Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] place and the hearings will continue today but I understand that there’s an application that is to be made at the present time.

MR PHOSA: That is correct Mr Chairman. I appear on behalf of the families of Mthimkhulu and the Madaka family - Madaka. There is a problem - I got instructions only over the weekend, this past weekend, for reasons - very good reasons that I could explain. In the circumstances we ourselves would require until after lunch hour, about 2pm, to be able to determine our position so we do need the morning portion.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let’s settle for 13H30. We’ll try for 13H30 and see how you’re doing and let us know, keep in touch with us. I think it is a perfectly reasonable request if you’ve received instructions at such short notice because I think it will no doubt save time in the long run if you do have an opportunity to get proper instructions.

So, I regret that those people who have taken the trouble to be here on time, ready for the proceedings will unfortunately have to wait for some time. As you have just heard, the application has been made that we should not start till after the long adjournment, normally at two but I think we perhaps can try to start at 13H30 today. So, we will now adjourn until 13H30 when the hearing will commence.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] is an estimated 15 minutes away. This may be an optimistic estimate but I think it would probably be safer - because he’ll have to do things when he arrives, to stand down now until 2 o’clock. So we will now stand down until 2 o’clock by which time we hope we will be able to commence.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: This is a hearing of the Amnesty Committee held in Port Elizabeth on the 22nd of September 1997. The Committee members are myself, that is Andrew Wilson, Chris de Jager and Ntsiki Sandi.

Would the counsel who are appearing please place themselves on record.

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, my name is Brink, Robin Brink, I appear as evidence leader.

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman, Honourable members of Committee, my name is Louis Visser, I’m instructed by Wagner Muller and du Plessis and I appear for Mr Gerrit Nicholas Erasmus who is marked number 3 on your bundle.

MR BOOYENS: May it please the Commission Mr Chairman, Kobus Booyens, I appear for Nicholas Janse van Rensburg, Gerrit Erasmus and Gideon Niewoudt - I beg your pardon, Hermanus du Plessis and Gideon Niewoudt.

MR PHOSA: May it please Mr Chairman and the Commission, I appear on behalf or - sorry my name is Phosa, I appear on behalf of the two families of Mthimkhulu and Madaka, instructed by Nyoka - Attorney Nyoka.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairman, if I could start I have an application to make namely, that the ...[inaudible] should be postponed until tomorrow morning. I received instructions - through no fault of mine or the family, only over the weekend. This is not a joking matter, it is a serious matter and not one which you just brush over for the benefit of any person.

The intention is to see to it with that at long last justice is done in this matter and if I must be involved in doing justice in this matter, I must be properly instructed. I have never done so before and I won’t do so now, I will never proceed in a matter where I am not ready for the benefit of the people I’m acting for, to move ahead. Therefore, when I make this application it is meant not for my benefit but for the benefit of the families sitting down there, therefore I request that I be given time to do justice for the last time to those who are not here, the two people who passed away and their families.

I have access to certain information which was not available to me until this morning, with regards to certain possible witnesses. I would need to interview, prior to doing any cross-examination. This therefore means there could be two possibilities, one would be to postpone until I have seen these witnesses, which we hope to do tonight when they will first be available or alternatively, if it is so felt the proceedings can go on for as long as I am not called upon to cross-examine anybody - which is our intention to cross-examine so, there are two options available.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phosa, I have no doubt it is no fault of your own but why were you only instructed at such late notice?

MR PHOSA: Perhaps, to put it simpler in a shell, initially the intention was not to engage counsel at all in this matter but the family on learning that the other side had counsel, in their own interest M’Lord, sorry, Mr Chairman, felt that there is no way that they could just themselves with the attorney - not to say the attorney didn’t feel adequate but it’s the feeling of the family.

So, at the last moment they made these efforts and I cannot really force them, it is part of our system that people think in terms of advocates and attorneys in different positions which is of course far from reality. That is the position.

CHAIRPERSON: But they were - so they were given notice a long time ago, they decided they would not participate. The matter was originally set down for hearing last week, wasn’t it?

MR PHOSA: Yes. Mr Chairman, there may well be very good reasons for having expressing displeasure. Once I’ve taken the matter have done, in the thinking that it is correct to do so, I’m now sitting with the matter so the alternative will be to say I must now withdraw.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is if they elect to give you such short notice, they must accept responsibility for it, mustn’t they?

MR PHOSA: Unfortunately, interest justice are not just for them only, this is a public matter Mr Chairman. If any discretion’s, if there are any discretion’s - I don’t think there are, on their part can not be made to visit everybody else, this is a national matter. Actually, it could be an international matter, so we cannot leave it on that basis. Justice has to be seen to be done and I think it would be inappropriate to punish them as it seems to be the situation you’ve suggested, simply because they rightly I think, felt intimidated.

ADV DE JAGER: Wouldn’t it be to your advantage if for instance they start giving evidence, you could listen to the evidence and then get an opportunity this afternoon to prepare further after hearing their evidence and reserving your right for cross-examination because I don’t think you’ll be in a position to cross-examine but as the evidence in chief is concerned, couldn’t we proceed with that and you then prepare for your cross-examination?

MR PHOSA: It is precisely one of the two alternatives I suggested, I did say so.

CHAIRPERSON: Shouldn’t we also consider allowing other people to question if they wish to?

MR PHOSA: Such as?

CHAIRPERSON: Council for the other applicants or the leader of the evidence?

MR PHOSA: No, I definitely have no objection to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you gentlemen got anything you wish to say in this regard?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we would certainly support the suggestion of Advocate de Jager to use some of the time which remains today, to at least get some of the evidence behind us and we would suggest that we should call Mr Gerrit Erasmus to give his evidence in chief at least. And certainly in fairness to Mr Phosa, we would have no objection to his cross-examination standing over until tomorrow.

MR BOOYENS: I agree with my colleague Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, I take it from that that you have agreed with your colleague that you will lead the first witness Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Indeed Mr Chairman, we are ready to proceed with the evidence in the application of Mr Gerrit Nicholas Erasmus. Mr Chairman, there’s a few matters - house-holding matters, before I ask him to give his evidence.

Firstly, his application you will find or an extract thereof, at page 24. If I may say so Mr Chairman, what was very sensibly done is that it has been shortened, extracts have been made from the original application of Mr Erasmus to conform with the matter in hand namely, Messrs Madaka and Mthimkhulu. Unfortunately, if you turn to page 28, paragraph 10(a), you will see that there is a reference to paragraph 10(a) at page 5 of the application, now that has unfortunately been omitted from the papers before you and of course that is very relevant. We have made copies for your benefit Mr Chairman, which we beg leave to hand up to you and what we’ve done is we have marked - it’s four pages only, and what we have done is we have marked them 28(a) to (d). They are already numbered - the pages.

If you would perhaps be so kind Mr Chairman, as to just include that in your bundle which is the bundle with the legend amnesty applications of - and the four applicants are mentioned. There are two bundles - I don’t know whether you wish to refer to this bundle as bundle A perhaps for identification purposes, it would make it easier.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that would be a wise idea, so can we all mark that bundle as bundle A, the other bundle will accordingly be bundle B.

MR VISSER: As it please you Mr Chairman. And then just the last matter, house-holding importance Mr Chairman, is that notes have been made - you may have noticed at page 28, the history of Mr Erasmus in the South African police is very briefly sketched and we felt it appropriate to make some - page 24, I’m sorry, page 24, we’ve felt it appropriate Mr Chairman, to compile a document which is a little bit more full in detail and we wish to hand that up to you for inclusion, perhaps after page 24 Mr Chairman. I don’t know whether it’s necessary to mark this an exhibit number or whether you simply wish to include it in the bundle now before you, as 24(a) ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: 24(a), yes.

MR VISSER: I think it might be more sensible to do it that way. May we hand that to you then as well Mr Chairman? Unfortunately, I’ve just decided on the numbering of the pages, so that has not been done. I do apologise for that omission Mr Chairman, it will run to 24(e) in fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, can’t it just be 24(a) 1,2,3,4,5?

MR VISSER: Or 1,2,3 and 4, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because the pages are numbered 1,2,3,4,5.

MR VISSER: Indeed, thank you Mr Chairman, that’s a better suggestion.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this all you have to say in this regard?

MR VISSER: That is all we have to say in this regard Mr Chairman, apart from begging your leave to present the evidence of Mr ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well, before you go on, can we continue with this? Mr Booyens you have arranged to also give us a supplemented application in respect of Mr du Plessis which has been handed in which will also form part of the record as page 17(a) and the same thing.

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairman, bear with me sorry, I have - may I interpose something Mr Chairman, sorry? I have a problem, it turns out we don’t have bundle A so I’m struggling to understand what’s being said about bundle A, we’ve never been served with bundle A.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the bundle dealing with the applications. You’re here to oppose applications and you say you haven’t got the bundle dealing with them.

MR PHOSA: I dealt - I did all that was given and I read what I was given. I had no way of knowing that something else was given.

CHAIRPERSON: There are only two bundles, you’re holding up two now.

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, it appears Mr Phosa’s difficulty is that he doesn’t have what we have referred to as bundle A, he has an application of Mr Niewoudt only. I don’t know why that is. I’m endeavouring to obtain a further copy for him through your secretary and the logistics officer.

MR PHOSA: That was what was sent from here I understand, that’s all that was sent from Cape Town and I had no way of knowing that there’s something I hadn’t been given in this short time.

MR BRINK: You can use this one Mr de Jager.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You have now been lent the copy of bundle A - my colleague Mr de Jager’s.

MR PHOSA: Thank you. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, are we now ready to continue? Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman. I see there are lights on the other side on this - Mr Phosa’s as well.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can I explain something to Mr Phosa? [Advocate Sandi explains to Mr Phosa how microphone and equipment works]

MR PHOSA: Mr Sandi, thank you very much for the assistance, nobody ever told me that before - I was told something different actually, thank you very much.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I did inadvertently mislead you, there is one more matter for house-holding issue and that is at page 24 Mr Chairman, paragraph 7)(a) and (b). You will notice that in the Afrikaans vernacular there is "not applicable", "not applicable" under A and B. I’m informed by my client that that is incorrect, that 7(a) should read "Yes" and 7(b) should read "Supporter" Mr Chairman.

I’m not certain whether it is - I’m sorry, 7(a) should be "Yes, National Party", I’m sorry, and 7(b) should be "Supporter". In fact Mr Chairman, I ask for this formal amendment. It will become clear from a reading of his paragraph 10 that that has been the intention all along. It’s perhaps to be ascribed to the somewhat - the language which has been used in that paragraph and perhaps the mistake is more that of his legal representatives than of the client himself. It’s a question of interpretation of that paragraph Mr Chairman., nothing really turns on it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I have no problems with it Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. May I then call Mr Erasmus to give evidence before the Committee. He prefers to speak in his own language, Afrikaans Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?

MR ERASMUS: Gerrit Nicholas Erasmus.

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, you are applying for amnesty before this Commission and you have completed the prescribed form for amnesty, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the contents of that statement which you made?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Now in your statement you referred - on page 28(d), in paragraph 10(a) you referred to a submission of the Foundation of Equality before the Law and you refer to the evidence or a submission made to this Committee on the 21st of October last year by General Johan Velde van der Merwe, and in paragraph 10 you requested that that evidence be incorporated into your evidence. Is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Lastly, you also referred in your application, on page 26 - I beg your pardon, it’s page 27, at IV you referred to the amnesty application of Mr H B du Plessis that is one of the applicants here today, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: You also requested his application insofar as it’s relevant to your application, that that be incorporated into your application?

MR ERASMUS: Correct.

MR VISSER: Did you after that, have the opportunity to also read the applications of Mr van Rensburg and Mr Niewoudt? Those are the other two applicants in this matter. Did you read the applications?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: And you told me that you would request that the information contained in those applications insofar as it’s relevant to yourself, be incorporated into your own application.

MR ERASMUS: Correct.

MR VISSER: Yes, will you please speak a little bit louder? Mr Erasmus, would you please give a brief background sketch of yourself and your particulars, where you were born, when you were born, etc?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, I was born in Fraserburg in the Cape Province on the 28th of August 1936.

MR VISSER: And how old are you now?

MR ERASMUS: I was 61, I am 61.

MR VISSER: Can you give us a bit of background about your family circumstances, the way in which you grew up?

MR ERASMUS: My parents were staunch Afrikaners and I have a brother and two sisters, only one sister is still alive.

MR VISSER: What did your father do?

MR ERASMUS: My father was a farmer and he was the foreman on a farm. He also did a variety of other jobs in his lifetime.

MR VISSER: And your mother?

MR ERASMUS: My mother was a housewife.

MR VISSER: In the years of your formation as a person and as an adult, what political and religious impressions did you form in your parental home?

MR ERASMUS: As far back as I can remember, my parents were supporters of the National Party.

MR VISSER: And how did you feel the Government’s policy in your childhood years and when you were a young man, did you have any reason to doubt it in any way?

MR ERASMUS: Whilst I was growing up I believed that the policy was correct. That is the way I grew up and right from when I was a small child it was taught to me as being the correct way of life and that was how we lived. We understood that we lived apart from other people, from other races for instance in society.

MR VISSER: And you believed that that was correct and justifiable?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s correct.

MR VISSER: I understand that you’re also a church go-er, a religious person?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I grew up in a religious home, went to Sunday school in the Dutch Reformed Church. I was baptised, confirmed and became a full member of the Dutch Reformed Church and in later years I also served in the church council.

MR VISSER: Can you tell the Committee, in your experience of the Dutch Reformed Church and you involvement with the church, did you receive any indications that the policy of the then Government was morally indefensible, wrong or a sin?

MR ERASMUS: No, I never saw that.

MR VISSER: Well, what were your perceptions of the church’s view?

MR ERASMUS: The way I saw it was, that I believed what I heard and saw in the church. I believed even in church circles, that the National Party was correct.

MR VISSER: If we can then turn to your joining of the police force and the career in the police force. You drafted a document which has no been submitted to the Committee, and that’s page 24(1) and following and you there give us a picture of your career in the police. And now, what I would like to ask you is, as a policemen, from the day that you joined the police force ...[intervention]

Perhaps Mr Chairman, the interpreter could give me an indication if I’m going too quickly. I’m told that I’m going at the correct pace.

From the time that you joined the police force until you retired, did you - in respect of the policy as you understood it and those principles, did you apply those principles?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, and when I joined the police I promised to be faithful.

MR VISSER: To be faithful to?

MR ERASMUS: To the Government.

MR VISSER: To the Government and to the State?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you’re saying that you actually gave effect to that oath?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Then Mr Erasmus, I’m asking you, did that entail you seeing it as part of your duties to bolster and support the Government of the day and to protect the Government’s policies?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Now, without elaborating on that anymore, could you please with reference to page 24(1) - perhaps Chairperson, with your permission I can perhaps lead him a little bit just to expedite the process?

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

You in 1957, 3rd of January you became a policeman and you did certain training - completed certain training at the police college in Pretoria and you were then stationed at the headquarters in Pretoria at the offices of the paymaster?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then from ‘58 you then completed a detective course and upon completion of that course you were placed at Marshall Plein - Marshall Square in fact, in Johannesburg.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Now, then in January of 1959, you were transferred to Caledon Square at you own request - that was in Cape Town. And is it further correct that during 1960 you then became aware of certain problems which had already emerged on the socio-political scene?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, Chairperson. At the beginning of 1960 there was a big march of Black people from Langa to Caledon Square and as far as I was aware and I was standing in amongst the people - this body of people was massive, there were about 30.000 people present there that day. And these people were led by a young man by the name of Philip Khosana and because I didn’t know much about Black politics at the time, I drew the inference that the march had been organised by the PAC.

MR VISSER: Was that in fact the case?

MR ERASMUS: I think so, yes.

MR VISSER: Was there a consequence, what happened as a result of this march?

MR ERASMUS: Well, the result of this march was that after this man whose name I now mentioned, handed a memorandum to the then Divisional Commissioner of police, the crowd of people dispersed and proceeded to rather seriously damage some vehicles and committed certain robberies.

MR VISSER: Were you part of the body of people whilst they were plundering and causing damage to property?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I was in amongst them right at the entrance of the Buitenkant Street and Caledon Square police station, where you enter the backyard of the station and for me as a young man who’d come from Beaufort West, it was an occasion of great moment and in fact I was rather afraid because I didn’t know what to expect.

MR VISSER: According to your insight at the time, did this occurrence or rather, was it repeated at any other time and in any other place in the country?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I became aware that that was the case.

MR VISSER: And here you’re referring to Langa and Sharpeville where many people were killed and wounded?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, correct.

MR VISSER: Now, that was in 1960, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And on page 24(1), paragraph 7, you set out that there had been a further consequence as a result of these events namely, that the ANC and the PAC had been banned by the NP Government and that -if I may perhaps read it, perhaps you should read it. You have given us a quote there from the annals of Doctor Verwoerd and Mr John Vorster. Could you perhaps tell us where this version in paragraph 7 comes form?

MR ERASMUS: That I found in a book which I read or a document which I read. I don’t know whether it was Hansard - I can’t actually remember what this document was.

MR VISSER: Could you perhaps read it to the Commission?

MR ERASMUS: The following

"The Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd in this period acted by suppressing by these occurrences and in July of 1961, he appointed John Vorster as the Minister of Justice and Mr John Vorster at a certain meeting told how Verwoerd had told him...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Please continue. It’s Vorster speaking?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

"Mr Vorster at a certain meeting recalled how Verwoerd had told him ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, there’s a mistake there, Verwoerd should be Vorster but please continue. We understand what you’re actually trying to say.

MR ERASMUS

"I remember saying to Doctor Verwoerd, he should let me deal with the threat of subversion and the revolution in my own way. I told him that I could not fight communism with the Queensburry rules, if you did then you would loose. He agreed with me and said that he would leave me free to do what I had to do"

MR VISSER: And that was 1961?

MR ERASMUS: Yes indeed, that was 1961.

MR VISSER: And now in 1960, you did the promotional exam in the South African police, you were successful in this and in 1960 you were appointed as a station commander of the police at Mzimkhulu in Griekwaland. Is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: And you were promoted to Sergeant.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In 1961, you were involved with the detective work in Lesana and also certain matters against pupils in ...[inaudible]. You mentioned that in paragraph 9, but what I want you to mention to the Committee is, what your awareness was regarding the availability of evidence at that stage.

MR ERASMUS: At the stage during this investigation - and that was also at the security branch where I was stationed on a relief basis, I already then realised that because of intimidation it was extremely difficult to find evidence or witnesses to give evidence in a criminal court.

MR VISSER: You refer - to put this in the correct perspective, you are referring to evidence in criminal procedures with a political motive. In 1962 you were transferred to Mkobo as station commander and you were then sent to Rosebank as a detective, as an exchange transfer and later to the security branch at The Graze. Is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In total you were associated with the security branch from 1963 to 1983, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you retired in 1989?

MR ERASMUS: No, I retired in 1992.

MR VISSER: What happened between ‘89 and ‘92?

MR ERASMUS: I was first divisional commander of the Witwatersrand region -the commissioner or that region and then I was appointed as the regional commissioner of the Witwatersrand area.

MR VISSER: During this time, were you involved in certain matters which were of historical political importance in our the country?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman. I was part of the investigative personnel of the security branch at The Graze. I and other people amongst others, handled the Rivonia case, the bomb which exploded on the station - the so-called Harris bomb which exploded at The Park station as well as a matter which was heard in Pietermaritzburg under the name of APDUSA.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us what it stands for?

MR ERASMUS: It stands for African Peoples Democratic Union of South Africa. It should be from South Africa.

MR VISSER: From 1963/64, was that period from the point of view of security, was that characterised by any specific incidents?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, numerous acts of sabotage were committed. The targets were railway lines, electrical lines, electrical sub-stations.

MR VISSER: Just to return to the question of the Harris bomb and this refers to the Arms Resistance Movement, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: ARM stands for the African Resistance Movement, Africa.

MR VISSER: Why I’m referring to this is, that I want you to tell the Commission whether you were personally involved in the Harris bomb explosion in Parktown station or what your experiences were.

MR ERASMUS: I was there Mr Chairman, and I had to be part of the investigation. This bomb exploded at 16H00 in the afternoon, that was the time when people go to the station to depart to their various destinations. It is also one of the busiest times at the station.

MR VISSER: In this bomb explosion 83 people were injured and one lady of 77 years of age died. We also know that because of detective work and various investigations, Mr Harris was found guilty and executed. Is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Will you tell us - this incident, did it make any impression on you?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, the impression it made on me was that I was amongst these injured people, I saw their blood and other pieces of waste. I had to look amongst that for evidence for this matter. I can tell you that if you walk around that debris, you have this strange feeling and you feel nauseous.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, we are going to talk about - we are going to omit paragraph 16, 17, and 18, they are self-explanatory and we want to come to your first experiences in the beginning of 1997 when you were transferred to Pietermaritzburg. And there you replaced Colonel Dreyer as divisional commander.

In this regard I refer you to the evidence which has been provided, I’m not certain whether this is also contained in a bundle. The evidence which was rendered before the Gross Violations of Human Rights Committee - I believe it was on the 26th of June, yes indeed Mr Chairman, I’m not sure whether you have it before you. I wish to refer to page 44, if you do have it before you Mr Chairman. It’s not one the two - part of one of the two bundles which we have, it’s other evidence which we were provided by the Committee. Perhaps I could just - could I hand one copy to you?

CHAIRPERSON: Provided by the Committee?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, we received it from the TRC Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, from the TRC, that’s not the Committee.

MR VISSER: No, it was from the TRC.

CHAIRPERSON: We haven’t got it.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, you may be interested in that. That is evidence that was given on the 26th of June last year in this hall, in regard to the Mthimkhulu matter as well as the Madaka matter - various witnesses gave evidence at the time. You are free to use that copy Mr Chairman, it’s my attorney’s copy but you’re certainly free to use it.

For the present purposes, as far as this particular witness is concerned there’s only a very short - only one reference in all of that.

CHAIRPERSON: Should we call this bundle C?

MR VISSER: As you wish Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The bundle B will be the other bundle produced by the investigation unit.

MR PHOSA: May I just interpose here Mr Chairman. At some stage I’ve got to prepare myself for tomorrow, am I going to have a copy available for me?

CHAIRPERSON: You may be able to borrow mine.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the reason why I interrupted the leading of the evidence is because I believe that it’s proper to alert you to the fact that Mr Erasmus was referred to by one of the witnesses, one Mondi Mditswa at page 44 and perhaps I may read this Mr Chairman. The reference starts at line 20 and it says

"The formation of COSAS posed a serious threat to the State"

Mr Chairman yes, the pages you’ll observe are numbered from the middle of the pages, it makes it a little bit difficult. I think it’s one page before the one that you’re on now, it’s page 44. Have you found it Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: If I may repeat

"The formation of COSAS posed a serious threat to the State, hence a systematic harassment and repression that was to follow throughout it’s history. The State was convinced that COSAS was the brainchild of the ANC. During the 1980 student’s boycott, students decided to form a new student’s body which was named the Port Elizabeth Student’s Committee, that is PESCO.

This was necessary as stated by the fact that COSAS was already under the constant eye of the security police and was seen as a hawk. PESCO was specifically formed to spearhead the boycott until student" -

Must read: "demands" instead of "scants", we assume.

CHAIRPERSON: "Scant demands"

MR VISSER: Or "Scant demands" Well, "scant" just doesn’t seem to fit in Mr Chairman but anyway be that as it may, that’s what stands here - what is written here

"Scants demands were met"

Now that is by way of introduction. Over the page we read as follows:

"A new leadership emerged. This strategy did not work because the security police alleged that the old COSAS members were hiding behind PESCO to further their aims. As part of the onslaught by the State, there was a deployment of a senior police officer, one Colonel Gerrit Erasmus"

Now I think it is important to mention that in 1979 when the then Colonel Goosen who used to be heading this region, was transferred to Pretoria, he was replaced by one Colonel Gerrit Erasmus from Pretoria. Now the reason that we’re mentioning that is the tactics and the intensity of repression increased.

We saw a different means that were used, that were employed by the special branch towards the various organisations that were working in Port Elizabeth. We believe that it is important for you to take note of that evidence.

Mr Erasmus, you will remember that I’ve worked through this evidence with you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, is that the only part of that bundle you’re going to use.

MR VISSER: That is the only part I feel that I want to bring under your attention and which I intend to use.

ADV DE JAGER: The reason why I’m asking this is, if we have to make a copy of this whole bundle, is it necessary because you’ve handed it in as a bundle?

MR VISSER: From our point of view, we’re not going to refer to anything else.

ADV DE JAGER: Will it be possible for you then to make copies of these two pages you’ve referred to and we will keep the bundle here should there be any other references but for record purposes - I think if Mr Phosa would need the whole bundle it would be made available to him but he’s only using two pages and I think those two pages should as soon as possible be distributed.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we find that the suggestion is an immanently sensible one and certainly we will make the copies for you and certainly also you may keep the document. I don’t know whether my learned friend Mr Booyens may not want - wish to refer to other portions of it. However that may be, we fall in with the suggestion of Advocate de Jager.

ADV SANDI: Mr Visser, can we make a request to you that whenever you intend to use documents, you give us a copy so that we can go though and see the context in which whatever portion of the document is being used, that would make things a lot easier.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, we’ve had this argument before, with respect but I hear what is said and we certainly do make our best endeavours to always provide you with copies of what we wish to use.

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think you need provide us with copies Mr Visser, where the document is as long as this one is and where it emanates from the TRC. What I think you can do is notify us sufficiently in advance so that we can arrange to obtain copies from the TRC.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we do have to apologise, we were under the impression that you would have the copies. Clearly we were wrong in being under that impression but we do apologise.

In any event, if I can continue. Mr Erasmus you’ve listened to what Mr Mondi has said, what is your comment regarding this evidence?

MR ERASMUS: This evidence is not correct, I was transferred from Pietermaritzburg to Port Elizabeth to replace Colonel Dreyer as divisional commissioner.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of any strategy of the Government in transferring you to Port Elizabeth in order to suppress people or organisations?

MR ERASMUS: There was no specific strategy in this regard. It was our job, it was our instruction from the State to monitor organisations which were dangerous to the State and we would say if there were organisations like that, they had to be regarded to be suppressed.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, something completely different. You came to Port Elizabeth - first I want to finish with this document, what was the first experience you had when you started in the division Eastern Province when you started with your new post?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, my experience or my observation was - to put it better, the security situation in this region was definitely not what it should be, in other words the atmosphere was tense. Why I’m saying this is that I was taken on an orientation tour and when we came to the Walmer residential area, we stopped there. It was the first time I visited that area.

Some of the members of my staff took me to this area and one of my staff members started talking while we were getting out of the car, with a Black man. The next moment I heard an explosion right behind me, I looked around and saw that there was half a brick lying right behind me. I did not see the person who had thrown this brick.

MR VISSER: At that stage, what did people tell you regarding access of the police regarding policing in the Black townships in the Eastern Province?

MR ERASMUS: They told me that this specific area which was lying next to the White Walmer residential area, could not be policed because policemen were not allowed into that area.

MR VISSER: At a later stage, did you become aware of the strategy of the ANC to establish the so-called "no-go" areas, to prevent the police or the army to enter these areas?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that was brought under my attention.

MR VISSER: What was your experience regarding Port Elizabeth and the vicinities regarding these "no-go" area?

MR ERASMUS: These areas were distributed and it was just imported for certain areas, it was not a total "no-go" strategy at that stage.

MR VISSER: To jump then to January 1980 as you’ve mentioned in paragraph 20 of the document, you experienced the boycott at the Ford factory in Port Elizabeth. What was the cause of that strike?

MR ERASMUS: As it goes in all strikes, there were people who wanted to strike and other people who wanted to work. The people who did not want to strike were intimidated not to go to work and some of them who tried to go to work, their houses were burnt down.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, in paragraph 20 you refer to a quote titled: - incorrectly spelt Mr Chairman, you will forgive us - it was published in Seshowa in 1987 and in this it is mentioned amongst others, that there were clashes between the police and students.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: In your experience as a policeman in Port Elizabeth, that aspect of the revolution, did it have a low or a high profile - these clashes between the students and the police?

MR ERASMUS: It was a high profile.

MR VISSER: Can you give us a bit of a background, which organisations were involved?

MR ERASMUS: The organisation which was mainly involved in this aspect was COSAS.

MR VISSER: And Mr Moditswa mentioned that PESCO was also involved. Can you please tell us whether his summary of the situation was that the one was only a smoke screen for the other? Was that also your opinion?

MR ERASMUS: We did not think that, it was only another name, it was the Port Elizabeth Student Council - Congress.

MR VISSER: And the conflict which was caused because of students and the activities of scholars, did that give rise to any violence and damage to property? Was there any damage done?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: These student activities - if you could refer to it like that, what was the intensity in 1981/82, can you still remember?

MR ERASMUS: These student boycotts went on continuously up to the middle of 1982.

MR VISSER: Were there any bomb attacks during this time?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, there were many bomb attacks, too many to mention here.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 23, you mentioned a few of these.

MR ERASMUS: That is so, during this period there were many bomb attacks for example, at the Constantia shopping mall and the Administration Council building, the new Justice buildings and on the railroad - Swartkops railroad.

MR VISSER: You also confirm the content of these notes which have become part of your application and that it is true and correct according to your experiences?

MR ERASMUS: That is so.

MR VISSER: Just then to come back - the specific command you had here, could you shortly tell the Committee which branch offices were in your area. First refer to the Eastern Province area, till where did that go - the boundaries of that division?

MR ERASMUS: My area of authority was the headquarters in Port Elizabeth, then there was a branch office in Uitenhage, one in Grahamstown, one in Fort Beaufort and one in Cradock.

MR VISSER: Can you remember who was in charge of these various branch offices during that time?

MR ERASMUS: In Cradock, it was Lieutenant Fouche, in Fort Beaufort, it was Hearn, in Grahamstown, Lieutenant Oosthuizen, in Uitenhage, Captain Muller.

MR VISSER: Regarding the command structure in Port Elizabeth, can you in the first place give us an indication of which components were there and how this command structure functioned according to these? We refer first of all to number one - you were the commanding officer, you were number one, who was second in charge?

MR ERASMUS: That was Major Snyman, Major Harold Snyman. And then we had various divisions or sub-divisions, administration - the administrative staff under the authority of van Greunen, he was a captain at that time.

MR VISSER: You can go ahead.

MR ERASMUS: Then there was a division for Black matters and investigations under the guidance of Captain du Plessis. Then there were White staff under the command of Captain Siebritz. Trade Unions, Coloureds, Asians under the command of Major Nick van Rensburg.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, I just want to draw your attention that you have a way of dropping your voice and then we can’t hear you. Please speak a bit louder so we can hear you.

MR ERASMUS: I will do that Mr Chairman. The last division was technical matters under the command of Captain Greyling.

MR VISSER: I can’t remember, but was there also a division of court related aspects?

MR ERASMUS: I’ve referred to investigations under H B du Plessis.

MR VISSER: In total then in Port Elizabeth, how many staff were employed in the security branch?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, all inclusive it refers also to the branches and the administrative staff, not more that 140 staff members.

MR VISSER: Can we just talk for a minute about where you were standing in this whole command structure and what your task was. Firstly, regarding instructions, did you receive instructions from security head office regarding everything you had to do or did you not receive instructions from them or what was the situation in that regard?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I was appointed as the commanding officer in Port Elizabeth. Headquarters did from time to time give us various instructions and then I delegated it to the various branches. The daily instructions, I was responsible for myself because it was my duty according to my instructions, to gather intelligence, to monitor everything which was possible and in this way to keep the State informed regarding the latest developments and therefore enable them to form policy. This was shortly what my instructions were.

MR VISSER: Mr Gerrit Erasmus’s position - if a problem should arise on the ground, what would be the normal situation? Was it passed along to head office or was it solved here on the ground? What was the expectation and what was the practical position?

MR ERASMUS: It was expected of me to solve my own problems and if there were serious problems which I couldn’t solve myself, I would refer these or report them to head office.

MR VISSER: Now, the day to day protection of lives and property, the prevention of violence, crime, preventative actions, arrests, prosecutions etc., - that type of thing, did you receive specific instructions for those things or did you have to use your discretion in that regard?

MR ERASMUS: We had to carry these things out, it was part of our duties. That’s why we were appointed and as I’ve already said, from time to time requests were made by head office or questions were asked as to why certain things had happened and why we could not control certain things. But as far as the day to day functioning and investigations were concerned, that type of thing was my duty and I had to do that.

MR VISSER: And you did it?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, according to the experience that you had at the time in 1981/82 and in the light of your insight views regarding the revolutionary onslaught against the country, how did you rate Port Elizabeth and surroundings as far as violence and unrest were concerned, in the bigger South African picture of the time?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I regarded it a seriously destabilised flash-point.

MR VISSER: Briefly tell us how this manifested itself?

MR ERASMUS: It manifested itself in the many boycotts, the destruction which took place, the intimidation and the mobilisation and the political awareness of the youth.

MR VISSER: Why did you - in respect to students and scholars, their activities - why did you see that as a major threat? What were the influences at work there as far as the students and scholars were concerned, in your experience?

MR ERASMUS: As far as the students were concerned the position was as follows: almost every household was represented by a child and that created a broad base for mobilisation, organisation, politicisation etc.

MR VISSER: Now, with this situation of Port Elizabeth being a flash-point area, were you left by the powers at the time, to deal with the situation? What were your observations? What did the higher powers do?

MR ERASMUS: Well, my observation and the observation of others was that the pressure from Government side and the department, politicians and other state institutions that were monitoring the situation, this pressure became greater and greater and there were growing expectations and it was impossible to actually meet these expectations.

MR VISSER: Then of course there were also the public interest which you had to serve.

MR ERASMUS: Yes. From the side of the public, business and from virtually every quarter, there was the expectation that we would address and control the situation which was emerging.

MR VISSER: In order to do this you’ve told us that you had to try to weaken the power basis of the revolutionary organisations, liberation organisations. Did you feel that you were actually achieving some measure of success in this struggle? What were your observations?

MR ERASMUS: My feeling in this regard was that as a result of the severe intimidation, greater mobilisation and the youth becoming more and more politically aware, I felt that we were not actually succeeding in controlling this situation.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, I would like now to turn to the very particular facts regarding Mr Topsi Madaka and Siphiwe Mthimkhulu. Firstly, I understand that a report was made to you by Mr du Plessis and Mr van Rensburg at a particular time, do I understand that correctly?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Could you please tell us what you remember about this? What was your information regarding these two people and what had been discussed, how the whole thing developed at these meetings - please tell us as far as you can remember?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, these meetings took place - and I’ve had a look at the applications of the other applicants, after they had these discussions with each other - if I remember correctly, there was about ten to fourteen days before the 14th of April - just give me a chance to check it, the 14th of April 1982, du Plessis and van Rensburg came to me at a stage and these two gentlemen, Mthimkhulu and Madaka - they discussed these two men with me and the meeting dealt with what their perceptions were and the role played by these people in these uncontrollable circumstances.

One of the things we discussed was that Mthimkhulu, had become ill after he was released from detention. There were major headlines in the newspapers to the effect that he had been given some kind of poison and as a result of this he landed up in hospital, I can’t remember for how long he stayed there. His condition improved and he returned to Port Elizabeth. His condition improved to such an extent that he could continue with his general activities and with the assistance and support of Madaka, he continued to do that.

MR VISSER: I’m sorry for interrupting but can you be more specific, what was told to you about Mthimkhulu’s activities and what exactly was the role played by Mr Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Mthimkhulu’s role was that of a leader figure in COSAS, he was a leading figure in COSAS and I’ve already sketched what this role - this COSAS role was. Mr Madaka was in an ANC cell along with Mr Mthimkhulu, they were taken up into this ANC cell.

Mthimkhulu, according to the information which I received, played the more open role, in other words working towards the mobilisation of the people and working towards making the youth politically aware etc., distributing pamphlets, that sort of thing - ANC pamphlets, inflammatory pamphlets. He was assisted by Mr Madaka.

Both these gentlemen, according to my information, also recruited students and scholars for military training abroad. Mr Madaka possessed a car and he also acted as a courier and there was also some information that he transported weapons between Lesotho and this division or section.

Mr Madaka was also responsible for the establishment of DLB’s and that was the dead letter box or a place where these weapons could be stored - concealed is perhaps a better word.

MR VISSER: Now, what about the creation of safe house for terrorists?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, his further duty was to look after the ANC cadres who were infiltrating.

MR VISSER: To do what Mr Erasmus?

MR ERASMUS: These cadres who were infiltrating came here with one purpose only and that was - or rather with more than one objective, but firstly to commit acts of sabotage, to train people in the handling of weapons inside the borders of the country and ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: If we may continue, did Mr Madaka have sisters or brothers according to your information?

MR ERASMUS: As far as I knew he had one brother and at that stage he was somewhere in a foreign country and it was also my information that he was a trained cadre.

MR VISSER: I might have to refer you to an affidavit in bundle B - I hope I’ll be able to find it without too much delay, otherwise I’ll draw your attention to it tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Who by?

MR VISSER: It’s by the - as I remember, the sister of Mr Madaka.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] page 71.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. No. I will look for it Mr Chairman, but it refers to safe houses. I thought for completeness of the evidence before you but I’ll draw your attention to it tomorrow Mr Chairman, I’ll look for it this afternoon.

As far as the brother was concerned, you said he was a trained cadre and regarding Mr Madaka and Mthimkhulu’s actions, were you aware of any incidents of violence?

MR ERASMUS: I was aware that Mr Madaka or rather Mr Mthimkhulu, had been involved in a shooting at the funeral of Robert Sebukwe and that happened at Graaf Reinet.

CHAIRPERSON: When did that happen?

MR ERASMUS: I think if I recall correctly, it was during 1979.

MR VISSER: Do you have any further information, who shot at whom and what happened?

MR ERASMUS: The information at my disposal is that Mr Buthalezi and a policeman had been shot at and they were wounded in the incident.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, you were told all these things, what happened then? How did the conversation develop, what else was discussed especially as regards what you were supposed to do?

MR ERASMUS: Just before I answer this question Chairperson, please allow me to say the following: I was busy saying that Mthimkhulu had played on the level, the open role and Mr Madaka took a more underground role. Now, to get to the discussion, the question was raised: "What must we do or what are we to do with these two people"?

MR VISSER: I’m sorry for interrupting you here, I believe that for purpose of continuity we need to say the following: "Is it correct at that stage, in other words April 1982, Mr Mthimkhulu had already been detained previously by the security branch"?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s correct.

MR VISSER: And for the information of the Committee, the last occasion on which he’d been detained was from March 1981, 31st of March ‘81 to the 20th of October 1981 - he was then released. Can you confirm that?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You’ve already told us that he became ill and he was admitted to hospital and there were allegations that he had been poisoned. Now, the question is this, are you Gerrit Erasmus personally aware - do you have any personal knowledge of one, the fact that Mr Mthimkhulu had been poisoned by anybody?

MR ERASMUS: No, I don’t have any such knowledge.

MR VISSER: Did you personally in any way - did you in any way and personally, have any dealings or involvement with such a poisoning if he had been poisoned?

MR ERASMUS: No.

MR VISSER: Do you have any knowledge of any other policeman being involved in the poisoning of Mr Mthimkhulu?

MR ERASMUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You were busy saying that as a result of the fact that it had been reported that Mr Mthimkhulu had been poisoned, he acquired a certain image amongst the other students. Could you please elaborate on that, on that image that you referred to?

MR ERASMUS: After this poisoning, or suspected case of poisoning, Mr Mthimkhulu achieved a certain stature, he became - he grew in stature and became a very important person.

MR VISSER: Now if I can lead you here, did he achieve a certain martyr image?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s correct.

MR VISSER: Now, in your discussions, did you in respect of the possibility of an arrest of Mr Mthimkhulu and his further detention in terms of the security legislation then existing, did you consider that?

MR ERASMUS: It was discussed and considered and we came to the conclusion firstly, that head office would not authorise this action of ours or authorise us to take action on this idea namely in respect of this person who was still ill or not entirely healthy, to detain him once again.

MR VISSER: What did you suspect was likely to happen, should you detain him again? I’m talking here about the possible reaction from other students, was that discussed?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it was discussed and we came to the conclusion that if we tried to detain him again, that would lead to widespread unrest and riots.

MR VISSER: What about Mr Madaka, what about the arrest and the detention of Mr Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: The arrest and detention of Mr Madaka was discussed and I asked the two gentlemen talking to me, why they couldn’t detain him and I received the following answer: "That as a result of a very delicately placed informer very close to him, it was actually not possible to detain him because arising from the questions which would have to be put to him, that would make it very clear where this information came from.

MR VISSER: And that source would be the informer?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: So, the idea was that should you arrest Madaka and possibly prosecute him, it would have become abundantly clear who the informer was?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And according to your insights at the time, what would then have happened in all probability to this informer?

MR ERASMUS: In all probability there would not have been sufficient evidence to arraign Mr Madaka in a criminal court and this would lead to his later release and that informer would definitely then be killed.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, was this a discussion which took place on one occasion, this discussion regarding Mr Madaka and Mr Mthimkhulu, or was it something that was discussed on more than one occasion?

MR ERASMUS: There were several discussions on more than one occasion because I asked questions which needed elucidation and these two - these men then had to go back and look at other alternatives.

MR VISSER: And what was the ultimate conclusion which the three of you reached?

MR ERASMUS: Our final conclusion was that there was no other way - detention or any other thing, other than to eliminate these people.

MR VISSER: When you talking about elimination, you’re mean to kill them?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now, how did you feel about that personally - about this decision?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, this decision was a very, very difficult one, it’s not something which you decide to do lightly. Gerrit Erasmus is obviously not a murderer - the way he was brought up, and in all these years I still remember it. I tried to get this decision right out of my system but it constantly came back to me.

MR VISSER: And Mr Erasmus, I think you said that today you are relieved for the process which was created and established whereby you can reveal all these facts so that the families of the victims can know what happened and that you can at least get it off your conscience to a certain extent, is that not so?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is so. The opportunity given me, I’ve grabbed with both hands to come and say what the situation is or was so that the families will be able to know what exactly happened to their loved ones.

MR VISSER: Mr Erasmus, we know that Mr Mthimkhulu, after he was released from detention, went to see an attorney in order to lodge a civil claim against the police or to be more specific the Minister of Law and Order, based on alleged assaults which he said he had suffered whilst he was in detention. Are you aware of that?

MR ERASMUS: I am aware of a civil claim, yes.

MR VISSER: There is documentation before this Committee which includes a statement made by Mr Mthimkhulu which indicates that, or which alleges that he had been tortured and assaulted in various ways. I want to ask you the following: "You Gerrit Erasmus, do you have any personal knowledge of any assault committed on Mr Mthimkhulu during his period of detention, as he alleges?

MR ERASMUS: I personally have no such knowledge.

MR VISSER: Yes, I’m going to ask you this even though you weren’t implicated by him - did you personally assault Mr Mthimkhulu at any time?

MR ERASMUS: No, not at all, I also did not interrogate him.

MR VISSER: And you are aware that is you did do so or if you had poisoned him, you would have been able to apply for amnesty for that?

MR ERASMUS: I would most certainly apply for amnesty, yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I be allowed a moment?

Mr Erasmus, it is the evidence so far - and the probability exists that your former colleagues will confirm this in their testimony, that to a certain extent we can call it a joint decision between the three of you, you du Plessis and van Rensburg about what should happen to Madaka and Mthimkhulu?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Sir.

MR VISSER: But it is also like that Mr Erasmus that you, the commanding officer is telling this Commission that you take the responsibility, that you gave that instruction.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You did not receive any instructions from senior level to do that, that was your own decision and you accept full responsibility for that?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, I did not receive any direct instructions.

MR VISSER: You, yourself were not present or was part of the execution of this instruction, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Later, they reported back to you that the instruction was completed?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I just want to ask you this, did you give the instruction in the name of Gerrit Erasmus in your personal capacity, or did you give this instruction for another reason, or for which other reason?

MR ERASMUS: I did not give this instruction for any personal gain, I did not do it for Gerrit Erasmus. As I saw it at that stage, I gave this instruction in the execution of my duties. I firmly believed that that which I had done was correct.

MR VISSER: And what purpose did you try to achieve with that?

MR ERASMUS: What I tried to achieve was to break this power basis which was developing around these people.

MR VISSER: And in the end, was it the present political dispensation - was that to maintain that dispensation?

MR ERASMUS: That was at all costs the fact.

MR VISSER: And then do you confirm the contents pages 28 - that is paragraph 10 of your application, in which you describe the circumstances and the objectives of your actions?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I’ve noticed that it is ten to four. I believe that this is the evidence that we wish to present from this witness. There may one or two aspects which I might have overlooked in the evidence and I’m wondering Mr Chairman, whether it will be a great hardship if we took an adjournment now so that I could perhaps go through my notes and finish off tomorrow morning first thing. I don’t believe that there is anything else but it would perhaps make sense to allow the cross-examiners some time to digest what they’ve heard and perhaps start tomorrow morning first thing.

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody wish to say anything in that regard?

MR BRINK: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well we’ll grant your application Mr Visser, and take the adjournment now. We will adjourn till 9 o’clock tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION - 23rd SEPTEMBER 1997

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: We are proceeding with the application of Erasmus, van Rensburg, du Plessis and Niewoudt. It is today the 23rd of September.

Mr Phosa, I received a message that you would be a few minutes late, that you were interviewing a potential witness - it’s slightly more than a few minutes, isn’t it?

MR PHOSA: I said I hoped to be a few minutes late. In fact I said I hoped to not be late at all but I had no control over the situation, it’s a witness I had to have. I must thank the court and everybody else for giving me that opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: We must make every effort in the future to start on time. Are you now ready Mr Visser, to proceed?

MR VISSER: Indeed I am Mr Chairman. First two matters before I continue rounding off the evidence. Yesterday we undertook to make photocopies of pages 44 and 45 of the record of proceedings before the Human Rights Commission Mr Chairman, They’ve been placed before you - we’ve dealt with them yesterday and we have nothing further to say about that.

The other matter Mr Chairman, which I took to do last night, was a reference to the evidence in bundle B which refers to safe houses and Mr Chairman, would you just make the note that it is at pages 67 and 69. We wish to make it quite clear that it does not support the proposition that Mr Madaka ran the safe houses, it’s just for the benefit of your Committee to take note of the fact that there were these two references and we thought we’d draw your attention to it, we make nothing further of that matter.

Mr Chairman, a third matter which I wish to bring up ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: It’s pages 60?

MR VISSER: 67 and 69 in bundle B and it’s just those two pages.

Mr Chairman, if I may, before we proceed with the evidence of Mr Erasmus, may I be permitted to mention a matter of incorrect reporting which we could not help noticing last night on watching SABC news television and hearing the commentary. Mr Chairman, it was stated in the commentary on the 8 o’clock news in English, that Mr Mthimkhulu was poisoned with thallium and secondly that this occurred while he was detained by the police.

Now Mr Chairman, in our respectful submission that bears no resemblance to the evidence given yesterday and with respect, we are quite certain that it was not calculated to pre-empt any findings of this Committee and we’re not making that allegation but it does remain inaccurate reporting Mr Chairman. And for the record we just wish to rectify that matter because both those issues are in dispute first of all and this Committee has made no finding in that regard. We take it no further than that.

If I then may continue to round off Mr Chairman, with Mr Erasmus - with your permission.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, one thing I think should be mentioned, there was reference was there not yesterday, to the fact that allegations had been made that he had been poisoned?

MR VISSER: That is indeed so Mr Chairman, quite correct.

Mr Erasmus, you’re still under oath - the oath which you took yesterday to tell the truth, do you understand that?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)

One last aspect which I’d like to deal with now - you yesterday explained to the Committee that you accept responsibility for giving the orders to eliminate Mr Madaka and Mr Mthimkhulu. You also said that it wasn’t Gerrit Erasmus the person, who gave the instruction but Gerrit Erasmus, the policeman. Now, I would like you to place this in context because you also told the Committee previously that you experienced pressure from the hierarchy above you in this regard.

Now could you please just place this into the proper context regarding your orders and instructions and the pressure from above which you experienced, is there a connection here and if so, what is this connection?

MR ERASMUS: As I said yesterday and also in the background that I sketched as to how I grew up, the fact that I grew up in a Christian democratic home - after that I followed a long career in the South African police and there were certain influences at work, I was influenced by certain courses for instance which I did and at a later stage when the struggle actually escalated into a war, the struggle became more and more intense and the pressure also increased - that is pressure from politicians, from our own head office and pressure exerted by the already established security system.

This was pressure was aimed at achieving more purposeful action. There was also pressure from the surroundings and society because I think that the people who lived here could also - in respect of the activities of the youth and children who for instance became totally out of control, that that became a problem for society and the parents lost control over their children and we who had to perform this task experienced pressure. And that task was to keep the Government of the day in power.

Now, the norms and structures which were important to us as White South Africans, to keep that in place - that created certain grey areas as far as the policemen’s work is concerned and more specifically, security policemen. I, or any of my colleagues did not act for personal benefit or gain, that was not my motive. We did what we did exclusively to safeguard the Government of the day and to keep them in power.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt for a moment, by that do you mean that you did this to keep the Nationalist Party in power?

MR ERASMUS: It was the National party Government of the day, yes. And the attacks and everything which happened here, more specifically the actions undertaken by the youth and COSAS and so forth, these things were aimed at overthrowing the National Party Government of the day.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Erasmus, one last aspect. May I take you back to the process of discussions and talks which you had with du Plessis and van Niekerk or rather van Rensburg, apologies - Major van Rensburg, he was then a Major.

Yesterday we referred to the fact that you were aware of the fact that there was a civil action brought by Mr Mthimkhulu, now certain reports in the media had already suggested in the past and also for the Harmse Commission, that that was the actual reason why Mr Mthimkhulu was killed. What is your comment on that?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I was aware of the fact that a civil claim had been instituted. In the past these - the fact that civil claims were instituted was not an unknown fact. In this particular case that topic wasn’t discussed at all, it didn’t even cross my mind when I made my decision.

MR VISSER: Now you also referred to the fact that Port Elizabeth was actually the core and the flash-point of violence in the years 1980 to 1982, did you have any fears about the further spreading of this violence?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is so. Statements made by - especially the youth, indicated that that was what would happen.

MR VISSER: What direction are you referring to?

MR ERASMUS: Well, to actually cause the violence to spread throughout the country.

MR VISSER: And according to your view, was there a real danger that if you failed to bring the situation under control, that there was a possibility that violence could be spread further by organisations such as COSAS and that it could become a nation-wide problem?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is so. I was also aware that many of these escalated more intense actions on the part of the revolutionary movement had started here and then spread to other parts of the country.

MR VISSER: Now, yesterday you touched on this aspect but just for the sake of completeness, did you regard COSAS as separate from the ANC’s policy of revolutionary action, or what was the position?

MR ERASMUS: No, I regarded COSAS as an extension and a support of the internal set-up because the cadres, many of them had to come from outside the borders of the country to come and work here and they had to have a contact organisation here to assist them. And for that reason I saw it as an extension and a leg of the ANC and a very strong supporting body.

MR VISSER: One last aspect Mr Erasmus, in your application you said that at some stage during your discussions there was a turning point, can you remember that?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that happened during the last phase just before the decision was made. Information was given to me to the effect that since there were these allegations that the security police had poisoned Mr Mthimkhulu, that he had sworn to take revenge, especially revenge against members of the security branch because those were the people who had dealings with him over the years.

MR VISSER: You’ve already told us that according to your information from reliable sources, weapons had been at the disposal of amongst others, Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, there was that type of information.

MR VISSER: You also told the Committee yesterday that you were aware of certain attacks, armed attacks launched and directed at the bodyguards of Mr Buthalezi.

MR ERASMUS: That is so.

MR VISSER: Now, this turning point which you’ve referred to as - did you discuss or regard this as important for purposes of your decision?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I regarded it as very important because the further information which I got about this threat caused the police to believe and accept that Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka were able - as a result of their organisational back-up and also the liaison between them and the cadres, that they were actually able to execute this threat and that caused grave fear amongst our people. At that stage it was already the situation that policemen couldn’t do their normal jobs, they could not perform their functions properly.

MR VISSER: Now, were there already recorded incidents of attacks on policemen or attacks on their property or families?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, there were.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions at this time. That concludes the evidence in support of the application Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Erasmus, you’ve already told us yesterday that you gave an order that the deceased must be killed and that this happened after discussions between yourself and your two subordinates - now that’s just and introductory remark.

When this elimination of the deceased was raised and you gave the order, did you think that you were acting in accordance with the security and safety policy of the then Government - that it was in line with the security policy of the day?

MR ERASMUS: That is what I believed and the reason why I had that belief was because of all the statements that had been made and the pressure that there was to - or the pressure for stronger action to address the situation.

MR BOOYENS: There was also a structure in those days called security management system, can you recall that?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it had already been in existence for quite some time.

MR BOOYENS: Now just briefly, as a point of departure it had the State Security Council?

MR ERASMUS: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: And then I think on a provincial level, there was an extension of this council in the form of the JMC - Joint Management System, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now, if we can deal briefly with the JMC, the JMC was normally under the Chairmanship of the commanding officer of the defence force for that particular province or area, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And these meetings were attended amongst others, by the police and members of the security branch, correct?

MR ERASMUS: These meetings were also attention by members of the uniform branch.

MR BOOYENS: I see, but also members of the security branch?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, security branch and uniform branch.

MR BOOYENS: As well as other State departments who could have a potential interest in matters discussed there?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is the case, the whole spectrum was represented.

MR BOOYENS: There were also other sub-committees under the JMC as Safety or Security Committees, Joint Information Centre, Joint Operational Centre, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: I’d like you to answer the next question as briefly as possible, what was actually discussed at the JMC meetings - what was the important issue?

MR ERASMUS: The JMC meetings as I saw it, actually constituted a controlling body or mechanism and all information had to be reported to the JMC, anything that happened in a particular department had to be reported back to the JMC. The JMC wanted to know what was happening in the various departments or what was not happening and why.

MR BOOYENS: And to be more specific, each and everything that happened within a particular department, are these things which could relate to the security situation in the country?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, and which could also have an impact on the economic field or whatever.

MR BOOYENS: At the JMC meetings - you attended these on behalf of the security branch?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And I believe that on occasion Mr van Rensburg also attended some of these Sub-Committee meetings?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s correct. We always if possible, sent two members just to ensure continuity.

MR BOOYENS: The nature of what was discussed there and more specifically, relating to the people who were active - who were actively involved in trying to topple the security cart - to put it that way. Was that discussed there?

MR ERASMUS: The internal security situation was discussed at the JIC - the Joint Information Centre, that was what was discussed there.

MR BOOYENS: And at these Sub-Committee meetings, were there any discussions or suggestions as to how to combat and counter the revolutionary onslaught and how to counter the people threatening the security situation in the country?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Would it be correct to say - and it is my instructions, that at these meetings a very strong message was relayed, namely that you people in the Eastern Cape should actually control the situation?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And the messages which came through, did that come from the politicians or the police headquarters?

MR ERASMUS: It came from the National Security Management System and was then followed down through the channels.

MR BOOYENS: If you’re talking about National Security Management, are you talking about the Secretariat of the State Security Council?

MR ERASMUS: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: So the Secretariat was in fact the controlling body of the JMC system?

MR ERASMUS: That’s how I saw it yes, and that’s how it appears on the diagram.

MR BOOYENS: I think it is a matter of public record that that was where many members of the Cabinet, State President and so forth, that is where they sat?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s correct, that’s the State Security Council.

MR BOOYENS: Terms are bandied about, such as "elimination" or "hostile targets which had to be eliminated" or "leaders that had to be eliminated", are these terms familiar to you, were they used during discussions?

MR ERASMUS: I can remember that they were used during discussions and the term "eliminate" was used.

MR BOOYENS: One is aware of the fact that some of the politicians who used theses terms, later alleged that eliminate meant something different to what perhaps the dictionary definition would be, but for you as an Afrikaans speaking person, what does it mean when you say a person has to be eliminated? How would you understand it?

MR ERASMUS: I can only interpret it in one way, that is to kill somebody.

MR BOOYENS: So I come back to what I’ve asked you originally. When this decision was made to kill these people, was it perceived that eliminating people was a possibility to manage the security situation as already been planted, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Shortly, referring to your political purpose you wish to achieve, from the documentation it appears - also from the other applicants, that regarding the liberation movements and specifically COSAS being part of that liberation movement, what would you say was the ultimate purpose, not the short-term purpose, the ultimate purpose?

MR ERASMUS: The long-term purpose of these revolutionary organisations was amongst others, to throw over the Government, to get rid of the National Apartheid Government.

MR BOOYENS: And I think you can just refer to the political statements of that time, to realise that the politicians of that time also saw that as the purpose. Was that also your impression?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it was very clear what the purpose of these people were because everything which happened on the ground was taken back to them through all these systems.

MR BOOYENS: The fact, was this channelled through your own police channels? Did you receive it from your direct line?

MR ERASMUS: First of all it was conveyed through our own channels and secondly, it was reported at the JIC, it was discussed there and it was taken further from there.

MR BOOYENS: Taking into account the pressure, or taking into account the channelling of these political perspectives and the fact that we’ve already heard that it was mentioned that people should be eliminated, where you satisfied when you gave that order that these people should be killed, that this was - and I’m referring to the people in this application, that it was within that framework?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that was what I believed.

MR BOOYENS: You’ve already told the Chairman that the information provided to you was that they were active in COSAS, one of the organisations trying to overthrow the previous Government?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At that time, there was a lot of pressure and also a lot of critisism regarding the security police. Many allegations were also made and we use a modern term or a term which is more relevant regarding human rights violations by the security police, can you remember that?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Specifically allegations were made regarding the Port Elizabeth security police, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: These allegations were made in the media, in the press and questions were posed in Parliament so people paid a lot of attention to that.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Taking into consideration what I’ve just asked you Mr Erasmus, and taking into account that human rights violations did take place - it is a question of public record today, what was your impression - and I know you can give an impression only, what was the reaction when enquiries were made regarding these violations? What I want to now from you actually - what was the feeling, did the politicians know or thought that they knew about these violations? Can you answer that please?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, and today I’m still under the impression that the politicians had to know, they were aware of what was going on.

MR BOOYENS: Why are you saying that?

MR ERASMUS: I base this on the fact that although investigations were undertaken into these circumstances, the difference between the pressure exerted on us to solve this situation and the questions which were posed after this information was published in the press, it was not of that high level which we would expect to have been asked. That is on what I based my viewpoint.

MR BOOYENS: Do I understand you correctly, your impression is it should - if they really wanted to investigate that, it should have been an in-depth investigation?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phosa?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Erasmus, I just want to get clarity on the issues that arise right now towards the end of your evidence. Firstly, are you saying that by politicians you include the State President of the day?

MR ERASMUS: Not the State President, if you refer to the present State President, no.

MR PHOSA: No, I’m referring to the President of the day at the time of the incidents, when these were happening - the President of the Nationalist Party, whoever he was at the time.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I can answer this in this way. I’ve said the politicians who - and I can’t refer to specific persons because I did not communicate on that level.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Phosa, can I try and help here? Mr Erasmus the question as I understand it from Mr Phosa, he says when you use - when you make reference to politicians, are you doing so including whoever is a State President at that time in question? Is that inclusive of a State President?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, this is a better question. Yes, it also includes that.

MR PHOSA: Have you Mr Erasmus, always been of this impression, that the State President was aware of the need to eliminate troublesome revolutionaries?

MR ERASMUS: I think that was the case.

MR PHOSA: No, that was the answer. I’m not talking about beliefs, you are here now, you give evidence, you tell the court - the Commission, towards the end what your attitude is ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: With respect Mr Chairman, let’s be fair to the witness, he was asked for his impression, he’s given his belief or impression, with great respect - and may I at this point enquire Mr Chairman, whether Mr Phosa is opposing the application of Mr Erasmus, and if so, on what grounds or whether he’s here for some other purposes not opposing the application. I believe the Committee is entitled to that information Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think you have officially put on record what your position in that regard is Mr Phosa, or rather not your position naturally, that of your clients.

MR PHOSA: I made the error of assuming that it was too obvious, I apologise. This application is undoubtedly being opposed and I’m not sure whether the - I have to now give reasons unless there is an order for me to say so. It is simple as I understand it, to tell you this application is opposed.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you can indicate - not in any detail, on what grounds. You are not here merely to oppose because you don’t think they ought to get it, you don’t like them. It must be one of the grounds in the Act.

MR PHOSA: Because to put it as they would say nowadays, the bottom line. The bottom line is that these were not acts of political decision, they were acts of thugs who were simply intending to defend themselves and their pride, I can say much more than that.

CHAIRPERSON: I would ask members of the public to remember that we are not at a theatre, that we must preserve due decorum and if they do not do so, steps will have to be taken to ensure that the meeting is conducted peacefully.

MR PHOSA: Thank you Mr Chairman. I want to go back to the question I asked you before the interruption - of course I understand why I was asked, the question is, is it a sudden thought of yours, a thought in your mind now, or were you always of this impression that - let’s say to mention one, Mr de Klerk the President, was aware that it was necessary to eliminate people like Mr Mthimkhulu? Were you honest about that?

MR VISSER: With due respect Mr Chairman, Mr de Klerk wasn’t even on the scene in 1981/82.

MR PHOSA: Then just give us the relevant President ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You must brush up on your history Mr Phosa.

MR PHOSA: I do realise I should have done a bit of my history when I came - before coming here. The witness will be very helpful, he knows.

Who was the State President who was also sitting at these Security State Councils?

MR ERASMUS: During that time I think it was P W Botha, Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Was he Mr Botha, to your knowledge, aware of this need to eliminate people like Mr Mthimkhulu?

CHAIRPERSON: Hasn’t that already been answered? He told us as I have noted: "I think the State President was aware of the need to remove revolutionaries".

MR PHOSA: If my questions are inappropriate Mr Chairperson, if I could just be allowed to ask - I have not been here before and I will pose some questions and I’m not pressurising the witness. If I can get an answer, it might even say - not: "I think".

I’m asking a question from this witness, is he saying - not: "I think", is he saying for instance: "President Botha by virtue of attending these meetings where the word elimination was used, was aware of that need". It ought to be a very simple question for him to answer, was he aware?

CHAIRPERSON: He wasn’t at those meetings. The witness has not said he attended meetings of the State Security Council.

MR PHOSA: Maybe I’ll have to go about it the long way I was trying to avoid. Now you mentioned evidence with regard to these State Security Councils, what are you saying about them because I want to ask you to understand it clearly. What are you saying about them, what is their relevance to all this application of yours?

CHAIRPERSON: He was asked to give a history of the security set-up in those days. He explained that it was the Security Management System based on the State Security Council which came down to the Joint Management Council at provincial level. And that is the body he attended and spoke about, the rest was pure history to tell us how the ....[intervention]

MR PHOSA: Now Mr Chairperson, I’m having a bit of a difficulty. When evidence has been tendered, I have no reason why I shouldn’t ask about it ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] precisely what was asked, if you had listened you would have heard Mr Visser say: "Will you tell us what the organisation was", so he told us. You are now asking him: "why did he tell us".

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairperson, I really have great difficulty, let me lay out my problems. As I understand in this matter here, one does not object to leading questions, it’s been done and ...[inaudible] has been brought in. One doesn’t object because it’s assumed as I’ve just come in to it, there seems to be an understanding that it is in the best interest of the proceedings that technical ...[inaudible] not be raised ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: And ...[inaudible] a limited right of cross-examination. Mr Phosa, you will remember you have a limited right of cross-examination, not an unlimited right.

MR PHOSA: I was still busy explaining myself Mr Chairperson, and I’m having difficulty coming across to you in the first place. I’m just saying that when those issues were raised and he was asked to say about a,b,c, how do you say: "what is the relevance of that"? Nobody else did so I assumed that I would be allowed also to ask now what the relevance of that was because it couldn’t have ...[inaudible] gratuity, there must have been a reason why it has been given, you can’t waste your court’s - the Commission’s time. There must be a reason why it’s given. If the Committee knows why, I don’t. And I’m now asking on behalf of those who have asked me to come here - and I’m sure a number of others, what the relevance of these State Security Councils are. And if the Committee knows I can ask for an answer, then I won’t ask the question but I do seriously want to know.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Chairman, I think we have to try and make some progress on this. As I understand your question Mr Phosa, to the witness, the question is: "Is it part of his testimony before this Committee that the person who was a State President at the time, must have known about the agenda or the programme to eliminate those who were opponents of the State". Is that your question to the witness?

MR PHOSA: That was the question that was overruled as being on my part, not having listened carefully, so that was really my question but I tried now to start from scratch in asking him. That is really the question, why - is that his evidence?

ADV SANDI: Were you happy with his explanation? He says: "Because I found this happening during the time with all the meetings by different structures". This is the impression he had.

MR PHOSA: Now we’ve been wasting so much in seconds that I don’t remember what answer that was. All I had wanted to ask, and I’m sure if you - if the Committee says: "that’s the answer". All I want to know is, is the answer according to him, that President Botha - and I deliberately chose him, was aware of the fact that there were elimination’s? In other words he attended those ...[inaudible] of elimination’s, he attended meetings where it was said there had to be elimination’s, is that his evidence?

ADV SANDI: Do you want to answer that Mr Erasmus, is it your answer to the question, that the person who was the State President surely he must have known that the idea was to kill those who were opposing the State?

MR ERASMUS: I said Mr Chairman, I was under the impression that the politicians of the day knew about this. In that dispensation every department had a Minister and the Minister if he knew, he could have told for example, the State President. What the lines of communications were, I do not know.

MR PHOSA: I’ll tell you why I’m delivering this question Mr Erasmus, I do not want later to work on a false premise, so I am now from now on going to be working on the basis that whether or not the State President, Mr Botha knew is another matter but as far as you’re concerned, you believed he knew. Can I work on that premise now, from now on?

MR ERASMUS: You can work on that basis, yes.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr PHOSA, maybe just to ensure that we do not come back to this.

Mr Erasmus, when you say Mr Botha, the State President, every time knew of must have known about this killing ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: He didn’t say that, he said: "I thought he knew".

ADV SANDI: If you say: "You thought he knew", would you be surprised if he says he didn’t know about that?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I would not be surprised if a politician says anything and I believe and I’m convinced that if I asked anybody, he would deny that but I am here to tell the Committee what I know.

MR PHOSA: That is a ...[inaudible] for saying, "If he said so", you would say: "He lies like politicians lie"?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, you don’t want me to say that they’re telling the truth always, I can’t say that the people are always lying but what I am saying is that anybody would deny such a question.

MR PHOSA: Now to take it a step further, on the understanding - please, understand at all times, on the understanding that it was your belief not only now but then that the politicians were talking about - knew the need for elimination, they need to eliminate - on that understanding, so when the decision was made to eliminate Mr Mthimkhulu and his colleague Mr Madaka, you did not expect that that decision would be disapproved of by the politicians, did you?

MR ERASMUS: This operation was a covert one and what I mean by covert - and perhaps this will become clearer later, is that it was performed in such a way that there should be no comeback or no tracks back to the security branch or to anybody.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, maybe I should make myself clear to you. I’m not referring to a public disclosure of elimination, of the elimination of these two persons. If the information were to reach the politicians, including the then President - State President, that you in your camp, your division of the police, have decided to eliminate these two persons, you would not have expected them - from the point of view of necessity, to have objected to that.

MR ERASMUS: I would have expected that if the matter was revealed there, that there would have been some reaction from the politicians right the way down to myself and I said that there was no such reaction.

MR PHOSA: I don’t understand you, perhaps because you don’t understand me. Let me just be fair to you and hope you don’t understand me. Was the constant reference to the need to eliminate people like Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka, was that a political decision?

MR ERASMUS: I said that the constant pressure and statements created the perception in my mind that that was the intention.

MR PHOSA: Please, I deliberately choose the word political and do you know what I mean by political, when I say political decision - do you understand that? Do you know the meaning of political decision?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I understand it very well.

ADV DE JAGER: Wasn’t his reply to say: "I was under the impression, I had the perception that it was in fact a political decision".

MR PHOSA: Sorry, I missed the preamble to that ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I - looking at the answer as I’ve written it down, he said: "It was my perception that it was in fact a political decision". He’s sort of agreeing with you as far as his own perception was concerned, that he was under the impression that it was a political decision to eliminate these people.

MR PHOSA: I can’t remember now why I had a doubt about that but it’s clear, let’s come back to that. On the understanding ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, if I’m wrong you must please say so.

MR ERASMUS: That’s how I understand it and that is why I gave the answer that I did, as you’ve now explained it.

MR PHOSA: Let’s cut this thing, it can be shorter. All I’m saying is this, if it was a political decision to eliminate people like Mr Mthimkhulu, is your answer that you did not expect any rebuff or disapproval from the top politicians if you said: "Look, that’s the only answer now, we are getting rid of them"? There ought not to have been a rebuff or let’s say, a rebuke from them.

MR ERASMUS: I have stated that this was a covert operation and given the circumstances under which we were living in those days, I also said that there was no such reaction as far as I was aware.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may interrupt. It is beginning to occur to me that my learned friend Mr Phosa and the witness may be on two different wavelengths. Now I don’t want to say too much because I don’t want to lay words in the mouths of witnesses but is there problem here not perhaps that he is assimilating a political decision with a political objective as far as the commission of the offence is concerned, or the incident is concerned?

I’m just trying to help Mr Chairman, I don’t want to say more because I don’t want to put any words in the mouth of the witness but it appears to me that this may be the problem of misunderstanding between the witness and my learned friend Mr PHOSA.

MR PHOSA: Mr Erasmus, you see, that these were covert decisions seems to have been obvious right through your evidence. Can I just to clear that, say that - ask you whether when the word eliminating or to eliminate, those phrases were used at the provincial level, were those words or phrases used at a covert level in other words, where there was extreme secrecy or were they just being made publicly at the lower level?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I think the questions was put to me as to the fact that politicians spoke about eliminating in public and later they denied this. And the question was also asked of me what does it mean and I told the Committee what I thought it means, so I said that it was mentioned during discussions.

MR PHOSA: I’m sure it may be easier if we answer them bit by bit. Is it a fact or is it not that when elimination was made at the provincial level, it was made publicly or was it made secretly at the meetings you attended?

CHAIRPERSON: I think the witness must understand that as I understand what you mean - he doesn’t publicly from shouting it off from the rooftops, the question is: "did they speak openly about this at the meeting"?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct. The term "elimination" as I said, was used - the word.

MR PHOSA: And those meetings themselves were not a secret? And I’m not talking now the ...[inaudible] you said, but the meetings themselves were there for everyone to read about.

MR ERASMUS: All documents pertaining to the Security Management System and for instance reports which we sent, all these things were marked "secret, top secret or confidential", so they weren’t public documents for everybody and members of the public to read.

MR PHOSA: Therefore, if you as the Eastern Cape branch of the security police decided to act in terms of what was said at these meetings, you would normally expect that what you convey to the politicians would also be kept a secret, isn’t it? If you decided you were going to kill Mthimkhulu and you decide to tell the President, you’d expect him to keep it a secret in the nature of the general conduct of his meetings, isn’t it? Do you understand the question though?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, I must ask that Mr Phosa perhaps just make it a little bit clearer - he made a lot of statements, perhaps he must repeat the question so that we can understand each other properly.

MR PHOSA: Right. You see, we have now established that whenever at any meeting, the word "eliminate" or the phrase "to eliminate" was mentioned - although it was said openly at the meeting, it remained a secret conversation. Am I correct? The meeting was secret.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is so, secret in the sense that that what was said there had to be dealt with in that way.

MR PHOSA: So, there was an understanding amongst all those who attended such meetings including politicians, that these were sensitive issues to be dealt with in a secret manner.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct and we’re talking here about small committee meetings and not very big public meetings.

MR PHOSA: Yes. I am therefore suggesting to you and you just correct me, that if when the decision came to kill - use the nice phrase "eliminate these two gentlemen", if at that stage you had passed word to the politicians on top, you would have expected them to keep it a secret, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I would most certainly have expected them to keep it a secret.

MR PHOSA: Moreover, it being something that they had been talking about all along, you would not expect it to shock them, isn’t it? Do you follow the question? Okay, let me repeat it to save time. Seeing that they themselves the politicians and you and all others concerned, had already been talking about elimination as a solution, if you had told them being the Eastern Province branch that: "We want to eliminate these two", it would have given them no shock as far as you’re concerned, no surprise?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it wouldn’t have been a shock to them if such an incident such as this had arisen. I think the matter would have been dealt with in very small committees or perhaps a person to person discussion, that’s probably how it would have been conveyed. And I agree with you, I don’t think it would have caused a sense of shock. Many people died on a daily basis, so death within this war context wasn’t actually a shock to anybody anymore.

MR PHOSA: Even death at the hands of the Government, was no shock anymore according to you? At the ...[inaudible] of the Government?

MR ERASMUS: Shock as I understand it no, but I qualify that by saying that I did not convey this information to them so if they had heard this information, I don’t know what their reaction would have been but what was relayed back to me - the feedback which I got, did not indicate that.

MR PHOSA: I ask you one question and then you go onto others. Let’s just come back to the one I dealt with. Are you saying that - and if you’ve answered it yes, are you saying that even the idea of a Government eliminating it’s citizens was no shock in those days? Is that your answer, is that your evidence?

MR ERASMUS: Shock is a normal reaction and I think yes, there would have been a sense of shock amongst the people but I have to qualify it by saying, I don’t know what happened afterwards.

MR PHOSA: You see, you ought to realise by now that I’m raising these question simply because it appears you didn’t report, so that is why I’m raising these questions but to go back to the question itself.

MR ERASMUS: I can sate unequivocally that in this particular instance, I did not report it in the normal way and along the normal channels because I said it was a covert operation.

MR PHOSA: I want you to go back - I have reasons why I ask you these questions, I tried to have as clear the question of secrecy to understand each other on the basis that as between you - your team in the Eastern Cape and the politicians, there was general understanding that there would secrecy on issues like this, isn’t that so?

MR VISSER: No, with great respect Mr Chairman, not with any stretch of the imagination did he say that. He said that it was his impression that the politicians must have known what was going on on ground and he based that belief inter-alias on the fact that he said that from the GSB’s there must have been reporting upwards to the politicians but he never said that there was an understanding between the politicians and the police themselves on the ground, in the line of the questioning which my learned friend has just put. That has not been the evidence.

MR PHOSA: I’ll go ahead, I’ll repeat my question. ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phosa, is there any misunderstanding here?

Did you in certain instances report back in the normal along normal channels?

MR ERASMUS: On a daily basis.

CHAIRPERSON: To whom did you report?

MR ERASMUS: I reported firstly, along the channels to head office and that happened on a daily basis. Then these systems - management systems were in place and I attended meetings there and these systems had sub-structures and sub-committees. And at that committee it was my task as divisional commissioner here locally, to give an overview of the security situation of the area within my jurisdiction, that was the reporting. So firstly, it was a direct channel to my head office and secondly, at these meetings I had to give an overview or a survey of the security situation.

CHAIRPERSON: But because you classed this operation as a covert operation, you did not report it in the normal way, is that what you’ve told us?

MR ERASMUS: That is my evidence. This specific instance was never documented and was never reported in such a way.

MR PHOSA: Just to make sure that you and I understand each other in the light of everything having been said so far. Regardless of how you’d report it, my point is this, if you had - if information had reached the politicians, the State President and others that you have decided to eliminate - not that you’ve eliminated, you’ve decided that you have to eliminate these two, that information you would expect to be treated by them in confidence otherwise they would not - you wouldn’t expect them to tell the world about that, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: That is what I assume, that’s how I understand it. I’m assuming that is how they would have dealt with the information if such information ever reached their ears or they would then have to take the necessary steps about it.

MR PHOSA: To go back to your evidence in chief, after all this decision of yours - you personally, that these two must be eliminated was not Gerrit Erasmus’s decision, it was that of Erasmus the policeman, isn’t it - according to you?

MR ERASMUS: That is so, that is what I testified.

MR PHOSA: You believed that you were making a decision in the interest of even Mr Botha, the President.

MR ERASMUS: I took this decision in order to protect the National Party Government of the day and to keep the Government in power, that was one of the legs on which I based my decision. One can them by implication say that the person who was in control of the State was the State President, Mr P W Botha.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Erasmus, I when Mr Phosa refers to Mr P W Botha, he does not refer to the fact that it was in his personal interest, he’s not referring to him in his personal capacity but in his political capacity. That is what we mean when we talk about the Government and the person.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct and that’s how I understood it, we’re talking about the Government of the day, the National Party Government and everything surrounding that.

MR PHOSA: I think we shall again ...[inaudible] In the light of that impression of yours that you were acting on behalf of the Nationalist Party Government amongst others, you would have had no reason to fear in telling them the politicians, what your conclusions were. Do you understand the question?

MR ERASMUS: I say once again, it was a covert operation and I don’t know how better to explain this other than by saying it was a covert operation. I did not have a face to face discussion with any politician at which I conveyed this information or decision and the fear that the operation could go wry or miscarry or be revealed, well I believe there would have been a major investigation in such a case.

MR PHOSA: Talking for myself, I’ve heard you but I don’t understand you but it will be surprising perhaps, let me start afresh. If the politicians had accepted that people like Mr Mthimkhulu must be eliminated then such a decision would be in keeping with what they expected, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t speak on behalf of the politicians, I can’t testify on their behalf. What I told you was that statements were made which influenced my decision making and that caused me to make up my mind. I can’t sit here today and speak on any politician’s behalf, or any other person.

MR PHOSA: Maybe it’s the way I phrase the question, I don’t want you to talk on their behalf. I’m trying to understand your reasoning, whether to report or not to report. Would you with the understanding you’ve given us, have thought - the word is thought, have thought that they would be against the elimination of these two? Do you understand the question now? Would you have thought so, or did you think so?

MR ERASMUS: Normally there would probably have been problems, problems in the sense that we would have had to report back, we would probably have had to be involved in a court case etc., but once again the operation was a covert one and I did not report anything to the politicians. And at this stage I state that I drew my conclusions on the basis of what happened after this operation, that is why I’m saying they must have been aware. I can’t tell you now what kind of problems would have been created or not.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Erasmus, do I understand you correctly, what you’re saying is that you don’t think they would have been opposed to the elimination but they would have against the disclosure of that fact, of elimination?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, it was a covert operation and nobody could disclose such an operation in those circumstances. You can imagine for yourself what would the consequences have been if such action - the killing of people, had been made public. You can imagine what the reaction and repercussions have been in Port Elizabeth.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let us for forget about reporting and making public. Let us go back to the Joint Management Council. As I understand your evidence, various people representing the various departments attended these meetings and at these meetings it would be said that people should be eliminated. Did you not go back to the meeting of the same council and not make a report but merely say they could leave that matter it had been attended to, or something of that nature?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I must return to my original point, the word eliminate was used at times and there was no specific or...[inaudible] instruction for us to do such and such in a particular case, in other words, I did not go back to the committee to report back because there was no specific instruction emanating from that committee about that particular case.

CHAIRPERSON: No, that’s why I want to avoid the word report because you have told us several times when Mr PHOSA has been questioning you, that you understood that they knew. Well, it seems to me very odd if you’re sitting in a Committee which is a secretive body where matters are discussed of this nature, that you don’t tell them they needn’t bother about it anymore because otherwise they might come at the next meeting and the meeting thereafter still saying that the person ought to be eliminated. Surely you must have indicated in some way that they needn’t bother about these matters? By that I do not mean that you reported to them that you had killed or eliminated them.

MR ERASMUS: The term was used very generally, it was very generally used during meetings, no mention was made of specific cases or names and I did not as far as I can remember, I did not know that I reported it back to any committee.

ADV SANDI: Can you repeat that, are you saying you cannot remember if you reported this to any committee or structure?

MR ERASMUS: As far as I know, I did not report it anywhere. In total I did not report this incident. If I had done this, the first channel would have been to my headquarters, that would have been the first point of reference.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but you have said it was a covert operation, you wouldn’t have told anyone anywhere about it, you would have kept it a secret, something to be known only by those of you who were involved. Do you agree?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman, it was just the few of us who are sitting here who knew about this, it was not for the eyes and ears of anybody else.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll take a short adjournment at this stage.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

ADV SANDI: Before we start, there’s a second request that if there could be silence during the hearing. It is difficult to understand the witnesses and their attorneys when there’s disorder or noise from the floor. Could you work with us please. This is a very difficult job, we have to hear each and everything and hear it well from both the witness and the attorneys. We have to ...[inaudible], thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Just before the tea break you were as to whether you did not just perhaps mention this elimination, that the job had been done - without saying elimination, that job has been look after, you didn’t mention that at the lower level at the other meeting and your answer was you hadn’t done so - I think so, did you say so? You didn’t do so?

MR ERASMUS: I mentioned it to nobody.

MR PHOSA: You see I wasn’t having my earphones, did you say "I did do it"?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I said I did not do it.

MR PHOSA: Let’s cut out then the meetings with various other persons but let’s talk about the channels within the police force. Did you report to your seniors in the police force that you wanted to eliminate these two?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I did not do that.

MR PHOSA: Now, sure - certainly now, really here where it is within the police force, you would have not the slightest fear that this might get elsewhere, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman I repeat, the task was executed and the knowledge of this operation only I and the colleagues who were with me, we were the only people who knew about this.

MR PHOSA: I am going to do what is not really advocacy but for the sake of saving time, let me tell the purpose of my questions. I am trying to find out and therefore want you to let the Committee know whether this action of yours was just a private venture of your side, the Eastern Province branch of the security police, the P.E. police, in other words whether it was intended to further the general advance for all policemen concerned, for all security police concerned - I’m giving you a background.

And I want to suggest - which I’m going to do, depending on how you’re going to answer, you did not tell even as much as report in advance to your senior policemen because you believed that even your senior policemen would oppose you action. I’m being kind to you now, am I right? You believed that if you report to them, they would say no, no, no, don’t do that.

MR ERASMUS: Because this was a covert operation, I did not report this matter.

MR PHOSA: Could you just cut out the word "covert" and answer the question. Did you or did you not believe that your senior members in the police force would have said to you, you cannot and do not do that?

MR ERASMUS: At this stage I would say, they would have probably not have agreed with me but if you talk on a man to a man basis or convey it to a certain person, the answer could have been yes also.

MR PHOSA: You did not convey it to a single person amongst your senior policemen on a man to man basis, your intention to eliminate these two?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, I did not convey this to any other people.

MR PHOSA: You did not as much as ask on a man to man basis to one of your seniors, whether it might be proper to do so? I’m not saying that you would say: "Don’t you think in the light of this, we should now get rid of Mthimkhulu and Madaka", you didn’t do that?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I did not discuss this with anybody.

MR PHOSA: The initial answer I asked you was, whether you reported it to one of your seniors and you said on a man to man basis you did not, now do - would it have - sorry, I’ll rephrase that. I’m dealing now about asking a question asking an enquiry, am I correct in saying you could easily have enquired on a man to man basis from your seniors, whether it was appropriate or not to do so - enquired, you could have asked on a man to man basis?

MR ERASMUS: I could have asked it but I did not ask this from them.

MR PHOSA: Well, that is why my questions are being raised, because you didn’t ask, now that is according to you. Now also - now having done it - the first was I was talking about your intention to do it, having done it (a) you could have asked - you could have reported on a person to person basis to your seniors or one of them that you have done it on a person to person, couldn’t you?

MR ERASMUS: I repeat I could have done it but I did not do it.

MR PHOSA: Is there perhaps something we don’t understand, are the two gentlemen - hold on please - are the two gentlemen, Mr du Plessis and Mr van Rensburg, the only policemen that you trusted on matters of that nature - the only two in the whole police force?

MR VISSER: I think is also and it’s been throughout Mr Chairman, Mr Niewoudt was also part of the ...[intervention]

MR PHOSA: I just don’t know how I can forget Mr Niewoudt - by implication he was included, I’m sorry actually I can have problems for leaving him out. Is he one - are those three the only ones you trusted?

MR ERASMUS: An operation of this nature should be executed by people whom you trust. This group was composed in such a way - I did not add Niewoudt, it was du Plessis’s choice to include whomever he wished and I trusted these people and I still put my trust in them today.

MR PHOSA: Yes but you know, I have used the word: "only". Besides these three others, is your evidence that: "I could not trust any other policeman in South Africa or in the world regarding this aspect". Now you answer is, "it is or it is not". I see your counsel is shaking his head.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, it is not what I am saying, I’m sayin that in this specific incident these people were involved and I would have certainly - could find other security policemen somewhere to execute this task.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr PHOSA, suppose you - I want to commit a murder and I trust 20 people in South Africa, would I go around and tell them: "Listen, I’m going to commit a murder?

MR PHOSA: If they are joint murderers, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: But you’re making them joint murderers by telling them.

MR PHOSA: No, no, I don’t understand - as I understand, the police in the security branch, firstly in the Eastern Cape and right through the country were trusted, they trusted one another. I’ve now even left out the political {intervention] - I’m so sorry, so sorry, I’ve now even omitted the other - the politicians, I’m dealing strictly within the police force and I’m saying - I’m assuming from what you said that the police trusted one another - the security police and therefore I’m trying to find out whether he sees it differently.

He could not have trusted other security policemen because the assumption is that security policemen would all have no difficulty about the eliminating. So the example you raised with me Mr Commissioner, is inappropriate in that you are talking about people I don’t know, whose thinking but according to him security police were thought it was appropriate to kill people like him.

ADV DE JAGER: Now I understand ...[inaudible]

MR PHOSA: Yes. So the question being - I really am asking - I’m glad for it to have been cleared, is simply whether you did not believe that surely security policemen especially your seniors could also be trusted, not just these four individuals? Well if it’s your case to say they couldn’t be, well that’s your case. I want to understand your problem.

MR ERASMUS: I cannot believe that I could not trust my other colleagues but in incidents like these or this specific incident, this was performed on a must know basis. I could not tell everybody that I came to such a point to perform this task.

MR PHOSA: Okay, let’s leave out every policeman, let’s not talk about every other policeman. Was there not even one other senior policeman in the entire security branch system senior or junior outside Port Elizabeth, that you could have reported to, that you could have mentioned this to with confidence?

MR ERASMUS: I repeat, I trusted a lot of policemen but at this stage I want to say I did not, I personally did not talk about this to anybody because I regarded this case a need to know and those who knew and the others, for them it was not necessary to know.

MR PHOSA: I should ask you this question. Do you regard yourself and your colleagues in having eliminated these two young men, as having done a wonderful job - as you sit there now?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, in my evidence I have said that this was a very tragic deed and everyone of us and especially I myself am extremely sorry and I feel sorry for the families who suffered because of this. This was not a very heroic thing to do. For me as a person, it degraded me. Every day for 15 years or more, I Gerrit Erasmus had to live with this. I’m trying to forget, I’m trying to put it behind me but I can say today it’s almost impossible, you never forget this.

And this is why I’m sitting here today and this is why I’m telling you exactly what I have done. If I look back I would not have done it and hopefully I would never be in a position again to be involved in something like this. And for us, I am not a murderer otherwise we could have murdered a lot of people here. We’ve experienced many problems here, if we wanted to commit murder just for the sake of murder, we could have done that.

CHAIRPERSON: How many times did you do that?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, there was one further incident for which I am applying for amnesty which will serve before this Committee, and that was all.

CHAIRPERSON: It took place some months before this one, didn’t it - with the same team and in the same circumstances?

MR ERASMUS: I don’t know whether is was exactly the same team, there was perhaps the exception of one or two other people.

CHAIRPERSON: It was Mr van Rensburg and Mr du Plessis and having killed the man, they left his car near the border so that the suspicion would be created that he’d left the country - same pattern.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So what you were doing now was not something new for you, it was something you’d done before?

MR ERASMUS: It was not new - this was not the first incident of this kind I agree but the first incident, those circumstances were not the same.

ADV SANDI: Is there perhaps any incident similar to the two you have mentioned which you may have forgotten?

MR ERASMUS: If you mean where murder was involved, no.

ADV SANDI: Do I understand you to say that there was nothing preventing you from giving a report to your senior security officers? If you wished to do so you would have done so, there was nothing preventing you.

MR ERASMUS: That is the normal procedure. Under normal circumstances there was nothing which could prevent me but in this instance I did not report back.

ADV SANDI: The question I was putting to you is: "If you wanted to do so, you would have reported the matter to one of your senior security officers or confide on a man to man basis", as you’ve said - to one of them?

MR ERASMUS: I could have done it like that, yes.

ADV SANDI: You did not see the need to do so?

MR ERASMUS: I did not see a need for that because I handled it on a need to know basis.

MR PHOSA: You’ll bear with me, I may ask question that other people wouldn’t have asked, I’ve only just walked into this so bear with me. Which is this other instance where - referred to by the Chairperson - the Chairman, where you and others dumped somebody in his - somebody’s car at the border?

MR ERASMUS: The other incident was the Kondile matter.

MR PHOSA: That was in 1981?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: You did not report that incident to any senior of yours, did you?

MR ERASMUS: That incident I handled on the same basis as this one, in other words, I did not report back.

MR PHOSA: You keep saying in response to some questions: "Yes, in the normal situation yes, I would do a, b, c, or x, y, z, but you see, earlier on when I started cross-examining you or questioning you, you said: "In those days in that period the death of human beings was a normal thing", do you remember saying that? Do you remember saying that?

MR ERASMUS: What I meant Mr Chairman was, that people died during this unrest period, many people died on a daily basis. They died where the police and the protesters got involved, where they murdered one another, this is was I meant by that. I did not mean that the police just killed people during that period.

MR PHOSA: You know, I am simply trying to refresh your memory and mine and allowing you to correct me if I’m wrong. Short and simple, I understood you to be saying early in our dealings between you and me in these proceedings, you said - you’ve got to have a context, "In that period death was not something surprising, it was a common thing". Now, didn’t you say that?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, if you’ve understood me wrong - I can’t remember what the earlier question was, what I’ve said: "On a daily basis many people died during that time". I did not mean that the security police or the South African police were killing those people.

MR PHOSA: Let’s leave that for the time being. Now, you said in your evidence yesterday when you were being led by my learned friend Mr Visser, you said - I think you repeated this today, this thing worried you, what you did worried you, in other words it’s something that bothers your soul, isn’t it? It bother you what the two of you did - what the four of you did?

MR ERASMUS: I have just repeated that it was a very unpleasant task for me as a person and I think also for all my colleagues. It was a very difficult thing to do, extremely difficult.

MR PHOSA: Without having asked Mr Chairman, why he raised the question, I can assume and I ask it my own way - the one before, the Kondile incident the year or so or even less before that, was that not also a very nasty thing to have done or to do?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman, that was also a nasty thing to do.

MR PHOSA: Right. So, it did not deter you from doing the next one - the nasty thing you’d just done did not stop you from doing another nasty incident - now killing two people?

MR ERASMUS: I must admit and I say I was wrong but the circumstances of these two cases are unrelated. I understand Mr Chairman, that did not prevent me from doing this deed. It is like that.

MR PHOSA: Maybe I should stress what I have in mind. I’m assuming too much in your favour for purposes of this discussion. I thought you would say: "The killing of Kondile was something that disturbed my soul tremendously". Am I wrong?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it did bother me. This was an ongoing feeling which never leaves one.

MR PHOSA: Which one? Did you have an ongoing feeling after killing Kondile, a feeling that never left you?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I could never forget that.

ADV SANDI: Can I ask to interrupt you Mr Phosa? I’m not quite sure in my mind as to how far you can take the witness in your cross-examination regarding the Kondile matter, given that it is not the subject matter of these proceedings.

MR PHOSA: No, I’m simply testing the witnesses sincerity when he tells this Commission what he did in the present instance severely affected his soul because it is - I said when I was asked earlier: "Why we are objecting", we said "This is not a political conduct as far as you’re concerned, it’s an action of people who were just behaving like rogues, just killing. Now, I’m not concerned about the Kondile incident as such but it’s a series of events that shows - establishes, we shall argue that these people are simply killers.

CHAIRPERSON: You’ve just made the point haven’t you, you will argue it? It’s a question for argument, isn’t it?

MR PHOSA: Not without evidence. I’ve been asked why I raised it, I can’t raise it without giving the witness an opportunity of answering it, I have to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: He’s tried to do so.

MR PHOSA: He’s trying his best I know. Mr Erasmus, all I’m trying to find out from you is this, is it correct that according to you - I know it’s before but shortly after you had extinguished Kondile, you had this feeling - oh, I’ve done a terrible thing, and that feeling was with you right through. Is that your evidence?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is my evidence, that is my personal, my human evidence that I could never forget that.

MR PHOSA: As you were giving instructions to these other gentlemen to go and destroy, eliminate, wipe out these two gentlemen, that is Mthimkhulu and Madaka, as you were doing that you were still having this terrible feeling about what you had done with Kondile.

MR ERASMUS: I have told you Mr Chairman, I could never forget this incident.

MR PHOSA: So the answer is yes, at the time that you were busy doing this you were still having this terrible feeling about what you had done the year before - the answer is yes.

MR ERASMUS: It is yes, Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Did you discuss with your colleagues - the other colleagues, regarding this incident the present one, when it should be done - when?

MR ERASMUS: Are we referring to Mthimkhulu and Madaka?

MR PHOSA: The answer is yes.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I discussed with them when this should be done.

MR PHOSA: Can you just let us into that secret, how did that discussion go? Now who came to you and said what - before, who said what to you about that for you to say: "Let’s do it in this way and that way"? Just go - just give us those details.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, in my evidence I said that du Plessis and van Rensburg came to me and they reported back to me regarding the situation surrounding - centring around Mthimkhulu and Madaka. They mentioned the activities in which these people were involved during that specific unrest period.

MR PHOSA: Yes but really, they must have reported to you before that day - even if not those two specifically, by that time you had information on a daily day - on a day to day basis as to what their role was, it’s true isn’t it ...[inaudible] Mthimkhulu and Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, there was continuous reporting regarding these two but the handling of this specific incident where we concentrated on the roles of these two people and reports were provided regarding these two.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I clear up one point before you go on. As I recollect your evidence you said: "If I remember, it was 10 days before the 14th of April 1982", is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember.

CHAIRPERSON: That that’s when they came and discussed it with you?

MR ERASMUS: That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR PHOSA: After they had given you this background, on this day of the decision - what next? I’m interested to know what next happened. They’ve given you now an account of what these people have done and what have you, so who said what?

MR ERASMUS: During this discussion Mr Chairman, all options were considered, it was not only a once off discussion as I’ve told you previously, this went on for a few days. Finally when the decision was taken - I think it was shortly before that time, what happened was that the people informed me that the situation was going in a direction where these people were swearing revenge against the security police and they believed that these people - because weapons were involved there was intelligence about weapons, about weapon caches and trained people, that these people could enforce this threat.

MR PHOSA: Well all that’s said - so just deal with the final decision. I want to hear what was said and who said what so as to say: "now they must be killed".

MR ERASMUS: At this stage I’m unable to say the du Plessis for example, has said this. They reported certain information which they had gathered by means of informers and this cumulated in this presentation or submission to me. I could not remember specifically what du Plessis said but this whole discussion centred around this specific incident.

MR PHOSA: I was trying to be perhaps fair to you, on your story it would seem that they were suggesting to you that: "Man, nothing else can be done now, we want these two persons killed", they were making that suggestion to you, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: It is like that, they made certain suggestions to me.

MR PHOSA: So, in fairness to you insofar as one can be fair to you, you were reacting ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Well with what - with respect Mr Chairman, what does that mean? Can’t we be civil to each other, with great respect.

MR PHOSA: You can hardly expect that I, speaking on behalf of the parents of children who were eliminated in this fashion, can possibly have questions that are fair to him. I don’t imagine that they are fair ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: They should certainly be fair, they may not be friendly but we are not going to have unfair questions Mr PHOSA.

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairman, all I asked was the question being asked: "What do I mean", I’m putting questions that are technically fair but I don’t think they are fair to ...[inaudible] can view them as being fair. I meant it only in that sense. In any event, let me go on with the question I was asking, it will clear up.

As between you and these other persons, when you made the decision you were saying only what you felt was the logical conclusion of what they’d come for?

MR ERASMUS: In the final stage when this final report - after these people went back and discussed to determine whether there were any other channels or options which could be followed, we discussed this incident for a whole morning to decide or to try and determine what to do in this regard. This - after 15 years, this is what I can remember and I can say we just did not decide quickly to eliminate these people, it was after long consideration considering all these options, to think about court actions, detention and other things, we considered all those. It took a long time to come to this decision and in the end it was an extremely difficult decision we all made at that stage.

MR PHOSA: That’s what I’ve been trying to get at, it was a joint decision.

MR ERASMUS: We took the decision jointly but I was the commanding officer and I have to accept responsibility for the decision.

ADV SANDI: Can I interrupt Mr Phosa, just for clarity.

Mr Erasmus, are you in other words saying you as the senior person to these gentlemen - these security officers who came to you, you were being asked to give a permission that the plan of action be proceeded with, is that what you’re saying? They were asking for permission from you to eliminate these two gentlemen?

MR ERASMUS: You could put it that way. I as the senior officer in the organisation at that stage and locally, had to accept responsibility for it.

ADV SANDI: You accordingly gave the permission that they should be killed or eliminated, in your jargon.

MR ERASMUS: In my evidence in chief I said that I did give the permission.

MR PHOSA: Did you perchance say to them in the course of these deliberations - in all these days, "But you know gentlemen I’ve got a problem, I am worried by what I did to Kondile man, it worries me, I have difficulty, that thing keeps worrying me". Did you say that to them?

MR ERASMUS: I would not be able to tell you at this stage that we discussed Kondile at all in this particular instance and you must realise - I’m assuming that you’ve never been in such a position, that you don’t talk about those things, you never ever want to repeat it again, you don’t want to refer to it, you want to forget it.

MR PHOSA: There’s an extent to which I can say, I understand you. I have represented people who have been charged with murder and I know they behave and how they think but I personally have not been. However, to get back to your position, at one stage I understood - it may not be your fault, that the decision was made 10 days before the actual incident - event, but it appears that the first discussion was 10 days before but the ultimate decision was much later, isn’t it? The ultimate decision was much later than 10 days before?

MR ERASMUS: That is so. The decision was taken at a later stage and the reporting took place about or started about 10 days before the time but I was not satisfied with the information obtained at that stage and I said: "Look, bring me everything, all the information that you have regarding these people" and that’s how matters continued for a while. And I can’t say what happened on day 7 or day 8 or what specifically happened on each day but the final decision was taken closer to this date of the 14th.

MR VISSER: The interpretation missed out on the phrase that it - with respect Mr Chairman, that it lasted for a period of 10 days. That phrase was not interpreted, I think it needs to be on record.

ADV SANDI: Did the witness say the discussions went on for a period of 10 days?

MR VISSER: It stretched over a period of 10 days, he said in Afrikaans but that was not translated.

ADV SANDI: Can we perhaps ask the witness to repeat what he has just said, so that we can get proper and accurate interpretation.

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, what I said was: "The discussion of this matter took place over a period of about 10 days, over that period. I can’t say what happened on day 1 and what happened on day 2 or 3 of whatever, but it lasted for a period of about 10 days.

MR PHOSA: I can therefore correctly say to the Committee that Mr Erasmus had ample time to reflect upon whether or not to eliminate these two young people, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Now, who decided that the 14th was going to be the date?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t think as to why the 14th specifically was decided about or on, the specific handling of this case was left to my colleagues and I didn’t take part in this operation any further so I can’t really tell you how the date of the 14th was determined, I can only make certain assumptions.

MR PHOSA: Let’s just go through the following steps quickly. Did you know before the 14th, that is was going to be the 14th? Did you personally know that, that this is going to happen on the 14th? - before the 14th?

MR ERASMUS: I didn’t know.

MR ERASMUS: Were you told on the 14th that on the 14th that: "We are going to do it today"?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I was told when these people had been picked up or abducted, then I was informed.

MR PHOSA: I’m making an assumption - assuming you still wanted to change your mind you were given an opportunity before they were killed - after they were abducted you were given a chance and you could have said: "No", if you wanted to do so.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, and today I want to say to the Committee that I strongly considered doing that after it was reported to me, I considered stopping the whole process.

MR PHOSA: Can it be perhaps that you were yourself afraid of your colleagues. that they might eliminate you if you said: "No"? I’m really trying to find out what’s behind your decision, was there possible fear that: "If I stop now - I’ve gone too far, they might get rid of me"

MR ERASMUS: No Chairperson, I wasn’t scared that anybody would eliminate me, I had no reason to believe that my colleagues would want to eliminate me. I took that decision based on the circumstances sketched to me so I considered it, I really seriously considered it. If I remember correctly, I was not in Port Elizabeth on that day, on the day that it was reported to me and I would like to say to you that the possibility to turn around was no longer there.

MR PHOSA: I did not listen to your words directly, at that moment I was listening to the interpretation in English, so I want just to make sure that I heard correctly. As it came out it says: "I want to say to you that the possibility of turning it around no longer existed", is that correctly interpreted?

ADV DE JAGER: His exact words was: "The road for turning around was no longer there".

MR PHOSA: Please allow me - you know people interpret words and phrases differently. I understand that to say: "No matter what I wanted to do, even if I wanted to change it, I could no longer personally change it", is that what you’re saying?

MR ERASMUS: I could not change my decision at that stage.

MR PHOSA: At that stage you say the matter was beyond your control, your personal control?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying Chairperson, that I accept the responsibility for what happened here, I’m not saying that it was outside of my control.

MR PHOSA: Unfortunately I have to deal with every portion of your answer then you can clear it. I’m not dealing with whether you accept responsibility, I’m asking you literally, are you saying: "At that stage when the report was given to me when I was outside - if I think correctly, outside Port Elizabeth. I as Erasmus, could no longer do anything to stop it even if I had wanted to". Are you saying that or not?

MR ERASMUS: I said that I could no longer change my decision.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Phosa, could I try and help?

Mr Erasmus, you said could not change your decision at that stage and that you assume responsibility for that. What Mr Phosa wants to get from you is, why could you not change your decision? What caused you to stand by your previous decision and not to change it?

MR ERASMUS: I would like to answer this question as follows as to why I did not change my decision after having considered doing so. There were these two people who had literally been abducted and kidnapped, now from that further and bigger problems could arise.

MR PHOSA: You will bear with my ignorance really, I don’t understand that. You knew that without you the three other persons - let’s say the two who spoke to you were unable to go ahead with the decision, they had to get your permission, remember that -they had to wait for your nod?

MR ERASMUS: At that stage after the kidnapping - at that stage my decision had already been given, it had been given before the kidnapping so the operation was now in full swing, it was in the execution phase so ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not hear the entire sentence.

ADV SANDI: Could you repeat that, the interpreter Mr Erasmus, has not heard what you’ve just said.

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying Chairperson, that at that stage when the report was made to me that these two deceased had been caught and abducted, at that stage I had already made my decision at an earlier stage so it wasn’t necessary for me at that late stage to give the decision or the order again.

MR PHOSA: You seem to suddenly miss the point, no-one asked you why you did not give the order to kill again. The question being asked is whether at that stage you were physically in a position to say: "Hey, stop it"? Now I understood you to be saying: "Hey, it was too late, I could not do it".

ADV DE JAGER: What he in fact said, he reconsidered it but decided not to stop it.

MR PHOSA: ...[inaudible] I don’t think he said so but I don’t - I don’t think he said so.

Are you saying that when they told you: "The man is captured now", you said to yourself: "Must they go on, must they not", said: "Let them go on, that decision is quite correct, let them go on - my earlier decision was correct". Is that what went on in your mind?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying it was reported to me and I ran through it in my own mind, there was nobody else with whom I could discuss this. The people were already being conveyed somewhere, an abduction had taken place and after consideration I decided that I couldn’t stop it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know where they were being taken to?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t recall whether they told me at that stage where they were taking them.

ADV SANDI: In terms of the decision, where were they going to be abducted and taken to - in terms of the decision you had taken together?

MR ERASMUS: I don’t recall that particular aspect, I can’t recall whether we decided on a particular place and as I said, after I had made my decision the operation was then entrusted to my colleagues and they had to decide on a particular place.

MR PHOSA: Because you indicated that this is a matter that really bothers you a lot, I assume that you do recall where - according to the report you got, where they were abducted from, in other words where were they when they were abducted, do you remember that? It’s something you can’t forget.

MR ERASMUS: The report was made to me telephonically and - if I’m now saying I think it was du Plessis, that told me they were abducted from point A or point B then I would actually be misleading the Committee.

MR PHOSA: Be that as it may. Now, am I correct in the understanding that they were not eliminated on the day on which they were abducted - on the same day?

MR ERASMUS: I think that is correct, yes.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, when did you get to know that they were either not going to be eliminated on that day or that in fact on that day they were not eliminated, when did that get to your ...[inaudible]

MR ERASMUS: My knowledge of this incident is to the effect that when - my knowledge about this comes from when it was reported back to me after the incident that is was successful.

MR PHOSA: Now I just want clarity on this. Are you saying on the occasion - on the date that these two people were abducted, you were not informed on that day that they are still alive, they have not yet been eliminated - at the end of that day you were not informed?

MR ERASMUS: What I’m saying is that when they reported to me that they had been picked up, the report was that they were still alive. And I took note of the fact that the operation had been completed, that is what I can say to the Committee, nothing more.

MR PHOSA: No, maybe a bit more. When you got up the next day, the 15th, were you of the impression that these people are gone - that they have now been eliminated as you got up that morning?

MR ERASMUS: If I recall correctly, I was informed on that day that the operation had been carried out.

MR PHOSA: Yes, but you are not dealing with the portion I’m dealing with. I don’t want to force you to give answers in my favour or otherwise, I just want to know that the day after they’d been abducted - when you got up the next day, you being Erasmus, did you - where you thinking then that they died the day before?

MR ERASMUS: I think it is logical to say that I did think about it and I’m not sure whether I actually slept that night, I can’t tell you that now.

MR PHOSA: Are you suggesting - I’m just trying to understand, are you suggesting that it is possible that you were so worried about this decision - the kidnapping of these people, that you might not have slept out of worry because of that?

MR ERASMUS: That’s not what I’m suggesting. If you’re saying to me: "I got up that morning", all I’m saying to is I’m not even sure if I even slept that night. I’m not trying to say that which you are now suggesting to me.

MR PHOSA: Just to let you into my ...[inaudible] on my mind, I raised that because I thought you might have been saying: "I was so worried about this terrible thing - decision, that I could not go to bed", however you say you’re saying you’re not saying that.

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying I can’t remember whether I slept that night, I’m saying I was worried and concerned on an ongoing basis and I was worried about my colleagues who actually had to carry out this inhuman act. I don’t know whether I slept that night or not.

MR PHOSA: So it is ...[inaudible] then that for as much as 24 hours - I’m just giving an indication - I’m just assuming it could be that, for about 24 hours, a good part thereof after you had been told they had been abducted, you didn’t bother to find out: "Have you done it, have you not"?

MR ERASMUS: I didn’t have contact with these people, this was in the days before we had the luxuries of cell phones and that kind of thing.

MR PHOSA: I would like you to realise that whatever you say we take seriously. Are you now saying that it was impossible for you for a period of even 24 hours after the report, to find out from these people whether they had actually killed these two young people?

MR ERASMUS: What I’m saying is that I had no physical contact with the operation and with the people involved.

MR PHOSA: Well that is - I’m asking these questions with that in mind and I have a reason I’ll explain later, but it’s not - you could not say - you cannot say to this Committee: "I wanted to ask but could not do so", that’s not your evidence.

MR ERASMUS: My evidence on this question is the following. I had no form of contact with these people ...[intervention]

ADV SANDI: Can I assist here Mr Phosa, maybe to phrase the question differently.

Mr Erasmus, when you colleagues reported to you that the abduction had taken place and that the two gentlemen Mr Mthimkhulu and Madaka were already elsewhere, was it part of the arrangement that they were going to come back to you to tell you that they’ve killed them or what has happened? Where they going to come back to you subsequently?

MR ERASMUS: If I remember correctly, the people phoned me and I think I was in Grahamstown busy with some inspection when they phoned me and what was told to me was that they abducted the people and that they were on their way somewhere. You can’t on the phone discuss a matter like this in detail, you can’t - they simply said they’d arrested them and they were on their way and after that I had no further contact with them.

ADV SANDI: Were they supposed to come back to you after carrying out this mission - according to the plan of action, were they supposed to come back to you?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, they were supposed to report back to me as to whether the operation had been carried out.

ADV SANDI: Does that answer your question Mr Phosa?

CHAIRPERSON: Well let me ask another one first. Did you know where they were taking these people to?

MR ERASMUS: I know now and it had been reported to me where the operation had been carried out, so I know now.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know then?

MR ERASMUS: Honestly I cannot remember whether the - a place was mentioned to me at that stage but it wasn’t impossible and I can’t deny that. I can’t remember whether it was mentioned specifically.

ADV SANDI: Yes but Mr Erasmus, the abduction of people is not something that happens every day, if someone phones you and tells you that: "We have abducted so and so according to the plan and we’re taking them to a certain place", surely it can’t be easy to forget that ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: But he’s never said - with respect, that they’ve told him that they were taking them to a specific place. He said: "Over the telephone you can’t discuss the matters, they told me they’ve arrested or they’ve abducted the people and they’re on their way".

MR PHOSA: Was that your evidence?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, it was reported to me that the people had already been picked up and that they were on their way. If I think back to our discussions, we very possibly decided that because it was a covert operation there was no place where the operation could be carried out and that they had to be taken away.

MR PHOSA: Now, was it discussed between - amongst the three or more or you - is it three of you, as to how precisely the elimination was going to be done?

MR ERASMUS: No. I’m saying I took the decision and the operational part of it, everything which preceded the operation was entrusted to my colleagues. I had no part in that and there was no detailed discussion as to how it would take place.

MR PHOSA: I understand you and I think you’re saying the method of elimination was theirs, not yours - it was their choice.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I agree. I didn’t take part in the detailed discussion of that so, yes.

MR PHOSA: And did they report to you on the occasion that they told you, "look they’ve been eliminated" - did they tell you how they’d done it?

MR ERASMUS: Because this was such an unpleasant task that they had to carry out, once again we did not discuss it in detail. All that was said was that it was carried out and it was properly completed.

MR PHOSA: Now I have difficulty with that but I my be wrong. Perhaps let’s go a little more in detail, you may remember a bit more about it and tell us. When did you get a report that these unfortunate young people had been eliminated?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

MR PHOSA: Or don’t you remember?

MR ERASMUS: No, I think it is the day after they had been eliminated - if I remember correctly.

MR PHOSA: Well maybe that’s what I tried to suggest when I added that, in other words, it could have been on the day of elimination or the day after - you just can’t say.

MR ERASMUS: I believe that it was the day after the elimination. I said that I had no contact with the people.

MR PHOSA: On the assumption that this an important occurrence, do you remember where you were when you received the report that these two young people don’t exist anymore?

MR ERASMUS: I can recall that I was at home, if I recall correctly - things become hazy after a period of time but if I remember correctly, I was at home when the report was made to me.

MR PHOSA: Are you seriously telling this Committee that an occurrence of the nature - of the magnitude is not very clear in your mind simply where you were when you learnt that two young people had been removed, you can’t remember that?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying that the report that the operation had been completed successfully was made to me.

MR PHOSA: You can’t say whether you were at home or not?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying that is how I recall it, I recall that I was at home at that stage. That is what I vaguely recollect.

MR PHOSA: Maybe perhaps you missed my point - I am deliberately this, I understand ...[inaudible] your question, what I want on record and I would like to say it before - at a later stage, is that as important as this occasion - we must understand, is to you, you don’t as a matter of fact know where you were when you got the report, you don’t. I mean - not think, you don’t ...[inaudible]

MR ERASMUS: Sorry?

MR PHOSA: You don’t know where you were when you received the report?

MR ERASMUS: I stand by what I said, that is as far as I can remember otherwise I could have told you I was sitting in my office. What I can remember is that at that stage I was at home - that is as I remember it.

MR PHOSA: And now I’ll tell you what I understand that you mean. As far as I, Erasmus can remember, I think I was at home. It may well be that I was elsewhere but I think I was at home. Am I rendering your reply correctly?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I come in here. I certainly don’t want to seem to be overprotective of the witness - he can fend for himself, but we asked specifically on what ground Mr Phosa intended opposing the application for amnesty of Mr Erasmus and he pointed out to you quite categorically, that it will be his submission to you that the incident was not perpetrated with a political objective. Now what he’s doing now is - with great respect, wasting time on whether the witness remembers where he was and at a time when he receives a report which he admits he received.

How is the question as to where he received the report relevant Mr Chairman? We would ask to - whether he committed the act with a political objective or not. With great respect Mr Chairman, he’s not testing the credibility of the witness, he’s attempting to establish something which is of total irrelevance to this enquiry.

CHAIRPERSON: Well speaking for myself, I can’t see the relevance that somebody can’t remember where he was 15 years ago.

MR PHOSA: Am I being allowed to explain why or to ask the question?

CHAIRPERSON: You can explain why Mr Phosa, he’s told you - as far as he can recollect, he was at home but he’s not sure. What more do you want from the man?

MR PHOSA: Actually now what your - what Mr Chairman says is not the same as the objection. I thought I was going to deal with the objection which was: "Why do I want to know that" but what Mr Chairman is saying is the answer I wanted to ascertain, I wanted to ascertain exactly that. And I said to him: "I understand him as your" - Mr Chairman says that he only thinks that he was at home but he can’t be sure. I wanted clarity on that. Now the question was, I shouldn’t have asked that question.

Now I don’t know which to answer because if the answer is exactly what Mr Chairman says, that’s what I wanted clarity on, there’s nothing wrong with that. I wanted to know whether his answer is exactly as you say Mr Chairman: "Yes, as far as I’m concerned I think I was at home, but it can well be that I wasn’t at home" - because I was going to deal with that later. Is that your answer Sir?

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I believe that I was at home and why I’m saying that is that Mr van Rensburg and myself lived close to each other and I think he made the report back to me and that is I think how it happened - I think I was at home.

MR PHOSA: Now when Mr van Rensburg gave the report - if it was Mr van Rensburg as we think who gave the report to you, did he give you the details of where the people eliminated and how they were eliminated?

MR ERASMUS: I’m sure that he told me that the people had been killed and that the bodies were disposed of and it is very possible that he told me that this operation had been carried out near Cradock.

MR PHOSA: Just a small digression - not small to the persons concerned, where you told what happened to the car, to Mr Madaka’s car?

MR ERASMUS: I think initially at our discussions we decided that this operation should be made to look as if the two deceased had left the country, so I believe that they would have told me that the car had been left near the border.

MR PHOSA: You might want to know why I ask that question, I was approached by the family today to just say: "Could you Mr PHOSA, ascertain where the car is, it is something that could still be of use to us". You don’t know where it is, do you? You don’t know where the car is?

MR ERASMUS: No, no I don’t.

CHAIRPERSON: On this point I think I have read somewhere that it was found some days later by the Transkei police, haven’t I?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, that’s why I’m saying I don’t know where the car is now.

CHAIRPERSON: The Transkei police took it, did they?

MR VISSER: We can’t be of any assistance there Mr Chairman, it does appear that that’s the last word on the car - is when the Transkei police took control of it.

MR PHOSA: Now whether the report was given by Mr van Rensburg or not - just one more time, at that stage did you reflect upon the wisdom or otherwise of now reporting to some senior policeman that it had happened?

MR ERASMUS: I did not consider it.

MR PHOSA: Just a matter of fact, was it physically possible for you to report it, in other words if you had wanted to you could have done that

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, it was physically possible.

MR PHOSA: I gain the impression - now please correct me if it’s wrong, when you were reporting about what used to be said at these discussions, when you talk about the turning point, sorry - when you were talking about these various meeting - covert meetings, that you of the Eastern Cape - that is the P.E. branch, were accused of letting down the rest of the country, in other words you were not putting your acts together. Did I understand that correctly?

MR ERASMUS: I don’t think that that was the impression that I got, that I was actually letting down the rest of the country. The fact of the matter was that here in P.E. was where the flash-point was - the problems were here.

MR PHOSA: May the Committee just bear with me, I want to check on this because I think that is the position as I understood it.

ADV DE JAGER: Was the situation in the Eastern Cape discussed as should it be a situation to be out of control?

MR ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson, the situation was very bad.

ADV DE JAGER: Was there any decisions or statements from a higher level, from Parliament or the Minister that you should be doing something to get it under it control?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman yes, the pressure from the top, from the Ministers through the head of security were extremely high - this situation should be solved, stronger action should be taken. This was because of what was happening here in the Eastern Cape.

ADV DE JAGER: Was the defence force also involved at this stage?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, the defence force was involved.

ADV DE JAGER: Why were they involved, what was given as the reason for their involvement?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, the defence force had a big component here in the Eastern Cape - they were not brought in, they were here at that stage but the co-operation was there, they had to assist us because the South African police were a few members and because of long hours the people were tired and everybody who could assist us had to help.

ADV DE JAGER: Would the police have been able to cope without the assistance of the defence force?

MR ERASMUS: At that stage I would say no.

MR PHOSA: I do think I should give you this opportunity to answer this again because there ...[inaudible] I’m right or wrong. Surely, was it not the view of the others - these covert meetings, that you in the Eastern Cape had to do more than you’ve done so far? In other words, you were not doing enough to contain this violence or the situation?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, it is like that like I’ve said before, through the systems pressure was exerted to do more to act in a stronger way and to undertake further actions.

MR PHOSA: The point I’m trying to make now is that you were made to appear that you in your division were not as successful in containing the situation as the other areas were, isn’t that so?

MR VISSER: He’s already denied that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so Mr Phosa?

MR PHOSA: What?

CHAIRPERSON: That he’s already denied that.

MR PHOSA: I actually didn’t understand that he denied it, and honesty I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: His answer was: "I did not get the impression that I was letting down the rest of the country, there was a flash-point here in Port Elizabeth".

MR PHOSA: No, no, I had said initially I’d understood him to say that and I came back and said: "Have a look at my notes, I want to give him a further opportunity on that", so I did understand that on that occasion he did deny but he might have done so but I didn’t understand that. Anyway I do not pursue that point, he’s answered it.

Now you said something yesterday about your not knowing anything about the poisoning of Mr Mthimkhulu. Do you still say so?

MR ERASMUS: What I’m saying is that I knew about that because it was printed, it was in all papers right through the world. Regarding this, I personally do not have any knowledge of who was responsible for this poisoning.

MR PHOSA: Did you get to know that there was some medical opinion regarding that incident, in other words, some medical views to whatever but did you know of any medical opinion regarding that particular incident?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I did not read that but I know that there were certain medical points of view.

MR PHOSA: When you say you know that here were certain medical points of view, are you saying yes, you aware that certain medical experts commented about this incident, are you saying yes?

MR ERASMUS: I have stated yes, it was also reflected in the local newspapers.

MR PHOSA: Without giving details - I just want to indicate to you what I am referring to and hear whether you also got to hear about that amongst other things. For instance, did you hear a mention that it was thallium poison, some thallium poisoning?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it disputed gentlemen that it was - he did suffer from thallium poisoning at the time set up in the reports and that he was treated for it?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we simply don’t know because you will know that not a single medical report in the sense of a clinical chemical analysis has ever served before any court of law, nor before this Commission so we don’t know but we’ve got no reason to deny that he suffered thallium poisoning. All that we’re saying is: "We don’t know how it happened".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it seems that one of the reasons why is that something mysterious happened to the samples on the way to the laboratory.

MR VISSER: Well that’s only part of the story ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: The other part is in the medical report which says what the report they received from an English laboratory ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: That’s missing. That we’ve never seem although we’ve asked for it for years Mr Chairman. The Harmse Commission tried to get hold of it and as far as I can remember, they didn’t even get hold of it. We don’t know what the doctor in England say, we know what Doctor Ames says the doctor in England says, but that’s all we know.

ADV DE JAGER: For purposes of this application, could we accept that nobody is applying for poising the deceased? If it can be proved that they’ve - there was an attempt to poison them, persons could be arrested, they could be brought before court unless they get amnesty. So if the present applicants had a hand in it, they could be charged and brought before a court of law because they’re not asking for amnesty as far as that is concerned.

MR VISSER: That is precisely correct Mr Chairman, and for that reason we will submit in argument - we didn’t want to interfere now, for that reason we will submit that the evidence in bundle B is irrelevant to this present hearing.

MR PHOSA: Just before that is concluded, I didn’t raise for the first time the issue of the poisoning, it came from the evidence in chief.

ADV DE JAGER: I’m not blaming you at all Mr PHOSA, I’m only stating a fact, that they can still be prosecuted.

MR PHOSA: I have no difficulty with all that if it’s not stopping me from questioning.

CHAIRPERSON: But I am now. I would like your comments gentlemen and if any members of the staff wish to make comments, at Bloemfontein where we had a similar hearing we found that three quarters of an hour was for sufficient for the long adjournment because everybody remained in the presence of the hall - I don’t know what the position is here.

MR VISSER: We have no objection at all Mr Chairman, of course bearing in mind the convenience of the witness, it perhaps is a long time for two hours on end to sit but let’s please continue from a quarter to two and the witnesses can signify if they’re uncomfortable.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR PHOSA: I’m in this - in the previous position where I walked into this case very late - all my work has to be faxed to me for me to get back - between one and two, it’s closed. I may request perhaps that at some stage I be given an opportunity to speak to my secretary. Either we stop at a quarter past one, sorry, we stop at a quarter to one so that I can just speak to her and then go on or we move in such a way that I can talk to her at 2 o’clock. I really wasn’t planning to be here and I’m going to be struck off in no time for not dealing with my work. But now ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We’ve sprung this on you today, let us rather say we will start at a quarter to two and we will take an adjournment at half past two, would that suit you?

MR PHOSA: Yes, that will suit me a lot, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we’ll adjourn now till a quarter to - sorry, I can’t see behind you, can you move? Does that suit the interpreters? Very well we will now adjourn until a quarter to two.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: We will proceed now with the hearing. I should perhaps inform everyone that - thanks to the co-operation of the staff and particularly the interpreters and the other members of the staff, we propose to continue with the hearing tomorrow and will then go on up till the end of the week including Friday, to try to complete it.

Right, Mr Phosa, do you have any further questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: (cont)

Yes, Mr Chairman. I want to take you back - this is something that I’ve come across in my note which may have led me to perhaps putting to you what you take as an incorrect position. I’m just reading a summary of how I put it. You were dealing with the question when you were asked - when you began you answers this morning - being asked by Mr Visser, you were referring - you referred to pressure that came from above, you mentioned how you grew up - your Christian background, you also mentioned your own long career in the police force, certain influences also that had an effect on your - perhaps your decision. Now you said the pressure came from amongst others, politicians or political organs, the head office etc., for you to produce more positive results. There was also pressure from - sorry, so far did I sum up correctly what you were saying?

MR ERASMUS: It is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: That was pressure being put to you as the Port Elizabeth branch of the security police, is that so?

MR ERASMUS: It is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Yes, in other words then I understood from that, to say that the feeling was that your branch - at these discussions, your branch had to do more than other branches to solve the problem.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we’ve been through this on more than one occasion and he’s given his denial quite categorically, he says that was never the impression. I was a matter throughout the country, everybody was under pressure to do more to address the situation ...[intervention]

MR PHOSA: I object my learned friend, I give you an answer that amounts to an answer - an objection.

CHAIRPERSON: Nowhere has he said, Mr Phosa, that the pressure was on his branch only, you keep putting it but he has not agreed to that in his evidence.

MR PHOSA: I have the right to put to the witness what I understand from what I’ve written down and I’ve been fair enough to write it down, so he has the right to say: "I disagree" - I don’t like answers coming from individuals who are other than a witness, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: Nothing that you have written down accords with the last question you put. You cannot put to a witness something he has not said and say: "That is so", you can ask him: "If that is not the fact you position", but you can’t put it as something he has said Mr Phosa.

MR PHOSA: But I’ve done exactly that Mr Chairman, I said: "That led me to understand that, is that correct". Who else must I ask, I can’t ask the Chairperson, I can’t ask Mr Visser, he must answer the question and I put the question - I repeat: "Is that my correct interpretation", I have never heard that I can’t say that. I’ve given a fair background of what I’ve written - my interpretation and I’m asking is that fair? I’m not coming with it from - sucking it from nowhere.

CHAIRPERSON: Was any particular pressure on the Eastern Cape branch other than the pressure on the other branches?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I think there was a big pressure here in the Easter Cape because this division was the flash-point because of the continuous unrest situation.

MR PHOSA: I will get an apology from all of you for being - viewed as being unfair to the witness.

So quite clearly then when you left that meeting, you felt that your branch or your division was required to do more than it had done up to them?

MR ERASMUS: I wish to explain to the Chairman the following, it was a once off situation, these discussion that there should be done more in the Eastern Cape, in the P.E. and environment, was a continuous discussion. It was my duty but because the situation deteriorated, we had to take extra steps in this regard.

MR PHOSA: Whatever your answer is, my next question is, did you as the head of this branch not feel as a policeman - "look, it’s a bad reflection on us as policemen to suggest or even give the impression that we are failing", now didn’t that hurt your pride as a policeman?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, it had nothing to do with my pride or the pride of my people, it had to do with the solution and the handling of an impossible situation.

MR PHOSA: I’ve heard and understood your answer but I’m deliberately now putting it to you - it was a question, you are at liberty to stick to your reply. I put it to you that what in fact was - if those meetings did take place in the form you say, what it in fact was, you felt that you as a police force, this branch that you were had failed to contain the situation and in desperation to save your pride - not for political reasons, to save your pride you decided to kill these two young men.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I deny it in total.

MR PHOSA: You gave a background referring to a number of - to a few instances being examples of what - how rife the unrest or political instability was in the Eastern Cape and you went right back to even as far as the incident at Graaf Reinet, do you remember that - at the funeral in Graaf Reinet?

MR ERASMUS: I’ve mentioned that Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Are you saying for instance that that event that took place so long ago with regard to either Mr Buthalezi or his guard - I’m not sure which, that event had a bearing upon your action in 1982?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying yes, it did have an influence and it shows what they were capable of already at that stage.

MR PHOSA: Are you also saying the event in Sharpville, Vereniging so many years back had a bearing on what you did here in 1982 regarding these two young men?

MR ERASMUS: I believe so yes, that from where I have started, my first experience with these political marches, this political unrest that it already became evident that the Black people were not satisfied with the Government of the day and it did make an impression on me.

MR PHOSA: Before I go further on the issues I’m raising with you, just to -for a while confine myself to the Sharpville event, did I understand you correctly to be saying that the people who were shot there were shot because of their own conduct?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I can’t comment on Sharpville, I’ve mentioned it together with Langa in Cape Town. I was not involved in Sharpville, at that time I was stationed in Cape Town.

MR PHOSA: No, you can’t just say things and expect us to keep quiet about them. What to you is the relevance of Sharpeville and the conduct of people in justifying anything you have done?

MR ERASMUS: What had happened there, I can’t say what had happened there but the political situation arising from a certain march led to certain things, indicating to me that this was leading to chaos and this was what we were heading for during those years.

MR PHOSA: In fairness to you or perhaps in fairness to me, when you were giving that evidence, I listened entirely to the interpretation so it might not be - I’m not saying it’s not, it may just be that I didn’t get you correctly and I need to say this because I found it strange. Were you saying that insofar as it was important to you that, the people of Sharpeville - the ones who were shot, went and presented whatever the complaint was and on their way back they behaved violently and therefore got shot? That’s how it came through on the interpretation. Where you saying that - yes or no?

MR ERASMUS: If I remember correctly Mr Chairman, after this march in Cape Town the next two incidents arose, the one at Langa and the one in Sharpeville where people were shot dead. I did not expand on that as far as I know.

ADV DE JAGER: Weren’t both incidents part of the freedom struggle?

MR PHOSA: Answer Mr - I’m not sure if the Commission is asking me, your answer please?

ADV DE JAGER: Were the incidents in Sharpeville and the present uprisings part of the freedom struggle?

MR ERASMUS: It was the beginning of this liberation struggle.

MR PHOSA: Your beginning of the liberation struggle is very limited, the struggle started long before that. Anyway, am I not correct in my understanding that right through the country there were incidents of violence, in other words violence was not restricted to the Eastern Cape?

MR ERASMUS: I came from Pietermaritzburg in Natal at that stage and nothing was happening there in comparison to what was happening here. I would not deny that elsewhere incidents like these were happening.

MR PHOSA: Do I understand that - sorry, the suggestion that elimination be resorted to was for the entire country, in other words the idea as you understood it the police all over the country where there was a problem like this, must destroy - kill people?

MR ERASMUS: I cannot speak on behalf of other people, what they understood and how they regarded that, I can’t explain that here.

MR PHOSA: As you understood it did it say, now the suggestion is that police must now consider all over the country wherever there’s a problem of this nature - eliminate ...[inaudible]

MR ERASMUS: I don’t understand it in that way.

MR PHOSA: Therefore anyway we’ve covered that, I think you were saying it was really aiming at the situation in the Eastern Cape. Now did Mr - from your reports you got, did Mr Mthimkhulu make a statement in the form of a confession whilst he was in detention?

MR ERASMUS: I did not see his confession Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Was his statement irrelevant to you or irrelevant to this decision whether or not he should be killed? Isn’t it something that you would have like to see - what he says?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, at that stage no statement was shown to me, no confession was shown to me. If it was a confession, I did not see it.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know if there was a confession in existence, whether he had made a confession?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, no.

MR PHOSA: Of course he’d been there, he’d been in detention for the greater part of 1981, wasn’t he?

MR ERASMUS: He was detained for a long time Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: For interrogation obviously, not for fun?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, that was what the legislation made provision for.

MR PHOSA: I put two questions - you mean for interrogation? He was detained for interrogation?

MR ERASMUS: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Was he interrogated?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, he was interrogated.

MR PHOSA: Because you as the senior person there were bound to be given reports from time to time as to whether or not he was answering questions and as to whether he was answering in a satisfactory manner, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: It is so Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: How was he answering?

MR ERASMUS: At this stage I cannot remember what he answered.

MR PHOSA: If he was confessing that would be a very important occurrence, isn’t it - to you as a police?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it would have been important, outstanding confessions which we could have used.

MR PHOSA: From another reply of your where you said something like: "If he’d been charged there would have been no successful prosecution - I’m not using your exact words, something like that. Do you remember saying that?

MR VISSER: With respect Mr Chairman, that was in regard to Madaka, no evidence in that regard was presented in regard to Mr Mthimkhulu.

MR PHOSA: Now, you’ve just heard your counsel, do you agree with him that you didn’t say that because I don’t remember and I ask you seriously?

MR ERASMUS: I did mention that there was not enough evidence to institute successful prosecutions.

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairperson, I’m about to ask that the next time Mr Visser wants to say something, he’d better clear his mind about his correctness because right now it’s the second time I’m being interrupted unduly.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I take exception to that, the record will show who was right and who was wrong in the end, with respect. It’s my duty point out to you when my learned friend places questions to the witness which are not based on the evidence. I submit that we will see on the record who was right later.

MR PHOSA: Mr Erasmus, you and I are in agreement now let’s go on your evidence that you and I understand you have given. Now, why would a prosecution have been unsuccessful if you had tried to go against Mr Mthimkhulu - in your opinion?

MR ERASMUS: A prosecution would be unsuccessful because there was not enough evidence and even evidence to present in a criminal court. No person here would give evidence in a criminal case against Mthimkhulu and that was because of intimidation, he wouldn’t have lived the next day.

MR PHOSA: I am aware of cases all over the country but more pertinently in the Eastern Cape where it appeared a lot where a number of people - political people - politico’s were detained, they made admission in terms whilst interrogated and subsequently made statement on which they were convicted, aren’t you aware of such?

MR ERASMUS: I cannot deny that such cases might have happened.

MR PHOSA: Do you have records or have you destroyed them, concerning Mr Mthimkhulu’s detention?

MR ERASMUS: I cannot tell you, I left P.E. in 1983, if there’s still records available I do not know.

MR PHOSA: Are you giving evidence here all this time and all the details and things you have done without sight of any documentation regarding that period?

MR ERASMUS: In other documents or publications you can find a lot of this information I have provided, I did not have access to Government documents.

MR PHOSA: Is your answer to this effect that since 1983 up to today, you have not had sight of the records regarding Mr Mthimkhulu’s detention by the security police in your division?

MR ERASMUS: I did not control - I did not look at any of these records.

MR PHOSA: Does the same apply to Mr Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: But as you know the position, you would expect - if everything goes normally, that those records are available to date. If everything is being done properly, those records should be available.

MR ERASMUS: If everything went in a normal way those documents will still be available.

MR PHOSA: Now, those records would indicate firstly when Mr - when each of them was detained, wouldn’t they do that?

MR ERASMUS: It is so, yes.

MR PHOSA: By whom they were arrested and by whom they were interrogated?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: The occasions when they were interrogated and the places where they were interrogated?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: And they ought also to have the various notes or statements or just call them scribblings of what they were saying, all that ought to be found somewhere?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t tell you whether it is still available because I don’t know.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, by "ought" I mean if everything goes normally one would expect to find all that?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Just before the lunch adjournment, I made reference to poisoning to what you had said in court - before the Commission, do you remember that? I put that you had said you nothing about the poisoning, do you remember me saying that?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Yes, now why I referred to - to make it - to shorten this now, why I referred to medical experts is because in the records - in the information provided for me to ask here, there is a portion where some medical experts say something. Now in brief, one of the things they say is this and I want your comment on that, they say this kind of poison is very, very rare, officially it was continued in South Africa, did you see that?

CHAIRPERSON: Where is this?

MR PHOSA: May the Commission just bear with me please, Chairperson? Tall order. Whilst I’m looking Mr Chairperson, could it be that we are the only ones who have this information? Does the Commission not have anything from Doctor Ames?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I just want the reference - page number.

MR PHOSA: I’m one of those who can’t give page numbers, I only arrived on the case, page numbers are a problem to me.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there are various references, the first is page 42, that is where Doctor Marais, Doctor Abe Marais gives a statement in regard to Mr Siphiwe Mthimkhulu and the second paragraph where he says

"This opinion is held for several reasons firstly,"

and then he continues to refer to the rarity of it.

MR PHOSA: That is precisely the one I’m referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Except the ...[inaudible]

MR PHOSA: Now it says firstly, well he puts it this way

"We the undersigned Francis Rix Ames and Adrian David Marais declare under oath that the deliberate administration of thallium to anybody indicates a sophisticated knowledge of chemistry and/or toxicology or access to such knowledge by the perpetrator of such a poisoning".

Then he says:

"This opinion is held for several reasons firstly, thallium poisoning has been extremely rare in the past few decades since it’s use is a - as a rodenticide was discontinued.

In 1974, Cavana et Al" - then he mentions a "...[inaudible] reported three cases of deliberate poisoning. He noted that it was extremely rare in Britain".

That really is the jest of my cross-examination really, it’s based on that. What is suggested here is that, it’s a rare poison, difficult to come by and that people who administer it must be people who know very well. I now your story, you know nothing about it, you can’t dispute - you won’t dispute this suggestion here, you don’t dispute this?

MR ERASMUS: I do not deny this, I’m not a chemist either.

MR PHOSA: I appears - now you are free to disagree with me or answer in any other form, it appears or it has appeared in the past - I’m going to refer to personal experience without giving evidence and you can disagree, that the security police have means, financial means as the police, to acquire most items that they think are necessary for their use, including - say for, chemicals, explosives, ammunition. They can acquire these things even if in law they are forbidden- possession in law is forbidden, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: It is correct, you could obtain that. Explosives were available in this dispensation.

MR PHOSA: Lately you must have read about or heard about Doctor Neethling, you must have lately heard about him, haven’t you?

MR ERASMUS: I know Doctor Neethling.

MR PHOSA: How do you know him as, what is he?

MR ERASMUS: If reference is made at General Neethling or the former General Neethling, I know him.

MR PHOSA: I have no personal knowledge but he’s accredited with being an expert when it comes to science and chemistry, isn’t he?

MR ERASMUS: I think he was a well known chemist.

MR PHOSA: And he is associated with the police, in other words he was practising his chemistry in his capacity as a member of the police force?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, he was a policeman.

CHAIRPERSON: He was in charge of the laboratories in Pretoria, wasn’t he?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Just finally on that aspect, you have learnt that he’s being accused of having utilised his knowledge of science and chemistry improperly in his capacity as a policeman, you are aware of that? I said accused.

MR ERASMUS: I am aware of that, yes.

MR PHOSA: Did I understand you to say the security police do not assault people - now please don’t fight me if I’m wrong just correct me, did I understand you to say that? That they not assault people they interrogate?

MR ERASMUS: I said that I did not assault these deceased people and that they were not assaulted in my presence, I think that is what I said.

MR PHOSA: Right, let’s think about it now, let’s think about it very carefully. I work on the basis that to kill is worse than to assault generally, what do you say?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR PHOSA: If it was - if it could be necessary in order to solve a problem, political or otherwise, assaulting would also naturally be legitimate, isn’t it? Do you understand my question? Let me just repeat that. If it was decided that this x, y, z, is a problem, say for instance he never admits it and yet he does it - he never admits his involvement and meanwhile he’s causing more problems, then you feel no, let him eliminated. Assaulting him would just be a natural part of it, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: If you’re referring to this case, I want to repeat that I don’t have any personal knowledge of an assault on Mr Madaka or Mr Mthimkhulu. It was not committed in my presence if there are such allegations.

MR PHOSA: Sir, what is your - I’m not intending to be hard on you, what is your standard of education?

MR ERASMUS: I did matric and then I wrote all the further exams.

MR PHOSA: And with we have heard, what we could call considerable experience as a policeman?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I was in the police force for many years.

MR PHOSA: You’re bilingual?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I am.

MR PHOSA: My question was simply if it were - now meaning a hypothetical situation where the police were to say: "Now we should do it", if it had to be decided that someone must be eliminated for reasons given - good reasons as far as police are concerned, surely assaulting him is but a minor portion of that exercise, in other words it will be quite natural that he should be assaulted?

MR ERASMUS: I suppose it could be like that.

MR PHOSA: Consequently, if any of the members of your team of the Port Elizabeth branch who had been at these meetings where there was talk of elimination, had decided: "Maybe before we eliminate this man, let us beat him up", that wouldn’t surprise you would it? I don’t say your instructions, if they decided so - that wouldn’t surprise you would it?

MR ERASMUS: That was never discussed, assault was never discussed and you’re asking whether it would have surprised me, I can’t see in this context why somebody would make such a remark.

MR PHOSA: Maybe I didn’t make myself clear then to you. For purposes of this discussion - don’t think about yourself and any of your members but - any of these four and there only were four of you, let’s just say a member of your team who was aware that there is a problem in the Eastern Cape coming from COSAS and the lives of Mthimkhulu and Madaka, who was equally aware that elimination was discussed as one of the solutions, then he’s given Mthimkhulu who goes on denying. If he thought to himself: "Perhaps before this man gets killed let me just rough him up", that would be an understandable attitude of a member of the police force in that situation, do you understand me?

MR ERASMUS: No, it would not be acceptable and I ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Erasmus, what the advocate is putting to you is this, here you have a person who is causing trouble and ultimately you decide that the person has to be killed, why did you not try to see whether the problem could be solved by just assaulting him first? Perhaps an assault would have caused him to change his views and he would stop giving trouble.

MR ERASMUS: Chairperson, I now understand what this is leading to. I’ve already said that if we had detained Mthimkhulu again at that stage then - in order to assault him, well I’ve already sketched what the consequences would have been, so we didn’t consider it.

MR PHOSA: Look I’ve given you enough opportunity to deal with that, let’s pass on. You are aware that Mr Mthimkhulu though and Mr Madaka perhaps - let’s talk about one Mr Mthimkhulu, alleged that he was assaulted whilst in detention in your area under your command.

MR ERASMUS: I’m aware of that.

MR PHOSA: In terms of physical condition, in other words whether this could happen or not, if any of the members of your police force - the security police had so decided to assault him of course it was not impossible, it could be done physically - I’m not saying they wanted to but it could be done physically, you can’t say: "Oh no, the conditions there are such that it couldn’t be done, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is so.

MR PHOSA: Are you aware of any member of the security police in your area who has anywhere alleged that Mthimkhulu was assaulted by members of your team during interrogation?

MR ERASMUS: Could you repeat the question please?

MR PHOSA: Did any member of the security police in your division at any stage allege that Mthimkhulu was assaulted by your team during interrogation? Have you come across any such allegation?

MR ERASMUS: No.

MR PHOSA: Did anybody before I did - okay sorry, can I repeat - withdraw and repeat it in a different form? Before you stood up yesterday and gave evidence here - evidence in chief being led by Mr Visser, had anybody every suggested or asked you whether or not you were aware of an allegation that your members did that, in other words, did someone say to you: "A member of the security police claims that there was an assault"?

MR ERASMUS: I have no such knowledge and I wasn’t asked.

MR PHOSA: So I am therefore the first person to make a suggestion to you that a member of the security police in your division made such an accusation, I’m the first person to say that to you?

MR ERASMUS: Whether a member of my team made such allegations?

CHAIRPERSON: No, a member of the security police in your division made allegations that he had been assaulted by members of your team that - when I say he I’m of course talking about Mthimkhulu.

MR ERASMUS: I think what I said is that I had no knowledge of somebody in my team had assaulted Mr Mthimkhulu and I was not present during such an assault, I didn’t take part in such an assault if it happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any knowledge of a member of the security police in your division saying it did happen, that is the question.

MR ERASMUS: ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: The reply which I don’t think came over the machine was: "No, I didn’t".

MR PHOSA: Perhaps my comment doesn’t matter but I’m a bit astonished about that but you see - Mr Chairman, please bear with me, in the course of the rush yesterday I ended up not knowing what number - what bundle this is.

MR VISSER: It’s B page 7.

MR PHOSA: Okay thank you, thank you. Now, thank you very much. According to bundle B on page 7 there is a person called - who goes by the name of Hamilton Bobelo, now do you know such a person?

MR ERASMUS: There was such a person, he was a member of my staff while I was stationed here and I think this piece was shown to me by the advocate, now that I see it and the name of Bobelo, I think so.

MR PHOSA: Now you suddenly remember now that: "Yes, I think my advocate showed me this".

MR ERASMUS: I’m convinced that he did show it to me.

MR PHOSA: Is it a - sorry, - is it a matter of no real consequence to you that a member of your team says something about an improper conduct by your team?

MR ERASMUS: I’m sure it is important, perhaps I didn’t understand you correctly because you didn’t refer to this case. I didn’t know specifically what you were referring to.

MR PHOSA: I shall not even bother to follow up your answer, the record will show. Anyway let’s come to him now, is there anything that is reported as having been said by Mr Bobelo that makes you uncomfortable?

MR ERASMUS: Not at all. I have no knowledge of the content of this document.

MR PHOSA: Lest there be a misunderstanding - an alleged misunderstanding later, are you saying that you did not read this document and it was not read by anyone else to you until now?

MR ERASMUS: It wasn’t read to me.

MR PHOSA: So all you mean is, you just saw the name there - the name was mentioned Hamilton Bobelo and nothing else was said about what is contained therein?

MR ERASMUS: I think a remark was made that he alleged that there was an assault but it wasn’t applicable to me personally.

MR PHOSA: Can you please - your memory seems to recover slowly, can you tell the Commission - the Committee what it is you remember was said about Mr Bobelo? Please try, I’m asking you seriously.

MR ERASMUS: I know that this document was shown to me but it wasn’t discussed in detail, I didn’t read it. It was shown to me, the remark was made that he had made the allegation about the assault.

MR PHOSA: What allegation about the assault, it’s not clear to me? I’m not saying you must suck it out of your thumb but what was said to you as having being said by Mr Bobelo about the assault?

MR ERASMUS: As I’ve already explained to the Committee, I didn’t read the document, the allegation - if it is contained in this document, pertains to either Mr Madaka or Mr Mthimkhulu.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say also as I understand you, that neither your attorney nor your counsel discussed this document with you? And by that I mean discussed the contents with you.

MR ERASMUS: We didn’t discuss it.

MR PHOSA: I noticed that you and your counsel and I must commend both of you, did a lot of preparation for this case - for this application, isn’t it - the two of you and maybe your attorney as well, isn’t it" - you did a lot of preparation for this case?

MR ERASMUS: That is true.

MR PHOSA: You even drew his attention to something that was said my Mr Miditshwa when you were not present.

MR VISSER: No, that’s not so Mr Chairman with respect, I found that on my own.

MR PHOSA: Your counsel is answering the questions I’m putting.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect to my learned friend, with great respect, I told the Committee in the present of my learned friend Mr PHOSA - if he’d been listening, that we were present here on the day when the evidence was given. We knew about that evidence and we drew your attention to it. I didn’t ask or need my client to tell me about that evidence.

MR PHOSA: My apologies. Can I ask him and please, may I ask the question, did you at any stage discuss with your counsel the aspect that was raised yesterday about - in the evidence of Mr Maditshwa, did you?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Visser discussed it with me, he showed me a phrase there which we dealt with yesterday.

MR PHOSA: You obviously gave your own reaction to the phrase before you came here to give evidence, you gave him your views on it. Your answer Sir?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I did give my view about it.

MR PHOSA: Now, you did not want anything that reflects badly on you to go uncorrected, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: All I can say is that that is not so.

MR PHOSA: I don’t propose worrying you about something you haven’t read and that you haven’t discussed with your counsel regarding Mr Bobelo, save to say to you, I have personally interviewed Mr Bobelo and what I interviewed him about confirms - he confirms what appears here.

I had a talk with him this morning, he confirms what appears here. Now obviously there’s nothing we can do about that because you don’t know what’s contained in it? There’s nothing we can do about that, you know nothing that’s contained here.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you kindly assist me and refer me to the exact passage that links Mr Bobelo and Erasmus in the affidavit please?

MR PHOSA: I just thought that this gentleman is in charge of all the police who interrogated Mr Bobelo - Mr Mthimkhulu ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: No, I’m only asking you a question, could you kindly refer me in the evidence in order to assist me to evaluate things, where Mr Bobelo said that he implicated him in this affidavit?

MR PHOSA: I repeat, ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: No, no please, I’m also going to repeat my question and I’d like an answer to that too.

MR PHOSA: Now I’m not so sure that I’m being cross-examined here now, I’m giving the answers as a lawyer as I understand the legal position. This witness has claimed from time to time that these people were under him and the reports of interrogation have been reported to him, so when a witness - a person from his area says, the relevant person was assaulted I don’t want to see a statement here saying: "I told so and so".

The matter can be argued later if I’m wrong, I really don’t ...[inaudible] further. I don’t see why I should do that, how can I do that. I the suggestion is - I don’t understand why it should be made, that the head of a team - of an area, when members of this team are reported by part of his team to have assaulted ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: The only thing I’m asking is, whether this affidavit - whether Mr Bobelo said somewhere that he reported it to Erasmus, that’s all I wanted to know.

MR PHOSA: The record is before the Commission, they had it before I came, the contents of it are there, I’ve given my views on it, I cannot do much more than that. I cannot do ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: I only asked you to assist me. If there’s some specific passage here where Mr Mabola said - Bobelo said: "I discussed this with the witness". Kindly assist me in pointing it out so that I can write it down, it’ll sort of make it easier for us in the long run to judge the whole matter and I’ve asked your assistance but if you can’t give it to me, it’s okay, I’ll do it myself.

MR PHOSA: Besides that Mr de Jager - Mr Commissioner - Committee member, I have difficulty in law as to why you want me to do that. It has no relevance because ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Because it’s only decent for counsel to assist - it’s only decent for counsel to assist Committee members and that’s the reason why I asked you to do so but if you’re not prepared to do so, I’ll do it myself, I’ve already said so, so could we kindly continue.

MR PHOSA: Except that Mr Commissioner, my difficulty is you asked me to answer and explain and when I explained you stopped me. All I’m saying is the way I see it, it is not necessary for the Commission or the Committee to find that kind of answer from the witness - from the potential witness or this security policemen, all that is important is that he accuses that team of assaulting the very Mthimkhulu in an interrogation that has been mentioned here - during a period mentioned here and therefore I would therefore expect that by definition that is relevant to Mr Erasmus. Now, I ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: I’m not disputing that, I’ve asked you only to assist me in giving me the passage and that’s all I’ve been asking you, I’m ...[inaudible]

MR PHOSA: No, I’m unable to assist.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, may I reluctantly join in the thray? On the basis of the questions and the fairness to the questions to Mr Erasmus, I wish to point out that nowhere in this affidavit has Mr Gerrit Erasmus been implicated by Mr Bobelo. In point of fact Mr Bobelo himself, refers to a period of time which you will notice at page 9 the second last paragraph, where he states that Nick van Rensburg was in charge of the security branch.

So, I don’t know Mr Chairman, whether this refers to the occasion when Mr Mthimkhulu was detained in 1981, bearing in mind that it is common cause that he was detained on more than one occasion. So I didn’t want unnecessarily to object ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It says 1981 on the first page of it, a Friday in 1981.

MR VISSER: Oh yes, oh yes but the problem remains a problem Mr Chairman, and with respect there is no implication of Mr Erasmus in this affidavit nor any reason why this should have been given to him to read or detail - discussed with him in detail.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have thought it was extremely cogent when there are allegations that this man was detained for 5 months, assaulted by the police, an action has been instituted against the Minister and now there is an affidavit from a policeman who says he was there. I would certainly have discussed it with my client Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, only insofar as the allegation is concerned but not the detail yes, certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: While we’re about it don’t you Colonel, that an action was instituted against the Minister for damages arising out of the alleged assault during detention?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I know about this action which was instituted.

MR PHOSA: Now you have repeatedly said how remorseful you feel about what has happened - I’m dealing with the elimination of these two young people, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: It is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Once more, when that particular aspect of your evidence was tendered, I listened exclusively to the English interpretation so I want to be sure in my mind that you said so. Did you say that the - when the earliest opportunity for you to clear your heard - your breast of this matter, presented itself you did so?

I would not like Mr Visser to say: "He didn’t say so" and shake his head because the witness is next to him, please. Commit yourself - I have - I’m referring to evidence, did you say - and please remember this evidence, did you say that when the earliest opportunity arose for you to indicate your remorse, you did so. Did you or did you not say that?

MR ERASMUS: What I said Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember, is that this opportunity which the Commission is offering which I’m putting all the facts on the table, that I’m using that opportunity.

MR PHOSA: It will be important and you can make your decision on it, and I’m not going to ask further, I just want your answer. Are you saying I am wrong in saying that you said, when the earliest opportunity presented itself you took it? Now you can say you didn’t say that or you did say that.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I can’t remember whether I’ve said the earliest opportunity, you may be right but what I’m saying is, an opportunity had been created by the Commission, whether it was the earliest opportunity, perhaps it was.

MR PHOSA: For 15 years Mr Erasmus, you kept this terrible deed as your own secret - you and your colleagues, I’m talking about you now, as you own secret?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Not only that for part of that 15 years - you get up out of that 15 years - sorry my apologies, ...[inaudible] but for part of that 15 years - the early portion of it, you continued as on paper a respectable honest policeman, isn’t’ it? You continued working as a - sorry, highly placed policeman, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: You continued occupying the position of a Commissioner of Oaths, the sort of person before whom the truth is told, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: You were in a position and you must have made other swear to you that they’re speaking the truth, meanwhile you had a big lie in your heart. You were sitting on a big lie.

MR ERASMUS: That is true.

MR PHOSA: In fact as we now know - at least as we know, there were two big lies concerning the death of three people that you would not have divulged at all to any person other than the three who were with you or the five who were involved with you?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Really, when it suits you, you lie, isn’t it - when it suits you, you lie, don’t you?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I have said this secret concerning these deeds, I did not divulge that to anybody so when did I lie then?

MR PHOSA: When you led - you concealed the truth from those who seek it, you are deliberately misleading them, don’t you, aren’t you?

MR ERASMUS: It is not so Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: You made a calculated decision not to mention or divulge this incident to anyone other than those who were involved with you in the two instances, isn’t that so - the two incidents?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, they knew about that.

MR PHOSA: I don’t know why you emphasised the wrong part, I would expect you to say: "It is correct, I made a calculated decision that other than these here, no-one else should know", that’s the emphasis.

MR ERASMUS: The statement is also correct.

MR PHOSA: Even when - may the Commission bear with me? Even when last year the TRC, that is The Truth and Reconciliation Committee was listening to victims and your name amongst others was mentioned ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Can we please refer to where exactly that occurred Mr Chairman please - before this questioning is continued with because we’re not aware of that?

MR PHOSA: Can I just rephrase that question, I’m trying to finish this without any further debates on this now.

MR VISSER: I’m going to object to that question Mr Chairman, I first want to see whether my learned friend has a ground for asking the question. He refers to last year - I take it June 198, June last year, when there was evidence heard in this hall about Mthimkhulu and Madaka and he is suggesting that Gerrit Erasmus’s name was mentioned or that he was implicated. We’re not aware of that as we’re sitting her and we’d like to see whether my learned friend is correct.

In point of fact Mr Chairman, we pointed out to you on the record, the only instance where Gerrit Erasmus’s name was mentioned that is at page 44 and page 45. Now if that is what my learned friend refers to then I suggest he puts that to Mr Erasmus.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible

MR VISSER: The document we gave you this morning, the two pages. That’s the only reference to Gerrit Erasmus, we made it quite plain yesterday in all of the evidence that was given on the 26th of June last year.

ADV SANDI: Mr PHOSA, should the question not really be: "When the Human Rights Violations Committee of the Truth Commission gathered here last year, that was a continuation of the process of seeking the truth and what was his reaction to that. Is that what you’re trying to put to the witness?

MR PHOSA: I am but I’m you see I’m at a disadvantage. My learned friend wants me to give a page which I can’t do because I’ve just walked into this, I would need to look for the page. Otherwise, that’s the question I’m asking, that’s the question I’m asking.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there such a page? Is this the bundle that you gave me yesterday - which I gave to you yesterday? Surely you made a note of the page if there was such a page Mr Phosa, if you saw it. What is the page number, is what Mr Visser wants to know?

MR PHOSA: I did not act on the basis purely of that document I was given yesterday, I was given instructions that there was an application by members of the security police and I assumed then that he was one of them so as soon as the objection was raised I wanted to stop and get instructions.

So I’m only entitled to do the way I got it from, to go where I got it from so I’m busy doing that now. And I’m not going to look for pages that I haven’t seen. I didn’t see that in any page, I’m acting on instructions so I think I’m entitled to go back to my instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: What are your instructions, can your attorney give evidence to that effect?

MR PHOSA: No, I don’t want him to give evidence, I want to go and get my instructions and since it’s ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: From whom do you get instructions if not your attorney?

MR PHOSA: May the court, may the Commission - the Chairperson just bear with me. I know how to get the source of information that I had got, I don’t have to tell everybody how I am going to get it. I need a stand down - it’s a time that I’d would ask for anyway much earlier, I’ll use that and use this for also finding out. I don’t have to tell everybody how I’m going to get that information and if it’s wrong I’ll come and say so. I have no fear of saying so.

CHAIRPERSON: Five minutes. I apologise, we did say half past two.

MR PHOSA: Five minutes will be inadequate now because I require it for the phone call, I require it for getting the information.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I don’t think that should take more than five minutes Mr Phosa.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: (cont)

Regarding the question I raised, the objection was properly taken. My instructions - I misunderstood my instructions. It is not so much that this witness was mentioned and that he himself objected. I was referring to - I was going to refer because it never came out, I was going to refer to the application which was made in which the Committee was being interdicted from mentioning names of alleged assailants. Now, I understood then that he was one of them, so I’m going - I’m withdrawing that question but I’m continuing in that vein in a different form.

You are aware that an application was made before the Human Rights Committee of the TRC last year here ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: With respect Mr Chairman, may I assist my learned friend. On the 11th of April of last year, certain notices were sent out by the TRC, inter alias to some 20 ex-security policemen, two of whom were Mr Nick van Rensburg who is here today for whom we don’t appear today, and Mr du Preez, who is not here - who is not implicated in this affair. The point that was taken was in an application to the Supreme Court of Cape Town, that insufficient notification had been given and that there was refusal to provide information as to what the matter was about.

His Lordship, Mr Justice King gave a judgement in favour of the applicants, it was overturned by the full bench of the Cape Provincial Division and the Appellate Division upheld the judgment of King J and that is what happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR PHOSA: Did you become aware last year in whatever manner, that there was an application being made or intended to be made by alleged victims regarding amongst others, conduct of security policemen? Did you become aware at all before hand or at any stage that there was intended to bring such an application?

MR ERASMUS: There was an application but the circumstances surrounding it and what it was about, I do not know.

MR PHOSA: Did it occur to you that there are some grumblings, in other words there’s a lot of activity about people who are concerned and who want to know information about, amongst other things, the death of Siphiwe Mthimkhulu and Madaka? Did you realise that the people are getting concerned about that last year?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, I saw the press regarding this matter.

MR PHOSA: You did not in any way take any steps to assist them in their concerns by in whatever manner, letting them know what really happened - you did not.

MR ERASMUS: No, I did not.

MR PHOSA: Your big concern about what you had done was still with you then, you were still as worried as you’ve been telling us, about the fact that you had killed these two kids, weren’t you?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it is so Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Now wasn’t that an opportunity for you to say: "Let me come forward now man, let me come forward and say something about this"?

MR ERASMUS: It could have been an opportunity but I was planning to apply for amnesty.

ADV SANDI: You eventually applied as you say, you are planning to apply for amnesty at this stage, you eventually applied for amnesty, when did you actually do that? I’m not talking about the date when the application was received by the Amnesty Committee.

MR ERASMUS: I can’t remember the specific date but it was during the second half of last year, I think it was during the third quarter.

MR PHOSA: You Mr Erasmus, did not apply for amnesty at the earliest available opportunity for you to do so?

MR ERASMUS: I want to tell the Committee that that in itself was a very difficult decision for us, it was difficult for us to do that. I understand what you are telling me, that to come to the fore and make full disclosure is just as difficult.

MR PHOSA: Look, I’ve heard you and I’m not being funny, I want to understand you clearly so I may even in the course of this cause you to repeat what you’ve said but it is in endeavour to understand you. Are you first of all saying: "Yes, I did not take the first available opportunity to apply for amnesty", it that a yes or a no?

MR ERASMUS: If this session that you’re referring to was the first possibility, I did not Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: I’m not sure where we part company. When the law was announced that people can apply for amnesty, you were not amongst the first people to do that.

MR ERASMUS: I don’t think so Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Even after you got to know that you could apply for amnesty, whatever the reasons are you remained deliberating whether to do so or not to do so.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: You did not approach the family of these unfortunate children either - these two young men, you did not approach that family to apologise privately?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I did not know these people. While I was here this short time, I’ve never met any of them, saw them, they never approached me, I do not know these people.

MR PHOSA: Well the truth of the matter is, you never entertained that idea of approaching the family surely?

MR ERASMUS: No, I did not Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Then did you learn that some of your - some of the police - I’m not sure if you are amongst them, but some of these security police were having an application in court requiring certain things to be done, the ones mentioned by my learned friend. Did you learn of that application? You heard him saying something here explaining, did you learn of that application?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I know there was an application.

MR PHOSA: Were you not amongst those?

MR ERASMUS: No, I was not there.

MR PHOSA: Did you ever speak to those members and say - and just discuss their attitude towards the whole discussion, did you approach them at all - the other policemen, just to find out what their attitude is?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I do not know who they were and nobody contacted me and I did not have contact with any or them.

MR PHOSA: Just one more thing, you said something about your church background. What is the relevance of your church background to what you have done?

MR ERASMUS: The relevance Mr Chairman, is that I am a believer. I served in the church for a short time and I want to tell the Committee today that in Port Elizabeth after or before that incident I resigned and never ever I served in any church council.

MR PHOSA: I don’t recall now whether I listened to your Afrikaans direct answer when you gave that during your evidence in chief or as you were being asked perhaps by Mr Booyens, but I do recall that what I understood had nothing to do with what you’re saying now. When you spoke about church background you were not telling us about your resigning, it was part of your background and I thought you were trying to say it’s relevant the court - we must consider that here when it comes to your action. Is it irrelevant to why you did this?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I did not refer to my resignation, I just remembered it that at that stage I had resigned. While you’re asking me I’m just mentioning it.

MR PHOSA: All right, maybe you forgotten that why you mentioned it. Can I just ask you this way, does your church do like most churches that I know of - that say: "Thou shalt not kill"?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, we see that in the 10 Commandments.

MR PHOSA: And you were also brought up in that manner in your church?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Does your church also say: "You must not lie"?

MR ERASMUS: I assume that that is the case.

MR PHOSA: I didn’t hear the English version properly, did you say: "You assume"? What was the answer?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying yes, that is so.

MR PHOSA: So you have your church that says what it does and in the police force, even in apartheid laws a policeman was not supposed to kill, isn’t it?

MR ERASMUS: Correct, yes.

MR PHOSA: Even again in that regime a policeman was not supposed to assault people during interrogation?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Similarly, a policeman under that regime was not supposed to lie?

MR ERASMUS: One could put it that way, I’m assuming yes.

MR PHOSA: Well isn’t the true position then that you wouldn’t have - you would not have expected the support of your Government or let’s put it this way, the police to allow you to kill Mthimkhulu and Madaka, isn’t that so?

MR ERASMUS: I have told you today that if I had reported it and I explained myself on that point, then the answer could have gone either way, either yes or no, it could have been either.

MR PHOSA: Well, which means even as you are doing this act - if we take your evidence now, you did think: "I might just not get support of the police to kill these people" - the head of the police?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t tell you what I thought at that stage and everything that went through my mind. That was my decision as to how I should deal with the situation at that time.

MR PHOSA: Now I have a bit of a difficulty, I thought ...[inaudible] Are you saying that the attitude of your seniors never entered your mind in the course of your taking this decision - the possible attitude of your seniors?

MR ERASMUS: I’m sure that I did consider it.

MR PHOSA: Well then, I thought you would at worst or at best you should say: "When I thought about that, I wasn’t sure in my mind that my decision would be supported", isn’t that your answer?

MR ERASMUS: I want to repeat, that what I decided to do was such that I could expect either a total no or a yes. And when I say that I am speculating, I don’t knave a factual answer in this case.

MR PHOSA: No, no, no, I’m not saying to you, you know the answer but I want to know what you were thinking then. Are you saying: "Mr Chairman, I actually thought about this, whether or not to report to my seniors, then I thought to myself: "They might just disagree with me, you never know and I decided the best thing is not to report". Isn’t that your answer?

MR ERASMUS: What I thought at that stage and in that connection, I’m not sure but you are saying to me, I could have thought about it in that way and at this stage I can’t remember what exactly I thought about this matter.

MR PHOSA: Just finally on that point, you’re not suggesting that you were unconscious of your decisions at the time - you did them unconsciously, you’re not suggesting that?

MR ERASMUS: No, I would not that in any circumstances because that is not true.

MR PHOSA: Did you ever get to hear that Mthimkhulu alleged that he was actually shot - shot during arrest, by members of the security police?

MR ERASMUS: I can vaguely recall that and I would say yes, I can recall that there was a shooting incident.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, sorry. Was - where members of your team - those who dealt with him or even arrested him, under an obligation to inform you that he had been shot and of the circumstances under which that happened?

MR ERASMUS: I’m saying yes, because in such a case there would have had to be an enquiry or an investigation because all incidents of shooting had to be investigated by the detective branch of the South African police, and my answer is yes.

MR PHOSA: Can I put it to you, as a matter of fact Mr Mthimkhulu was shot, are you denying that?

MR ERASMUS: I’m not denying it at all.

MR PHOSA: Now, did members of your police - of your team of the security branch report that incident to you?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that’s what I said.

MR PHOSA: And did you take the necessary steps that are normally taken when a report like that reaches a person of your status?

MR ERASMUS: The necessary steps and the normal procedure would be that any shooting incident would be reported and would be investigated, not by my staff but by another section of the South African police.

MR PHOSA: I’m trying to finalise this. Where did you take steps that you ere obliged to take and was this matter handled in the normal way when someone has been shot at the hands of the police?

MR ERASMUS: It was done in that way, yes.

MR PHOSA: Was the person that shot him identified?

MR ERASMUS: I don’t remember but I think a statement would have been made by him.

MR PHOSA: Were you not concerned that a member - possibly a member of your team, would have shot him? Isn’t that something that would have worried you?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t understand why I should have been so concerned about it because the issue would have been dealt with in the normal way.

MR PHOSA: Finally on that score you would - if things are normal, expect that there is a record somewhere there. There should be a record that will indicate what was done about that, shouldn’t there be if things are normal?

MR ERASMUS: There ought to be, yes.

MR PHOSA: Just finally now, who is applying here for amnesty? Is it Erasmus the person or Erasmus the policeman? I’m using your distinctions?

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think we need to waste time on that Mr Phosa.

MR PHOSA: I really meant it seriously but I’m not going to pursue it, it will emerge later. That settles my - that ends my questioning.

Just to point one thing Mr Chairperson, the document that was given to me yesterday, C - just for interest of those who might want to, is incomplete, there are many pages missing. I’m just mentioning it for the sake of - in case it arises later. I couldn’t have seen everything because there are certain pages missing, it might just cause a problem to everybody else as well.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PHOSA

EXAMINATION BY MR BRINK: Thank you. Just on that aspect, I understand that the two pages were made by Mr Visser of Mr Wagner because that was the only reference to Mr Erasmus, the other evidence given was quite irrelevant to these proceedings.

Yes, I won’t keep you long Mr Erasmus you’ll be pleased to hear but perhaps you can help me, when did you first become aware of Mthimkhulu’s political activities when you came down to Port

Elizabeth?

MR ERASMUS: When I arrived here I found myself in this unrest situation in the early ‘80’s - early in 1980, the 1980’s.

MR BRINK: Is that when you became aware of his activities? You were informed abut them presumably?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BRINK: Would you have been the one to have authorised his detention in May 1981?

MR ERASMUS: We would have sent an application to headquarters and if it was in terms of the security legislation, I would not have authorised it.

MR BRINK: No, but on the basis that it would have been approved, would you have taken responsibility for the authorisation of his detention once it had been approved by head office.

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BRINK: So, would it be fair to say that you probably authorised his detention on the 31st of May 1981?

MR ERASMUS: If the approval did take place and there would be a document embodying it, then the answer is yes.

MR BRINK: One can only think that there must have been approval otherwise he wouldn’t have been detained.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BRINK: Did you at any stage visit him during the course of his detention from the 31st of May to the 20th of October 1981?

MR ERASMUS: I can’t remember that I did but I’m assuming that I must have seen him and if I had visited him, it would have been noted somewhere.

MR BRINK: So you have no independent recollection of what his physical condition might have been at any time during the period May to October 1981?

MR ERASMUS: No, I don’t.

MR BRINK: Now, you told the Committee - I think it was either this morning or yesterday but it doesn’t matter, that the discussion which you had with your co-applicants to kill Mthimkhulu took place some 10 days before the 14th of April 1982, that was the date upon which he died. In other words, the discussion was held on or about the 4th of April 1982. ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that’s not ...[inaudible] if I may be permitted to say so. He did state twice that it was over a period of 10 days, with respect Mr Chairman, that’s how I - my understanding of the evidence ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: The discussion took place over a period of 10 days, it started on the 10th ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: It started on the 4th.

MR VISSER: On the 4th.

MR BRINK: Yes, yes. I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to mislead you Mr Erasmus. In any event the discussion - the point of the matter is, the discussions started on the 4th of April 1982, discussions held with the view to agreeing to kill this man and Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BRINK: And you were aware of course that - I think it was one the 2nd of April 1982, proceedings had been launched against the Minister of Law and Order or Minister of Police - he was then, by Mthimkhulu for damages as a result of the treatment which he alleged he received at the hands of security policemen?

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, the summons on the 2nd was in result of the poisoning - that he had already issued summons in respect of other damages on the 15th of December, is that not correct?

MR BRINK: I’ll check that, my impression was - but in any event, a summons had been issued on the 2nd ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I’m relying on B page 95, the report.

MR BRINK: I’m obliged to you Mr Chairman. You see ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know there was one summons against the police for assault during his detention? You’ve told us you were aware of that.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct. Maybe I can explain to the Committee how the issuing of the summons works, it is sent to the Divisional Commissioner who deals with that kind of administrative detail. It wouldn’t have been served on me directly, so I can’t actually help you with dates.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that once a summons of that nature had been served, they would have made enquiries as to whether they should defend the action in matters of that nature?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And they would have made enquiries of you and people in your department?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And do you know that there was a second summons for damages for poisoning which was issued on the 2nd of April? I don’t ask you if you knew the contents but did you know that he’d issued another summons?

MR ERASMUS: That’s correct.

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman. Yes, that date appears at page 97 of bundle B on the third item from the Pretoria News, 20th of June 1990.

You see, there must have been discussion between you and your co-applicants about the second summons which related to the poisoning which was a very serious allegation indeed, do you agree with me?

MR ERASMUS: May I please ask that - was this concerning the decision to kill the two people or was this concerning the civil matter? I don’t quite understand the question.

MR BRINK: Let me try and be more clear. You see, a summons was issued by Mthimkhulu on the 2nd of April 1982, in terms of which he was claiming damages for alleged poisoning - poisoning by members of the security police, do you remember that?

MR ERASMUS: I remember that.

MR BRINK: And that must have caused you some considerable concern Mr Erasmus.

MR ERASMUS: It was a difficult situation, it was uncomfortable, it was an embarrassment for the South African police.

MR BRINK: Yes, highly embarrassing and highly dangerous, would you agree?

MR ERASMUS: That’s correct.

MR BRINK: And it was two days after that summons was issued that discussions commenced between you and your co-applicants about murdering this person who’d instituted action against the police.

MR ERASMUS: Correct, yes.

MR BRINK: A somewhat unfortunate coincidence, was it not?

MR ERASMUS: I agree, yes.

MR BRINK: Because it tends to - it may tend to create the impression in some people’s minds that the reason that it was decided to kill Mthimkhulu was because he had issued that summons.

MR ERASMUS: I don’t agree.

MR BRINK: You don’t agree that it might create that impression?

MR ERASMUS: It could create such an impression.

MR BRINK: Yes, thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: While we’re on that - are you going onto something else now Mr Brink? Do you know the Colonel that - please bear with me - an enquiry was being held for the Magistrate on the 5th of May 1982 into allegations that members of the security police had committed grievous bodily harm on Mr Mthimkhulu?

MR ERASMUS: I didn’t take part in the proceedings but I can recall that.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were aware that there was going to be a public enquiry at which witness were being subpoenaed on the 5th May into serious allegations of assault? Do you recall that?

MR ERASMUS: Correct.

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have finished.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BRINK

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Erasmus, when you were having these discussions over a period of approximately 10 days and eventually came to the conclusion that you would eliminate these people, I want to put it to you that at that stage you were aware of the subpoena relating to the poisoning case.

MR ERASMUS: I don’t know exactly when it was served but I’m assuming that I must have been aware of it. I must have been aware of it, if it had been served before that time.

ADV DE JAGER: And as you’ve correctly said it would have been grave embarrassment for you?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Now, I can’t imagine that that point would not have been discussed and that that would not have been a factor influencing your decision.

MR ERASMUS: I would like to state unequivocally that that was not discussed.

ADV DE JAGER: But you had discussed the kind of problems that these people were causing you?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, we had made a decision as to the kind of problems they were causing.

ADV DE JAGER: And you came to the decision which you did as a result of the problems they were creating for you?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, it was based on the situation of unrest.

ADV DE JAGER: For me as an outsider, it seems to me that that would have been one of the biggest problems that they would have created for you.

MR ERASMUS: No, I do not agree. The discussion here turned on the overthrow of the Government and the revolutionary climate and

attempts to destabilise the Government.

ADV DE JAGER: But would it not have been a major embarrassment for the Government that you were trying to protect if this case - this poisoning case came to court?

MR ERASMUS: I think the issue was so thoroughly discussed and dealt with in the media that the embarrassment had already been created.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood, one of the reasons why you felt you couldn’t detain him again was because of his physical state and because you couldn’t afford to have another death in detention?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct and I also said that his detention would, as a result of his martyr’s status as a result of the poison incident, would just have caused further unrest and riots.

CHAIRPERSON: And if he’d gone into court and given evidence about the poison incident, what would that have done to you?

MR ERASMUS: As I’ve said, the issue had been so exhaustively dealt with in the press that the issue - the case had already created embarrassment, whether it went to court or not I don’t think it would have made a difference.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you serious in that, are you suggesting that it would not have made a difference if a court of this country had found that he had been deliberately poisoned by members of the security police?

MR ERASMUS: No, that’s not what I’m saying, what I’m saying is, the fact that the case could have gone to court - well I can’t comment on the finding.

CHAIRPERSON: I’d like to ask you - you’ve told us if we can go back to the - as I understand you, the first killing was the Kondile one and that was also one between you and your team?

MR ERASMUS: Between myself and my members, yes. I don’t know whether we actually constituted a team.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but you took the decision, it was not taken by anyone else and as I understand the evidence you’ve given and I’m subject to correction, you did not communicate with anyone else about it?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because we have been given an affidavit by Mr Dirk Coetzee - or when I say we, those members hearing that application, in which he says he played a prominent part in this killing. Have you seen the affidavit?

MR ERASMUS: I haven’t seen the affidavit, are we talking about the murder of Mthimkhulu and Madaka or the Kondile murder?

CHAIRPERSON: Kondile.

MR ERASMUS: Once again I made that decision and that’s were it remained, I didn’t take the matter further so I don’t know whether Dirk Coetzee was involved, I wasn’t present.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, his affidavit says that he was summoned by Brigadier Schoon to collect knock-out drops from Lood and Neethling, which he arranged - and he arranged to meet Nick van Rensburg and his team at Komatiepoort. It would seem from that that there was very close connection between your Port Elizabeth squad and people in Pretoria.

MR ERASMUS: I suppose that is true if he says that, I had no contact with him.

CHAIRPERSON: And nobody told you? When your team came back and reported to you, they didn’t tell you that they had been assisted by Coetzee from Vlakplaas and that he had brought the knockout drops?

MR ERASMUS: No, the matter was not discussed again, it was finalised.

CHAIRPERSON: And you know he’s also made statements about the Mthimkhulu matter - the poisoning of Mthimkhulu, in which he says the poisons were flown down by a Mr van den Hoven to hand over to Nick van Rensburg. Did you know he’d made that allegation?

MR ERASMUS: I’m aware of that. I would just like to say that van den Hoven in my time, only came to Port Elizabeth once and that was to attend a funeral in Noupoort.

CHAIRPERSON: And he then said that Major General Johan Coetzee, then Chief of Security personally investigated the case. Did that happen?

MR ERASMUS: Not as far as I’m aware.

CHAIRPERSON: And that it was then that Jan du Preez told him that it had been decided to kidnap Siphiwe and get rid of him and leave his car at the border. Are you aware that he said this?

MR ERASMUS: I read it in the press.

MR VISSER: Excuse me Mr Chairman, before you move onto something else, could you give us the benefit of what you’re referring to, the last document ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Have you not read Mr Coetzee’s book?

MR VISSER: Oh the book. I’m sorry well, I did not - that wasn’t part of my preparation, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: The reference is 5485. Now we’ve heard about Mr Mthimkhulu’s political activities which resulted in his being detained on the 31st of May, was it?

MR ERASMUS: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was kept in detention for nearly 6 months - 4 to 6 months, wasn’t he?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And when he came out of detention he was in a very bad state of health and he had to be taken first to a hospital in Port Elizabeth and then to Groote Schuur hospital.

MR ERASMUS: I’m not aware of the fact that he was in poor physical condition when he was released, I can’t comment on that. I do know that he became ill and that he was taken to a hospital in Cape Town.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was there for some months.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And that when he was released, he was a wheelchair case.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And up to the time of his death he was still hobbling around with a stick, he couldn’t walk properly.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the man - the man you considered so potentially dangerous as an activist that he should be killed - this invalid?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you find any arms and ammunition in any dead letter box established by Madaka?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, during that time there were many caches found, I can’t remember whether it had any relevance to Madaka.

CHAIRPERSON: But I thought that you told us that he was responsible for establishing them?

MR ERASMUS: That was the information provided to me.

CHAIRPERSON: But this was one of the reasons for killing him and now you’ve said you’re not sure if it was relevant to him or not.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, what I’m saying is that I am saying there were weapon caches found, not in his immediate house.

CHAIRPERSON: What you said - my note is: "Some information was available that he transported weapons between Lesotho and this area and that he was responsible for establishing DLB’s", which you explained were dead letter boxes where weapons could be stored.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well was ...[inaudible], did you find any that he was responsible for?

MR ERASMUS: What we are saying is, we found these weapon caches and I’ve explained that this information, according to what was conveyed to me, came from a source very near to him which we could not use against him.

CHAIRPERSON: So you never verified to see if this was true or not but it was one of the factors you say you took into account in killing him. Is that the position Colonel?

MR ERASMUS: What was put to me - because I knew these people, I accepted as the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the informer that was so close to him that you didn’t want him or her to be exposed? Is that where your information came from?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, I assume so.

CHAIRPERSON: And I think as a matter of correction, it was in fact then that you said: "In all probability there was not sufficient evidence to charge him, it would lead to his release and the informer would then be killed", you were talking about Madaka when you talked about insufficient evidence.

MR ERASMUS: That is what I have said.

CHAIRPERSON: Just bear with me.

ADV SANDI: Mr Erasmus, who took the decision that the information or the evidence available was insufficient to secure a conviction against Madaka and Mthimkhulu?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, we know what we have and this information is weighed up.

ADV SANDI: You did not seek the opinion of the Attorney General to see whether one could secure any conviction on the basis of that evidence?

MR ERASMUS: No, I did not Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: If I understand you clearly, that is to say that you were a judge as well as an executioner in your own case.

MR ERASMUS: You can call me that.

ADV SANDI: What I mean is, because there was not sufficient evidence to have these people convicted in a court of law, you decided that they should be killed because they won’t be convicted in court.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, we considered all the options for example, a court case and this was the only solution we found.

ADV SANDI: When you took the decision that these two young men should be killed, in terms of what law were you acting?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman with respect, is that a fair question? We know it was illegal, he wasn’t acting in terms of any law, we know that.

ADV SANDI: I think we should get it from him.

MR VISSER: It’s a legal argument, it’s not in terms of the act and it’s an unfair question, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think it’s fair to say: "You knew that you were going to order two junior officers to commit one of the most gross irregularities that a policeman could commit and yet you did not take the trouble to get authority from anyone higher up the chain", is that an accurate picture?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV SANDI: In the course of our evidence yesterday and today, you said you considered a number of options before you finally decided that the two should be killed. You mentioned detention as well as prosecution, are there any other options which you gave a thought?

MR ERASMUS: There were no other options, those were the only two options.

ADV SANDI: Did you not have powers in terms of the security laws of the country to keep these gentlemen in detention for as long as you like?

MR ERASMUS: At that stage Mr Chairman, I have already said we could not detain Mthimkhulu again.

ADV SANDI: You had detained him before and the detention had no effect on him, is that what you’re saying?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Just to get to the end, when you took the decision that the two gentlemen should be killed - when you started yesterday you told us a lot about your faith, you as a member of the NG Kerk, in terms of which principle of your faith were you taking such a decision?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I object to this really because ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I’m afraid I don’t see the relevance of that question, we’re not here to ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: But to put it in context, what he said was simply this, he said he was a church-goer and he never heard that his church ever expressed themselves against the principles of apartheid. That was the long and the short of all of that evidence Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Okay, maybe one can deal with that during the argument stage. My last question to you Mr Erasmus, if a group of people identify a problem and one of them solves that problem of a part of the problem, is it not natural that such a person would go and report somewhere and say: "Look, you don’t have to bother yourselves about this problem, I’ve solved it"?

MR ERASMUS: That is the normal procedure, yes. If the situation warrants it - if it was a normal situation, that would have been the case.

ADV SANDI: You stated repeatedly yesterday and today: "This was never reported to anyone".

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, that is all I’ve got to ask you.

CHAIRPERSON: One last thing which I think arises out of that - just to clear my own mind. As I understand, the reason why you couldn’t detain him was you felt you could not afford the publicity of another death in detention? That he already ...[inaudible] martyr status and if he were to die in detention, it would create innumerable problems for you, so it would be better to kill him.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: I have only have one re-exam - point in re-examination.

Mr Erasmus, it is fair to say that your evidence indicates that you have tried to support the Government of the day, that was what you tried to do?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Would you have assisted them by reporting back to them that you committed a murder?

MR ERASMUS: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: We have reached the time for closing for today. It has been suggested to me that we should not start at 9 tomorrow but rather start at half past nine, to allow everybody the time they may need to make telephone calls and to do other things, so once we start we can get going at 9H30. I think that that is probably a wise suggestion so I’m now adjourning till 9H30 but we’ll be starting then.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS