Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: It is the 3rd of November 1997. We are dealing with the applications of Lotz, Snyman and others. The panel is as it is now constituted is as follows. Myself, in the Chair, Ngoepe, J. To my right Advocate Potgieter and to my left Advocate Sandi.

Advocate Potgieter has taken the decision to recuse himself from these hearings by reason of the fact that he had been in a panel which listened to the evidence of a certain Joe Mamasela in terms of Section 29 of the Act, and that decision of his will be in line with the wishes of some of the parties involved.

For the purpose of reconstituting the panel we will adjourn the matter until tomorrow morning at 09H30. Thank you.

Is there anybody who wanted to say something in this regard?

Counsel reply in the negative

CHAIRPERSON: No did you in particular, Sir, did you, Mr de Villiers is there any other issue that you wanted to raise?

ADV DE VILLIERS: Not at this stage Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Very well then we will adjourn until tomorrow at 09H30.

MR BRINK: Sorry Mr Chairman, would it be convenient to do a little bit of housekeeping as regard to who the Committee will consist as everyone is here rather than waste the time tomorrow morning. It just relates to a supplementary index, the annexures, which I can give you so at least the page reference is there, if I could refer you perhaps to page 139 of the bundle. This is merely to implement the page reference numbers in the bundle where various annexures are referred to. This will make it easier for the Committee if those are going to be used. Page 139 of the bundle. I wonder if Advocate Potgieter wouldn't mind doing that as well for whoever comes in his place, page 139.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry what should be done?

MR BRINK: Just to make a note of the page numbers. If you refer to page 139 Mr Chairman, of the bundle ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, 139.

MR BRINK: Page 139 you will see on the left-hand column is "Aanhangsel een" and then - those don't come out very clearly, but if you could put on the right-hand side where it says "Bladsy Vyf" on the first line, 142. That is a page in the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to take us through that page?

MR BRINK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR BRINK: So on the - wherever you would like to put it convenient, but I suggest on the extreme right of page 139, "Aanhangsel Een" will be page 142, "twee" will be 147; three, is 167; four, is 175; five is 186; six is 189; seven is 192; eight is 201; and then over the page, nine is 208; ten is 215; eleven is 220; 11A is 221; 12 is 224; 13 is 230; 14 is 237. Over the page 15.1 is 240; 15.2 is 247; 15.3 is 248; 16 is 253. There is no 17 but you have - I have given the Committee members and I think those representing the applicants have also got a map and certain photographs. I mention that merely because it may facilitate things if reference is made to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We will see you tomorrow morning then at 09H30. We will adjourn.

HEARING ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: It is the 4 November 1997. We are commencing to hear applications by Lotz, Snyman and others. The Committee is differently constituted today. In the place of Advocate Potgieter SC we do have Advocate de Jager SC, sitting on my right.

Before we start I have been told that some equipment, the headphones, a few of them are missing. They were not returned yesterday and I have been asked to request members of the public to please leave those headphones behind at the end of the day or during intervals or adjournment. If you do not cooperate in that regard we will reach a stage where headphones will no longer be distributed and I am sure there are people who will not be able to follow the proceedings. So your cooperation is very important in that regard, in your own interest.

Mr Brink.

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman ready to proceed. I think possibly the legal representatives of the applicants should indicate who they intend calling and place themselves on record.

ADV BOOYENS: May it please the Court Mr Chairman. J A Booyens, instructed by Van der Merwe and Bester. I appear on behalf of the applicants, Gerhardus Johannes Lotz, Harold Snyman, Hermanus Barend du Plessis and Gideon Johannes Nieuwoudt.

As far as the second request is concerned I intend to start off the evidence with the evidence of Hermanus Barend du Plessis. There has been agreement between the various teams on behalf of the applicants that he will also be the first witness to be called.

ADV DE VILLIERS: As it pleases the Court my name is W P de Villiers and I appear on behalf of J M van Zyl on the instructions of Leon Maree en Kie. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis I think maybe we should all of us put ourselves on record.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. I am Roelof du Plessis from the Pretoria Bar instructed by Strydom Brits Attorneys from Pretoria. I act on behalf of W/O Gert Beeslaar, Colonel Roelf Venter and also Brigadier Jack Cronje who is an implicated person. Only W/O Gert Beeslaar will give evidence.

ADV LAMEY: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. My name is A Lamey and I represent Mr K P Mogoai as well as Mr J Koole who will testify in this hearing.

ADV NYOKA: As it pleases Mr Chairperson, I am Pumele Nyoka, I am acting for the three widows, Mrs Galela, Mrs Hashe and Mrs Godolozi. Thank you.

MS HARTLE: May it please the Committee. My name is Belinda Hartle. I represent Mesdames Benedict Nompolelo and Nombeko Edith Godolozi, the mother and daughter of the late Pebco president, Qaqawuli Godolozi.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Nyoka, who are you appearing for?

ADV NYOKA: I am acting for the widows, Mrs Godolozi, Mrs Hashe and Mrs Galela, the widows.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: And their children, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And the lady?

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman I represent the mother and the daughter of the late Pebco president, Mr Qaqawuli Godolozi, in other words Mrs Nompolelo Benedictor Godolozi, the mother of the late Pebco president and his daughter ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The mother of the deceased?

MS HARTLE: The mother of the deceased, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I see, yes thank you. Mr Booyens.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman with the Commission's permission I would just like to hand in documents just setting out, it's three documents, pages 83A, 83B and 83C which just sets out the background of the applicant, Mr du Plessis, which was not attached to and which will once again expedite matters. With your permission I would ask leave to hand this up. I wish to place on record that all my other colleagues have been placed in possession of this document, I am instructed by my attorney.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You are calling Mr du Plessis?

ADV BOOYENS: That is correct Mr Chairman.

HERMANUS BAREND DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis you are an applicant in this matter, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is.

ADV BOOYENS: I refer you to page 83A, B and C which actually replaces page 83. Do you confirm the correctness of that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do.

ADV BOOYENS: You are applying for amnesty with regard to any offence which originates from the death of the Pebco Three, Mr Hashe, Galela and Godolozi, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The incident took place in May 1995, in Cradock and Port Elizabeth, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 84 briefly if we can deal with the background of the organisation, Pebco. Now is it correct that Pebco's role in reality appears in the organogram which appears on page 220 which shows how the various organisations were compiled?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did Pebco play an umbrella organisation role with regard to various organisations such as shown in the organogram?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: If we could possibly just for completion, for the information of the Commission it consisted of the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress, which was an organisation for the non-working youth, the student council which was for the scholars, women's organisation is self-explanatory, Idamsa, Idamasa, that stood for an organisation which included the churches, and Pecic which was the Port Elizabeth Crisis and Education Committee is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV BOOYENS: The Council of Pebco, were those the nominated and delegates of regional committees?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And furthermore the organogram, any further details will be given if requested how it looked on the ground level.

Pebco was in practice an umbrella body over various organisations?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did it also play a role in the organising of meetings and speakers where they dealt with resistance politics?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On occasion there was a negative reference to corroborators or so-called impis who have been people who collaborated with the security forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: In the days of '84/'85 it often happened that real or alleged collaborators were murdered.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: By 1984 Pebco succeeded with the end plan and this is explained on page 211 to 214 in a copy of Sishaba, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV BOOYENS: In reality the end plan boiled down to the fact that alternative structures would be placed in place of the existing structures, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV BOOYENS: And that was in agreement with this end plan as it was known among you and which you have already referred to?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The structures which were established were in reality surrogate structures which replaced the structures placed there by the government of the day, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: From '84 and up to '85 did Pebco's role strengthen and enlarge?

MR DU PLESSIS: They are enlarged more and more and with the politicisation - or firstly let's say with the mobilisation of the masses and the politicisation of them they became increasingly more important as an organisation and every movement made by the organisations in the Eastern Cape or Port Elizabeth per se, Pebco had a hand in the matter. All the other organisation under them and around them were invited to meetings where they then decided or made decisions as a unit to politicise the masses even further and that which they proposed to carry out.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 84 you refer to the fact that since the establishment of the UDF on 20 August 1983 the situation gained momentum?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The practical situation at grassroots level regarding Pebco and its leading figures how did they determine the lives of the people at grassroots level?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage - they started in '84, even before that, I am not quite sure, with the establishment of firstly the area and street committees. They exercised complete control over the masses. The instructions which they wanted to carry out or carry through to the masses were done via these channels. To give you an example if there were any boycotts these people were told to carry it through and to ensure that they took place. As a matter of fact they were compelled to do so. Pebco led the meetings where all these organisations were invited and had turns to speak and made their contributions which were then conveyed to the community. They formed a unity to do what they wanted to do.

ADV BOOYENS: Regarding everyday life of people they decided whether there were consumer boycotts, school boycotts etc, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Of the powers which the security forces had then, was among others Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, what kind of reaction did this result in if people were detained?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage the politicisation was so advanced in the Eastern Cape that when action was taken against any of these leading figures the community came forward and demanded that they be released and if this was not done there would be unrest or the unrest would be expanded. They knew that the community was behind them and the community placed pressure on the government and in per se on us either to negotiate with them or to release them.

ADV BOOYENS: Was it the old statement which one heard in those days either prosecute or release?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: When you resisted and did not want to free people did that lead to consumer boycotts?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's true, it also in turn led to pressure from the side of the government or pressure on the government which placed pressure on us and said that if you do not have evidence against the people release them.

ADV BOOYENS: Did the pressure also come from the commercial community in Port Elizabeth as a result of the fact that they then felt the pressure from the consumer boycotts, they were dissatisfied because they were losing money and they complained about the economic situation in the Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Seen countrywide by 1985 the statement has already been made that the Eastern Cape was a priority area regarding internal unrest.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: There were also so-called - a border war was underway, has that war expanded?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The de facto situation as a result of the street committees and area committees which replaced the government structures one often used the term "ungovernable", will you say that that was applicable?

MR DU PLESSIS: I stood in that area and I can tell you quite honestly that Port Elizabeth was ungovernable and I want to go even further and say that Pebco was in control here.

ADV BOOYENS: If one then wants to talk about a war which was going on that they won that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The security forces, if we get back to that situation, at that stage and I think there is quite a bit of evidence before the Commission in that regard, the so-called Management System which you could say was connected to the State Security Council, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: It was under the chairmanship of the commanding officer of the Defence Force but amongst others it was - the SAP was also represented in the State Security Council?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was there via the JMS which was attended by different commanding officers and then in this specific case Mr Harold Snyman, did they exert pressure on you as members as a result of the pressure exerted on them?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was there any criticism that you were not doing your work, that you were not capable of controlling the situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The legal options which were available to you then, because that was before the state of emergency was implemented, that was detention without - there was also the possibility of restricting people, of limited his freedom, house arrest etc, did that work?

MR DU PLESSIS: It has never worked in the Eastern Cape and at that stage it was made even more difficult because it was already so-called no-go areas. That means that we could not move around and monitor people for 24 hours a day, that was impossible from the start, and at that stage it was even more difficult. Even informers could not move in these areas.

ADV BOOYENS: The no-go areas did they mean that when the police moved into the areas that you had to move in with armoured vehicles or you had to go in with large groups, the situation of two policemen was life-threatening in these no-go areas?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: These no-go areas did they also result in the fact that a fruitful breeding ground was created for cadres because it was much easier for them to manage their activities there?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct. We also launched an investigation during that period where various people were arrested and it was clear to us how easy it was to bring explosives, hand-grenades, firearms and to hide them in this area. They gave training quite openly because they realised that we could not move in.

ADV BOOYENS: Good. The other alternative of course was, I am now speaking about the pressure from the side of the JMS that you had to prosecute people, what was the problem in this regard?

MR DU PLESSIS: In the first place we did not have any evidence. The people who could give evidence had the fear that as a result of the necklace methods and the intimidations which took place in these areas to such an extent that we did not get any witnesses they were just not prepared to come forward.

ADV BOOYENS: So in spite of what was called the draconian legislation which was valid then you were still not successful in your attempt to curb the situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: We could not.

ADV BOOYENS: And as far as you were concerned you were in control of the Black Desk, did the situation escalate?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, on a daily basis.

ADV BOOYENS: You were given instructions or made an attempt to bring organisations, leaders, people and individuals who were responsible for the fact that you had lost control practically in certain areas to identify and prioritise these, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you then get a full - could a full picture be formed of, and we are now on page 86, of the fact that of who was actually responsible for the unrest, who were the primary people involved in this organisation?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 86 you mention that the objective was to curb these people legally and you've told us why this did not work.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did the situation ultimately become totally disruptive and chaotic?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is true, the whole area was ungovernable.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 86 you refer to, and in this regard I am going to request you to elaborate on this, at the same time in these days statements were made by political leaders, you mentioned PW Botha, Magnus Malan who spoke about fighting fire with fire, we find ourselves in a war situation, it was the rhetoric of the media and the SABC in those days, not so, or of the politicians that was conveyed to the press, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is so.

ADV BOOYENS: Since then we have also obtained examples of evidence of, among others, the former Minister of Law and Order, and I just want to quote a few phrases which he acknowledged was used. I am only in possession of a fax Committee of the submission of Adriaan Johannes Vlok to the Truth Commission and it is quite a thick document as one can expect and I am only going to quote from certain passages. I will only copy those passages that I quote if the Commission so requires. Vlok says that words that were commonly used at meetings used by politicians were words such as neutralise, extinct, eliminate, things like that (...indistinct)

ADV DE JAGER: Could you please just go slower, we don't have the evidence, we have to write it.

ADV BOOYENS: Sure.

ADV SANDI: Sorry for the interruption. Can you, if you are going to refer to passages from a specific document can you please give page references.

ADV BOOYENS: Yes I have done that, but it's page 25 Mr Chairman. Sorry I think the microphones were off.

I refer specifically to the submission of Vlok, page 25 paragraph 7.1 and I read:

"Firstly there is a specific usage of language which was usually used in that specific area at meetings, expressions such as eliminate, neutralise, take-out, destroy and similar words were used".

do you agree with that, that those were the words that were commonly heard and also came through to you in communication through the JMS and so on?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And then he also states on page 26 the following paragraph

"And it is a fact that our country during the conflict of the past were immersed in a psychosis of war where such words and expressions which is part of the military use became part of everyday language".

and it was also, for example, the same as was used by revolutionaries, do you agree?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I do.

ADV BOOYENS: A lot has been said about that and I also know what the politicians said and other people had said, people who used dictionaries what they intended, but for you as a policeman on the ground if they were referred to as agitators or terrorists or what they were called, and I am going to specifically refer to specific words that people had to be eliminated, that they had to be taken out, that they had to be destroyed and that they had to be eliminated, precisely what did those terms mean to you? Not regarding what the politicians said, what did it mean to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: It meant they had to be killed.

ADV BOOYENS: From a submission of Willem Frederick Schoon to the TRC and specifically on page 4, paragraph 4.2 I am going to quote - but you know who Willem Schoon is?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: He was at Security head office, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And at a stage he was commander of Section C of the Security Branch, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: C is the section which had to do with combating terrorism and Schoon says in this particular paragraph, he says the following

"I also don't want to become part of a semantic argument with regard to the meaning of certain words used in these documents, but I want to stress that words such as eliminate and take-out, according to me for the member on the ground where he was daily in a war situation it meant nothing else than killing people".

Do you agree with that statement?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I do.

ADV BOOYENS: One of the aspects that is often quoted by people in senior positions is the excuse that they didn't know, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You are aware of the fact that the former Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Leon Wessels, also testified before the Human Rights Committee, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Wessels says on page 2 of his submission, and I quote - the paragraphs are not numbered

"I further do no believe that the political defence of 'I/we did not know is available to me/us', because in many respects I believe we did not want to know. In my own way I had my suspicions of things that had caused discomfort in official circles, but because I did not have the facts to substantiate my suspicions I had lacked the courage to shout from the rooftops. I have to confess that I only whispered in the corridors. That I believe is the accusation that people may level at many of us. We did not confront the report of injustices head-on".

Was that also your impression that the politicians of the day that if accusations were made that they were quite weak in their attempts to make enquiries about people for example who were assaulted, who disappeared, etc?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Wessels then continues, a further paragraph and he says

"Eugene de Kock's recent claim, namely that any National Party politician or supporter I may add at the time who believed that we held power because of persuasion and not through coercion was out of touch with reality".

The situation was that the Security Branch was the persuading force which would have brought the uprising against the government under control, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Roelf Meyer, in his submission to the Truth Commission, and I just want to quote one aspect, what he calls on page 2 of his application

"Regarding the nature of the conflicts of the past the following observation. One dimension was the view that South Africa had been the target of a total revolutionary onslaught that could only be countered by a total counter-strategy. As a result huge emphasis was placed on a combined effort to utilise all the forces of State in a counter-mobilisation plan".

Those were the days of the total onslaught. It was a well-known term and the perception with the security forces was that you had to come with a total counter-strategy?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. And at several incidents it was explained to us that we were the last line and we were already in the last trenches and it is dependent on us whether the government would in fact stay in power.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to this pressure you already referred to, in fact that's Colonel Snyman at a particular situation when he came back from JMS meetings that he also placed some pressure on you that the situation in the Western Cape should be controlled.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I think it is a question of record that the JMS in fact was an extension of the State Security Council and that Council was to a large extent the Cabinet of the day, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember that some time before this incident occurred Colonel Snyman did a report at Cradock where the following people were present, the then Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, as well as other politicians it will be clear from the evidence, we also just have to mention it now and the former Minister Barend du Plessis and Dr Morrison, he was LP of Cradock, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And during later discussions, I will lead this evidence, but Colonel Snyman said that after he explained to this meeting that the normal legal options weren't working, that he mentioned in a private discussion, despite the fact that he said that the legal options weren't working, that you had to make a plan with the activists in the Cape, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I already told you that the legal options aren't working, I can't restrict them and the Minister tells you make a plan, how would you have interpreted it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well I interpreted it as the only way to make a plan is to actually take them or remove them from a community is to kill them.

ADV BOOYENS: During consultation when we discussed this aspect something came to the fore that you initially were quite reticent to mention at this meeting with regard to certain security structures, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: It has to do with the way in which the security forces at that time, and sometimes the figure is mentioned that 95% or even more of the people who left the country were identified to get their photos and monitor their movements, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Is it also correct that you initially told me that you felt that it was something that you would rather not mention it but I told you that it is important because it can show the fact that people were denying things were perhaps really not the truth is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And afterwards you then indicated that you were prepared to give the evidence that you are now going to give, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The normal procedure when people left the country was that they went to one of the neighbouring countries, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And there they then applied at the United Nations for refugee status, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The procedure was then that in order to enable them to get refugee status that photos were then taken, forms were completed where they made their identity known and that they then chose false names for themselves and they would then also operate under that name in future?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is it correct that the security police succeeded in those days, and I know you don't want to mention any names, but that they succeeded to totally infiltrate the office of the refugee office, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Is that where the photo albums that you had were compiled?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You have a photo album here and if we can just point to certain - usually you try to take some measures that when the stamp was visible when the person was eliminated that something was done about that, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: But sometimes the stamp of the United Nations High Commissioner was still visible and it was then also tippexed out, quite visibly, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Commissioner it's not practical to make photocopies of this because then it won't help but I would just - we have marked certain of these documents and I think because this is a Commission and not a court I would just perhaps hand over the photo album to the Commissioners to have a look at. Certain of the places where the stamp appears have been marked with the markers and the Commission can see for itself where the letters appearing in the stamp have in fact been tippexed out.

Mr du Plessis what seems to appear from this is that while the people left the country never knew it you knew exactly who they were, their photos came back and you could identify them and that is how you succeeded in getting identification lists of all people who left the country, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Just to go a bit broader with regard to the Eastern Cape only we know of six high profile people who disappeared without trace, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And you also tried creating a specific legend in certain of these cases which also forms part of other applications that these people left the country, for example leaving their vehicles close to the border, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: We know those people had left the country, they are dead, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Afterwards with regard to only these people, there may even be more in the country, there was a lot of publicity because of the fact that these people disappeared.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Well I don't think it's a far stretch to accept that Security head office and the specific politicians would have known how well these organisations had been infiltrated, and the High Commissioner because you were kept up-to-date with everybody's movements.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to the three gentlemen in this case we know that they never left the country but there were dockets opened and those were the answers that were given. We know they never left the country, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were enquiries ever directed to you to determine whether these people with this very specific list that you have, that these people actually were there, that they left the country?

MR DU PLESSIS: Never.

ADV BOOYENS: One almost has the impression that the people who had to look for them knew that it would not give them any information, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Booyens I think I understand what you are trying to convey but I don't think you are making it quite clear so that other people who are also involved here can understand it. You say that there was a photo album of everybody who left, or almost everybody who actually reached foreign countries, but the six that you referred to you say that they never got to the other side where the photos were taken.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And the deduction that you make is that if internally they said that they actually disappeared to foreign countries then you could actually determine whether they arrived there or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And the implication of what you want to say or what you said and which isn't quite clear perhaps you should just repeat that in your own words. I don't want to put words in your mouth.

MR DU PLESSIS: What I want to say is that I don't want to say that all the personnel of head office, but the top structure of the Security Branch and by implication also certain politicians suspected what happened otherwise they could have pointed it out to us and have asked us, well ascertain whether the people arrived. They never did that.

ADV BOOYENS: Regarding the three gentlemen in this matter there were amongst others, interdicts brought against them that where allegations were made that they were seen in police detention in certain places when they were already dead, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV BOOYENS: Your story was that the people had left the country?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: We know that it is easily ascertainable that if they had really left the country that it would be easy for you to have said that this man left South Africa at that stage, at the moment he's in Lusaka or wherever because you had that kind of information.

MR DU PLESSIS: We did.

ADV BOOYENS: But no-one said anything with regard to the question in this regard.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can just say that there were enquiries about these people but they were more from Parliament which were meant for head office or who asked the Minister certain questions which came to us via head office and we had the standard reply that according to our information they had left the country.

ADV BOOYENS: The next question that you would have expected is surely that if they had left the country why is there no record of them or no trace of them on the other side of the border, and that question never came?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Investigations were launched because these people were all high profile people?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Your impression, Mr du Plessis, as an experienced policeman as to the standard of those investigations?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was very poor and I had the impression that they did not actually want to know what the truth was.

ADV BOOYENS: The English use the word "window dressing"?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Seen against this background in Port Elizabeth, the background of which you were aware that where there were cases of allegations of people who had disappeared in the Eastern Cape and was your impression that the elimination of people was an option which was at least silently approved, in other words it was a silent policy, do you agree?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: As a result of that did you, and with taking into consideration all the options, give any consideration to the fact that the three deceased in this case, whether that was not the only solution for them?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr du Plessis if you were not under the impression that it was the unwritten policy which was followed in this total counter-reaction would you have considered this option at all?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not.

ADV BOOYENS: Would you have discussed this option with your commanding officer, Colonel Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not.

ADV BOOYENS: If it was something that you just did in the Eastern Cape then surely you would have chosen your people very carefully?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: There are other applications which have served before this Committee and which are still pending which show that every time the people told the Security Office about this they knew about it, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Were you not involved in the other cases, but you also heard the stories of people who have disappeared?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And one surely had your suspicions even though you did not know?

MR DU PLESSIS: One did have one's suspicions.

ADV BOOYENS: And the evidence in the other applications was that the people were informed, that the commanding officer was informed. In this case we have another commanding officer, he was also informed. Another application, a third commanding officer was mentioned, every time the commanding officers were informed in these decisions as to eliminate people or not, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Was your impression that there was this silent policy that this could be done but you still felt that with regard to the strategic authorisation that this should be done on local level, that you should get your authorisation from your highest rank?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And is that the reason why you went to speak to Colonel Snyman?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman's initial reaction to this was - let's just deal with the situation. You reported to him on a daily basis, told him what the situation was, what the threat was, who the people who were responsible for this threat, the prominent figures, and I take it that he also got this information from other people in the branch, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: When you discussed the matter with Colonel Snyman he was thoroughly aware in his capacity of commanding officer of the exact explosiveness of the situation in Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You mentioned the option that it seemed to you as if the only steps that could be taken was that the people had to be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is that a decision that was taken very easily in a single discussion or was this discussed over a relatively long period?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember how long it took or how many weeks it took but we discussed this on a daily basis, sometimes even more than once a day due to the pressure which came from head office, from the JMS and also as a result of the unrest which was expanding in the area.

ADV BOOYENS: These three persons who were killed in this matter were they pertinently identified as of the prominent figures?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: In those days files were kept on all known activists, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: But thanks to the modern era all the information was then telescoped and was stored on microfiche which was just a very cryptic explanation of people's activities, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And if you could just possibly look at the first one, I will make copies available Mr Chairman, is this the microfiche copy regarding the activities of Mr Godolozi?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: With your approval can I just give these copies to you. Mr du Plessis the document gives the man's personal history, his family, his contacts, his friends etc, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Then it deals with who were his political comrades, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Unfortunately these things do not have page numbers but on the fourth last page it is said, told the meetings that he addressed and a very brief summary is given about his activities.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is it correct that this is by nature a cryptic and very brief summary of his activities as were placed on microfiche at Security head office, it replaced the filing system?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: May I hand this in as Exhibit A1. Once again without going into detail there were similar forms with regard to Mr Galela and Hashe.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: They contained the same type of information?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Once again in a very brief form. May we make the document with regard to Mr Galela Exhibit A2 and Mr Hashe A3 with your permission and I ask that these be submitted.

Mr du Plessis I do not believe that it's necessary to go into detail. If people want to ask you about the documents then they must do so. I will just provide copies to my learned friends.

These three persons, their activities, their movements, they were well known in Port Elizabeth is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you and Colonel Snyman after discussions finally decide that the only way open to you was to eliminate them or to kill them?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You make the statement on page 87 that although Colonel Snyman did give the specific instruction that people be eliminated it was clear that his words, that this is what he meant, what do you actually want to say there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Colonel Snyman did not give a direct instruction but he did say that he realised that there were no other options, nothing else would work, did work, and that I had to proceed and do the best I could in the interests of the country.

ADV BOOYENS: And you interpreted that as an instruction to go ahead and eliminate, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The planning and the execution of the operation thereafter was it left over to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman may I just ask for a five minute adjournment please?

CHAIRPERSON: Okay we will adjourn for five minutes.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens you were still busy leading the evidence of Mr du Plessis.

HERMANUS BAREND DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o.)

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr du Plessis with regard to the photo album it is also correct that a name list together with the particulars which you obtained it was compiled, which was a separate document and which then had the name, his ID number according to the numbers of the photos and you could get an identity picture of this man, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And then in turn these photo albums were used for the identification of people who were overseas when you apprehended people, when people walked over to the security forces, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The photo album and the list of the names were also updated and new information was gained?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman I am not sure whether you want me to hand this photo album in as an exhibit. Unfortunately we haven't got the name list here but we've got it available, but due to an oversight it was just left at my attorney's office. We will have that available tomorrow, do you want me to hand the photo album in as an exhibit or - I don't know?

CHAIRPERSON: It may very well be that we may have as an exhibit - what is it you say we don't have - did you say the numbers?

ADV BOOYENS: No the numbers appear in the photo album Mr Chairman. Under each photograph there's a number, what I don't have here but what the witness has spoken about now is then there would be a separate list with the name and sometimes the ID number and detail like that, in other words photograph number 5336 would have opposite 5336 the name, sometimes the name under which he left the country etc.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it something which we can have say tomorrow or so?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes I will have that available for you tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We will see how the matter develops with regard to that photo album. It may be that after cross-examination and possibly the evidence of some other people it may become imperative to have it as an exhibit but just keep it with you and make it available to whosoever would like to have a look at it.

ADV BOOYENS: I will do so Mr Chairman. Now you have already testified regarding the discussions that you and Colonel Snyman had. Just give us in your own words the situation at ground level at that stage in Port Elizabeth, how things were going here.

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage I can just say at the outset that there was total anarchy in the black areas and I can give the following as examples. The Councillor's houses were burnt down, I won't say all of them but many of them were attacked. They had to resign, they were forced to resign and this created a vacuum, that is that the third tier of government collapsed. Petrol bomb attacks were made on the houses of policemen to such an extent that the policemen withdrew from the black areas, together with their families. There were school boycotts, schools were burnt down, schools were damaged, vandalised. All buildings that had anything to do with the government or with that government was destroyed or burnt down. There were rent boycotts, bus boycotts. Streets were blockaded. At a stage in certain areas trenches were dug in which the casspirs fell and then could not get out and petrol bombs were then thrown at the police. Soft cover vehicles were impossible to drive with and we had to do so in convoys. Delivery vehicles in the areas were burnt out. The consumer boycott was on and off. If I can remember correctly December 1984 we had the so-called Black Christmas where nobody was allowed to buy in these areas and those who did were forced to either drink or eat whatever they had bought.

ADV BOOYENS: Ordinary crime, what was the situation in this regard in these no-go areas?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well a crime was actually never reported and if it was it was done so by exception. At that stage I can also just mention that the so-called heads, people's heads also took over that part of the government's duties. That means that they had to report to them and the trials were held there.

ADV BOOYENS: Did the criminal element, I am now talking about your ordinary criminals, did they also see this as a golden opportunity to expand their own activities due to the fact that the police were ineffective?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You have already made the statement that the battle in Port Elizabeth was won.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: There was pressure on you to gain the initiative again, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And you realised that the only way in which you could gain the initiative again would be to eliminate the Pebco leaders.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Why did you specifically decide on the Pebco leaders and specifically these three?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage the information at my disposal they were the most radical and I believed that if we eliminated them that we would harm Pebco irreparably, it would take them a long time to reorganise and re-group and to bring the unrest to the same level that it was at that stage.

ADV BOOYENS: It would result in the fact that people would not realise that you were toothless because they would have thought that you would have had something to do with this, they knew that the people had not left the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: In all these aspects you were involved with Colonel Snyman, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And after the authorisation, let's call it that, after the authorisation was given you then took steps to get the operation going.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Who did you speak to at that stage?

MR DU PLESSIS: I spoke to Captain van Zyl. I believe, after all these years, that it took place in my office. At that stage I also spoke to Captain Nieuwoudt and explained to them what the problem was that we were faced with. I can just mention that Mr Nieuwoudt and Mr van Zyl at that stage were completely aware of the activities of Pebco.

ADV BOOYENS: Did Nieuwoudt and van Zyl, and we know later Lotz as well became involved, did they have anything to do with the decision that the people had to be eliminated or were they only involved in the fact of the elimination?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I only involved them in the operation itself. ADV BOOYENS: In other words the fact of the elimination?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I then asked Captain van Zyl to compile a team and to plan how we were going to go over to the action of elimination. I believe that we also discussed this, that the perception had to be created that they had left the country and I can remember that we arranged that the vehicle was to be left at the Lesotho border. The place was identified.

I will not say that I did all the talking but we were in agreement that the old police station at Cradock was to be used to carry out the elimination. We had one problem and that was how we would get the three people aside to kidnap them. At that stage I was aware of Colonel Roelf Venter's Askaris who were somewhere in the area. And it was also then decided that they would have to play a possible role in the kidnapping.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Roelf Venter and Askaris, it's a Vlakplaas component which operated here in the Eastern Cape at that stage.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct. I do not know how long they had been here at that stage but they came down during the unrest. If I can remember correctly they were normally used to identify exiles who had returned to the areas, especially in unrest areas because at that stage we knew that the MKs were in abundance in our area.

ADV BOOYENS: So Vlakplaas was not specifically requested to come down for this operation, there were some of the operatives active here?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Just for clarity the local Security Branch's people were well-known.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is the reason why we considered using them for the sole purpose of assisting us with the kidnapping.

ADV BOOYENS: Your evidence does not make complete sense because possibly it will seem apparent from the other evidence as a result of certain information that was received the people were lured to the local airport, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And as the local airport was a public place local security police could not become involved because they would have been identified?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And that is why Vlakplaas people and Askaris were used because they were not known in this area.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: So they were involved to do the kidnapping?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The physical kidnapping of the people at the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Were they at all in the picture? Did they know that the intention was to eliminate these people or was it dealt with on a need-to-know basis?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I know they were not informed. I know that Colonel Venter was not informed either that this would be the case.

ADV BOOYENS: With the physical picking up of the people at the airport here in Port Elizabeth you were not involved but the other people and the Vlakplaas element was, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: One of the risks which existed at all times with such an operation is that people must be identified or be seen, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The people on the evening of the 8th these people were picked up at the airport, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And they were then to be taken to a disused police station at Cradock, that was what was planned.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was the plan.

ADV BOOYENS: You first had to wait to hear whether the alarm would not be raised that these people had been kidnapped?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Booyens can I just interrupt you there. I am not necessarily saying that you are going to do that but I would suggest that when you deal with as to what the other applicants might have said to Mr du Plessis, the present applicant, I am referring to the applicants you do not represent, as to what they had done or it is alleged they did, as also regarding what they could have told your client or clients, do not ask leading questions.

ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman, I won't do that.

I think we are the stage where you said that the other people, the intention was that they would only assist with the taking of the people and that they did not know what would happen further.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You did not go with to Post Chalmers that evening, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: We have already dealt with the fact that you remained behind in case, from the side of the public, any complaints would arise that the people had been kidnapped, then you would contact your people at Post Chalmers.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is true.

ADV BOOYENS: There were no allegations or complaints at that stage that these people had been kidnapped or that the kidnapping had been seen at the airport, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you then the next day, the 9th, did you drive to Post Chalmers and inform the people that no alarm had been raised and that the planned elimination could continue?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I know that it is a long time ago but can you remember at what time you reached Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: I worked out that it was approximately 12 o'clock or in that vicinity, because I had first gone to the office that morning and thereafter I left for Cradock.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you then tell them that no alarm had been raised?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you remain behind or return to Port Elizabeth?

MR DU PLESSIS: I came back to Port Elizabeth.

ADV BOOYENS: So you were not physically present when the people were eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I was not.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember, I know it's a long time ago, but can you remember in the middle of the day on the 8th when you were there, can you remember who was present at Post Chalmers? Sorry the 9th, the 9th.

MR DU PLESSIS: On the 9th it was the three people for which we are requesting amnesty, Captain van Zyl, Mr Nieuwoudt and Mr Lotz.

ADV BOOYENS: At that stage when you were there can you remember whether the Askaris and the Vlakplaas people were still present?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not see them there.

ADV BOOYENS: So it was just the three members of the local Security Branch?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You were there, you gave them the message and you returned.

MR DU PLESSIS: I did.

ADV BOOYENS: Later you were - it was reported to you that the people had been eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. I have the idea that it was the next day or during the course of the next day.

ADV BOOYENS: By whom?

MR DU PLESSIS: By Captain van Zyl.

ADV BOOYENS: Now what was the purpose, or let me put it differently, when you kidnapped these people was the purpose to interrogate them, to get information from them or to kill them?

MR DU PLESSIS: To kill them.

ADV BOOYENS: Allegations have been made and although I do not suggest - it's possibly suggested that you were physically present, that these people died or were hit to death during a drawn-out interrogation, was there any purpose in interrogating them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not at all.

ADV BOOYENS: The ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, Mr - did you not want any information from them? Did you want them to take whatever information they might have had, to take it together with them to their grave?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believed that if we got information from them - but we knew that we couldn't get any information from them.

ADV BOOYENS: Of the people who were present say that there was a superficial interrogation, I refer more specifically to Mr Nieuwoudt that he spoke to the people about that information they had available and it was information that he already had in his possession.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct. But I can also remember that while I was there Captain van Zyl told me that nothing new arose, but what I am saying is we didn't kidnap them to interrogate them. We kidnapped them to kill them.

ADV BOOYENS: The intention was that if you could get information from them it would have been a bonus.

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: But that was not the purpose of the kidnapping.

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you have any knowledge of any assault on the people there?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I don't know.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to the political motivation for this act and with reference to you I think you already touched on that, that you were the last line of defence, the Security Police, there was a war psychosis, it was a struggle at all cost and so forth, did you at that stage believe that resistance was a warranted, justified one?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I did.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you believe that this was a struggle that the security forces was something that had to be fought up until the end of your life because the politicians also said that they should not surrender?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you also believe at that stage that your duty and task as a policeman was to keep the government of the day in place and also to prevent that other forces subvert the government?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And as far as you are concerned with regard to your personal political belief did you believe that you were fighting for the South Africa in which you believed was the country for you?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Were you brainwashed to a certain extent and did you believe that the liberation movements or resistance movements what they were busy doing was not justified and that it was a threat for civilisation, and that it was your duty and your right to fight against it?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I believed that.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you in any way get some kind of an advantage or benefit for yourself ever?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV BOOYENS: What you did, did you do it to use the cliche, for country and nation?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The war talk by the politicians, Mr Vlok also referred to it, as far as it concerned you, the war on the borders was that war only there at that stage or did it also move inland?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes it was in the country itself, so the borders almost disappeared.

ADV BOOYENS: And people at that stage who were considered to be the enemy they weren't on the other side of the border, they didn't have a uniform, they were in amongst the people and you had to fight them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that's correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I use the word "enemy", are you also aware the fact that the term "enemy" was used, for example, quite freely at JMS meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I am aware of that.

ADV BOOYENS: And basically it was the situation of government forces and enemy forces, you were part of the government force and the reason for the existence of the Security Police was to protect the government against subversion.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And was that the political aim that you were striving for when you got involved in these situations to give resistance against the onslaught and I think today it isn't secret anymore, but the aim at that stage was to subvert the government of the day, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: More specifically on ground level here regarding the situation the aim was with this operation to give a blow to one of the major organisations against government.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that's correct. We would have done that by eliminating some of the leading figures.

ADV BOOYENS: And according to your planning if you would have succeeded in doing this did you believe that it could make things less effective?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I believed in that. If I think back we did in a way succeed in actually diminishing their activities.

ADV BOOYENS: So the aim was or the intention was to regain the benefit that Pebco had and to get the initiative back into the hands of the government?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: That would then include that the unrest situation should be lessened, the boycotts should be ended and the situation should normalise so that normal policing could occur.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was that the aim?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that was the only aim.

ADV BOOYENS: We've already paid attention to the broader background that it was not just concerned with Port Elizabeth but it was the total situation with regard to the whole country. This was one of the components of it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I think you already said that that as far as it concerned you that Pebco and its leaders were the most important cog in the whole wheel, in this whole structure in Port Elizabeth and all the activities going on?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is there anything you would like to add?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I have nothing to add.

ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps just a further aspect Mr du Plessis. It's 12 years later, we are talking about things that happened 12 years ago, how do you feel today, that people lost their lives?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am very sorry that the situation, or the political situation in South Africa increased in such a way that I was part of this process and I also had to do what one did in the end.

You also have pity on the families. I also have to say that I also feel sorry for my own family because they had no idea of what I was doing and for me as a commander it was very difficult to ask people who were working under me to help to salvage the situation where I now believe that the politicians had to save the whole situation and not have used us to do it for them.

ADV BOOYENS: Is that all?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens I don't know, it may be that for reasons that you may know better than I you deliberately chose not to deal with certain two points which seem to be obvious points which you should have traversed in your evidence-in-chief. And that is that -what report did you give later to Colonel Snyman, and number two, what happened to the bodies, eventually? If he does know what happened to the bodies ...(intervention)

ADV BOOYENS: His evidence as to what happened to the bodies will be hearsay Mr Chairman. There will be other evidence forthcoming as far as that is concerned.

Just the one aspect - Did you after you reported back, did you report to Colonel Snyman that the operation had been concluded?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And with regard to the bodies, did you, by means of hearsay, receive report that the bodies were burnt after they were eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you then confirm the content of your application?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is that all Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Who decided or was to decide as to how to get rid of the bodies?

ADV BOOYENS: Would you mind repeating your question please Mr Chairman, I don't think Mr du Plessis heard it.

CHAIRPERSON: Who decided and/or had to decide as to how the bodies should be disposed of?

MR DU PLESSIS: I left that to Captain van Zyl.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you exactly say to him?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot precisely remember my words but I know that we decided, myself and Captain van Zyl, that we would burn the bodies but I cannot remember specifically what we discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not sure I understand you. Let's take it step-by-step. Was it agreed that the bodies should be burned?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Whose suggestion was that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know, I believe it must have been mine.

ADV SANDI: Mr du Plessis can I ask, are you saying in your reply to the question by the Judge you are not sure who decided that the bodies should be burnt and you think it may have been you?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I am saying is that we discussed the planning and I believe that we discussed that bodies had to be burnt. I cannot remember whether I suggested, Captain van Zyl or whether both of us suggested it, but I in any case agreed with it.

CHAIRPERSON: And as far as you can remember, let us see if we can take it a little bit further, the bodies would be burnt and then what would happen to them?

MR DU PLESSIS: They would have been burnt out completely.

CHAIRPERSON: And where would they be burned?

MR DU PLESSIS: The place that we identified was the old police station, Post Chalmers.

CHAIRPERSON: What was to be used in burning these bodies?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I know it would have been wood and diesel.

CHAIRPERSON: Had preparations been made beforehand to get together all those things, the diesel and the firewood?

MR DU PLESSIS: I didn't arrange that, and I also didn't discuss it.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was to attend to that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Captain van Zyl executed the operation and I believe that he would have attended to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Who gave the report to you that the deceased had been killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Captain van Zyl.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he also tell you that the bodies were burnt?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know whether he gave me so much detail. I think he told me that the operation was concluded and everything was clean.

CHAIRPERSON: And in your report to Mr Snyman did you tell him that the bodies were burned?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't think that I gave any detail to Colonel Snyman, I just said that the elimination was done. I can't remember the exact words, it's impossible, but by implication that he didn't have to worry, it was completed.

CHAIRPERSON: Between you and Mr Snyman what would eventually happen to the bodies?

MR DU PLESSIS: Is that before or during the time that we discussed it?

CHAIRPERSON: During the planning.

MR DU PLESSIS: No we didn't discuss that. It was left in the hands of Colonel Snyman and that we would make a plan to do the elimination. I didn't discuss the detailed plans with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Villiers?

ADV DE VILLIERS: Yes Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: You have no questions?

ADV DE VILLIERS: Just one Mr Chairman, thanks. Mr du Plessis in what capacity did Captain van Zyl work at the Security Branch, it was 8 May 1985?

MR DU PLESSIS: He was the head of the terrorist desk or the tracing of people who returned and also the people who left the country.

ADV DE VILLIERS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman my learned friends on my right-hand side have a lot more questions to ask than I have, and I would prefer them to cross-examine before I do.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Lamey.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Just read your name into the record each time when you start.

ADV LAMEY: I will do so Mr Chairman. My surname is Lamey, and I represent Mr Mogoai as well as Mr Koole.

Mr du Plessis you say that Captain van Zyl was head of the Terrorist Desk, were you then directly commanding above Captain van Zyl?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: What did this desk entail, or this department or section which Captain van Zyl was in charge of, with you as commanding officer above him?

MR DU PLESSIS: This consisted of the following-up of information of people who had left the country. He also dealt with reporters who were involved in organisations.

ADV LAMEY: Did this involve the tracking of MK soldiers and weapons which could have been hidden in the area?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV LAMEY: The Vlakplaas contingency which was in PE at this stage, did they assist your office specifically in this task, namely the tracking down of terrorists and the identification of them, tracking down weapons, etc?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: And they were under the leadership of Captain Roelf Venter, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: You spoke about the interest which arose and the large degree of involvement of the Pebco leaders element in PE at that stage, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: And that ultimately a decision was made to neutralise this leadership element ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: To eliminate. Before I proceed with this question how far did your involvement stretch with the execution of the operation, until what stage were you involved?

MR DU PLESSIS: In my office where the discussions between myself and Mr Nieuwoudt and also at one stage with Mr Venter took place.

ADV LAMEY: On what date was this, can you remember?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember when I spoke specifically to Colonel Nieuwoudt and Mr van Zyl, it could be two weeks or even longer before the 8th but I think that we spoke to Mr Venter on the day of the kidnapping.

ADV LAMEY: Did you speak to Captain Venter yourself?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember that very well, but I believe that I did speak to him in the office.

ADV LAMEY: In your application you spoke of the compartmentalising of the operation, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: What do you mean by that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That the kidnapping was to be done by Captain Venter and some of his members and other members would then execute the operation afterwards. Captain Venter's team which included himself would therefore not be informed completely as to the ultimate purpose of the operation.

ADV LAMEY: In other words you are saying that Captain Venter was not informed that the persons were ultimately to be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Would Captain Venter and his men, specifically with reference to your discussions with him would they have been involved in any other capacity other than the kidnap?

MR DU PLESSIS: Nothing as far as I know.

ADV LAMEY: Was Captain van Zyl and Nieuwoudt present during this discussion?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that to be true.

ADV LAMEY: Did you know how the persons were supposed to reach the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I know that it was discussed that Mr Nieuwoudt would lure them to the airport by means of an informer.

ADV LAMEY: Apart from the fact that you know about an informer, and I don't want you to mention his name, but do you know where he originated from?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know, what I do know is that he would have said to have been from the British Embassy.

ADV LAMEY: So the plan was to eliminate the leader element of the Pebco Three, how many of this element were involved in this planning?

MR DU PLESSIS: Three of them.

ADV LAMEY: Three from the beginning?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV LAMEY: Are you sure about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I am.

ADV LAMEY: Mr du Plessis I would like to refer you to page 87 of your application in which in the third paragraph you say - I am going to read the whole paragraph.

"After my submission to Colonel Snyman the latter gave permission that an operation be initiated in order to eliminate the leader element of Pebco in order to stabilise the unrest and violence in the Eastern Cape. In this regard it can be mentioned that the following members of Pebco who are identified as part of the leader figures, Mr Godolozi, Mr Galela, Hashe, Fazi, Ngoyi and Qwabe".

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV LAMEY: But in the evidence that you have just given you said that from the outset there were only three while in the application there are more than three people ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry to interrupt. That is not the correct interpretation of that sentence. The previous sentence speaks of elimination. The last sentence is the one which you are trying to confront the witness gives a list of the leaders, not necessarily people to be eliminated.

ADV LAMEY: I see what you mean Mr Chairman, I will rephrase the question then.

Mr du Plessis, perhaps I must put it in a question. The logical way to solve the problems in the Eastern Cape, and specifically PE at that stage to control these problems was certainly to make an attempt to eliminate the leading figures of Pebco, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: Well you know why do you say that?

ADV LAMEY: I beg your pardon Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Why do you say that because he hasn't said in his evidence that the strategy was to eliminate the whole leadership core? I thought he said the strategy was to eliminate only three leaders. Is it your personal proposition that the best way for you to have gone about was to eliminate the entire leadership?

ADV LAMEY: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: If it is your personal proposition then you should put it that way, not in a way as to suggest that that was his evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman I must say my impression is in the context of his evidence and with regard to the activities of Pebco in general, that the leader element played a vital role here, and in fact also on the top of page 87 Mr du Plessis, and if I can just refer you to it

"It was according to the existing facts that was of cardinal interest that the leader element of Pebco had to be neutralised in order to take away the leader element".

Right Mr Chairman, I will rephrase the question.

Mr du Plessis was it of importance only to eliminate certain of the leaders in the Pebco organisation or was the plan to eliminate more than three?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can just say what I experienced and that is that we decided to eliminate some of the leader elements. We, on a previous occasion, we testified that we did prioritise them at the request of the JMS, not the Pebco leaders, but everybody that was involved in activities such as these and the situation at that stage, but we decided - I went to Colonel Snyman with the idea that if we were to remove those three, and that is what I believed then we would be able to make an impact.

ADV LAMEY: Surely there were other leaders in the organisation apart from these three people?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Now what would the impact have been if only three of the leaders were eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well it had an impact.

ADV LAMEY: Would the other leaders not just merely have taken over the organisation and carried on with the activities?

MR DU PLESSIS: These things are all possible.

ADV LAMEY: Mr du Plessis, would it not have been of importance seeing as the Vlakplaas members in the vicinity were involved and I accept, in view of the previous evidence, that these Pebco leaders, specifically these three, that they had information regarding insurgents, MK soldiers, weapons which were hidden, etc, am I wrong?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I do not believe that you are wrong.

ADV LAMEY: As Vlakplaas assisted your department with the identification and tracking down of terrorists and weapons would it not have been of importance to also involve them in the interrogation in order to get information before the people were to be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have never used Vlakplaas members for interrogation purposes because in my opinion they were not trained in interrogation.

ADV LAMEY: Are you saying that, in your opinion, they were not trained?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, not to do interrogations.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let's also put it differently. Would it not have been helpful if they were present during an interrogation even if they were not taking part in the interrogation?

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know what purpose it would have served if he was present during interrogation, I don't know what purpose this would have served.

CHAIRPERSON: Well some names may be mentioned by the people interrogated and then the Askaris who would confirm or dispute or clarify. For example names may be mentioned of some people outside the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Usually what we do is that we take statements, we write down the names and then we follow it up later. We can't have achieved anything there, as the normal procedure that was usually used. With regard to the photo album the Askaris, all the information that we wanted to get and I can't think of any instance but where we would have needed it we would have put it on paper.

CHAIRPERSON: Anyway your evidence is that, tell me if I am wrong, you have never interrogated anybody with or in the presence of the Askaris?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I am sitting here I cannot think of any incident. If someone can help me with that I can perhaps recall it but I cannot remember.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr du Plessis can I refer you to page 88 of your statement, paragraph 2 where you say

"When the activists were interrogated at Cradock I visited for a short time there".

can you give us more information with regard to this interrogation that you refer to in your application?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I meant with the interrogation is that these people had to be kept busy. I take it that Captain van Zyl or Nieuwoudt or someone who was present there would have talked to them and the idea was also as to hear from them what they know, things that we don't. And when I arrived I think it was Captain van Zyl told me that no new facts came to the fore. We already knew everything, there was nothing more specific that came to light.

ADV LAMEY: Mr du Plessis you said earlier that it wasn't much importance for the Vlakplaas members, I now refer to the Askaris whom I represent and I have to just correct myself, it's one Askari and one permanent member, Johannes Koole, of Vlakplaas the Askari whom I represent is Mr Mogoai, who said that should there be information during interrogation it could have been given to them later on, and therefore it wasn't necessary that they had to be present or that they had to go along for that purpose to the interrogation. Do I understand you correctly?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Based on your experience from tracing terrorists and AK-47s isn't it of utmost importance that should there be an interrogation at Post Chalmers police station that there could have been information that could be described as hot information that would have been followed up quickly? And then from Post Chalmers that there could have been acted should the information have come out, for example that one of the people would have said that one of the MK soldiers is hiding in a house in the township or that there's an AK-47 somewhere in the township, and that this information should be followed up urgently?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is possible.

ADV LAMEY: I accept that you weren't present from the beginning at the old police station ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: I was not Chairman.

ADV LAMEY: Ja. So you also don't know exactly what type of interrogation took place?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Do you have any knowledge of the fact that the way in which the people were lured by means of a trap to the airport was that there was a false impression created to the three deceased that someone from the British Embassy would have met them there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I testified in that regard.

ADV LAMEY: The person who would have waited for them would that have been a person who would have had an English accent, a white person?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that to be the case.

ADV LAMEY: If they had then expected such a person could that not have derailed the whole operation should they have been confronted at the airport by three Askaris or black persons?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I don't think so. I didn't precisely know from where they would kidnap them. I later on heard that it was the airport.

ADV LAMEY: You weren't involved or present when the instructions were given lower down to the Askari members, what they had to do?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV LAMEY: What was your impression, was it that - to use the term that you briefed Captain Venter and that he would then communicate it to his members?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: The communication wouldn't be taken from Captain van Zyl or Nieuwoudt, from your members, they would have been communicated with Captain Venter as leader of the group?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: In your evidence you testified that the Askaris intercepted the people at the airport, is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: But you weren't present?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: So that's hearsay?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: Exactly what happened at the airport, what occurred there you cannot give evidence on that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Just a moment Mr Chairman. Do you know if Captain van Zyl and Nieuwoudt and Lotz and other members of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth whether they accompanied Captain Venter and his team to the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I can't say that. I believe that they were together but how they moved I don't know.

ADV LAMEY: Do you know if Captain van Zyl and Nieuwoudt whether they were present?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so.

ADV LAMEY: Wouldn't that have created a danger that they would have been seen at the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I say I don't know what the circumstances were there. I didn't know how they planned the operation.

ADV LAMEY: But let's say they were, that's Captain van Zyl and Nieuwoudt, let's say they were at the airport, would that have been strange to you against the background of the planning that Captain Venter and his team is unknown in the area and that they would have done the interception?

MR DU PLESSIS: No that's not strange.

ADV LAMEY: But wouldn't the three persons have noticed something wrong?

MR DU PLESSIS: No one can create any scenario but as I know the airport it looks different now but there are many places were Captain van Zyl and Nieuwoudt could have been waiting, or they could have moved with vehicles from Captain Venter - well there are thousands of scenarios I can sketch ...(intervention)

ADV LAMEY: I am not going to question it any further, you weren't there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I have already said that.

ADV LAMEY: Captain Venter as we know will not testify most possibly in these proceedings but I have his amnesty application and I want to tell you what he says. Mr Chairman I refer to the amnesty application of Captain Venter, not his evidence during his hearing, and I refer to page 108 of his application.

ADV DE JAGER: Of Venter's application or of the papers before us?

ADV LAMEY: My apology Chairperson, it's not part of the bundle. Perhaps I made the wrong assumption that the Committee also has his application but at a later stage I will make copies available to the Committee.

I refer to paragraph 3 where Captain Venter says -

"The information at our disposal was ...

and within the context it refers to the three people that they would pick up at the airport -

"...that they were ANC activists who were involved in the unrest in that area and the aim of the operation was to question or to interrogate them to get information from them and to remove them from the area and to neutralise their involvement".

MR BRINK: Sorry Mr Chairman, may I just interpose. What you do have is the supplement and I think my learned friend Mr Lamey is reading from paginated page 4 which is marked 190 on the typed copy but it's paginated page 4 of the supplement.

ADV LAMEY: Mr Chairman may I just correct you. I am referring to a document which I now understand is not before you and that is his initial application of Venter, and it is paginated page 108.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes I think he read his original application into the record at that stage and Mr Brink is referring to page 4 which forms part of what he's read into the record at a previous occasion, because I think it's the same words actually.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I see also ja, it is indeed paginated page 4 of the bundle before you.

The important point that I want to make here and which is also important for the people that I represent is the fact that Captain Venter knew that the aim of this operation was inter alia, to interrogate them and to get the information from them, and you say that this was not discussed with Captain Venter?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that's not what I said. I said that the purpose of the Askaris was to intercept them at the airport or wherever, to kidnap them, and I believe that we told him that we wanted to interrogate them, but what I am saying is that I never told him that we wanted to eliminate them. That part we kept from him.

ADV LAMEY: I am not going to question you on that because my instructions are that the applicants whom I represent also had no knowledge of any plan to eliminate the people.

But I understood your evidence to be testimony that Captain Venter was only informed that they would be involved with a kidnapping and Captain Venter in his application goes further than kidnapping, he refers to interrogation to get information.

ADV DE JAGER: All that Venter is saying, in the part that you are quoting, is that

"I was asked to kidnap them. I was told that the purpose why they are going to be kidnapped would be to interrogate them".

If you kidnap someone why do you kidnap him? If Venter got the instruction you have to kidnap Mr X then he will ask you why must I kidnap him, is that not the logical thing?

ADV LAMEY: Yes I understand what you are saying ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: And then they told him that they purpose why they had to be kidnapped was to interrogate them.

ADV LAMEY: That is precisely the point and I also want to get information from Mr du Plessis to know whether there was an intentional plan to create a false perception with Captain Venter that the purpose of the kidnapping was interrogation.

ADV DE JAGER: I think his testimony is quite clear that he didn't tell Venter and the message also didn't get through to your people - well it could have got there by other means, but they weren't informed that we are going to kill these people.

ADV LAMEY: Yes I understand that Chairperson, but this has to do specifically with the fact whether Captain Venter was informed with regard to the purpose of the kidnapping that a false perception was created for the kidnapping and that is that it was for the purpose of interrogation, and what precisely was informed to him during the briefing.

ADV DE JAGER: If we accept his testimony then it's clear that a false perception was created with regard to Venter, but you can in fact ask whether the aim was to create a false perception.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you, yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman before my learned friend proceeds may I ask for a five minute adjournment please.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. I think we will adjourn for five minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HERMANUS BAREND DU PLESSIS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey were you still putting questions to the witness?

ADV LAMEY: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed to do that, and for the benefit of those members of the public who are already listening in, are not busy making a noise to us, we need to explain that we take these short adjournments because they have been requested by the witness for medical reasons. You can proceed.

EXAMINATION BY ADV LAMEY: (cont)

Mr du Plessis I just want to refer to my question before the adjournment. Is it possible that this object or purpose of interrogation was given as a false basis to Captain Venter for the reason for the kidnapping?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that to be true.

ADV LAMEY: What was the purpose of your visit later to the old police station at Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: We have already say that there was a concern that somebody could identify these people who were involved with the operation and this could be referred back to us that is why we did the kidnapping and I had to try to determine the next morning what had been said, what had been said on the ground and I had to make sure that no finger was pointing at us.

ADV LAMEY: How was it possible for you to determine whether there was cause for concern? Which methods would you use to determine this?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot tell you exactly now but there are physical sources, there are telephone apparatus which we used and I think the press also made a contribution, so I would have had a reasonable idea whether at that stage they had seen anything.

ADV LAMEY: Are you sure that you visited the place the day after the kidnapping?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Would it not, under the circumstances, have been better as you wanted to determine whether possible problems could arise and whether the members of the Security Branch, whether their involvement would have been identified in order to put this elimination off until the next day possibly?

MR DU PLESSIS: The fact remains this is not what happened. I am just telling the Commission what happened.

ADV LAMEY: How far is this police station from PE?

MR DU PLESSIS: Perhaps there are people who can help me, it's up to Cradock and I think Cradock is approximately, in the old language, 160 miles, more-or-less 30 or 40 kilometres from there.

ADV LAMEY: Is that approximately 300 kilometres?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, more-or-less 280 kilometres.

ADV LAMEY: What time did you arrive there?

MR DU PLESSIS: If I worked out my time, that I went to the office that morning and what I did there I believe that it must have been around about 12 o'clock.

ADV LAMEY: So you were at the office for approximately an hour after which you departed?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's not what I am saying, it can be longer, I usually go to the office at six o'clock.

ADV LAMEY: My instructions are that the kidnapped persons arrived at the police station very late the previous evening. In other words I want to say that you had a very short time in which to identify this aspect, whether it was a potential problem before your departure to the police station.

MR DU PLESSIS: It was not very long but if you knew the Eastern Cape it was long enough.

ADV LAMEY: Mr Mogoai and Koole will testify that they spent two nights at the old police station and that is why I am asking you these questions because according to their evidence they first - they only left on the second day after they had been held at the old police station in Cradock.

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I know they were kidnapped here the evening and the next evening the elimination was done. That is how I remember it. I cannot say anything more in this regard.

ADV LAMEY: Now could it be possible that seeing it's a long time ago that you could possible be wrong?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will agree that it is possible.

ADV LAMEY: Then I would also like to just put it to you that the evidence, as far as it is relevant to your evidence of Mr Mogoai and Mr Koole, was that these persons were intensively interrogated at the old police station at Cradock and that these three persons, during interrogation, were assaulted. Can you comment on that?

MR DU PLESSIS: All the commentary that I have on this is that with my visit to Cradock they did not appear as if they had been assaulted. I did not ask them directly but I believe that we did speak to one another and I know the three persons, I knew them reasonably well and I believe that had they been assaulted they would have reported it to me.

ADV LAMEY: Are you saying that the three persons would have reported it to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe they would have complained.

ADV LAMEY: Why would they have done that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Whenever they were assaulted or alleged to have been assaulted they would tell us. They have never been shy in this respect.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you surprised to learn that they were assaulted but nevertheless that they did not report to you, would that surprise you?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I would be surprised. I know of no person who was assaulted when I was not present, especially the high profile people, who denied or hid it when they were assaulted. They immediately reported to us if they were assaulted.

CHAIRPERSON: But they were at the mercy of those people and you expected them to report to you - they were at an isolated place, in the hands of the people that you had left them, you had left them with, how could you have expected them to really to report to you and then later you leave them behind in the hands of the very same people, how could you expect them to report to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: I see the problem but they did not appear to have been assaulted.

ADV SANDI: Mr du Plessis, maybe at the risk of belabouring the point, are you trying to suggest that they had confidence in you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No that is not what I said.

ADV SANDI: Is it not the implication of what you have just said that they sort of regarded you as someone to whom they could complain and say we have been assaulted and you would do something about it?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, no that is not what I said. What I am saying is that on occasion these people were high profile people, they were learned people, they were politically active and they had no fear of the Security Branch, neither did they hide it, and on various occasions they confronted us. I cannot recall specific cases but if anybody had assaulted them I believe that they would have reported it, regardless who arrived there.

You will also know that it was the orders from the ANC that the moment you were detained you had to report that you had been assaulted. So by implication that is what I want to believe.

ADV LAMEY: Mr du Plessis did you see these persons physical appearance when you arrived there?

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as I can remember, yes.

ADV LAMEY: My instructions were specifically that Mr Hashe had been assaulted to such a degree that his head was swollen and that he was bloodied.

MR DU PLESSIS: No that is nonsense.

ADV LAMEY: Was Captain Venter and his team of Askaris, to call them such, had they already left by the time you arrived?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believed that. I did not ask where they were nor did I see them.

ADV LAMEY: Just a minute Mr Chairman. I have got no further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask you for purpose of clarity Mr Lamey, the occasion when Mr Hashe was assaulted, as you put it, how does it stand in relation to the witness' visit to Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman it must have been before the visit of Mr du Plessis. My instructions are that they don't know whether Mr du Plessis visited Post Chalmers, they did not see him there. And my instructions are that they were there for two days and they parted the morning of the second day of their stay there at the old police station.

CHAIRPERSON: So on your client's version the witness could only have come there, if he did arrive around 12 o'clock midday, that could only have been the following day after the deceased would have slept at that place ...(intervention)

ADV LAMEY: Ja it must have been the second day after they have departed and not the first day ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Because the first day they arrived in PE isn't it?

ADV LAMEY: No if I could just - if I speak about the first day I speak during day time. They arrived, my instructions are they arrived in the evening where they were taken from the airport, they were there the whole following day.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: They slept two nights and they departed the morning of, in other words the second full day. It could be the third day in fact, the third day.

ADV DE JAGER: But they were taken at the airport after sunset, dark.

ADV LAMEY: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: During the night, say 11 o'clock, 12 o'clock or whatever the time they arrived there do you consider that to be the first night?

ADV LAMEY: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: The next day would be the first full day they are there ...(intervention)

ADV LAMEY: The first day, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And then they slept the night and departed the following morning or during the day, you don't know.

ADV LAMEY: Which would be the second day, ja.

ADV DE JAGER: Which would have been the second day.

ADV LAMEY: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And they have never seen Du Plessis there?

ADV LAMEY: My recollection of the instructions, if I could just confirm that specifically, but they cannot, they haven't got that in their picture that someone arrived there. They haven't noticed that they have seen him there. May I just confirm that instruction?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV LAMEY: As it pleases Mr Chairman. Yes Mr Chairman my instructions are indeed that they didn't see anybody arriving there while they were there.

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr du Plessis it seems that it should be your turn now.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr du Plessis these events took place quite a long time ago, is that not true?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is.

ADV DU PLESSIS: You were very actively involved with actions during that period, it was a very busy time.

MR DU PLESSIS: I agree with you.

ADV DU PLESSIS: It is possible therefore that one cannot recall certain things.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is true.

ADV DU PLESSIS: As we have also seen from your evidence it is quite possible that there are things which one cannot recall 100% correctly or some things which you cannot recall at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Can you remember how long you were present at the police station that morning when you arrived, how long did you spend there?

ADV DE JAGER: Can you just clarify he was at two police stations that day, the one his head office and the one at Port Chalmers.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Sorry, I thought it was clear. Naturally at Port Chalmers when you said you arrived at 12 o'clock.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot recall but I do not believe that I was there any longer than about two hours, if it was so long.

ADV DU PLESSIS: You testified that -let me just get this right, can you recall whether you saw Captain Venter there?

MR DU PLESSIS: That specific day with my visit?

ADV DU PLESSIS: Ja.

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And can you recall whether you saw the Askaris?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I did not see them there.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it possible that the Askaris could have been there when you were there, is it possible?

MR DU PLESSIS: Anything is possible but surely I would have seen them there, I would have seen their vehicle. I believe that Captain van Zyl, these are only scenarios, I believe that he would have informed me had they still been there.

ADV DU PLESSIS: But you do concede that it was possible that they were there, that your memory is not 100% correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can remember that I did not see them.

ADV DU PLESSIS: I accept that, but do you concede that it was possible that they could have been there?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's a possibility.

ADV DU PLESSIS: You say that's a possibility?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Because you see according to the evidence given by Colonel Venter and Mr Beeslaar had the Askaris still been present during your visit (het nog daar gewees dit) (not translated).

MR DU PLESSIS: These are all possibilities. I do not think it's very possible because my instruction was very clear that the Askaris only had to be involved in the kidnapping and thereafter had to withdraw. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I don't think Venter is speculating. Are you not putting it as a fact that Venter says that was the case?

ADV DU PLESSIS: Yes that was a fact Mr Chairman, yes. He testified about that and Mr Beeslaar will also testify to that effect.

Let me just make it clear what Colonel Venter and Beeslaar said in their evidence and this was that the Askaris spent the night there, that Colonel Venter and Mr Beeslaar, later the afternoon of the following day, that they arrived there and together with the Askaris they departed early that evening, that is the day after the kidnapping took place, and based on that the Askaris still had to be there when you arrived there at 12 o'clock that morning and that is the only reason for asking you this regarding the presence of the Askaris. You have already conceded that the possibility could exist that they had been there. I do not want you to speculate about other possibilities, my question is only do you concede in the light of memory problems, the fact that it all took place a long time ago, is it possible that the Askaris could have been there that morning when you arrived?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is possible, but as I say I did not see them and as far as I know they were not there.

ADV DE JAGER: Let us just get some clarity. Venter and Beeslaar were they there or not?

ADV DU PLESSIS: They were not there when Mr du Plessis arrived.

ADV DE JAGER: When did they arrive?

ADV DU PLESSIS: They arrived later that afternoon.

Did you have a great deal to do with Askaris?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not - reasonably.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Did you know what an Askari was?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it correct if I say that one's trust would be rather restricted with regard to an Askari?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: In other words one would just have told him what was necessary and where one needed him one would have given him information and no more?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it also true, do you agree with me that the Security Police did not use Askaris in sensitive operations?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Do you also agree with me that under those circumstances Askaris would not easily be involved in interrogations where the serious assaults would have taken place?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: The Security Police would also not have held serious interrogations in the presence of Askaris, do you agree?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do.

ADV DU PLESSIS: If we then go over to elimination, such as in this case, the Security Police, is it possible that they could have done this in the presence of these Askaris under normal circumstances?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I would definitely not have done that.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And especially in this case, if we look at this specific case where the Askaris were not stationed under you, where they came from Vlakplaas and they were not informed about the circumstances is there a possibility that you would have allowed them to be present at the interrogation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Never.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And the people who worked under you? I am referring to van Zyl, Lotz and Nieuwoudt.

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not believe that they would have done this. It was my instructions that they were not to participate in the interrogation.

ADV DU PLESSIS: It was known among the members of the PE Security Branch, Nieuwoudt, Lotz and Van Zyl, or was it known among them that the purpose of the operation was elimination and that purpose was not made known, or should not have been made known to Captain Venter?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: In other words they all knew what the ultimate objective was, but Venter did not?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Was that also your instructions?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Can one then accept that where Captain Venter gave evidence or testified that according to him the purpose of the operation was interrogation, that this was a deduction that he made?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's true.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Am I also correct in saying that if the people under you, Lotz, Van Zyl and Nieuwoudt, that had they carried out your orders they would surely not have discussed serious interrogations or held this in the presence of the Askaris?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis I am going to read this long sentence to you and you must tell me whether in your opinion this is a deduction that was made regarding Captain Venter. That is the portion that was read to you earlier on.

"The purpose of the operation was to interrogate them, gain information, remove them out of the area and neutralise their involvement".

Are you saying that was or could be a deduction on the part of Captain Venter?

MR DU PLESSIS: No that doesn't seem to be the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Good, thank you.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, I just have to make a point that one obviously has to read Colonel Venter's testimony in total context but I will leave it, I won't ask further questions about that.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis I have also got the same problem as my learned Judge. At the top of page 4

"The information available to us was that they were ANC activists involved in the unrest in the area, the purpose of the operation...."

no I won't say that the first sentence also involves information available to us, but there is no suggestion that he sort of made a deduction or came to a conclusion the purpose was that, it is more direct evidence.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Yes but Mr Chairman one must clearly realise that when he testified he testified about what he knew. Now all I am asking is if, and that was the gist of the question, if he testified that and Mr du Plessis is correct in his evidence, surely this was the impression under which he was and it could have been a deduction that he made that that was the purpose of the operation. The only point in asking that is to show that there is no conflict between the two. That's the only point.

ADV DE JAGER: It could have been an instruction directly - "go and abduct them because we want to interrogate them".

ADV DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman clearly the evidence, if we read the whole context of the application, I've got the Afrikaans in front of me, it says in the third paragraph

"The information at our disposal was that they were ANC activists who were involved in the unrest. The purpose of the operation was to interrogate them and to neutralise their involvement. I had no knowledge of a decision which was made that they had to be eliminated".

Now the point is that that was what Colonel Venter testified and that was according to his knowledge. He nowhere testified, as far as I can remember, that he was given an instruction that there was to be an interrogation. He says -

"That the purpose of the operation was to interrogate them".

Now the point I am trying to make is if he testified it in that way that was never, he was never asked to comment about the fact was it an instruction or not. The fact that he testifies that in relation to Mr du Plessis' evidence, I am asking Mr du Plessis if that is what Captain Venter said, would that have been his, the impression he had or would it have been a deduction that he made.

CHAIRPERSON: That would have to be a very huge deduction Mr du Plessis. In fact are you suggesting that Captain Venter took his men to go and abduct people without specifically being told of the purpose thereof? He acted merely on the basis of an assumption. That would be very strange.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman he testified that the "...that the purpose of the operation was to interrogate". Now the evidence of Mr du Plessis is that he was never brought under the correct impression of what the purpose of the operation was, "elimination". Now the only other reason why people had to be abducted in those circumstances could have been interrogation, it cannot be anything else.

ADV DE JAGER: It did not have to be a deduction, it could have been that he told him directly - we want the man to interrogate him, go and kidnap him.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Is it possible that Captain Venter was directly brought under the impression that the purpose was interrogation?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that I did, I had to have given him a reason why I wanted the people.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Will you bear with me for a moment.

ADV SANDI: Mr du Plessis can I ask a question. Mr Venter seems to have been a very senior member of the force who was involved in making attempts to combat terrorism, the total onslaught, why should he be kept in the dark as to the purpose of elimination? Did you not have confidence in Venter?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson I won't say that I did not trust him, I just felt that only the people who had to know were to be informed. We did not want to involve everybody who had anything to do with the operation. That is the only reason.

ADV SANDI: I also find it a bit strange that someone would be involved in organising a full group of people who will execute abduction or kidnapping of people who are perceived to be troublesome figures so that they can be eliminated, such person is not told that the idea is to kill these people in line with what he referred to as the "silent policy of the day", to eliminate, to kill such people.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can just repeat we used the Askaris, Captain Venter's people only for the abduction. It was not to do anything further. That was the decision that was made at that time and there was no other sinister reason behind it. I did not want to involve them in the operation. It was only because we were known and as a result of that we had to use these people to abduct these people so that we could get hold of them.

ADV SANDI: That is precisely what I say I find extremely odd.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't find it strange at all.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman maybe I can enlighten you in respect of this. Mr du Plessis evidence was given often before the Commission and before Judge Ngoepe and Advocate de Jager with regard to the procedures and actions of the Security Police. In this regard, with regards to the question that was just asked, I just want to know whether there was a general use that the Security Police acted on a need to know basis?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And am I correct in saying that people often participated in operations while they only had a part of the information and not all the information?

MR DU PLESSIS: In most cases that was so.

ADV DU PLESSIS: In this case where Captain Venter was not informed fully, is that the normal action of the Security Police?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

ADV DU PLESSIS: This is the last question I am going to ask and that is that if Vlakplaas members such as these came to work in your area, under whose command did they fall?

MR DU PLESSIS: If I can recall correctly the instructions were that they had to report to the commanding officer per se of the region that they went to and then that was devolved to the unit commanding officer who was working with that unit and in turn he would entrust them to someone or give them the necessary assistance such as logistics etc.

ADV DU PLESSIS: Am I correct in saying that they fell under the command structure of the Security Branch Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we should adjourn until two o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV NYOKA

ADV NYOKA: Mr Chairperson, we wish to oppose the amnesty application on the two grounds legally required, namely, lack of ... Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, Pumelele Nyoka for the widows and families. We wish to oppose the amnesty application of Mr du Plessis on the two grounds legally required. Namely, lack of full disclosure and no political motive shown. I would like to start the questioning.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV NYOKA

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Mr du Plessis, looking back now, as we are at 1997, looking back to 1985, it was within five years, to be precise, that is from May eight or nine 1985 to the 11th of February 1990, when the groupings that you fought so hard against, the ANC, SACP alliance were unbanned and the leaders released from prison, was the fight worth it? Was the fight worth the killing?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage I believed that that was the only option. I did not envisage what the future would hold.

ADV NYOKA: I understand that, I just wanted your sentiment. Consistent with your spirit of apologising, is it also not correct that those remaining Pebco leaders, two of them, are currently in Parliament, Mrs Ivy Kina and Mr Harry Faaz. They are currently in Parliament, being your leaders and my leaders.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. You have stated that the reason why the Pebco leadership had to be killed were, was, were that there was a radicalism and you also wanted to regain the initiative. Is it not correct that even if you had removed some radicals, there were other radial leaders and members of Pebco that were alive at the time. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it also not correct that Pebco formed a constituent of UDF which was the umbrella body, there were other radical political organisations like Cosas and Cosatu which had radical members? So, eliminating a specific grouping like Pebco leaders would have been inconsequential or futile. Would you agree with me?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not agree.

ADV NYOKA: I understand why you do not, because you did not mention that in your application. You said you wanted to regain the initiative, but is it not correct that after the disappearance was made publicly known in the media, there were protests for the release or the revelation of the leaders resulting in a State of Emergency, which you do not mention, in June 1985, two months afterwards or July 1985, two months afterwards, because of the pressure that was exerted for the release of the leaders. Is it not correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: So, therefore, you grossly miscalculated that the death will instead diminish activism or you will regain the initiative? That was not the case, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I believed that it served a purpose and it also served a purpose, to a measure, to curb Pebco's activities and structures.

ADV NYOKA: When that decision was made to kill the leadership, did you tell beforehand or afterwards the leaders, political leaders or your seniors, except Mr Snyman, who is an applicant, like the Regional Commissioner of the South African Police, that you were going to kill these people or you kill them or the Minister of Law and Order, did you tell them afterwards or beforehand of your...?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not inform them.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not inform them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I did not get the instruction from them. I discussed it with Colonel Snyman and we decided he had to do it. I did not take it any further than that.

ADV NYOKA: Is it correct that you were hiding that from them, that you were going to do that? Were you hiding it from them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Logically, yes.

ADV NYOKA: You were trying to achieve a political motive of helping restoration of law and order in the national interests, helping them. How can you hide something that is beneficial to them?

MR DU PLESSIS: They never gave us direct instructions, we just accepted, by implication, that they had knowledge of that and I believed that, I not only in their interest, but in my own interest, did this.

ADV NYOKA: But you said you relied on their statements that that meant you must kill. Why did you not send a memorandum as the Regional Command of the Security Police that, look, we want to be clear about this? Are you certain that you were not asked to kill by your statements and then get a feedback from them that, yes or no, if you were in doubt?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not do that. I also did not believe that they would have given authority, written authority.

ADV NYOKA: So, you acted on your own?

MR DU PLESSIS: I acted on my own whilst believing that it was the only way to normalise the country or the Port Elizabeth region.

ADV NYOKA: Had they known they will have stopped you or, perhaps, ensured that there were criminal charges against you if you had, if they had known that you had actually implemented that, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that if I had asked them directly that they would not have given us authorisation by implication, but directly we would never have received that, in any case, from the politicians.

ADV NYOKA: I am saying this on your own version, I am not saying that they did not know, but on your own version, I am not saying they did not know. Assuming they did not, they will have stopped you or they will have laid or ensure that criminal charges were laid for abduction and murder.

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that.

ADV NYOKA: Was, also, the intention to kill the leadership to scare the rest of the remaining leadership? Was that also the intention?

MR DU PLESSIS: That, I believe it was also the idea, that they would ask questions among themselves and also then have a low profile.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that at the time there was the UDF and Azapo feud, not so, which was mentioned in the opposing affidavit of Mr Snyman when there was a habeus corpus application for the release of the leaders? He mentioned in his statement that it was possible that the leaders could have been killed or escape during the UDF and Azapo feud. So, there must have been that feud at that time, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: How would your objective then be achieved if, A, you hid your actions from your leaders, B, you hid your actions from the politicians and, thirdly, there was the Azapo, UDF feud, who will know that you were responsible, how can you achieve, how could you have achieved, therefore, the deterrents of scaring them?

MR DU PLESSIS: The fact remains that at that stage and, by implication they actually disappeared, there were questions asked by the other leaders and I believe the other leaders did not know precisely what had happened. So, they were more careful although you do not know who is responsible.

ADV NYOKA: You thought they were careful, you do not know they were careful.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I would not know that.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Before I go further, is it correct that you applied for amnesty for abduction and murder on the 8th of May and 9th of May and in Port Elizabeth and Cradock, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: I notice in the bundle, page 84, it has not been amended, (ii), the dates mentioned is only the ninth of May and, (iii), the place mentioned is only Cradock. There is no mention of the date of the eighth of May for abduction. There is no date, there is no mention of the place of abduction being PE. The impression is being created only that you are referring to the ninth of May and Cradock, that is murder. Can your, perhaps, your people make an amendment in that regard?

MR VAN DER MERWE: We will do so, Mr Chairman. We, in fact, did say that we would deal with the abduction and the evidence in facto. May I apply for an amendment to include the date, 8th of May, and for the place, Port Elizabeth, as well.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. As a policeman you were employed by the State in the Ministry of Law and Order?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: And your contract of employment was based on the Law of South Africa?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And your contract of employment contained your rights, duties and capacities as a policeman?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Did those duties and capacities include abduction and murder?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV NYOKA: In your motivation at the end of your application you said that you were doing this in compliance with the duties and capacities. How can you, therefore, say that you were acting within your duties and capacities if those duties and capacities did not cater for abduction and murder? Is that not a contradiction?

MR DU PLESSIS: The fact remains that we, as security force members, had to, because of circumstances at that time, we had to go much further than was what expected of me as a police or policeman. When I joined the security task, it was to gain information, to process it and then to take people to court with the evidence and in my years in the security branch it changed totally. We were part of the so-called war, because it was a war raging in the country. We were part of it and so our duties then also followed and it is a pity that it actually happened.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that you believed that a security policeman had the right to kill, simple and klaar. Can you comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not believe that.

ADV NYOKA: Let us come to the speeches of politicians. If, as you said, that the politicians speeches and the National Party Government leaders lent themselves to interpretation to the fact that you had to kill freedom fighters, why then did you not seek definite clarification that that should be case? It is such an important thing, I have to repeat it. Why did you not seek definite clarification from them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot think of a reason, I just did not clear it out.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that, perhaps, those words like "eliminate" or "kill" or "take out" did not refer to active guerrillas, people who were found in, with weapons and people who were actually engaged in fights with the security police, not people, leaders who were engaged in peaceful activity like calling for rent boycotts, etcetera. Did those words not mean, refer to those participants, the actual guerrillas, I am not going to call them terrorists, the actual guerrillas, did they not refer to them, where you find and kill them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know, they did not pertinently state it like that. Not that I can recall. Perhaps, that as well, but I can just say to you that the peaceful activities that you are referring to, that might be the case. It started with rent boycotts, but where did it end? People who were killed, vehicles that were burnt out, because of the occurrences that was the result.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to take this opportunity of quoting two different, but relevant extracts of Mr P W Botha, without holding any brief for him, which were quoted in a book written for him entitled Fighter and Reformer, extracts of, from speeches of P W Botha compiled by Mr J J J Scholtz. He says that on page 94, it is available in UPE library, just in case anyone wants it.

"If we have to fight, then let us fight, but do you know what the price is? It is your sons, it is your husbands who will be called up if all things fail. I am prepared to accept that responsibility, but before I do so I want to know that I have made every other effort to achieve peace for the sake of the countries future."

What do you read in that statement? Does it not read that after the exhaustion of all legal means, then we can resort to illegal means?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. And then on total onslaught on page 28 of the same book he quotes, he says, it is quoted as having said. Okay, that first bit was made at a NP meeting in Forestsmith on the 25th of April 1980. The second one was made in a NP meeting at Witbank on the 16th of September 1980. It is, it goes like this,

"Against these forces that want to destroy our stability, we have to develop a national opposing wheel. That national opposing wheel should not be only a White wheel, it must also be established amongst the Coloureds and Blacks".

What do you read from that statement?

MR DU PLESSIS: Anything is possible to deduce from that. They started with the Tricamaral Parliament and they also started with the so-called Bantustans Government which was not acceptable.

ADV NYOKA: The total, that national opposing wheel meant that other groups, racial groups had to be involved in the fight against the so-called terrorists. If, therefore, to kill peaceful activists, to kill active, peaceful activists, was that not going to be contrary to that goal of a national opposing wheel?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: No, because you started this. You referred to the political background and your speech consists of 80%, 8% of your speech is political. I thought you would be able to have an answer on that.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Last month, that is October 1997, some National Party politicians and former leaders, like Mr Vlok, distanced themselves from your actions, saying that they were unauthorised, dumping you, so to speak. What is your feeling about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never expected, in all honesty, that Mr Vlok or any other politician would testify in front of this Committee and say that they, by implication, gave authority, I never expected that and they also never gave direct authority, that is what I am saying, that by implication the inference was made that they actually gave authorisation.

ADV NYOKA: So, you are disappointed to some extent? You are disappointed with Mr Vlok?

MR DU PLESSIS: That he does not come forward totally, yes, that is true.

ADV NYOKA: So, are you saying he was not speaking the truth when you said so?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that is not what I am saying. I believe that he knew. I do not say that he knew about everything. I also do not say that all the politicians knew what was going on, but there are people in head office and there are political leaders who, if they did not know directly, they knew by implication what was going on.

ADV NYOKA: Some of them, far right leaders, said that they suspected that these atrocities were being perpetrated, but they did nothing about that. What is your comment about that one? You are not going to mention their names, in October last month.

MR DU PLESSIS: Which commentary do you want?

ADV NYOKA: They said, okay, they went further than Mr Vlok who said those actions were unauthorised, they were due to misinterpretations. Some said we suspected that these atrocities occurred, but we kept a blind eye to that. What is your feeling about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that it happened.

ADV NYOKA: On the eighth of October, in the Special TRC hearing on armed forces in Cape Town, General Joep Joubert said that there was a special, there were special forces in the Defence Force which assisted regional commands of the Security Branch in eliminating activists. Did he come that month or month before or during that year of 1985 to assist you, consistent with what he is saying, consistent with what he said in Cape Town?

MR DU PLESSIS: To assist in what regard?

ADV NYOKA: In eliminating ANC activists. Do you not recall that or you never came to be ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Not as far as I know.

ADV NYOKA: Because it is said that three problem areas were identified, Eastern Cape, Northern Transvaal and Witwatersrand, specifically Eastern Cape. If, as the Head at that time, you must have known about that, because you were mentioned in the Eastern Cape, that is not you personally, as the security branch, you must have known about that, those special forces, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I knew about the special forces, but what I am saying is that I do not know of General Joubert, who was directly involved in this operation. It could be that at the JMS, he attended it, but I do not have any knowledge.

ADV NYOKA: But you said the actions were taken jointly with the regional commands. That is, perhaps Mr Snyman would know about him, but if Mr Snyman will know about him, surely as his junior, he will tell you about that, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that to be so.

ADV NYOKA: You do not recall that the special forces came and assisted the regional command of the Security Branch in the Eastern Cape?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, what happened, we had or there were different military members, army members who did their service in the Eastern Cape, but I do not know whether spec forces came with authorisation to eliminate, I cannot tell, say that to you. Perhaps it was discussed on JMS level or other places, could be possible, yes.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that when the first Pebco executive was formed, three of its members, namely Mr Thozamele Botha, Mono Padelie and Paul Chume were restricted in 1980 and the new executive was elected? Is that, do you recall that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can remember that they served on the executive, but I believe they were restricted. If you say that to me, I will accept that. I cannot recall.

ADV NYOKA: And further that from then on the Pebco executive kept on changing yearly, that is four times. Once in 1981, 1982, 1983 and on the 26th of March 1985 before the leaders were killed, the Pebco executive kept on changing. I got that information from Mr Nieuwoudt's application.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Yes, I am very grateful to him for teaching me. If yes, did that not seriously mean that eliminating a particular executive was a futile exercise, because another one would just crop up?

MR DU PLESSIS: Anything is possible. At that stage that was what we believed would work best and from 1980 with Thozamele Botha and Pebco up to 85 for this group, there was dramatic change, the violence increased.

ADV NYOKA: That, in fact, in March 1986 there were two interim executives in the year of 1987. That is on the eighth of April 1987 and the 23rd of August 1987, there were other executives demonstrating the failure of your plan or intentions.

MR DU PLESSIS: Eighty seven or when was that.

ADV NYOKA: I am saying that a new Pebco executive was formed in March 1986 and then there were two interim executives in the same year of 1987 to clearly demonstrate that your plan to intimidate or scare the executive of Pebco was futile.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, that is some time after 85.

ADV NYOKA: Ja, the reason why it was sometime after 85, because there were two States of Emergency. One from July to November, four months the leadership was detained, and then there was another one in 1986, a second State of Emergency. So, there was not much activity.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it furthermore not correct that the Pebco leadership survived right up to 1990 and up to the elections?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it, therefore, looking back, not correct to concede that you grossly miscalculated the entire situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is quite possible, but at that stage I believed that it would work.

ADV NYOKA: I do not think it is a possibility, it is a reality, because the events of today show that it was a gross miscalculation. It is not a possibility, it is a reality.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Let us come to legal options. Which legal options did you consider before venturing on this plan?

MR DU PLESSIS: The only available were criminal cases, we could not get evidence. The second was restriction, which I already explained, it had no teeth and then detention and at that stage we did not consider that, because that would have been counter-productive.

ADV NYOKA: You mentioned three. I noticed that you omitted the banishment legal option, you omitted the State of Emergency legal option.

MR VAN DER MERWE OBJECTS

MR VAN DER MERWE: State of Emergency was only announced about two months after this, Mr Chairman, and Banishment, I think, is, in fact, what the witness referred as "die inperking" that is what is commonly called a Banning Order.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Chairman, I do not know whether my learned friend is assisting the applicant, but I think the applicant can answer on his own. I wish to restate what I said again. Banishment is not a Banning Order, it is to take someone from an area to another area, Banning Order is to restrict a person in that locality, legally, how I understand it and, secondly, the State of Emergency is a legal option on its own. I was not talking about events after, I said why did you not think about that before killing them, not afterwards? Why did you not say, before we kill, gentlemen, let us impose a State of Emergency, because it was imposed two months later on? Why did you not think about it before, not afterwards. That is the point I am trying to drive. Can you please answer the question?

MR DU PLESSIS: You made a long statement so I do not know what the question is.

ADV NYOKA: The question is why did you not think about the State of Emergency before killing them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not think of it. The politicians had the authority to do that, the power to do that. Perhaps it was suggested, but we did not send reports to head office, we wrote books to point to them that the political situation was of such a nature that we were losing control and every time they came back to us with just one thing, you have to make a plan, you have to salvage the situation. ADV NYOKA: You mentioned that the legal options would not have desired effects. You mentioned that, not the politicians. My question is, even though the ultimate decision rested with the politicians, why did you not suggest that let us consider a State of Emergency rather than killing them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not suggest it to them.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. So you did not apply your mind carefully about this situation? You did not apply your mind carefully before taking someone's life? Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I had within my powers I considered thoroughly. I did not consider asking them for State of Emergency. I believe that if they wanted to have a State of Emergency, they would, in fact, have stated it. Possibly they had some reasons why they did not do it beforehand.

ADV NYOKA: How long have you been a policeman?

MR DU PLESSIS: Since 1961.

ADV NYOKA: Since 1961. I am sure you are aware of the 1960 State of Emergency which had good results? You are aware of that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV NYOKA: You did not know about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I knew a bit, but I do not have real physical knowledge of it. If you would ask me about it, I could not give you any information to you and 61 I was in the police depot, then I only became active later.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Snyman, when you spoke to him, had 13 years experience as a policeman and he started being a policeman in 1947. Why did you not, when you were discussing this with him say, look, please suggest other legal options? Maybe he could have helped you by saying there was a State of Emergency I know of in 1960, let us suggest that to the relevant authorities. Why did you not do, why did you not suggest that or talk to him about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not discuss it with him. I kept Colonel Snyman, on a day to day basis, abreast of what was happening on this area. He informed the JMS, we informed head office, specific Ministers, we kept them up to date. We believe that they thought about these things, but I did not suggest it to Colonel Snyman.

ADV NYOKA: Okay, alright. No, why I am asking you all this, because he had a senior position and the applicants represented by the same lawyers said that they did not doubt your summary, you had the reputation as a policeman. I thought that you will also have the thought of thinking about a State of Emergency. That is what I read from the statement, that this is a responsible policeman. Surely, he must have thought about the State of Emergency, suggesting it.

MR DU PLESSIS: No I did not think of a State of Emergency.

ADV NYOKA: That is why I say that you did not apply your mind carefully to this before deciding to kill the three activists. Do you agree with me?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not agree completely, because it was not in my interest to do that. I cannot call for a State of Emergency, I can only suggest it. I cannot declare it and I think they actually thought about it at that stage. Besides the State of Emergency there was nothing really that could be done.

ADV NYOKA: You said you could not agree with me completely, which part do you agree with?

MR DU PLESSIS: And that is that I did not ask for a State of Emergency.

ADV NYOKA: Okay. Before considering and embarking upon the ultimate and drastic illegal option of death to, the illegal option of death to the Pebco leadership or some of it, did you not consider or embark upon any less drastic illegal options so as to scare them or achieve your goals less drastic illegal options? Did you not consider those and embark upon them?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think there was something like that.

ADV NYOKA: No, I will give you an example. Assaulting people, activists, bombing their houses, Mrs Hashe's house was bombed after the three days-stay away in March, things like those or threatening telephone calls, we are watching you or something like that, to scare them rather than killing them, those are the examples that I am referring about, I am referring to.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, we did not think of that. That was not an option for me.

ADV NYOKA: Maybe they will have been alive today if you had considered that, although I deny that you did not consider it, because that was being done by the police. They assaulted people and they bombed houses. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will concede or, that people attacked houses with bombs.

ADV NYOKA: Was that not a less drastic illegal act, option than death?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not think of that.

ADV NYOKA: No, I am asking now, would that not have been a less drastic illegal option than death? I am asking now, that is all, that is all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, possibly yes.

ADV NYOKA: Then why did you not consider it?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not consider it. I cannot give you a reason.

ADV NYOKA: Again, I put it to you that you did not apply your mind to the entire situation before taking life? This is the second instance I am saying that. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I believe I did.

ADV NYOKA: You said that detentional trial could not be embarked upon, because there would be protests, that the leaders be released etcetera. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that two months after the death of the three Pebco leaders, in July 1985, a State of Emergency was imposed which lasted until November 1985, that is for four months, and during that period the entire UDF leadership, including the Pebco leadership, was detained in terms of the State of Emergency. Is that not correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it also not correct that there was a further three year State of Emergency from 1986 to 1989, where the leadership again was detained with other constituent parties, like Cosas, etcetera? Is that not correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Is it also not correct that before the imposition of the State of Emergency, there was the indefinite period, a type of detentional trial, which succeeded the 180 day detention without trial? Is that not correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know whether it was successful.

ADV NYOKA: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know.

ADV NYOKA: I am not asking about success, I am asking whether it was not present or not, not whether it was a success or failure.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes it was.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Why is that this option of an indefinite period detentional trial was not used if the leaders were detained for only four months during the first State of Emergency and released, if it did not have any effect, why did you not opt for it?

MR DU PLESSIS: We did not have a State of Emergency at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: No, I am saying that I do not understand that if people could be detained for four months, even during a State of Emergency, there was no reason why they could not be detained indefinitely without the State of Emergency, that is what I want to, the point I am trying to drive at.

MR DU PLESSIS: The moment that we detained them was the result of the unrest much higher, the intensity of the unrest became worse. Every time when we detained them and that is why it served no purpose and we got pressure from all sides to release them, should we detain them.

ADV NYOKA: If you were getting pressure from the people on the ground for people to be released, did you not get the same pressure when they were in detention for four months and when they were in detention for the three years, because you said you could not detain without trial because of pressure from the ground? Did you not get the same pressure during the State of Emergency?

MR DU PLESSIS: During the State of Emergency there was also pressure, but you had more powers. The moment that they started, you just locked them up. How many people in PE, I think in the Eastern Cape the most people were, in fact, detained under the State of Emergency.

ADV NYOKA: But, Mr Du Plessis, you were an applicant in the previous Mthimkulu and Madaka hearing last month. Mr Madaka was, Mr Mthimkulu was detained for five months May, June, July, August, September and released in October. Why could you not do the same and detain them for such a long period without resorting to the State of Emergency?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, it did not work at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: What did not work?

MR DU PLESSIS: The detention of Mthimkulu.

ADV NYOKA: Okay. You said that you were an applicant at Mthimkulu, Madaka hearing. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: And you were one of the people who took the decision for them to be killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: You also said in your application that a year after, on the 20th August 1983, UDF was formed and political mobilisation increased. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: Can you honestly tell me now why was it that you moved from one killing to another if the first one did not have the desired effect, because subsequent afterwards UDF was formed, they took off where the dead Mthimkulu left of. Why did you move from one killing to another?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was the case, because of the circumstances in which we were. We went, had to go from the one to the other. It was the pressure.

ADV NYOKA: My point is, why did you not say, gentlemen, we have done this in 1982. I do not think, in view of the fact that UDF has been formed, we will achieve results if you kill further. Why did you not say that, no, let us not opt for killing, because it did not work, look at the UDF being formed and later on the Mass Democratic Movement?

MR DU PLESSIS: We also know the history of what happened later with the UDF people at a later stage.

ADV NYOKA: No, I am saying that at the time that you decided to embark upon the killing, why did you not say there is a previous lesson, we killed Mthimkulu, Madaka, but UDF was formed. If we kill, there might be another grouping, so it is useless to kill people. Why did you not say so?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that after the arrest of the very first Pebco executive in 1990, there had been felt some fair inactivity by Pebco leaders, after the arrest in 1980. Is not correct? Like Mr Thozamele Botha, there was some inactivity of Pebco.

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage they only got off the ground.

ADV NYOKA: So, did that not prove that detentional trial does, to some extent, work?

MR DU PLESSIS: In, at that stage, yes.

ADV NYOKA: Why do you say so, at that stage, yes?

MR DU PLESSIS: Because the people were not politicised to that extent.

ADV NYOKA: I beg to differ with you about that. When apartheid was introduced in 1948, as early as 1952 in the first Defiance Campaign, 8000 people were arrested for defying Apartheid Laws. Was that not politicisation from the very beginning?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not have a problem with that, but I am referring to the situation 1980, as opposed to 85, those were two different situations.

ADV NYOKA: I know you have no problem, that is not my point. My point was that political mobilisation started way back, not in 1985, 1952, 1960, 1976 right through. It is a misconception saying that people became politically mobilised only in the early 90's. It is, in fact, an insult to them.

MR DU PLESSIS: I also have never said it. I have never said it.

ADV NYOKA: In your written statement. Mr Chairperson, I would like Mr Francois van der Merwe to be restrained, he keeps on shaking his head and he is distracting me. I do not, I did not shake the head, my head when your applicants are testifying. Please stop shaking your head, you are distracting me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka, there could have been a better way of putting it, especially because he is your colleague.

ADV NYOKA: Okay, I must also apologise. Mr Du Plessis, my point is that in your statement you said there was an increase in political mobilisation, giving the impression that, then that people then became politically mobilised. My point raised in this question is that that started three years, four years when Apartheid was introduced, right through.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is why I say that there was an increase, it became worse. The masses were more politicised. I did not say that it started then, I said that it worsened.

ADV NYOKA: Well it is a question of argument that it increased. It may have been worse then than now. Why is it that you did not at least try restricting the target at Pebco leadership? Just try to restrict them even though you said you had problems, just try to restrict them. Why did you not try that one?

MR DU PLESSIS: Experience taught me that it does not help to start with something that you know is not going to work. I did not try it and if it would have worked that time, I am sorry that I did not do it and I would not have done it.

ADV NYOKA: No, I did not want you to say so. Is it not correct that Banning Orders or restrictions entailed that the restricted person must report regularly at police stations. Their rounds is monitored with police vehicles and casspirs, etcetera. Did that not entail that restrictions?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it could happen in that way.

ADV NYOKA: If so, why did the police force not sacrifice and ensure that it monitored the only eight Pebco leaders, rather than kill them.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was not the only work that the police had to execute in Port Elizabeth and that is to look after five people at their homes. There was unrest and everybody in this hall know what it looked like at that stage. We just could not go sit at five people's homes and look after them. We had to police the whole area.

ADV NYOKA: My point is that they were targeted as the key persons and they had to be killed, not the entire leadership, they had to be killed. Why did you not sacrifice that manpower towards those eight? Surely you could have had that manpower. That is my point. I am not saying that you were not doing your other duty, duties, but I am saying that for those eight a sacrifice could have been made to survey them.

MR DU PLESSIS: And while you doing that then they ask that we should withdraw as they did with the schools, otherwise the boycotts or the consumer boycotts would start.

ADV NYOKA: No, at least you should have tried that measure.

MR DU PLESSIS: I already told you it was senseless to do something that I knew was not going to work.

ADV NYOKA: Are you saying that, as a security policeman, you never tried anything within your duties? You would just do something, you never try anything?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that is not what I said.

ADV NYOKA: Then why did you not try this one?

MR DU PLESSIS: I realised that it was not going to work and therefore I did not do it.

ADV NYOKA: But you did something that did not work in this place?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: You thought it was going to work?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believed that.

ADV NYOKA: But it did not work?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV NYOKA: According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, administration of security legislation in South Africa is quoted by Professor Dugard, page 139, sorry.

"Between 1950 and 1974 about 1240 persons were banned in South Africa and that at the end of 1976 alone, 144 banning orders prevailed."

Did this not mean that just in that period banning orders were being used and effective, especially against key people, key leaders?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know whether it worked in other places, but here with us it did not work.

ADV NYOKA: (...Indistinct) Here that did not work. You can quote?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember of one that did not work. I think that is easier.

ADV NYOKA: You see, banning people is not like going to a shop and buying chocolates, you must know that someone was banned and this did not work. Can you quote us an example? Were there not many people that were banned here?

MR DU PLESSIS: Barney Dtiyana, for example, did not work, that is one that I can remember (end of tape 3A).

ADV NYOKA: Ja, and Mr Botha also, he left the country. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, that also did not work.

ADV NYOKA: Do you not agree with me that if you had tried banning people and those that you tried left the country, you will have achieved your objective, because they will be out of the area and, therefore, not effective as trouble makers, because they left.

MR DU PLESSIS: We can now debate anything for hours, everyone has his own opinion and at that stage that was my opinion, my view and I did not try to get them out of the country, because if he is outside of the country, he is also a danger.

ADV NYOKA: Again, I put it to you that because of that you did not apply your mind to this scenario, you could have opted for banning.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am satisfied that I did.

ADV NYOKA: Then it is strange that there are many things that you did not think of then than now, if you did so. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. Is it not correct, Mr du Plessis, that after the last 1986 to 1989 State of Emergency, both the UDF and Pebco leaders were given restriction orders for about three months from 6 am to 6 pm, Mr Mdongo is here to testify to that. From April to May 1989 to July, that is for three months, they were restricted after the release from jail. Do you agree with me or do you remember that, let me be fair to you?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot recall, but if it is put like that, as a fact, then it is possible.

ADV NYOKA: I am instructed that that was the case and if that was the case, I find it very logical for a measure to be used which was useless, if at all it was useless. In other words, if restriction was not having the desired effects, why would it be used, especially as late as 1989?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that under the State of Emergency it was done, but I was not involved with that, because I do not agree with that.

ADV NYOKA: Let me take instructions whether the State of Emergency was prevalent then. I am instructed that, sorry, at the time there was no State of Emergency when they were being restricted.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot recall.

ADV NYOKA: Alright, fine. According to Mr Dugard, again, "From 1948 to 1977 ...",

this is about Banishment,

"... about 158 Africans were banished under the Security Laws."

The example given is Chief Albert Lutuli in 1977 and, sorry, Chief Albert Lutuli, Dr Mamphele Ramphele etcetera. Like restrictions this meant that banishment was effective especially against prominent leaders. Do you agree with me?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not agree.

ADV NYOKA: Why?

MR DU PLESSIS: Because I know how they organise it and they will also tell it to you today that there are many ANC members who were restricted, who now recall or tell how they actually also got around these banning orders and the security police are actually quite proud of it today.

ADV NYOKA: Okay, let us talk about the removal of a person from one area to another. Why was an attempt not made to remove a certain section of the leadership from one area, from the Port Elizabeth area, to a remote area in the country. Why was that matter, at least, not tried, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was tried in several instances and it did not work and in this particular incidence we would have had the pressure to bring him back immediately.

ADV NYOKA: I am sure it was going to be of interest to you to say that. Let me satisfy myself, Mr du Plessis, by saying to myself that I am going to try this banishment, remove this Pebco leaders from Port Elizabeth to a remote area, if it does not fail my hands, to some extent, will be clean.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I never considered it. I did not do it.

ADV NYOKA: Okay. The final, okay, criminal prosecution, did you really have, did you have real evidence of commission of any offence by any of the Pebco leadership? Was there real evidence of a commission of an offence?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, we did not. We had information, yes.

ADV NYOKA: So, that is why the criminal prosecution was not exhausted?

MR DU PLESSIS: We did not have the evidence.

ADV NYOKA: So, they were involved, so to speak, then, if I am correct, in peaceful activity, because they did not commit any crime, but yet their lives had to be taken. I find that very, very, very strange.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because of them or their activities other lives were taken. There was unrest where not one, but many people died or were killed.

ADV NYOKA: It is not that there was evidence, but informers were not coming forward or witnesses were not prepared to testify, that is not the case. You just did not have evidence. Is that all?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was evidence, but you did not have the witness to say that in court, because of fear and no one can blame him that, and the circumstances of the day, he cannot be blamed. Today we want to see it as it could have been, but it was a totally different story.

ADV NYOKA: If informers had the evidence, why did you not force them? It is part of their duty to say, look, we have got these, this essential case of these eight, we have to put them behind bars rather than kill them. We want you to testify, it is one of the consequences of being an informer, and put them in a witness relocation programme, take them to another place. Why did you not do that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is impossible.

ADV NYOKA: So you were nursing your informers?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is the one thing, yes.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Nyoka, just on that point of informers. Now if you can not use these informers to conduct a criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts of the country, what are they getting paid for doing?

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you mean paid for information? What do you mean, I do not understand the question quite clear.

ADV SANDI: I understand you to say it was not possible to take these people who, in your view were causing trouble, to take them to court, because if you did so you would expose your informers. Is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Now, if your informers, who are such important people in your job of trying to combat the unrest and all the criminal activities that are going on, what are these informers getting paid for?

MR DU PLESSIS: To give us the information. I never recruited an informer, I also know of no one who recruited one that he had to give information or join in such a way that he had, in fact, have to give evidence in court, otherwise he would never ever get informers. Later on we had agents. An agent was a policeman that you sent in and they also refused to testify, because they feared for their lives. They knew or they saw how people were burnt, even people who were not informers. The so-called informers, the people just had an argument and an allegation was made that he was an informer. The fears, the psychosis of fear, fear psychosis was there.

ADV DE JAGER: Did people testify and what happened to them after they had testified?

MR DU PLESSIS: There were people who testified, I cannot remember how many, but I can recall one off the cuff. I do not think I should mention his name, he was also murdered shortly after testifying in a High Treason case and I think Mr Nieuwoudt had statistics of people who testified who were killed. I know of one incident, if you will allow me, it is the so-called Red Laager where detectives go to a lady to enquire and afterwards when they left, she was murdered.

ADV NYOKA: The final legal option, I have already mentioned it, the State of Emergency. I just have one question about it. Do you agree with me that the legal option of the State of Emergency fell within the category of drastic far reaching measures that you referred to?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And that, therefore, the politicians could have meant by "drastic" and "far reaching measures" things like the State of Emergency or the police doing their work, arresting people, ensuring that ANC and (...indistinct) are arrested at the borders, things like those?

MR DU PLESSIS: They could have meant anything, but it depends on how I interpreted it.

ADV NYOKA: You said that the most irritating thing or the thing that you were concerned about at Pebco was the M-plan and its consequent ungovernability in local areas. Is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Honestly, do you agree with me, Mr du Plessis, that if by City Council was discredited, it was not representative, it was racial and it was the creation of National Party. People had no interest in it. They did not vote for the councillors. Do you agree with me?

MR DU PLESSIS: I agree with you, but they voted, we also have to say this, there was a voting percentage, I do not know who counted it, but there were people who voted. I agree that the majority of the people did not accept them but it was a system that I had to defend and I believed in that system.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that because of its unrepresentativity, that was a fertile ground for political concepts like the M-plan and institutions like Pebco substituting for it by City Council, whether or not these concepts came from the ANC in exile or not, the M-plan, the fertile ground was laid for concepts like the M-plans.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And that, therefore, you were fighting a losing battle by trying to prohibit the implementation of the M-plan, because if by the City Council was discredited and discreditable, not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you. I have not finished, but you can take your break on a light note, I am not offending you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for five minutes.

HEARING ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka.

ADV NYOKA: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr du Plessis, did you specifically suggest to Mr Snyman that the Pebco leadership be killed or just far-reaching measures or drastic measures be taken, when you had the discussions with him?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can you just repeat that.

ADV NYOKA: Did you specifically suggest to Mr Snyman that the Pebco leadership be killed when you spoke to him or you just suggested drastic measures because of the situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: I suggested that three people had to be eliminated.

ADV NYOKA: Did you reach that decision on your own or with the other security policeman and, if so, who are they?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, at that stage I had all the information and Colonel Snyman had information and we just took this information and we drew the conclusion that the normal security legislation would not serve the purpose.

ADV NYOKA: No, my point is ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think the question is, when you took this decision, before you went to Mr Snyman, had you, was this a joint decision between you and any other person or other people or was it just your decision alone?

MR DU PLESSIS: To go to Colonel Snyman was my own decision, I did it on my own and I did not involve any other person, I did not notify any other person.

CHAIRPERSON: To eliminate them?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was my own.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you take it in consultation with any of your colleagues?

MR DU PLESSIS: Before the discussion with Colonel Snyman, no. What I did was over a period of time we discussed what could be done and the pressure on us, I also conveyed to my juniors, who every time came back to me and said to me that there are not any options that we could exercise, and that is why I decided to go to Colonel Snyman and to tell him that I do not see that there is any other option.

ADV NYOKA: So, no other security policemen or SAP members knew of your decision to go to Mr Snyman before you did so. It was only you yourself?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Why is it that you did not consult your junior, Mr van Zyl, about this or even Mr Nieuwoudt?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage I did not do it, afterwards I talked to them.

ADV NYOKA: I want to know why you did not do so?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not have a specific reason for that.

ADV NYOKA: Okay. We know that the security police acted in consultation with the JSMC, Joint Security Management Centre, and that, in fact, Mr Snyman sat in the JSMC once a month with Mr, Brigadier Swart and that one of his aims was to document actions, aims and actions of opposition political parties and to monitor activities of political activists, compile a database and also to monitor external orders and from all that a good picture, according to your statement, be formed and that these people be dealt with by legal means. Did you approach Mr Snyman with such documentation regarding the Pebco leaders, those three?

MR DU PLESSIS: He had all documentation regarding information concerning them. He already had that. On a daily basis we informed him in writing about what was going on.

ADV NYOKA: Before this incident, had you approached Mr Snyman about a similar incident, for a similar request before?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not think that he was going to be offended by you suggesting that these people be killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: I took the chance, I cannot say anything further about that. He was initially, I, well, I suppose it bothered him and I suppose it is still bothering him, but we had no choice.

ADV NYOKA: Why I asked you about the JSMC exploring legal ways was because your decision was contrary to the exhaustion of legal ways. You suggested something contrary to what was the joint working together, the joint decision making of prioritising, identifying and their trying to deal legally with them, but your decision was way off the line.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is precisely what happened. What they asked we conveyed to them, we also told them that there were no legal ways to stabilise this place, but even so they expected of us to do that. They agreed that restriction does not work, detention does not work. They realised that we did not have witnesses to charge the people, to prosecute them, but they still say that we have to make a plan.

ADV NYOKA: I accept that. My point is why did you not tell them that, gentlemen, that is the background, but now we are going further by taking an illegal action of killing them.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, we did not do it.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you act unilaterally then, not collectively with them if they did not know, if they did not know?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think they per se knew what we were going to do and that is why we did not inform them.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you sit in the, in that committee?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think at the beginning, at one instance, I attended a meeting, but I did not attend the meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: And Colonel Snyman did sit in those meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether he discussed that plan with, in one of those meetings?

MR DU PLESSIS: I would not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you expect that he would do so?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know. I do not know who were members of, at the meetings. I do not know whether they communicated in isolated ways, I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you discussed this plan with him, he approved of it?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct and I think what was the main consideration for him was that Minister le Grange at that stage told him that after all these options, explained to them did not work, he nevertheless said that we had to do something, we had to stop this and the deduction that we made, and I believe that he also did this, was that this was the only option. I think that added to taking the decision.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, what I am trying to find out from you, he did not say, wait a minute, I must still go and consult with some people or person, come and see me tomorrow or so. He just said to you there and there, after you discussed it with him, he just said well, yes, you can proceed?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, he did not say that to me. He did not say that he first wanted to go and consult. I think this was something that came over a long period of time and I do not know whether Colonel Snyman consulted someone.

CHAIRPERSON: But, oh, I thought on a particular day you went to him and say, well, Colonel, look, I think we must eliminate these people.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is that day, yes. The discussion came over a long period of time.

CHAIRPERSON: The discussion might have taken a long time, but at some point you took a decision and you went to him and said to him, look, now my decision is, after all these many days of deliberations, my decision is that these people should be killed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I am interested in that particular day, in that particular moment of the day. Well, his response was an approval. He did not say to you, listen, now I must go and discuss that decision first with some other people.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, he did not.

ADV SANDI: Why is it that the discussions took a long time before a decision was reached? What was it in particular?

MR DU PLESSIS: It was facts conveyed over a long period of time, because at that stage, as I mentioned already, there was a lot of pressure from the JSMC from all over that we had to do something. Myself and Colonel Snyman discussed all the information that we had at our disposal and what we could do and every time we came to a cul-de-sac and then I said in the end there is only one option.

ADV SANDI: You said you agonised about the fact that you took a decision to kill the Pebco 3. How long did it take for you to agonise over this after having had the discussions over a long period of time? How long did it take for you to agonise about this?

MR DU PLESSIS: Over a period of time I thought about it. I cannot say exactly how many days and how many nights, but I considered it and the consideration was based on the anarchy and that they were responsible for it.

ADV SANDI: But you had been involved, in 1982 in the Mthimkulu and Madaka killing. What caused you to agonise about this one?

MR DU PLESSIS: I had to take a decision about it, about both. It is not easy decisions to take.

ADV SANDI: I understand.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if you think back, if you would have known what the situation would have been today, you would never have taken such decisions.

ADV NYOKA: How many amnesty applications are you involved in?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think four.

ADV NYOKA: All of them agonising periods, in all four?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: I know you were not sitting at the JSMC, but after the implementation of the plan, say getting the information from Mr Snyman, did the JSMC not enquire about what happened, we are reading the newspaper that there were three leaders that disappeared. Did you gentlemen, the security branch, not have anything to do with this? Was there no inquiry made after that say in May or June or July?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not that I know of.

ADV NYOKA: Is that not strange to you, because you were trying to get a solution to the security situation?

MR DU PLESSIS: You mean after these people were killed?

ADV NYOKA: Yes, I mean that.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that is why I say that I believe, by implication, that they knew what had happened.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not tell them beforehand that you were going to do that?

MR DU PLESSIS: No I did not.

ADV NYOKA: Was the UDF, Azapo feud not a sufficient cover for you to say, gentlemen, I am telling you this, anyway you have got an excuse, there is already the ongoing UDF and Azapo feud. Was that not a sufficient cover for you to tell them or let me put it this way, did you not trust them enough, as your colleagues, to tell them of your plans?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

ADV NYOKA: You did not trust them?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not trust them?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I suppose you can decide on whom you want to trust. I did not have any contact with them, I did not trust them.

ADV NYOKA: I find that strange, because when you decided that there was going to be some people who were going to be involved in the abduction, you did not bother as to who exactly the personnel that was going to be involved in the abduction, there were askaris that you did not know. The plan was uncontrollable after the decision was taken. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. They were only concerned with the abduction and I believed no noise would be made about that.

ADV NYOKA: But this was of great importance for you to say, gentlemen, we are going to embark on this, I want to know who is going to be involved on that need to know basis so that nothing slips out, because it did slip up in 1995 when a Sergeant X testified, telling that the, telling the world that the Pebco 3 were killed and assaulted. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: So the entire thing was uncontrolled, was not managed properly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, we made certain mistakes. I thought that I trusted Captain Venter with the abduction and I cannot take it further than that.

ADV NYOKA: But then, why did you not trust the JSMC? If the plan on the ground below was not controllable.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot give you a reason, but I did not convey to them and I did not trust them.

ADV NYOKA: You said you paid a short visit to the place. Why did you go there? It is 260 or 280 kilometres from Cradock, why did you go there, how, why did you go there just for a short period and then go back to PE?

MR DU PLESSIS: To inform Captain van Zyl that at that stage that no one had seen them, that they, when they abducted the people at the airport.

ADV NYOKA: I agree with Mr Lamey that that was a short time for you to have determined that, because they arrived at about eleven, the abduction occurred about eight or nine and you must have left Port Elizabeth at nine o'clock in the morning. The information that they were abducted could have been delayed and conveyed later on. You said he was not living in the Eastern Cape, but I do live in the Eastern Cape. Do you agree with me that that was a short time for you to have determined that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it was a short period, but I cannot remember specifically the circumstances, but there was a reason why I was already satisfied that they did not see us. There would have been some kind of information. I cannot remember specifically what it was.

ADV NYOKA: You, I put it to you that you did not go to Cradock for that purpose. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: I told you why I went to Cradock and I maintain that and I am satisfied. That is why I went there.

ADV NYOKA: No, you have got the right to maintain your stance, but I am putting it to you that you did not go for that purpose. Let us move on. How long did you stay in Cradock?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I said, I do not know, I think it might have been a hour or two.

ADV NYOKA: You do agree with me that a hour is very long for you to just to, just to go there and say, people, let us go ahead, there has been no trace and how far has this light talk gone, how far has it gone? It is very long for a hour or even two hours.

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not say that was all that we discussed. I do not know what we discussed. It is impossible for me to recall that, but I would challenge any person to tell me what they said twelve years ago to any person, but that was the period in my memory that I was there. Inter alia, I conveyed that to them.

ADV NYOKA: Mr du Plessis, you do agree with me that for such an event of killing a person, you must know who the participants are and what happened and you are involved in only four amnesty applications. Surely you must tell us, you must know what happened, it is not just like going to a shop and buying the chocolates, if I can put it like that.

MR DU PLESSIS: What did I not tell you?

ADV NYOKA: You said that you cannot remember something, everything that happened twelve years ago. This event must have stood prominently in your mind, because it is not usual to kill a person.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: So why do you, why is it that you do not forget. Why is it that you do not remember, conveniently, other things and remember certain details in your statement.

MR DU PLESSIS: The important thing was the killing of the people not what I discussed with Captain van Zyl there. That is the important thing that I remember. I cannot remember the day that it was, but I can remember that I went there and I can remember that the people were killed. That is important.

CHAIRPERSON: Even though you might not remember the details of the discussion for that hour or two, is it not reasonable to accept that the discussions must have been respect of the deceased?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that, I believe so, but I cannot give you the detail of what we discussed.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that by virtue of the fact that you said you were not present when they were killed, you do not know for a fact that they were killed in Cradock? You, you were just told by a colleague. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: So, it is possible that they were killed later on elsewhere, it is possible?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is possible.

ADV NYOKA: My instructions are that the activists were seen in Alexandria and in police stations in Port Elizabeth long after that ninth of May. They were not dead by then. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I am aware of three interdicts. The one was at the airport where someone would have seen him, I do not know which of the applicants it was. The second time it was, if I can remember correctly, it was in murder and robbery in Louis le Grange Square where they would have been seen either in the lift or in a cell and the third time was where the person was seen in a police station in Alexandria or Port Alfred.

ADV NYOKA: Precisely, those are my instructions. Is it furthermore not correct that when you reported their death to Mr Snyman, you were speaking, talking about something that you did not have factual knowledge of, because you did not witness it, the death.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Did you, you had identified six out of an executive of eight persons, but yet you killed only three. Did you think that you achieved your goals by doing that? Eight executive members, at that point six, but ended up by killing three. Did you think that you achieved your goals?

MR DU PLESSIS: At that stage we believed that we would not succeed, but that we at least would have curbed or lessened the unrest by killing the three.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that it was just by chance that the three had to go to the airport, because some people were not available, they had other appointments elsewhere.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I do not know. As far as I know these three were pertinently identified, that was my instruction that the three had to be abducted.

ADV NYOKA: My instructions, Mr du Plessis, are that Mr Mogoai and Fazi had an appointment elsewhere and they requested that these three who were available must go to the airport. It was by chance that they were abducted and killed.

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: Did you take any further efforts to eliminate the remainder of the Pebco leadership?

MR DU PLESSIS: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know why, but we did not. I think that is what we did, I did not do it, I do not know whether, if, whether someone else tried to do it, but I did not do it.

ADV NYOKA: I think it is in an annexure to Mr Nieuwoudt's statement. It has been stated there that there was an attempt to lure Mr Fazi to a place next to King William's Town after their disappearance. I can check that. I think there was a newspaper cutting in an annexure to Mr Nieuwoudt. Let me check that.

ADV SANDI: That is page 253 of the bundle.

ADV NYOKA: I am trying to get the relevant passage. Ja, it is the fourth column, the second last paragraph. It reads,

"Mr Fazi said, after the killers discovered he was not among the Pebco 3, they made several attempts to lure him into a sinister trap. He said that after the disappearance of the three men and at the height of the search for them he received a strange long distance call from a man saying he was in East London. This man told me in my car there is now...",

you know, the photostat copy, I cannot make out this, but the gist of this is that he said that there were further attempts to kill him. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no comment.

ADV NYOKA: Is it possible that the attempt was made by the security police, not Azapo?

 

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know.

ADV NYOKA: Did the situation then normalise after the elimination as you had hoped?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it did diminish for a certain period.

ADV NYOKA: What, how long is that period?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember. I will go and try to ascertain it, but I do not know actually, it did diminish.

ADV NYOKA: Could it not have diminished because the State of Emergency was imposed two months later on? It diminished because of the State of Emergency, not because of the death?

MR DU PLESSIS: During the State of Emergency it went just as bad. I do not know whether it actually contributed to stabilising situation in the Eastern Cape.

ADV NYOKA: Please understand, I am not getting to the Cradock murder now, but it occurred two months, strangely, two months after the death of the Pebco 3. Were you involved in any discussions to kill them as you were with the three Pebco leaders?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, to a certain extent.

ADV NYOKA: Did this two meetings occur at the same time or one after the other?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, they were totally different.

ADV NYOKA: If the situation stabilised, why is it, then, that you engaged in yet other discussions, in another discussion to kill other people, if the situation stabilised?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I said it did not totally or completely stabilise.

ADV NYOKA: But I thought you said it did diminish, by interpretation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, at Pebco.

ADV NYOKA: So, are you referring to the PE area, not the Eastern Cape.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV NYOKA: If it diminished, why was it then that the State of Emergency had to be imposed also for PE, if it diminished? There must have been pressure for the State of Emergency to be imposed.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct. It did not diminish totally.

ADV NYOKA: You knew that Pebco was one of the components of the UDF. Certainly other groupings like Cosas or Cosatu could have taken up where Pebco left by implementing that M-plan or ungovernability or rent boycotts. Did you not think about that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is true.

ADV NYOKA: Then why did you focus only on Pebco? I am not saying that it was right for you to focus on Pebco, to kill them, but why did you focus on Pebco then if that was the case?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, at that stage I saw them as the most radical who incited the unrest.

ADV NYOKA: Do you agree, therefore, with me that you miscalculated if you missed that one? That is thinking about the other components of the UDF, you miscalculated the situation.

MR DU PLESSIS: I made many mistakes.

ADV NYOKA: Let us come to the assault part. I am not holding any brief for Mr Mogoai and Mr Koole, but it is not strange for two people, who are applicants here, to say that we did assault the Pebco leaders, despite the fact that the mandate, their mandate was only to abduct? Is it not strange for people to make that allegations if that did not happen at all?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think I can comment on that. It is strange. In the first instance, it is strange that they were still there, because I believe that they already had left the morning. I did not see them there, so I cannot really comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: Is it, furthermore, not strange for people who could have just applied for amnesty for abduction, but here they are, they go further and admit an assault when they were not even involved in the bigger crime of murder? Is it not strange for them to go further and even volunteer, we were even involved in the assault, they could have just said abduction only, because they were not involved in murder, which is graver than assault? Do you agree with me, that it is rather strange.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it is.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that the applicants, except Mr Koole and Mr Mogoai and, to a lesser extent, Mr Beeslaar did assault the leaders and the reason why they are omitting the assault is because they want the killing to seem humane. We applied them with drinks, we talked nicely to them, we gave them sleeping pills and shot them in their sleep. You just want to make this killing humane, not brutal as it was. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: No comment.

ADV NYOKA: Was it so or not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was not there.

ADV NYOKA: Okay, sorry, I forgot about those. You say you were not there.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you at any stage given details as to how they were killed?

MR DU PLESSIS: The only thing that Captain van Zyl said was that he did the elimination. I can mention that with the discussion and the planning it was suggested by me that they be shot and that they be burnt and Captain van Zyl agreed to that, at the place suggested by myself, that is at Post Charmers Police station.

CHAIRPERSON: By the way, if the purpose suggest to have them then shoot them to death, why were they taken to so far away a place and such a desolated place?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know of a place nearer where one could

do something like that.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the nearest place where you felt it could be the stable place to shoot somebody to death?

MR DU PLESSIS: But where you could burn someone. I do not know of another place where you can actually burn someone.

ADV NYOKA: I am not going to be long with you Mr du Plessis. You said that the information that you obtained was that the interrogation was superficial. Is that correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: According to the application of Mr Nieuwoudt, the interrogation started that previous night, although not for a short, for a long time, but it occurred in the morning and occurred again earlier on after twelve o'clock. If it was superficial, why is it that it took the morning and afternoon, if it was that superficial and they were not being assaulted in the interim? I know you were not there, but do you not find that strange?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, he says that he interrogated them. It could have been that he talked to them.

ADV NYOKA: I have got a difficulty, if it is, if it was superficial, why did you take so long if it was superficial?

MR DU PLESSIS: He had to wait till the next evening to execute the operation, so he would have talked to them the whole day.

ADV NYOKA: No, there is difference between interrogating a person and talking to a person. Not so?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, according to me it is more or less the same. I know other people had other, have other ideas.

ADV NYOKA: The impression that is given in my translation is that this was not a mere casual talk, it was an interrogation which is graver than talking to a person (end of tape 3B).

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: You said that you were sorry. Have you apologised to the families?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did it now.

ADV NYOKA: So it took 12 years for you to try and get them, to apologise.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, one feels sorry for it.

ADV NYOKA: You were present during the abduction and murder of Messrs Mthimkulu and Madaka. Can you tell us why you were not present in this instance? Why did you keep away from Cradock, it was the same modus operandi or way of operating was adopted, they were abducted next to the Holiday Inn and taken to Cradock. The same situation occurred, why were you not present in this case?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember the circumstances, but I was not involved.

ADV NYOKA: But you were involved in similar discussions in that one?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is correct, but I tell you I was not involved here. I was involved up to a certain point and then I was not involved any further.

ADV NYOKA: No, I was asking out of curiosity. Why did you not avail yourself out of curiosity and you say that you do not know where the abduction took place. You were not told.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was at the airport.

ADV NYOKA: No, no beforehand, when the planning was made, you were not informed where it was going to take place.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I knew that they were going to be lured to the airport, but I did not know where physically the abduction would take place.

ADV NYOKA: Was it not of interest to you to know that, because this was, essentially, you had discussed this with your senior? It was essential of essence for you to know what the details are going to be.

MR DU PLESSIS: Such operations you leave in the hands of the person who is in charge of the operation. Anything can happen and then he has to think on his feet.

ADV NYOKA: Did you learn of the fact that two days after the abduction and murder, alleged murder, Mrs Hashe, when you went to the police station to enquire, she was locked for an entire month, she was detained for an entire month? Do you know about that?

 

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no knowledge.

ADV NYOKA: That was to add insult to the injury.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no knowledge.

ADV NYOKA: Furthermore, that the night after that the police came and assaulted them, including his, her son, they came.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is news to me.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that you must have known about that in your position.

MR DU PLESSIS: I can assure you that I did not know.

ADV NYOKA: Is it possible ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, the question is regarding as to your position then. Is it possible that a decision to so detain her could have been taken by any other person without your knowledge?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Who would that have been?

MR DU PLESSIS: Now we have to ask the question, she was detained under security legislation or what, I do not know. At that stage there were not emergency regulations, it could not have been that, if it was security regulations I think I would have given the motivation or Colonel Snyman or perhaps Lieutenant Colonel, someone else. I had, I have no knowledge of the fact that she was detained. I could have forgotten it, but I have no knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: But the, as I understand your evidence, the operation was your concern, I am talking about the elimination of

the people.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And her enquiry after her husband, which would you have given rise to her detention, would have been linked to the whole operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Her detention?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, was surely related to the abduction and the disappearance of her husband?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I really have no knowledge of her detention. I cannot give any comment. I also do not believe that she enquired at the security police station. I suppose she went to a different police station.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, my instructions are that my client went or was detained for a month before the State of Emergency, firstly, and, secondly, one Eric Strydom, told her that her husband was found burnt near Soweto and they identified him, that is the police, identified him by his legs. They told her when they had arrested her.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no knowledge of that.

ADV NYOKA: You did not hear of that either?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not at all.

ADV NYOKA: So, you policemen were not co-operating with each other?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not think it was a security policeman who

detained her.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Would my learned friend just remind, mind repeating the name of the policeman? Was it Eric Strydom?

ADV NYOKA: One Eric Strydom, that is my instructions. One, Eric Strydom.

MR DU PLESSIS: Eric Strydom. As far as I know, the only Eric Strydom that I know is Murder and Robbery. He is the Commander of Murder and Robbery. I have no knowledge of that.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that, in summary, the entire truth has not been told to the family and, secondly, you failed to apply your mind to the matter on several issues which could have led you to prevent the killing of the Pebco 3. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: All that I can say to the Commission and also to the family is that as I am sitting here today, I am satisfied that everything that I know of this, I have told. That is the only comment that I can give.

ADV NYOKA: And, secondly, there was no motive, political motive being pursued, it was a criminal motive, because you could have approached the politicians, if it was a political motive and say, look, we are thinking about this, this falls within the political arena. It was a criminal action, because you thought you were above the Law. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: I never thought that, that I was above the Law. I believed that what I did was sanctioned by the politicians, but I

knew, and I think you also know, that no politician would come forward or give an instruction to commit acts such as this. This is why I did it on my own.

ADV NYOKA: Despite the strong feelings that the family is entertaining, the families are entertaining, they will only be prepared to forgive you if you tell them everything, not what you have said today. Any comment?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot tell them anything more. I am sorry.

ADV NYOKA: No further questions or submissions, your, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV NYOKA

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ma'am.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HARTLE

MS HARTLE: Thank you. Mr du Plessis, what is your motivation for applying for amnesty to this Commission?

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just put your name on record please?

MS HARTLE: Sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: Just put your name on record ... (intervention).

MS HARTLE: Sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: ... so that they should know that.

MS HARTLE: Belinda Hartle, I act for Mrs Nampolelo Godolozi and for her grand-daughter Nombeko Godolozi.

The question is, Mr du Plessis, what is your motivation for applying for amnesty?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believed in the circumstances to fight against an ANC communistic order in the country and in the Eastern Cape, that the only way to do that was to eliminate these people.

ADV C DE JAGER: I think you do not understand the question properly. I do not think the question was why you eliminated them, the question is why are you now applying for amnesty.

MR DU PLESSIS: We were invited to come to the Truth Commission and to tell what we did and that is what I am now using this opportunity to do so.

MS HARTLE: Mr du Plessis, you say you were invited, but would you have brought these applications for amnesty, but for the fact that you were named by the families in relation to certain events, certain violations?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not believe that I was mentioned by any of them, I did this out of my own free will.

MS HARTLE: You say that you have apologised to the families, is this your only apology that you have tendered here today, before this Commission?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Is there any reason why you have not approached the families privately?

MR DU PLESSIS: I was advised by my legal advisers not to take it further, not at this stage in any case.

MS HARTLE: Have you taken any other steps, taken any other steps to affect reconciliation? Have you shown any remorse or contrition for what you have done?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have definitely.

MS HARTLE: How have you demonstrated that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think my way of life today has demonstrated that.

MS HARTLE: Can you explain, clarify?

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I will never commit such a deed again. Where I can, I try to do good and I do not believe that there is one case that somebody can mention that I have tried to break down what the present Government is trying to build up.

MS HARTLE: Mr du Plessis, I am interested in the finer details of the plot to eliminate the Pebco 3. What were those details that were agreed before the operation was carried into execution?

MR DU PLESSIS: Are these the details between me and, the planning between van Zyl, Nieuwoudt and I?

MS HARTLE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know what extra detail you are looking for.

MS HARTLE: What were, what was the exact modus operandi that was agreed upon? How were you going to go about executing your plan to eliminate the three?

MR DU PLESSIS: In the first instance, the decision was made to abduct them. They could not have been followed from their houses, because we were well known. Then it was suggested that some of Colonel Roelf Venter's people were to be used with the abduction per se.

MS HARTLE: If I can I just stop you. When did you decide that you were going to kidnap the three from the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was right from the outset, the idea, not at the airport, but the abduction as such. I cannot remember whether it was a day or two before, but I do know that, if I can recall correctly, that Colonel Venter, on the day of the abduction, was informed.

MS HARTLE: It was not necessarily so that you would find the three persons together at one time, at one place. I mean, there must have been a plan to abduct these three persons particularly and I want to know when you had decided that that was going to be what you would do?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot say exactly, but I think it was a case by the means, by means of Colonel Nieuwoudt's informant that they would take the three people to a specific venue, which was to be the airport.

MS HARTLE: Was it coincidence that the three leaders, who were taken that day, were taken? Would you have taken other leaders if

they were, had been with them at the airport?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not believe so. If there were more people we would have had to think out another option.

MS HARTLE: Why is that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Because, in the first instance, I did not discuss it with Colonel Snyman and, because we decided on these three and if we were to be, take more it would have been many more people and different planning would have to be instituted.

MS HARTLE: And the venue, the chosen venue, when was that decided, the Post Chalmers venue?

MR DU PLESSIS: This was decided right from the outset. It was suggested by me. I was there on a previous occasion and it was the only place that I know of, in that area, where one could do this.

MS HARTLE: Did you concern yourself with the details of how they were going to be eliminated?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe so, yes, that they were to be shot and then burnt to death.

MS HARTLE: Who supplied the weapons?

MR DU PLESSIS: I left this to Captain van Zyl.

MS HARTLE: You say at page 87 of the record that although Colonel Snyman did not give you a specific instruction that these three persons had to be permanently eliminated or removed from the community, you say,

"It was, however, clear that these words were sufficient to deduce this instruction.".

So, there was no direct instruction given to you, this was a process of deduction which you made?

MR DU PLESSIS: What I am saying by implication was that because Snyman did not call me in and say that I had to eliminate them, I suggested it and then he realised I believed that there was no other alternative and he said that if that was the only option then we were to continue.

MS HARTLE: Is there any reason why, between the two of you, you did not use the word "kill"?

MR DU PLESSIS: I believe that we did, perhaps, use it.

MS HARTLE: Was there never any doubt in your mind that to eliminate, meant that they would have to be permanently removed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Never.

MS HARTLE: And I see that Colonel Snyman, in his submissions, at page 22 of the record says,

"Thereafter I instructed that the leader element of Pebco had to be eliminated.".

So, he give you a direct instruction?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not regard it as such. I feel that, and we must not go into semantics now, but I feel that the suggestion came from me. He did agree that it could be done, but he did not say how we were to kill him, them.

MS HARTLE: If you merely believed that what he was intending to

get at was that the Pebco 3 should be permanently eliminated, was it not a bit of a risky decision to take to kill them? I mean if you were not, if you say that you were not, you did not actually understand him to give you that instruction directly, you surmised it rather?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Colonel Snyman and I did speak about murdering. Eliminate means to kill, as far as I am concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, where did you read Snyman's, what page is that?

MS HARTLE: Twenty two, in the first paragraph of the submissions on that page. It is page eight of the actual submissions.

MR VAN DER MERWE: M'Lord, your Lordship recall that my attorney mentioned to you that, in fact, there was some mess up with the computer printout on the document on your papers and that there is another one that he wanted to give you yesterday and it is at that page 22. Perhaps, I, could I pass that ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.

MR VAN DER MERWE: ... pass it on. I think, your Lord, the other gentlemen, Commissions have got the correct one.

ADV DE JAGER: I am afraid I have not got it, because I was in Cape Town, so I ...

CHAIRPERSON: Now, were you reading on the, from the improved

version, ... (intervention).

MS HARTLE: I was ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: .. the corrected one?

MS HARTLE: I was indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: What paragraph?

MS HARTLE: It is, the page number, the typed page number is eight, and the handwritten numbering is page 22 and it is in the first paragraph. It is the, the eighth line down.

"I gave instructions that the leaders of Pebco be eliminated.".

CHAIRPERSON: Now, was your question that, from the area that you are referring us to, it would appear as though the decision originates from Colonel Snyman or what? What was your question about that?

MS HARTLE: The instruction from Colonel Snyman is quite clear, they must be eliminated, whereas Mr du Plessis says, in his submission, that he gathered, that there was not a specific instruction given.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MS HARTLE: But he says,

"It is, however, clear from his words ...".

ADV DE JAGER: But there was in the, in consensus, that they should be eliminated, that they should be killed.

MS HARTLE: Now, you are aware, Mr du Plessis, of the three applications, you referred them to as interdicts, which were brought by the families for the police to produce their loved ones after their disappearance?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And you were involved in that litigation, if you can recall?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot remember if I made any declarations, it is possible.

MS HARTLE: Are you Hermanus Barend du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: And could you have deposed to an affidavit in this regard on the 29th of January 1986?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is possible, I cannot remember anymore.

MS HARTLE: Now, I am going to read relevant passages from the affidavit which I believe you deposed to. You can have a look at and identify whether or not it is your signature. Mr Chairman, I have, unfortunately, only got two extra copies of this, I will make one copy available to the Chair's of table and to my learned friend.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chairman, before my learned colleague proceeds with this, I think in all fairness, Mr du, I think in all fairness Mr du Plessis should be, perhaps, just be given an opportunity to read the document that she wish to refer to, before

she refers him to an affidavit, because he told you just now that he had no recollection of it. So, it is obviously not something that is fresh in his memory anymore. So, I notice that it is past four o'clock already. May I perhaps, subject, of course, always to what the Commission states, suggest that he take this home with him tonight and read this affidavit. I do not know if it has been signed. Ja, it appears to be signed and then my learned friend, I would suggest, can proceed tomorrow, because at the moment it is going to be arguments about things out of context again.

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, my learned friend assumes that the arguments will be out of context and these documents are not strange to the applicant. They have been before this Commission before, they were referred to in the Roelof Venter application and they should not come as a surprise to the applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, except that you, it may be necessary to refresh ones memory especially if, on some areas, one would not have been telling the truth.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chairman, ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN DER MERWE: ... may I come in here, please? I do not know what other documents my learned friend may have which may, perhaps, relate to one of my clients at the end of the day. The, as far as I am aware, the practice has always been, in the hearings that

I was involved in, that documents be made available before the hearing by all parties concerned, the documents we are going to use, the parties are going to use, so that nobody is taken by surprise. While we are dealing with this issue, I think I want to raise this point, that if there are any documents which my learned friend, or any of my learned friends in the opposite table, may have which they are going to use in cross-examining my client, and I presume my learned friends would agree with me, that those documents be made available to us so that we can take it up with our clients instead of being taken by surprise.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure they will do that. Mr du Plessis, before we resolve on that, am I correct in suspecting that, in all probability, some of the things in the affidavit would not be the truth, because the police must have engaged in some bit of cover up?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we, if, to adjourn now is not so much, because of the fact that a document is being produced, but it is simply because it is beyond four o'clock and I think that it may be a convenient stage to adjourn unless you, there is a particular issue that you feel should be dealt with now.

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, it could wait until the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon.

MS HARTLE: It may wait until the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. Well, if it is possible for you, maybe you should try and make more copies for other people.

MS HARTLE: I will indeed do so.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until tomorrow half past nine.

HEARING ADJOURNS