Amnesty Hearings

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (sworn states)

MR BOOYENS: The witness' application appears on page 20 of the record, Mr Chairman. Mr Van Rensburg - Mr Chairman, just before dealing with this, there is just a formal aspect, although I do not know whether it is strictly speaking necessary, but in paragraph 9(a)(1) I would just ask for an amendment to add to abduction and killing of the four mentioned persons, and any other offence of delict arising from that.

I do this ex abundanti because I do not really think it is necessary. My impression is if you get amnesty, you get amnesty irrespective, but I know in some instances some of your colleagues have said, was of the view that one should actually specify it wider than it has been specified in this.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you are asking for an amendment to include any other possible crime that may flow out of the same action?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, well, crime or delict.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Rensburg, in front of you you have your application for amnesty, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm what is stated on page 20?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I confirm it.

MR BOOYENS: Page 21? Is it correct, do you confirm that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And page 22, to where paragraph 9 starts, do you confirm that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, the acts for which you are applying for amnesty, that includes murder is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't hear?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I see on the top paragraph on page 22, you allege that you had never at any stage acted for your own personal gain or with any mala fide motives. What exactly do you mean by that? Especially the mala fide part?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That I didn't commit the acts with any criminal intent or objective. I did it because at that stage I believed it was in the interests of the country and the State.

CHAIRPERSON: How can murder be a bona fide act?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it can never be bona fide, but I am saying that there was a reason for acting in such a way. In my view there can never by any justification, legal justification for what I did. If there was, I wouldn't be sitting here today, but I did it based on the very firm convictions which I had at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just in fact if the Committee would be so kind to look at Section 20(2)(b), that any offence must be committed with bona fide, so this is as opposed to mala fide.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it as a result of that Section?

MR BOOYENS: I beg your pardon Mr Van Rensburg. In paragraph 9 it says that during 1984, what happened in that period, I will come back to this, but I would just like to deal with this provisionally, I am dealing here with pages 22, 23, 24 and 25 as far as the paragraph which starts with the words "Major Du Plessis", do you confirm all of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: At this stage you were second in command of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Please describe your functions and duties very briefly?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My function was about 80 percent administrative and virtually all correspondence or post, came to my desk. Depending on the contents of the correspondence, I would then decide where to channel that particular correspondence or letters for further attention.

Documents or correspondence which I thought was of importance to the Commanding Officer, I would refer it to him first and he could then issue further issues based on that. Orders which went further than the orders which I could have given.

I also sometimes wrote instructions or orders on the documents for the attention of the particular Section Commander, or I perhaps penned a question to him, something that required clarification.

Some of the reports which went from PE to Security Headquarters in Pretoria or any other section anywhere else in the country, I would check these as far as the content was concerned, and I would decide whether that would also first have to go to the Commanding Officer before it was sent, so that he could possibly comment on it.

That was in the main my task, the distribution of information and receipt thereof. And the taking of certain decisions in respect of that.

MR BOOYENS: So, by virtue of that you had quite a broad overview of what was going on because I am assuming that before you could make any decisions, you would have to make the documents?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: So you had a broad overview of the local security situation in Port Elizabeth and vicinity and over the provincial security situation, in the region as a whole and also to some extent you had an overview of the national security situation, because all this documentation came to your desk?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And your knowledge also enabled you to make a reasonable evaluation of people and organisations and threats that they posed, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, broadly speaking.

MR BOOYENS: Your Security Police experience at that stage had gone as far back as 1968?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: That is when you started in the Durban Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: During the 1980's, and I want you to specifically testify on this point because the members of this panel have perhaps not heard this particular evidence so it is important that we deal with it, during the 1980's there was a system which devolved from the State Security Council which is known as the Joint Management System or Centre, the so-called JMC, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Die State Security Council was based on the legislation but the State Security Council, I think Mr Bizos also referred to that, the SCR consisted of virtually all members of the National Cabinet and certain departmental heads, senior Defence Force Officers and other important officials, State officials, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now this was devolved down to a local JMC, which actually would have been a provincial JMC? I am not talking about provincial in the sense of the whole of the Cape Province, but provincial in the sense of the Eastern Cape or Natal or that kind of situation, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I don't want to split hairs on that, but my recollection of it is that Eastern Province Division, the Police Division was a sub-JMC and border was also a sub-JMC, and once or twice a month these two would meet as a JMC.

I may be wrong, but that is more or less how I can remember it. Maybe Eastern Province had its own JMC, I can't recall exactly.

MR BOOYENS: One can understand that, it is a long time ago. Let's just talk about the EP JMC, whether it is a sub-JMC or not, I don't think anything turns on that.

Now, the JMC normally functioned under the Chairmanship of the local Commanding Officer of the Defence Force, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And at the JMC there were representatives from the Police, which included the Security Branch and several other important or interested parties from State departments?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: In this respect one thinks of departments such as Education, several State departments which have an interest in the governing of the country?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were there also some sub-Committees of the JMC who acted in a more specialised way?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In this respect, was there a JIC, Joint Intelligence Centre?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was a JOC, Joint Operational Centre?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was "Veikom", Security Committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And there were also a number of other committees, I don't think it is necessary to list them all. These committees or meetings of the committees were attended by heads of certain departments, sometimes there were different permutations of people who would attend these meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you on occasion also attend these meetings when the Commanding Officer wasn't present?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: These smaller committees, I have for instance referred to the JOC, the Joint Operational Centre, JOC, representatives on that committee - did that include the non-uniform people, I am talking about the Police and Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not normally.

MR BOOYENS: So some of these sub-committees only consisted of the uniform Police or Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: So apart from the JMC meetings to be attended, there were also some of these joint sub-committees that had to be attended?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, during the period that Colonel Harold Snyman was the Commanding Officer, that is from 1984 onwards, he in his capacity as Security Branch Commander, did he attend the JMC meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you sometimes attend with him or if he wasn't available, did you attend on his behalf?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: When he wasn't available, yes.

MR BOOYENS: The Chairmanship of the JMC in the Eastern Province at that time - that resorted under the Defence Force, the Commanding Officer of the Defence Force or the command in the Eastern Province?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as far as I can recall.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman, did he attend any of these other meetings of these other committees?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman when attending these meetings, did he give any feedback to you as members, did he give you any feedback as to what happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he did sometimes. Sometimes he didn't.

MR BOOYENS: Let us bring the matter a bit closer to home. The security situation in the Eastern Cape as far as you were personally aware in 1984, 1985, what exactly was it like?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would say that the security situation in the Eastern Province was in a very bad way. There were areas where there was absolutely no law and order.

There were areas that were known as liberated zones. There were places where alternative structures had been established to supplant the legal governmental structures.

And there were necklace murders. People had been actually driven out of the townships. The policemen and here I am specifically referring to black policemen at the time, some of them had also been driven out of their communities and they had to find homes elsewhere.

Some of them had to live in tents for long periods of time. So undoubtedly in my opinion and in the opinions of other people at the time, there was a revolutionary onslaught or conflict and activities, these were the order of the day during this period in the province, or in certain parts any way.

MR BOOYENS: This revolutionary battle that was being waged, I think it is common knowledge that it was waged by the so-called liberation movements?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And drawing on your knowledge and experience of security matters, was it so that the purpose and objective of the liberation movements was to overthrow the government and to supplant it with another government?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: As far as the methods were concerned, as far as you knew, were the methods used always of a peaceful nature or was there sometimes violence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, there was definitely use made of violence at times.

MR BOOYENS: The violence begot further violence. There would be cases of arson, riots, unrest and there would be shooting incidents between the Police and the communities, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: The task of the Security Police in this context, what was your task?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We had to gather information and intelligence regarding the activities of the activists and persons who were busy orchestrating the violence or inciting it or fermenting it as well as the organisations within which this took place.

MR BOOYENS: Once you had gathered the information, very wide powers were granted to the Security Police under the then existing legislation to prosecute people, to place them under banning orders and restriction orders, detain them without trial, there were many different methods?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have already mentioned the fact that there were alternative structures established. Were there certain areas where the normal governmental functions had ceased to exist? I am here referring to for instance police patrols and that kind of thing, did it collapse?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, especially in respect of normal policing duties, there were certain areas that were only accessible by means of armed vehicles, such as Caspirs and at times obstructions were placed and ditches made in certain areas, so that even those armed vehicles had problems to enter certain areas.

MR BOOYENS: The Bobby on the Beat, to call it that, that simply disappeared, it was no longer there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not at all. That is so, not in the black areas.

MR BOOYENS: When we refer to normal policing, we are talking about your ordinary Detective, uniformed Detective who would go and investigate housebreaking and things like that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Or simply to do crime prevention patrol?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: It was your task as the Security Forces to gather this intelligence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Reference has already been made to the alternative structures and so on that had been established in certain places.

Now, according to your information, who were the architects and who advocated these alternative structures?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information which came to my notice was that Mr Matthew Goniwe had been instrumental in the establishment of alternative structures and his plan was known as the so-called G-Plan.

MR BOOYENS: The G-Plan, was that primarily aimed at the rural areas?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't say only in the rural areas, but here definitely yes - in some of our rural areas.

MR BOOYENS: During this period, there were certain rural areas that found themselves in the situation as you have already sketched?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Obviously these structures led to the Security Forces having to give more and more urgent attention to that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Based on what Colonel Snyman informed you, was there from the JMC side, and when I talk about the JMC, the JMC with all its sub-committees, did the JMC also attend to these matters?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You said that Snyman sometimes gave you feedback, let us draw the focus closer to the current situation. In respect of the security situation in the Eastern Cape generally, in respect of the implementation of the G-Plan and so-called alternative structures, what kind of feedback did you receive if any from Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That more attention should be given to obtaining more information as far as who the ring leaders where, who were the people directly responsible for this.

MR BOOYENS: Is that what you referred to if you look at page 24 - you say that as a result of this, there was increased activities and consultation and liaison between the JMC and the Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You talk about a data base that was then established and that from this emerged a more complete picture as to the ring leaders and the people responsible for the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, the situation in Cradock specifically, as far as that is concerned, were you aware that there was a meeting in February 1985 which was attended by the Minister of Law and Order, Minister Louis le Grange? Barend du Plessis was at that stage the Minister of Black Education and there was a Morrison who was also the local MEC or MP for Cradock, Johan Coetzee the Commissioner of Police and a couple of other interested parties?

And Colonel Snyman was also told to attend the meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can recall such a meeting. The people that you have now mentioned, but I can't recall them all, can't remember whether I knew that they were present, maybe I had forgotten some of their names. I can recall that the Minister was there, that is Minister le Grange, or I was told that Minister le Grange was there.

MR BOOYENS: Told to you by whom?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: By Colonel Snyman.

MR BOOYENS: After Colonel Snyman attended this meeting, did he give you any feedback as to a private conversation he had with le Grange?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct. He gave me that feedback.

MR BOOYENS: To you? Please tell the Commission what Mr Snyman told you in essence about that conversation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman told me that he had a private conversation with Minister le Grange and that le Grange had told him that the situation in the Eastern Province needed attention and should be addressed.

He wanted to know why these people weren't being prosecuted, what the problem was and why people responsible for the violence, could not be brought to court.

Mr Snyman apparently answered that lawful actions simply had no effect any longer, and that witnesses was simply not obtainable as a result of the intimidation and that the other options such as detention etc, were no longer effective because it simply led to an escalation in the violence.

MR BOOYENS: We are talking about restriction orders, detention with trial, bannings, etc?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What else did he say?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he told me that Minister le Grange told him that well, then you should make some other drastic plan.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether he told you what le Grange's exact words were?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I can't remember exactly but what it amounted to was that some other drastic plan should be made to counter the problem posed by the activists, to neutralise them.

MR BOOYENS: To neutralise or something to that effect?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You and Mr Snyman talked about this, what was Mr Snyman's conclusion as to what the Minister had actually told him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Snyman told me he had gained the impression or it was clear to him that the Minister had meant to say that we should actually get rid of these people in an unlawful way.

MR BOOYENS: In other words eliminate them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now, what were your inferences as to that conversation, did you agree with that conclusion of his?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: This was in February 1985?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I assume it was that time.

MR BOOYENS: Let's come back to the pressure from the JMC - what happened after this? What kind of feedback did you receive from Mr Snyman?

Let's talk in general. The relationship between you and the Defence Force, was it a tugging of war who did not do his work? The Army told you you didn't do your work and the reverse?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, this happened.

MR BOOYENS: And on the JMC, what was the feedback that Colonel Snyman gave you about the attitude of the Defence Force in that situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he told me sometimes that when he came from such a meeting, that the Security Branch received a slap on the wrist because of our inability to deal with these violence situation and the alternative structure situation.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, to let the violence situation cool down?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall - you heard Mr Van Zyl's evidence, that round about the 6th, 7th of June you called him in and you gave him an order.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Tell the Commission what led to this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was where Colonel Snyman returned from a JMC meeting and mentioned to me that there was in discussion with the Defence Force in the JMC that the Security Branch was being put under pressure and it was said that the Security Police are unable to stabilise the position.

And that during the discussions it was said by Army personnel that the only manner to save the situation, was to eliminate the hooligans amongst the activists.

MR BOOYENS: What did Colonel Snyman tell you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He said he cannot see any other solution and he asked me if I could speak to Mr Van Zyl and Colonel Du Plessis about the possibility of elimination of Goniwe and his hangers on, or his Lieutenants around him.

MR BOOYENS: The name of Mr Goniwe was specifically mentioned? At that stage it was his name and his co-warts that was named?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How did you interpret what Colonel Snyman told you? Was it an instruction that you should look at it, or what was the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, definitely it was an instruction.

MR BOOYENS: You have told us already that at that stage, you were up to date with the security situation in the Eastern Cape.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you continue Mr Van Rensburg, how many times before this incident, before this discussion with Snyman, was Goniwe arrested?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago and I could be wrong, but I imagine, I just remember once. But if somebody tells me that there was more, I couldn't argue this point.

I am not sure. I know he was detained once from April 1984 to approximately September 1984, he was detained for sixth months. I cannot remember any other incident where he was detained. I cannot say that my memory is so good that I can remember everything.

MR BOOYENS: The Chairperson asked you about the arrest of Goniwe. Do you remember whether he was picked up for questioning and then let go again?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: This is possible. I just cannot remember a specific incident where I can remember it, it is possible.

MR BOOYENS: It seems from the Judge Zietsman's judgement that during approximately March and April there was a request from you that under the provisions of the Security Act, he should be picked up again and detained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot remember this specifically, but I won't argue the point.

MR BOOYENS: Just to explain briefly. Detention without trial, is not something you could decide on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You had to motivate this and it had to be authorised by the Minister?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just to continue, you said you received the instruction from Mr Snyman. Relevant at this stage, it is something that my learned colleague Mr Bizos pointed out to us, it seems that at this stage there was a signal from Defence Force that concerned Mr Goniwe and some other names, I cannot remember them, this was put to Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I heard this.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know of this Defence Force signal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not at all.

MR BOOYENS: With the type of operation that followed this, would you and the soldiers have worked together with such a type of operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't think so.

MR BOOYENS: There was not good cooperation between the two Forces?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: On certain levels there was good cooperation, but maybe when I look back now, there was somewhat professional jealousy amongst us.

But I think in this field, we had much more information than them.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman gave you a directive that you had to look at the elimination of these people, what was your personal feeling?

CHAIRPERSON: What were his actual words, the directive?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He told me that I should speak to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl that they looked at the possibility to look at Goniwe and his co-warts or the people who were responsible for this revolutionary onslaught, violence - to eliminate them in a manner that would not point the finger at the Security Police.

MR BOOYENS: I know you can only talk about the impression you got, was this the impression that came from Mr Snyman, did you form any impression over where this came from?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I got the impression that he received this instruction from elsewhere, because at that time I believed that he would not act on his own and give these instructions.

And because of what he told me about his discussion with Mr le Grange and the Defence Force personnel at the JMC, I got the impression that he got it from higher up.

MR BOOYENS: I think you have mentioned previously that the discussion between the two of you was just after he came from a meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What I just asked you earlier, you personally told us that you had a broad insight to the security situation at ground level, not that you were a field worker, but you have seen all the reports. Is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, what was your feeling, your personal feeling when Colonel Snyman gave you this instruction in respect to the necessity of such a directive? Did you agree, did you differ?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I agreed.

MR BOOYENS: Explain to the Commission why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I agreed on the condition that the right persons were identified, and at that time I agreed because in my opinion this country was in an inexplicable war situation.

People died all over, on both sides. Both sides were involved in illegal activities. We killed each other. We did not act according to the rules on both sides. Legal acts was in my opinion just not sufficient enough.

There were continuous attacks on police stations and on members and their houses. Structures collapsed and I believed that by doing this, this revolutionary violent onslaught against the State could be stopped.

MR BOOYENS: And to bring it closer to home, concerning this application - you have spoken broadly, can you just come back to what you have said now specifically. What role of Mr Goniwe and the people who were active with him, did they also fall into this category?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, tell me you talk about a directive and what you did and at the same time you say you agreed with what was meant.

In this light, this directive, does it matter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it does matter.

CHAIRPERSON: How so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, it matters that an authorised instruction as I saw it.

CHAIRPERSON: If you were willing to participate in these murders, how does the fact that there was a directive, affect it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Probably not in the doing, but in the context I don't believe that I felt at that stage that I could give such authorization myself.

MR BOOYENS: Would you have taken the steps to initiate this operation without having received this instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't have.

MR BOOYENS: So, you said you did not have a - and you agreed that - let me put it in another way, it is something that we asked Mr Van Zyl - if the information that you had in your possession was that the people who were identified as targets, were totally innocent or that they were to be killed because of another motive that had nothing to do with the safety of the State, would you have had anything to do in this process?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: So you say in this context that you did not have any problem with this directive and you agreed to it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: After the discussion between yourself and Colonel Snyman, what happened then?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The same day I went to Mr Du Plessis but he was not available and I called in Mr Van Zyl, and informed him of what Colonel Snyman's instruction was.

MR BOOYENS: Just to get a clear picture, Mr Du Plessis was then in command of the black situation and he had the rank of Major?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, Mr Du Plessis I think he was a Major or Lieutenant Colonel.

MR BOOYENS: And Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he was a Captain.

MR BOOYENS: Both of them were junior in rank in relation to you, were you a Lieutenant Colonel or a full Colonel?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think I was a Lieutenant Colonel.

MR BOOYENS: I see you became a full Colonel in 1986?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did you tell Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told Mr Van Zyl what Mr Snyman told me. I told him that Colonel Snyman expressed his opinion that the only way to save the situation, was the elimination of Goniwe and his immediate ring leaders who moved with him.

And that Colonel Snyman requested the possibility to do this was to be investigated and the right persons had to be identified who acted with Goniwe.

And also that we should not act before it was discussed with Colonel Snyman.

MR BOOYENS: It was your order that they didn't have to do anything?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, this was his instruction.

MR BOOYENS: Now, did you discuss this matter later with Mr Du Plessis, why was he brought into the picture?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Because he was the Head of that unit in which Mr Van Zyl was and he was Mr Van Zyl's senior.

MR BOOYENS: You give the order and did Van Zyl indicate that he would carry out the instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: If we can just take what happened in the meantime. During this stage, let me put it to you as such, at some stage him and Du Plessis came back to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was there also liaison between yourself and Mr Du Plessis and or yourself and Van Zyl and or between all three of you to identify the final members?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there was.

MR BOOYENS: Tell us about this.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was mostly that they acknowledged to me that Mr Goniwe travelled a lot in this division.

That he usually met with people like Mr Mkonto and Mr Calata and sometimes others or that others travelled with him, and visited other places with him.

They acknowledged that certain persons were important persons who were part of Goniwe's activities, and helped realise his objectives and that they felt it was possible to intercept them without being seen and to eliminate them.

MR BOOYENS: You have mentioned, that is feedback while the investigation was ongoing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Eventually did they come with a final decision or let's call it a final group of persons, did they come back to you with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember this group, how many people were in this group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The people I can remember was Mr Fort Calata, Mr Goniwe, Mr Mkonto and then they had a cousin or a brother of Mr Goniwe, and there was Mr Jacobs and then they spoke about a man from Oudtshoorn - afterwards we knew it was Mr Mhlawuli.

I would guess it was about seven or eight in total.

MR BOOYENS: Did you receive feedback why in their opinion these persons qualified as cohorts of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. They told me that these persons were responsible especially in the rural area of the Eastern Province, for the unrest and the collapse of the council's or the local management level law system, that was replaced in some places by people's courts. Policing was not possible by the driving out of police members and they caused that normal flow of the government could not continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, when you get to a convenient stage?

MR BOOYENS: I was actually going to suggest that this might be Mr Chairman.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (cont)

Mr Van Rensburg, just before we adjourned to a man from Oudtshoorn, can you expand on that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information that was given to me with regard to Mr Mhlawuli, is that he was a person from Oudtshoorn and that he sometimes was seen with Mr Goniwe and others in Cradock among other places, and that he had played a pivotal role in Oudtshoorn with regard to organisations similar, youth organisations and community organisations and alternative structure organisations, which he would have established and maintained in Oudtshoorn in order to increase or elevate the revolutionary climate in Oudtshoorn to such a degree that it would transgress to an ungovernable situation.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember - would you like to add something?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was also communicated to me that he apparently would also recruit some youths for training in other countries.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether they possessed certain documents or papers, that is Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot remember that. It was communicated to me by Mr Du Plessis. I cannot recall which documentation they had.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, at this stage when they approached you with the final group, what did you tell them to do?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told them that they should go to Colonel Snyman for his authorization, for his further instructions.

MR BOOYENS: And you did not accompany them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BOOYENS: Did they return to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did they tell you, anything about Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: They told me that Colonel Snyman had approved an operation whereby Mr Goniwe and some of his cohorts would be eliminated.

MR BOOYENS: Did you engage in further discussion regarding - now it is about the how, the when and the where?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: If you would refer to page 27, at the top. You state here that you engaged in discussion with the two and this concerned the modus operandi of the operation. Can you tell us what was said and what occurred?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the modus operandi which would be used, was discussed. The modus operandi regarding the execution of the instructions, that the Security Police could not be pointed out.

My opinion was that it should be considered that the operation appear as a robbery or a vigilante attack.

MR BOOYENS: You also state the AZAPO UDF situation in your statement, what is that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: At that stage, there was conflict between the AZAPO group and the UDF group which had already led to bloodshed in the black townships of that time in Port Elizabeth.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would happen if the operation was a success and the people believed in the situation that you created, that Mr Goniwe and his colleagues were killed by an opposing organisation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I cannot imagine that we actually considered that. The objective was to divert it away from us.

CHAIRPERSON: But the point is that some of the problems which you considered, were the attacks in the areas where there was unrest.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So these murders or would these murders not have aggravated the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It could possibly have done so.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the probability that it would have worsened if the people thought that it was an opposing organisation who carried out these activities?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is probable.

MR BOOYENS: Was it considered at that stage?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it was not.

MR BOOYENS: And did it play any kind of role in your discussions, in other words did you want the situation to escalate?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, we did not want that. If I recall correctly, the other group, the AZAPO group was by far the minority at that stage, that is my recollection.

MR BOOYENS: So, the planning was undertaken regarding how the operation would be executed and the where and when would have to be a reaction to information received, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether you again had contact with them or received any kind of communication with regard to the specific planning for the time and place of the operation?

I beg your pardon, that is a weak question. Did you know beforehand whether they would carry out the operation on the 27th of June?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not know that.

MR BOOYENS: When did you hear of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The following morning.

MR BOOYENS: From whom?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Colonel Snyman and Mr Van Zyl came to tell me that the operation had been executed.

MR BOOYENS: Did they give any particulars regarding who was killed and so forth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they told me who had been killed.

MR BOOYENS: Did they mention the names of the four deceased?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just for clarity sake, I understood that there were more people who were identified in this group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This took place in June, and is it correct that during July it was a partial state of emergency that was happening in the Eastern Cape?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can remember something like that?

MR BOOYENS: In so far as your knowledge reaches, was anything or was any action taken to eliminate any other members of the initial group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, there was not.

MR BOOYENS: You discuss the political objectives and motivations on page 28 of your application?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm everything that is stated in the application?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I confirm this.

MR BOOYENS: If you would return to page 26. The situation as sketched by you in the second paragraph that Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl approached you and that they approached Colonel Snyman after that, is that how you remember the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. I provided a broader basis of what occurred. My legal counsel said that I would have to provide oral testimony at a later stage where I would provide full details of the events.

MR BOOYENS: So your summary as contained in the second paragraph on page 26 is not entirely complete, is that so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Would the Commission grant me a moment? That is the testimony, thank you very much.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: General Van Rensburg, you told the Committee that Colonel Snyman would not have done this unless it was ordered from above?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is how I believe it.

MR BIZOS: Can I take it that you yourself would not have taken part in this unless orders came from above?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: At the time that Mr Snyman told you that Goniwe and his colleagues were to be killed, an order from above, did you ask Colonel Snyman who gave him the order?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Colonel Snyman did not tell me that he received orders from above. I made the assumption and I did not ask Colonel Snyman who had issued the orders.

MR BIZOS: Now, you see I can understand that he would not have told you the names at the time, but from your knowledge of Colonel Snyman and the sort of person that he is and the way that he behaved, you assumed that somebody had told him. I can understand that at the time, you would not have wanted to ask him the name because I assume like all highly illegal activity, the rule of need to know applied. Would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would agree.

MR BIZOS: But now, General I want to ask you this. The time of the need to know has passed us, hasn't it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And we are now at a stage where we have to in the interests of these proceedings and general reconciliation and for the success of your own application, to be completely open and not protect anyone, would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I agree.

MR BIZOS: Now, at the time that you were preparing your applications, and Colonel Snyman is a co-applicant, did you ask him who were the Army people that said that these, what is the word you used, I have it here, these gangsters or words to that effect, should be killed? I will find the word used by the interpreter.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it could have been cohorts.

MR BIZOS: Cohorts, yes, Goniwe and his cohorts. I think that another word was used, but it doesn't matter.

Whilst you were preparing these applications, surely you would have gone to Colonel Snyman and say Harold, we are at the end of the road, we've got to make public admissions that our children and grandchildren have got to hear, let's tell the whole truth, who was it that told you.

Did you go and ask him that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, after I decided to apply for amnesty for these murders, I went to my legal counsel and we prepared a preliminary application.

I then went to Colonel Snyman and I informed him of my intent to apply for amnesty. At that stage, Colonel Snyman did not wish to discuss the matter with me. It was clear to me that he had not yet reconciled the matter with himself to apply for amnesty and he would not discuss it with me at all.

I later was notified through my legal counsel that Colonel Snyman had also applied for amnesty. I initially on a very recent date, heard or saw what his application involved.

MR BIZOS: You have the same Attorney, the same counsel?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You have a common interest in the outcome of these proceedings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Do you realise how important it is for the purposes of full disclosure, that Colonel Snyman and you should not keep anything back?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: When you knew all that and you had the same Attorney and the same counsel, did you go back to Mr Snyman and say it is in the interest of all of us that the identity of the Army people that said at the GBS that Goniwe and his cohorts must be killed, and the person that gave you the order to do this, should become known, did you do that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not do this. As I have already stated I went to see him and he read my preliminary application.

I asked him if there was any commentary or anything that he wished to add and at that stage he did not wish to discuss it with me at all.

MR BIZOS: Did he specifically say that he did not want to discuss it with you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask him why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it was a difficult situation. The man wouldn't speak to me regarding the matter and I felt that I was unwelcome at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Your applications for amnesty have consecutive numbers, they were handed in at the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, that may be so but I do not know how my legal counsel handled this. I can only say what happened.

MR BIZOS: Counsel usually do what their clients ask them to do General Van Rensburg, but of your own in order to satisfy your own conscience, in order to come to terms with the full truth, why didn't you ask Mr Snyman from whom did these orders come?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did not ask him that.

MR BIZOS: The question is didn't you want to know?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would probably want to know. It could help us all with this application.

MR BIZOS: I would have thought that you would have visited him because we hear he is not well. Did you visit him recently?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't that have been a collegial duty to do, one senior officer to the other when one of them has become apparently terminally ill?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, the information that I have is that the family of Mr Snyman requested that we respect their privacy and on the basis of that and his condition, I felt that at this stage I should not visit him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, if that is the case, and we all understand how important it was to find out who it was that was actually responsible for this order, didn't you ask your Attorney to ask Snyman if he would not be prepared to disclose the name of the person who issued the order?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: But it is the same Attorney?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is important to know who this person is?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is important sir, but I didn't do it Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I feel that if Mr Snyman wishes to come forward and disclose the names, that would be what I would want.

But I did visit him and the impression that I received was that he didn't wish to speak to me regarding the matter, and the choice now lies with him whether he would like to disclose who the person was.

CHAIRPERSON: But if your Attorney had asked him, he wouldn't necessarily be discussing it with you? It appears as if the Attorney would have been welcome there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he must have an opinion on that.

CHAIRPERSON: In either event, you didn't do so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I wish to make known an application at this stage, that I would ask and I suppose our learned friend's consent is necessary and I hope will be forthcoming, we may have to look at the statute in order to see the perimeters of the powers of the Commission if we do not get the cooperation, but I believe that this fact is of such vital importance in relation to these applications, that I am going to ask Mr Chairman, that this witness' evidence should be interrupted by calling Mr Snyman to come and tell us just that.

I do not intend subjecting him to a lengthy cross-examination as I am sure that no one else would want to subject him to any lengthy questioning if his state of health does not permit it, but Mr Chairman, I would suggest that we be given permission to employ a Doctor from a panel of two or three practising here in Port Elizabeth at our request, in cooperation with the Doctor attending to Mr Snyman, to visit him, to determine whether he is in a condition to come to the Committee for a short period and if not, what steps ought to be taken in order that alternative arrangements should be made for the Committee to obtain this vital information from him.

It is so vital Mr Chairman, however ill he may be and however inconvenient it may be for Colonel Snyman in his unfortunate condition, from the point of view of his health, I believe that this is a matter in which this is a vital piece of information that should not be lost Mr Chairman, in the interests of truth and justice.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I want to suggest that the parties get together to determine two things.

(1), whether there is agreement that the evidence of the present witness can be interrupted and -

(2) whether an agreement can be obtained to secure the presence or otherwise of Mr Snyman.

If the parties cannot agree on it, then the Committee will have to make the ruling on the issue.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I am in your hands as to whether I proceed now or whether we take a short adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to suggest we take a short adjournment to facilitate ...

MR BIZOS: Because there are a number of Doctors on standby, one of whom will have to interrupt his or her practice and I understand that Mr Snyman is not in Port Elizabeth, but in Uitenhage, which is not very far away, but nevertheless it will be an interruption.

The sooner we know, the sooner we know, the better.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to suggest that you take the next 15 to 20 minutes to see if we can get an agreement. If not, then maybe you can come see me.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think speaking for myself, I think my Attorney's difficulty in this is that he will have to take instructions. We haven't got the client here to take instructions from him in this regard.

I think the 15 to 20 minutes may be a bit short, I don't know. May I suggest that we see what we can sort out and then...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, the client that you are referring to is in fact an applicant here, isn't he?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He has then made himself open to giving evidence, isn't it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not necessarily Mr Chairman. As I understand the Act, any person who is an applicant has got the option whether he wants to give evidence, he is not obliged.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us adjourn - you people can discuss it in an attempt to come to some kind of agreement.

MR BOOYENS: No, we will certainly try to come to some type of agreement.

HEARING ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: I have been informed by the relevant representatives that attempts are going to be made to secure the attendance of one of the applicants.

I am informed further that he is extremely ill and certain logistical issues need to be attended to. In the circumstances I am going to adjourn his hearing, so as to give them an opportunity to put this into operation and we will reconvene at half past nine tomorrow morning. Thank you.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just before my learned friend starts, I think it should come from my side because I've got the first hand information, we took an early adjournment yesterday to ascertain what the situation is with the applicant, Colonel Snyman.

We have succeeded in speaking to one of the Specialists who is treating him, as well as his General Practitioner. We set out the proposals to the General Practitioner inter alia the possibility that evidence in this sort of a Commission like situation can be taken. The General Practitioner then said that he would revert to us and he spoke to two other Specialists who were involved also in the treatment of Mr Snyman, his diagnosis and exploratory operation done on him and the sum total and I am not suggesting that I am putting it in the correct medical terms, the sum total of what we have been told boils down to the following, that his condition of health is so bad at the moment that to subject him to any sort of stressful situation, can cause the disease that he is suffering from, to get more virulent and probably - there is a reasonable possibility that he could accelerate, or decrease his life expectancy.

According to the Doctors we have spoken to, their medical advice is that he should not be subjected to any stressful situation. We have spoken to Snyman, he is very weak, but we have spoken to him as well, and he has indicated that he intends following the advice of his medical personnel.

We have invited my learned friend to, in arrangement with Snyman's own Doctor, arrangements that can be made through the Attorneys, to have Mr Snyman examined if they feel they want to do so on a time that is mutually convenient to all parties. The Doctors would obviously have to arrange, we are not going to be present at a medical examination.

So the situation at this stage is that my learned friend and I then spoke to each other yesterday afternoon, and we were in fact advised this morning that they are considering the possibility of doing that tomorrow morning. That is so far as the situation was yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we have made attempts to obtain the services of a duly qualified medical practitioner to visit Mr Snyman. Arrangements have been made I understand for it to take place at eight o'clock tomorrow morning.

I would suggest that we leave the matter over until we have had a report from the medical practitioner of our clients' choice and we proceed today with the examination of the witness that is now being examined.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't suppose we've got much choice in the circumstances, so let us proceed on the basis you suggest.

MR BIZOS: I may indicate that we are also in the process of examining alternative solutions such as for instance a statement being taken from Mr Snyman. The information that we are seeking is important and I do not believe that we should lose it because it is absolutely vital to this whole process.

We are not unmindful, nor lacking in consideration for his health, but on the other hand, we will make if agreement is not reached, specific proposals if we are advised by our own medical practitioner that it would be unwise for him to come here, we will make specific proposals to get the information which we consider to be vital, even if he does not attend the hearing.

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Mr Van Rensburg, you told us that as Mr Snyman's deputy from time to time, you attended the meetings of the Joint Management Centre. I will refer to the Afrikaans abbreviation GBS throughout my - is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: There were not only plenary sessions of GBS, there were also sub-committees of GBS to deal with different aspects?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Was there a special committee from which the Department of Education and the SABC and other representatives which did not emanate from the security apparatus, were excluded, were there such meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there were.

MR BIZOS: What was the name of that sub-committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was the JIC, the Joint Information Centre.

MR BIZOS: And did you attend any of those meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: Who were represented at these meetings, the Information Centre meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can recall it was only the Police and when I say the Police I think it was only the Security Branch and the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: And on vital questions of security, it was this sub-committee of the GBS that really had the serious discussions and the serious decisions were made?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. You are correct. I can't recall serious or important decisions taken as such. I suppose one could say there were decisions but these decisions were then referred to Pretoria.

How can I put it, these were proposals.

MR BIZOS: Proposals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: The proposals from this Information Centre would go through to Pretoria for their information and their advice and direction in relation to what may happen later?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Bizos, may I just come in here for a second please. May I just interrupt you for a moment?

MR BIZOS: Yes, of course.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Mr Van Rensburg, this information or intelligence proposal emanating from the JIC, did you get any feedback lower down the chain of command in the PE Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If instructions were received from above, yes, then feedback would be given.

ADV BOSMAN: I am not talking about instructions. I am talking about the whole import of what was discussed at these meetings, was that communicated lower down the levels or was it privileged information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was reported lower down the levels where it was relevant. If a particular section of the Security Police or some other component of the Police, if they had to attend to a particular matter, then it would be reported to them.

CHAIRPERSON: What about policy Mr Van Rensburg? The policy emanating from the JIC, was that conveyed to the people below you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I can't say that policy was formulated there as such. The Police had its own policy and at these meetings certain information was discussed and what the problems were at that time and possible solutions to these problems, and that was reported back to Pretoria and Pretoria from time to time gave their feedback as to how they saw the matter and perhaps they also gave instructions in regard to certain matters.

The men lower down, the footsoldiers, did not receive all the information which was discussed there at that level. What was important and relevant to them, was given to them, but not everything.

MR BIZOS: The question of how to put an end to the unrest and the unsatisfactorily security situation, would this be discussed in the JMC or in the Information sub-committee or both?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, the problems surrounding for instance school boycotts and the like, that would have been dealt with by the person representing that government department or he would have been present as well.

The JIC concentrated more specifically on how to actually stop the rioting and the unrest on the ground, in other words the physical unrest situation, how to deal with that.

MR BIZOS: Let us just take a concrete example. Your evidence was that Colonel Snyman reported that there was discussion at the JMC in which the Defence Force people in the JMC put the Security Police under pressure and suggested that the Security Police were unable to stabilise the position. Do you recall that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, would that have been a discussion at the JMC or the JIC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Where would it have been suggested that the Army personnel only appeared to be able to possibly eliminate the hooligans amongst them, where would that discussion have taken place?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know about that.

MR BIZOS: This is what you said.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall that.

MR BIZOS: The record will speak for itself, but I ...

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, I am not quite sure.

MR BIZOS: Well, let me repeat the effect of it. The effect of it was that the Army personnel at this meeting suggested that because of the inability of the Security Police to eliminate the "trawante", if you don't like the word hooligans, the word hooligans was used by the interpreter and it made an impression on me, but don't let's argue about words, where would that have been discussed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My recollection of that is that Mr Snyman told me that that took place during private discussions of the Force.

MR BIZOS: With members of the Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Not at a meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Now, who were the members of the Force in JMC? Who were the regular people that attended the JMC meetings who came from the Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The people that I can remember were Brigadier van der Westhuizen, there was a person Van Aswegen was his surname, and Du Plessis.

MR BIZOS: Let us just take that in a little more detail. The top Army man was Brigadier van der Westhuizen?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He was the Chairman of the JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And one would have expected him as Chairman, to yield influence at least on the other members of the Army that may have been present at any given time, at the JMC or the sub-committee relating to information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is true.

MR BIZOS: When Colonel Snyman told you that this is what the soldiers were saying, did you understand him to mean Mr Van der Westhuizen and his junior officers involved in JIC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall what I understood that to mean, but I wasn't quite sure whether it was said at the JIC and what Colonel Snyman meant exactly or whether there was a private discussion with JIC members.

He referred to Defence Force members, I don't know who they were.

MR BIZOS: Well, this was a very important accusation that was made against the Security Police of whom you were the number 2 person.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you ask Mr Snyman who are these people from the South African Defence Force accusing us of incompetence and claiming the right to be in a better position to eliminate people better than we can, did you ask him that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I just didn't ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't your professional pride hurt by this accusation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I would not put it that way.

MR BIZOS: How would you put it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't comment on that. I ...

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't the natural thing by a professional person such as yourself be, when you were being insulted in your professional capacity, that you would want to know who is it that made such a serious accusation against us?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't even ask who these people were.

MR BIZOS: Yes, you have told us that and one of the issues here General Van Rensburg, is whether you can be believed or not.

It will help the Committee to believe you or not to believe you I would submit, if you told them why you did not ask Mr Snyman the obvious question.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't tell you, I didn't ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Could you try and put a date on when Mr Snyman said this to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't give you an exact date. If I have to make certain inferences, I would say it had to be approximately two to three weeks before Mr Goniwe and his colleagues were eliminated.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and that would have been the time when you asked for Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl to come to you and make a plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now three weeks would have been the week during the 6th of June 1985.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I will accept that.

MR BIZOS: It would have been the day or certainly during the week when the signal asking for a death warrant for Goniwe, Calata and Mkonto?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I will accept that. I wasn't aware of such a signal, but I will assume or I will accept that there was such a signal as a result of what I learnt later.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well let us just get the date sequence correctly and then we can carry on.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just a matter of record. I don't think my learned friend did that deliberately, the copy of the signal appearing at page 101, 102, actually doesn't talk about Mkonto, it talks about the two Goniwe's and Calata.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, yes, I beg your pardon. Calata and Mbolelo Goniwe. I am sorry it was a mistake, but it is not relevant to the issue, but thank you for correcting me.

You see here is - Mr Van der Westhuizen, will you turn to page 101 of your application. We know that it is the 7th of June, and it is at or about the time that two other things happened.

When Mr Snyman told you that the soldiers were saying that the Security Police can't be trusted any more to eliminate people, and when you said make a plan in order to eliminate Goniwe and his cohorts. Do you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: It is more or less the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, listen to what this says. "Personally" - have a look at the bottom of page 101 - "personally for General Van Rensburg, telephone conversation General Van Rensburg, Brigadier van der Westhuizen on the 7th of June 1985, refers."

Now, that speaks for itself that there was a telephone discussion between General Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council and the Chairman of GOS in Port Elizabeth, do you accept that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: This happened at or about the same time as the other two things happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And names as follows: Matthew Goniwe, Mbolelo Goniwe, brother or cousin of the abovementioned, and Fort Calata.

Now these three persons had been identified by you, your Security Police in Port Elizabeth and recommended for a banning order in 1984, which was in fact issued?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, Mr Chairman I know of the order as far as Mr Matthew Goniwe is concerned, but I am not sure whether Mr Mbolelo Goniwe and Mr Fort Calata whether they, whether these orders were served on them.

MR BIZOS: Well, any way the document shows that they were identified and placed together for this purpose?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, the Chairman of GOS at about the time that you were told that you were incompetent to eliminate people and at the time more or less when you told your people to make a plan, the Chairman of GOS then Brigadier Van der Westhuizen says to General Van Rensburg of the Security Council Secretariat in Pretoria, "it is proposed that the abovementioned persons be removed from society permanently as a matter of urgency."

I want you to please put your hat on as an Investigating Officer, and you were looking for the murderers of Goniwe after the event, and you had this three bits of information that I gave you. Who would you say requested the murder of Goniwe, his brother Goniwe and Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I would have to suspect Brigadier Van der Westhuizen, I would have to seriously suspect him.

MR BIZOS: Seriously suspect him, yes?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If, of course, if the report is interpreted correctly.

MR BIZOS: If the information is correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And if General Van der Westhuizen admitted that although he may have meant something else, which Judge Zietsman rejected, he did send the signal. Would you be satisfied that there was at least a take for you to take before the Attorney-General for the arrest of General Van der Westhuizen?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would obviously have wanted to send more proof to the Attorney-General, but I would have consulted with him.

MR BIZOS: Your job as a good Detective would have pointed at General Van der Westhuizen's guilt for inciting or initiating the procedure of murdering the two Goniwe's and Mr Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: If you had evidence that General Van Rensburg, not you, the other Van Rensburg at the Secretariat of the State Security Council, that he gave contradictory evidence as to what he did with this signal, would you add him into the list of prime suspects?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would have.

MR BIZOS: And presumably those working in close cooperation with these two Generals at the time that these facts became known, would also be suspects and possibly approached as witnesses to give evidence against their Generals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Is it not clear to you now that these facts have become known that if there was an order from above, it was most certainly ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, you mean Pretoria?

MR BIZOS: Pretoria?

CHAIRPERSON: Not above?

MR BIZOS: No, these are acts of men, not of the gods Mr Chairman.

It is clear that you were in effect used as nothing more than the doers of the act that must of necessity have been authorised by the Secretariat of the Security Council?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Vlok was in Port Elizabeth or was concerned with this matter, attended a meeting - could I just check where it was, whether it was in Port Elizabeth or Pretoria, one moment please - in Pretoria.

Mr Vlok was in a meeting in Pretoria. I want to refer to the Exhibit number. We will just get the exact words, but we needn't delay.

Mr Vlok was at a meeting on the 6th, now which is also round about this time, this vital period around the 6th and 7th of June 1985. It would appear that there were telephone calls from Pretoria, the signal makes it clear does it not, that there were telephone calls before the signal was sent, because it says the telephone conversation refers, do you remember that at the bottom of 101?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: Here we have a situation which I would like your comment on, that Mr Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council suggests - well refers to a conversation and in response he gets a request for a death warrant and at the meeting attended by Mr Vlok, a decision is made in order to appoint a committee to investigate whether or not Mr Goniwe should be reappointed to his post.

Now, what did you know about the steps to reappoint him to his post?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: All that I know regarding that is that the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth was opposed to it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, because you must know the document dated the 23rd of May which is before the Committee, as Exhibit what was referred to during the inquest as the "nooit ooit" document, that never must he be - our list of Exhibits and Exhibits have been left in a car Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I think it is Exhibit C, that Goniwe and Calata would never again be reappointed?

MR BIZOS: That was the attitude of the Security Police, Exhibit C. Yes, and then here we have deputy Minister Vlok where I told you with many Generals and Brigadiers, I didn't tell you I referred it to Mr Van Zyl, and the proposal is that decision (1) after discussion of the Goniwe case, it is decided that a committee under leadership of the SCR regarding the fate of Goniwe would make a decision and would make a submission on the 12th of June 1985.

We are told that this was a committee appointed the next day or the day after in order to decide whether Mr Goniwe should be reappointed or not. You must agree with me obvious General Van Rensburg, that the signal on the one hand to which the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Security Council was present and a committee should be appointed in order to investigate whether he should be reinstated or not, are as far apart as Cape Town to Messina?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, if you had been given these facts would you have requested or ordered or suggested to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl, that they should put a plan into motion to eliminate Mr Goniwe and one or other of his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I have no knowledge of that meeting in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: Well, then let me accept your answer General, that you didn't know about it.

Would it not follow that either the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing, which is unlikely in view of the fact that General Van Rensburg of the State Security Council that was responsible for the detail putting together the committee and the same Van Rensburg having received a signal that should be killed, that somebody or a number of people were playing a double game?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot comment on that. I do not know what occurred there. I could agree with you yes, it appears to be a double game that creates the impression, but personally I do not know anything about it.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You see, we would have a situation would we not if there is any truth in the suggestion that there was a serious attempt to decide whether Mr Goniwe should be reappointed or not, that General Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council, would not have disclosed the fact of the signal to Mr Vlok who attended the meeting of the 6th about a burning issue which the Deputy Minister was concerned about, the Security Council was concerned about, the Secretariat of the Security Council was concerned about and the Chairman of GOS in Port Elizabeth was concerned about.

How could there be these two contradictory processes going on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That I cannot explain.

MR BIZOS: Well, let me ask you you cannot explain it because you do not know the facts, but assume that the facts are that I have given you, clearly appear from the documents that were produced at the inquest, and now that we know that Goniwe and his friends were killed, put on your cap as an Investigating Officer again, looking to find the truth.

Would you not say that either the Security Council including the Deputy Minister knew about this and had authorised it or the Secretariat of the Security Council in the name of General Van Rensburg was playing a double game?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is possible.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now let us take into consideration what you did General. Do I understand that as a result of your discussion with Mr Snyman, it was decided to make a plan to kill Mr Goniwe, plus how many others, you tell me please?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was never said how many others apart from Mr Goniwe. It was said that it would be Mr Goniwe and the persons surrounding him who along with him, created the situation.

MR BIZOS: Well, and no other names were mentioned either by you or Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot recall. Mr Snyman as far as I can remember did not mention any other names. I can't recall whether I mentioned other names.

My recollection is that we spoke of Goniwe and his confidants.

MR BIZOS: His confidants, very well. And this was an open mandate given to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't believe that it was at that stage with regard to who, apart from Mr Goniwe, it was said that they should investigate who else would have to be removed or eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they ever report to you sir, we have done what you asked us to do, here are the names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they did.

CHAIRPERSON: When would that have been?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was approximately a week before the elimination was carried out. I can really not remember with certainty when I issued Colonel Snyman's order, whether the names of Fort Calata and Sparrow Mkonto emerged, I cannot recall that specifically.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now, from the moment that you told them to make a plan, do you say that Du Plessis and Van Zyl had authority if the occasion arose, to put the plan into operation and execute it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. Colonel Snyman said that I should tell the members that they shouldn't go over into action before they had cleared it with him finally.

MR BIZOS: Did they have to go to Snyman more than once?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: They could surely have gone to him. I do not know whether or not they visited him more than once.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Van Rensburg, did you tell them before the operation was put into operation, that they should come into contact with Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether or not they did so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: When do you say that they did so, because I do not recall Mr Van Zyl telling us that they went to Mr Snyman more than once?

MR BOOYENS: No, but this witness doesn't say they went to him more than once either, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me, Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: I am saying, this witness didn't testify that they went to Colonel Snyman more than once either, I think there is a misunderstanding here.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's clarify it. I thought it was so. What do you say, did Du Plessis and Van Zyl go to Snyman once only when they were told do what is best for South Africa, or do you say that they went back to him thereafter as well?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I know of the one case. I am saying that it is possible that they were there more than once, but I only know of the one case.

MR BIZOS: And if Mr Van Zyl didn't tell us about another case, we can assume that they only went to Mr Snyman once for the purposes of getting authorization, correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is as far as I know.

MR BIZOS: And the authorization was do the best, what you think is best for South Africa, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I accept it as that.

MR BIZOS: Because presumably that was what was reported back to you if we are to believe Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I cannot recall what his exact words were when he reported back to me. What I can remember is that it was reported back to me that Colonel Snyman had given the final approval for the operation or the final order.

MR BIZOS: Yes. The operation was to put the plan into operation in relation to Mr Goniwe if it was in the best interest of South Africa.

There was no mandate as to precisely who was going to be killed from Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that I cannot say. When Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis returned to me, they told me that Mr Snyman had given the final approval for the operation with regard to any of those persons that they had suggested to him for elimination.

MR BIZOS: But, I do not recall Mr Van Zyl telling us that a list of persons was given to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall whether a list of names was supplied to Colonel Snyman or whether the names were orally or verbally communicated to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, why would they have returned to you with the names during that week?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, because originally the instruction was to determine who the persons were that should be eliminated with Goniwe.

CHAIRPERSON: That was your instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: From Colonel Snyman to them.

CHAIRPERSON: Through you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I told this to them.

CHAIRPERSON: And they returned to you with names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you say regarding these names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I said that - I can't recall how many names there were - they broadly explained to me that these were the persons who were causing problems and who they deemed it necessary to be eliminated.

Names were mentioned to me and I was satisfied that they had identified the correct individuals, I was satisfied with the information and I told them to go to Colonel Snyman in order to get the final approval for the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: That is a week before the incident?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Approximately a week before the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they go?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the first time that they went to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: But wouldn't they have gone to Colonel Snyman at the time that you told them to make the plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I don't know if they went. I simply communicated to them what Colonel Snyman had said and to my knowledge, they accepted it as such.

MR BIZOS: The mandate that you gave them, and the mandate that they got from Snyman, if Van Zyl's evidence is to be believed, was an open-ended one. Would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I don't know about an open mandate, what was communicated to me was that persons had to be identified who were involved. Not simply any person.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Was there anything as formal as the signal which apparently seems to have required specific identification of the people that had to be eliminated. Did that not apply to the Security Police in Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I am not following you.

MR BIZOS: Have a look at the signal, there it seems to suggest, you know when they wanted people eliminated, they named them.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can see it.

MR BIZOS: Now was there no similar, was there no similar procedure in your department so that people were not condemned to death on a loose and untidy way so to speak, but properly identified after due consideration?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I do not know about that. The names that appear here, are also names which were mentioned at the Security Branch, Colonel Snyman and Colonel Du Plessis and there were other names as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, tell me, what was the point of your juniors coming to report to you about what they had discovered as a result of your instruction to them, in respect of those people who were friends of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not follow.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did they come to report back to you and Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To ensure that they would eliminate identified individuals, not just anybody.

And to determine whether or not they would be able to execute such an operation as desired.

CHAIRPERSON: So specific names must have been approved with them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you approve specific people?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not approve specific individuals as such. As I have already mentioned, names were given and if any combination of those individuals would be found at a given point in time, they would be eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: So, you are saying you never approved of the elimination of these specific people?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, through Colonel Snyman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't follow you.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: When they came to me with their information and with the information that we already had regarding these individuals and determined that these were the activists who were causing problems, and that they should be eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: So in so far as you could authorise those killings, you did?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I suppose one could put it that way with the condition that the Commanding Officer first had to place his seal there on.

MR BIZOS: Is that Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, let me just get clarity. When Du Plessis, when you called Du Plessis and Van Zyl in, they mentioned Goniwe and his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And you didn't identify any one other than Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Myself?

MR BIZOS: Yourself?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not that I can recall.

MR BIZOS: And there was no instruction from you to go and get authorization for Goniwe and other specific persons, but merely general authorization of his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, when they returned to me with certain names ...

MR BIZOS: I see this is what you are saying, so that they had to go to Snyman to obtain permission for the operation, Goniwe and others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: What did they have to ask Snyman for?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay, perhaps I did not understand you correctly. In this regard Goniwe and six or seven other names ...

MR BIZOS: That is what you said, you say Goniwe and six or seven other names.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't say that, six or seven other names were put to me.

MR BIZOS: Was this three weeks before the death?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, approximately a week before the death.

MR BIZOS: Now, originally when you called them in, what did you tell them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told them that Colonel Snyman had requested that they determine exactly who the cohorts of Goniwe were, who were creating the situation of unrest and that they should identify the correct individuals and monitor their movements and try to eliminate these individuals in an unobtrusive manner.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever ...

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage, was there any talk that they should contact Colonel Snyman with regards to this operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman had stated it ...

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage when you told them to monitor these people in order to determine who should be eliminated, that conversation, did you tell them that they should go and see Colonel Snyman regarding this operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall that I told them that specifically, but I told them that the final approval had to be obtained from Colonel Snyman personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this when you told them about monitoring the individuals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Let us try and get you to answer the question in another way, put it another way in the hope of getting clarity.

As to who was going to be killed, as to precisely who was going to be killed, did that have to be approved by Snyman or not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And without Snyman's approval, nobody could be killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is so.

MR BIZOS: And if anybody killed anyone other than persons identified to Snyman, that killing would not have been authorised?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: In order that there should have been specific authorization from Snyman, there would have had to have been more than one visit by Van Zyl and Du Plessis to Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is possible, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: It follows from the versions that we have heard.

MR BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, not necessarily.

MR BIZOS: Well, we will argue it, we will argue it. It was an argumentative question.

But now, let me read to you what the application of Mr Van Zyl says in paragraph 8 of page 47.

"Several weeks before the 27th of June 1985, Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg, second in command of the Security Branch, Division Eastern Province told me in his office that a drastic plan had to be devised with Matthew Goniwe and his most prominent cohorts."

Do you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Further

"Because they were creating a situation of total anarchy in the rural Eastern Cape. I assumed that he indicated that the activists should be eliminated, seeing as he would express it clearly if he meant that they should be detained. I discussed this later with Major Du Plessis specifically referring to Goniwe, Calata and Mkonto. Major Du Plessis accompanied me to Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg's office at one stage, where Colonel Van Rensburg emphasised it that Colonel Snyman the Commander of the Security Branch, Division Eastern Province, had to approve the elimination of the activists. Myself and Major Du Plessis went to the Colonel Snyman's office, where we briefly discussed the matter, seeing as Colonel Snyman was up to date regarding the activities of all the relevant activists. Colonel Snyman, who I had always regarded as a soft-hearted person, said that we should do what would be in the interests of the Republic of South Africa. We regarded this as the official authorization of the operation. Myself and Major Du Plessis subsequently returned to the office of Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg and informed him that Colonel Snyman had approved the operation".

Do you agree with the contents of that paragraph?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that he only speaks of one visit to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that this only date that they mentioned there, is a few weeks before the 27th and that the agreement of Mr Snyman was obtained at that time to the operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot argue what is contained in this paragraph, but my recollection is that they visited me approximately a week before the operation was executed, and then went to Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: But you see there that they say that three names were specified right at the beginning.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, it is possible that they had those three names in mind after they had spoken to me, or after I had spoken to Colonel Snyman and that he then went to Mr Du Plessis and that those were the two names, apart from Goniwe's, which immediately came to mind.

MR BIZOS: Surely, you are not going to tell the Committee, General Van Rensburg, that a mandate would have been given by Colonel Snyman to kill unnamed persons?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't believe that Colonel Snyman had it in mind to eliminate unidentified or unnamed persons. He wanted to make dead sure that the persons who had been creating the problems, be eliminated.

I am convinced that Colonel Snyman within himself, as a result of information which he possessed, had certain people in mind.

MR BIZOS: But you see, have a look at page 59, in the application of Mr Du Plessis. Have you got it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: yes.

MR BIZOS: How does your evidence square up with the second paragraph on page 59? "On an unknown date before the 27th of June, 1985, General Van Rensburg informed me that he had discussed the possible elimination of Goniwe and other activists, with Captain Van Zyl. He did emphasise however, that Colonel Snyman would have to approve it. Myself and Captain van Zyl discussed the matter fully with Colonel Snyman for a number of days after this, and informed him that the only manner in which the Eastern Cape and surrounding areas could be stabilised, would be to go to the extreme and eliminate the above-mentioned activists. He said that we should continue and do what would be in the interest of the RSA. We regarded this as the official authorization for the operation. Myself and Captain Van Zyl, after our visit to Colonel Snyman, returned to the office of Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg, and informed him that the proposed operation for the elimination of the Cradock 4 had been approved by the Commanding Officer." How do you reconcile your evidence with the contents of this paragraph?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: In what regard do you mean?

MR BIZOS: Well, let us take the obvious for a man of your standing and experience.

Although a specific date is not mentioned, the unknown date must be round about the 7th of June, according to your evidence, according to the evidence of Van Zyl, can we accept that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And they went to Colonel Snyman "a few days thereafter", does that make sense to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That could have been that way.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but then he says that after their visit, they returned to you. He doesn't speak about a second visit to Snyman.

So the visit to Snyman must have been a couple of days after the 7th of June, before the investigation had been done?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I know nothing of this. It is possible, but I don't know anything about it.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that this does not square up with your evidence that there was a second visit to Mr Snyman for him to authorise specific names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not mention it in my application, because I didn't know that such a visit had taken place.

MR BIZOS: And this is in accordance, and I don't want to read it out, that there was no second visit, on page 37 to 38 of your own evidence.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is what I said.

MR BIZOS: Why did you in answer to my questions as to whether Snyman had authorised unspecified persons, say no, they were authorised after the investigation and that you were informed of this about a week before the killing? Why did you make that up?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't fabricate anything. All I said is that I issued the instructions to Du Plessis and Van Zyl, as it had been communicated to me by Colonel Snyman.

After that, they satisfied themselves by finding those who had to be eliminated. They returned to me with the information and I advised them to go to Colonel Snyman to determine the final decision regarding this elimination.

MR BIZOS: You know why you tried to give that impression that there was a second, you made the statement that there was a second visit to Mr Snyman, General?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, he never said there was a second visit. He said he knows only about one, there might have been another visit. To say to the witness that he said there was a second meeting, visit, is not correct, that was never his evidence.

It doesn't even appear in his application.

MR BIZOS: Well, let us assume that you did not say it or you did not imply it, which I do not agree with on your previous evidence, but if you say that you don't know whether it happened or not.

Was it not necessary for Mr Snyman to authorise the death of specific persons and not persons that may have fallen into a particular class, in accordance with the opinion of his juniors?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman, as I have already said, asked that these people come and tell him specifically who was responsible for that current situation. That is what they did and on the basis of that, Colonel Snyman granted approval and that is as far as my knowledge goes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, according to Mr Du Plessis' statement, the matter was discussed with him and you discussed it with him. He also says in his application that when you discussed it with him, you indicated that Colonel Snyman would have to grant approval for the operation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I said so?

CHAIRPERSON: He said that you indicated this. In his statement he continues to say that him and Van Zyl, although he doesn't have a date, went to Colonel Snyman at some stage, where they were granted the official approval.

And it was then that they returned to you and informed you that the Commanding Officer had approved the elimination of the Cradock 4.

Then there can only be one discussion with Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is what I know.

CHAIRPERSON: Then when did that occur?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: According to my knowledge, that was approximately a week before the elimination was carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: But did they not return to you with the names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they did.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you certain, because that is not the impression which was created by Mr Du Plessis' statements?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I cannot speak for Mr Du Plessis, but that is how I have the facts.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Bizos, can we - or do you want to carry on?

MR BIZOS: It is in order Mr Chairman.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (sworn states)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Did you know anything about Mr Mhlawuli a day or two after the 7th of June?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall.

MR BIZOS: During June 1985, did you communicate with Mr Eric Winter in Cradock at all, either on the telephone, or personally or any other manner?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I can't recall anything like that.

MR BIZOS: During June 1985, and before the killing of the four people in that motor car, did you speak to the Head or any other person in the Security Police in the Southwest Districts, and more particularly Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not as far as I can recall.

MR BIZOS: Did any file relating to Mr Mhlawuli appear on your desk containing information about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not, that as far as I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, what do you mean ...

MR BIZOS: Did anybody show you a photograph ...

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean when you say not as far as you can recall? Is it possible that that could have happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is possible, but I can't remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: But, if you had spoken to the people in Oudtshoorn, regarding Mr Mhlawuli, then surely there would have been a formal file on him at that time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, perhaps a formal file, but not what is referred to as a personal file. I can't recall speaking to them about Mr Mhlawuli. I can't recall it, it is possible, I just can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Was any photographs shown to you or any scraps of paper on anybody's desk shown to you, relating to Mr Mhlawuli?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: You said some things about Mr Mhlawuli in your evidence in chief that I want to come to. I am going to suggest to you that it is easy to speak about people that were killed by you, who cannot speak for themselves to say things about them after they are dead.

But let us see what the objective evidence is about Mr Mhlawuli's activities. In Exhibit K, the information available to the Police in relation to Mr Goniwe up to and including the 17th of June 1985 as contained in Exhibit K and Exhibit K2 shows that Mr Goniwe, if you have a look at page 4 of Exhibit K with 87, page number relating to the inquest proceedings, sets out where he was active in 1985, Cradock, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset East, Bedford, Adelaide, Middelburg Cape, Hanover, Hofmeyr, Pearson, Steynsburg, Cookhouse, Newport, Port Alfred and Fort Beaufort. There is nothing there about Oudtshoorn.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't see Oudtshoorn listed here.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and have all those towns for the benefit of all of us who are not acquainted with local geography, did all those towns have something in common?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Those are towns in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and within your area of jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. They were not all in our jurisdiction.

MR BIZOS: Was not the whole of Eastern Province in your jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, any way, it is the Eastern Province. Which portion of the Eastern Province was not under your jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can only tell you that the towns listed here, well Cradock fell under our jurisdiction, Somerset-East was under our jurisdiction, Bedford, Adelaide, Cookhouse, Port Alfred and Fort Beaufort, as far as I can recall, those were under our jurisdiction.

MR BIZOS: Was not Hanover and Hofmeyr?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's leave them out for a moment.

Does not the absence of anything relating to Oudtshoorn, not suggest to you that as at the 17th of June, there was nothing that Mr Goniwe was doing in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't see anything.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think in all fairness to the witness, one must read the very preceding paragraph, and it says that Mr Goniwe was appointed as UDF organiser for the following towns, and then the next paragraph where these towns follows.

So, from there to jump to say that a man was never in Oudtshoorn, is not really justified under argument. One cannot read this paragraph only, you must read the previous paragraph as you will see.

MR BIZOS: Well, it goes on Mr Chairman. "He had visited these towns and addressed meetings of black people", etc. It deals with his activities during that period. He apparently kept within his jurisdiction outside, unlike if they are telling the truth, the Security Police, that they had things to do with people from Oudtshoorn.

But be that as it may. Do you agree that there is nothing in Exhibit K and Exhibit K1 and K2, there is nothing to indicate that he did anything which was noted by the Security Police in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Exhibit K2, page 111 there is a reference to paragraph dated the 5th of March 1985, in that reference it mentions Mr Goniwe had sent a telegram to the UDF in Oudtshoorn on behalf of Cradora, in respect of the commemoration of May day.

That is all that I can see in this document, where there is a reference to Oudtshoorn.

MR BIZOS: Yes, is the sending of a telegram of solidarity of May day, underground subversive activity?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was a May day commemoration. Subject wrote a telegram to the UDF in Oudtshoorn on behalf of Cradora, in which Mr Goniwe makes the following statement to the commemoration of May day and then there is a verbatim quote.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you for drawing that to our attention. Is there anything else, or any other activity that Mr Goniwe did in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not in this document.

MR BIZOS: And one would have expected that if there was any information, that there was any contact with Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlawuli in relation to the recruitment of people to join the liberation movements outside the country, or whether there was any conspiratorial conduct between Mr Mhlawuli and Mr Goniwe, having regard to the minutiae that are reported in these documents for security purposes, one would have expected if there was any truth at all in your assertions about Mr Mhlawuli, to have found something in these documents?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I cannot comment on that. There are no such indications in these documents, and I can't dispute that.

But I can't say that there wasn't any other information made available in any other way, or which came to our knowledge in any other way.

MR BIZOS: Well, you can't refer us to any other information and we can't find any facts in the information that we have.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I told you what had been told to me in respect of Mr Mhlawuli.

MR BIZOS: The question that we are concerned with here sir, is whether you can be believed or not.

If you were given that information, why was that information not furnished to the Commissioner of Police who had to decide, who had the responsibility in relation to the Security of the Country, that there was the dangerous conspiracy between the two of them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't answer you on that.

MR BIZOS: And the information came from the Security Police to the Commissioner, couldn't have come from anyone else? In fact a member of the Committee pointed it out to Mr Van Zyl, that this information was furnished by your Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information regarding Mr Mhlawuli that was conveyed to me, that I told you. I don't know about any other information.

I don't know what information Pretoria used to based its decisions on, I can't comment on that.

MR BIZOS: Try and come to terms with my question sir.

The information that you say you had, is not in Exhibit K or Exhibit K1 or Exhibit K2, which was sent to the Commissioner of Police. Leave out what Pretoria may have sent him. The question is, if you had that information, why is it not contained in Exhibits K, K1 or K2?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: You said that you didn't have any comment. Will you please deal with the suggestion that I am going to make to you as to the submission we are going to make to this Committee, that this evidence that Mr Mhlawuli was involved in subversive activities with Mr Goniwe, was a fabrication in order to justify his death, because he happened to be in the car with Mr Goniwe at the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am not party to such a fabrication. I told you what was conveyed to me about Mr Mhlawuli. I told you - you and the Committee.

MR BIZOS: But now, when Du Plessis and Van Zyl came to you and you put your stamp of approval on the elimination of the persons that they were to kill, did you apply your mind as to whether Mr Mhlawuli was one of the persons to be killed if found?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, according to what Mr Du Plessis told me.

MR BIZOS: And you were the person who initiated this operation to your subordinate officers?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You didn't bother ...

MR BOOYENS: Not really Mr Chairman. I think if I understood the evidence correctly, the initiation certainly didn't come from him, he might have conveyed it.

But I think one cannot really say that he initiated it because he said he acted on certain instructions.

MR BIZOS: Well, you conveyed it to your men in the Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Did you feel any responsibility in helping that even with in the parameters in which the Security Police were acting as murderers, that care should be taken that persons even within their own definition, were not killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you not think that before acquiescing in the murder of Mr Mhlawuli, that a reasonable precaution would have been to phone Mr Winter in Cradock?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that is not how I thought.

MR BIZOS: Did you not consider it a reasonable precaution to telephone the Police in Oudtshoorn to ask, to verify any information that may have been put before you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Did you not consider it a reasonable precaution to ask for reports in order to, written reports, and whence they came, in order to ascertain their authenticity or the reliability of the information they contained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't do that. I didn't doubt Mr Du Plessis or the information of his subordinates.

The information was usually confirmed in some way or corroborated in some way, it was normal practice, and I accepted that it was correct.

I accepted that this was correct and that these were the people causing all the trouble.

MR BIZOS: You know, you consider trouble receiving the Ambassador of the United States by the looks of things, or speaking with Mrs Molly Blackburn, sending telegrams wishing people well on May day. That was trouble making?

Was it within your understanding of the instructions and authority that you had, to act illegally, that you could just put to death people that you suspected of trouble making without making any, or taking any reasonable steps to verify the correctness or nature of the information that had been given to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. The information that was available, I didn't doubt. I had no doubt that the people who had collected the intelligence had done so in a proper way, that the information was correct and that they had corroborated it and that they were quite sure that these were the people who were responsible for the situation.

MR BIZOS: Now, we have an affidavit from Mr Winter who says that the name Mhlawuli didn't mean anything to him until after his death. Will you accept that as a correct statement?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know if the contents is correct.

MR BIZOS: On the assumption that it is correct, if he is called, he is going to verify that information, it would appear that neither you, nor Van Zyl, nor Du Plessis, nor Taylor, nor Lotz bothered to speak to the one person that was nearest to the problem in Cradock and who would have been likely to know something about Mr Mhlawuli.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't speak to Mr Winter.

MR BIZOS: No, it would appear that none of your men whom you trusted, took the trouble to verify any information about Mr Mhlawuli, with Mr Winter. Would you accept that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, if you say so. If you say so, then it probably is the way it is.

MR BIZOS: No, I say so on the basis of the affidavit made by Mr Winter, that Mr Mhlawuli's name meant nothing to him.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't speak on Mr Winter's behalf.

MR BIZOS: No, but you can speak on your own account, that you took no reasonable step or no steps whatsoever to find out what sort of man you authorised the killing of, if in fact you did it.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl had to ascertain who the correct people were.

CHAIRPERSON: What would have been the position if they had lied to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I wouldn't have necessarily even have known that they were lying to me, although some of the people that were eliminated, I think there was a lot of information in respect of some of these people, which had been confirmed through and through, which confirmed what they were busy doing.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that the reason why they had to report to you regarding information which they had, so that you could verify it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. I wasn't really in a position to verify, they were in a position to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: What would you have done if Mr Winter had told you that he didn't know Mr Mhlawuli at all?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Then I would have said well, then we would have to look at this person again.

CHAIRPERSON: Then he wouldn't have been killed, isn't that so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know. Maybe there was other information that Mr Winter had at his disposal.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you knew that there was no file on him, those are the facts at this stage. There is no file, I don't know what will appear later in the application, but at this stage it seems that there was absolutely no information regarding Mr Mhlawuli's activities.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I don't know. I can only tell you what I know regarding Mr Mhlawuli.

ADV BOSMAN: Major General, did you discuss any of these names individually when Du Plessis and Van Zyl came to you or did you just refer to them in general?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, when they came back to me, they discussed the names with me, individually.

ADV BOSMAN: Was the name of Mhlawuli significant in the sense that you didn't know much about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My recollection is that I had already become aware of him in respect of allegations that he was sometimes seen in the presence of Mr Goniwe, that he moved around with Mr Goniwe and that Mr Goniwe was actually showing him the ropes as far as the establishment of similar organisations in Oudtshoorn was concerned.

ADV BOSMAN: So you actually asked questions regarding Mr Mhlawuli?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

DR TSOTSI: Did you know these people, these four people who were assassinated before the deed of assassination? Did you know them personally?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't know them personally, I knew about them.

DR TSOTSI: You knew about them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

DR TSOTSI: Did you know that they would be in Port Elizabeth at the time, at the date of their assassination?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.

DR TSOTSI: You didn't know?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

DR TSOTSI: Was it a coincidence that they were all travelling together at the time of the assassination? We have heard that Mr Mhlawuli for instance didn't live in Cradock, he lived somewhere else?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know.

DR TSOTSI: You yourself don't know anything about the execution of the plan to assassinate these men? You personally do not know of the precise arrangements for the assassination of these men?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not the exact elimination.

DR TSOTSI: What did you know actually about the execution of the plan, what actually did you know apart from the fact that Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl reported the matter to Mr Snyman.

Apart from that, what do you know personally about the execution of the plan to assassinate the four men?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Only that after Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis had been to Mr Snyman and they had come back to me, I knew about the method, the modus operandi of the elimination.

There was some discussion regarding that, but I didn't take part to any further extent than that.

DR TSOTSI: What was the modus operandi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: What was discussed was that the elimination should be carried out in such a way that no finger should point in the direction of the Police. That was discussed and it was decided that the murders should be made to look as if it had been carried out by vigilantes or be made to look like a robbery.

DR TSOTSI: Were there in fact any vigilantes operating in the area where these men were killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know. I am not sure of the actual scene where they were killed.

I wasn't then and I am not today, familiar with that area.

DR TSOTSI: Wouldn't vigilantes be operating probably in the (indistinct) area of Port Elizabeth or Cradock or some other place, would they be operating right in the bush somewhere near Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I really didn't know where they operated and where these incidents took place. Geographically speaking, I didn't know.

DR TSOTSI: Would it not have been easier for those men, for your people to carry out their assassination in Cradock, sort of near Port Elizabeth? There was urgency in this desire to have them eliminated and apparently you had to wait for a time when they would all be together in the same car before you could carry out the assassination?

But if there was that urgency, wouldn't it have been easier for you to have these men eliminated somewhere in Cradock or in the vicinity of Cradock?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I was not party to that decision as to where exactly it would be done, and I don't know why that was decided. I don't know why that specific place was decided on.

DR TSOTSI: Do you know who of the men who carried out the assassination, actually knew these Cradock 4 men?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am assuming that they all knew about them, I don't know.

DR TSOTSI: But you can't assume that, I mean it was an important operation, wasn't it where the lives of men were at stake, and you authorised these men to go out and carry out the operation?

And you didn't know whether or not they knew the persons who they were due to assassinate?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't speak for all of them, but I know that Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis knew who these persons were.

DR TSOTSI: Are you satisfied in your own mind that the correct people were assassinated?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I am.

DR TSOTSI: What makes you so sure that they were the correct men, if you didn't know them personally and the men that you sent out to assassinate them, apparently you didn't know whether they knew them or not. What makes you so sure that the correct people were assassinated?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was as a result of information, it was confirmed over and over again that three of these persons in any event, the three Cradock people, that they were responsible for the situation of violence which existed there in Cradock and the vicinity.

DR TSOTSI: Was this confirmed to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, by information.

DR TSOTSI: Through information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

DR TSOTSI: Which you got from whom precisely?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't deal with the informers, there were people who actually dealt with the informers who gave certain information. There was also some monitoring of conversations and of certain meetings which these people held, etc.

DR TSOTSI: Isn't it a fact that you didn't consider it your business to know whether or not the correct people were assassinated?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I think I have already told this Committee earlier, that that is not the case.

DR TSOTSI: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Let us see how objective and reasonable your characterisation of Mr Goniwe as a person responsible for the violence in this area, was and what sort of open mind you had.

Would you please have a look at Exhibit I. I want to read paragraph 2.1 "the matter was at a JMC meeting under the Chairmanship of Minister Adriaan Vlok, the Deputy Minister of Defence and Law and Order, the matter was discussed at this meeting, on the 6th of June 1985. And on instructions of the Chief Director, a special committee was established under the Chairmanship of the Secretariat of the State Security Council to look into the matter of the reappointment and to make recommendations in this regard."

Now, were you aware of the fact that such a committee was recommended on the 6th?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I can't recall that.

MR BIZOS: But how could you who were responsible for the receipt of documentation, for the study in in, for making it known to your colleagues could have been concerned with Mr Goniwe and yet, this very efficient Security Police that we were hearing about, could miss a directive from their Minister?

He was your Deputy Minister?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know what directive you are referring to. I don't know this document.

MR BIZOS: You know what directive I am referring to, a directive by your Minister to establish a committee in order to decide the fate of Mr Goniwe.

How could the person responsible for the receiving of information at the Security Police Headquarters in Port Elizabeth, be ignorant of a recommendation by his Minister in relation to one of the burning issues in the province and the person who was thought by you, to be responsible for violence? How could you have missed it?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think there is a misunderstanding here. That meeting where Vlok presided, if you look at the very top page, you will see it was at Police Headquarters, that is in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: I am not unmindful of that Mr Chairman, I am asking whether this Security Department was such that a recommendation of their Minister could not come to their notice on a burning issue with which they were concerned. That is the question and I submit that it should go through to the witness and that he should be asked to answer it.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That there was such a committee and that these decisions were made, that I don't dispute, but I can't remember - what I can remember is that the reappointment of Mr Goniwe was dealt with by the JMC and it was in fact opposed by them, they were not in favour of that.

MR BIZOS: I can understand that.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that before the decision or after the decision?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: What decision?

CHAIRPERSON: The decision taken at this meeting where Vlok was the Chairman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would have to check that. If I can find a date.

MR BIZOS: I can help you with a date. Your "nooit ooit" document was dated the 23rd of May and it is an Exhibit before the Court.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: The question, I am sorry Mr Chairman, may I? The question is - no I think it is your question.

CHAIRPERSON: In relation to that meeting, the opposition, was that before or after the decision taken at that meeting regarding Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: According to this document I read it was discussed on the 6th of June 1985, that would mean that it was after the JMC discussion if I can put it that way.

Because that was in May.

CHAIRPERSON: What did the Eastern Cape oppose?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The appointment of Mr Goniwe.

CHAIRPERSON: So the Eastern Cape knew about it that Mr Goniwe's reappointment was being considered?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't personally recall whether I knew about it or not.

CHAIRPERSON: What would they then have been opposed to?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Please give me a moment. Yes, it is so they were opposed to his reappointment, so it was definitely discussed on certain levels.

CHAIRPERSON: And the Eastern Cape was aware of that, that there was consideration given to his reappointment and that the matter was discussed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that must have been the case.

MR BIZOS: Document dated 13 June 1985, of which a copy was in the possession of the Deputy Minister S.J. de Beer, reappointment is recommended.

Please have a look at page 3 at the bottom in order to establish the date of this document, 18th of June. Please look at paragraph 2.5. "The local security community in Cradock was continually informed and supported the strategy of reappointment."

How could it be possible that the security establishment in Cradock, which fell under your jurisdiction, which supported the policy of reinstatement, have failed to inform you about its support for it and the information that it received continually in this regard?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I see what is contained here. I cannot comment on it. I don't know anything about it. I can see it here in front of me.

MR BIZOS: How often did you see Mr Winter from the beginning of June to the 27th of June 1985?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I would not be able to respond to that. I can't give an answer.

MR BIZOS: Were you in regular contact with him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not that I can recall.

MR BIZOS: But if you were so concerned about the question of life and death of a number of people, and the epicentre was Cradock, how could you not have been in contact with the Head of the Security Police in Cradock almost on a daily basis?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I was not in regular contact with him.

CHAIRPERSON: We are aware of that, but the question is why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It surely part of my task to be in daily contact with him.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Bizos, can I just pick up here. With whom as a matter of routine, would Major Winter have liaised? One would think that there would have been regular liaison between the Branch and the Headquarters.

With whom according to your office practice, would Major Winter have been in regular liaison?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: With the Commanding Officer.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And if he was not available?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He would have contacted me.

MR BIZOS: And we were told by Mr Van Zyl that they were in contact with Mr Winter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so. That could have happened.

MR BIZOS: You were the second in command and central to this decision to kill people from Cradock. They earned the name Cradock 4 - how could the matters of his reinstatement being recommended, and you remained in ignorance of it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot remember that I ever had any knowledge of this. I accept that he would have discussed this with Mr Snyman, but I cannot confirm anything.

MR BIZOS: If the facts contained in Exhibit H were communicated to you, would you have carried on with the plan of killing the people that you had decided to kill?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If any instruction was given ...

MR BIZOS: It is Exhibit I, it was Exhibit H and I scratched it out. The document headed "the Director General personally", is that the document that you have Exhibit I.

If you had the information on Exhibit I, would you have decided to kill them or would you have allowed the decision to kill them, to be carried out, if this had been brought to your attention?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If it had reached me, that the operation to eliminate Mr Goniwe, had to be stopped as a result of the facts here, then I would have ceased it.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that if any reasonable steps were taken to keep up with what was happening in relation to the fate of Mr Goniwe, you and your fellow officers would have found out?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, no instructions were issued that we should cease this operation.

MR BIZOS: You see, if you have a look at page 2 that part and parcel of this reappointment in terms of paragraph 5.3,

"Mr Goniwe's behaviour would be thoroughly monitored at all times by the members of the Security community."

So your own Security police office was envisaged as having a special task to perform in this reinstatement.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, is that really a fair question. We don't know which Department's memo this is. What we do know, it is apparently not Police because it is Directors and Chief Directors, and in those days the Police had Generals and Brigadiers and those kind of things.

CHAIRPERSON: Who would the security community be?

MR BOOYENS: The security community would in all probability be the Army and the Police Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Including the Security Police?

MR BOOYENS: Yes. The point is this security community which will monitor him at all times, this is some departmental memo between the Director of something and I presume it is Education. But it is between, it is an inter- departmental memo passed around between the members of that department.

Surely it is stretching it a bit to expect that apart from the absolute absurdity of somebody being monitored for every minute of the day, I think it is stretching it a bit in expecting the Police to answer on that one.

CHAIRPERSON: Has been done before?

MR BOOYENS: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I don't know what to do with that objection, other than to say that it has to be read together with Exhibit H, which is from the Secretariat of the State Security Council.

I would have thought that the Security Police of Port Elizabeth would consider themselves as a body subordinate to that body, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, Exhibit I is after all referred to in Exhibit H.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, exactly Mr Chairman, but at this stage we cannot forget that what appears on page 4 of Exhibit I. This was not a foregone conclusion, this is at the stage when this is doing the rounds, it is an inter-departmental memo to a committee who still made a recommendation to a Minister that hasn't even been approved.

So this is still paper work flowing around in those portals of power up in Pretoria.

ADV POTGIETER: And it seems as if even before the Minister could actually decide, the issue was settled?

The subject of the enquiry ...

MR BOOYENS: I was just going to say I wouldn't like to put it like that, but I get your drift. I agree with Mr Potgieter.

ADV POTGIETER: So it looks as if the Minister did not have time to apply his mind to this?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, well, that is apparently what it says. My objection is to my learned friend is going a bit too far. If you are monitoring somebody, if they are monitoring somebody with the intention of assassinating him, you are not in all probability going to ask the Department of Education and find out what is written in their inter-departmental memos, really Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's deal if I may with the witness Mr Chairman. Let's deal with this argumentative objection General.

Doesn't it amount to this that you had decided to sentence Mr Goniwe to death and was busy making preparations to carry it out, whilst an appeal process was going on in order that the warrant should be set aside? Isn't that what it amounts to if my learned friend wants to argue it, that steps were taken to reinstate him as a teacher and we know that corpses don't teach.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, all that I can say in response to that is that I was given certain instructions by Mr Snyman and evidently he had received instructions from elsewhere to launch such an operation.

This is what we initiated and up until the elimination of these persons, no instruction was issued to cease this operation.

MR BIZOS: But you see the other aspect of this objection, this argumentative objection is that whilst you, Snyman, Van Zyl, Du Plessis and two others were busy preparing to carry out the death sentence, your Commissioner, the Commissioner of Police, suggests that Goniwe be reappointed in an educational position in Cradock.

That is on page 8 of Exhibit H Mr Chairman. And no conditions apart from the basic conditions of employment in Education, be applied.

So on the assumption that there may be something in your counsel's objection in relation to departmental matters ...

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, sorry, I must object again. Exhibit H, unless it is a mistaken reference, Exhibit H does not appear to be a letter by the Commissioner of Police.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry it is from the Secretariat.

MR BOOYENS: The Secretariat of the Security Council.

MR BIZOS: From the Secretariat, I am sorry I said from the Commission, yes, I am sorry. But the Secretariat suggests that - and if we have a look at Exhibit K, paragraph 16

"Conditional reappointment of Goniwe in his position as teacher, the opinion is that this option definitely holds certain merits, provided that the conditions include the following: Goniwe would undertake in writing to resign from the UDF and Cradora"

and so on and then again an alternative on page 7 and in paragraph 20 -

"A restriction in Cradock would appear under the circumstances to be the desirable step. If his behaviour complies with the requirements of the law, which would be determined by the Director of Security Legislation ..."

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect to my learned friend once again, none of these paragraphs are recommendations, they are discussion.

The one, the closest we get to anything, and that is not even put as strong as a recommendation, is paragraph 21, that says it looks between conditional reappointment and the conditional reappointment has already been qualified in the previous paragraph or a restriction, group (b) restriction in terms of the Security Legislation, but nowhere, the Commissioner doesn't get so far as to make a recommendation really.

CHAIRPERSON: In reality I think what Mr Bizos is asking about, is the awareness of those who were party to arranging the death of the deceased, rather than whether this was an order or a discussion or a decision. Unless, I've lost Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Whether or not these are recommendations or conditional recommendations, if it had come to your notice that the process was being conducted in order to reappoint him as a teacher by your superiors, would you have continued with the plans to kill him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If I understand you correctly, then you mean that if my superiors had informed me of these decisions which still had to be made, and that we had to cease the operation, I would have ceased the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us put it this way, if it had come to your attention that a possibility existed that Mr Goniwe would have been reappointed, what would your position have been regarding the execution of the plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is difficult to say because an instruction had been received from Colonel Snyman, I had received this instruction.

If Colonel Snyman had at any stage returned to me and said that this operation had to be ceased because negotiations were underway regarding the reappointment of Mr Goniwe and so forth, and that we should cease the operation, I would have ceased it.

ADV POTGIETER: Or would you have returned to Mr Snyman if that information came to your attention?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would probably have.

MR BIZOS: Do you say that the statement, Exhibit I.2.5, the "local security community in Cradock has been continually informed, and supports the strategy for reappointment", is that correct or incorrect statement?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I do not know whether or not it is correct. I cannot recall any knowledge of this.

MR BIZOS: If you had kept proper communication with Cradock, or had asked them like you ask the Governor before a sentence is executed, the Governor or the President at the last minute, if you had asked Cradock who were likely to know what was happening, these lives would have been saved?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot speculate on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why can you not speculate on that, if Mr Winter had told you Mr Van Rensburg, I, Winter have received information regarding the reappointment of Goniwe in his position, what would you have then done?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would have consulted Mr Snyman with regard to this.

ADV BOSMAN: Might I ask it in this manner. Would you have expected from Winter, if he had received information regarding Goniwe's reappointment, would you have expected of him to hand over this information to Port Elizabeth, because Goniwe was the thorn in the side of the security community.

Surely you would have wanted him to tell you that they were thinking of reappointing Goniwe.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I would have expected that he would have discussed this with Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: Now, the Exhibit of the 23rd of June, Exhibit C, which expresses this very strong view of the GBS, that "never ever" must Goniwe be reappointed, shows that there was discussion at the GBS, was there not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it indicates that.

MR BIZOS: And for it to be so strongly expressed, somebody at the GBS must have expressed the view that serious consideration is being given to reappointing Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It may be so.

MR BIZOS: Well, otherwise it wouldn't have been a subject matter at the GBS?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can only speculate that that could have been a possibility.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well there is a difference between speculation and inference. Isn't the inference very clear that somebody was pushing for Mr Goniwe's reappointment?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That impression was created.

MR BIZOS: Right, now you received the minutes of the GBS, didn't you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And you would have been the one responsible, even if you were not at the meeting, to read them, take notice of their contents?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir the minutes of the JMC were kept by Mr Snyman in his office, as far as I can recall, in the steel cabinets.

MR BIZOS: But you had access to them, and you had to keep yourself informed of their contents, because you were a sort of alternative delegate to the JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, if it was necessary, that would have been the case.

MR BIZOS: Did you bother to find out who were the people who were moving for his reinstatement?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can deduce, it had to have been the Department of Education and Training.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And were you aware that the Department of Education and Training considered it so important a matter, that it sent its Director-General to Cradock in order to try and investigate the feasibility of the proposal?

Was that reported to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot remember that.

MR BIZOS: You know, would it not be strange if such an important step in relation to the future of Cradock, the safety of the country, the fate of Mr Goniwe, was going on at such a high level that the Director-General of the Department of Education take the trouble to go to Cradock, and the all powerful and so well informed Security Police in Port Elizabeth, under whose jurisdiction was, remained ignorant of the fact?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not argue that Mr Strydom was there and that a meeting was held, but I cannot call this up from memory.

MR BIZOS: Well, if I were to put to you that one can infer despite your lack of memory, that you must have known about it, would you quarrel with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is possible that I knew of this, but I cannot recall.

MR BIZOS: And did you know right up to the time of the fateful day of the 27th of June, as far as Mr Goniwe and his colleagues were concerned, that this process of trying to have him reinstated, was still going on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: All that I can clearly recall is that Mr Snyman at more than one occasion told me that there was a lack of decision regarding those who wanted to reappoint this man and those who were opposed to his reappointment, and that is basically all that I have knowledge I have of this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: But you knew that the Eastern Cape opposed this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so.

MR BIZOS: Well, if I may qualify your answer in answer to the Chairman's question, the Security Police in the Eastern Cape, we are not suggesting that the people of the Eastern Cape were against it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Let us say rather the JMC, not the people of the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now from your answer, can we infer that you were not - you had no knowledge that the people pushing for his reinstatement, had given up? You thought that that was still going on at a high level?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would not be able to deny this. As far as I know it was an on going matter which as far as I was concerned, the parties concerned could not reach a decision.

MR BIZOS: Who were the parties who could not reach a decision?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am assuming that it was the authorities in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: And the authorities in Pretoria consisted of the Minister of Police, the Minister of Law and Order and the Minister of Education, and there was a debate going on at the very high level as to whether he should be reinstated or not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is the impression that I received, I did not know exactly what they were occupied with or who would take the decision.

But there was just - no decision ever reached us.

MR BIZOS: But what we do know, is that it reached what the proposal, that there was serious proposal reached the office of the Commissioner of Police?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, if you are referring to a document which I have seen, then yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it was shown to you a short while ago.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: It received, now and he made certain proposals if not recommendations. I am only interested that it establishes the fact that he knew about these proposals made that he should be reinstated?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The Commissioner?

MR BIZOS: The Commissioner yes.

How did it happen that the Commissioner had knowledge of this and that the Chief of the Security Police in the Eastern Cape did not know about this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I have absolutely no knowledge of that.

MR BIZOS: But how could the Commissioner of Police deal with the matter in the manner in which he did, in Exhibit K without an input from the Security Police from Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I do not know whether or not he received input from the Security Police Branch in Port Elizabeth, I cannot say whether or not it was like that.

MR BIZOS: Now, you see again what we are busy with is whether you can be believed when you say that you did not know. Can you explain how it might have got to the Commissioner of Police who was so derelict in his duty, that in not asking the Security Police in Port Elizabeth where the "brandpunt" was, men what do you think of this situation"

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am sorry but I cannot answer your question.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well the answer must of necessity be that it was so improbable that all these decisions and recommendations and expectations of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth, would have taken place without you being made aware of what was going on. Any comment from you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir, I have already told you that I have no knowledge regarding the meeting in Pretoria. I do not know whether or not input was delivered from Port Elizabeth, I do not know.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Rensburg, if an input was sent from Port Elizabeth, then that correspondence would have travelled through your office?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not necessarily.

ADV POTGIETER: Unless I heard you incorrectly, when you explained what your tasks were, is it not true that all correspondence which reached your division, actually was delivered to you and that you distributed it to the other persons in the division.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, that was the normal procedure, but there were many instances where there were pieces which came from Head Office which was delivered personally or addressed personally to Colonel Snyman as the Commanding Officer.

There were times when I wasn't in my office, where people took post to Colonel Snyman if he was available. There were other instances where the person who opened the post, had to use his discretion to decide whether or not a piece had to go directly to Colonel Snyman.

I have already explained what my position was, but there were many other instances where the post did not necessarily reached my hands.

MR BIZOS: I thought that you were primarily responsible for opening the post as you told us, and classifying it and handing it over. How could it possibly have happened on this issue, that you didn't open any post relating to this matter for the whole month of June or practically the whole of the month of June?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir, I did not say that. What I am saying is that I didn't open the post myself. There was another member who dealt with that, he opened it and stamped a date onto it, and he could use his discretion and send certain things directly the Commanding Officer.

Other items he would place on my desk and I would make decisions regarding those items. There were also other items which were addressed only to Mr Snyman, which he opened privately.

That is how the system worked.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, if you could tell me, you were second in command, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Under Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What would have happened if there was an issue or an item to be dealt with and he was not available? Would it not then have been deferred to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume, correct me if I am wrong, that everything that occurred in the office had to be communicated to you by him, so that you could be updated regarding what the situation was if he was not available.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was not the most perfect manner, but it simply wasn't possible. He accepted that if something arrived, that I would have to refer to the file and determine what had happened beforehand, especially regarding JMC matters.

CHAIRPERSON: You see what concerns me Mr Van Rensburg, is that on this whole issue of Goniwe, it seems that the Port Elizabeth Branch of the Security Police, were completely left out on all the other possibilities other than killing him. Do you agree with me?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I would not agree with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Because nobody can tell us about their knowledge of the possibility of his reappointment as a teacher or a principal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would not say that. I stated that no final decisions or instructions were issued. Mr Snyman told me that decisions had to be made about a number of factors, and that options were being considered, but no feedback had been received, no decision had been made.

CHAIRPERSON: Regardless of whether or not there had been a decision, did you not deem it necessary to find out what the position was before the decision was taken to kill these people?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, Colonel Snyman stated expressly that this operation had to not be continued with, before it had been cleared up with him finally.

I accepted that if there was anything that would deter the planning, he would have informed us thereof.

MR BIZOS: You have already told us that if you knew that the steps were going on, you would have stopped the planning and the killing would not have taken place.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I have stated that if Mr Snyman had informed me otherwise, I would have ceased the operation.

MR BIZOS: If you knew that the weight of opinion was against your "nooit ooit" opinion expressed on the 23rd of May, how would you have felt about these people sitting in Pretoria, not giving sufficient weight to your opinion?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I was not in a position to veto the decisions of the higher authority or express my opinion, or to do something about it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, you couldn't do it by passing a resolution, but you could do it with bullets, surreptitiously and put the blame on others and you would have achieved the same result? Isn't that what happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I told you that a order was issued and that it was executed.

MR BIZOS: What did you think what do you think in your frame of mind in 1985, would have happened if Goniwe was appointed to teach at Cradock as suggested by the Geldenhuys Committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: What would have happened in Cradock?

MR BIZOS: Yes, about the security of the people of the Eastern Province that you were supposed to protect? What did you think would happen?

Well, let me give you two options, would the security situation have improved or would the matter have become worse?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: You are asking me to speculate. In as far as the security activities were concerned, I don't think he would have stopped it. If I had to speculate on that.

CHAIRPERSON: But is that not the reason why these people were killed in an attempt to improve the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: So how could you provide your previous answer, it doesn't make sense?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I also don't understand what Mr Bizos is trying to ask me.

MR BIZOS: If I may, what I am asking you to say is if you had been informed of the Geldenhuys Commission recommendation which was unanimous and you thought that the Ministers would approve of it, how would you have felt - you don't have to speculate - how would you have felt the security of the area you were to protect, would be affected?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as the education field is concerned, he was appointed as a teacher, and I would have expected that it would then function normally again.

But as far as his other activities were concerned, I can only speculate on that, but I believed he would not have ceased those activities.

MR BIZOS: So, you thought that death was an answer, reinstatement was not an answer to the problems of the Eastern Cape?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't see it in those terms, or in that context, I didn't make my decision in that context. What I was concerned with was what he was busy doing on the security level, not so much the educational area.

ADV BOSMAN: May I just come in here again. Put a little more simply Mr Van Rensburg - if there had been a meeting and you were asked to vote to say whether Goniwe should be reappointed or should we eliminate Goniwe, with all the information at that time, what option would you have voted for in 1985?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would have voted for elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, can we take the adjournment on that note?

MR BIZOS: Thank you.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (conts)

Major General, would you please turn to page 25 of your own application, page 25 the last paragraph on that page. "Major Du Plessis, who was the Unit Commanding Officer concerned with black affairs, by means of the intensified JMC action, gathered intelligence surrounding the identified and prioritised leaders which indicated that the political activists of Cradora, namely M. Goniwe, F. Calata, S. Mkonto as well as a further activist whose name was S. Mhlawuli posed a very serious threat to the constitutional dispensation since they were engaged in inflammatory activities which brought about total chaos in the Eastern Cape including the rural areas and the Southwestern districts, which would also lead to an unnecessary loss of life and damaging of property."

Do you confirm that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And particularly the first part that this information came from the sharpened JMC action in relation to information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And this is repeated in a sense by the applicant Du Plessis, would you please turn to page 59 of the application volume?

"He says by means of the intensified JMC conduct regarding the identified and prioritised leaders, I gathered information which indicated that the political activists of Cradora, namely Goniwe, Calata, Mkonto as well as a further activist by the name of Mhlawuli, posed a very serious threat for the constitutional dispensation, etc, etc".

Do you agree that that is how you understood that the information came from the sharpened JMC information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: And if you have a look at the bottom of page 59 "the operation and possible elimination of the Cradock 4 had already been discussed at previous occasions in the so-called security community, but the particulars and dates of these discussions are not known at this stage.

I was part of the overall planning of the operation, as a result of the fact that I in cooperation with Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg, had coordinated information in respect of the political activists and I was familiar with the total threat in the Eastern Cape at that stage."

Now I want to ask you as a result of this information that was furnished to the Committee under oath, whether that clearly indicates that the persons that you referred to as "Cradock 4", the question was discussed at JMC meetings, and the information available to the JMC was made available to you when you decided to recommend the elimination of these persons?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know about any information which the JMC gave to us and that we reacted on information coming from the JMC.

MR BIZOS: Well, but your own statement at the bottom of page 25 "by means of the intensified JMC actions to gather intelligence relating to these identified leaders", doesn't that mean anything that it came from the JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think what I tried to convey here was that as a result of the JMC, their concern regarding the situation, there was a request that there be an intensified or stepped up action as far as the gathering of information was concerned, to see if more information couldn't be obtained.

MR BIZOS: No, don't write an editorial on your statement, just read what you said. And read if you want to, if you have any difficulty and you want clarity, what Du Plessis said, that this was as a result of information received from the JMC. That is what it says.

MR BOOYENS: With respect, it is not what it says. He refers to "sharpened JMC actions." If my learned friend would look back at page 24, you would see what the sharpened JMC actions are.

MR BIZOS: I submit that the question should go to the witness. This is an explanation that the witness can give as to what he meant, I am putting what I suggest he meant and I want from the witness what he says, he meant Mr Chairman.

The witness can give any explanation that my learned friend thinks that he may give.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Van Rensburg?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As I said, as a result of the concern which existed in JMC circles regarding this threat, there was the request that actions and activities be stepped up as far as intelligence gathering was concerned so that certain things could be ascertained, such as those listed from 1 to 4.

And from this information, a total picture could be formed of who was responsible for the unrest and political violence in the Eastern Cape. Political activists were identified as well as prioritised after this.

The objective at this stage was in respect of these identified and prioritised activists, to restrict them using legal means and to restrict them to the best of the Security Branch's abilities.

It however, became clear for the reasons mentioned, that the anarchy, violence only escalated and it was common cause that the situation required urgent and drastic actions.

MR BIZOS: Please turn to page 59. "I by means of the stepped up JMC activities obtained information regarding the identified and prioritised leaders. By means of this intensified JMC conduct or action", what does that mean?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: This is not my statement, but I am interpreting that to mean that as a result of the request from the JMC, Mr Du Plessis and his men, obtained further information regarding these leaders, they identified and prioritised them and that they came to certain conclusions.

MR BIZOS: Was the question of Goniwe and his cohorts discussed at JMC meetings months before they were killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as far as I remember yes.

MR BIZOS: Were they discussed as a result of reports - did you learn about that discussion as a result of reports given to you by Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, and perhaps I also attended one or two of these meetings myself.

MR BIZOS: Were the four persons discussed at the meetings that you were at or which were reported on to you by Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't remember which persons - I can remember that Goniwe, Calata and Mkonto, that these gentlemen were discussed. I can't recall Mr Mhlawuli's name from that period.

I can't remember whether he was discussed or not.

MR BIZOS: But you see, I am going to suggest to you that these applications were prepared without having strict regard to the truth, because you talk about the Cradock 4 in a loose sort of a way.

You say you had not heard of Mr Mhlawuli. But what about Mr Mkonto, was he discussed at the JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. It is difficult to remember whether he was specifically discussed, it is very possible. Whether he was mentioned by name, I can't recall, I am not sure. I can't state something if I am not sure about it. It may have been the case that Goniwe and his cohorts were referred to, referring to these people.

MR BIZOS: And to be branded as a cowart, was enough to be killed without actually identifying the people.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't think that is what I said.

MR BIZOS: But now, Mr Mhlawuli was apparently in terms of your affidavits - once you found out that he was not a Cradock person, a newcomer, but would Mr Mkonto be one of the permanent people in Cradock and would he have been discussed at the JMC meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would expect that to have been the case.

MR BIZOS: Because he was one of the top Lieutenants of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And one would have expected that his name and Calata's name, as the top Lieutenants', would have been well known to everyone concerned with the security of the State at JMC meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would expect so.

MR BIZOS: Now, according to an affidavit by Christopher Pierre van der Westhuizen, the Chairman of the Eastern Province JMC, the person who signed that signal, I ask for leave to hand that in as an Exhibit Mr Chairman, it will be Exhibit R.

Before referring you to this document, can you please tell us how often did the JMC meet?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think, and I am not very sure, I would say about once a week.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I was distracted, did you say once a week?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think so, but I am not sure.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And the Joint Operation Centres, how often did they meet?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I remember or understand the JOC, JOC was put into operation when there was rioting or unrest and the JOC actually functioned along the lines of an operational room, ops room, which was constantly manned by certain people.

MR BIZOS: And the mini-JMC's, how often did they meet?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am not sure. I think that would depend on circumstances in the various mini-JMC areas.

MR BIZOS: When according to you Mr Mhlawuli came into the area and he was identified as a result of the sharpened gathering of information, if he was the dangerous person that deserved to be sentenced to death, surely his name would have come forward in one or other of the JMC meetings or sub-committees?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know, I suppose that would have been the case.

MR BIZOS: Yes, if in fact his name does not appear anywhere in any of those meetings, the likelihood of you telling the truth as to what you believed him to be, becomes even more remote?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't say that. All information regarding these matters wasn't always conveyed to the Security Branch by the JMC.

MR BIZOS: But there was a heavy responsibility was there not, on Brigadier van der Westhuizen, for the safety of the area and any newcomer into the area and any spreading of the unrest, would have been a matter of serious concern to him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I suppose so. I don't think that was always the case with names, I think information about activities broadly speaking, or by any intensified onslaughts, yes.

But we didn't always give information in respect of all persons involved.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you know, this EP JMC was a body containing so many persons, surely if a dangerous person found himself in your area, you would mention his name for the purposes of one or other of the people there supplying information and coordinating the information and getting even more information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It didn't always worked that way as far as I can remember.

MR BIZOS: Well, if you turn to the last page of Exhibit R, you will see the last four lines of his statement

"In summary I deny categorically that I had anything whatsoever to do with the death of Goniwe, Fort - He didn't even know his name properly, but Sparrow Mkonto and Cicelo Mhlawuli. The last-mentioned two persons were unknown to me."

Would you accept the correctness of that statement, that is that it was unknown, not the first part that he had anything to do with it? That the two persons were unknown to him, would you accept that as a correct statement?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't vouch for the correctness or otherwise of this statement.

MR BIZOS: But you have no reason to doubt it? Have you any reason to doubt it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know whether the statement is actually telling the truth or not.

MR BIZOS: Well, on the assumption that he is telling the truth, and your counsel may consider calling him if he challenges it, on the assumption that he is telling the truth, it would appear that Sparrow Mkonto was not of such a high profile to be known by the Chairman of the JMC, the body that was responsible for the safety of this area?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know whether he knew or didn't, or whether he simply forgot. I really can't comment on this statement of Brigadier Van der Westhuizen, and on the knowledge or otherwise that he had.

MR BIZOS: He was not even on the signal that was sent, his name was not even on the signal that he was sent?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did not know anything about that signal.

MR BIZOS: Has it occurred to you that your subjective opinion about the danger that Mr Mkonto held for the security of the State was exaggerated and that only you and your small group of Security Policemen were concerned, if the Chairman of the JMC did not know anything about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We would never have killed people simply for the sake of killing. We were in a situation of war and we had to try to the best of our ability, to prevent this war or revolution escalating to a violent overthrow of the government by the communists and their allies.

And to be able to do that in certain areas, that is why this decision was taken. That is why the decision was taken to actually execute this plan.

MR BIZOS: That was your subjective opinion, what I am asking you in relation to Mr Mkonto is that he was not even known to the Chairman of the EP JMC, how dangerous could he have been?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't speculate on that as to whether he was known to the JMC or not or whether his name had been mentioned or not.

But for us in the then Security Branch, he was a prominent figure.

MR BIZOS: Was this the period during which Security Policemen thought that they knew better than anyone else and they would decide for themselves what was good for the country irrespective of the views of others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: In relation to your knowledge of whether or not this question was pending, the question as to whether Mr Goniwe was to be reinstated or not, I would like to hand in the minutes, Mr Chairman, we made reference to it before, but haven't handed it in.

The meeting of the 23rd of May 1985. It will be Exhibit S, and will you note that on the first page, Colonel H. Snyman, representing the South African Police - does "V" stand for "Veiligheid"? Just have a look at it.

MR BOOYENS: Let's just have the document first please.

MR BIZOS: Mr Snyman's name, do you see it there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I see his name.

MR BIZOS: Please have a look at page 13, "there would still be demanded that Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata be reappointed."

MR BOOYENS: Sorry, I think our pages are different, which paragraph Mr Chairman?

MR BIZOS: It is paragraph 16, it is a thick 19 on the Exhibit. Does that accord with your information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: Please turn over the page - 20, paragraph 26.

"EP JMC recommendation, a signal. I am sorry I can't make the word out on my copy - will be sent to the SCR to be sent through as well to the relevant Ministers. Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata should never ever again be reappointed".

Now, did you ever, was this reported to you that this was resolved by the EP JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think so.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever receive a response from either the Minister or the SSVR or anyone in higher authority to say that this matter had been decided one way or the other?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not that I can remember today.

MR BIZOS: So for anybody that kept the record in mind, the matter of the reappointment or not, was still pending?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can remember, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And then in relation to what the purpose of the SSVR was, I want to put in as an Exhibit, the affidavit of Adamus Paulos Stemmet as Exhibit T. This too, Mr Chairman, comes from the inquest file.

I am going to read this into the record and ask you to comment on it.

"During 1985, I was the Head of the Strategic Communication Branch of the Secretariat of the Security Branch. As a result of this position, I was asked to explain the various minutes and other documents of the National Security Management System, a list of the minutes and documents is included.

During 1985, there was a situation of unrest in the country, especially in the Eastern Cape, which resulted in the announcement of a state of emergency.

The gravity of the situation can be seen in the documents which will be discussed in this. The school unrest was especially alarming. Of all the areas, it was probably the worst in the Eastern Cape. Minutes taken from the EP JMC indicates the regional management of the system.

The major body on regional level was the JMC, Joint Management Centre. Under the JMC, there were various sub-committees such as the JOC which coordinated security actions and dealt with urgent matters or matters which could not wait for JMC meetings.

In the case of the meetings of the EP JMC, the school situation was a matter of great concern, and as a result there were frequent discussions held regarding this".

Paragraph 6 of Exhibit T,

"The JMC was a coordinating body among various departments. Departments had to liaise directly with their Head Offices in cases where more than one department was involved or where there were differences between departments which could not be clarified on JMC level, the SCR would also be informed and the assistance of the SCR could also be enlisted in order to help solve problems, or provide advice.

In such cases the SSC fulfilled a role of facilitation between departments. The decision to send a signal to the SSC, as contained in paragraph 26 of the EP JMC meeting of the 23rd of May 1989, was thus an example of the usual practice and communication channels."

Mr Chairman, that is the document we would suggest which is referred to as Exhibit C. It refers to a document, the never ever, we would suggest that that is what it refers to.

"At the meeting of the action committee on 6th of June 1985, Mr Strydom from Education and Training, submitted a report regarding his interview with Matthew Goniwe and the situation in Cradock, and as a result thereof, the matter was referred to a committee under the leadership of the SSC. The JMC was developing at that stage from a pure planning committee to one which eventually would coordinate security action on the lowest level. There was close cooperation between the JMC and the SSC because the same persons would frequently participate in both.

The latter body had a chiefly planning role. The Goniwe matter was discussed in a working group under the SSC. Such a working group normally did not take minutes, but dealt with inputs and concept documents. This working group's recommendation were sent to the Chairperson of the JMC for channelling probably to the interested or relevant departments.

It is confirmed by the fact that both Education and Training and South African Police officials completed documents or assignments regarding the document for the attention of their Ministers. Copies of the documents are also contained in these pieces referred to Education and Training documents of the 9th of the 1st, 915, which was set out during June 1985, and the South African Police documents, S.4/43680, dated 25 June 1985 entitled the recommended action taken against Matthew Goniwe, both documents sketched possible options from departmental viewpoints.

The above indicates channels which were followed to achieve the documents which were set out for the Ministers. Before final decisions were taken, Goniwe had passed away."

This was nothing new, this was a formal procedure that was to be adopted whenever there were departmental differences?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You knew from towards the end of May that there were departmental differences which were sent to this SSVR, in order to facilitate the differences of opinion in the two departments?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And once you knew that and you knew that this conflict had not been resolved, why did you not postpone or abort the plan that you had hatched in order to kill Goniwe and his friends?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, these recommendations and the decisions which had to be taken, had to do with Educational matters and not necessarily with national security.

We carried out an instruction in terms of a decision which was taken on the basis of national security.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, that cannot be correct. Exhibit S is the minutes of a meeting at which mostly Security Officials were present and it was decided during that meeting to take action regarding Mr Goniwe.

Or at least no decision was taken, but he was discussed? Is this not so, and I also see on page 20 number 26(b), a decision was taken regarding 248 former students. So it is not actually correct that the Goniwe matter was or could be referred to as strictly an Educational matter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I am not saying that it was restricted to the Department of Education and that it was their duty to attend to it, but the appointments or reappointment or non-appointment had to do with his capacity as a teacher and not as an individual who posed a serious threat to the dispensation.

MR BIZOS: You know, General, the logic of that answer is not worthy of a standard 2 child.

Are you suggesting that the Secretariat of the Security Council should appoint a committee consisting of Generals, Brigadiers and top Educationists as to what should happen to Goniwe, and that you could solve their problem by killing him without any reference to them? That is what you said?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, what did you mean by this answer that you gave?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I stated that that body and those people who were taking decisions, did so surrounding Mr Goniwe as a teacher. That is the only inference that I can make.

They were not taking decisions regarding him as a threat to the State.

MR BIZOS: But your own Commissioner of Police made recommendations in relation to the circumstances under which he should be reappointed and what steps should be taken in order to avoid any security dangers, General?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot make a statement regarding what the Commissioner decided, that is how I understood the situation.

MR BIZOS: But you say that this Committee had nothing to do or rather, your decision to kill Goniwe was something quite apart about the top, the Secretariat of the Security Council deciding that the security of the State may be better served by reappointing him as a school teacher, and thereby stopping the school boycotts and thereby creating a climate of peace in the area.

You say that the one had nothing to do with the other. That you could act from the security point of view and whilst they were debating whether he was a good teacher or not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that is not what I am saying.

MR BIZOS: But that is what it means.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Just allow me to answer. I am saying that is what was decided there. If I look at the documents, I understand that the decision was about his appointment, or reappointment in order to rectify the situation regarding education.

Whether he would have been appointed or not, to me was a matter which had not achieved finality and the serious point which must be addressed here, the point whether he would be appointed or reappointed, would not have put an end to his political activities.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that his reappointment as a teacher, had nothing to do with his political activities?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, basically that is so.

MR BIZOS: Look at Exhibit G. Major General of the Air Force, who was in the Security Council Secretariat, says paragraph 4

"Surrounding Mr Goniwe, there was a potential clash of interests" between the department of Education and Training on the one hand, and the security community on the other hand.

Mr Goniwe was dismissed from his teaching post and the Department of Education and Training, wanted to reappoint him to his position in order to defuse the situation of unrest.

The security community's viewpoint was that the same objective could be achieved by detaining Mr Goniwe for an indefinite time."

We will assume that the later General of the Air Force didn't know of the option being prepared by you to kill him, but how can you say that they were separate issues?

We are waiting for an answer General.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I am concerned, and as far as I understood it, they were two different issues which did connect with one another.

But the matter that was of importance to us was that the actions that these people were taking to topple the government of the day.

MR BIZOS: Oh, now let me just see. If you consider their conduct and what they were trying to do, irrelevant, does it follow that you would have allowed the plan to be carried into effect and have them killed, even though you had detailed information as to what they were busy doing at the offices of the Secretariat of the Security Council?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, could you repeat the question. I do not have clarity regarding the question.

MR BIZOS: If what you tell us is true, that the two were separate issues, you would have continued with the plan to kill Goniwe and his friends, even if you knew in detail what they were discussing in Pretoria?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: So that you took it upon yourself in Port Elizabeth to decide for yourselves what was good for the country and it didn't matter what the Secretariat of the Security Council said?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, with regard to the instruction that I received, I agreed with it and I participated in the planning and execution thereof, and I would have taken this action regardless what had been decided, unless I had received an instruction to cease the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: So even though you didn't agree with it, you would have executed it, because it was an instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct. And also in my opinion, it offered a possible solution to the situation which had been created.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that I understand, but even if you hadn't agreed with it, would you have carried it out because it was an instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: If you knew that the matter was pending before the Secretariat of the Security Council, would you not have considered that process as countermanding any order that may have come from some person that Mr Snyman hadn't told you about?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can only say that I would have expected him to have informed me if there was any change in the plans.

MR BIZOS: You didn't get the - you are not coming to terms with the question. You thought that Mr Snyman had got an order from somewhere?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you consider as a then Colonel and now General, that this process if you knew about it, this process would have been a countermanding of any order that may have been given to Mr Snyman to be transmitted to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am still not clear on what you are asking of me.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me put it this way, if you had to choose between an order from the Secretariat and an order from Colonel Snyman, which one would you follow?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Between the Secretariat and who?

CHAIRPERSON: Snyman. Is that right?

MR BIZOS: That is bringing it down to its basic elements, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I would have followed the order from Mr Snyman.

MR BIZOS: Why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Because I accepted that he had received this order from some upper level and that it was an order which had to do with security activities, and that it had to be carried out.

MR BIZOS: But did you consider murder as something so light that you would take the suggestion of your immediate superior officer on the basis that he may have got authority from someone else, even though you had information that some higher organ of State, was doing something inconsistent with that order that you thought had been given?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, during that war situation that we found ourselves in, we were placed in a position by politicians from all sides, where we had to win the struggle at all sides, so therefore my answer is yes.

MR BIZOS: I can understand that in the field conditions of the war that you may have to immediately obey an order, but you had been on Mr Goniwe's tail as far back as 1984, had you not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: If you knew that this process was going on, why would you have followed Snyman's order and not delay for clarification once you knew that a process going up to higher authority, had been started on the 23rd of May and you did not know whether or not it had been completed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, in my opinion the decision as to whether it would be an appointment or no appointment, would not have solved the problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, would it be a convenient time to take a ten minute break?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.o.u.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (conts)

You told us that the name Mkonto was well known to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: As one of the close Lieutenants of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And that this was known to you way from the start when you started paying attention to Mr Goniwe from the beginning of 1984?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think so. I think so, I can't remember specifically as from what date, but I will accept that.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And you considered him one of the close Lieutenants?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Mhlawuli, when did his name come to your notice for the first time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't say for certain when I became of him.

MR BIZOS: Would that also have been in 1984?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is possible, but I can't say that with certainty.

MR BIZOS: When you made this momentous decision to sentence him to death, you were satisfied that he was a high profile activist who had been a Lieutenant of Mr Goniwe for some time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that was the information conveyed to me.

MR BIZOS: And a high powered UDF affiliated activists really started from August 1983 when the UDF was formed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I will accept that. I am not exactly sure of the dates.

MR BIZOS: You assumed when you made the decision that Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlawuli should die, you assumed that they had been Lieutenants of long standing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And dangerous Lieutenants at that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And that information would of necessity have come in various ways, but more particularly as a result of the monitoring that was done in Cradock?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, will accept that, Cradock and elsewhere.

MR BIZOS: Yes, elsewhere as well, but there was not better place, because there it was a small area, it had its mini-JMC, it had the technical means of surveillance and people to transcribe what was said on the telephone, it was properly equipped investigation centre in stead of the rather - because it was Cradock because the thorn in your flesh, Mr high powered Goniwe, agitator and activist in your words, came from there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: But now you see I am going to suggest to you that both in relation to Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlawuli, an exaggerated case of their importance has been made in the case of Mr Mkonto - completely exaggerated case, and a false case in the case of Mr Mhlawuli, and I will tell you why.

Mr Chairman, I want to hand in what purports to be a comprehensive report of the National Security Management System of the Cradock mini-JMC, which deals for the period 1983 to February 1985.

Let me at the outset put to you the importance of this document for what it does not contain. Firstly that I am assured by Mr Clive Plasket of the Legal Resources Centre up to the beginning of this year, and the University of Rhodes as from the beginning of this year, who studied this document, and he assures me that the names of Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlawuli don't appear at all in this document drawn by Commandant Marais of the Cradock JMC.

You can satisfy yourself whether this is so or not, you can accept my assurance if you want to, because I want to ask you a couple of questions on the assumption that that proposition is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, it is a pity my learned friend didn't give this to us before the adjournment, because this is some 20 pages I guess, 15.

MR BIZOS: Again, Mr Chairman, I didn't pull it out of my sleeve, it is part of the official record which has been filed with the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, the nature of the questions that you intend dealing with out of this document, are you going to refer to specific paragraphs?

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I can't hear Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The questions you intend to ask in regard to this document, are you going to refer the witness to certain paragraphs or pages when asking?

MR BIZOS: No, because of the negative nature of the putting, it is not possible to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, then you would have to give him a chance to ...

MR BIZOS: But I will deal with certain aspects of the overall contents once he has glanced over it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let us bear with him then, he is acquainting himself with that.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you for the indulgence Mr Chairman.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would just like to know Mr Chairman, if I have to read this entire document now?

CHAIRPERSON: If you don't want to accept Mr Bizos' word, then it is better for you to actually read it.

MR BOOYENS: I think the problem is Mr Chairman, that it is not - I doubt whether my learned friend would tell us that the name is here, but my learned friend said he would also like to deal with the contents in general, and I think that is where the problem is.

It is no problem, I for one, will accept my learned friend for it without qualification, that the name of Mkonto doesn't appear here, or the name of Mhlawuli, but the moment my learned friend starts talking about the general contents, and it may be so that it is part of the 4 000 or 5 000 pages of inquest record, that is neither here not there, because quite frankly nobody even if he did make a study of it, can be expected to remember 4 000 or 5 000 pages. Maybe not nobody, but I am certainly not one of those lucky persons who would be able to do that.

I think it is a funny situation to sit here, while the witness is reading through it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I was going to suggest subject to your objection ...

MR BOOYENS: Or my agreement Mr Chairman perhaps.

CHAIRPERSON: That Mr Bizos be allowed to ask the question. If the need arises for us to adjourn because of the specific nature of the question, then we will do so.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, yes Mr Chairman, I think that is fair.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You see, if Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlawuli were the high profile activists that you say that they were, their names would have been in this, what appears to be a comprehensive statement of, compilation of the activities of the people there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No Security Branch as far as I am aware at the time, conveyed all information to a mini-JMC. That would undoubtedly never have happened.

There was some information which would never have been discussed at a mini-JMC as a result of the composition of the mini-JMC. I see that the person who compiled the document, a Commandant Marais, well I remember him vaguely and I think, I could go as far as saying, he was a farmer.

CHAIRPERSON: What concerns me Mr Van Rensburg, is that if the three other deceased were the ring leaders along with Mr Goniwe in the Cradock area, don't you think one would ordinarily expect their names to be mentioned in minutes of a meeting regarding the unrest situation in Cradock?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If they had been involved in that particular situation, yes then I would say so.

MR BIZOS: You see, you may be correct that he was a farmer, but he was no ordinary farmer because he was a Commandant.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he was a Commandant.

MR BIZOS: And a Commandant under whose Chairmanship Mr Fouche, the top Security Policeman was sitting in Cradock during 1983, 1984 and Mr Winter in 1985?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And he had the full cooperation presumably of the full Security Police staff in order to assist him in the task of collecting the information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as I said I am not doubting the contents of this document. All I said was that all the information wouldn't necessarily be contained herein.

MR BIZOS: I am merely dealing with one of your answers that he was a farmer in a - as a reason to suggest that this cannot be a comprehensive document, and if he was a farmer and he was the Chairman, he had a Lieutenant, Captain and a Major as his Chief Executive Officers, General?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I hear what you say.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And you see, let me just mention to you what your counsel can check afterwards, that the names that occur are Fort Calata. In order to test your knowledge about the people that you sentenced to death and who were executed.

What was the occupation of Mr Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he was a teacher.

MR BIZOS: And what was his background?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I couldn't tell you that off the cuff.

MR BIZOS: Was he a religious person or was he not a religious person?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am guessing but I think his father was a minister? But I am guessing.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it was actually his grandfather who was a historical figure.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay, fine.

MR BIZOS: Well, any way, you had picked up something about that, yes. And what was his position in Cradora?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am once again guessing, but I think he was the Chairperson at some stage.

MR BIZOS: Well, you got that wrong.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay.

MR BIZOS: There was Mr Mbolelo Goniwe, did you know whether he was the brother or cousin of Matthew Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Once again I am guessing, I think he was a cousin, but he could have been a brother.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Madolla Jacobs, he was also a prominent person there. What was his occupation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he was a pupil, a scholar.

MR BIZOS: That is what you think? The other names mentioned there as visitors are Oscar Mpeta, when the UDF was founded, Molly Blackburn, who was she?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I know she was a lady here in Port Elizabeth, and I think she was involved in the Black Sash.

MR BIZOS: And Di Bishop?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall. I don't know exactly.

MR BIZOS: And a person by the name of Vuysani who is mentioned there, did you know anything about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: On what page is that?

MR BIZOS: It doesn't matter, it is Vuysani?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir, I can't remember him.

MR BIZOS: And Dave O'Grady?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't remember him either.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Mkalipi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't remember him.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and ...

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I don't know whether this exercise is taking us anywhere.

MR BIZOS: Can we leave that to argument Mr Chairman?

MR BOOYENS: I want to object to this line of questioning really.

CHAIRPERSON: Why?

MR BOOYENS: For the simple reason we are moving way out of the scope of this application in any case now. We are hearing names that nobody has mentioned here. It is Cradock activists, what we are really testing is how good is his memory, and if he fails, is he a liar?

CHAIRPERSON: You know Mr Booyens, I think the crux of Mr Bizos' argument as I can follow it, is that four people were killed as a result of an opinion that they were the cause of wide spread unrest.

MR BOOYENS: Quite true.

CHAIRPERSON: And in being able to structure this unrest they belonged to certain organisations etc, and I think what the exercise is designed to do is to find out whether that decision made in so far as the present witness is concerned, was based on sufficient knowledge of the situation, and whether the proper people, if indeed it can be condoned, people had to be killed, if indeed the proper people were killed.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: And Gladwill Makahula?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I have heard the name before.

MR BIZOS: Do you know anything about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As I said I have heard the name, but I can't place him exactly.

MR BIZOS: How many members were there on Cradora's committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Do you know who the office bearers of this organisation were other than Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't remember that today.

MR BIZOS: Well, did you ever know it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I am sure I would have known that at some stage. Maybe I wouldn't have known all the names.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You see what I want to put to you in general terms is, that this document drawn obviously by the Security Police, despite the occupation of the Chairman, shows no evidence of the activities that you say induced you to order their death, but that there was activity either not against any law or other activity indulged in by other UDF affiliates, which may have been contraventions of certain laws, but which was done by way of protest for the purposes of showing dissatisfaction with the undemocratic nature of the State at that time.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, before my client answers this question, now we are getting to a situation where he cannot answer it unless he has read the document, because just for example, at page 6 and I have just scanned through this, I see there is talk about what the purpose was of the street committees.

Then there is a long list in Annexure A, I have just seen something at page 9 for example, opposite 30, SAP vehicles pelted with stones, and other incidents involving the Police.

With all due respect, I think we are now getting to a situation where it will be unfair to expect the witness to answer a question as wide as that.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless he has read the document?

MR BOOYENS: Unless he has, yes.

MR BIZOS: Well, may I just generalise it and come back to it after the witness and his counsel have read it and we can come back to it if the - what I am going to put to you that there is nothing in here that carries the death sentence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know. I haven't yet read the document. As Mr Bizos puts it, it could perhaps indicate that, but the decision to kill these people was not made based on this document.

MR BIZOS: Again I must put to you that you and your Security Police Department in Port Elizabeth, decided that because if you detained people and tortured them, and died like Biko had, or complained to tortured them, and they didn't keep to the statements that you extracted from them, decided from 1980 onwards, to eliminate people who were involved in politics that were not in support of the government that you were prepared to support by committing torture, murder and other very serious offences in order to prevent democracy taking root in this country.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I deny that.

MR BIZOS: And you know, there is, I am going to submit to the Committee a hypocrisy in your applications for amnesty.

You speak of you are doing it because of the sufferings of the black people who were the victims of people's courts and other wrongs done against them. Have I put the position correctly, that you owed a duty to the black people of the country to protect them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: All people.

MR BIZOS: All people? But now this was touched upon by a member of the panel yesterday and I want to develop it with you.

You planned and committed these murders, correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: yes.

MR BIZOS: You gave out and pretended that AZAPO was responsible for it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, people could have regarded it like that.

MR BIZOS: You said AZAPO did it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and it was usually either that the ANC did it or that another black group, and in this case it was AZAPO?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: You described AZAPO as a minority movement here in Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BIZOS: If the people, the black people in Port Elizabeth, were as stupid as you might have thought them to be, as a result of your killing Goniwe and others, and giving out a false story that AZAPO had done it, you might have succeeded in having unbridled violence by supporters of the UDF against AZAPO?

How would that have brought peace to the country?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, once again that is speculation. I can't say it would have happened like this or like that. We acted in the way that we thought best at the time.

If we made a mistake, then we made a mistake.

MR BIZOS: No, it is not as simple as that General. Did you foresee the possibility that if your murder and false propaganda achieved its proper result, there would have been unbridled violence, or there could have been unbridled violence by the supporters of the UDF against the supporters of AZAPO and as you said, violence begets violence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was not a consideration amongst us.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As I have said, it was made to look like a robbery or like a vigilante attack. It wasn't a consideration to actually put these two groups against each other, and if we made some mistake in the process, well then that is the way it is, and I will concede that.

MR BIZOS: You actually don't want to admit that you made any mistakes?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is not what I said. Nobody can say that he never makes any mistakes.

MR BIZOS: Well, what mistakes did you make in relation to this matter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, if you cast your mind back, I would say that we should never have acted in this way.

I am talking about the situation today, not 1985, if I reflect upon it today, then in retrospect or with hindsight, I probably would have acted differently.

I once again want to say that, and I have said it before, that on both sides namely the Police and the ANC, Umkonto We Sizwe people, we were actually caught between two political factions, or parties, and we killed each other, we tackled each other and that is the result we see today.

If the politicians on both sides could have negotiated it in time and addressed the situation and saved the situation, it would have been so much the better, it wouldn't have been necessary to actually land up in such a pressurised situation.

MR BIZOS: In relation to the manner in which the four victims were killed and were burnt, was it your instruction that they should be killed and burnt and their bodies disposed in a manner in which the identity of the deceased should not become known?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that was not my instruction.

MR BIZOS: Why was the car burnt?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To this day I still don't know why. I can only accept that it was to conceal the ownership of the vehicle or to render it untraceable for as long as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, a report was given regarding the incident, a day after it took place, or shortly after the incident?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there must have been some kind of report.

CHAIRPERSON: And at that stage you knew that the vehicle had been burnt?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I cannot recall whether Mr Snyman or Mr Van Zyl mentioned that to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let me put it this way, at some or other time after the incident, months or years, did you determine yourself who burnt the vehicle?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I knew it was Mr Van Zyl.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well and the bodies were not left in one place, but at four different places and in one instance, some 15 kilometres away from the other? And another yet at another place, and the other two at another place, but fairly near? Why was that so much trouble taken to spread the bodies?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: And the bodies were burnt?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Why were the bodies burnt?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot tell you why.

MR BIZOS: Well, haven't you thought about it, why did your underlings take so much trouble to remove the number plates off the car, put false number plates on, separate the bodies and not leave them in a group of four, burn them and in some instances, put clothing on top of the face obviously saturated with petrol in order, presumably to burn the face beyond recognition? Did you ask any of your underlings why all those things were done?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not ask them. I suspected that that was done in order to make it appear like a vigilante attack, but I did not elaborate or investigate any further.

MR BIZOS: Not only to make it look like a vigilante attack, but in order to conceal the fact that Goniwe and his colleagues had been killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, one could assume that, but if that was the objective, then I doubt whether it was successful, but I could accept that that was the objective.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well, those who investigated the case, who were not attached to the Security Police, and tried in the beginning to do an honest investigation before General Krappies Engelbrecht came into the picture to try and sweep the place clean, the correct number plate of Mr Goniwe's car that had been taken off, had obviously accidentally been dropped within a very near the burnt car, did you know that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I am not certain, but I accept that that is so.

MR BIZOS: And had it not been for that - from the point of view of the investigation - fortunate circumstance, nobody would have suspected that to be Goniwe's car, nor particularly as there was no four bodies in its immediate vicinity?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it could have looked like that. I would just like to add that if the engine number and chassis number had been available, it would not have been difficult to determine whose vehicle it was.

MR BIZOS: That would have depended of course on the will of a proper investigation being done to that extent and maybe that is why Mr Krappies Engelbrecht took over.

But be that as it may. The disappearance of Mr Goniwe and his companions, if the plan had worked, would have been hidden without inquests being held, without the Security Police or anyone else having to give any account, because if their bodies were not identified, you would have given out another story.

We did not arrest them, they must have escaped and joined the ANC in exile. Isn't that what you said in relation to the Pebco 3?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I never made any statement regarding the Pebco 3.

MR BIZOS: I know that you didn't, but isn't that what happened when the Security Police of Port Elizabeth killed the Pebco 3?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I no longer am certain as to what the Police's version was at the time. I cannot remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, wasn't that the version in respect of Condile?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If it was that way, it must have been. I have no reason to tell you that it wasn't that way, but I cannot recall it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, about two to three weeks ago you testified to that in Cape Town?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Regarding what sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Condile's murder.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes?

CHAIRPERSON: Near the border of Mozambique?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And the story there was officially that they probably escaped and joined an organisation outside, it was intended to look like that, and then he was killed there, is that not so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: You are completely correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that what counsel is suggesting to you that that was the modus operandi?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is possible yes, but I can't remember. I agree, I can't remember whether that was the official version made or provided by the Police. If it was that way, then it was that way, I won't argue it.

MR BIZOS: General Van Rensburg, Mr Van Zyl in answering one of Mr Hugo's questions yesterday said that he and Mr De Kock were trading in misinformation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I heard that.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't that the modus operandi of the Security Police here in Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was.

MR BIZOS: And now, could you please tell the Committee in view of this experience in pedalling misinformation, what yardstick they might use in order to determine when you are telling the truth and when you are not?

MR BOOYENS: That is not a proper question Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't hear.

MR BOOYENS: That is not a proper question to ask really. That is a matter - that is argumentative what my learned friend is putting now.

MR BIZOS: I will not insist on an answer Mr Chairman because I won't know whether it is true or not.

General, when did you learn that the operation was a success?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That morning, or at least the following morning.

MR BIZOS: At what time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Eight o'clock, half past eight perhaps, in that vicinity. Perhaps nine o'clock, I am not dead sure.

MR BIZOS: And did General Krappies Engelbrecht come down here?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know. Not after the incident, not after the murders, I do not know whether he was here.

MR BIZOS: During the course of investigation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir. Not to my knowledge.

MR BIZOS: The three members of the Security Police, were they under your command? The three members of the Security Police that took part in the killing, were they part of your - under your command?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I was second in command of the Branch, so automatically they fell beneath my command.

MR BIZOS: Who were they?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: You are speaking of Mr Van Zyl ...

MR BIZOS: No, no, no, the black members?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Oh, no, they were not, structurally yes, but they were not directly under my command.

MR BIZOS: Were you told that they participated in this killings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: When did you for the first time learn that they participated in the killings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think that it was - no, I am not completely certain, I think it was during the early 1990's, but I am not sure.

MR BIZOS: Why would that be kept a secret from you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That I cannot explain.

MR BIZOS: When the plan was being discussed, were you asked for an opinion as to whether or not persons other than Van Zyl, Du Plessis, Taylor and Lotz should take part?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. I did not know who the other members would be who would participate in the operation.

MR BIZOS: And are you saying that that was kept, that black police officers took part in this operation was kept a secret from you, right up to the years 1990?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask Du Plessis or Van Zyl or Taylor or Lotz why did you keep this a secret from me?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Because it was something that had happened, and it was in the past, one didn't wish to discuss it. I didn't wish to know anything further regarding the matter.

MR BIZOS: Were you ever told that one of the persons that participated was an ascari?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Would you agree that a person who had changed loyalties once, may present dangers that he may change loyalties again?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Would you have authorised the use of the black members of the Security Police if you had been asked before the murders had been committed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, if these members who would execute the operation, in this case Mr Van Zyl, who was in charge of the ground execution of the operation, I would have left the choice to him as to who would be participating in the operation along with him.

MR BIZOS: Were you involved in any way with the killing of the Pebco 3?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Did you know about it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Do you know who the order came from?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. I know now subsequent to the trial I received certain information.

MR BIZOS: Were the Pebco 3 discussed at JMC meetings?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, we are going a bit wide now. That is the subject matter of completely another application I think. It is a collateral issue, the witness has answered that he doesn't know about it. In the circumstances I think this is really going too wide, it is not relevant.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, perhaps that being a part-heard matter, may give rise to a bit of discomfort in legal terms.

MR BIZOS: I will respect that. I didn't know that it was part-heard Mr Chairman, I am not involved in that.

CHAIRPERSON: No fair enough.

MR BIZOS: And let me say that I don't intend to embarrass anybody in relation to any other application, I was merely going to investigate whether it had gone through the JMC system or not.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I understand that.

MR BIZOS: But I will not. You said, I will use the words in Afrikaans "an order was issued, and we carried it out", did you say that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: What order were you referring to there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The order from Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: And you said "no order was issued for us to cease the operation"?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: What order might you have expected in order to cease the operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I said that in connection with the fact that I received no order from Colonel Snyman to cease the operation at any stage, after he issued the initial order.

MR BIZOS: The words reported to you were they that you must do what is in the best interest of South Africa?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Today I cannot say under oath that those were the words that Du Plessis and Van Zyl communicated to me.

And to the best of my memory they said that Mr Snyman had approved the elimination.

MR BIZOS: That may have been a question of interpretation, he didn't say to you what we have heard from others, that he said you do what is in the best interest of South Africa?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Once again I cannot recall those words which you have quoted, but I cannot give you the precise words.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree with Mr Van Zyl, that Mr Snyman is the sort of person who would not have given that order unless he had an order from above?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it is very difficult to summarise a person correctly all the time. But personally I would have doubted whether Colonel Snyman would have taken such a decision on his own.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there are certain other documents that we have to have copied in order to put to the witness. It may be a convenient stage.

In order to - it is ready Mr Chairman, it is the record of Mr Snyman's evidence, and we might facilitate the smoother running of the proceedings, if we hand those portions in at this stage. Shall we do that?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you can hand it in and pass copies to all who need copies, and we can adjourn.

MR BIZOS: Yes, it will be Exhibit V. Shall we then incorporate it then as Exhibit V now and we will bring them to your office Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, this hearing will adjourn till half past nine tomorrow morning.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION ON 27-02-1998: DAY 5

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (conts)

Mr Van Rensburg, you were given a copy of Exhibit V yesterday, which consists of extracts from the evidence of Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: May I make it clear Mr Chairman, that the record as a whole is before the Committee, and has been made available. In so far as this is a portion, either party is entitled during the course of argument or at any other time to refer to any other portion of the record, this is merely for the Committee's convenience.

Have you had an opportunity of reading this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What Exhibit are you talking about?

MR BIZOS: Exhibit V, the one that we handed in yesterday afternoon. You see that it consists of portions of the affidavit of Mr Snyman led by Mr Hargin who was the acting Attorney General at the time, and portion of questions asked by me in the inquest before Justice Zietsman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, could you please turn to page 959 of this extract, 959? Have you got it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I've got it.

MR BIZOS: Paragraph 3

"At the request of the Attorney General leading the evidence, I have issued two telegrams, one dated the 23rd of the 5th 1985, from the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch, SVD Lieutenant Colonel Rolands, and the other dated 22nd of the 5th 1985, sent by myself to the Commanding Officer of the Security Office in Pretoria.

I attach copies of these telegrams to this as Annexures A and B respectively. The relevant telegrams or telexes were sent to the Head Office. I confirm that the branches in my region, the Eastern Province, collected information and would send it through to the Divisional Head Office in Port Elizabeth of which I was the Head.

Subsequently it would be sent from my office in Port Elizabeth to the Security Head Office in Pretoria."

I just want to arrange for a copy to go to the interpreters, other wise they will be under stress to follow. If I may just have a ...

Let's take it paragraph by paragraph. Is paragraph 4 that I have read out in accordance with the procedure followed by Port Elizabeth as you knew it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Let's go on to paragraph 5.

The fact that Annexure A was also sent by Colonel Rolands to the Commanding Officer in Pretoria, and the division just as the Eastern Province had direct contact with Security Headquarters in Pretoria, Annexures A and B are therefore good examples of how this line function operated? Do you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Again

"Insofar as it involved the identity of informants, any references to informants in Annexures A and B were removed. The reason for this is obvious. I was also shown Annexures A and B to the affidavit of the then Commissioner of Police, General Coetzee. These appear in the second volume, page 92 and 105 respectively.

Although I cannot remember precisely from whence this information was derived, I accept that this is information which was handled by our office and sent to the Security Head Office in Pretoria. As mentioned already in the above, input was given by all branches in my then region, the Eastern Province, but also from other divisions, such as the Southwestern District and the Northern Cape. Do you accept that that is a correct description of the procedures followed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Would you please turn to page 993. The second line, "yes, and if there was any proposal that Goniwe, Calata and other persons should be detained, whose line function was it to request this from Head Office? It would have come from the division, Your Honour. From the Security Police? That is correct Your Honour. Of which you were the Head? Correct Your Honour. So no recommendation for the detention of Mr Goniwe could have been made without your permission? That is correct, we would have made a recommendation Your Honour. Without your personal approval? It would still have been up to the Head Office to decide whether or not they would have detained him, Your Honour. Do you accept that as correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, sir.

MR BIZOS: I want to ask you why would Head Office reserve for itself to decide whether a person should be restricted or not and is there any doubt in your mind, that he couldn't be killed without the authority of the Head Office?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's take it, one of the reasons presumably why Head Office had to decide whether a person should be recommended to be restricted is because it had consequences, we see it in the documents. Sometimes a restriction was counter productive because of the public outcry about it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And this is why even Mr Snyman couldn't recommend or rather there could not be a restriction on the recommendation of Mr Snyman, the Head Office had to accept it and recommend it to the Minister?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Why should anything less have to be done in order to eliminate a person?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot believe that anything less could have been done to eliminate a person.

MR BIZOS: Well, was your understanding that if you couldn't, if your recommendation to detain people was not sufficient and it had to be approved by Head Office, that all the more that would be the case if a much more drastic punishment was to be imposed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: So can we then take it from you that you who were - that you had the knowledge of how things were happening, that these killings could not have taken place without the authority of the Security Police Head Office in Pretoria?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is what I believed.

MR BIZOS: And who was the Head of the Security Police of the country at that time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it was, I am not sure, it could have been Mr Coetzee or possibly Mr Schutte.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Coetzee was the Commissioner, he had been the Chief of the Security Police before becoming the Commissioner.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it was Mr Schutte, I am not certain.

MR BIZOS: Yes, so would you say that being in the system that at the time that Mr Snyman authorised this killing and you were strongly of the view that he had authority from above, the line function would indicate that the head of the Security Police must have been responsible for the approval of the plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. One could have speculated at that, but I am not certain.

MR BIZOS: But surely at the time that you took this awesome responsibility upon yourself, you would have wanted to know on whose orders you were taking this responsibility?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I received the request or order from Colonel Snyman, or I believed that he received it from higher authority and I responded on that.

I cannot comment on who was the final upper authority which gave the permission for the order.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly, if an order had not come from anyone, you would not have proceeded with the approval of the death of Mr Goniwe and the other three?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir.

MR BIZOS: And did you take any steps to verify that the order came from the appropriate person who had the necessary authority to do this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that a reasonable step would have been to ask Mr Snyman, who authorised this act?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, is not the way that we responded or acted.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He was my senior, he issued an order to me and I believed that he received the order from a higher level.

MR BIZOS: Well, but there must have been complete trust. What were you afraid of, why would you not have asked who authorised this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As you have said, there was trust. I believed that he would not have given me such an order if he hadn't received it from a higher level of authority, and that was all that I had to know, and that is all that I do know of the operation.

MR BIZOS: It was not because there was any lack of trust between you and Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No sir.

MR BIZOS: Did you know Mr McDonald at the time at the Head Office?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think I had known him at that stage, by then.

MR BIZOS: What was his rank?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know, I can't remember any more what his rank was at that time, he may have been a Colonel more or less.

MR BIZOS: Was he in the Security Police?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And was he responsible for coordinating documents and transmitting requests to the Commissioner and to the Minister?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I am not certain. If it was so, then I wouldn't argue it.

MR BIZOS: Did you not speak to him on the telephone or have contact with him in relation to security business?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I cannot recall whether I had telephonic discussions with him.

MR BIZOS: Can we please turn to - I just want to get it in complete context Mr Chairman - I just want to identify a document that is referred to in this passage - the document of the 23rd of May 1985, if you have a look at page 1010 ...

MR BOOYENS: Sorry, you've lost us now Mr Chairman, what document of the 23rd of May. We know of only one document of the 23rd of May, that is Exhibit C. We've just lost you now.

MR BIZOS: I think that it will become apparent from the context in the document, if you could turn to 1010.

"You refer to Annexure B?

Yes, that is correct Your Honour.

Until F6, is that so?

That is correct. Mr Bizos, please read it out loud. This information was communicated on 1985/05/23 during a visit by the Minister of Law and Order to PE, verbally by the Divisional Commander. The Minister immediately contacted the office of the Minister of Cooperation, Development and Education in Cape Town with the request that the reappointment of Goniwe be delayed until such time that Minister Le Grange had discussed the matter on 24th of May with the Minister. The Minister had requested that the content of this report be handed over personally by Major General Schutte to him on the 27th of May where he would be attending a Cabinet Committee Meeting in Pretoria."

I might as well read on.

"Now did you receive the answer to the question there, did the Minister express any opinion in connection with the proposal that he, Goniwe be reappointed or not?

It would probably have been so Your Honour.

By inference of what stands here, what is probable? That the Minister would have stated that he would want to discuss the matter himself with the Minister when he arrived in Pretoria.

But did he express any opinion to you?

Yes, I cannot remember what he told me Your Honour.

So you do not find the answer in the document, is that correct?

No.

That is why I am asking you to please try to remember what the Minister said to you.

I would only have communicated to the Minister the activities as it was at that time at Cradock. And also that decision regarding the reappointment and on the basis thereof.

You should - sorry, are you finished - and on the basis thereof, the Minister stated those words. I want to put it to you that someone in your position would have said to his Minister, look, the people from Education and Training are interfering with issues or matters which are not a matter of their decision, Goniwe is a dangerous person, which according to my recommendation, should be detained, and he should never ever be appointed. Did you say this?

It is possible on the basis of his activities Your Honour.

Yes, that would have been the natural thing that while the Minister was interested in a matter, it would not have been necessary for the bureaucracy of the Head Office in Pretoria to wait. You had your Minister there and you tried to convince that the problem could be solved if Goniwe were to be detained. Is that not so?

No, I did not intercept the Head Office Your Honour, I sent that telefax in which it was clearly stated.

And now we know that the deceased Minister Louis le Grange is no longer with us, but we know that he probably reported to Dr Viljoen or Professor Viljoen, is that not so?

Correct Your Honour.

And we could determine what the Minister of Police would have said to Minister/Professor Viljoen? Correct Your Honour.

Did someone return after the discussion with your Minister and said look, as a result of your discussion with the Minister, the decision is this or that. Did any person return to you?

I cannot remember Your Honour.

Well, Cradock was a burning point for the country, you saw your Minister. Surely the reason why he would have gone to Minister Viljoen would have been to explain to him how dangerous Goniwe was. Are you asking His Honour to accept that no one informed you as the Chief of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth, regarding what the Ministers had decided after their discussion on the matter?

Well Your Honour, I cannot remember whether or not there was feedback.

Did you contact the office or the Head Office and who was it? Brigadier Schutte. Who was the interloper, is that an incorrect word, sorry intermediary between the two Ministers, did you ask him but Brigadier, what is going on here? The matter is so important that two Ministers would have to consult over it and no one is giving me an answer, what is going on?

I am saying that I cannot remember whether or not there was feedback Your Honour.

After the discussion with the Minister when you were at the meeting of the EP JMC on the 23rd of May, did you inform the people there that you had discussed the matter with the Minister of Police?

It is possible, but I cannot remember it Your Honour. Very well, didn't you want to convince the meeting that it was now an important matter and the Minister and Police and the Minister of National Education, Dr Viljoen, would discuss the matter? Why would you not have reported that discussion with the Minister to the EP JMC?

As I have said Your Honour, it maybe possible that I reported it, I cannot recall it, it is too long ago. Well, did anything occur between the 23rd of May when you recommended that Goniwe never ever again be reappointed, did anything happen after that to change your opinion that he, Goniwe, could be reappointed and that he should not be detained, according to the stipulations of Section 28? Did your opinion change or not?

I would have maintained my recommendation Your Honour."

Now, I think that I have read enough to you to apprise you of what was going on behind the scenes about Mr Goniwe. What I want to ask you is did Mr Snyman report to you that he had a discussion with the Minister and the Minister apparently, this is the Minister of Police, Mr le Grange, and it would appear that Mr le Grange did not want to leave it for the discussion to take place between him and Mr de Beer, but wanted to discuss it with Professor Viljoen? Did Mr Snyman mention to you that this Goniwe matter was a matter which was enjoying the attention of the highest placed politicians?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I can not remember at all that he ever mentioned that to me.

MR BIZOS: Would you not agree that for people involved in a conspiracy to kill Goniwe, and rely on the authority of the State for their actions, for you not to be informed by Mr Snyman, of the Ministerial interventions in the matter, would have been most unusual?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't comment on that. I don't know why, if he didn't mention it to me, why he didn't do so. I really can't remember that.

MR BIZOS: Well, is it such a matter of little detail that one would - that this sort of thing would escape one's memory or be pushed back into oblivion if in fact it was said to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, if I could remember it, I would say so, I can't remember it.

MR BIZOS: Now, it appears that the person on whom you relied on as authority and having come up from higher authority, if he didn't say it to you, was deliberately keeping vital information back which he had in his possession, would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is possible. I just want to add that what I can recall is that Mr Snyman on some occasion, I can't recall exactly when, said that agreement could not be reached as to whether the man should be reappointed in his teaching post or not, that I can recall that he told me.

MR BIZOS: Yes. May I at this stage for the sake of clarity, you recall Mr Chairman, that I was reading with reference to a document, that my learned friend correctly raised the question, what documents I was referring to. May I hand in an Exhibit, the affidavit of Mr Snyman F6 in the inquest, if we can give it an Exhibit number here, together with the two telegrams. One from him and the one from the South-Western Districts, Mr Chairman, would that be Exhibit ...

They are annexures to one, do you want to, yes, perhaps we should do that Exhibit W, and the telegrams are Exhibits X and Y. We are just trying to clarify which is from Western Districts and which is from ... X is from Port Elizabeth Mr Chairman, and Y is from the South Western Districts. It is not very clear, but I am now told that it is the other way round. Any way, I think they speak for themselves.

We have now established that X is from Southwest Districts, and Y is from Port Elizabeth, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, let us just rearrange it properly.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The first page originally marked F6, would be the first page of Exhibit W, and the obvious page 2 ...

MR BIZOS: Which has an A on it on top ...