Surely that can't be true?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, the people that were in the house would have been shot that night. You don't go into the house and just shoot one person.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR CLOETE: Because the other people can shoot back.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh. Let me just get something here?

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Chairperson, with your permission can I just? But when you say other people might shoot back, isn't that precisely the reason why you got to establish how many people would be there and what kind of people would be inside the house together with the person you wanted to attack and kill?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, the people were supposed to do the intelligence gathering and reconnaissance on this person or on the house were supposed to do that and as you can see their information was incorrect.

ADV SANDI: Approximately how many people were you personally expecting to be with Mr Ntuli inside the house?

MR CLOETE: I cannot answer that question, I don't know how many people would have been in the house.

ADV SANDI: Were you interested to know? What was your attitude? Is that something you would have wanted to know?

MR CLOETE: You don't lose anything by asking a simple question. Did you expect anyone to be there with Ntuli? Why not ask such a simple question?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman kept everything to himself and he only told me what I needed to know. I didn't even know who did the intelligence gathering on the house and so on. He never told me anything that I shouldn't have known.

ADV SANDI: Yes but is it the position here that he didn't want to know all those things, those questions we're busy asking you today? He didn't want to know those things, is it the position here?

MR CLOETE: Can you please repeat that question?

ADV SANDI: Did you want to know anything? You keep on saying I don't know about this and that. What is your attitude? Did you want to ask any questions and know precisely what the position was?

MR CLOETE: I was interested to know but he would not have told me.

ADV SANDI: Why not? Didn't he trust you?

MR CLOETE: It's not that he trusted, we worked on a need to know basis. I didn't need to know who the targets were. All my work was to prepare the people and rehearse with them. I knew nothing of the work he did with the people who gathered the intelligence and the reconnaissance.

CHAIRPERSON: You know, Mr Cloete, this rehearsal concerns me. If you're going to kill one person, you have one type of rehearsal. If you're going to kill ten people then you have another type of rehearsal because there's ten people and if you're going to kill fourteen people and try to kill eight others, then you have even another kind of rehearsal. Now that's why I'm asking you, what type of rehearsal did you have to prepare all these people to kill fourteen people and attempt to kill four others.

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, the rehearsal or the drill to enter a house stays the same whether there's two people in a house or ten people. The rehearsal stays the same.

CHAIRPERSON: Your statement says a rehearsal of the attack took place under my supervision close to the said Mission Hospital during midday. It's not a rehearsal of entering a house, your statement says a rehearsal of the attack. Or are you saying or intended to say entering the house?

MR CLOETE: That's what I meant by that, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, if you did not know who the targets were and how many they were, how were you to know whether they were proper targets for the purposes of this act?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, they were selected by Capt Opperman and I just followed his orders.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying Opperman knew the identity of all those people at that house?

MR CLOETE: I don't know if he knew all their identity, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, Mr Cloete, you're applying for fourteen counts of murder and four counts of attempted murder. No, I'm sorry. Five counts of attempted murder and thirteen counts of murder. Now you tell us that you didn't know who these people were. Somebody else elected them and you didn't know, it follows then, that you didn't know why they had to be killed? Am I correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now if that is so, how do you comply with the requirements of the Act?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, I helped with the rehearsal of ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, wait. Look, in order to get amnesty, whatever offence you committed was must have been done for a political reason, a political motive, correct? Do you understand?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And the other essential issue is that you must make full disclosure of the relevant information pertaining to the commission of that offence?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you don't know who is going to be killed except that it's intended to kill Mr Ntuli. You know, you say now, that there are going to be other people in the house as well, but you don't know who they are but you know they might be killed. It follows then that you don't know why they had to be killed because you don't know who they are, not so?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now given those two primary requirements of the Act, how does the killing of a four year old child fall into that category of having been murdered for political reasons. It's a set of factors that you rely on. Now you must help me because I really can't understand this.

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, I was just as shocked the next day when I read in the paper of the children and the women that were killed.

CHAIRPERSON: That may be so but we're busy with your application now. In order to be granted amnesty the offence for which you ask for amnesty must have been committed for a political reason which in itself is defined in the Act. We need not go into that. One of the guiding factors in deciding whether it was for political reasons is the advancement of the political association on behalf of whom you act. How is the killing and the murdering of a four year old child going to advance the political position of any political party? I dare say it will have the opposite effect, not so?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now how are you asking us now to consider favourably your application in respect thereof.

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, I'm very sorry about what happened. Like I said, I was just as shocked the next day when I read in the paper of the people who were killed and like I said in the beginning, if I have done the reconnaissance on the house or on Mr Ntuli, that attack would never have taken place, if I knew that there were only women and children in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you explain this also. In your pivotal focal position that you had in this whole operation and such like operations, did you not teach your - I don't want to use the word activist, your soldiers, not to kill children and women if that was not your intention, to abort the operation if that be the case?

MR CLOETE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't teach them that. Why not?

MR CLOETE: I cannot answer that, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And especially if the original main target is not accessible to you? Mr Ntuli, it seems to me, was not present at that house but yet your group go ahead and shoot up all those people and the main target is not there. What sense does that make?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, it doesn't make sense, like I said the people who did the intelligence gathering made a big mistake, they did not give the right facts to Capt Opperman, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not intend that those other people get killed if Mr Ntuli was not there, is that not so?

MR CLOETE: Can you please ask the question again?

CHAIRPERSON: You did not intend the others to be injured or killed if Mr Ntuli was not accessible to your gang, correct?

Or did you think they should go ahead even if Mr Ntuli is not there?

MR CLOETE: I did not know that, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but surely you had an idea of what should happen? You now testified all along that the target was Mr Ntuli and Mr Ntuli had to be killed together with all those others that were present in the house, correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that's the way you pictured the attack?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And if Mr Ntuli was not present then surely you could not have intended the other people to die because their deaths would have been purposeless, Mr Ntuli was not there?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Potgieter?

JUDGE POTGIETER: Sorry, so in other words if I understand you correctly, given the facts of this particular incident, this in fact should not have occurred?

MR CLOETE: Say again, Mr Chairperson?

JUDGE POTGIETER: Given the facts, the attack should not have occurred?

MR CLOETE: No, it should not have occurred.

JUDGE POTGIETER: And secondly, if for example you had proceeded with the attack and Mr Ntuli was the only person in the house and you killed him, your mission would have been successful, your objective would have been achieved?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Was it part of your rehearsal for your operatives to ascertain whether Mr Ntuli was present in the house or was the order that was given to them simply to wipe out everybody in the house?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, the last statement.

JUDGE POTGIETER: On the assumption that Mr Ntuli was in the house?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes, thank you.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Chair, if I can just ask here? Would it be correct to say that at the time you were doing the reconnaissance in preparation for the attack you had no information to the effect that the people who were staying with Mr Ntuli in the house were in any way involved or assisting him towards his political activities? You had no such information?

MR CLOETE: No.

ADV SANDI: When you say you were shocked to learn the next day that children and women had been killed in this attack, did you do anything? How did you go about to show your shock, as someone who was shocked. Did you do anything?

MR CLOETE: No, I didn't do anything, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: You didn't for example go to Mr Opperman to discuss him how shocked you were? You didn't do that sort of thing?

MR CLOETE: We were both concerned the next morning.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chair.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, I'm going to take you back now to an answer you gave to Mr Benny Schoenfeld in the trial and this is page 154 ...(inaudible) of your evidence, line 16

Question: "What was the order given to the members?"

and your reply: "Victor Ntuli lives in the house with his

family and he and his whole family must be

eliminated, your Honour."

And I'm not taken that out of context, if you read on a bit there is continuity in that vein. You, at the trial, made no bones about the fact that you viewed not just Victor Ntuli as a target but in fact all the members of his family in that home. So I think it's pretty rich of you at this late hour to suggest to this Commission that you were very sorry about the loss of life of women and children after you heard of the incident in the paper the next morning. What do you have to say to that?

MR CLOETE: I have nothing to say, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, I want to take you back to what was discussed about the dry run, the mock rehearsal that you did at Ulundi or at the hospital outside Ulundi. Can you please recall for us what exactly transpired, in particular your conduct at that exercise?

MR CLOETE: Mr Chairperson, first of all, as I can remember correctly, the people first had a shooting exercise for the men to get used to their weapons because they hadn't used them for a very long time. Secondly, one or two people held a mock house where the entrance of the doors are and where the windows are and so on with sticks and stones and then I divided the people up into their five groups and then we rehearsed to enter the house a couple of times.

MS MOODLEY: My question, Mr Cloete, your conduct and your involvement in the exercise. Can you answer that one? What did you do?

MR CLOETE: I was watching over them, doing the rehearsal.

MS MOODLEY: You didn't do anything actively yourself in relation to the sketch. What happened to the sketch, who gave you the sketch and what happened? Who did what?

MR CLOETE: One of the people gave it to me who did the ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: And what did you do when they gave you the sketch, can you recall who gave you the sketch?

MR CLOETE: I'm not sure.

MS MOODLEY: Can I jog your memory a bit? It's a Mr Khumalo who gave you the sketch, so you say in your evidence at the trial. What next? He gives you the sketch and then?

MR CLOETE: We build a mock ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Who did that?

MR CLOETE: Myself and some of the people who were there.

MS MOODLEY: So it's now more than just yourself? You do this together with other people. In your evidence at the trial you said that you, with the help of stones and sticks, did a layout of the plan of the house in the veld?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, but there were some people around me.

MS MOODLEY: Alright. I also turn now to bundle 4, or bundle 3 rather, of the papers which refers to an application made by a certain Mr B A Khumalo. Page 21 of the record where Mr Khumalo says that he is the one that actually drew the plan on the soil. He says

"I was actually supposed to draw that on the soil, the structure of the house. I then did that with the soil. Then I just left it on that sand."

Is that not correct?

MR CLOETE: No, that's not correct. I helped them to build the mock house.

MS MOODLEY: So are you saying that this applicant applying for amnesty has actually perjured himself in this application?

MR CLOETE: I'm not saying that ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: If you say that he is not talking the truth then you're saying he is lying?

MR CLOETE: No, I'm not saying he is lying, it's a long time ago, that's small things that I can't remember everything, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: So what is your short answer?

MR CLOETE: My answer on what?

MS MOODLEY: On what you did and what others did so that we know the difference?

MR CLOETE: I helped them to build a mock house.

MS MOODLEY: So he is lying. He actually didn't do it, you did it? You helped him to do it or you did it or he did it on his own?

MR CLOETE: He could have helped me, he could have been one of the people who helped me.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, let's move on. When you did this plan of the house at kwaMakhuta, do you recall how many rooms were in this house?

MR CLOETE: If I remember correctly there were four rooms.

MS MOODLEY: Was there an outbuilding?

MR CLOETE: There was an outbuilding, that's right.

MS MOODLEY: Was that reflected on the sand?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember.

MS MOODLEY: So in fact you were not looking at an individual target here, you were looking at a lot of people and you say as much. The fact that women and children were going to be killed was just that, sadly that's what it is, you only can say sadly but you say that's simply what it is? It shows a consistency, Mr Cloete, in the manner in which you've given your evidence, in the demeanour that you have expressed, you didn't care two hoots for the people that were going to be on the receiving end. In fact, if we look at the Caprivi training, the context of where all this emanates from, you couldn't care less if black lives were lost and I use this very advisedly, I'm not playing a race card but I'm telling it to you and these are my instructions. You didn't care two hoots for who the casualties were to be, they were not important to you. For you that was just part of the job description that you had. What do you have to say to that?

MR CLOETE: I have to say at that time you are correct. But that's not the way I feel about it now.

MS MOODLEY: So you've had a change in heart, Mr Cloete?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: But you know, you can't do these things in half measures. You have to make full disclosures and from what I've put to you earlier on, you're hardly making an attempt to make a full disclosure as is required of you if you want an application for amnesty to even be considered by the victims that I represent?

MR CLOETE: I'm doing my best to remember everything because it happened a very long time ago. I can't remember the small details of everything exactly, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, in regard to offensive actions in terms of Operation Marion, all targets had to be cleared by certain individuals, you know that, it's common cause. There's no debate about that?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: Can you recall who were the persons who had to actually approve of these targets?

MR CLOETE: Well it would have been Capt Opperman's superiors.

MS MOODLEY: No, they were your superiors as well, in fact they were people who were more familiar to you than to your commanding officer?

MR CLOETE: I don't understand that question.

MS MOODLEY: I'm saying to you that the people who would have had to clear the targets for any offensive action in terms of the Marion Operation would have had to have been approved by a certain number of people and these people that were people that were known to you, people that were, in fact I suggest to you now, better known to you than even to your commanding officer?

MR CLOETE: No, that's not correct.

MS MOODLEY: Alright, I'm going to actually read to you something which gives me the basis for what I'm saying to you. When the 200 Caprivi recruits had been trained and they were to be returned to the area of operation, who accompanied them on their trip back to Natal? Can you just tell the Commission?

MR CLOETE: I ...(indistinct) now.

MS MOODLEY: Now out of all the people at Caprivi who were busy with training, what was so special about Sgt Cloete, why is he accompanying Dr Roos and Dr Myburgh and he is coming back to South Africa together with the trainees? You're not just an ordinary foot soldier and I think it's very misleading to create that kind of impression to the Commission. Here's your opportunity to make a full disclosure. Let us hear that you are very sorry for what has happened, let us hear the truth this time.

MR CLOETE: There's no specific reason why I accompanied them back. I think I was due for leave ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: You were the blue eyed boy, Mr Cloete, even though Mr Opperman was your commanding officer. In terms of a pecking order, although you had a lower rank, you had special ways of getting ahead within the military. I want a simple answer, yes or no to that one?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS MOODLEY: And I remind you that you're under oath. I want to jog your memory again a bit. When this kwaMakhuta incident was behind us and thirteen people were killed, what happened to the operation shortly thereafter?

MR CLOETE: I don't know, I was transferred back to the Caprivi ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Please don't tell me you don't know, that's not an honest answer. You were transferred because the operation had come to an end. A senior brigadier had said you people were busy with capital offences. The word he used was "...(indistinct) misdryf", you people were busy with capital offences and that you had to stopped. Where did you go when you left KwaZulu Natal? Were you not stationed at South West?

MR CLOETE: I was stationed in the Caprivi.

MS MOODLEY: In the Caprivi, not South West?

MR CLOETE: Well that is South West.

MS MOODLEY: Okay. Namibia, yes. So why did everything come to an end if everything was done according to plan in terms of the proper procedure? I put it to you, you knew full well that the offensive actions you took upon yourself to implement together with the trainees had gone they said "skeefgeloop", had gone all wrong and you had to be reined in now and that is why you were relocated? Is there a comment that you'd like to make on what I put to you now?

MR CLOETE: I had asked for a transfer to the Caprivi.

MS MOODLEY: Why? Was it getting too hot for you to stay in KwaZulu Natal?

MR CLOETE: Well Capt Opperman stayed behind for a long time.

MS MOODLEY: No, I'm not worried about Opperman, I'm asking you a question. Why did you now decide to leave the area? Because you botched up royally? You were the expert, you're the person who had planned the attack?

MR CLOETE: I did not plan the attack.

MS MOODLEY: Well in terms of military procedure and you're familiar and I'm not, I know that you would have been germane, you would have been an integral part of the implementation of that operation?

MR CLOETE: That is not correct.

MS MOODLEY: Can I ask you expand, very crisply, the objective behind Operation Marion? Crisply, for the benefit of everyone here. Why was Operation Marion even on the cards?

MR CLOETE: Operation Marion, as I recall, was more a political story than anything else. The people in KwaZulu Natal was concerned about their people getting killed and so on and that is why we'd trained these people to do their own thing back.

MS MOODLEY: It's a bit garbled, Mr Cloete, I think you need to throw some more light on it.

MR CLOETE: I don't know the whole background where it all originally started, I just know what I heard. It's more a political thing for the people of the IFP to have their own defensive and offensive elements against the ANC at that time.

MS MOODLEY: And so how did you feature in Operation Marion?

MR CLOETE: I trained the people or some of the people.

MS MOODLEY: And you couldn't do that to the exclusion of the context in which you were operating in, you weren't just training people to go just anywhere, you trained people specifically to go to a specific part of the country? Isn't that true?

MR CLOETE: Just repeat the question please?

MS MOODLEY: You were not doing that in a vacuum, you were training people in the context of Operation Marion and people would eventually themselves, operatives would find themselves in KwaZulu Natal?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS MOODLEY: And you would have been something of an expert in regard to operations that would have been launched in KwaZulu Natal or you should have been at least?

MR CLOETE: Like I said if I had to do the planning of that operation and the intelligence gathering, that attack would never have happened. The people who have done that had made a big mistake.

MS MOODLEY: Why, what would you have done?

MR CLOETE: I'd have made sure that Victor Ntuli was eliminated a different way.

MS MOODLEY: A sniper?

MR CLOETE: Maybe.

MS MOODLEY: That was put to you in the trial. What was your response thereto?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember.

MS MOODLEY: Well can I remind you? You said that there would be shots ringing out in kwaMakhuta, too much of attention. It was a ridiculous answer for an expert to give because kwaMakhuta at that time, any fool would tell you, was a volatile place where shots rang out all the time?

MR CLOETE: I don't think that was my answer.

MS MOODLEY: You don't think that was your answer. Are you hundred percent sure or you don't think?

MR CLOETE: I don't think so.

MS MOODLEY: So if you knew that you were going to take - you say you don't know that you were going to take out Victor Ntuli, but you say in the same breath that you don't care - I mean you didn't care at that time whether women and children were going to be killed because you said eliminate his whole family. Wasn't that the gist of your answer? Can you remember that?

MR CLOETE: I can remember that.

MS MOODLEY: So you were reckless and you disregarded totally the fact that there could be a four year old child or one year old child. In fact, if you looked at the thirteen people, let's give some sort of humanity to all this. There was an elderly priest, there was a second elderly gentleman, there were many women and the rest of them were children and your answer then speaks volumes for what your mind set would have been at the time and there is the difficulty for us. If we have to consider your application, we're going to have to find a political objective and we have difficulty with that. Where do we find a political objective for the thirteen people that were eliminated for no political objective? It seemed as though the political objective, as hard as we might try to find, scratch and look around, we can't find it. It leaves one in the terrain of malice, ill will. We're scraping at the bottom of the barrel, Mr Cloete.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, I'm trying to follow. Do you have any response to the last statement that has been made by counsel?

MR CLOETE: I've no response.

ADV SANDI: Just to contextualise all this. Would it be correct to say then it cannot be said that you had a political objective in relation to the people who were injured and killed in this incident? You didn't know them?

MR CLOETE: I did not know them.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, you did not know of them. You didn't know they were going to be there?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: But I'm putting this as a question to you. In the light of all this, it cannot be said that you had a political objective in relation to those people?

MR CLOETE: At that time I was in the Defence Force and we were serving the government or the political party of that time and, I mean, the ANC as you know and the UDF were political opponents at that time especially against the IFP in KwaZulu Natal.

ADV SANDI: I thought you said a moment ago you had no information to the effect that these people were in any way involved with Mr Ntuli and his ANC activities? You had no such information?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman told me before that, that in fact Mr Ntuli was a UDF paymaster or something to that extent.

ADV SANDI: He told you nothing about the people who were staying with him in the house?

MR CLOETE: No.

ADV SANDI: He didn't say they were also involved with Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: He did not mention that to me.

ADV SANDI: Yes, thank you.

MS MOODLEY: Mr Cloete, I'm going to make a comment on this whole almost calculated, careful, cultivated, engineering profile that you've actually put across during the course of the trial. One of a weak person, someone who is easily influenced and could be easily badgered and could end up saying yes and no. I actually think that that has been partly the reason for the manner which a decision has been arrived at in regard to your particular evidence and character at the time when the trial was finalised. I want to say something now which might not go down very well but I say it as frankly and as honestly as I can say it in terms of the instructions that my clients have furnished me, that a lot of senior people had actually chose to go the way of the prosecutorial route knowing full well of the limitations that actually attends those kinds of prosecutions and the plight of the prosecutorial services generally in our country and within those, the framework and the restrictions of that framework, one is not able to ventilate and deal fully with issues as one would hope to deal with. That trial is now behind us, there have been acquittals all over. The Honourable Judge did not absolve you in terms of that Section 204, so you have something hanging over you, something that is very uncomfortable, something that actually makes you come to the Commission. Is that not really the crux of why you are here today, to avoid prosecution, rather than to make a full disclosure, because if you intended to make a full disclosure, a lot of what has actually been extracted from you today should have come of your own volition earlier on in the day? That's the comment I make. Would you like to say something on it?

MR CLOETE: I am trying my best to remember everything and telling everything that I can remember to the best of my knowledge. I'm not trying to hide anything. That is why I am here, so that the truth can come out, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Have you ever contacted any of the victims in this matter? The family of the victims?

MR CLOETE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Why not?

MR CLOETE: Well I don't know where to find them, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: You are a Special Force person, you are doing attacks all over the country, security is in your hands and you can't find people who are an indictment?

MR CLOETE: I left the Defence Force thirteen years ago, I've ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: You see, it's easy for you, Mr Cloete, to put it away, to cut it off so to speak, cut the offending hand, but for everyone that's sitting here and it's a victim, this is actually traumatising people all over again, hearing this going on all over again. So I think you have to understand where people are coming from.

MR CLOETE: I realise that, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: And you have to actually show by your conduct that you are serious about what you say.

We have another problem, Mr Cloete, which I'll address now, is the question of proportionality in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that a question for argument? What I'm saying is, is it for the witness to decide that or not?

MS MOODLEY: ...(inaudible). Mr Cloete, your planning of the act and your eventual implementation of that attack by the men that were under your command, would you not say was actually totally out of clique with what was required, that to take ten AK47s to the home of the Ntulis to eliminate one person was a ridiculous route to follow?

MR CLOETE: I agree with that, Mr Chairperson.

MS MOODLEY: Can you bear with me for a minute?

Mr Cloete, I'd like you to actually just comment on the aspect of the weapons that were removed from the group of men after the kwaMakhuta attack. What was the fate of those weapons, where did they go?

MR CLOETE: Myself and Capt Opperman handed them over to I think it's a Capt or Major Victor at Natal Command the next morning. What happened with them afterwards I don't know because like I said I was transferred.

MS MOODLEY: But you have heard the evidence of your commanding officer at the trial?

MR CLOETE: They said something like they were burnt or melted down.

MS MOODLEY: Melted down at Iscor, you know nothing of that?

MR CLOETE: I know nothing about that.

MS MOODLEY: Do you know what happened to Victor Ntuli on the day of this incident?

MR CLOETE: No, I don't know.

MS MOODLEY: That he was taken into custody for the various attacks at kwaMakhuta. He was accused of actually launching this massive attack of eliminating his entire family and friends. You don't know of that?

MR CLOETE: I don't know about that.

MS MOODLEY: That's all I have for now.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS MOODLEY

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: May I take just a minute Mr Chair? Yes, Mr Chairperson, thank you.

Mr Cloete, you've indicated that you know that something was going to happen. How did you know that something was going to happen? What led you to believe that something was going to happen?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman, like I said in the beginning, had various meetings with people in Natal. At the meetings, which I wasn't present, I used to go out of the hotel room when he had the meeting with somebody in the hotel. So I knew they were planning something but I did not know exactly what. Perhaps about a month prior to the attack.

MS THABETHE: Did you know what this something involved?

MR CLOETE: Look, the people were trained to kill people and I mean I thought it would be something to that effect.

MS THABETHE: Is there any particular reason why it was concealed who those people would be who would be killed, why that fact would be concealed from you?

MR CLOETE: Because we only worked on a need to know basis. Capt Opperman would not have told me anything if I didn't need to know it at that time.

MS THABETHE: And didn't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But eventually he told you?

MR CLOETE: He told me a day before the attack.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so what's the difference?

MR CLOETE: Maybe he didn't trust me.

CHAIRPERSON: And a day before he did?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: Isn't it correct though that you were always travelling together? You and Capt Opperman?

MR CLOETE: Not always but most of the time.

MS THABETHE: For example before this operation was done both of you went to Pretoria?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Both of you went to Durban thereafter, isn't that correct?

MR CLOETE: Was this now after the attack or before?

MS THABETHE: No, after having gone to Pretoria?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Yes. Now why would he not trust you? I mean he had gone to all these places with you, why would he not trust you?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman worked with the intelligence group and in any intelligence community or organisation, the one person would not know what the other person next to you does. That is how it is.

MS THABETHE: In Khumalo's evidence it became very clear that they knew who the targets were going to be and further that Dulatolo Luthuli had informed Opperman of who the target would be. Would you still hold your reasoning that it was on a need to know basis when they knew about it and yet you didn't know about it?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Wasn't there something unusual about that?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS THABETHE: Now you've also indicated that you heard the morning of the incident who the victim was. Did Opperman tell you?

MR CLOETE: He told me, yes.

MS THABETHE: Who the victim was going to be? Did he say it was going to be Victor Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Did Opperman tell you as well that a surveillance was done before by one of the groups that was going to launch this attack?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: And did he tell you that they had indicated to him that there might be children and you know, some people besides Victor Ntuli in the house, like there might be children and mothers in that house?

MR CLOETE: I cannot remember whether he said that or not.

MS THABETHE: But he did tell you that there was a surveillance, that is correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, yes.

MS THABETHE: Why I'm asking you this, it's because you indicated that when the people came back they told you that the attack was a success and the following day when you heard that there were children or innocent people killed, you became disappointed?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Who would you say became disappointed, is it yourself with Opperman?

MR CLOETE: Myself with Opperman.

MS THABETHE: Why would Opperman be disappointed because according to the surveillance he knew that there would be children, he knew that there would be mothers there? Why would he be disappointed?

MR CLOETE: I think he was disappointed because Victor Ntuli wasn't there.

MS THABETHE: Oh okay, not that mothers and children were killed?

MR CLOETE: I think he was disappointed about that as well.

MS THABETHE: But more particularly that Victor Ntuli was not targeted?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Just explain this, if Mr Ntuli had been there, got injured or killed together with those people who were also injured and killed, would that have made any difference to your disappointment? What would have been your attitude to that state of affairs?

MR CLOETE: Well at least that would have been a success in some way that he was eliminated, if Victor Ntuli was killed.

ADV SANDI: Would you have been disappointed that Mr Ntuli had been killed together with these other people who had nothing to do with his political activities? Would you have been disappointed that these other people had been killed as well?

MR CLOETE: At the time of the incident, if Mr Ntuli was killed and other people were also killed, I would have been satisfied at that time.

ADV SANDI: Just explain to me, what exactly did they mean when they said to you the operation had been a success?

MR CLOETE: The people were very noisy when they came back, I mean obviously the adrenal and everything and they thought they killed Victor Ntuli and which they didn't. We only found that out the next morning.

ADV SANDI: Did you personally ask them what exactly had happened there in the scene of the attack?

MR CLOETE: I did not personally ask them, Capt Opperman spoke to them, I was busy putting the weapons away in the car and so on. I did not speak to one person specifically.

ADV SANDI: Were you interested to know as to exactly what had happened there?

MR CLOETE: I would have been interested but like I said, Capt Opperman spoke to the team leader about what had happened and they thought they shot Victor Ntuli.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Ms Thabethe.

MS THABETHE: Thank you. Mr Cloete, was this your first operation?

MR CLOETE: Of this kind?

MS THABETHE: Yes, I'm talking about you personally?

MR CLOETE: No.

MS THABETHE: It wasn't? Now you indicated the way you operated, you operated on a house cleaning operation, is that correct? When you attacked houses you would do house cleaning, a house cleaning job?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Would you say this attack, this specific one was a house cleaning attack or - I just want you to clarify that because it's a bit confusing. Would you say this attack was a house cleaning attack or ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: By his own definition yes, he cleaned out the house of all human beings.

MS THABETHE: Maybe let me rephrase the question. Was the intention of this attack or the plan of the attack to hit on Victor Ntuli specifically which would make it a specific target attack for lack of a better word or was the plan at the beginning to house clean?

CHAIRPERSON: Let me explain it better. Capt Opperman, along with the other people identified Victor Ntuli as the target. But during a house clearing operation, if you enter a house, the target will be eliminated plus everybody else that is in the house. Then I would say Victor Ntuli was the primary target but the other people that are present in the house would automatically also be eliminated.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Would it have been a sort of a mixed operation? It would be a house cleaning if Victor Ntuli was at home?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: So it depended on the circumstances. If there was nobody else home but Mr Ntuli, it would have been an attack on a specified victim?

MR CLOETE: It would have been the same.

JUDGE POTGIETER: But was part of your objective, part of your operation, part of your plan, was it that if Mr Ntuli were at home you would kill him and you would kill anybody else in that home regardless?

MR CLOETE: That is standard operating procedure.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Was that how you ...(intervention)

MR CLOETE: That is how they were trained in the Caprivi. If you go into the house nobody must come out alive.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes but the trigger, if I might put it that way, the trigger to the house cleaning would be the presence of Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: And if I understand your evidence correctly, your men, your operatives were elated, they were happy because they thought that they had killed Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: That was the point of their excitement?

MR CLOETE: That is correct but I don't think they - I don't think any of the operatives even knew what he looks like because they weren't part of the intelligence gathering.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes but the point that made them happy was their belief, which turned out to be a mistake we know now, the belief that Mr Ntuli was killed in this operation?

MR CLOETE: I think they believed that, Mr Chairperson.

JUDGE POTGIETER: That is why they felt this thing was such a success?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

JUDGE POTGIETER: It might have been otherwise if they were aware of the true facts?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes. Sorry, Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: My last question. With regard to the political objective that was sought to be achieved in this operation, would you say you did achieve the political objective that you had sought to achieve in this operation?

MR CLOETE: At that time of the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, think now, what's your evidence now?

MR CLOETE: Can you repeat the question please?

MS THABETHE: My question is, what would be your comment, do you think the political objective that you had sought to achieve was achieved?

MR CLOETE: No it wasn't achieved.

MS THABETHE: Why do you say that?

MR CLOETE: Because it just spurred on the violence further.

MS THABETHE: Then how would you justify it politically if the political objective was not achieved?

MR CLOETE: I don't really understand your question.

MS THABETHE: What I'm trying to ascertain from you is, looking at this operation, how would you justify it, that it was committed to achieve a political objective.

MR CLOETE: It was the IFP against the ANC at that time.

MS THABETHE: Yes but you have just indicated that the political objective was not achieved? Or rather, let me rephrase my question, do you still justify this act as having been a political objective?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Why?

MR CLOETE: At that time the ANC and the IFP people were killing each other and the people of the IFP at that time complained that they've got nothing to do back at the ANC and that is, I think, why they did the attack, to let the people in the ANC at that time think what was going on.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE

CHAIRPERSON: Is it also that the political objective that you sought was not achieved because Mr Ntuli was not killed?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because he was regarded as roughly as a political enemy?

MR CLOETE: He was a political enemy to the IFP at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: And by the same token to whoever were giving you your orders?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: They were identifying with the IFP in this conflict?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chairperson, may I interpose please? I just forgot to ask one question. Can I proceed? Thank you.

Mr Cloete, would you say in view of the fact that Mr Ntuli was not killed as you had planned or as you had intended, would you then say that the wrong targets were killed? Or the other, the wrong people were killed, would you say that?

MR CLOETE: Yes I would say that.

MS THABETHE: And would the fact that the wrong people were killed justify your political objective?

MR CLOETE: No, that does not justify it.

MS THABETHE: Okay, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chairperson, just one or two questions I suppose before Mr Nel is going to take his re-examination? Maybe I'll have to ask my question or questions before him.

Would it be correct to say that you were not really expecting any resistance from the people who were in the house?

MR CLOETE: Like I said I cannot answer on that because I did not know what was going on in the house, how many people there are or whatever or if they had weapons there or not.

ADV SANDI: Yes but when I was listening to your evidence regarding the reconnaissance, it did not appear to me that you were expecting a counter-attack from the house? Did I misunderstand you? Whilst you were planning you didn't discuss what you would do to counter any counter-attack from those who were in the house?

MR CLOETE: No, I did not say that. I mean the whole idea of the attack was an element of surprise. The people were sleeping that time of the night.

ADV SANDI: What I'm saying is implicate from your evidence, you had no information that there were people who were armed in that house?

MR CLOETE: No, no. I didn't have that information.

ADV SANDI: Yes, you had no information that this was a military base of some sought which was occupied by Mr Ntuli and some other unknown people, you had no such information?

MR CLOETE: No.

ADV SANDI: Tell me, during the course of the military training at Caprivi, did you teach your trainees anything about the concept of innocent civilians? Was that in any way a part of your training?

MR CLOETE: No, it was not part of.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Chairperson.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Cloete, as a matter of background, what was Operation Marion as far as you were concerned?

MR CLOETE: As far as I was concerned it was to give the IFP a military sought of para-military force to protect - either to attack targets that they identified with themselves or to protect their tribal chiefs and also to protect VIP people travelling in Kwa-Zulu Natal and also to contra mobilisation by propagandising the ideas of the IFP.

MR NEL: Okay, we all know what happened is that massive government went into taking people up to the Caprivi and certain training was given to about 200 trainees, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: What did this training amount to as far as you were involved?

MR CLOETE: The first six weeks was normal basic military training like shooting, drilling, physical exercises, the normal army basic training and during this period the people were selected for four different groups on their capabilities and then after this training they were divided up into four groups. The one group was the offensive group and that is the group that I trained. The other group was the defensive group and they were trained to protect VIP and so on. The third group was the intelligence gathering group and the fourth group were the contra-mobilisation group.

MR NEL: Did any of these groups intermingle or did they have any joint command structure or were they separate?

MR CLOETE: they were separate with one overall leader.

MR NEL: Now this offensive group, what was the idea of the offensive group, what were they to do?

MR CLOETE: They were to be trained to attack targets, to eliminate political opponents and so on.

MR NEL: And who would identify the targets?

MR CLOETE: That was for the intelligence gathering group.

MR NEL: You've said so earlier on in your evidence that the form of what you call house clearing that you taught these people were standard operating procedure. Nobody asked you about this but did this include what we have described, what you have described as what happened at kwaMakutha that particular night?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there books describing this type of training?

MR CLOETE: They were in training manuals in the South African Defence Force.

MR NEL: Now there have been two applications for amnesty relating to this very same incident by Mr Bhekikise Khumalo and also by Mr Luthuli, the one that you've mentioned, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: And as far as we understand these applications went through unopposed, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Now this Mr Luthuli who applied for amnesty, is he in fact the same person that you mention in your evidence?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: The one that met with Capt Opperman?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: And this other person, Mr Bhekikise Alex Khumalo, in what group was he slotted in?

MR CLOETE: He was in the intelligence gathering group.

MR NEL: Intelligence gathering group. Now you were asked why you accompanied these trainees back to Durban. Is there any specific reason for that?

MR CLOETE: There's no specific reason. I knew beforehand that I was going to be stationed down in Natal, that's why i went ahead with them.

MR NEL: Now after you parted ways and after coming back from the Caprivi, up till this stage when this attack in kwaMakutha happened, did you have any contact with any of these trainees?

MR CLOETE: No.

MR NEL: The first time you saw them again was at Ulundi as described in your application?

MR CLOETE: That is now the offensive group, that's the first time I saw them again.

MR NEL: Do you know or did you know at the time the morning, let's say the morning at Ulundi when this rehearsal took place, did you know what the intelligence was regarding the house and occupants of this house upon which the attack was to take place?

MR CLOETE: No, I did not know.

MR NEL: So you were basically told the house was going to be cleared?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Can I just ask? I don't understand what the purpose of the intelligence gathering would be then if you as the person who will be part of the planning of the actual attack?

MR CLOETE: I wasn't part of the planning of the attack. I was just there to rehearse them again because I hadn't done house clearing for a long time, they had done it the last time in Caprivi and a couple of months had surpassed since then, so I just had to drill them in again to penetrate the house. I had nothing to do with the planning.

ADV SANDI: No, no, I don't know what you mean when you say that, but isn't that logically part of the planning. Here were a group of people who are about to go and attack a house somewhere there and you do the rehearsing with them and getting them ready to do what they are about to do?

MR CLOETE: Like I said, the intelligence gathering group and Capt Opperman did reconnaissance and the intelligence gathering on the house or the target or whatever. I was never any part of that, I only went along to retrain the people and like what I trained them for up in the Caprivi.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, I'm afraid maybe you are misunderstanding me. What I'm saying to you is that I have a problem, I cannot understand why you would not be given a feedback on those aspects of the intelligence gathering that are relevant for your purposes of the rehearsal?

MR CLOETE: Like I said we worked on a need to know basis, I didn't know what any discussions Capt Opperman had with any of the other people.

JUDGE POTGIETER: But Mr Cloete, did Opperman not give you any information at all?

MR CLOETE: No.

JUDGE POTGIETER: About the statistics, "look Cloete, you must get these ten people ready, they must penetrate a house."

MR CLOETE: Yes, that information of the house.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes, but then he goes a step further, then it gives you a concrete context within which to work, you know? There's no need for you to work on a theoretical basis like at the Caprivi Training Centre where you are basically working on a theoretical basis, say "look chaps if you penetrate a house this is what you do." Normally you do this and normally do that, now you've got a concrete context here. Did Opperman not tell you "look here, Cloete, there are inside this house, there is the target whom we've identified" without giving you any further information about that. There are so many people that we expect. We expect there to be resistance, we expect the target is under armed guard, we expect that your men would be fired at. Did he give you that concrete context?

MR CLOETE: He did not give me that information, no.

JUDGE POTGIETER: He left you to just do a theoretical exercise?

MR CLOETE: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then how were you going to prepare your group to face a retaliation or existence?

MR CLOETE: Can you please repeat the question, Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you confused by the question?

MR CLOETE: No, I'm not confused. You mean when they are retaliated by them at the target or ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just answer the question. That you were not asked and you did not expect and you were not told to expect any resistance etc. I'm asking you, in order to train your group, that group of ten people, how were they going to handle retaliation or resistance if they were not trained to do so?

MR CLOETE: They were trained to do that, to expect resistance.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

JUDGE POTGIETER: And the rehearsal that you did, did that make provision for retaliation?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Did you just guess there would be a retaliation?

MR CLOETE: Well these people were very well trained, they could have handled any retaliation.

JUDGE POTGIETER: Yes but I mean it doesn't make very much sense to me, because you see the concept of a rehearsal is a sort of a trial run, it is a way of preparing you for something that you know you must do in a short while, you're going to participate in a play, you know what the plot is all about, all of that. You know exactly what you're going to do, that's why you prepare them. Every person knows that person's role, each one is given a role, you know exactly what you're going to do, you know what's expected of you?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

JUDGE POTGIETER: But how can you do that if you're not given any information, if you just grab things out of the air? You're going to prepare them for retaliation, you've got no clue, it might be a church that you're going to go and attack. Do you understand? I mean I just have great difficulty to understand how you were going to go through this rehearsal under those circumstances without at least - it was within hours, if I understand you correctly, of the actual attack and Opperman did tell you he gave you the complete run down in the course of that same period?

MR CLOETE: Well Opperman basically told me who the target was and what the house looked like which we built the mock up of and that was basically that.

JUDGE POTGIETER: He didn't give you a run down on the report of the intelligence people?

MR CLOETE: No, nothing.

CHAIRPERSON: He told you who the actual target was, Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know Mr Ntuli?

MR CLOETE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would he tell you that? Why would he tell you about somebody you don't know?

MR CLOETE: I don't know, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Are you seriously telling us that you were not supposed to know what emanated from the intelligence reports?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: You're not supposed to know it?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: What harm, what harm would have been caused by you knowing what had emanated from the intelligence gathering process because you eventually became part of this operation?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman had a top secret security clearance, I only had a secret security clearance. That is why I was not supposed to know.

CHAIRPERSON: But didn't that even jeopardise the safety and the lives of your operatives if Opperman knew that there was going to be ten MK members armed with AK47 rifles, F1 hand-grenades, whatever it might be? He doesn't tell you, he says "Cloete, get these people ready to penetrate the house, you're going to kill Victor Ntuli and you don't know who it is in any case." Wouldn't that jeopardise? Isn't that an irresponsible action on the part of your commander, of Opperman?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't ask him any questions, you didn't

say "now Opperman, who is Ntuli, is he a trained MK person, who is he? Is a minister with bodyguards or who is he? Is he a priest with nobody in his house? Is he a recluse, does he live alone there?" You asked nothing?

MR CLOETE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Nel.

MR NEL: Thank you Sir. Mr Cloete, to just come back to the aspect that was raised with you now. Did you determine how many people would partake in this attack?

MR CLOETE: No, I did not determine that.

MR NEL: It was like a pre-baked cake set down in front of you?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Did you determine how many ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It turned out to be stale, Mr Nel.

MR NEL: Correct, Mr Chairperson.

Did you determine how many weapons were to be taken?

MR CLOETE: No.

MR NEL: It seems to me that the intelligence side of it determined how, in what manner the attack would have taken place?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Let us skip over on that one. Were you personally satisfied that the number of people who were going to be involved? I understood you said it was ten and the calibre of weapons they were going to use, what was your opinion, were you satisfied that this was an appropriate number of people to be involved as well as the calibre of weapons to be used for this particular operation? Were you happy?

MR CLOETE: Well there wasn't any other weapons to use so they had to use them.

ADV SANDI: Yes but were you satisfied that you had the right number of people as well as the correct type of weapons for the operation? Were you happy about those two things?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Why?

MR CLOETE: Because it wasn't a big house.

ADV SANDI: Yes but I thought you have said you did not know what kind of resistance they would meet once they get to the house?

MR CLOETE: The people had sufficient weapons and they could have dealt with any resistance. They would have ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Even MK?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let me tell you, they wouldn't be so jolly when they came back if MK was there. Surely you must have realised there was that possibility?

MR CLOETE: No, they were sufficiently trained.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but the point of the matter is that it's one of the possibilities that you as an expert must have taken into account, look we're going to a high-profiled ANC leader that we're going to assassinate. You don't know him, you've got no other information as far as you're concerned, I must train these ten people.

MR CLOETE: No, I did not train them again, I just rehearsed what they have been trained up in the Caprivi.

CHAIRPERSON: You prepared them, okay.

MR CLOETE: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the word you've used.

MR CLOETE: I prepared them.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely it must have crossed your mind that if I'm going to prepare them to attack this gentleman, he is either going to be alone, I must prepare them for that, he is going to have his family with him and the possibility exists that he is going to be guarded by MK members. Shouldn't I warn these people that that is a possibility?

MR CLOETE: Capt Opperman could have warned them on that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm talking about you in preparing, Opperman didn't prepare them.

MR CLOETE: He briefed them on ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You prepared them.

MR CLOETE: No, that's incorrect. He briefed them before the start, before I did the rehearsals with the people on who they were going to attack. What he said to them I can't even remember.

CHAIRPERSON: But what is the sense of that? What is the sense of not briefing you as well? You are supposed to prepare them?

MR CLOETE: Yes but I was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You were the expert.

MR CLOETE: I was preparing the weapons for them and the mock up of the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that there is a possibility that he might have given them all the intelligence information and all of the detail?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And he kept you in the dark?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Can I just ask you to answer this question honestly? Did you personally have a suspicion that there could have been women and children in that house?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Did you do anything to confirm your suspicions?

MR CLOETE: No.

ADV SANDI: Why not?

MR CLOETE: I cannot answer that now.

CHAIRPERSON: Why can't you answer it? Especially it it's going to be night, one expects children and wives to be in the house, one o'clock, twelve o'clock at night, no so?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you expect children to be there, you expect wives to be there and women to be there and you say you never enquired from anyone to confirm that?

MR CLOETE: No, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: But you should have realised that as a big possibility, never mind if you didn't enquire isn't it? Human experience would tell you that that is so, isn't that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But nonetheless you went ahead with associating yourself with that attack?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Nel?

ADV SANDI: Sorry, just on this aspect? But tell me, at what stage exactly did you become suspicious that there might have been women and children in this house?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember at what time I became suspicious.

ADV SANDI: Why did you have such a suspicion in the first place?

MR CLOETE: A suspicion about the women and children?

ADV SANDI: Yes. It's a very clear question, why did you have a suspicion that there could have been women and children in that house, why?

MR CLOETE: Because I mean it's a family house.

ADV SANDI: I'm sorry about that, Mr Nel?

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chair.

Mr Opperman, your orders were received from Capt Opperman at all stages, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: And your order in this instance was to do a house clearing?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: In accordance with standard operating procedures?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: You say that you got transferred to the Caprivi about a month after this incident, is that correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Capt Opperman, what happened to him?

MR CLOETE: He remained behind.

MR NEL: And what did he do there?

MR CLOETE: He continued working with the Caprivi people.

MR NEL: With Operation Marion?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: You don't know for how long?

MR CLOETE: I don't know for how long.

MR NEL: Was there any specific reason for your transfer?

MR CLOETE: I can't remember. There wasn't a specific reason.

MR NEL: Did you get along with Opperman or not?

MR CLOETE: Well now and then we got along but not always.

MR NEL: Were you anything more than a common sergeant doing a job?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: Did you get any personal gain from these operations or you were simply paid your salary at the end of the month?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

MR NEL: What is correct.

MR CLOETE: That I did it because it was my job and I got paid my salary.

MR NEL: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL

CHAIRPERSON: Tell me, I just want to be fair to you Mr Cloete. I've heard many applications involving security policemen who were involved in special tasks like Vlakplaas, Koevoet, whatever. Is there any medical reason why many of your people seemed to suffer from amnesia?

MR CLOETE: I don't know, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean a lot of you people seem to be so forgetful. Do you know of any medical reason?

MR CLOETE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now one last question, it seems to me that you rely in your application on the actual activities of those people who actually committed these crimes, correct?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you rely further on what Opperman told you?

MR CLOETE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now aside from your own omissions or negligence, it seems to me that if they, either Opperman or this group of operatives, if they were negligent and did something wrong then you're stuck with that because you rely on what they did? Do I understand it correctly?

MR CLOETE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Nel, have you got any other witnesses?

MR NEL: Sorry, Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking have you got any witnesses who would support the applicant's case?

MR NEL: I have no further witnesses to call, thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Moodley, have you got any witnesses aside from those that you've indicated that wish to make statements?

MS MOODLEY: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: No witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we leave that session with the victims till tomorrow then?

MS MOODLEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Would half past nine suit you Ms Moodley?

MS MOODLEY: I'm in your hands but I thought we could start a bit earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got travel ...(intervention)

MS MOODLEY: Travel arrangements, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Then we'll start nine o'clock. We'll adjourn until nine o'clock.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS