Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nieuwoudt is entitled to a hearing here without interruption or intimidation. If this continues I will have no option but to ask that the hall be cleared.

ADV SANDI: Let’s work together - let us please co-operate, this is a very difficult job. Each person that comes before the Commission to testify must be given a chance to testify so that at the end we can conclude the matter accordingly. I hope that we will not have to ask you again for order.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I just want to record also that I reserve my rights at this stage just in light of what has happened now, that there seems to be a fair amount of hostility - I reserve my rights. At this stage I wish to carry on and I would like the public to hear what Mr Nieuwoudt says but I would reserve any rights I might have in this regard, should it become impossible for us to feel that we can conduct our case in such a way that justice can not only be done but also be seen to be done.

I call Mr Nieuwoudt. Mr Nieuwoudt could I please swear - could you please stand.

ADV DE JAGER: Full names?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt on the first page, that is page 31 of the Annexure A, you have stated your personal particulars, are they correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Up to the middle of page 32, you give a history of your time in the police force?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: After that, you give a personal overview starting on page 32, you’ve also set out in the second paragraph that you noticed in your opinion, that there were cultural differences between the different cultural groups.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Paragraph 4 you state your belief at that stage - your convictions, we’re speaking about the ‘80’s and prior to that and also the period after that. You were of the opinion that the continued existence of the White and Black consciousness were not possible alongside one another. You also made the statement that you acted bona fide in all cases.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You also made the statement on page 6 - page 34, paragraph 6 that the church of which you were a member also decided at synod level, that the policy of separate development as it was termed by the Government of the day could be justified in terms of the Bible.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Your conditioning and influencing started when you were very young?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: If we can turn to paragraph 8, the security forces and the National Party leadership figures who repeatedly told you the revolutionary basis of the liberation movements.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: After that in paragraph 9, you refer to the so-called counter-revolutionary philosophy.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I think it may be essential considering that you are relying on Annexures here, is that it may take some but I think it is essential for you to explain how this document, Annexures 1 and 2 and these are the documents which can be found on pages 59 and 64 of the documentation. The first on page 59 then, it’s a document dated 10 April 1986 - it’s some time after the previous dates.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: But from your experience then and what you’d known before that, this circular directed to members of the State Security Council, it was a confidential document, it concerned UBS plans in the revolutionary war. Was that a philosophy which was given through prior to that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on Mr Booyens, I don’t know if your copy on page ....[inaudible]

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You’ve got a blank on page 59 too.

MR BOOYENS: I’ve got a blank Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it of any importance what’s below there, we get the sense of the documents in the rest of it. Your client is shaking his head in agreement.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, no, that is indeed correct Mr Chairman, I’ve seen the full one on a previous occasion.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: The irrelevant sections which you’ve referred to in terms of your statements can be found on page 60, paragraph 5, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Namely the strategy which was being finalised which had to be put into effect.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And the reporting back of the GBS’s in paragraph 7, that is referred to?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: The document which starts on page 62, is this an Annexure to the Secretariat of the State Security Council’s document?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Here and more specifically on page 63, if you could just for reference sake, take note that on page 62 at the top it is stated: "Objective Tasks, Action, Responsible Department" and so forth.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have referred specifically to the objective mentioned on page 63 - it should be animus leaders, to neutralise and to destroy their influence.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And their task which is stipulated clearly in the column is that their leaders should be identified and the areas of influence determined and that they should be neutralised or eliminated.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then the actions referred to - misleading operations which is more commonly know as misinformation, it’s psychological warfare, compensation for information that was the system put into effect, exploitation of disputes if the ANC or PAC were disputing something which had to be exploited for propaganda services.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Identification through GIK actions, that’s an action committee that launched these actions, it was a branch of the GBS.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: What are quell actions referred to there.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Those are problematic areas.

MR BOOYENS: What are grab operations?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The point referred to concerns problems where people had to be arrested or removed

MR BOOYENS: No English translation.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Then the following one was a task used to persuade people.

MR BOOYENS: In other words to change their views.

MR NIEUWOUDT: To change their views and their ideologies.

MR BOOYENS: And then legal action, we all understand what is meant by that.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What is interesting are the actions described here, neutralisation or elimination actions.

MR NIEUWOUDT: These are neutralisation actions Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: To you what does the word eliminate mean?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It’s means the killing of people Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Especially if one speaks about a person to be eliminated?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You furthermore refer also to the document which starts on page 64 ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Can you just wait a moment please? On page 63 right at the bottom on the right hand side, there’s a comment: "Liaison or linking with the VH’s must be avoided". What are they referring to, what must be avoided?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is the security forces and any link with them - with the VM’s.

ADV DE JAGER: What was the intention in using those words?

MR NIEUWOUDT: In other words, they should be covert operations.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, these operations - it should not be known that the security forces were involved?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then there is a strategic communication document, what is the origin of this - it comes from a Captain Putter. This is a document which has been attached in order to illustrate what this ...[inaudible] was that was so widely spoken of.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairman..

MR BOOYENS: Once again it is dated 9th of October 1988, what is the content of this? Was the contents known to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: In the early ‘80’s or ‘70’s?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This seems to be a study document and a summary of what was happening in other countries.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: It is mentioned that every department had certain instruments allocated it and for which it was responsible in carrying out - 66.4, at the bottom of 66, the SA police, law enforcement and Stratcom.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: On age 67, paragraph 4, reference is made to covert action also known as Stratcom and especially - according to what Mr de Jager asked you, secret actions which were carried out in a way that they could not be detected to achieve the objectives of national security policy.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Is this - let me ask you the following first, these kind of Stratcom or covert actions, in the late ‘70’, early ‘80’s, was this the order of the day?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What is pulver?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I think it comes from Russia’s Stratcom and that is what is being referred to there.

MR BOOYENS: And then mention is made that it concerns these actions that cannot be detectable in order to achieve the objectives of the national security policy.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The document further then deals with - I’m just going to highlight some parts of the document and I want to refer to page 69, paragraph 18.1: "Stratcom is an instrument of the State which may be used".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Paragraph 70 - it’s actually 19.2, paragraph 19.2 on page 72.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s true.

MR BOOYENS: The Western Governments emphasise the upholding of civilised values such as freedom of speech, individual rights and press freedom Stratcom concerns the secret manipulation of groups or undermining of organisations and the image which Governments wanted to uphold of themselves.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

MR BOOYENS: So a lot has been said about the fact that the politicians in general were reluctant to admit that some unlawful deeds were carried out on their behalf, does it concern that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Other countries are also referred to and their manner of dealing with such instances for example, in Britain there were British involved in - this is on page 71 and a number of similar deeds and how they acted in terms of sabotage and assassination. On page 78, paragraph (g), "Secret Political Warfare in South Africa", an exposition is given of the Department of Information and what they did.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mention is also made of some of the departments - that’s on page 81 ...[inaudible] departments that were tasked by the State President to carry out these instructions.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What is important to note on page 82 is paragraph 58: "Covert Stratcom is run in the South African police by the security branch".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And Stratcom actions in paragraph 3 are not unknown for the security branch, they have been busy on an ad-hoc basis for years with this. The South African police is sometimes accused by implication by the press of Stratcom actions including assassinations, damage of property and sabotage.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm that these documents give a summary of the philosophical background against which you found yourself as a policeman since the late ‘70’s - a security policeman?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: On page 35, if I may return to the earlier part of the document, you sketch a general background of experience in the security branch?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: You mention which organisations you investigated including COSAS - that’s on page 36, paragraph 2.8, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: On page 37, you sketch the history of different cases where you were the investigating officer.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You make a statement on page 37 that: "You were well grounded on the knowledge of certain liberation organisations"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt you have applied on page 38 for amnesty for the abduction, killing and removal of Mthimkhulu and Madaka?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I think it is essential here to mention that your document corresponds with the applications of the former applicants. I think you should start before the 14th of April 1982. Were the deceased persons known to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were working under the command of Mr du Plessis?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were a Warrant Officer at the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Let’s first of all handle Mr Mthimkhulu, what was the context that you got to know him and what role was he playing at the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, he was involved or had been involved since 1976 during the Black consciousness activities of which he had played a prominent role in. And at that period of time Black consciousness, in other words SASIN, the Black Consciousness Movement, the BBC had played a prominent role and this was also the run up to the 16th of June riots nationally of which on the 17th of August 1977, the unrest erupted in Port Elizabeth as well.

MR BOOYENS: So he was involved in these organisations. When did he pertinently come to your attention?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He persistently came to my attention in 1978 during the time of the deceased Robert Sobukwe’s funeral, a Pan African Congress leadership figure at Graaff-Reinet.

MR BOOYENS: What happened there as far as Mr Mthimkhulu was concerned?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage the bodyguards of Mr Buthelezi were fired at.

MR BOOYENS: According to the information you have, who was responsible for the shooting?

MR NIEUWOUDT: According to information the deceased Mthimkhulu, was responsible or he was involved in the shooting incident.

MR BOOYENS: Was he arrested?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At a later stage after that he was arrested - before I turn to the Mr Chairperson, I want to mention that when they returned, there’d been busses which had gone from Port Elizabeth to attend the funeral. As I recollect there was a policeman I think from Port Elizabeth, who was on the bus and if I remember correctly it was Sergeant Jalobe. He was shot near to Jansenville while the bus had stopped for a moment to offload some people. The information at that stage was that the deceased Mthimkhulu was responsible for the shooting.

MR BOOYENS: So you said he was arrested at a later stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: In connection with these incidents?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: That is the Graaff Reinet incident?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have anything to do with the investigation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Chairperson, at that time I only assisted. If I remember there was a Colonel Vosloo of SWD who was responsible for the investigation and I assisted him in tracing him for the arrest.

MR BOOYENS: Did you arrest Mr Mthimkhulu?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not personally but I was part of a group who arrested him.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know if he was prosecuted successfully?

MR NIEUWOUDT: What I do know is that - I think he was about 16 years old at the time, he was a youth and whether they used him as a witness or whether he was actually charged, I’m not sure what happened with the case. I cannot remember, my memory is not what it used to be - I cannot recall this.

MR BOOYENS: In any case did he become more prominent later in Port Elizabeth? This was your first encounter with him, what was his role later?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Chairperson, at that stage he was militant because of the Black consciousness ideology which he supported and he had the appearance of a militant person. There was a series of riots and chaos at that stage which prevailed, it went right up to ‘78 and it was really a burning point in the Eastern Cape.

MR BOOYENS: Did Mr Mthimkhulu later become involved in COSAS, the Congress of South African Students?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot remember the exact dates - after, in October 1978, all the Black consciousness movements were unbanned. In 1979 at Wilgerspruit, the organisations - the Congress of South African Students was established which took over the Black consciousness ideology under the influence of the SACP and the ANC ideology. Most of the leadership figures and elements of which Mr Mthimkhulu was also a part, joined this organisation and reinitiated the move in Port Elizabeth. At that stage One Two Zenzile was the National Executive President and he was elected as the president of COSAS.

MR BOOYENS: What role did Mr Mthimkhulu play in COSAS?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was part of the executive of the local branch of this Province.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have contact with him in the capacity as a security force person?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did he come across as a strong leadership person?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He did and my impression - with great ...[inaudible] Chairperson, my impression was that he was extremely militant because of the conflict between the Black ideology and the Whites really came to the fore.

MR BOOYENS: Did the situation in the Eastern Cape develop further? We have heard evidence already that the situation deteriorated - the security situation. According to your investigation, did Mr Mthimkhulu play a role in this situation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: What exactly was his role?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was involved in the school boycotts in 1980.

MR BOOYENS: Did he play a prominent role here?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis was the branch commander or what was his position?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was the commander of the unit of the Black component of the security branch.

MR BOOYENS: We’ve heard his evidence that the situation in terms of school boycotts ultimately went from boycotts into violence, into the damaging of property and it escalated gradually. Would you agree with that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I agree Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And that eventually this spread further into school organisations and COSAS and to other organisations who also became involved.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: After this while this situation deteriorated there was a campaign with the Republican Festival?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was Mr Mthimkhulu - during the campaign in May of 1981, was he arrested and detained in terms of the security legislation of the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: If we can leave Mr Mthimkhulu for a moment and turn to Mr Topsi Madaka, ...[intervention]

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Booyens before you leave that, where was Mr Mthimkhulu arrested in 1981?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, he was arrested at Mjoli Street. That was is Kwazakele, a Black township in Port Elizabeth.

ADV SANDI: What were the circumstances of his arrest? Had you gone out there to look for him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Lulama Bangani was in possession of ANC documents and he was arrested and he alleged that Mr Mthimkhulu, the late Mr Siphiwe Mthimkhulu, had been involved in the distribution of these ANC pamphlets. If I remember correctly he said that both of them had obtained these documents from the ANC in Lesotho and that was the reason there had already been a whole series of arrests that had taken place.

ADV SANDI: I do not intend to interrupt your leading of your witness but right at that point, Mthimkhulu, is he distributing pamphlets - what is he doing?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don’t believe he was distributing the pamphlets himself, he was the contact to collect the pamphlets from the late Chris Hani which had been drafted by the ANC in Lesotho, they just received the pamphlets with the purpose of distributing them here internally in the country.

ADV SANDI: Okay carry on, sorry for that.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. You didn’t arrest him then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: Somebody else arrested him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: We’re going to return to Topsi Madaka, can you give us some background? Where does he fit into this story?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, according to the information which we had Topsi Madaka was involved in a covert underground structure ...[intervention]

MR BOOYENS: You can continue.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Which was a structure which was responsible to act as a courier between Lesotho and South Africa, also to recruit scholars for military training outside of South Africa, the accommodation of trained persons, the establishment of DLB’s.

MR BOOYENS: Was he in the same cell as Mthimkhulu?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: If you were to place him in order of rank as far as that operation was concerned, where would you place him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mthimkhulu seems to have been the number one person, I would make him second in command.

MR BOOYENS: The information on Topsi Madaka, where did you get this information from?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That came from an extremely sensitive report, an informant who was affiliated to their cell.

MR BOOYENS: Why - was this considered to information coming from the informants?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Why Madaka not detained in terms of the Security Act?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, because this informant was the only one and he placed in a very sensitive position in the network of Madaka and if we should have detained him, it would not have mattered what questions you would have put to Madaka he would have immediately through neutralisation have established the identity of this informant. I can categorically state here today that that person would have been eliminated by the ANC or whoever.

MR BOOYENS: It was well known policy of the liberation movements at that time that informants should be dealt with in this way, not so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: So you had information, not evidence that you could use?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: We know that Mr Mthimkhulu was detained in terms of the Security Act and he was released in ‘81.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: During consultation the contents of his statement and the allegations which he made against you were dealt with.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: He has - as far as you yourself are concerned, alleged that on occasions you assaulted him.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Would you like to comment on these allegations?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny these strongly, I remain with my statement - my affidavit, which is attached to my application.

MR BOOYENS: I don’t think it’s an affidavit.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I beg your pardon, it is a statement of warning.

MR BOOYENS: This is the document on page 84, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Despite the fact that you said you’d like to keep this statement of warning which you’ve included in a different context before a different part of this Commission when you were applying for amnesty concerning the assault of a detainee, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: It was actually two incidents, Mr Jack and Mr Jones?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: If you had assaulted Mr Mthimkhulu as he alleges and the other assaults mentioned there - they are not as serious when compared to what you are actually applying for, would you still have applied for amnesty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I would have.

MR BOOYENS: While we’re on the topic of his detention, you were involved in the interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I was.

MR BOOYENS: Over the five months that he was detained and during these five months - it may not have been on a continuous basis, but he was interrogated during this period of time by members of the security branch - I know it’s a long time ago but how many members of the security branch would you say were involved in interrogating him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it would be 8 to 10 persons if I were to guess but I’m not sure.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon Mr Nieuwoudt, unfortunately we don’t have this information available on the assaults of Mr Jack and the other person which you applied for amnesty for, could you just inform us why you assaulted these persons?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson. In the case of Mr Jack, I applied for amnesty during interrogation or questioning ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: I want to know why you assaulted Mr Jack. I know you applied - we don’t want to know about that, but why did you assault him? What was the reason for the assault of Mr Jack.

MR NIEUWOUDT: To get information from him.

ADV DE JAGER: He did not want to give information?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: What about Mr Mthimkhulu, did you want to get information from him as well?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: And he also did not wish to divulge information.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Why did you not assault him then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The reason why I did not assault him was because at that stage there were other persons present. I didn’t have to assault him, I asked him Mr Chairperson and his detention was already - I put questions to him, I didn’t see it necessary to assault him.

CHAIRPERSON: But we’ve been told he did not supply any information. What is merely putting questions to him mean?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson, I did question him and interrogate him and he didn’t want to divulge information to us.

ADV SANDI: Did anyone else in your group assault him because he was not co-operating?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t have any knowledge of that but the group with whom I’d been involved did not assault him in my presence Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Could you exclude the possibility that some of the other people who were involved - because you worked in teams, is that not so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Could you exclude the possibility that some of the other team members could have assaulted him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I cannot exclude that possibility.

MR BOOYENS: Allegations were also made - it’s not addressed to you, I’ve got to state that clearly but there is also room for the possibility that he had been given thallium poisoning while in police custody. In your statement you also referred to this, so you have been confronted with this and that happened by the 28th of December already. Before I told you what thallium poison was more or less, did you know anything about it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you administer poison to Mr Mthimkhulu or do you know about anybody?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don’t know.

MR BOOYENS: So included with that, you also didn’t give him poison?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I didn’t, definitely not.

MR BOOYENS: In the interrogation of Mr Mthimkhulu you were a Warrant Officer still, there were many other people who were involved with more senior ranks?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Then just for clarity’s sake, there was quite an intense campaign against the ‘81 Republic festivities, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.

MR BOOYENS: Were many people held under the security legislation at the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.

MR BOOYENS: Were many people interrogated or had to be interrogated?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: So all your attention was not focused on Mr Mthimkhulu?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, I also had to deal with informers and debrief them.

MR BOOYENS: Were you satisfied - let me rather rephrase, the general situation that existed in the Eastern Cape I think was sketched by Mr du Plessis to a large extent.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: As a field worker - a person in the field, did you experience the situation to be similar to that described by him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Statements have been made and questions asked regarding exactly how ungovernable, how inaccessible the area had been, could you perhaps in your own words briefly state how during those days and I refer approximately to May when held Mr Mthimkhulu in detention until the time of his death, how you experienced the situation generally in the townships in and around Port Elizabeth and elsewhere?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Our degree of policing was very limited due to the unrest, to such an extent that many of our Black colleagues had their houses attacked, the guard services that should have been rendered were impossible to carry out so the general policing task and function on ground level could really not function properly.

MR BOOYENS: The guard services that you are referring to, were those attempts to guard Black policemen’s houses?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: And it couldn’t practically be carried out?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: What was the reason?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They were attacked.

MR BOOYENS: And the people were too scared to do those services?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, they were scared to carry out the services because they would leave their own families alone and their houses would in turn be attacked.

MR BOOYENS: Your workload at that stage particularly as far as the security branch was concerned, how serious was it - particularly in your case as a Warrant Officer?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I experienced it as very taxing and quite a bit of intensified actions were required in order to identify these enemy leaders - elements, and to determine who were responsible for the unrest situation and to try and prevent this and stabilise the situation.

MR BOOYENS: Okay. Now let’s deal with Mr Mthimkhulu, he was detained, released, he got sick, he was hospitalised and this is a matter of public record today. Before he returned, allegations were made that he had been poisoned and this appeared in the press. When he returned to Port Elizabeth - and this is also apparent from the press cuttings, a large group waited for him at the Port Elizabeth airport.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Was the security police present?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: What happened to Mr Mthimkhulu’s stature after his return?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, his stature increased markedly after his return. During all the meetings - and perhaps I should just mention this, at that stage the following action with regard to the 70th anniversary of the ANC was taking place and that played a great role in the politicisation of the masses and in organising the masses, mobilising the masses. And a number of meetings were held in this hall where the masses were conditioned and that enmity towards the White regime or the apartheid Government featured very prominently.

MR BOOYENS: What role if any, did Mr Madaka play at these meetings?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Madaka at this stage acted very covertly because it is a consequence of these resistance actions that were taking place and this created fertile ground for the initiation of the people’s war. If you would allow me a moment to explain this please. From 1978 onwards the executive management of the ANC outside the country inter alia the late Oliver Tambo visited Vietnam where they encountered the strategy of the people’s war and where it originated.

And during 1980, the fertile ground for the initiation of the people’s war was created by mobilising the masses, by politicising the masses and by arming the masses. That is where Madaka had a role in that structure in particular because the fertile ground had been created, the concept of revolutionary action had been created internally in the country, the masses have been indoctrinated, the have been politicised and they have been mobilised. That is the spectrum at which we are looking on the left from the freedom movements to topple the apartheid Government at the time and to effect this. And these are the two poles that we have to look at and the spectrum that existed.

It’s exactly what happened, that is where the late Mr Madaka played a role and that is the conflict which arose between the security police of the time and the liberation ideology at this stage. The masses had been armed inside the country and that is why we had the series of attacks on - which took the form of bomb attacks, deeds of terror which were the order of the day at the time. We have to look at it from this subjective point of view and analyse the situation.

MR BOOYENS: That which you told the Commission now, is this also confirmed by Tom Lodge’s book "Black Politics in South Africa" on pages 95 and 96 of the Appendices to your application?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is that bundle A?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: And more specifically dealing with the ‘80’s, on page 96 the second paragraph, left hand page, in contrast to the first Umkhonto campaign etc., - that section there, where reference is made also to the Sasol bomb attack, the power stations in Eastern Transvaal, Voortrekker Hoogte police stations, inter alias New Briton, Chatsworth, Booysens, Soekmekaar. At the bottom of the page he refers to: "With the exception of the assassination of informers and other people regarded as collaborators, African Security policemen for example, the campaign strategy has been guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided". Was that the situation at the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: At the same, in the middle of the page "Setting up Arms Caches etc., as well as forming a cellular organisational structure in the main townships", Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: I’m sorry, can I ask - Mr Nieuwoudt are you still talking about 1980 when you talk about: "Acts of terror, violence, widespread turmoil", are you still talking about 1982?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I am sketching the scenario from 1980 onwards which continued up to 1982.

ADV SANDI: You are at 1982 now?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It continues right through but what I referred to now was 1981 Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: You referred to page 96, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Could just indicate again, I couldn’t follow exactly which paragraph you were referring to?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chair, through you - sorry, two pages had been copied. On the left hand side, the second paragraph which starts with: "In contrast to the first Umkhonto campaign" and more or less in the middle of the same paragraph there is a reference to: "Setting up arms caches as well as forming a cellular organisation structure in the main townships".

ADV SANDI: Sorry, this book by Tom Lodge, when was it published?

MR BOOYENS: First impression 1983, second impression ‘85 - can I hand it to you Mr Chairman?

ADV SANDI: You can carry on. That is after Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka had been eliminated?

MR BOOYENS: ...[inaudible]

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: With respect yes, the book was published after the death of Mr Mthimkhulu but it deals with the period from 1945 Mr Chairman.

I beg your pardon Mr Chair, I’m still dealing with Mr de Jager’s question to me. Still on page 96 at the bottom of the page, last line: "With the exception of the assassination etc.,", those are the sections we wish to quote.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the problem was - which my learned colleague also experience, when these dates - when these deeds that are referred to took place but I see on the pages that you have referred to, the latter section with that quotation: "With the exception of the assassination of informers and people regarded as collaborators, African security policemen for example, the campaign’s strategy has been guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided" etc., as quoted and then in August 1981 however, "Oliver Tambo announced".

ADV DE JAGER: So I think he’s in fact dealing with the period ‘80/’81 when he relates, whether it’s correct or not I wouldn’t know.

MR BOOYENS: That is so Mr Chairperson, we just quoted this as confirmation of the statement made by the witness regarding the situation.

You have dealt now with Mr Madaka’s position, let us return to the position after the return of Mr Mthimkhulu. You said that his stature increased, what was his practical role on the ground? What did he do there, did he address meetings?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He addressed meetings and the youth specifically at that time and one has to keep in mind that the schools boycott continued until the beginning of more or less March ‘82 and then gradually the pupils started returning to school. So there was throughout a process of politicisation and mobilisation that was taking place and this was done by Mr Mthimkhulu and with the stature that had increased.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon Mr Nieuwoudt, but I just wish to determine whether these facts given in the book are approximately correct and you have to assist me to tell me whether these are so or not. On page 96 we have the statement that in August 1981 Oliver Tambo made a certain announcement - "Before the Tambo statement appeared in a foreign press, it was not reported inside South Africa, a bomb exploded in the main shopping centre of Port Elizabeth. Unlike earlier inner city explosions, this one took place during working hours".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson, the facts are correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know when this bomb explosion in the shopping centre took place?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you perhaps tell us?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I have a docket with me here Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Could you just give us a date?

ADV DE JAGER: Is this one of these that you didn’t destroy?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Or which they’d perhaps forgotten to destroy. "Explosion at Constantia Centre - 8 August 1981".

MR BOOYENS: May I continue Mr Chair? Your colleague also made reference very briefly of other bomb explosions, specifically in the Port Elizabeth area. Do you confirm that in July 1981 a bomb exploded at the old administration offices?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And later on in 1981, at the railway line New Brighton?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Besides these, were there murders committed on policemen?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember specific incidents?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I can.

MR BOOYENS: Could you please tell us?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Sergeant Mtselo who worked with me from 1 April 1975 when I joined the security branch, he was my Black colleague who had been allocated to me.

MR BOOYENS: When more or less was he murdered?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I think - well he was murdered in 1981 in front of the police station at Kwazakele.

MR BOOYENS: And any others?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Then Sergeant Mtanda.

MR BOOYENS: Also security branch?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, also at security branch and also in that period or in 1982 Mr Chairperson - ‘81/’82.

MR BOOYENS: That is as far as security branch policemen are concerned?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Although you are not aware of names or cannot remember names, if you recall, were other Black members of the police force also murdered, killed or had their property damaged?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: I think we were dealing with Mr Mthimkhulu’s role - you say he addressed meetings?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did he do so from his wheelchair?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He did so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did the fact that he was confined to a wheelchair affect his competence as a speaker?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: As a political speaker to state it more clearly?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not at all.

MR BOOYENS: The fact that he was in a wheelchair, did he use this as an example of what the agents of the apartheid regime allegedly did to him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson, if I remember correctly, the terminology that was used was: "This was what the system had done to me".

MR BOOYENS: So was this illness according to your perceptions, to some extent misused by him or used/misused - it all depends on which perspective you take, to advance his political perspective?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct, yes to increase his martyr status.

MR BOOYENS: So by the time that we reach the beginning of April 1982, would you say that the situation had escalated - that is now the unrest situation in general in the Eastern Cape, from what it had been at the period May of the previous year?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Would you say the situation was much worse or just a little worse or what was the position?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I would say the situation had escalated increasingly.

MR BOOYENS: You’d also said that as far as your personal opinion was concerned, it was rapidly on it’s way to the people’s war?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Now upon this - I beg your pardon, as a field worker you collected information regarding these two people and others?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: You always refer to physical and non-physical sources, how did you collect the terms - the information?

MR NIEUWOUDT: By means of registered informers as well as tapping of phones or listening in on people’s conversations, otherwise that is the terminology - that is how we refer to, by calling them non-physical means.

MR BOOYENS: You also made tape recordings as referred to earlier, of meetings etc., that these had been referred to the Attorney General’s office and this had not been adequate for prosecution?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You were at that stage an experience investigating officer?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: Could you succeed in collecting adequate information in order to compile a docket which you could confidently take to the court against any of the two?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, may I please explain? In this hall in particular the acoustics are now much better than they were at that stage but if you look at the stage - if you look from the stage upwards, the sound was so bad that even Professor Jansen who specialised in voice identification, could not identify any voice properly.

MR BOOYENS: So these recordings actually didn’t help in the end, not in terms of evidence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You’ve already mentioned that the situation was escalating, did you report to your to section commander?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, reports were compiled and they were sent through to him and he took note thereof, I also spoke to him personally.

MR BOOYENS: As far as these persons are concerned whose activities you investigated at the time, how important was Topsi Madaka and Mr Mthimkhulu? In other words you didn’t only investigate them, you also investigated a number of other persons?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: How long are you going to be with this witness do you think?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairperson, I’m just covering this aspect of the evidence that’s not fully covered in his ...[inaudible] then I will - I’m confident that I’ll be able to finish in chief before the end of the day hopefully or get very close to finishing it tomorrow morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the end of the day might well be 5 o’clock this afternoon, what I wanted to know was whether you think you’ll be finished by four because if we’re going to go after four, we’ll take a five minute adjournment now and then continue until you’ve finished the evidence. Very well, we’ll take a five minute adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (cont)

Mr Chairman, may I just discuss something with my client please?

We got to the fact that all this information that you’d collected, you reported to your commanding officer?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: If we could then go to page 39 of your application, paragraph 9 - under paragraph 9A (1), (2), (3), the background which you’ve already given where you discussed this with your seniors. You weren’t present during these times, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: They repeat essentially the information and the information set out here, is this the information that you conveyed to them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You heard the evidence of the three senior officers, that it was decided eventually that the elimination of the two deceased was the only option left open?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were you part of the original decision?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I was not.

MR BOOYENS: It seems that after this decision - before the death of these persons, you were approached by Mr du Plessis according to his evidence, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did he then inform you the nature of the conversations which had been held?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And did he then tell you that a decision had been taken that the two deceased persons must be eliminated?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did he instruct you, request you or approach you to assist?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did he give you time to think about this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: What was your attitude, were you willing? Did you agree?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did.

MR BOOYENS: Was this the first time that you were involved in something like this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage was there already a prevailing attitude which you as a junior member would have perceived that elimination of certain persons was an option in some cases?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you declare your willingness to participate in this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you then confirm the contents of pages of the application up to pages 48, paragraph 14 of the application?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Were you aware that the commander of the office had been informed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: You didn’t speak to Colonel Erasmus yourself?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: As far as the planning is concerned - and I’m going to sum this up, it was to abduct the persons, to eliminate them, to leave the motor vehicle near to the Lesotho border and thus create the impression that they would have left the country, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You were involved with the abduction of these two persons near to the Holiday Inn in Port Elizabeth?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How did you know that they were going to the Holiday Inn?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I knew through - as I’ve already mentioned, through information and the monitoring of physical and non-physical informants.

MR BOOYENS: So you know they were going to the Holiday Inn?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You and Mr du Plessis then stopped them near to the Holiday Inn?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were known to both these persons?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you bring them under the impression that you wished to - or that they should come with you for questioning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You got into the car with them and Captain du Plessis followed you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: You drove some distance and at Algoa Park you met Mr van Rensburg?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Just outside Port Elizabeth near to St. Georges Beach, the two deceased and Captain du Plessis got into Captain du Plessis’s vehicle and Colonel van Rensburg and the two deceased went by vehicle, you followed in the deceased vehicle, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: You went to Post Chalmers, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Can we just deal with something else now, before the time Mr du Plessis told you that when these persons were to be eliminated you had to get something to put them to sleep?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Did you say that you would get hold of a substance?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: What did you have in mind?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, at that stage I had a prescription of a physician which had prescribed sleeping tablets for myself, I’d been using it for studying purposes as I was busy with studies at the moment and I wanted to allow myself some rest and sleep at night and therefore I took these sleeping tablets and I had some in my possession.

MR BOOYENS: Just to give an indication, how strong were these sleeping tablets?

MR NIEUWOUDT: What I can remember - and I can’t remember the name of the tablets but what I do know Mr Chairperson, is that only half a tablet was needed to put me to sleep immediately.

MR BOOYENS: Surely not immediately?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Well, shortly afterwards.

MR BOOYENS: Did these tablets cause you to sleep?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You took some of these sleeping tablets with you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember if there was a conversation whether you had the sleeping tablets or something to get them to sleep, with you or not?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can’t pertinently remember such a conversation but in the planning phase when we discussed this matter, it was mentioned that everything needed for the operation such as the sleeping tablets and I said I did have sleeping tablets.

MR BOOYENS: Was this part of the part of the plan for you to take diesel with?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have two jerry cans with you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We did.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, they take 50 litres in total?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have these empty jerry cans in your car and did you put them over into their car?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And along the road, did you fill these containers with diesel? Can you remember where?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember it was at Cradock before we moved out.

MR BOOYENS: You got there quite late at night?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I just want to come back to that, it was at an ordinary filling station, I think I still paid for it out of my own pocket.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, you didn’t get it from a police station?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: So it was a secret operation.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You then drove to Post Chalmers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You arrived at night?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: That night the impression may have been created that you wanted to question the persons - the deceased, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you sleep that evening and spend the next day there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: The following evening, did you give the deceased some sleeping tablets?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: How did you so this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was in their coffee that I offered them, I put and overdose of the tablets in the coffee and I gave it to them to drink.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember how many tablets you gave the deceased each?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot be precise but it was more than two or four.

MR BOOYENS: The prescribed dosage was a half a tablet.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: The deceased went to sleep?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They did Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You and Mr van Rensburg - or you, was it you - and Mr van Rensburg carried them out?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr van Rensburg and I carried them out.

MR BOOYENS: Van Rensburg shot the one person, you shot the other?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Afterwards the bodies were placed on some wooden stumps, diesel was put on and they were set alight?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: During the course of the evening, on several occasions you had to keep the fire going and put on more wood?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: After about six hours their bodies were nearly ash?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: The next morning, did you gather the remains and throw these into the Fish River?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The vehicle which you had with you - Madaka’s vehicle, was then taken to Tella Bridge near to the Lesotho border and it was left there, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Was the purpose of that to create the impression that these persons had left the country?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt, to a certain extent you’ve dealt with the political background, do you confirm what you’ve said up to page 51 and including 51 of Annexure A, that’s paragraph 17?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: I have already dealt with your political background and you’ve also dealt with it to a certain extent but if we can just look at the spirit of the day. Mr P W Botha was the State President, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And one of his well-known phrases was: "The total onslaught" phrase?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The message which came to you as a security force person even as one of the junior officers, was that this "total onslaught" had to be fought?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The utterances of the leaders of the day at that time concerned largely words such as: "enemies which had to be eliminated, the ANC had to be taken on" and similar statements?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: A politician never told you directly to kill people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: But the deduction which you made from what the politicians had been saying what they wanted was?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was that we should eliminate people and that we should protect the Apartheid Government and the White population at all times.

MR BOOYENS: They wanted the results, you could work out the methods.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct, unconventional methods were used.

MR BOOYENS: You’ve said that the talk about eliminating people also created the impression from what was discussed amongst your own ranks, that people could be eliminated if necessary. It was part of their total reaction to the "total onslaught".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you yourself believe that you could contribute in achieving this objective of a complete action against the "total onslaught"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did believe this.

MR BOOYENS: If we can just return to the two deceased persons specifically. As far as you were concerned the death of the two deceased would be essential for achieving this objective or not the entire achievement but partial achievement of combating the total onslaught?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, with the objective of toppling the Government.

MR BOOYENS: So the total objective was to ...[inaudible] the toppling of the Government?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

MR BOOYENS: You mention on page 52, the political objectives which you wanted to achieve, do you confirm the contents of 52?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Just for clarity purposes, on the top of page 54, paragraph 24, you mention SM and TM that’s Madaka - Topsi Madaka that is referred to?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt, did you participate in the killing of these persons - first listen to the question. Did you participate in killing them for your own purposes?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: Or in any way to gain anything out of it yourself?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR BOOYENS: As far as you were concerned, it was for the protection of a political dispensation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage, did you believe that that political dispensation which was in place was necessary for South Africa?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: So it was based on your own political convictions?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: So you acted in a double capacity - if I can put it that way, on the one hand then as a security policeman and in the other context, privately as a support of the Government?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And this was what your conviction and belief was based on?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: I’ve said as a supporter of the Government - as a supporter of the Governing party?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: If we can just touch on some other aspects, why are you applying for amnesty in this case and other cases?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, because of the opportunity and process that was made available to me, also taking into consideration the crime and conflict which arose at that time, I personally am sorry towards the families - sorry about happened. I was caught up in the middle of the struggle and the conflict of the past against the liberation organisations who wanted to overthrow the apartheid Government and it was on that basis that I was caught up in the middle of this conflict.

And now the present Government has given me the opportunity to come and tell the truth here and explain what happened and it’s on that basis that I am applying for amnesty.

MR BOOYENS: That is why you decided to apply for amnesty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You’ve hear what your colleagues have testified that your - you were also not very hasty in applying for amnesty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Your colleagues have said that in police ranks and between your colleagues and yourself the opportunity of amnesty has been discussed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And there has been a measure of distrust towards this process, did you have the same experience?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did experience it in this way Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And it was only later after General van der Merwe had given an input and you had discussed it with Mr van der Merwe and the attorney, that you decided to apply for amnesty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You also discussed this with your former colleagues I presume?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you mention to them that you were planning to apply for amnesty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: As far as this particular matter is concerned and to your knowledge, was anybody else involved in this matter apart from the four applicants? Were there other offenders involved?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not that I know about.

MR BOOYENS: Possibly just for purposes of the records, some photographs have been made which form part of the exhibits. You took these, I want to identify them - they’ve already been handed in.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR BOOYENS: Yes, Exhibit E Mr Chairman. He pointed out the - which resulted in the key to the photographs and plan.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

MR VISSER: I have no questions to this witness, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: Mr Nieuwoudt, why did you have some - why was there a measure of distrust regarding this process?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, at this stage I was in a hearing where I had been found guilty. The process had not got going yet and when the process at a later stage got going, I was brought under the impression that a witch-hunt would be carried out against us, Nuremberg style hearings, trials would take place. That was my own perception and was already in 1993 - the way it was conveyed to me

by Advocate Hodgen of the Attorney General’s office.

MR PHOSA: You refer to the Nuremberg style process. Look, give us an idea what your concern is about that if that was going to happen to you, what was the problem with that according to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, the way I understood it I would not be given a fair opportunity to state my case, that’s the way I understood it.

MR PHOSA: Did Mr Hodgen say to you - according to his understanding, the then existing criminal process would be abandoned?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, that is the way it was explained to me.

MR PHOSA: Are you saying he said that to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR PHOSA: Did you think - did you understand from what was said to you, that you’ll go before a judge?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he didn’t explain to me the procedure, he just said that there would be Nuremberg style trials.

MR PHOSA: Do you say that was at a stage when there already were - was another matter pending against you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And was the procedure, sorry - had that matter not commenced yet?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR PHOSA: Is Mr Hodgen this gentleman who used to be in the Eastern Cape Attorney General’s office?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was the Acting Attorney General.

MR PHOSA: Is he still alive?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I suspect so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: In all circumstances, did he give you that sort of advice or interpretation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I beg your pardon. It was during the Goniwe inquest that he informed me to this effect.

MR PHOSA: Where you and Mr Hodgen dealing with the Goniwe inquest’s facts?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Perhaps I should just explain. I was tasked with assisting the team who represented the police during the inquest.

MR PHOSA: It didn’t come out clearly to me the way it was interpreted - I’m not saying it’s wrong but what does it mean, you were tasked with what?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I had to assist with the legal team which represented the police as a whole during the inquest.

MR PHOSA: Were you yourself one of the accused or suspects in that matter, the Goniwe matter?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, that was the impression that I received from Hodgen, that he suspected me as one of the suspects in the case but it never came out in evidence, only later in the Motherwell case.

MR PHOSA: Bear with me please, I’m trying to understand you seriously. When you were before Mr Hodgen, was he on your side or was he on the opposite side of you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was actually opposing me Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So why were you there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have explained, I assisted the legal team of the police in the investigation - the police legal team.

MR PHOSA: Were you helping in the investigation of the Goniwe matter?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: At the stage that you were before Mr Hodgen, was he then ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: He hasn’t said he was before him, this is the second time you’ve said: "At the stage you were before". He hasn’t indicated as far as I know, that he was before him.

Were you before him? Was he presiding over any enquiry?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, I wasn’t using the legal jargon of before, I was ...[inaudible] the literal meaning of being in front of him - no not the legal jargon, were you not in front of him as you’re talking?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, perhaps I can supply some information for the benefit of my learned friend here, which will shorten things here ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: We hope so, will you supply the information?

MR BOOYENS: During the Goniwe inquest Mr Hodgen, the then Acting Attorney General for the Eastern Cape was basically leading the evidence, the police had a legal team representing them, the army had a legal team representing them and national intelligence had a legal team representing them. And the witness was allocated to assist the legal team consisting of private practitioners instructed by the State Attorney I presume, with their investigations into - in other words, the legal were looking after the interest of the police. I wasn’t trying to answer, I’m just trying to shorten proceedings.

MR PHOSA: No, we’ll just ask him to confirm if he agrees with you. Do you confirm that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: You see, my understanding is that you were officially mentioned as one of the suspects but if I’m wrong just say so.

MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage I had discussions with him in private and he created the impression that I was a suspect and that the security branch was responsible for the death and that I was one of the persons and he didn’t have any evidence at his disposal.

MR PHOSA: That’s precisely what I was suspecting you were saying. Just the two of you were talking to each other somewhere with nobody else?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So what did he say to you about first of all, your possible involvement in the Goniwe matter and later about the Nuremberg situation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He created the impression with me that the security branch or the police had been responsible for the death of Goniwe and that I was a suspect in the matter. And then he wished to afford me the opportunity to come to the fore with the truth and I didn’t know anything about the Goniwe matter and then he said: "You have to keep in mind the Nuremberg trials that will come" because at that stage the process was already on the go - that the new Government would come to rule, there were elections planned for the next year and on that basis I already had the perception.

MR PHOSA: That is all that is discussed between you and him about the Goniwe matter and the Nuremberg trial?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: Then, did you have any further discussions with him about Nuremberg?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, that is why I’m using the terminology. That was the terminology that he used, that is what - the term that he used, the word Nuremberg trials and that is why I informed you of this.

MR PHOSA: Now that was 1993?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: Now when did you ever give thought for the first time in your mind about coming forward because the situation you are referring to as I understand it, was just about the Goniwe where you were being wrongly accused?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So when did you come and think about the present situation where you might possibly come forward and speak yourself out on the situation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was after the completely of my case before appeal where I was found guilty in the Motherwell case.

MR PHOSA: When was that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was in June - 27 June that I was found guilty and I was sentenced - that was last year 1996, and I applied on 13 December end of last year.

MR PHOSA: Yes, so what - you didn’t apply shortly after your conviction in the Motherwell case?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: At that stage, were you still suspecting the system - the process?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I can’t remember whether it’s a - is this now the stage after I had been found guilty or which stage are you referring to?

MR PHOSA: After you were found guilty.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but there was another process - there was an appeal and after I had been sentenced I instituted an appeal, I filed an appeal.

MR PHOSA: As I understand that process, that charge, the conviction, the appeal had nothing to do with the present circumstances, you - as far as you were concerned you were - in the present case, you were not guilty, you were being accused falsely in that case.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I was found guilty in that case.

MR PHOSA: But as far as ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, I thought you’re - maybe there’s confusion, did you refer to the Goniwe case or the Motherwell? You said - I thought you’re referring to the Goniwe case and you said you were found guilty but you weren’t found guilty in the Goniwe case.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not in the Goniwe case.

MR PHOSA: No, sorry. In the Motherwell case as far as you are concerned, you are concerned you’re being accused unfairly?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Well I was found guilty in the Motherwell case.

MR PHOSA: But you had an attitude in the case, you were pleading not guilty and your attitude was until conviction, I was not involved in this matter, they’re telling lies about me. Wasn’t that your attitude?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that was my attitude but when this process of amnesty - but the process of amnesty was not ongoing at the stage when I had already pleaded.

MR PHOSA: Let me make you understand, I understand clearly that you are now applying for amnesty for that, I’m dealing with Nieuwoudt the person. There you were being charged, you went up to the stage of appeal. Your attitude was - unless there’s something in my thinking, "Look, I didn’t do this, I’m being accused falsely and now I’m being convicted wrongly, I am appealing because I didn’t do it". Wasn’t that your attitude?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I took the decision in December to apply for this process whereas the process was not in operation initially and that is the reason why and I thought I had a chance, and that is so.

ADV SANDI: Which December are you talking about, December 1996 Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: But at that time the Amnesty Committee process was already in operation.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so Mr Chairperson but then I filed my application.

MR PHOSA: Let me make you understand me. Much as I obviously need some information, my understanding of the situation is that you have applied now for amnesty regarding the Motherwell situation, isn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: You did so after you’d been convicted and after you’d - did you lodge an appeal?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As I said, I had applied for appeal.

MR PHOSA: So I understand that but what I’m saying is this and I think it’s quite clear, right up to the stage when you were appearing before court and going through the criminal process, rightly or falsely your attitude and as exhibited in court was: "I am innocent, I didn’t do this". Am I correct in saying that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so.

MR PHOSA: Even after the conviction, that was your attitude.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now I know you’re applying - are you saying you lied in court, you were lying as you were claiming innocence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Well then, it may have emerged and I missed it in the course of your evidence - it’s quite possible, why then - about that Motherwell matter, were you being dishonest to the court? Why at that stage you did not take the attitude, when you were being tried in the normal process, "Let me speak out now, now they’ve found me, let me speak out" - about the Motherwell case?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, as I said if we now look back, yes I had but when I was asked to plead the amnesty process was not in operation so there was no process for me, so I had to go through that and I was under the impression that there were no witnesses and the process only started in March but I had pleaded before March.

MR PHOSA: I am not dealing with amnesty, I’m dealing with you and your honesty and I’m asking you why you did not honestly tell a court of law: "Look, the game is up now, I did it"? Why did you not tell the court of law so?

CHAIRPERSON: Hasn’t he just explained Mr Phosa? - because he thought there were no witnesses.

MR PHOSA: Oh, I missed that, sorry I missed that. Oh, you thought there were no witnesses?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I believed that there was not adequate evidence for me to be found guilty. Only at a later stage Eugene de Kock also became involved and this strengthened the State’s case and that’s my interpretation, my interpretation. I’m not saying the perception of why I was found guilty, it’s my perception. I’m not saying that the judge was in error or that anybody was in error, it’s my perception - that’s how I saw it.

MR PHOSA: Let’s just go past that quickly. You would never say the judge was in error because you did it.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR PHOSA: But you see ...[intervention]

MR NIEUWOUDT: But if you talk at that stage Mr Chairperson ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: You thought that you could get away with it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: The true position is that it at that stage had nothing to do with Nuremberg - that stage, your fear was - it’s gone, I don’t think it’s coming out - mine is not at least - mine is faulty.

I was saying that I think your concern at the time - whilst you were going through the criminal action against you in the Motherwell case, was that you will be convicted, you might be convicted and if you were convicted you would bear the consequences of the conviction, that was your fear. Put simply, that was your fear, that’s why you lied?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson no, it may be so that I feared that this could happen but at that stage I believed that there was not adequate evidence against me.

MR PHOSA: You mean you believed there was not adequate evidence on which they could convict you because you did not want to be convicted. You see I find it difficult - it’s a very simple point, you did not want to be convicted, did you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR PHOSA: The next step is for all - we all know the reasons why people don’t want to be convicted because if you are convicted you get sentenced.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: And you didn’t want to be sentenced.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: I’m not sure in my mind now, at the time was there still the possibility that you could get death penalty?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: But you would stay in prison for quite a long time if you were convicted, you feared that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And you’d be - you’d lose dignity, you’re integrity would be - your lack of integrity would be exposed right through and you didn’t want that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it’s not perception, I did it and I was found guilty and that is so. And this process has now occurred and I have availed myself of the opportunity and I am using this opportunity to clean the slate of the conflict of the past. And the present Government has created the opportunity and this is why I made use of this process.

MR PHOSA: I understand you but you see I have families here that say: "That person would be abusing this process if he’s given pardon" so that it why I’m questioning you in spite of what you say. I understand why you do it, it’s your right in terms of the law but there are certain conditions and the families say: "Please try and expose that person, he doesn’t deserve it", do you understand me? - now this is what I’m trying to do.

Now you said de Kock - you think you’re convicted ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Haven’t we dealt enough, you’ve exposed that he lied to the court, he pleaded not guilty when he knew he was guilty, he tried to get away with it and then he only took the amnesty way out in the end.

MR PHOSA: I just want to talk about de Kock, just quickly in passing Mr Chairperson.

De Kock’s aspect - I’m mean his information, did it emerge whilst your case was still going on, whilst it was still at the evidence stage?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, you see it was after the State had closed it’s case that they brought de Kock and then they re-opened the case of the State.

MR PHOSA: Right, now I am just raising de Kock’s position to ask another aspect. Now when de Kock came up - perhaps I should just ask a question before that. Were you ever sorry before you were charged with the Motherwell case, were you ever sorry about what you had done? Did you ever feel: "I have done a terrible thing by killing the two people here, Mthimkhulu and Madaka" - before that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did feel sorry Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And that was worrying you a lot.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And then the Motherwell thing came after that, isn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: In spite of your great concern and worry, you went on and killed the Motherwell people.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And those two - the Motherwell people included your colleagues?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: I act on ...[inaudible] now, just stop me if I’m wrong and media - you killed your colleagues because you thought they were a danger to you in that they might spill out the beans?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Well, I don’t want to go into details about that but why did you kill them - your colleagues?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they had gone over to the liberation movement, they had put out feelers and they had already been recruited. That’s in short what happened and this is the conflict of toppling the apartheid Government by violence.

MR PHOSA: I don’t want to go deep into that because I believe it’s coming up. Now, as far as de Kock was concerned then, wasn’t that a golden opportunity for you to say: "Well de Kock is now exposing this, would my conscience - I must now clear it up and admit in court"?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phosa, it’s quite clear he had no such feelings. He hasn’t pretended he had.

ADV SANDI: He didn’t want to go to jail, he’s made it very clear.

MR PHOSA: Maybe I should be taking the obvious. Now, you know why I’m putting this to the annoyance of even the Committee, it’s because I am suggesting to you that at all times when you firstly you decided to kill these young people and when later you did not disclose your action to anybody - these two young people here, it was because you did not want to be convicted. I’ll tell you to save you time, in the first instance you feared that you might be convicted of poising them? Your answer?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: But when you had killed them you obviously did not want to be convicted, you wouldn’t like to be convicted would you - after you had killed them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It may be so but everything that I believed at that stage when I committed the deed - the crime, was that it was a matter of the conflict of the past and that’s the way I saw it.

MR PHOSA: No, we’ll talk about that. You have now killed these two people, you know very well that if you get arrested and it’s get discovered that you’ve killed them you will be charged, if you’re convicted you’ll be given a severe sentence. Wasn’t that the case?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And naturally, not because you’re Nieuwoudt but because you’re a human being you would not have wanted the consequences of that conviction. In other words, the sentence that would follow up - that would follow that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So, in your answer then as to why you’re making an application there must surely be the aspect also that you would not like to languish in prison, isn’t that so?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Phosa, isn’t the requirement that we had - we will have to deal with is his motivation for committing the offence, not his motivation for applying for amnesty? The latter is irrelevant. The first one is the one that we should actually deal with and that was what you said in your opening remarks, the grounds on which you’re opposing.

MR PHOSA: I’m not so sure in my mind that when determining the motive for the action, one can overlook the possible motive for the application because if it is quite clear that his reason for applying now is simply to save his skin, he might well look for a reason to qualify when in fact he doesn’t qualify. I don’t understand why a person who does not want to suffer the consequences of an ordinary criminal action might not falsely create a political reason.

ADV DE JAGER: He may falsely create the political reason but we’re still back to the time when he committed the action, that was, what was his motive then, not what was his motive when he signed the application.

MR PHOSA: I’m going to have - if it’s being argued like this by people before me, I’m going to differ. I submit with respect, that if a person - if it can be shown that the applicant in fact is not concerned with anything else but just saving his skin - he was involved in a criminal case but he knows that he can’t say: "I was involved in a criminal case". In order to save his skin he’s got to say it was political and ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Okay Mr Phosa, I understand your point of view and I think you’re entitled to argue that but let’s leave it for argument and let’s in the meantime continue.

MR PHOSA: I must - two things, I must get the evidence from him, secondly I must give him the opportunity. I may be wrong - yes.

Now Mr Nieuwoudt, I think I stopped at the point where - I got the impression you were about to concede this, namely that indeed you are concerned about the consequences that might befall you if you were to be convicted for killing these two persons? Now I think that’s logical, others have admitted it.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: The Government under which - the Government that you were purporting to protect had created laws which did not permit you as a policemen - even a security policeman, even as a Nationalist Party supporter, to murder people, you know that.

MR NIEUWOUDT: There was not Act of Law that stipulated it as such Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Sorry, I misunderstood - stipulated what?

MR NIEUWOUDT: There was not Act that stipulated this, which prescribed this.

ADV DE JAGER: You mean there was no Act that permitted you to commit murder?

MR NIEUWOUDT: From the Government’s side, yes that’s correct.

MR PHOSA: When we come to your political - for your other background, we’ll come to that but am I wrong in saying that to your knowledge - let’s just answer what we can, is it not correct that the laws that you knew of forbade you from killing other persons - that’s simple?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Moreover, in terms of the laws of your Government, you were not supposed to torture people during interrogation.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Even Mr Hodgen whom you were speaking to, you viewed him as a member of the Attorney General’s team of that very Government.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: You had never - I know the things you have shown us here - the documentation, you never had any discussion with any politicos regarding their attitude to elimination of people.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I personally did not have any discussions with them Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now somewhere in your reply you say - sorry, I can’t get the exact portion but I remember what you said. You said something like this: "There was" - no, I think you were saying there was - the Government did not - the Government would not openly support the killing of people, am I correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And the word - in other words, there was never a direct statement that said people should be killed.

MR NIEUWOUDT: If we just consider speeches by the politicians to which I could refer you ...[intervention]

MR PHOSA: But before you do that, I’m dealing with a portion of your reply - I trust that everybody else has that, I noted that you said there was nowhere said by any politician anywhere directly that people could be killed. Didn’t you say that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t think I ever said that Mr Chairperson, I only said that I was indoctrinated and conditioned in such a way by the terms of "total onslaught" and the concept thereof Mr Chairperson, and from various meetings and seminars that I attended where certain terminology was used and reference was made to elimination.

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairperson, I really am serious about this. Has nobody else have a note where this witness said: "No politician ever said directly" ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But he agreed with you, he said: "Politicians never told us to kill, it was a deduction that I made from what they said". He agrees with that.

MR PHOSA: Now because of that Mr Nieuwoudt, I ask you the next question - are you saying that the word eliminate is of dubious meaning, in other words it does not necessarily mean "kill"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: In my evidence in chief I stated the way I understood the word eliminate was to kill, that’s the way I understand it.

MR PHOSA: Yes, the way I understand your evidence is that you gave an interpretation because it wasn’t an explicit word to say: "People must be killed". Isn’t that what you’re saying?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is my perception Mr Chairperson, and that is what I believed the word eliminate meant.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Phosa. Mr Nieuwoudt, didn’t you say in the context of those meetings, seminars and workshops you attended as a member of the security police, your understanding of the use of the word eliminate or elimination was that people should be killed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is the way I understood it.

MR PHOSA: I will quickly sum this up because I’m pretty sure that I don’t have much support - I will argue this later but just briefly on this thing because I don’t want to leave at that, You see what I’m putting to you is this, my understanding of your evidence is that politicians avoided using the word kill because that would be pretty obvious so they will use the word eliminate because it might not necessarily mean kill. Am I getting the wrong impression of what you’re saying, that you personally said: "I’m sure they mean, to kill"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I could quote Magnus Malan’s statement: "Visiting the scene of the landmine explosion in the Northern Transvaal he said, wherever the ANC is we will eliminate it".

MR PHOSA: Now, it doesn’t answer my question and I don’t think you are listening carefully. I have understood you - and I’ve been told a few times to remember this but I always understood, you are saying when the word eliminate was used, you understood that to mean "kill". Do you understand me?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: But your impression - and it’s important to me that I get this, was that the word eliminate was being chosen deliberately so as to be ambiguous and not to say clearly "kill", that’s how you understood it.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: But then I’m going further with you, I’m saying to you: "As a matter of fact the word eliminate is ambiguous, it is an ambiguous term, it could mean getting rid of people" ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Isn’t that a matter for argument Mr Phosa?

MR PHOSA: Am I wrong in putting it?

CHAIRPERSON: He’s told you what his impression was, you can put to him that he’s not being truthful in that.

MR PHOSA: No, he doesn’t have to be a liar in that regard, if the word is ambiguous and he knows it’s ambiguous I would like his support on that sphere. He doesn’t have to be a liar at all times to concede the fact, I’m not always going to get extracts - admissions of lies from him. I’m just trying to get from and I mean by the way Mr Chairman, to try and convince you later about this because I may have to do that but I ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: That’s what I’m saying, you do it in argument.

MR PHOSA: But if I said to you the witness also concedes ambiguous and you said I didn’t put it to him, what would I do? May I be allowed to put that to him?

CHAIRPERSON: He has conceded that politicians used it so that they could argue it meant something else, isn’t that ambiguity for you?

MR PHOSA: Mr Chairman, that’s my problem, had I just asked that question and got an answer - if he said no for instance, I’ll be able to address you about him. Can I ask him? ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You have made the point haven’t you, that politicians used the word eliminate so they could later argue they didn’t mean "to kill".

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, you are correct. May I just refer you to my attachment or Appendix 2?

CHAIRPERSON: You referred us there to the various references to eliminate, didn’t you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: The strategic communication?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, page 70 Mr Chairperson.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, this refers to the secret manipulation or secret undermining of groups or institutions which was directly opposite to the image which the Government wished to show of themselves.

ADV SANDI: As of today Mr Nieuwoudt, is it not your word against those politicians you’re talking about?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson with all respect, could you repeat this question?

ADV SANDI: As of now and today, is it not your word against the word of the politicians? You say: "It was clear from this that we were being given instructions to kill" and they say: "We never meant that, that is not what we were saying. We have no policy that political opponents should be killed or eliminated".

MR NIEUWOUDT: You are correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, if somebody tells me to go and eliminate somebody and I’m Afrikaans speaking, then I would understand: "Go and kill him".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is the way I also interpret it Mr Chairperson with great piety.

MR PHOSA: Mr Nieuwoudt, I know what has been put to you by the Committee member, I am dealing with the context - maybe there’s something I do to my things ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well I had hoped we might achieve something this afternoon, we’ve spent half an hour on hearing that he gave false evidence at his trial and that he want’s amnesty so that he won’t be punished. Can we get on with something now?

MR PHOSA: No, I’m still struggling with my microphone which just adds up to my problems, sorry. I will leave that aspect to arguments, quite clearly I’m having a battle not only against him.

Now back to the other factors, why did Mr du Plessis pick you up as the person to assist them in this terrible action?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t know, I don’t know what his considerations were.

MR PHOSA: Was he aware, as far as you know of any impropriety in your conduct before that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, just to ease the task of the Commission, could I explain what happened during those times when one was transferred to security? You did not apply to be transferred to that branch you were recruited, a selection was done and I don’t know why Mr du Plessis chose me - what his objectives were.

MR PHOSA: And when he chose you, you were quite willing to agree to be party to the elimination?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now I know you’ve given the stages, we’ve dealt with this and with others as well but allow me just to go through it quickly. Now, as far as your problems were concerned there was the problem of amongst others, the smallness of personnel, in other words there were not many enough policemen in your department - in your branch, isn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I think that was so and also in general in the whole of the police force this applied Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Was the question of the number - the small number of policemen, something that could physically be attended to if the powers that be understood the urgency?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t really understand the question, could you please just repeat what you had said Mr Phosa?

MR PHOSA: Assuming a request was made - I think yours is the same as mine, if a request was made to the powers that be to please increase as a matter of urgency, the number of security policemen or policemen generally in that area, would that be a relevant factor in trying to solve the problem?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been the case Mr Chairperson, it could be - I don’t know.

MR PHOSA: Of course that wasn’t done?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, I don’t know either - I was not in command.

MR PHOSA: The possibility exists therefore that with a greater number of policemen it might have been possible to contain the activities of these people in the Eastern Cape and it would be better than it was happening then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is possible, I don’t know Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Also if - especially after his return from this hospital, Mr Mthimkhulu had been house arrested, that too might have had an effect?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, is this now the restriction of the person to house arrest, is that the way I’ve got to understand the question?

ADV DE JAGER: I think that’s correct, yes.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, according to my personal experience, it was a problem, it would still have been a problem under the present circumstances. I know specifically in the case Mr Barney Pityana - Doctor Barney Pityana sorry, where all the necessary steps were taken and it had no effect. I also think of the late Steve Biko where he did not pay any attention whatsoever to the restriction. And it was difficult for me but I’m talking from personal experience and the problems that I experienced on ground level in dealing with this type of thing and physically monitoring it.

ADV SANDI: Did that have anything or something to do with the shortage of the number of members of the police force?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was so because then one had to delegate a large number of people just to keep such a person under observation. And a further problem that could stem from this would be that the colleague who had to go and do duty there could be attacked. We were in an unrest situation and the circumstances were such.

ADV SANDI: In that way you had a serious problem of shortage of the police?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so, yes.

ADV SANDI: Did you give any thought to the idea of making a recommendation to your superiors that there should be an increase in the number of members of the police.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I think Mr Chairperson, there were many requests from my commanders but I did not do so personally and where would we be able to find people to fulfil this task? I don’t think at that stage there were any people who wished to join the police, particularly not the security branch because they were regarded as collaborators of the White regime.

So you have to look at the circumstances that created the problems, these were all factors that created problems in the policing function of the police.

MR PHOSA: Don’t over-simplify that problem - that situation, you know that even today the problem of the shortage of police still exists.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: But when a certain area, a given area is in need of a greater proportion, a number of policemen, people are - security police or army and others, are sent to that area.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson, but now there’s a further factor that occurs. That person doesn’t know the suspect, he doesn’t know the circumstances, how long will it take for such a person to get into things? There’s an unnecessary waste of time so there are many factors that one has to take into consideration. If I have to consider the things now - at that stage I didn’t even think of those.

ADV DE JAGER: If you consider them now, how could you say we could resolve the position in KwaZulu Natal? Would it serve a purpose to send in hundreds of police and the defence force - under the present circumstances?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t think so Mr Chairperson, because they don’t know the circumstances, they’re not familiar with what is going on. It doesn’t help to transfer people there because it will remain a problem Mr Chairperson. That’s the way I see it.

ADV SANDI: Does that mean ...[intervention]

MR PHOSA: I get worried Mr Nieuwoudt - there’s too much generalisation about a serious matter because you know for a fact - not from me, even from public statements, from the survivors own reports, the unrest situation subsided substantially in Natal - in KwaZulu Natal through the sending of security forces from other areas. Now don’t you know that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It may be so but I think that these things have to be resolved on political level because we must not get trapped in the same process where the police have the task again to act in a military manner. This is something for the politicians to resolve, the police must not be involved as in the present circumstances where I was involved during those times and under those circumstances and I think that is the main difference. If we look at the present times, we cannot really compare situations because they are so different.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll take the adjournment now till 9 o’clock tomorrow morning.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION 26 SEPTEMBER 1997

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: It is now the 26th of September, we are continuing with the hearing and the delay in starting this morning is due to members of the Committee.

ADV DE JAGER: It was my fault, I took the wrong off-ramps and I’m apologising for keeping you and starting late.

CHAIRPERSON: It shocked me that in the light of the references to the various summonses that were issued on behalf of Mr Mthimkhulu, that it would be desirable for us to have copies of those if they are available. I gather that those representing the victims do not have a copy but I will arrange to get a copy from the Supreme - the High Court from where I take it, they were issued unless anybody happens to have copies available at the moment.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, lest we forget - while you’re on the subject of documentation, I’m just wondering - just to prevent us forgetting about this issue, we were asked yesterday whether we would be prepared to make some concessions - admissions in regard to medical reports. Do you wish to deal with that now and get it done with?

MR PHOSA: Yes please, we would like that done.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it appears to us that the reference would be to bundle B, page 34 to page - well there’s one document at page 34, the next document which is presumably a medical report, starts at page 35 and ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What about page 31?

MR VISSER: 31? But that’s a statement of Mr Mthimkhulu Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It’s not, it’s a statement of Adrian Dawid Marais.

MR VISSER: Oh I see, yes of course.

CHAIRPERSON: It’s about ...[inaudible]

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed. Page 31 through to page 33, page 34, then page 35 it would appear through to page 39, page 40 to 41 and then at 42 there’s a similar statement by two doctors. I don’t know whether you wish to include page 44 - the article, we certainly have no objection to that going in as well through to page 46 Mr Chairman, on the basis that the admission does not extend to admitting the correctness or truthfulness of the contents.

CHAIRPERSON: It is an admission that that is a case report by them, a statement by them, an affidavit by them.

MR VISSER: Indeed Mr Chairman, that admission we’re prepared to make on behalf of Mr Erasmus.

MR BOOYENS: I make similar admissions on behalf of those applicants that I represent Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that assist you Mr Phosa?

MR PHOSA: Before I answer that aspect, there’s also at page 26 to 30.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman I’m sorry, we’re quite happy if that goes in on the same basis, no problem.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that does cover all medical reports and other similar documents doesn’t it?

MR PHOSA: Yes, it does. Just to clear the technical way in which it’s admitted - which is of course one I know, I understand this to say, if the families want to rely on these documents as being proof of what they alleged, then that would be a problem.

MR VISSER: Well it won’t be a problem, they’ll just have to lead the evidence Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: The evidence of the doctors? Well, that doesn’t help us Mr Chairman, we don’t want an academic inclusion of the documents, we want this as evidence. It appears to us we shall have to call these witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: I think would think rather Mr Visser, that it is evidence but you have a right of cross-examination if you wish to challenge any - that this is evidence in chief so to speak. If they wish to challenge you can then say we want to cross-examine those people. If you don’t want to - because it seems to me gentlemen that this is a largely academic discussion. On the evidence - information available it appears quite clear this man was poisoned, how and in what manner, we don’t know but the evidence really - none of these doctors seeks to point a finger at any particular person, they merely relate the symptoms they found at certain times and I don’t think that they are really in dispute are they?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, it may be a little more complicated than that, you would have observed from a reading of these documents that it’s not altogether clear, in fact there’s great confusion as to when - if the poison was administered through the mouth, when it could have happened and there are all sorts of theories about that.

CHAIRPERSON: But they are theories, none of them purport to say it happened on such and such a time. They say, as I recollect it: "Depending on the quantity administered it can either be one large dosage, it could be a series of dosages over a period" and I don’t think you dispute that do you? That is one of the symptoms of this poison.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, on the basis that no inferences will be drawn obviously then we can accept it on a basis which you put it to us namely, that this is evidence - prima-facie evidence and if there’s anything in particular which we wish to dispute, we would have to give you notice that we wish to cross-examine these people. We’ll have to consider that then after today Mr Chairman.

MR PHOSA: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: A further matter that I think I should refer to is - I did not comment on it yesterday but it seems to have spread, I do not think it desirable that people should be sitting in the front row of the hall facing the applicants and potential witnesses, carrying posters. Would they please roll them up or take them down. Thank you.

I’m not quite sure who is going to start questioning this morning, I gather we might change horses.

MR PHOSA: I remain precisely so as to continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on them Mr Phosa.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, your instruction is not being followed, I’m not sure whether it’s been interpreted.

ADV SANDI: We would like to make a request that our posters be turned over or rolled up. The reason for this is that we do not want the witness to be distracted, he has to answer a lot of questions. We do not want the witness to be distracted because of the posters. If they could do the same please from the top - upstairs, they could turn their posters around. Thank you very much, we may proceed.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: (cont)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, you told the Committee that you were - you had two positions in which you acted, one you acted in your position as a security policeman and secondly as a supporter of the Nationalist Party ruling Government, is that so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, that was so.

MR PHOSA: In your position as a security policeman, you will be bound by the laws that govern you as a policeman, isn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And in your position as an individual you would surely not have been doing so at all as a policeman you’d be just a Mr X, a Nationalist Party member?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now clearly Mr Nieuwoudt, at all times on the face of everything else you were acting in cahoots, that is jointly with your security policemen - the four - three, the four of you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Quite clearly you did not discuss with your colleagues any aspects that said: "Look, let’s forget about our being policemen now, let’s doing this as being Nationalist Party supporters"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Phosa, did you say four of them? Weren’t there only three that he acted with?

MR PHOSA: Yes, I say four of them in all.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he was only with - there were three in the group he was in, wasn’t there? He didn’t have contact with Erasmus.

MR PHOSA: Perhaps let’s just clear that.

I know that you didn’t have contact with Mr Erasmus but did you believe him to be part of the group?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He was not part of the group where we did the planning, where they involved me but they informed me that General Erasmus had given permission.

MR PHOSA: Since this incident took place - let me not say since, after it took place, did you communicate, you personally communicate or talk to - communicate with or talk to Mr Erasmus?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Is the position that until you began preparing for this application, you had no direct communication with Mr Erasmus so as to find out what he was saying about this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, is that now if I understand correctly, during or before I submitted my application, is it just before or just after? It’s not clear to which period Mr Phosa is referring.

MR PHOSA: When did you speak to him for the first time about this matter, if you did?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did speak to Mr Erasmus regarding the matter at the time of the submission of my application, I had contact with him.

MR PHOSA: That then was the first time that you had personal confirmation of firstly his involvement, knowledge about this involvement and his approval of your action?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, the day during the event before elimination took place when I was involved in this covert action, I was approached by du Plessis or van Rensburg who - I’m not sure who exactly told me that they had obtained approval from Mr Erasmus, that was the first opportunity that I knew about him.

ADV DE JAGER: But the question is, when did you discuss it with him for the first time?

CHAIRPERSON: This is direct personal contact with Mr Erasmus.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I’m sorry that I misunderstood the question. It was when I submitted my application Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: I’m not interested in he whole story but was his attitude then: "Look I authorised this, I confirm that I authorised it and I say it was necessary for you to do it"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Right, let’s just get to the background - to a few things about the background in the matter of this case - of your actions, I’ll just deal with it briefly. On the question of the difficulty that you say you as a police had or experienced I doing your duties - let’s just talk about informers, you would agree with me that there were several informers, your own informers - I don’t mean yours alone, you as a security police in the township, at all times?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so.

MR PHOSA: And most of your informers had not been detected by the public, in other words they were not known because some of them occupied fairly high positions?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: If for instance Mr Mthimkhulu had been given house arrest - had been ordered to remain in his house and he breached that, there was any number of informers who would have informed you about that without being detected - themselves being detected?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson, but I would like to explain in this regard. I’ve already explained where I’d gained practical experience in the case of Doctor Barney Pityana who had also been placed under house arrest. There were several informers who watched his premises and all that they could do was to tell us that he had received visitors. And we never used them because at that stage where two or more had consulted with him he was committing an offence, so the informers weren’t physically present in the house and that was a factor that one had to keep in mind in order to prove one’s case.

And then he would just go into the next room and in this way he would shield this type of meeting in terms of which he would have been accused then. So that was the practical sort of problem in terms of informers.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nieuwoudt, I understood - correct me if I’m wrong, the evidence that the reason - one of the main reasons why you were alarmed was that after Mr Mthimkhulu returned from Cape Town as an invalid, he became a martyr and he addressed public gatherings from his wheelchair and stirred up the public at these public gatherings and violence took place afterwards.

Now that is a very different matter from a private meeting of two people inside a house, surely your informers could have given information that he was going to present at a meeting so you could have had a plain clothes policeman who could give evidence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was so Mr Chairperson, but I was just replying with regard to the house arrest matter, the practical problems on ground level concerning house arrest. But as far as the public gatherings were concerned, there were informers who reported regarding these matters to us.

MR PHOSA: No, I think you are either misunderstanding the churn of the question or just avoiding it or evading it. The question is - let me put it that way and I understood it to be the emphasis, with your highly positioned informers - informers who were highly positioned in the other camp, you could surely have had some of them attending the meetings that he would have in his room because - this is hypothetical now, he could have attended meetings and they would have been present at the meetings in his room or house.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson, but once again, then I would have had to use that informer to give physical evidence and that informer’s life would have been at stake.

MR PHOSA: You know there’s something that you and your colleagues have been keeping away from this Committee, the fact that a number of informers did in fact use evidence as Mr or Miss X, isn’t that so?

CHAIRPERSON: But surely Mr Phosa, that doesn’t stop the accused from telling his friends: "The people who gave evidence against me were a, b and c". If it someone that he knows so well that they attend private meetings, when they give evidence he will identify them.

MR PHOSA: What I’m trying to say Mr Chairperson, is that the fact of the matter is the police were never deterred by the question only of the threat to informers, several informers gave evidence as Mr X, many got to be known and they were taken elsewhere for protection or removed altogether - some others never got to be known.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have to go so far in this case, Mthimkhulu as I gather - they weren’t worried about private meetings in his room, they were worried about public meetings where they could have put policemen in not informers, to give evidence.

MR PHOSA: I take your point, I agree indeed.

Now, another aspect which concerned you - I’m just skimming through, you mentioned with concern the activities preceding the ANC anniversary, do you remember that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Yes, but you see that is clearly an isolated incident, that would be an occasion which anybody else expects will create a lot of activity.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: By the way I mentioned this thing about burning - banishing, let’s just go past it, there was also a method in terms whereof troublesome people could be banished lawfully to other areas even - mostly that they were taken to extreme rural areas, isn’t it - do you know that process?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I am aware of the process.

MR PHOSA: And I would say to you that would be a way of isolating or eliminating them from the area?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That would have been so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: The other incident you mentioned - ...[inaudible] significance, it is important to you I see, that the ANC allegedly - that is led by Tambo, went to Vietnam. I think you’re now talking about hearsay, this is not something that you personally know.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: To talk just quickly about your attitude to your work as a policeman. You mentioned - if I understood you well, that you did assault some people you were interrogating.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: Now, and you said you assaulted them so as to get information?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: That of course is one of the accepted methods amongst the security police or extracting information from those who are reluctant to give it? Unless you are going to suggest that you are queer - you are strange.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so but perhaps I could explain in this regard. There were instances where it was the strategy of the people whom we detained for a long period in terms of the security strategy. After they had been released they had to make this allegation because unfortunately their cohorts or fellow activists within the organisation would accuse them that they had been recruited by the security forces and that - and they had to make use of that opportunity after release to allege that they had been assaulted or ill-treated during detention. It was so, it’s a known fact.

CHAIRPERSON: That must have been caused by the fact that it was known that everybody who did not co-operate was assaulted so if you came out and didn’t complain of assault, it would be proof that you had co-operated because all the other detainees knew they had been assaulted, wasn’t that how this arose?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Did anyone determine amongst you the police, how far the assault must go, in others words: "Look you can beat him up to this point but not so far - no further". Was that ever done?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not that I’m aware of Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Did anyone set out the method and say: "Look, if you want to beat him do it this way and not the other way"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, not that I’m aware of.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nieuwoudt, wasn’t it the practice to endeavour not to leave marks so if a Judge - a Magistrate came on a ...[inaudible] inspection, they wouldn’t see obviously bruises and matters of that nature?

MR NIEUWOUDT: You are correct Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So things like - I’m just taking - mentioning at random, things like - methods like making a person stand day in and day out and all night and all day, that was one of the methods to make sure he gets tired.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Anything that will make him uncomfortable and lose resistance?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So you could make him stand on bricks because that would be most uncomfortable, that also was permissible?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So what appears in one of the statements here about - Mr Bobelo’s statement about Mr Mthimkhulu being made to stand on bricks, is not a far fetched statement?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t have personal experience in this regard, if he did it then he had probably done that. I don’t know, I cannot comment on that.

MR PHOSA: Let’s put it this way, it would not be abnormal, it would be quite a normal thing to make him go through that process whilst being interrogated especially because he was cheeky?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: That’s enough of that, sorry. This background that you referred to, remember you referred us to Exhibits 1 and 2 sorry, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think we’ve had Exhibits 1 and 2, our exhibits are all alphabetic.

MR PHOSA: Annexures, sorry. I haven’t abandoned my criminal ways in court. I had a look - perused this once again this Annexure 1, pages 59 to 61, you already considered and it’s obvious that that’s a document that came out in 1986, however let’s look at a few things about it. On page 60, paragraph 4, if you read - perhaps let us just read that and I’ll tell you which portion I wanted to concentrate on - just read that out aloud - 4.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Reads

"The strategic analysis of a situation in the RSA and comparison thereof with revolutionary wars in other countries make it very clear that the RSA will lose the struggle for the heart and soul of the body and thus work it’s own downfall unless the security situation is immediately stabilised. The revolutionaries in the population be separated and socio-economic bottlenecks be relieved and clear political guidelines for future Governmental development be held up to the population"

MR PHOSA: Thank you. Now from what I’ve read in the subsequent document - knowing that you’ve read it too I would like to say to you, you must concede that the reference there is for the South African Government to - not to lose the struggle for heart and soul and - before you answer, that has to be read with the subsequent document where it says

"The whole struggle must concentrate on winning the support of the majority of the people of South Africa"

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s true Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And even in that paragraph, the phrase 4th from the bottom

"The revolutionaries among the population must be separated from that population"

I say to you that gives the underlying notion of all this to distance the population from the leadership, that is the whole emphasis.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It could be so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: What I also pick up in these documents and I’ll just refer to one portion in support thereof, is that the emphasis was on national systematic action, in other words the idea was that there had to be a common approach, isn’t that so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Which page where - the reference?

MR PHOSA: Perhaps then to complete that just to make it easier for you - paragraph 5, if you read from the beginning and then you get to the end of the 3rd line or maybe begin in the middle of the 3rd line

"But it is of course essential that on national level there should be continuous planning"

MR NIEUWOUDT: I see that Mr Chairperson, but could you please read it in context with the word: "budget for".

MR PHOSA: Where is that?

MR NIEUWOUDT

"At national level there should be continuous planning which will address the revolutionary warfare for the present and on the long term and that strong co-ordinated action on regional and local level will have - it will have to be devolved to that level and budgeted for."

MR PHOSA: Maybe you should just make your point, what are saying about "budgeted for"? Are you saying "budgeted for" does not accommodate my suggestion that the whole idea was a co-ordinated action? Are you saying I am wrong about that - in that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Your question didn’t come through completely.

MR PHOSA: I’m sorry, I did something I suppose. Okay, can I repeat that? Are you saying that because of the need to budget for that, one must not - I’ve done nothing, it keeps cutting.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Phosa, what I’ve learnt - can you switch off your - what I’ve learnt from experience - can you switch off your, when you speak you must never have any paper on top of this here.

MR PHOSA: Thank you very much, I’m learning a lot of things.

Let’s just finalise this point. Mr Nieuwoudt, surely the word: "budgeted for" - the phrase, does not do away with the notion which is emphasised by even the words appearing thereafter: "in need to co-ordinate this at least even at all levels", so I’m suggesting to you that the issue of budgeting does not run away from the need to act jointly in a common strategy. I don’t think we should spend time on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Budgeting surely indicates, certainly in this country that it must be on a national basis?

MR PHOSA: Yes, Mr Chairman. Let’s save time on this, I don’t think there’s a problem with that. I understand you, you are saying there would have to be money for that but that’s not the issue, I’m saying it has national action - conduct, co-ordination.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so and it was devolved to local level.

MR PHOSA: Alright. Paragraph 6 ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Somebody who’s sitting in the vicinity of a microphone - should you turn a page or make any hand gestures, it in fact affects the sound and it causes a disturbance in the ears. These loudspeakers are very sensitive so one should try to refrain from moving the hands around or turning pages near to the mike’s.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: What still emerges in paragraph 6 if you take the second sentence, I suggest to you indicates once again that even this document had in mind lawful action on the part of the police. In other words, the Government had to give more authority to the police, not that they should act in their own way. You may disagree with me but please read the second sentence and perhaps for the benefit of everybody, read aloud.

"The State could not"

Go on from there please.

MR NIEUWOUDT

"The State could not afford to call out a state of emergency"

MR PHOSA: Read on please.

MR NIEUWOUDT

"The State could not afford I ...[inaudible] to call out a state of emergency. And legislation which would give broader powers to the safety and security community was essential in order to prevent the Republic of South Africa from being forced to take much more drastic measures soon"

MR PHOSA: Can you stop there? Do you accept that the idea there is that legislation must be made use of, this meeting was saying: "Let us create legislation to deal with the problem".

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Read the next sentence, that last one.

MR NIEUWOUDT

"An element that stands out in the legislation is the competence or ability to remove the revolutionary elements from the community through unrestricted detention where Judges, Magistrates, physicians and senior police officials would have access to them".

MR PHOSA: So even as late as 1986, the Government was saying: "Let’s find lawful means of removing these people" and it suggests how, can you see that? The emphasis is on whilst there is a certainty that there has to be something done it is still within lawful means, it’s got to be done through parliament, isn’t that so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, not in one of these paragraphs do we have the word eliminate.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: There’s reference to removing the people from the community and suggestions are also made like unlimited detention.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And this - I’ll just repeat that. The term that is used a lot in the next document - Stratcom, is mentioned in paragraph 7 and they describe it in the bottom lines there - you can see that because it features a lot that side. I want you to move the secrecy about the term - it’s explained here, the strategic communication component. It’s not something sinister that each department will have it’s own, isn’t it? I’m assuming that you’ve read this.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: And nothing sinister in the summary that appears on page 61, paragraph 9 can be read that suggests that people must be killed - from my reading of that paragraph, nothing suggests killing.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And then the strategy communication from page 6 ...[inaudible], just explain to me what you understand or what is meant in the third paragraph on page 65. Just read it and explain to me how you understand it.

MR NIEUWOUDT

"Every Government has the purpose and objective of protecting national values against enemies and to build them out to the benefit of the nation or the group"

Is that the paragraph you’re referring to?

MR PHOSA: Yes, that’s the paragraph. Now, that obviously is not dealing with people like Mr Mthimkhulu?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so, that paragraph does not refer to that kind of person.

MR PHOSA: Anyway just before I forget, you see this particular document as I see it, emphasises quite a lot of action being done by the Government - even there it says: "the Government", my general reading of it - you have read it, is that all these things are supposed to be done at a Government level. Did you get a different impression - not this paragraph but generally?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And what I - I don’t want to spend more time on this, what I’m suggesting to you is this Mr Nieuwoudt, even in - as 1986 the Government of the country had not given up on legal means of turning round the situation. Mind you this was 1989, this document was in - it talks about 1989, do you remember that? So even as late as 1989, the Government was still trying to do things that way.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson, but I would like to explain that certain objectives were set in the appendix which we have already dealt with, in which the Government set out certain guidelines and which were carried into effect, so they suggested policy on national level but this policy was carried out on ground level.

MR PHOSA: Yes, it may just be my difficulty with Afrikaans, can you indicate to me - I couldn’t pick up the interpretation that you give, where do you find this that the Government was obviously suggesting that. Can you show me?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, could you give me a moment please? Mr Chairperson, page 63 spells out very clearly the State Security Council - the objectives that should be implemented and that is type of thing that I referred to with regard to page 6 which I’d already read, that this was proposed on national level and then it was escalated down to ground level.

MR PHOSA: Are you saying that those - I’ll repeat that, are you saying that the words that you find on page 63 must be read without taking the context of what appears in the main document - in the documents? For instance what appears in the second - in the strategic one where it says: "the emphasis should be to win the heart and soul of the people"? You mean that must be read differently from that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, what I’m saying is it should be read in context because it is part of that document of mine of my Appendix 1, all of these are objectives that are spelt out.

MR PHOSA: Let me save time Sir, because I can argue this later when you are no longer talking. What I’m putting to you in this, what appears on page 80 for instance - 80, paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 really sums up what was intended, even at these strategic meetings namely the need to give political power to the police in the sense of allowing them sorry, - giving the Government political power, allowing it to politicise the people and winning their hearts and minds, as it says at 47. That is what appears to me to be the fundamental message being sent here including the need to act secretly, do you interpret it differently?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I interpret this differently, there are other steps that should be taken into consideration because this is psychological warfare forming part of it - there is a further step to be taken.

MR PHOSA: Just finally on that, from these documents it appears quite clearly that each department - each branch of the Government, the police, the army what have you, has it’s role to play in this whole affair. In other words, there are certain things that were to be done by the army and not by the police.

MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as strategic communication is concerned, yes that is correct.

MR PHOSA: Now to come back to the present story, the incident - I don’t know why I suddenly have difficulty with this after three days. Now this thallium poison that’s mentioned, do you know what it is? Do you know what thallium poison is?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I know now after I had spoken to my legal counsel before the matter because I had them explain to me. And I know when they warned me in the warning statement, they used the term thallium but I’m not a chemist and I won’t be able to tell what the components are.

MR PHOSA: I’m just skipping thallium itself. If you were interrogating a prisoner, would you not consider - as a strategy if he was resisting, giving him a substance that would make him exhausted or drowsy and still not allow him to sleep? Wouldn’t that be a good method?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know Mr Chairperson, I didn’t do it so I don’t know what the effect would be.

MR PHOSA: But it appears that keeping a person awake was one of the methods - making sure that he gets drowsy and he’s not allowed to sleep. If anything that could be - that could do that, you would do isn’t it - if you could keep him awake? I’m using the opposite now - keeping him awake, you could do that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I never did it so I - but it is possible.

MR PHOSA: You see according to the medical report which is - for what it says is not challenged, this substance thallium was used. Now I’m not sure how far I must go in this regard - whether I should say: "used on Mr Mthimkhulu" but of course then we’re dealing with Mr Mthimkhulu. Mr Mthimkhulu was obviously given thallium, now you would not say that he didn’t get it whilst he was in detention, you cannot say that.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And you heard Mr du Plessis or is it Mr du Plessis, one of them are admitting though that it is normal to send someone to go and collect food for a detainee to be given whilst being detained.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson, it was general practice among us to provide food to the detainees.

MR PHOSA: That would include drinks as well - I’m not talking about liquor. It would include soft drinks.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: You recall that when you dealt with Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka, later when you gave them that substance that put them to sleep, you had it into their coffee or tea, isn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now, you wouldn’t be in a position to dispute that anyone who wanted to use a substance could submerge it into the - ...[inaudible] interrogation, into the drink or soft drink?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot deny that Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Now to come to your substance now, the one that you used when you - before killing Mr Mthimkhulu, where did you get it from?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As I already stated it was a prescription drug, a medical doctor had prescribed it. It was a tranquilliser, a sleeping tablet.

MR PHOSA: You see, we don’t accept that so I will ask you about that. Who was the doctor?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I can no longer remember who the doctor was.

MR PHOSA: Right, maybe you can’t say precisely who, you obviously - I get the impression that you had a few doctors that you used when you were around here?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was the doctor around here, was it Port Elizabeth or where was it? Where did you get this prescription?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, in Port Elizabeth.

MR PHOSA: Well, who were your regular doctors, the ones - look man, the ones that would give you this wonderful substance? It ought to be one of those, who for instance? Might it be - a, b, c, there can’t be 20 or 30 surely?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, when I was in Port - when I arrive in Port Elizabeth, there were various - well we - our medical doctor were, the chief physician was the district surgeon and he had a number of doctors under him whom we saw. After him it was Doctor de Ruyter. I saw a number of specialists as well and now I am with Doctor Swartz.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Phosa, can we ask - can I ask the witness to repeat this, I think it’s very important. I did not follow his answer to the question.

MR NIEUWOUDT: When I arrived in Port Elizabeth, our medical aid worked in such a way that we saw the local district surgeon but this was within his office. There were a number of district surgeons whom we consulted and on various occasions different doctors were present - I can’t remember which doctor was on duty. And after that our medical aid changed where one could use one’s own local doctor and under those circumstances, Doctor de Ruyter was my doctor for quite some time and at present I am with Doctor Swartz.

MR PHOSA: Are you then saying if it was not the district surgeon - sergeant, then it was either Doctor Ruyter or Doctor Swartz who gave this to you?

CHAIRPERSON: The district surgeon or one of his staff, he said there were several doctors working in the district surgeon’s office as I understood it.

MR PHOSA: I meant it in that context, I say in that context. If it was not inside that ...[inaudible] district surgeon, so it would be either Doctor - who was it now, did he say Ruyter or Swartz?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can exclude Doctor Swartz because I recently went to Doctor Swartz.

MR PHOSA: Now for - what were you studying for? You said you used to use this instrument - this substance when you did your studies, what were you studying for?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I studied for becoming a lieutenant for the police examinations.

ADV SANDI: Can you give a description of this substance you were talking about? How did it look like?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it was an ordinary white sleeping tablet.

ADV SANDI: And when you gave it to Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka, Mr Mthimkhulu - you said yesterday he was able to simply take it with the coffee and drink it, was that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Was that in spite of ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What did these tablets taste of? Or did you merely swallow them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I just swallowed them Mr Chairperson. The prescription was that I had to take half a tablet.

CHAIRPERSON: So you had no idea whether they had a strong taste?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yet you put two to four tablets in a cup of coffee and gave it to somebody to drink, not knowing what it would taste like? Is that what you’re telling us?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Mr Mthimkhulu simply took the coffee and drank it in spite of the fact that he had already accused you of having poisoned him whilst he was in detention?

MR BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, I’m sure that it can - it’s justifiable to say that Nieuwoudt was specifically accused of ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I understood it to mean the police.

ADV SANDI: The police and not Mr Nieuwoudt personally, and this is at the time Mr Mthimkhulu has already made the allegation that whilst he was in detention he was poisoned by the police. Now he is given a coffee with this substance in it, he simply accepts it and he drinks it with no difficulty, no resistance.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Isn’t that something extremely odd Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Didn’t it come as a surprise to you that he was able to simply take this cup of coffee and drink it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I find - you were told as part of your instructions that you must get hold of some medicine that would put these people to sleep?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was while you were planning the abduction?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we’re all aware of the fact that there are very competent police laboratories in Pretoria.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yet you didn’t communicate with them, you took some tablets that you happened to have in your possession which you didn’t know what they tasted of, is that what you’re telling us was your planning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson, but they were sleeping tablets which would just put them to sleep Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but as I’ve already said to you, they may have tasted fowl. They were not designed to be dissolved in liquid and drank were they? They were to be swallowed.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson if I reflect, that tablet did dissolve and I think I added more sugar to make the coffee sweeter, I don’t know - that’s if I have to think back.

MR PHOSA: Aren’t you adding more sugar now in your story? Anyway, you don’t have to answer that one. You see, did you mix this stuff and the sugar and do the testing at all? Did you test the stuff?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Did you find out whether it required more sugar at all? If you did - look I know you’re surmising, assuming you did - it’s a difficult thing to ask, assuming you did do that, would you have tasted if it required more sugar?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: So it might not have required more sugar, it might have been sweet itself - very sweet? I’ll say for all you know it could have been very sweet.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Were you in a hurry, why do you - look, if you look back now you reflect, can you see this is strange - your conduct was strange, can you see that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, at this stage it creates the impression that my behaviour was strange but to me it wasn’t strange Mr Chairperson, because we had already planned that they had to be shot during the planning phase that was and we just wanted to see to it that they were asleep that’s all.

MR PHOSA: I did tell you that we were challenging your story. Now when did you ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going on to something else?

MR PHOSA: No, no, this one - the same point ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: On the sleeping pills?

MR PHOSA: Yes, yes. When did you do your examinations to be a lieutenant?

MR NIEUWOUDT: In 1981, I wrote the examination, in 1982, I passed.

MR PHOSA: Because according to your application here, you became a lieutenant in 1983.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but the examinations which I wrote were written in 1982 and the course was in 1983.

MR PHOSA: You mean you wrote the exam over two years?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, may I just explain? At that stage they would allow you to the examination over a certain period or they would allow you a certain period to complete and gain admission to the examination. Then during that year I passed some of my subjects which I repeated in 1982 because in one subject I got sick in ‘81 and I completed that subject in ‘82.

In 1983 then, I went on course, that was how the procedure worked. You had to be in service before hand for a certain period before you could gain admission to the examination, so there were procedures which followed or which had to be followed at the time - just as an explanation of how it worked.

MR PHOSA: Okay, let’s take that. Now most people I know of, in fact all that I’ve come across who need any substance to assist them whilst they write exams, they’re struggling to keep awake - not to fall asleep, they don’t want to sleep. Don’t you know that people want to keep awake to pass exams?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so but I didn’t have that problem, I just wished to stop my thoughts when I went to sleep and that’s why I approached a doctor because I had to rest, that’s why I used the tablets. It may seem like a story but that’s the way I studied Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: I’m sorry, I know that I gave the impression that it seems strange. I mean if you say you wanted to stop your thoughts whilst you go asleep, what does that mean? You could fall asleep, then you’d stop thinking. You see Mr Nieuwoudt, it might sound like a joke - the whole idea is that your story sounds exactly what we think it is, it sounds false to us.

In other words, we are saying that you had a substance - if you did use a substance, it was a substance that was known to you to be dangerous and you did not get it from your doctor, you go it from some special person. Do you disagree with that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny this very strongly Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Since we’re dealing with that aspect, let’s just finish it quickly. I don’t want the details again for obvious reasons but it appears that you - not appears, it is clear you had the nerve to be with these unfortunate young people from the time of abduction, to pretend that you were interrogating them, you personally went - even deviated and got yourself - got some diesel out of your own money - pocket.

When you couldn’t do it that night, you didn’t postpone it, isn’t that so? You were so bent on it, even when it was not easy to do you decided another 24 hours.

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, we had already decided when I was involved the first time, that we would abduct them and eliminate them and the decision was taken there, there were no other aims or objectives Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: Yes well I may be making the mistake of thinking that there is a human element in you. I’m trying to appeal to your - I’m trying to show how you completely were devoid of it and I thought you’d concede that it was a terrible thing to do. I’m suggesting that when people were in - at your mercy, not knowing they’re going to be killed, you could just go on giving the impression things are normal - give them coffee and once the opportunity presents for maybe abandoning the idea, you rather sleep and wait and wait 24 hours. Do you understand what I’m suggesting - that you’re so cruel?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it was a covert action and the reason why we waited until the next day, I was so well known, Mr du Plessis was well known and somebody could just have seen us on the evening of the 14th when we abducted the late Mr Siphiwe Mthimkhulu or the late Mr Topsi Madaka and that is the reason why we only eliminated them the next evening.

CHAIRPERSON: I’m afraid I don’t understand that, could you explain it a little further?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I was very well known, Mr du Plessis was very well known, we abducted them in public, somebody could have spotted us and then our whole covert operation would have been foiled and there would have been witnesses and that is why we didn’t do this immediately.

ADV SANDI: Can you give us more picture about the circumstances in which abduction occurred. You had information from your informers that these two gentlemen were going to be at Holiday Inn, is that correct?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: What were they going to be doing there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, I was under the impression that they would meet a lady friend there who worked there. That was the information that I had received from my source.

ADV SANDI: Did that information come to you before they went there or when you got the information they were already there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, may I just explain my actions? After I had become involved in the planning and had activated the necessary sources to monitor them, all physical and non-physical sources were activated and earlier during the day he had visited Livingstone hospital, after that he went to a certain address - Mrs Mtanga in Kwazakele, if I remember correctly - I don’t have independent recollection of this fact and then they were to have gone to the Holiday Inn. That is the way the scenario progressed, if I remember correctly now.

ADV SANDI: Which part of Holiday Inn were they going to be, were they going to visit the drinking section of the hotel or go and stand at the entrance part of the Holiday Inn? Where exactly were they going to be there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: The information which I’d received indicated that they would have an appointment with a lady person, a female person - I’m not exactly sure whom.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I go back, I don’t understand still I’m afraid, why the delay? You said you were very well known you might have been seen, how would it make the position any better to wait for 24 hours?

MR NIEUWOUDT: As I had explained Mr Chairperson, because it was such a covert action we just used the opportunity but somebody could have seen us along the way. There were many factors that we had to be aware of, they were also well known, an activist could have identified them or me and that was the reason.

It was part of the planning that if somebody had seen us, we wouldn’t immediately when we arrived there have done the elimination. We arrived there when it was dark and we had to collect the fire wood as well etc., so these were all factors that had to be taken into account.

CHAIRPERSON: If you say you had to collect the firewood I can understand it but I cannot understand how a 24 hour delay would in any way aid you if you had been identified.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, we abducted them the evening of the 14th, we arrived there late, the next day the 15th that evening we eliminated them Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you abducted them, was that before they got to the Holiday Inn?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, it was when they left the Holiday Inn.

CHAIRPERSON: You stopped their vehicle I take it and they recognised you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you point guns at them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, they didn’t resist at all.

CHAIRPERSON: And you then drove off and told them you were going to interrogate them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you then drove to Cradock?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You went and met Mr van Rensburg and changed cars, what vehicle did you drive to Cradock in with them or what - you didn’t you were in their car, what vehicle were they in?

MR NIEUWOUDT: They were with Messrs van Rensburg and du Plessis.

CHAIRPERSON: In what sort of vehicle?

MR NIEUWOUDT: His official vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: What is it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was a Cortina.

CHAIRPERSON: And they thought they were being taken to be interrogated?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Instead of which they were driven to Cradock, a long way away?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they not in a state of great alarm when you arrived at Cradock?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, if I think back there was no perceptible revelation of alarm or distress because they were under the impression that we were going to interrogate them.

CHAIRPERSON: This was a man who had already accused the police of trying to kill him by poisoning him, he gets dragged off at night into the wilds and you say there was no alarm? You took him to a building that was not a working police station, it was not working offices, it was a building all by itself wasn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That’s correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And what happened when you got there? You just let them go to bed did you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What happened when you got there?

MR NIEUWOUDT: We took them into the house, they were provided with camp beds, stretchers and there were blankets - bedding, and if I remember correctly one of us - I’m not entirely sure, I think General Erasmus also said we were waiting - General van Rensburg sorry, that we were waiting for people from Pretoria who wished to interrogate them further. They were actually quite relaxed, I don’t know what went through their minds, I cannot know that. And we talked to them and later on they went to sleep Mr Chairperson. And some of us went to sleep and then one of us would keep and eye on them. The next day we also continued to talk to them.

CHAIRPERSON: No people from Pretoria arrived?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say they still weren’t alarmed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, they offered no resistance whatsoever, that I can promise you.

CHAIRPERSON: And we have been told no notes were made of any interrogation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was purely an interview Mr Chairperson, no notes were taken. There was no real purpose for interrogation Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And what did they do while you went outside and collected the firewood you were going to use to burn them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, as I said General van Rensburg and I collected firewood and then Colonel du Plessis would look after them and we swapped around and collected the wood in that manner.

CHAIRPERSON: And they didn’t think this was odd?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Did they talk to each other during all this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I would believe they did so Mr Chairperson, they spoke to each other because they were together all the time.

ADV SANDI: You said you spoke with them and you did not really interrogate them, did I understand you correctly?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV SANDI: What did you say to them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t have independent recollection in this regard but I discussed with them activities and that is basically what our discussions concerned Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Was this not a very important opportunity for you, you had a problem, there were widespread unrest in the area, there was political instability, the security situation was very bad you said, was it not a very important moment for you to talk to these people and ask them what exactly is happening here? Who is behind this, who are they working with?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, because this decision had already been made two days prior to or shortly before the elimination of these two persons and I did not directly question them because I had to keep in mind that there was an informer who had closely liaised with Mr Madaka. And I had to be very careful with regard to all direct questions as far as his activities were concerned, to avoid those because at that stage I didn’t see any need because we had already decided we were going to eliminate them.

CHAIRPERSON: Therefore there was no need on earth to be very careful Mr Nieuwoudt was there? It didn’t matter if the man found out who the informer was now, you were going to kill him in a few hours?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So that excuse falls away, that you - the one you used about why you couldn’t question him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson, but that is why we said we did not - that’s why I say no, we didn’t do an in-depth interrogation regarding the unrests Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: So, whatever information they may have had, you just wanted to kill that information? If you kill them, you kill them with the information.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that was so Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Didn’t you say yesterday one of your informers had told you that Mthimkhulu was planning to take a revenge on you? Did I understand you correctly yesterday?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, there were revenge attacks on security policemen, not on me personally.

ADV SANDI: I don’t mean you personally, but Mthimkhulu was understood by members of the security police to be intending to revenge.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Did you not want to know how far preparations had gone insofar as this revenge was concerned?

MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage I did not even think of this, I didn’t have it in mind.

ADV SANDI: Did you know how far the preparations had gone anyway?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t understand the question, what preparations Mr Chairman?

ADV SANDI: You have said Mthimkhulu wanted to revenge - to take a revenge against the police, how far had that gone? Surely there must have been a preparation in that direction.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true but I didn’t know how far planning had progressed because during that period two security policemen had died, whether he was directly involved I don’t know. There was no evidence to that effect that was led in court.

ADV DE JAGER: But the core of the question was that you had an opportunity to find out how far these plans had progressed, you could possibly have prevented the death of other people by questioning them and yet you didn’t make use of this opportunity.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson, but we already decided earlier that they must ...[inaudible], that’s how I saw it at that stage.

ADV DE JAGER: You wouldn’t not use this opportunity to gain this kind of information, you would try and get it before he goes into the grave.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so but it would be useless because we had detained Mr Mthimkhulu at an earlier stage and he couldn’t provide us with any information.

CHAIRPERSON: This was five months later after you had had fresh information as I understand, that he was planning to use others to kill policemen and this was the one chance you had - as I think you conceded a little while ago, to question them without fear of the consequences. You could tell them what you’d got from the informers, it didn’t matter anymore, so why didn’t you try to find out how far he had gone to try to get revenge on security policemen?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson I didn’t, I didn’t do it, it was a mistake on my side.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll take the short adjournment at this stage.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PHOSA: (cont)

Mr Nieuwoudt, according to Miss Lazo who is the late Mr Mthimkhulu’s common wife, Mr Mthimkhulu was - never displayed aggression towards the police even in spite of what they’d done to him. Never, whenever he met the police he was never aggressive, he was never wild or cruel or bitter.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t know but my information was that he had sworn to avenge himself against the security branch. That was the information I had at my disposal.

MR PHOSA: Finally I just want to say to you, you killed or in some other way tortured many other people after you had killed Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I did Mr Chairperson. I had applied for those cases and they served before the Committee Mr Chairperson - the people whom I had assaulted during detention.

MR PHOSA: To your knowledge there cannot be many policemen who have killed as many people in their capacity as policemen as

you have done?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot comment on the Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We’ll take the short adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we now have a change of questioners, Mr Nyoka will complete the cross-examination.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NYOKA: Thank you Mr Chairperson. It is not always easy or desirable to complete the construction of another skilful builder but I will do my best.

Mr Nieuwoudt, you said that a decision to eliminate the two had already been taken when you reached Cradock, why was it necessary then to continue to interrogate them if a decision was taken? Why didn’t you just go there and eliminate them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, as I had already stated we arrived there late and the decision had been taken to do it the next evening.

MR NYOKA: Why did you have to wait the whole morning and afternoon to do it in the evening - almost after 12 hours?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t know what the reason was. I was the junior member, I don’t know whether one of the other members who were there with me had possibly said we had to do it later but as I’d already explained.

MR NYOKA: Did you use silencers in shooting them or you just shot them with your guns without silencers?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I used my own service pistol.

CHAIRPERSON: What calibre?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was a .32 Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that police issue?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: So, you did not care whether the sound was heard in the neighbourhood when you fired the two shots?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, there was nobody nearby, we didn’t mind if the shot - weren’t concerned that the shots might be heard.

MR NYOKA: But someone could have been in the neighbourhood, you could not control that. Do you agree with me therefore that you were not organised in this scheme?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, we knew that there were no people that lived nearby, there could have perhaps been somebody in the area but I don’t know.

MR NYOKA: So therefore you will agree with me that it was reckless for you not to use silencers if you were organised at all in implementing this scheme?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR NYOKA: I get the impression that you were called in because you were "Mr Fix It" but apparently because of the tablet issue and the silencers, you were not "Mr Fix It"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t have silencers Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: I said, I thought you were called because of your expertise as being "Mr Fix It" in eliminating people, apparently you were not after all because you were not organised. Do you agree with me?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: Mr Phosa referred to Boyiswa Shlazo, do you remember an incident in 1980 at Alabama Hotel when Mr Mthimkhulu called a meeting of civil leaders trying to ensure that the school boycotts ended. Amongst the civil leaders there were Reverend Soka, Reverend Hiya and Attorney Sogoni. As a result of his efforts the school boycott ended. Do you remember that because you were watching from nearby? In 1980 at the Alabama Hotel, do you remember that incident?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, what I can remember is that in 1982 attempts were made by Reverend Soka - and the person, is it Reverend Soka, the interpreter couldn’t pronounce it all that clearly? I remember such a case but it was later in 1982, not in 1980. In 1980 the schools boycott was ongoing and continued until 1982 Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: My instructions are that in 1980 such a thing did occur and you and Mr du Plessis were in the neighbourhood watching from a distance - Mr Mthimkhulu far from being a rebel- rouser, he was a peacemaker.

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, all that I - if you refer to the Alabama Hotel - the hall there, all that I can remember that is in 1983 they had a UDF meeting there.

MR NYOKA: You referred to Mr Mbuyizelo Madaka, the brother of Topsi Madaka, do you know him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I know Mbuyizelo Madaka.

MR NYOKA: Did you know him in 1976?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I know him.

MR NYOKA: I see that you are smiling, maybe you know what I am going to say to you. Is it not correct that you assaulted him during the first day - is it not correct that you assaulted during his first day of detention at Alabama sorry, at Sanlam building?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot remember this Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: My instructions from him are that you assaulted him with a Mr Marx but you gave up after you did not get the information that you required.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember this, I cannot remember assaulting him together with Mr Marx.

MR NYOKA: Maybe you are mixing with other assaults that you may have perpetrated, that’s why you cannot remember.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Does that concluded your questioning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot remember this.

MR NYOKA: The reason why I’m asking you this is because in your application you just mention him casually in passing as if he’s someone you never met, you never assaulted.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I have direct knowledge from end of ‘78 beginning of 1979 when he left the RSA for military training.

MR NYOKA: The final aspect I won’t spend more than 15 minutes on or 10 minutes, is about your warning statement. In your warning statement you said that: "On the 8th of September 1981 to the 11th of September 1981, a written statement was taken by Captain Roelofse in your presence wherein Siphiwe Mthimkhulu explained his involvement and his part in the distribution of ANC pamphlets and that this statement was later typed, photocopied and signed by Mr Mthimkhulu. How long was this statement Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember how long this statement was. It is difficult to remember after 15 years to remember exactly how many pages this contained.

MR NYOKA: The reason why I am asking it is because when I was reading this I was puzzled why a statement would take an entire four days to write - it’s incredible, he must have been writing something like a Bible.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know, Colonel Roelofse took that statement Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: Here you’ve got a confession or an admission, why did you release him after all that trouble?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t know but I can give an explanation. I don’t know whether that statement contained any acknowledgement of guilt but the admissibility of that this statement, I doubt it - I don’t know whether it could have been used in a court or stand up in court. I don’t know what the reason therefore was when they were released.

MR NYOKA: Before the 10 day discussion began, you spoke to your friend Mr du Plessis - perhaps let me say, is Mr du Plessis your bosom friend because he said he’s your bosom friend? Is he your bosom friend first?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He’s my colleague, he was my commanding officer Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: So he’s not your bosom friend?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, in the context we are friends, he’s my commanding officer and that is all that I can say.

MR NYOKA: Before the 10 day discussions began, why did you not present this confession to Mr du Plessis and say: "Before you do anything gentlemen I’ve got this confession, can we not act on it legally"?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t understand what Mr Nyoka is referring to or trying to suggest, I’ve already said - I said the statement - I was uncertain about the statement, I don’t know whether there were any admissions of guilt and they - he must have seen it. The decision in that regard was up to Mr du Plessis, I don’t know what Mr du Plessis had decided in this case and I cannot comment on this.

MR NYOKA: Be that as it may, did you not say to Mr du Plessis: "Please gentlemen, discuss that statement that was taken from Mr Mthimkhulu", it may have led to his being alive today?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn’t do that.

MR NYOKA: Do you know whether that was discussed at that 10 day meeting - the statement?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: You further said that in Jeffrey’s Bay police station the interrogation took place in an office from the 1st of July 1981, that is from seven to twenty past two, that is for seven hours and again on the following day, the 2nd of July 1981, it took place from ten past one to five to five, that is almost four hours. And then the last one was on the 4th of July, it took place from half past seven to 3 o’clock, that is for seven and a half hours. This is a total of 18 and a half hours of interrogation within a space of four days, is that human?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If one looks back at this then I must agree with you, it is possibly not human.

MR NYOKA: So at that stage you did not think it was inhuman, it’s only not that you are applying for amnesty you think it’s inhuman. Is that what you’re saying?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: Thank you very much. What was it that you were interrogating him about for a full 18 and a half hours, what was it? I’m sure even the questioners were bored with their questions.

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t believe that we became bored. I’d been giving the task of interrogating him, I carried out my task and that doesn’t mean that I was there for all those hours, we couldn’t all simultaneously interrogate him after all.

MR NYOKA: My question still remains, what was it that you were interrogating him about for an entire 18 and a half hours, you have not answered that one?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I have to think back, I interrogated many people but in brief it concerned his activities, the distribution of the pamphlet, where he had obtained the pamphlet, his activities etc.

MR NYOKA: You said the questioning was being done yourself and Captain Roelofse and that Mr Tongata and Mr Bobelo were just present. There were four of you, two were doing the interrogation two were not doing anything. Why was their presence necessary if they were not doing any questioning?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, as I’ve already stated and explained a Black member, a colleague had been allocated to every White member and Bobelo at that stage worked with me and Tongata with Roelofse and they were present.

MR NYOKA: Were they doing anything in their presence because I think that was a waste of tax payers money?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It could be so Mr Chairperson, but I think it was necessary.

MR NYOKA: Did you have - do you have any bad relation with Mr Bobelo?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I do not have a bad relationship with him.

MR NYOKA: Why did he then say that you and him drowned Mr Mthimkhulu repeatedly at Jeffrey’s Bay?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I didn’t do it and I don’t know where at Jeffrey’s Bay. You are making a general statement - I don’t know where at Jeffrey’s Bay, I don’t know of such an incident.

MR NYOKA: Sorry, sorry, it was at Sanlam.

ADV SANDI: Was it Sanlam or Jeffrey’s Bay?

MR NYOKA: It was at Sanlam. Mr Mthimkhulu was dirty, you wanted to wash him, you came in and the two of you drowned him repeatedly. I’m saying if there were no bad relations, why would he lie against you? Can you answer that question please?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it astonishes me because if I remember correctly the allegation had also been made against Mr Bobelo and I think he had also made such a statement. I can’t remember exactly what he said at that stage but it also astonishes me when I consulted with my legal counsel, I am equally astonished.

MR NYOKA: Mr Bobelo further said that the wrists of Mr Mthimkhulu and his legs were swollen. Is that so - was that so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so.

MR NYOKA: What caused them to be swollen - in particular the legs, what caused them to be swollen?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can only speculate Mr Chairperson, it could have been because he had been standing for long during his interrogation.

MR NYOKA: Mr Mthimkhulu in his statement said that you assaulted him by hitting with an open hand, you applied electric shocks and you made him to stand on his feet for long periods. Strangely you said it could have been done by someone else, yet someone is directing it to you. Any comment?

MR NIEUWOUDT: My only comment is, I deny it strongly. He was standing while I interrogated him but I personally did not assault him.

MR NYOKA: Finally in your statement you said that whilst Mr Mthimkhulu was kept in Jeffrey’s Bay he was in an office, why was he kept in an office not in an ordinary police cell? Were you treat - were you giving royal treatment?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, may I just explain the circumstances at Jeffrey’s Bay? He was detained in the cells in terms of Section 6 and when we interrogated him, he was taken out of the cells by the uniform member of duty and the station commander’s office was used for the interrogation of the person. Those were the circumstances there.

MR NYOKA: Are you saying therefore he was being returned after his interrogation, to his cell. Is that what you are saying?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR NYOKA: Have you read your statement - your warning statement Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did.

MR NYOKA: If you read it, why is there conflict now between what you saying and what you said in it because in your statement you said

"At night Mr Mthimkhulu was being guarded in the office by four people, Warrant Officer Loves, Lieutenant Hattingh, Sergeant Logwe and Sergeant Nani"

In an office not in a cell, there’s a difference between an office and a cell.

MR BOOYENS: With respect, I think if my learned friend is referring to the centre paragraph of page 85, my impression is - if one looks at the top paragraph, this was at Port Elizabeth not at Jeffrey’s Bay. It’s page 85 of bundle A. Do you want to borrow mine?

MR NYOKA: Can you read that statement, can you read that portion?

MR BOOYENS: Read it yourself.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the 5th paragraph changed the venue.

MR NYOKA: Mr Chairperson, my interpreter did not include Port Elizabeth, I rely on an English translation, thank you.

Can you tell me why did he have to be guarded at night, was he violent or hostile?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No.

MR NYOKA: Why did he have to be guarded then?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, we were divided into teams and I interrogated him at night and the persons who were responsible during the night for that guarded him there.

MR NYOKA: Were the other detainees guarded similarly as Mr Mthimkhulu at the time?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so.

MR NYOKA: I see that you paused, were you waiting for a correct answer?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, because I can’t remember which other detainees Mr Nyoka was referring to.

MR NYOKA: Was it a normal procedure to guard detainees at night?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was so.

MR NYOKA: It’s the first time that we are hearing of that.

ADV SANDI: Why was it necessary to guard detainees as night? To have more than one members guarding a detainee, why was it necessary?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, as I already stated we were divided into two teams, one team working during the day and one team doing the interrogation at night or looking after him. I don’t know I was not in command, I did the interrogation during the day in this particular case Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Looking after him, do you mean taking care of him or doing anything for him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: For example?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can only speculate, it he wished to avail himself of toilet facilities somebody would accompany him and if he required something there would always be two people, there had to be two people present to look after him - that is what I am saying Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: He had been detained at Port Elizabeth, why was there a need for him to be removed from Port Elizabeth to Jeffrey’s Bay?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I think while he was detained in terms of Section 6, his first detention was in Jeffrey’s Bay.

MR NYOKA: Why take him to Jeffrey’s Bay about 67 kilometres from P.E.?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know.

MR NYOKA: Is it not because it was to intimidate him in the sense that Mr Kondile was there during that same year of 1981 and subsequently died, was that not the reason?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: When you were informed that Mr Mthimkhulu had laid a charge against you, how did you feel about that? Did you feel - how did you feel?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember exactly what I felt like but I immediately knew that it was rubbish that he was saying, I had not assaulted him.

MR NYOKA: So your feeling was dismissive, you were dismissing what he was saying - you had a feeling of dismissiveness in other words.

MR NIEUWOUDT: I stated Mr Chairperson, that I couldn’t remember exactly what my feelings were but all that I said is I denied it, it was nonsense - these allegations against me.

MR NYOKA: When you further heard, besides the criminal complaint that he had laid two civil claims against the police, did you not regard him as a cheeky person - this is a cheeky person?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I don’t know about a criminal charge that was made against me.

MR NYOKA: No, he had laid a criminal complaint but he didn’t want to make a statement to the police. There was a criminal complaint but he didn’t want to make a statement to the police because he did not trust them. What I’m saying is, what did you feel about the other two legal actions that he had taken, a civil claim for an assault and civil claim for a poison, did you not regard him as a cheeky person?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, at that stage as I’ve already said - I only know about the civil suit at any rate and that’s the testimony in that regard and I said it was nonsense, it wasn’t true.

MR NYOKA: I put it to you that all of you were bitter and very angry that this cheeky disabled person instituted an action against big guns in the security force, what do you say about that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny that most strongly Sir.

MR NYOKA: And that because of what you were doing to him, you were going to embarrass him politically?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny that most strongly Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: If you wanted to eliminate him, why did you not do it in Port Elizabeth? Why did you have to go to Cradock - that far?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know Mr Chairperson, I didn’t make that decision.

MR NYOKA: And why was it that one person was not used to shoot both of them, why did two of you shoot both of them individually? Were you playing some shooting game of some kind?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: When you made the application to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, why did you shoot him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, if I recall what happened, General van Rensburg told me to shoot the other person and I carried this out.

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think that was his evidence, was it? I don’t think that was his evidence, was it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know but if I have to think back about this incident, I cannot remember exactly what happened.

MR NYOKA: Finally, you have said that you applied because you got an offer from the Government to apply and that you were sorry, do you agree with me that feeling of sorry or remorse is not exercised in a virtue. When you are sorry you go to the person you’ve offended and you say: "I am sorry", why did you not do that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I had been advised that before the amnesty I should not do so because it could be to my detriment in the case and for that reason I stated yesterday that I am sorry about what I had done to the family because of the conflict of the past, because I protected the State security, the interests of the State. And I had explained to you the two spectrums, on the one hand the liberation organisations and on the other hand the Government of the day and for that reason I didn’t so Sir.

MR NYOKA: If they were so troublesome Mr Nieuwoudt, and they were causing mass mobilisation, school boycotts, why did you not make a concerted effort to eliminate other COSAS activists besides them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I did not have the authority to make that decision.

MR NYOKA: Finally, do you remember in 1988 there was a case at Humansdorp where ...[inaudible] was acting having briefed ...[inaudible] - the case was Collin Devu and another person - another two people, Collin Devu was convicted having of having been an MK member - he’s a bodyguard of Mr Mandela now. He was sentenced to 14 years and an informer Mr X, was one of the people he skipped the country with but he was in protective custody, he was never a danger. The State succeeded in prosecuting people who were troublesome - I think I saw you in Humansdorp, do you remember that case? It was a big case in Humansdorp in 1988. Collin Devu, he’s now a bodyguard of Mr Mandela. He originates from Paarl in the Western Province, do you remember that case?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I remember that case but I was not the investigating officer in that case Mr Chairperson and ...[intervention]

MR NYOKA: I’m very pleased that you remember it. The reason why I’m saying that is because contrary to what all of you said, you could use an informer in a very big case like the big fish, like Mr Mthimkhulu and Madaka and say: "You’re an informer, we’re going to use you but we are going to place you in protective custody" and the second reason why I’m quoting that case is because contrary to what you said, prosecutions did continue after 1982 as late as 1988, but he got release in 1991. Any comment?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I can indicate some instances where this did happen 10 years after the person who gave evidence - that this person during the time of unrest had been eliminated and we can think of several other persons who were also so-called Mr X’s in the earlier years. Mr Thlapane for example, he was the first person who died so there are many such examples of persons who gave evidence and who were eliminated. I think at that stage the process changed.

ADV SANDI: I think Mr Nieuwoudt, - you must tell me if you agree or do not agree with me, the possibility is always there that a person who becomes a Mr X gets eliminated, do you agree?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Could you please repeat the question Mr Chairperson?

ADV SANDI: There is always a possibility that if someone becomes a Mr X and a State witness in a security related case against someone he or she has worked with, that person could possibly be eliminated at the end of the day and the police have to do something to ensure that it does not happen, they have to try and do something to ensure that it does not happen. I think that’s what Mr Nyoka is trying to say to you.

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn’t the position that informers were always at risk whether they gave evidence or not, that if their identity was discovered they were likely to be killed?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And despite this the security branch invariably tried to persuade people they had taken into custody for one reason or another, to become an informer. Is that not so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: I put it to you further, not Mr Mthimkhulu deserved to die but Mr Madaka did not deserve to die, all he did he was being a friend of Mr Mthimkhulu and helping him because he had transport, why did you not take Mr Madaka and put him elsewhere in the country to break that connection with Mr Mthimkhulu - under banishment for instance, why did you not do that? Or detain him without trial even if you didn’t have to interrogate him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I have given the - I gave the information to Mr du Plessis and the decision didn’t rest with me Mr Chairperson.

MR NYOKA: So you agree with me that it was foolish of Mr du Plessis not exhaust those avenues, not so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot comment on that or say yes.

MR NYOKA: No further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NYOKA

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, yesterday the questions and meaning of eliminating or "elimineering" was discussed, do you remember that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BRINK: And there was talk of various politicians who were encouraging elimination of people?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

MR BRINK: And you mentioned in particular, General Magnus Malan who had made a statement that after some bomb blast that the ANC would be eliminated, as I remember your evidence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BRINK: Now apart from General Malan, are you able to tell the Committee from where or from whom did you get the impression that politicians and more particularly Nationalist Party politicians were in favour of the elimination of political activists?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I can’t tell whether they - well I can just refer to their statements as we saw in the newspapers, the things that they had said about elimination. I know about the attack in Lesotho which was carried out, I know about the attack on the APLA bases in Natal - in Transkei, I beg your pardon and it is on those grounds - I can’t say that they really agreed with that type of activity.

MR BRINK: Are you able to recollect the names of any of the politicians who may have given the impression that they were anxious that activists should be eliminated?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I know about Mr Vlok’s statements where he referred to the word elimination and when he was confronted with this fact he said that it actually meant something else and if I think back that’s what I can remember, I don’t know whether he was in favour of this. And I think P W Botha also said first shoot and then ask questions, so that’s what I can think of Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Going back to this specific incident, am I correct in saying that you in fact never received a direct order from your superiors to take part in the murder of these two men?

MR NIEUWOUDT: My superior was Mr du Plessis, do I understand you correctly?

MR BRINK: What I’m asking you is whether or not you received an order to take part in the abduction and murder of these two men or whether you acted as a willing and free agent?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I had received a command, an instruction to be involved in the abduction and elimination of Mr Madaka and Mr Mthimkhulu.

MR BRINK: Was that a direct order given to you?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I construed that as a direct instruction.

MR BRINK: When Mr Mthimkhulu was in detention, I take it he had no visitors apart from the district surgeon and the Magistrate?

MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, he had access to the district surgeon because while he was in detention in Jeffrey’s Bay he underwent a small operation of his rectum Sir.

MR BRINK: But while he was in detention in Port Elizabeth, I take it he was not allowed any visitors save for a Magistrate and if necessary a district surgeon?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BRINK: Are you able to tell the Committee when, if a all you observed that Mr Mthimkhulu’s health was declining or he was becoming ill for example, losing his hair?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, it was shortly after his release when if I remember correctly - or it could have been during that period, I know there were things in the press to the effect that he had lost some of his hair before he had been at Groote Schuur or - I can’t remember exactly, it’s some time around that period.

MR BRINK: Did you observe that he was losing his hair while he was in detention?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Did he appear to you to be suffering from severe stomach pain while he was in detention?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, he never complained towards me if I remember correctly, of any stomach complaint or stomach ache Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Did you observe that it might have been difficult for him to stand or walk without considerable pain while he was in detention?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can only remember that his legs were swollen Mr Chairperson, because of his detention and standing for so long during the interrogation - at Sanlam building, there I observed this Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: How long was that before his release in October?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, if you can just allow me a moment I would like to refresh my memory regarding the dates in my statement. Mr Chairperson, it was during September, more or less the 11th that I observed this and he was only released on the 20th of October.

MR BRINK: So that was approximately five weeks before his release?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BRINK: Were his legs very swollen?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Not that seriously but one could see that they were swollen.

MR BRINK: Was he lying down in his cell?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I can’t - it was at security headquarters and I think it was Colonel Roelofse who soaked his feet in water, I think he gave him hot water and cold water to reduce the swelling Mr Chairperson. I remember something like that Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: And was that also because he was not able to walk with facility?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that was my observation, I think it was of a consequence of his standing for so long.

MR BRINK: Did you discuss this with your colleagues?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I didn’t Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Did you suggest that a doctor be called in to see him?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn’t Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Were you not concerned about his condition?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: Why, were all other detainees in the same situation?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t understand the question clearly, which other detainees?

MR BRINK: Well is the reason - well, any detainees in your experience, did they all suffer from these ailments, swollen legs, sore feet, being unable to walk and that sort of thing?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson.

MR BRINK: And you weren’t at all suspicious as to what might have given rise to this condition - Mr Mthimkhulu’s condition?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, Mr Chairperson, because I thought that it had been so because of his standing for so long.

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BRINK

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, as far as this case is concerned, were you the most junior member?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as the interrogation is concerned and how long it continued before these persons were murdered, was it your decision of the decision of your seniors?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was the seniors who decided.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: You’ve finished now have you?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I would like to clear up a number of different points with you Mr Nieuwoudt. The first is, do you know if either Captain Roelofse or Mr du Plessis also gave him tablets for his swollen feet?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I cannot recall that Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, now going back to the sleeping tablets - your sleeping tablets, if they were prescribed by the district surgeon would you have to go out and buy them or were the supplied to you? If they were prescribed by the district surgeon as you said, would you get them from the district surgeon’s office or would you have to buy them?

MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he would give me a script and then I would go to a pharmacy where I would receive this, I didn’t have to buy this from my own pocket.

CHAIRPERSON: It would go on your medical aid?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you remember which pharmacy you went to?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember but ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Quiet please.

ADV SANDI: Which pharmacy would you normally go to? You do not remember this particular one ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Just a moment, before you ask the next question - I can’t remember because there was such a noise because you wanted to add something that wasn’t interpreted or did you add something?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I wanted to add something Mr de Jager. I think the pharmacy was Hollumberg’s Pharmacy in Main Street Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Did you use different pharmacies or was this the only one?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That pharmacy was very close to the district surgeon’s office and I used it quite frequently Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, the next point I’d like to deal with is the Post Chalmers police station. You arranged that you were going to abduct these people and take them there and eliminate them, is that so?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that’s what you did?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Who got the key of the police station?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, I just wish to explain. The custom was - because we also used that police station to de-brief sources but normally somebody would contact the branch commander and the keys would then be left by him in a certain place or we would collect the keys from his house, depending on the circumstances but on that specific day I can’t remember what happened exactly - whether he had left the key close to the wind pump, I can’t remember exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: Now was he told that you were going to be occupying that place for a couple of days?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it must have been like that, I don’t whether Mr du Plessis or Mr van Rensburg had contacted the branch commander there - I assume that must have been arranged.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it would have defeated the whole object of your exercise if anybody had walked up to the house the next day, wouldn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely there would have been some arrangements made for the security of the house, the police - this building?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: What arrangements were made?

MR NIEUWOUDT: I don’t know what security arrangements had been made but I can’t think of exactly what you’re referring to, is this when we did the elimination?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, when you were there all day with these two men who didn’t want to be seen in your presence?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson, and that is why I think Mr du Plessis was there to see to it that nobody would gain access - that no person would gain access to the area.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And the final question in this regard, wasn’t it ...[inaudible] one of the reasons of the delay so you could communicate with Port Elizabeth and find out from them if anybody had seen you abducting these two people and whether an alarm had been raised?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was so Mr Chairperson, and I assume that General Erasmus would have informed General van Rensburg in this regard if this had happened Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: How would - could he have done this?

MR NIEUWOUDT: He could have possibly have - he could possibly have phoned the branch commander - I’m just giving examples, I’m speculating. He could have contacted the branch commander and he could have driven there and have come and warned us.

CHAIRPERSON: And if Colonel Erasmus was going to be away he would have appointed someone else to do this, wouldn’t he?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, once again I’m speculating, he could possibly have appointed somebody else, the second in command who was in the office or normally he would say where he was going and somebody would be able to contact him.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but it was very important if reports were been made that you had been seen with these people, that you should be contacted as quickly as possible, wasn’t it?

MR NIEUWOUDT: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: And finally, you referred to a docket yesterday, what docket was that?

MR NIEUWOUDT: It was the dossier on the explosion Sir, which had occurred at Constantia.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it the actual docket that you’ve got?

MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it is the actual docket.

CHAIRPERSON: I’ve had arrangements - I hope that I - that they will be made available, right.

MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR BOOYENS: That concludes the evidence on behalf of these applicants Mr Chairman.

APPLICANTS’ CASE

MR NYOKA: Mr Chairman, on the advice of my advocate we’re not calling any witnesses, thank you.

MR BRINK: I propose calling no witnesses Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you’re going to continue, we’ve got a flight arranged for half past one.

CHAIRPERSON: You’re going to have to travel quickly.

MR VISSER: It seems to us. We would like to be excused - it doesn’t seem as if there’s anything that we’re going to be involved in this afternoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the afternoon will merely be an address. You propose to address us now don’t you?

MR NYOKA: I’m ready now Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You do not I gather from your attitude, wish to address us now Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Well I was just going to enquire Mr Chairman, whether it would be in order for us to give you proper written argument at a later stage. We don’t believe it will take too long to draft them, depending of course when we can get hold of the record. We would like to see the record because a great many facts have been laid before here and we would like to deal with those.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you can get a copy of the address I take it?

MR VISSER: Yes, that would be the point, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don’t think there’s any - does anybody wish to say anything about why we shouldn’t get rid of Mr Visser that he can now follow Mr Phosa?

MR NYOKA: We don’t have any objection getting rid of Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well Mr Visser, you’ve observed the attitude of your colleague.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, although I’ve got no flights to

catch like my colleague, I may perhaps indicate that I also intend to rather file written argument to the Committee but we will obviously remain in attendance.

CHAIRPERSON: I have which I hope is a reliable guarantee that it won’t take very long.

MR BOOYENS: I don’t recall giving ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, not from you.

MR BOOYENS: I didn’t ...[inaudible]

CHAIRPERSON: I wouldn’t expect on like that from you Mr Booyens.

Very well, would you like to address us at this stage?

ADDRESS BY MR NYOKA: Thank you. None of the members of the community of Port Elizabeth in particular - not that of South Africa in general, pointed fingers for a second away from the security branch as being responsible for the disappearance of the two. To suggest otherwise will be an insult on the in - of the intelligence of the people of South Africa. The only thing that is surprising is the execution, not the fact that the police were responsible - we are not surprised at that.

We would like first to start with the grounds for reaching the decision to eliminate - in no particular order. With regard to that of politicians and senior police officers using statements like: "Total onslaught" etc., and exerting pressure on the Eastern Province security branch to stabilise the security situation, on their version - without saying that it is correct, on their version I would like to say that it is unfair to the then National Party politicians to say that all they uttered in their speeches was the "total onslaught" - in public speeches.

These were uttered simultaneously or counter-balanced with references to democratic - we defend a civilised Western way of life, democratic road but without Black domination, what did that mean? It means respect for human life, respect for human dignity not to take away human life or inflict harm or on violate limb, that did not mean that. It is therefore outstanding that the three applicants could conveniently isolate such statements and only concentrate on the so-called "total onslaught" speeches.

Secondly, the politicians could not have meant in their favour that - the politicians could have meant that the E.P. Special Branch was not doing their work properly. I’ll make an example of a education scenario. A principal will say to a history teacher: "You have a very high failure rate, you must do something, take drastic steps", it doesn’t mean that teacher must tell his students: "You must copy to pass or even eliminate the entire history class" - that’s not the intention.

It means that he must look at himself to see whether he is a good history teacher, he must see to it that he makes the student attend week-end classes, give individual attention to each history student. You cannot say therefore you are saying to people - to students, they must copy and say that is an educational motive towards - in an educational manner. That’s a pure crime or a pure offence.

The fact of the matter that the three did not do their work properly, it should even by the way these executions - these - the killings were executed, they were not properly planned.

Let’s come now to the undesirable effect of legal options, firstly with the criminal prosecution. The argument that the only evidence there was, was that of informers and that they had to be protected is with without sense. Surely one of the consequences of being an informer is that besides giving information and getting money, you stand the risk of having to go to court and being placed under witness protection, otherwise why will you have to use informers if you’re not going to use their information. That was a typical waste of tax payer’s money, no wonder many people did not pay tax before.

Furthermore, even after 1982 criminal prosecutions did continue as Mr Nieuwoudt agreed with me there was even a late case in 1988 of Collin Devu where a Mr X was used. The restriction in house arrests - this could have been a more humanitarian measure as it was considered that Mr Mthimkhulu’s home was visited by the police daily especially after his return from Cape Town. Secondly, the police could have caused him to report daily or once a week at the police station.

Furthermore, they could get into the township with the use of Casspirs or Nyala’s and that there was a shortage of policemen power is not enough. If you play rugby and you’re a scrum half you have to face a forward, your excuse would not be in not tackling him: "He’s big" - why do you get into the field the first place?

And if you are saying there’s a shortage of police and the two gentlemen were very high political figures, surely they could have sacrificed and take those few policemen to monitor them. We are not talking of a case of house arrest of a thousand of people, we are talking of two big fishes so to speak.

The last one of detention without trial - also with out belabouring the point, the reasons for not embarking upon this avenue are far from convincing. I do not understand how the stature of activists could be boosted by further detention without trial.

And if the fact was that Mr Mthimkhulu was sickly was a consideration, police stations have go prison hospitals and they could even have taken him to private hospitals under police surveillance, that was not going to be a problem. The last one of Mr Mthimkhulu swearing revenge on the police. I find it difficult that a wheel bound disabled person could be more dangerous in his disability than before against the notoriously almighty efficient effective police force.

I also find it difficult to accept that when the police force knew of the insurgence of the ANC cadres and attacks especially on State organs and police personnel, they could extraordinarily distinguish into prominence the alleged and untested revenge of a wheel bound young man. We are referred ...[inaudible] to the incident of Mr Mangasuto Buthelezi. That incident happened in 1978, why should it be of consideration four years later - to determine his death?

I finally find it difficult to accept that when the wheel-bound Mr Mthimkhulu was constantly under police surveillance and later on under monitoring, he will be feared of carrying revenge as immediately it will start that he will be taken, and if you have dangerous weapons or pamphlets the minimum sentence then was five years, the police would have used that evidence and sent him straight to jail even if they were not responsible for the prosecution at least they will cause him to be charged. Instead the three should have allowed ....

All the grounds they reached are not convincing ones to justify the decision to kill the two. Even then - even though the security laws were draconian, they had de iure legality, they were in law legal, but the four regarded themselves as above the law that is why this has happened. As I stated in the earlier Mkosene Jack application, there’s a saying by Lord Acton that:

"Power corrupts - absolute power corrupts absolutely"

and that is the classical example, that’s what happened here.

One wonders why it took an entire 10 days to discuss the entire thing when their arguments were so demonstrably weak or defective despite their vast experiences as policemen, some have got 20 years experience.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that all the four applicants have failed to prove or show that their acts were politically motivated and/or there was a political motive behind. In that firstly, if they had political motives, why did they not inform the head office of the security branch or the commissioner of police of their intended steps, as these two fell within their need to know basis category - they needed to know.

And their goal of coverted covertness would still have been applicable and achieved if they had spoken to the head of security or the commissioner of police, it would still be under the umbrella of covertness Perhaps they would have got more sensible or sensical advices like: "Gentlemen, you say you have a problem, before you eliminate how about trying a state of emergency for 1982" which was declared in 1985? This could have been sorted out and it was a humanitarian measure. Or they could have obtained the advice of banishment, taking Mr Mthimkhulu to a remote area like it was done to Mrs Mandela who was taken to Brandfort.

If they applied a need to know basis and they were trying to achieve a political motive, why did they involve a junior like Mr Nieuwoudt who was only known to Mr du Plessis and he was not known to Mr Erasmus closely or to Mr van Rensburg?

If they acted in the interest of State Security, why did they not trust the very State they were acting for by informing the relevant higher State organs that: "We have decided to act as such in the interest of the State but we would like your approval to doing this and we would like this matter to be treated confidentially"? I’m sure they will have given that confidentiality. The reason is that they acted for their own selfish needs.

The fact of the matter, they committed these monstrous deeds because of Mr Mthimkhulu’s cheek and apparent rebelliousness, fighting for his rights in that soon after his release he instituted two civil claims against the Minster of Law and Order for assault and poisoning. There was also a criminal complaint, there was also going to be a magisterial public enquiry on the 5th of May 1982. The cumulative effects of these led to this - led to that undesirable conclusion of elimination.

Furthermore Mr Mthimkhulu did not end there, he sought the assistance of human rights organisation like Black Sash and the opposition political party PFP, giving prominence to his disability and to his fight for human rights. The fact that during the 10 - the plus minus 10 days of discussion between Messrs Erasmus, van Rensburg and du Plessis, no mention of such steps like the civil claims, the poisoning allegations and the magisterial enquiry - especially after so much media publicity, is breathtakingly astounding and confirms out view to the say the very least.

And also shows that the act was not only criminal but the objective was criminal in that it was in response of Mr Mthimkhulu’s cheekiness which was justified. And not to embarrass the security branch of the Eastern Province especially after the embarrassing Biko debacle of 1977, the Eastern Province security branch could not afford that scandal.

To show further that this was a purely criminal act with a criminal motive, why was it that none of the other COSAS activists who were responsible for mobilisation and unrest were not eliminated - why was it? Why single only two and Mr Madaka was just unfortunate being a friend of Mr Mthimkhulu?

Also there’s been no real reason for the killing of Mr Mthimkhulu - of Mr Madaka, as Mr van Rensburg conceded later on that there was a quote: "No real evidence" against him. Even the DLB’s were not confirmed and the only evidence was that of an informer who could not be named, yet Mr van Rensburg is applying for amnesty which requires full disclosure of all relevant facts.

If there was such a big decision to take Mr Madaka’s life, then the person was instrumental in having him included in the killings should have been mentioned publicly or an offer be made to the Committee to mention him in camera. Maybe also there was no such an informer, it was thus a figment of his imagination.

The fact of the matter in conclusion is that the applicants are criminals, unconvicted and unsentenced abductors and murderers coming here wearing flimsy political clothing. No apology was given to the families. The Government is not implementing the Nuremberg type - style of prosecutions but an accommodative Government, an accommodative democracy like we have done with the Government of National Unity. They should have seized the opportunity of coming across from the other side of the bridge to meet the family halfway and not hide behind lawyers advice that: "Don’t apologise", meet them halfway and say: "We are sorry" - that was not done. That is all.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink, I take it you don’t want to say anything at this stage?

MR BRINK: No thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you kindly assist me with one problem that has arisen during the discussions, what would you say does the word: "eliminate" - referring to a particular person, mean?

MR NYOKA: "Referring to a particular person"

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. If I would say: "Eliminate Mr X" or "Eliminate a person", what would I convey?

MR NYOKA: Not being an Afrikaner but understanding English, I would say that it means: "Kill that person".

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I thought it was disputed whether it would mean: "Kill that person" or whether it could mean "Take him away and put him somewhere else" or whatever it may be. I’ve said already yesterday that I agree with your interpretation.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it you agree that it has an obvious different meaning when it is applied to an impersonal object such as a political party, you can’t kill political parties when you say: "Eliminate the ANC", it means: "Take steps to make sure that they cannot carry on their operations"?

ADV SANDI: Do you agree Mr Nyoka with that?

MR NYOKA: I agree.

ADV SANDI: Do you also agree that in the evidence we have received for the past four or five days, there is no order to eliminate a specific person, isn’t it?

MR NYOKA: Yes, there - that is so, but what I said was that those speeches were isolated deliberately, they were - they must be viewed in the totality. Where the Government will say that: "We are going to defend our nation, we are against Black domination", we believe in civilised - in a civilised western way. Mr Nieuwoudt read books on politics, he should have known that the Government meant that the opposition must be crushed. Nowhere in their speeches did they say: "Eliminate individuals", otherwise they would have been taken to task.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we have now come to an end of this hearing. We can discuss afterwards the question of the documentation getting - how I can arrange to get hold of the document and when written argument will be submitted. Thank you all for the patience you have shown during the course of this hearing, we have tried to be as punctual as possible but we haven’t always succeeded.

Thank you and we will now call an end to this hearing. There will be a separate - a different Committee sitting here on Monday to commence the next hearing. They will not start before 10 o’clock on Monday morning.

WITNESS EXCUSED

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS