Amnesty Hearings

HAROLD SNYMAN: (sworn states)

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just before I start with the evidence of Mr Snyman, there are just two aspects that we would like to mention.

Firstly, I have been informed, I must confess I haven't seen it myself, that apparently on the SABC newscast last night, it was alleged by Mr Ntsebeza referring to this incident and also to others, but our interest at this stage is this, this incident, that the policemen were having a braai while the bodies were being incinerated. Now obviously there has never been evidence like this and one finds it unfortunate that responsible people like that, would make statements like that.

It may indeed be that he was misinformed, but on national television which already, these things are already emotion laden as we all know and we can only judge that by the reaction that one gets every now and then, and we wish to record our strongest objection to information like that, especially if it is being telecast on national television. As I say I haven't seen the news report myself, but I have been informed by some of my colleagues here as well as some of my colleagues of my clients, that that is the case.

The second thing is exactly about what is happening in this hearing again Mr Chairman, what I complained about yesterday. There was the word "voetsek" was prominently heard when the previous witness finished his testimony. I must record once again my objection to this behaviour. I call Mr Snyman.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just respond to that, with regard to the noise from the floor. I think that if words of those nature were indeed used, I would appeal to the audience to please try to restrain themselves and we understand that people's emotions will or may go up in a situation like this in a hearing like this one, but we appeal to the people to please not allow themselves to get out of control.

With regard to Mr Ntsebeza's remarks, I saw that myself actually on TV. We have noted your concern, but I should mention though that it may very well be that he was in a panel where Mr Mamasela gave evidence and I don't know whether he was referring to, I am trying to say that one doesn't know whether he was speaking with reference to the evidence before us, or whether he was speaking with reference to the evidence which was before him which would have been the evidence of Mr Mamasela.

So, while we note your concern, we should bear that in mind, that there is that problematic situation.

ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman. Mr Snyman, your have your application in front of you, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And if you look at page 1, do you confirm the correctness of it?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: On page 2, do you confirm the correctness of that?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: When did you become Commanding Officer of the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: January 1984.

ADV BOOYENS: And when did you retire?

MR SNYMAN: The 30th of June, 1986.

ADV BOOYENS: So is it correct that you have now been retired for about 11 years?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of the particulars on page 2, are they correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And do you also confirm that you are applying for amnesty for the abduction and death of the Pebco 3 on the 8th of May, in Port Elizabeth and Cradock?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, to start off with, I would like to ask you whether you confirm the contents of the build up to the situation as set out on pages 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of your statement, do you confirm the correctness of those pages or what is contained there?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: As the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth and also before that you were second in command, correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You dealt with the administration or administrative functions and you also dealt with correspondence?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Now by virtue of your position as the Commanding Officer, you also served on the JMC meetings where you received feedback from the Secretariat of the State Security Council?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Those were meetings which took place on a fairly regular basis, approximately once a month?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Is it correct that there were also certain sub-committees of the JMC, namely the so-called Joint Operational Centre and the Joint Information Centre where you also attended meetings?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you also by virtue of your position as Commander receive information on a daily basis regarding the security situation in the Eastern Cape?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: What would you say or let us first deal with the JMC situation - it is set out in the statement and I am just going to summarise it for the convenience of the people here. The JMC was under the Chairmanship of Brigadier Joffel van der Westhuizen of the South African Defence Force normally and security matters were discussed there, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: At the JMC meetings arrangements were also made for politicians to address you, that is now the JMC, so the people such as Adriaan Vlok, Magnus Malan and so forth would come and address you?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The terminology in current use at that stage, I am referring to 1985, what types of words and phrases were used and what did these discussions centre on as far as the JMC meetings were concerned?

MR SNYMAN: I was aware that during these meetings reference was made in documents to the elimination of hostile leaders and the word eliminate was used fairly commonly at these JMC meetings and as far as I was concerned, that was a phrase you normally used in a war situation.

And in the context of the time, eliminate meant that people should be killed.

ADV BOOYENS: So at these meetings, this was the kind of talk and the type of phraseology used?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, was there also quite a bit of emphasis placed on the security situation in the Eastern Cape at these meetings?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, there was feedback from the Secretariat of the State Security Council which was received by the JMC and to the effect that the government was insisting that the Eastern Cape be stabilised and that a solution be found.

ADV BOOYENS: Was that the primary body responsible for that line of function of security?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it was the Security Branch which had to deal with that primarily. They had to stabilise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: What was the reaction at the JMC as regards, I mean the sub-committees as well, what was the reaction at the JMC regarding the way in which people expressed themselves or the way in which you did your work?

MR SNYMAN: The line function and the responsibility of the Security Branch was to stabilise the situation at that stage. Now, criticism addressed to us via the Defence Force and the politicians and our own head office, that criticism was trenchant criticism and we often had to listen to criticism of this kind.

This meant that these people were of a view that we weren't taking the necessary drastic steps and actions to solve the problem.

ADV BOOYENS: So, in short what you have just said is that they were obviously of the view that you could do more to solve the problem?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: As the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, you were the person dealing with matters on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: The options available to you at that stage Mr Snyman were things such as and I think it has been repeated quite frequently here, but those were the options within the Security Legislation, such as detention without trial under Section 28 or 29 of the Internal Security Act and there were a couple of other Sections dealing with detention.

There was the option to either restrict a person, to place a person under house arrest, these were all the banning orders that we are talking about and then there was another option, namely to charge persons or prosecute them in a criminal court?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, if we deal first with criminal prosecutions, was there a problem connected with criminal prosecutions, if so, please explain?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, there were most definitely problems with prosecuting people at that stage because there was total anarchy and ungovernability in the situation, and it was extremely difficult to get witnesses to come and testify in open court proceedings against these people.

ADV BOOYENS: You are talking about anarchy and the fact that this place was ungovernable and that there was difficulty in obtaining witnesses, were these witnesses just not available or were they too frightened to testify or what was the problem?

MR SNYMAN: Sometimes they were too scared to testify and those who did testify, their testimony was so diluted and was so watered down by cross-examination, that the whole case just fell through.

ADV BOOYENS: Then there was the other option of detaining people under the Security Legislation of the time. That was another option. What was the problem there?

MR SNYMAN: Are you referring to banning, banning orders?

ADV BOOYENS: I am referring to detention without trial, Section 29?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct, when we detained people in these circumstances which reigned at the time in the black townships, it had no effect because then immediately that would lead to further uprisings and violence and boycotts and stay-aways.

ADV BOOYENS: So, it actually did not have the desired effect it rather escalated the violence, rather than caused a decrease in the violence?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And then there was the option of restrictions or banning orders on people, what was the position there?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage banning orders were also not effective because we would see the same results, it would simply lead to further unrest and violence.

ADV BOOYENS: Were the police still able to effectively police the townships?

MR SNYMAN: No. There was total anarchy in the black townships, it was difficult and in fact dangerous to enter those areas even in motor vehicles.

ADV BOOYENS: Motor vehicles or armed vehicles?

MR SNYMAN: At one point we actually had to resort to the use of armed vehicles to be able to enter into the black townships.

ADV BOOYENS: So the legal options available to you were not efficient, they were not effective and they no longer worked?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: On the 14th of February 1985 there was a meeting at Cradock is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: You, in your capacity as Commanding Officer of the Eastern Cape, also attended that meeting?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I don't you to name all the people attending there, but who were some of the prominent names attending the meeting?

MR SNYMAN: Well it was the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, there was also another Minister, Minister Barend du Plessis. I think he was the Minister of Education at the time, black education.

ADV BOOYENS: He later became Minister of Finance?

MR SNYMAN: Correct. Then there was the MP for Cradock, Dr Morrison, he was also the Deputy Minister at that stage and then also the Commissioner of the South African Police, Johan Coetzee.

ADV BOOYENS: And many other people or only those four?

MR SNYMAN: There were also other people yes. And these people were all involved in the JMC, there was for instance also the Divisional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape Detective Branch.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have to make a submission of the security situation there?

MR SNYMAN: Correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you explain what the situation was as you experienced it on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, I gave an analysis of the situation which I obtain at the time.

ADV BOOYENS: You mean at the time?

MR SNYMAN: Yes. I explained what the situation was in the Eastern Cape and that the situation had become ungovernable and that the legal options at our disposal simply did not have the desired effect any more and we couldn't normalise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: And after you made your submission, did a general discussion of the security situation follow?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And what emerged from this meeting, did you obtain any answers or any practical and useful suggestions?

MR SNYMAN: No. Fact of the matter was that we were criticised for our inability to stabilise the situation.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, I know that you were only the Commanding Officer, you were not the policemen on the ground at that stage, but what was your impression how far had the situation already developed in the direction of ungovernability and as far as the black townships of Cradock and Port Elizabeth were concerned, who was actually winning the war in these areas?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, the activists were winning the war or had already done so.

ADV BOOYENS: Or had already won the war?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: All right, so you analyzed the situation and you explained that things weren't working any more and would you say that everybody attending the meeting, was very well aware of the fact that the normal measures were no longer effective?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And then during an adjournment you and Louis le Grange had a discussion?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Can you please tell us what you discussed?

MR SNYMAN: After I made my submission, we had tea and then I had the chance to have a chat to Minister Louis le Grange and as I said earlier, in my submission to them, we discussed the fact that the normal legal methods of policing were not longer effective and the Minister said to me very clearly, Colonel you have to make a plan with these activists in the Eastern Cape.

ADV BOOYENS: So Mr Snyman, that was a statement made by a man who had been very well informed as to the fact that the machinery or the methods which had been put at your disposal, was no longer effective in actually dealing with the situation?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And when he told you that you had to make a plan, how did you interpret that, how did you understand that?

MR SNYMAN: The way I understood it was that because I had said that the existing legal options were no longer effective, my understanding was that these people had to be eliminated.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, Colonel you also or let me put something to you by way of an illustration. Exhibit H My Lord. We could only track down a few documents which were handed in during other matters.

You have already mentioned the fact that there were talk continually about action against enemy forces and regarding the infiltration of these people, is it correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you also on occasion, I am showing you the minutes of a meeting that was held on the 7th of June 1985, it is indicated that you were present on this occasion in the capacity of Commanding Officer of the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: There is only one aspect that I want to deal with at this meeting. Under paragraph 9 unrest is dealt with, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: It is marked Exhibit H, but there is already an Exhibit H.

ADV BOOYENS: I am sorry, then it should be Exhibit J. ADV NYOKA: It should be Exhibit K, the documents I handed in was Exhibit J, Mr Booyens. The documents that I handed in was Exhibit J, this should be Exhibit K.

ADV BOOYENS: I am indebted to my learned friend.

ADV DE JAGER: Okay, Exhibit K would be safe, but which one did you hand in Mr Nyoka?

ADV NYOKA: The document which is similar to Ms Hartle. The document that is similar. I handed it in chambers, the big bundle. (Indistinct), Your Worship, but it was handed in in chambers. This is the one. It is because it was handed in in chambers, so there was no number.

CHAIRPERSON: So the document which Mr Nyoka handed in yesterday or gave to us yesterday, being a copy of an application by Hashe and Hashe against the Minister of Law and Order and another, will be Exhibit J and the document which Mr Booyens is handing in now, would be Exhibit K.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you. Colonel, this is for illustration purposes, we are aware of the fact that this was a meeting that was held on the 7th of June 1985, so this was after the death of these three, but regarding the things that were discussed, mention is made in paragraph 9 to unrest and in paragraph 10 the possibility of covert activities and it is important that they will establish whether the recce's could be utilised, is that correct?

And the recce's which are referred to, what were they?

MR SNYMAN: As I understood it at that stage, it was a highly specialised task force of the South African Defence Force.

ADV BOOYENS: A combat unit?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Which was mainly used in operations abroad?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Which paragraph refers to this?

ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 10, on page - we are merely referring to this as illustration. At these meetings were there more such discussions of the actions which were done in a covert manner?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Colonel, the culture and the spirit and the attitude which seemed apparent from that which was discussed in the total security community regarding the resistance against the liberation struggle, how did these people think and feel?

MR SNYMAN: It was often made very clear to us that the Security Branch was the last fort of the struggle to win the struggle and if the Security Branch were to collapse, the government would not be able to continue with its task of governing.

We as police officers therefore had an enormous responsibility to ensure that the government remained in power.

ADV BOOYENS: To refer once again to the Pebco situation, and with regards to the local situation, did you know about the activities of Pebco?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And were you kept informed of the leadership of Pebco?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And as far as you were concerned, what role if any, did Pebco play in the unrest situation?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we regarded them as the top brain of that organisation, they incited people to the state of ungovernability that we experienced in this area. There was also information that they recruited terrorists to send overseas for training.

ADV BOOYENS: So as far as you were concerned, Pebco was a high priority target, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And the leadership of Pebco and more specifically the three deceased which are related to this application, were they also known to you due to your post as Commanding Officer?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, they were known to me as a result of the files that passed through my hands and the reports that were submitted.

ADV BOOYENS: So as far as you were concerned, Mr Snyman, were these people thus prominent figures and people who created a problem?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: You heard the testimony of Mr Du Plessis, the first person to testify in this hearing, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And do you confirm his testimony regarding the run up to this incident?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: The discussions which took place between you and Mr Du Plessis regarding specifically those activities of the three deceased, over what period of time did this take place and how often?

MR SNYMAN: Each morning we held discussions with the different Branches in the office and these, a great deal of discussions were held about these three specific persons as a result of their activities and the incitement and the inciting of the masses in the black townships.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Du Plessis finally came to you and made a suggestion that these people were to be eliminated, can you remember this?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was this said in an open meeting or was this done privately?

MR SNYMAN: It was done privately in my office.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you immediately give permission or did you discuss this matter further?

MR SNYMAN: No, there was a great deal of discussion regarding this matter.

ADV BOOYENS: I know it happened a long time ago, you said that you were old and you cannot remember everything so well, but how long would you say did you toy with this idea of eliminating these people before you finally authorised the operation?

MR SNYMAN: I would say that it was after the information meeting held at Cradock, more or less. A great deal of discussion was held about this matter until the operation was finally ...

INTERPRETER: The interpreters are having a problem hearing the speaker.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Booyens the interpreter didn't hear you, maybe you should repeat the last question.

ADV BOOYENS: So it was from February until May am I correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Thereafter Mr Du Plessis testified that you, two weeks before the incident, that is more or less the end of April or the beginning of May, gave authorization?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was this the first occasion on which you ever gave authorization for such an operation?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. That was not something I did very lightly.

ADV BOOYENS: You say that you did not do it very lightly, or make this decision very lightly, did you feel - let me rather put it this way - why did you feel that you could give this authorization for this operation?

MR SNYMAN: In the first place ... (intervention)

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, there seems to be some problem with my sound system and the sound system of the interpreters there. It goes off in my headphones every now and then as well, so they seem to be having a problem in hearing me, that is why you are not getting full translation.

CHAIRPERSON: I wonder, I don't know, let's just try our best.

ADV BOOYENS: My problem is that I have a TV camera right in front of me, I can't see when the lady is indicating to me that she can't hear.

I asked you why you gave authorization for the operation?

MR SNYMAN: My final decision to authorise the elimination of these persons were done in light of the following facts: The above-mentioned statement of Louis le Grange, then all the statements made by politicians which announced the policy that we found ourselves in a war situation and made us aware that we were the only who could fight this war successfully.

And they continually emphasised the fact that the activities of the activists in the Eastern Cape had to be stopped and when we pointed out that we tried to use the available legal measures, that there was no sympathy, but that the insistence was to take steps.

ADV BOOYENS: Can we just perhaps just finish this little bit and I see it is nearly one o'clock Mr Chairman in any case. Hopefully we will be able to get something through it.

You said that when you tried to point out that the legal means were not successful, was there no sympathy for you, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Then you also had attended many conferences of Commanding Officers at the Security Branch in your capacity as Commanding Officer, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there informal discussions held often where they spoke about unconventional methods which were used to deal with activists?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And did you hear that people spoke about people being taken out or eliminated, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Further, at that stage there were also various or several cross-border operations which the police spoke about openly where people were attacked, amongst others in Lesotho where people were killed?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: And at least they were overt regarding the cross-border operations, or some of them?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I don't believe it is necessary to repeat this, but Mr Du Plessis dealt with this, you also heard the testimony regarding the fact that there was very good Security Police contact with the insurgents of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees ... (tape ends) ... that people who disappeared, that you ever had any enquiries regarding the clandestine sources that you had in order to determine whether these people could be traced overseas?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Now, we know that the six people including these three disappeared in the Eastern Cape, which we know about now, were high profile figures, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any knowledge of the Kondile and Mthimkhulu cases, that they had been eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: You were aware of allegations which in newspapers were made?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Were there any enquiries about them from Security Police Head Office to use your clandestine sources to pick up their tracks?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: You heard what Colonel Du Plessis said about this, do you make the same deductions?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, may I suggest - I am not going to succeed in finishing this evidence in proper time, may I suggest subject to what the Commission says, this might be an appropriate time to take the adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Before we adjourn, I think it is appropriate to go back to the issue which was raised by Adv Booyens after the adjournment or just before this witness started giving evidence with regard to certain statements made by the Head of the Investigative Unit, which were shown or reported on television yesterday.

I think that we have taken note of Adv Booyens' concern and I think we should say that it is not desirable for people in certain positions to express themselves on matters which are still pending, which are still sub-judice.

One hopes that people would not do that if matters are still pending, but we should also add that if that assurance need to be given, we should also add that we will not in any way be influenced by those remarks that were made and we will go on to decide the matter as if such remarks were not made at all, they are not going to influence us in any way.

Did you want to say anything else Mr Booyens?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman, just in light of the last remarks, I certainly, if it was at all understood that I suggested that the Committee would be influenced by something like that, that was not at all our intention and I did not suggest at all - the only reason why I said it is I complained about the fact that that type of remark cause to inflame an already volatile situation, that was the only basis. I was certainly not suggesting, and I do not now suggest, that it would influence your objectivity at all, whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I didn't understand you to be saying that.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you sir.

CHAIRPERSON: I just said it just for the purpose of record. I think it is appropriate just to add that kind of remark. We will adjourn then until Monday at half past nine.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS UNTIL MONDAY 10-11-1997 AT HALF PAST NINE

ON RESUMPTION ON MONDAY 10.11.97 - DAY 7

CHAIRPERSON: October, the 10th, we are still busy with evidence of Mr Snyman.

HAROLD SNYMAN: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: (cont)

Before the adjournment on Friday, we paid attention to the fact that there has already been something said, or openly there were discussions about cross-border operations where they also acknowledged that activists were destroyed, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, through the years that you were a member of the Security Branch, there were often allegations in the media and other places of several incidents where there were alleged that the powers of the State were involved with attacks on activists, the killing of activists, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is.

ADV BOOYENS: Here is a list that we got from a book, if you could just have a look at it, not on the basis that you personally will have it. We have the first few pages, it is February 1971 to February 1991, but from 1974 to 1984 it gives an indication of quite a number of people who were killed and so forth, many of them were well publicised, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I've got unfortunately only four copies available. I didn't think - I will make one copy available for my learned friends on the other side and three copies for the Commission. It is just a popular publication, but just by way of illustration of the next point.

I think it will be Exhibit L. Mr Snyman, we already discussed the atmosphere that was prevalent, there was evidence from Mr Du Plessis ...

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry Mr Booyens, could you please just tell us where did you get this, what is the origin of this list?

ADV BOOYENS: Chairperson, this was a book written by Jacques Pauw, in the Heart of the War, and it is based on the Harms Commission and what preceded it and it is from page 270. I have the complete publication.

I won't say it has a lot of authority, but some of the cases are in fact well-known and is documented.

ADV DE JAGER: I just want to have the name of the publication.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, the people who was in the course of time, who disappeared, who were killed and also died in attacks overseas, those were activists, enemies of the State, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is.

ADV BOOYENS: And within the culture and the community of the Security Police, I am not referring to a case that you know of yourself, who did you believe was responsible for the death of these people and those who were attacked? Excluding those where the State actually took responsibility, who did you think were responsible?

MR SNYMAN: We thought because the struggle was against the State, that it was executed by the State or by its powers.

ADV BOOYENS: Was it also a factor, you also refer to the political statements, the background related to Louis le Grange, was that also a factor that played a role with you with your eventual decision that this was the policy of the government, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: I know that sometimes allegations were made that some of the people died because of internal political struggles and I think at some stage they also said that in some applications, did you believe it?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we did.

ADV BOOYENS: Could you just perhaps tell us, I am not quite sure whether we have discussed this with Mr Du Plessis, but you heard Mr Du Plessis' evidence with regard to this case in the Eastern Cape and with regard to some of the people who disappeared without trace, and the evidence concerning the fact that you had very good information to actually pick up the trace of these people in other countries?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: As second in command, you handled the administration and so forth?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any enquiries from Police Head Office to ask what does your information say, where are these people?

MR SNYMAN: We never had any feedback from Head Office.

ADV BOOYENS: And your deduction from the above what was that with regard to perhaps the tacit situation from the State with the elimination of activists? What did you think about this?

MR SNYMAN: I thought that the government accepted this without saying anything and there were never any investigation on the ground because of that.

ADV BOOYENS: And in cases where there were investigations, what would you say about the standard of the investigation, was it intensive, you are an old policeman or was it a very low kind of standard - I am referring to that specific time?

MR SNYMAN: I would say it was quite a low standard.

ADV BOOYENS: The culmination of these factors, did it play a role when you agreed to these operations as proposed by Mr Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Snyman, how did you personally feel regarding this instruction, it was an instruction, you agreed as a Commander, the final agreement lay with you, that these people could now be eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: Personally, I had problems with the killing of people, but in regard of what I believed concerning the situation as described by my juniors and then also the policy of the government, I came to the conclusion that the only solution for the situation would be that these three people had to be eliminated and then I subsequently gave permission for that.

ADV BOOYENS: How did the person Harold Snyman feel about giving permission, and how do you feel about it today?

MR SNYMAN: It was a problem, I had problems with my conscience. As a Christian I could not really reconcile myself with such actions, but because of the situation on the ground, I had to give this instruction or give the permission that these people be eliminated.

ADV BOOYENS: How do you feel about this today?

MR SNYMAN: If I have to be very honest, I have to say at that stage we executed the policy of the government and if I think back to these 12 years, or 12 years ago, I would say there was discrimination against a large proportion of the population of this country and therefore we had this terrible struggle on the ground.

ADV BOOYENS: After you gave the order, did you have anything to do with the practical execution, the planning?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you, after you gave authorization to Major Du Plessis, did you have nothing further to do with the operation itself?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Did you eventually report or received a report from him that the people had been eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: I think you already confirmed, but just for the sake of completeness, could you just confirm about your political motives in your application?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, those are correct, I confirm.

ADV BOOYENS: If you didn't think that it was in line or in accordance with this policy of the government, would you have given permission, authority for this operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, never.

ADV BOOYENS: As Security Policeman at that time, did you believe that it was the political order of the day and it was often told to you that you were the last line of defence against the onslaught of the activists, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: And I refer to the believe of the situation then, did you believe that it was a justified struggle that you had to execute the State's policy?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, at that stage we thought that that were the right steps to do.

ADV BOOYENS: You didn't get any advantage?

MR SNYMAN: No, not at all.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV DU PLESSIS: Mr Snyman, I don't really want to ask you any questions, I just want to make one or two statements to you.

What I want to put to you and that will be my argument in this case, the evidence that you have given with regard to the meeting that was held on the 14th of February 1985, the Security Council meeting in Cradock, it is on page 21 of your application, it is page 7 of the amnesty application and page 21 of the bundle, if you have a look at the third last paragraph, it says that during an adjournment I had an informal discussion with the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and he told me that it was expected of us to make a plan with the agitators in the Eastern Cape and if you look at the paragraph just before that, where you say that it was quite clear from these meetings that it was expected of the Security Branch in the Eastern Cape to fight fire with fire.

I want to put it to you that I am going to say in my argument that the action of Le Grange in June 1985, when instruction was given to Brigadier Jack Cronje, Captain Roelf Venter and others, and General Johan van der Merwe with regard to the zero hand grenade incident, fits in with particular pattern with regard to what was expected of the Security Force and I am also going to argue further that it is more than just fitting in, but it does seem as if there is a particular way of instruction that was given by the government at that stage to act against activists in that way.

I am putting this to you, do you have any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I believe that it is the case in light of the discussion that I had with the Minister.

ADV DU PLESSIS: And what I also want to put to you is that I am also going to use it in my argument, you say that in the fourth paragraph from the bottom on that page, that it was expected of the Security Police in the Eastern Cape to fight fire with fire and this corresponds with what Brigadier Cronje and Hechter testified, that that was the instruction they got early in 1986 from Brigadier Victor, to act in exactly the same way in the Northern Transvaal area with regard to the Security Police. Do you want to comment?

MR SNYMAN: If that is the case, then I would agree with that.

ADV DU PLESSIS: May it please you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV DU PLESSIS: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Snyman, your evidence is that you weren't involved with the execution of this operation, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is.

ADV LAMEY: Can you remember when before the 8th of May, did you approve this operation?

MR SNYMAN: There were several discussions between Major Du Plessis and myself from that date up to the date that this operation was executed.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall when the final decision was taken that these three people had to be eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: I can't recall the specific date, but it must have been quite close to the 8th of May.

ADV LAMEY: Did you know when it would occur?

MR SNYMAN: No, the date was not given to me.

ADV LAMEY: Did you get feedback at some stage?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall how long after the 8th of May you received the feedback?

MR SNYMAN: I can't remember that well, but it could have been the 10th or any date after the 10th of May.

ADV LAMEY: So you say it is after the 10th of May?

MR SNYMAN: It could have been the 10th of May or any date later.

ADV LAMEY: But not before the 10th of May?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV LAMEY: Can you recall how this feedback took place, did you make any enquiries, how did it come about that you got feedback?

MR SNYMAN: The feedback was done by Major Du Plessis who initially came to me with this plan and it was conveyed to me by him without him giving any detail.

ADV LAMEY: So he didn't give you any detail how it was done?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Did you make any enquiries with regard to detail?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV LAMEY: Could I perhaps ask you did you expect that Major Du Plessis would give you feedback as soon as possible after the operation?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Can you explain that a little bit. What do you mean you wanted him to come and give a report back as soon as possible? Within a few minutes of the incident, within hours?

MR SNYMAN: As I said it was reported back to me and I am not quite sure of the date, but it might have been on the 10th of May.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in all fairness to you, I think I must repeat the question. You see Mr Lamey asked you whether it was expected of Major Du Plessis to report to you as soon as possible after the people were eliminated and you said yes.

Now my question is, how soon after the incident did you expect to get a report? Within a few minutes or within a few hours?

MR SNYMAN: Because I had no knowledge of when the operation was to have taken place, I believed that they would inform me as soon as it had been completed.

ADV DE JAGER: The Chairman wants to know how soon after the operation had been completed, if the operation had been completed at four o'clock the afternoon, by what time that same day or the next day, when would you have expected feedback?

MR SNYMAN: It would probably have been the next day.

ADV DE JAGER: If we continue with this, why not that same afternoon? If it had taken place at four o'clock the afternoon, why would you not have received feedback or expected feedback on that same day?

MR SNYMAN: As I said I was not aware of the day on which the operation was to be executed. I believed that the feedback would come as soon as it had been completed.

ADV DE JAGER: And do you think that two hours or twelve hours or even 24 hours would have been a reasonable period of time for that feedback?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: But which one of the three would you regard as being reasonable?

MR SNYMAN: I won't be able to say because he reported back to me after it had been completed and I believed that it had taken place shortly after the operation was completed.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, just one question from me at this stage. You say when Major Du Plessis gave you the report that the operation was successful, you didn't ask for any details as to how they went about executing the operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not ask for any details.

ADV SANDI: Why was that so?

MR SNYMAN: I said that this was, I had trouble with my conscience in that regard and I accepted that he told me that the operation had been executed. I accepted it like that.

ADV SANDI: Was it not important for you to know those details so that you could work out in your mind the possibility of being detected in all this?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Snyman, when you gave the instruction or the authorization for the execution of this elimination, did you tell Major Du Plessis that he had to report back to you as soon as he had completed it, or what were your instructions in this regard?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot remember whether I gave such an instruction, but at that stage I believed that he would report back to me once the operation had been completed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nyoka?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV NYOKA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Good morning Mr Snyman. Good morning.

MR SNYMAN: Good morning Mr Nyoka.

ADV NYOKA: I respect you Mr Snyman, you are the age, the same age as my father, I respect you. You said that you were a Commander from 1984 to 1986. I am curious to find out why was it such a short span of being a Commander, can you tell me?

MR SNYMAN: I think the reason for that was that in the beginning I didn't participate in promotion exams and I only started studying seriously at a later stage of my life and I was only given those two years as Commanding Officer. I was second in command for a number of years, but I was only Commanding Officer of the Security Branch for two years.

ADV NYOKA: I thought it had something to do with the fact that twice a state of emergency had to be imposed during your reign. I thought it had something to do with that and you resigned because of pressure?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't follow the question very well.

ADV NYOKA: I thought it was because of the fact that the first state of emergency was imposed in July 1985 and then the second one in 1986, and that you resigned because of pressure that you are not doing enough, I thought so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. Would you please give me the opportunity to answer. If I think of my career as a policeman, I started with unrest in the year that I married my wife and it continued throughout and I felt at that stage with my age, that the pressure was too much for me and I felt that my family as such had been neglected and therefore I decided to go on pension in July 1986.

ADV NYOKA: All right. As a Christian you accept one of the ten commandments, being that thou shalt not kill and I am sure you must have had problems with that when you authorised the elimination, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, I already said that it was really a problem with my conscience, a struggle, but if you go back to the Bible there were also people killed in the Bible and at this stage I believed because of the pressure of me and the approval that the government in such a manner was given, that I had to give the instruction to in fact calm down the unrest situation.

ADV NYOKA: Could you not have exercised your other unstated viable legal option, moral option, spiritual option of saying rather than doing this, I would resign? Please shift me to another police department as a Superintendent because you subsequently did that in 1986, that is why I asked you the question, could you not have done that as a Christian Mr Snyman.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. As I said in my exposition to the Minister that the legal options at that stage, did not work as a result of the situation on the ground.

ADV NYOKA: They did not work because you were there, I am saying that you as Harold Snyman saying to yourself, I am taking my only legal option, moral option, of moving out rather than killing, because you were involved in 1977, eight years ago in the killing of Steve Biko, though it was negligent according to you and that must have bothered you for the next eight years. Why did you not say, I, Harold Snyman, I move myself out of this because I am a Christian?

MR SNYMAN: The consideration at that stage was that there were no other options because legal options at that stage did not work any more and that the situation on the ground, had escalated, many people lost their lives, policemen also could not live in the black townships any more, they had to be removed and they also had to be accommodated at other police stations.

ADV NYOKA: I am not going to labour the point. This government policy to kill, was it documented anywhere because I understand that government policy must be in a document either in a constitution or a law or some official documentation saying that circularise, do this, kill activists. Was it documented anywhere Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: Was it ever documented to kill, I could not follow you precisely?

ADV NYOKA: Precisely, that is what I meant or did you imply that it was government policy by the statements and by the make a plan statement of Cradock?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. Even because of these documents that we have just submitted, we really thought that the State approved of this in a tacit way because we never received any enquiries or there were never any investigation.

ADV NYOKA: Mr Snyman, as a Regional Commander, it was a duty to ensure that government policy was explicit. You could have phoned Mr Louis le Grange or any government member to say is this government policy to kill, because I am about to kill now. Could you not have done that?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't take it any further after the discussion on the 14th of February with the Minister.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not get back to him to say that I have implemented that make a plan suggestion, I have killed this three Pebco leaders, did you not get back to him to say that?

MR SNYMAN: This was a clandestine operation and there was no feedback given in this regard.

ADV NYOKA: He is someone who started the chain of events and he was your Minister, could you not have trust in him by telling him that you have killed these three Pebco leaders?

MR SNYMAN: We accepted that it had the tacit approval of the government officials, because there was no feedback from them and also no investigation was launched.

ADV NYOKA: It is very strange that if you can get a mandate from someone, but not get back to that someone to say I have implemented your mandate? It is very, very strange.

MR SNYMAN: No, it wasn't strange at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that in 1977, you stated falsely under oath that the Police were not responsible for the death of Mr Biko?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. But I think as we have already said during that trial, that was not the truth. It was not the correct story.

ADV NYOKA: Do you remember an application made on the 22nd of May by the children of Mr Hashe, where again in an affidavit you denied that you are responsible for the disappearance of the Pebco 3? You stated under oath?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: There was another one in two months to come, two months later, that is on the 17th of July, a similar one by Mrs Hashe, Mrs Galela and the mother of Mr Godolozi, Mrs Benedida Godolozi? You similarly made a denial, is it not correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: That is the third instance you've lied under oath, not so? That was the third instance?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: The fourth and final one was in 1985, after the Cradock four inquest, you also made a falsehood under oath, denying that the Police had anything to do with that, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Why do you think we should believe you now when you are stating under oath when you lied in four instances, why should we believe you now?

MR SNYMAN: We came to apply for amnesty because the opportunity was given to us. And now we are coming forward with the true story and true facts.

ADV NYOKA: If that is the case, why is it that you did not tell us today of the reasons that you stated in your affidavit in saying that you had nothing to do with the disappearance of the three, because you have not told us that far? Let me make it easier Mr Snyman, is it not correct that in the affidavit you said that the three could have disappeared because of the UDF/AZAPO feud, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not tell us about that here?

MR SNYMAN: The facts that we have before you now, are the correct facts.

ADV NYOKA: And why is it that you made a last minute application if your conscience, you wanted to be clear with your conscience?

MR SNYMAN: I applied when we heard that the law was promulgated and it was made possible for us to apply for amnesty. Because for the rest of my life, I could not have this on my conscience and therefore I applied.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that you are living in Uitenhage as a pensioner?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Thus, you have all the time in the world to try to seek out the three families and apologise to them off the record, if you are genuine, and reveal to them what you did, could you not have done that being so near and having all the time?

MR SNYMAN: Could you please repeat the question, I could not follow it quite clearly.

ADV NYOKA: The question is that you have all the time to try to find out where the families are to see them off the record and to apologise to them, revealing what you did if you are genuine about apologising? Do you understand now?

MR SNYMAN: I understand, but we were advised by our legal counsel that we should not at this stage take any steps in this regard, but my legal representative on my left side, that he would explain the whole matter.

ADV NYOKA: Did you have problems with that stance?

MR SNYMAN: No, I would not have problems with that.

ADV NYOKA: All right. You were once a District Commander or a Head of a Division at the Security Branch, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Can you tell us what the procedure is that such a Head takes when an enquiry is made to that particular division about a particular matter, what is the procedure?

MR SNYMAN: If an enquiry is made about any case, a report has to be submitted.

ADV NYOKA: Do you make that report independently of other divisions after investigating the facts that are enquired upon, you make your own independent report, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Which reports are you referring to?

ADV NYOKA: I am saying that if a query is made Mr Snyman to your division, do you make up your mind independently by saying this is the response I am giving to this query that is coming to the Security Branch for instance as other divisions are doing, you don't consult other divisions, that is my point? You make your own letter, you make your own report independent of any other division, that is what I am trying to find out?

MR SNYMAN: If we receive a report, it will be handled by the specific desk, for example for that specific race group and if a letter has to be written, it will come through me.

ADV NYOKA: So you write your own letter, independent of other divisions?

MR SNYMAN: It depends what it has to do with. If it is of security importance, we would have answered it.

ADV NYOKA: Yes, in other words you agree with me you write it independently of other outside interference?

MR SNYMAN: It depends who were involved.

ADV NYOKA: The reason why I am asking all this is because when enquiries were made about the Pebco 3, to seven divisions, in both the May 1985 and July 1985 applications, the heads of the seven divisions, responded in letters that were very identical from the first word to the last one.

I will give an example of this. This division were the offices of the District Commander of the Police Port Elizabeth, a letter dated 21 May 1985 by Colonel P.J. Engelbrecht, then the second one is the District Commander of Grahamstown, 21st May 1985, by Major Husselman, the third one was the District Commander of Uitenhage, letter of 21st May 1985, by Lieutenant Colonel Pretorius, the fourth one was the District Commander of Cradock, same date of 21st May 1985, by Major Calitz, the fifth one was the District Commander of Port Elizabeth North, same date of the 21st of May 1985, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerber, the sixth one was yours, on the 21st of May 1985 and finally the Murder and Robbery Branch by Lieutenant Colonel Strydom.

I wish to refer you to Bundle J, page 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34, those are all the letters I am referring to. They are all identical. The only difference is your letter because it had to include Special Branch and Security Laws and the Murder and Robbery letter which omitted leaders of the SAP, otherwise the letters are all the same. I have a problem with that, if divisions respond independently. I have a great problem with that.

Let me say, I want you to respond briefly to what I am going to say. Firstly all the seven letters were written in different divisions, including cities Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Uitenhage and Cradock, yet the letters are identical. Can you tell me how did that happen?

MR SNYMAN: No, the only deduction that I can make is that these people were not detained by any of these police stations.

ADV NYOKA: I beg your pardon? I don't understand your answer.

MR SNYMAN: These people weren't arrested or detained by the different police stations.

ADV NYOKA: No, I understand what they say, but my problem is why are these letters all identical, coming from different divisions, when the head makes his own submission independently of other divisions?

I understand what the contents are saying, but I've got a problem with the identicality of the letters.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that. They replied to a letter written to them, and the fact was purely that the people weren't detained by the Police.

ADV NYOKA: The second problem that I have is that all the seven letters bore the same date of the 21st of May 1985, whereas they were written in different divisions, and cities. How coincidental that is?

MR SNYMAN: It could be coincidental, but I really cannot recall when this interdict arrived and people replied concerning letters that were sent to them, regarding this particular incident.

ADV NYOKA: The final problem I have is that the said date of 21st of May 1985, was just a day before the application, yet suddenly there was a flurry of letters which are identical? That is very strange again.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: If someone from the floor asked you, one of the Committee members, and you had to write letters about queries, it would be very strange indeed if our letters were identical and just a day before a particular event has to happen, especially as when we are not even in the same city? Would you not agree with me there was an authority from above stating that in a panicky manner, that you must write this letter, dictating that letter?

In other words, there were more than four people knowing of the Pebco 3, there were more than four people knowing of the Pebco 3 disappearance, those police stations knew hence our application says there was not full disclosure. Any comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: The only deduction that I can make is that it was alleged that these people were detained at different police stations and therefore the different offices answered those questions or replied to the question.

ADV NYOKA: But why is the wording identical, that is my point. I have no problem with the response, but why is the wording so uncanningly identical?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you therefore Mr Snyman, that you are not telling us the truth about this, you are not telling us who knew, because maybe those persons, whilst they did not have a direct involvement in the killing, they knew who did this but you don't want to mention them in your application. What is your comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: The fact of the matter is as it is put in the application before us, those are the true facts. The fact that they were detained at a police station, that did not occur.

ADV NYOKA: Let's move to the make a plan statement. Can you repeat for me the entire sentence that the late Mr Le Grange said to you to make a plan? What did he say in his own words?

MR SNYMAN: That took place after I did some counselling, during an adjournment for tea, we had tea together and despite of the fact of what I said that the legal options weren't working, the Minister told me but Colonel, you have to make a plan with these agitators in the Eastern Cape.

ADV NYOKA: Did he say that you must kill or eliminate those agitators in making a plan?

MR SNYMAN: I made the inference after we said that the normal legal options weren't working any more and the only inference that I could actually draw from this, was that these people had to be eliminated. And that the politicians would accept this silently.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not ask him, you were together, the two of you, aside, why did you not ask him Mr Le Grange, just to be absolutely certain, are you meaning that I must kill these activists, just to be sure?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not ask him, but that was the deduction I made.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not ask him, why did you not ask him?

MR SNYMAN: I understood it that that was what he implied.

ADV NYOKA: Would you agree with me, if I say that the phrase make a plan, is so broad enough to include both legal and illegal methods or options? It is broad, it is all encompassing, do you agree with me?

MR SNYMAN: I will agree.

ADV NYOKA: Would you further agree with me that even in the context of illegal options, the phrase is broad enough to encompass less drastic methods, illegal methods?

MR SNYMAN: We have already said that the other options did not work and the situation on the ground became more militant, to such an extent that we almost could not execute our work and duties in the black communities.

ADV NYOKA: I will make it easier for you, just to give you three examples of less drastic illegal steps. The first one will include assaulting and torturing activists, burning their houses or motor vehicles or threats through the mail or telephone, could that not have been considered rather than taking out of life?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: We would not have done that, because perhaps innocent people could also have been injured in such attacks.

ADV NYOKA: All right. Let's just restrict ourselves to assaulting. Only one person will be injured, the victim or target, why did you not consider that one?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never assaulted a person and I would also never tell anyone to assault a person.

ADV NYOKA: So rather than assault, it is preferable to kill, is that your stance?

MR SNYMAN: No, but based on the reports given to me at that stage and the situation that was really out of control, we came to the conclusion that there weren't any other options, other than to eliminate the leaders.

ADV NYOKA: Just be fair to me, is it correct that you never considered assaulting activists? Not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: The other less drastic illegal step will be bombing Pebco offices, committing burglary in the offices, removing the documentation just to cripple it so that you can regain the initiative as Mr Du Plessis had said. Could you not have done that?

MR SNYMAN: No, that was not considered.

ADV NYOKA: The other less drastic illegal option, and I am very sorry to say this, will be since these three leaders had wives, to interfere in their marriages by smear campaigns alleging that they were spies or they had affairs. Could you not have done that, just to destroy them and to divert their attention from the struggle. Could you not have done that Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was not considered.

ADV NYOKA: So in two instances you did not apply your mind properly to the situation before concluding that death is the only alternative, can you agree with me on that?

MR SNYMAN: I based my actions on the information that was daily at my disposal and also what Major Du Plessis had said, that the situation was getting totally out of control.

ADV NYOKA: Since the make a plan statement was made on the 14th of February, to the 8th of May, you had sufficient time to address your mind to all this legal and illegal avenues, not so? More than your mind?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. We considered other options, but we realised that it would not work.

ADV NYOKA: Would you agree with me that the make a plan statement, even on legal avenues, meant that simply Mr Le Grange was criticising you, he was saying that please Security Branch of PE, pull up your socks, do your work effectively? Could that not have been the meaning?

MR SNYMAN: No, that is not how I understood it, because there was tremendous pressure on us from the side of the government, from the State Security Council side, from the Defence Force and even the opposition and the media, the opposition parties criticised us.

ADV NYOKA: For instance, that could have meant that please instigate the current UDF and AZAPO feud, so that two liberation groups fight against each other and not concentrate on the State, that could have meant that.

It could also have meant that get Pebco executive members to be informers so that their attentions are diverted from the State. Things like those or infiltrating ANC cadres, kill them when you find them with weapons. That could have meant that legally, not so?

MR SNYMAN: The purpose of this organisation was to take over the government of the day. They did everything within their power to in fact get to that result.

ADV NYOKA: When Mr Du Plessis made the submission to you, did he say to you that the Pebco leadership must be eliminated, or did he leave the conclusion to you?

MR SNYMAN: No, he put it to me that they had to be eliminated as he put it in his evidence.

ADV NYOKA: And did you not say look Mr Du Plessis, I am both a Christian and hold a highly responsible position of trustworthiness, I simply cannot authorise that. You didn't do that?

MR SNYMAN: I have already said I had great problems with my conscience in this regard. I would never have done something like this on my own. But because of the situation on the ground, and the whole motivation given to me, it was quite clear that no other alternative existed.

ADV NYOKA: You were involved in the monthly Joined Security Management Centre, monthly meetings, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: When he made that submission, why did you not say to him look wait a little bit Mr Du Plessis, I am involved in the JSMC and it is trying with us Security Branch to reach solutions by legal ways. I can't do that, we can't do that unilaterally. We must do it jointly with the JSMC.

Why did you not stop him from doing that?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was quite clear that there was a lot of pressure from the JMS side and from the State Security Council and from politicians and because we were the first line of defence, they always threw it into our laps that we had to make a plan and that we had to normalise the situation.

So I did not go back to the JMS.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not tell the JSMC that there was this suggestion and you really think you are going to implement it now, in pursuance of the objective of restoration of law and order?

MR SNYMAN: This was a clandestine operation, and I would not have conveyed it to the JSMC.

ADV NYOKA: But everyone was criticising you, the Minister of Law and Order, the JSMC, Defence Force people saying that you were not doing enough. There was also the politicians' statements that drastic plans must be embarked upon. You had no reason to hide that from them.

You could have said look, my action is in the context of your criticism, of your statements. Why is it clandestine when you are being authorised to do that implicitly?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. The pressure was of such an extent that we really felt at that stage, that after the motivation that was given to me, that there was no other option or alternative way to normalise the situation.

ADV NYOKA: Right, but why did you not share your sentiment with the JSMC, why did you not do that? Why do you make it clandestine?

MR SNYMAN: As I have already said this was a clandestine operation and I would not have done it.

ADV NYOKA: So you were fearful of being criticised by them if they knew about that, is that what you are saying or suggesting?

MR SNYMAN: I don't know what their criticism would have been, but as I have said previously there was tacit approval of these kinds of incidents, that occurred all over the country, not only in Port Elizabeth.

ADV NYOKA: Is it not correct that when the three Pebco executive members of the first executive of Pebco, Mr Thozamilo Bota, Mona Padela and Palo Chuma were restricted in 1980, a new executive was elected and the executive kept on changing in 1981, 1982, 1983 and then the last one on the 26th of March 1985. Therefore killing certain people would not have been meaningful, do you agree with me?

MR SNYMAN: The Pebco at that stage, was a radical element and we believed that those three leaders were the prominent brain behind the unrest situation in the black areas.

ADV NYOKA: Was there any documentation produced and given to you, justifying that these three were the problem areas rather than the rest of the five executive members?

MR SNYMAN: Reports were given continuously by means of informers and other means that these people were primarily responsible for the situation that we experienced at that stage.

And that terrorists were also sent out of the country through them.

ADV NYOKA: I would like to be in your shoes. Can you tell me what it was about Mr Godolozi, what it was about Mr Hashe and what it was about Mr Galela that made you to take this ultimate step of killing each individual?

MR SNYMAN: I based my decisions on that which was reported by Major Du Plessis and his desk, his people. They were on the ground daily, they monitored this.

ADV NYOKA: So, you did not ascertain on your own about what the role of each individual was before taking such a monumental step of killing? It is not as light as assaulting a person?

MR SNYMAN: Daily reports were given with regard to the activities and the politicisation of the people by this leader group, the Pebco leaders.

ADV NYOKA: But initially you wanted to eliminate the entire Pebco leadership, not so?

MR SNYMAN: The motivation given to me by Major Du Plessis, was that these three people were the prominent leading figures in this organisation.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to put it to you that Pebco worked as a collective cadreship, not one of them was more prominent than others. It was just by chance that you killed those three.

It was only because they turned up due to their own misfortune, at the airport. Any comment about that?

MR SNYMAN: I don't agree. That was not the motivation that was given to me.

ADV NYOKA: And further more, there were further attempts to try to lure other Pebco executive members, Mr Hendrik Fassie for instance?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, I was not specifically involved in the operation.

ADV NYOKA: I am very pleased to say that today he is sitting here in the Centenary Hall, alive and kicking. Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I did not hear your question, please repeat?

ADV NYOKA: No, it was not a question, it was a comment. I am saying I am very pleased to say that he is here in Centenary Hall today, alive and kicking. It is just a comment, do you have anything to say? You don't have to say anything.

MR SNYMAN: No, I don't have any comment.

ADV NYOKA: And you said that you sat every morning with your senior, Brigadier Swart, who was the Regional South African Police Commissioner, not so? You reported to him every day, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Did you share with him the suggestion made by Mr Du Plessis before he made it, or even afterwards, your action that you committed? Did you talk to him the morning after you got the report?

MR SNYMAN: No, I did not convey it to Brigadier Swart.

ADV NYOKA: Are you seriously suggesting Mr Snyman, that Mr Swart was not within the category of a need to know, being your senior and you reporting to him daily? Did you not deem it necessary that it was necessary for him to have known about this?

MR SNYMAN: Because it was a clandestine operation, I did not convey it to him.

ADV NYOKA: So, are you saying that it was clandestine up to your level, you were the ceiling? Not any one above you, to whom you reported daily?

MR SNYMAN: After the incident, the Minister of Law and Order was again at a meeting. He didn't say anything to me and I also did not convey anything to him. And at that stage I believed that they tacitly approved of it.

ADV NYOKA: When the media reported that the Pebco leaders were missing, didn't Mr Swart sitting with you, enquire whether you had a hand in that as the Security Branch? Did he not ask you anything to that effect?

MR SNYMAN: No, he never asked such a question of me.

ADV NYOKA: Did you not even discuss that, the two of you?

MR SNYMAN: No. Reports were made after the interdict, those were the only reports.

ADV NYOKA: You know, what I find strange is that in the same application, both of them, Mr Swart shares the same sentiments or advances the same reasons as to what could have happened to the Pebco 3. He said that they could have disappeared, he agreed with you that they could have disappeared in the UDF/AZAPO feud.

Yet, you say you never discussed that - what a strange coincidence? Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I really can't recall, but it could be that we discussed it, but I am not sure.

ADV NYOKA: On the 7th of May 1985, a day before the abduction of the Pebco leaders, it was reported in the Herald that Mr Louis le Grange visited Port Elizabeth. Did he visit you as Regional Commander out of courtesy?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV NYOKA: Why did he not do that, because he had met you at Cradock and strangely he was here the day before the disappearance and he did not pay a courtesy visit to a head. I find that very strange?

MR SNYMAN: He would have contacted the Divisional Commissioner or the Head of the Defence Force at that stage, but he never made contact with my office.

ADV NYOKA: Did he not make any enquiries as to why these people disappeared after my visit, did he not make an enquiry?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot recall.

ADV NYOKA: So it could have happened, but you cannot recall?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible.

ADV NYOKA: And you said also the JSMC did not enquire and you did not tell them, not so?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, the last aspect Mr Snyman, it is about legal options, the state of emergency was imposed in July, within two months of the disappearance of the Pebco 3.

Do you remember that?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV NYOKA: And in 1960, you were 37 years old and the District Commander in Grahamstown, not so?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never went to Grahamstown, accept in the office of the Divisional Commissioner.

ADV NYOKA: The introduction here is, 1960 DK Grahamstown, what does that mean? DK Grahamstown, does that not mean District Commander in Grahamstown in 1960, your biography?

MR SNYMAN: There is a small error, it says DK Grahamstown, but at that stage I was in the office, at that stage I was a clerk in the office of the Divisional Commissioner for a period of nine months and when our office moved back to Port Elizabeth, I went with the staff of the Divisional Commissioner, to come and work here in Port Elizabeth. I was never at the District Command.

ADV NYOKA: If drastic measures had to be taken, and you had the maturity of age in 1960, to remember the state of emergency, why did you not phone your pal, Mr Louis le Grange and say listen, that make a plan, I think we can make a plan of the imposition of a state of emergency.

This three leaders could have been here today, not so? In other words the state of emergency could have been imposed two months earlier, rather than later?

MR SNYMAN: Do you refer to 1960?

ADV NYOKA: I am saying that I am quoting 1960 because I am saying that you were 37 years old and you will remember the state of emergency of 1960 and its effectiveness.

Surely you could have suggested this to Mr Louis le Grange and said I think that make a plan, I understand what I can do. Why don't you impose a state of emergency rather than I, a Christian, Harold Snyman, killing people. Why did you not do that?

MR SNYMAN: The prerogative for the state of emergency is in the hands of the State President on advice from his Cabinet and the State Security Council and we on the ground level, forwarded all the necessary documentation with regard to the unrest, and they had to take the decision with regard to a state of emergency and not us.

ADV NYOKA: I accept that, but I thought you said you on the ground, the last fort of resistance, had to come with solutions. Surely if you could have said please try the imposition of a state of emergency, it could have been imposed two months prematurely. Just a suggestion, not so?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it is a suggestion and it is still in the hands of the Security Head Office and the prerogative of the State President at that time.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not suggest it, why did you not suggest it?

MR SNYMAN: We did not suggest it, we only gave report on what was the situation on the ground and the total anarchy at that stage. It was in their hands to institute the state of emergency.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just step in here. Colonel the question really is, you had the opportunity of meeting with the Minister, you had the opportunity to discuss the situation with him, and he says to you make a plan.

Now, the question is why did you not bearing in mind that you had an experience of effectiveness of the 1960 state of emergency, why did you not go back to the Minister who had shown that he was willing to discuss the situation with you, why not go back to him and say you know, you remember I had a meeting with you and you said make a plan.

But I think that you should consider a state of emergency which of course he would discuss with the Cabinet and eventually it will get to the State President.

MR SNYMAN: I did not consider it at that stage. As I said that I reported with regard to what the situation was like on the ground and we also emphasised the urgency and the seriousness and I still believe it was the prerogative of the State President and his advisors to institute a state of emergency.

ADV NYOKA: I just have four more questions, Your Worship, just four more. Why did you not suggest to the Minister Mr Snyman, that part of the plan will be to declare Pebco an unlawful organisation, why did you not suggest that? It was another legal option?

MR SNYMAN: I did not.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: I didn't suggest it.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not do so?

MR SNYMAN: I thought that the Minister and his advisors would do that because it was also done from Head Office and from government side, it was not done from the local office.

I know that at that stage meetings were prohibited.

ADV NYOKA: Why did you not suggest that the only eight executive members of Pebco be removed from this area to a remote area in South Africa, thus to diminish their effectiveness, banishment in other words?

MR SNYMAN: Our previous experience in these cases were that it also didn't work. And it was also not considered at that stage because then there would have been some agitation from people on the ground, locally.

ADV NYOKA: I do not understand why it was not working. You never even tried it in this case.

MR SNYMAN: We did not try it.

ADV NYOKA: Why not?

MR SNYMAN: Because as I said it also didn't work in other cases, it also didn't work with us on the ground. It was a joke at that stage.

ADV NYOKA: Can you tell me of one case where it didn't work, a living example of that?

MR SNYMAN: After 12 years with no records in my possession, I am not able to say that to you.

ADV NYOKA: Are you saying you were banishing thousands of people for you not to remember? Surely you could have remembered one, there were not many people removed in such circumstances? Were you removing thousands of people Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: There were many incidents, but I cannot remember. I don't have records in front of me. After I went on pension, I totally retired. I did not involve myself with these kinds of political situations afterwards.

ADV NYOKA: Let me make life easier for you, during those two years when you were a Commander, 1984 to 1986, did you remove any activists to any other area that you can recall?

MR SNYMAN: No, I cannot recall. Perhaps some of my colleagues could remember that were more in the field, on the ground itself.

ADV NYOKA: Finally, are you saying that detention without trial was not being practised at the time that you were considering the permanent removal from society of the three Pebco leaders?

MR SNYMAN: No. It did not work at that stage because the moment you do it, there was agitation to release the people, there were boycotts and so forth.

ADV NYOKA: I am instructed that there were people in detention at that stage, some of them street committee members and other committee members. How can you dismiss a measure as being useless when you were still implementing it?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible, I cannot comment on that. It is a long time ago.

ADV NYOKA: Restriction, is it not furthermore correct that after the last state of emergency of 1986 to 1989, UDF leadership and Pebco leadership were restricted from six in the morning to six at night, for about three months? Is that not correct?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I cannot remember those specific cases.

ADV NYOKA: So despite all that was said about restriction not having the desired legal effects, it was being used although it was useless not so?

MR SNYMAN: As I said I cannot recall cases that my learned friend is referring to. If it was the case, then it must have been.

ADV NYOKA: By the way, we had resigned in 1986, I forgot, you were no longer in the picture at 1989 to be fair to you.

Finally Mr Snyman, the bottom line was that you were against the implementation of the (indistinct), because it was bringing the communism or the SACP, ANC/SACP communist alliance, you were against communism, not so to be brought into South Africa?

MR SNYMAN: The struggle was against communism and the expansionism of it, and it was put quite clearly to us from the politicians' side and at that stage we believed that these people wanted to take over the country and that the government would not allow them to take over and we were the servants of the State.

ADV NYOKA: I wish to close by saying that, I wish to put it to you that the mother of all paradoxes, the situation was that all the draconian legislation, security legislation that was being employed like detention without trial, solitary confinement, the killing of activists were measures that were used by the so-called communist regimes, starting from as far as Russia to post-revolutionary Russia and communist China. The same method that you were using, you were fighting against, you were using. Any comment?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, we fought against that.

ADV DE JAGER: But the question is or the statement put to you is that you used the same draconian measures as those that were used by communist regimes. You used exactly the same here against them?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, I was only a servant of the State and I had to execute the laws of the State. We didn't make the laws ourselves, we just had to implement and execute it.

ADV NYOKA: So Mr Snyman, you dislike something so much that you ended up liking it, because you used it, not so?

MR SNYMAN: What was used by the Security Branch, was legislation put there by the government and we were the people implementing it whether we liked it or not.

ADV NYOKA: I put it to you that as in the other four instances that I quoted earlier on, you are not telling us the truth and you are hiding certain people who knew about the Pebco 3 and I further put it to you that you are not genuine about apologising, because you have not apologised to the family, having all the opportunity to do so. Do you have any comment?

MR SNYMAN: I have already said that this situation was discussed with my legal counsel on my left hand side, and if he wants to say something at this stage, I will appreciate it because that was the advice given to us by him.

ADV NYOKA: No, I don't want him to testify, you are testifying now. Don't seek assistance Mr Snyman, just answer the question.

MR SNYMAN: I believe that in future there will be an opportunity for us to get to know the family.

ADV NYOKA: No further questions Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV NYOKA: .

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for 15 minutes.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Hartle?

HAROLD SNYMAN: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS HARTLE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Are you ready Mr Snyman,?

MR SNYMAN: I am.

MS HARTLE: In what other applications are you involved before this Commission?

MR SNYMAN: I am involved in three applications.

MS HARTLE: Can you please name those?

MR SNYMAN: The Biko case, the Pebco case and the Goniwe case.

MS HARTLE: At the time of the disappearance of the Pebco 3, what was your job description in the position which you held in the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: I was the Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, Eastern Province.

MS HARTLE: I understand the position you held, but what were you tasked to do especially, I mean were you charged with personnel, were you charged with troubleshooting, were you charged with liaison specifically, with those in higher positions of authority, what was expected of you in that position at that time?

MR SNYMAN: As Commanding Officer it was my responsibility to take charge of the division.

MS HARTLE: Can you be a bit more specific Mr Snyman, I put it to you that I need to establish exactly what it was that was expected of you in that position in relation to staff, in relation to liaising with persons in higher authority, troubleshooting in security areas, what exactly was expected of you in that position?

MR SNYMAN: Sometimes we went to Head Office where conferences were held, where the situation was discussed, I was responsible for the sessions on the JSMC and control over the whole division.

MS HARTLE: And were you personally aware of what was going on on the ground as it were or did you consult with other officials in order to ascertain exactly what was happening in your area at the time?

MR SNYMAN: No, every morning we held conferences where the security situation was discussed and where reports were made to me and where in turn I reported to the Divisional Commissioner every morning.

MS HARTLE: And who would report to you in this regard?

MR SNYMAN: The different desks at the Security Branch, Eastern Province.

MS HARTLE: And would it be fair to say Mr Snyman, that you based your report in turn, solely on the advice given to you by these officials who consulted with you?

MR SNYMAN: Are you now referring to the security men who were under my control?

MS HARTLE: That is correct, those who reported to you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, they reported to me.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, are you understanding my question? I am asking you if the advice given to you by the officials underneath you, was the only information you had concerning the affairs of the Eastern Cape at the time? You didn't have personal knowledge?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: So if the reports of those who served under you, were dubious, you followed such dubious reports? If those reports were exaggerated, you followed that exaggerated reports? Do you understand what I am saying?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot remember any suspicious reports that I received, the received that was received were reports from the events which happened every day.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, is it correct that you had no personal knowledge of what was going on on the ground? That you based your reports to the higher committees, on what was informed to you, what was advised to you by those serving under you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I had a great deal of responsibility that was placed on my shoulders and I had to be led by the information that was supplied by the people of the Security Branch.

MS HARTLE: Who were those persons serving under you on who you relied for your information?

MR SNYMAN: There were different desks.

MS HARTLE: Who are they Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot recall all the names, but there were desks for white affairs, asian and coloured affairs and black affairs, combatting of terrorism, etc.

MS HARTLE: Any of those persons who advised you and consulted with you in respect of what was going on, are they applicants before this Commission?

MR SNYMAN: There are some of them who are applicants at the moment.

MS HARTLE: Can you name them Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: Major Du Plessis was one of them, Captain Sakkie van Zyl, Captain Deon Nieuwoudt and the other who are appearing together with me.

MS HARTLE: In respect of the Pebco 3 operation, is it correct that the buck stopped with you as it were. If you had not made that decision to eliminate, the three might have been alive today?

MR SNYMAN: That is true.

ADV SANDI: Ms Hartle, can I just interpose for a moment. I want to ask a question which is very related to the one you have just asked, so that we do not come back to this. Can I ask Mr Snyman, if you were told that a certain person because of his or her political activities, was becoming or had become a candidate for elimination, would you go into the trouble of getting the file on such a person and use it and see what sort of person you are getting a report about?

MR SNYMAN: It worked in such a way at the Security Branch that if information came in regarding any person's activities, then that desk would place that file on my desk and I would have gone through it and if there was a letter to be signed, I would have done so.

ADV SANDI: On these three gentlemen, did you ever go through each one's file and see what this person is doing or what he is alleged to be involved in?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Carry on Ms Hartle, I do not want to interrupt.

MS HARTLE: Thank you. In your submissions to this Commission, at page 7 or page 21 of the record, you state as follows in the second last paragraph: This is after your informal discussion with the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange and after he had informed you that it was expected of you to make a plan concerning the agitators in the Eastern Cape, you said as follows: I understood it and interpreted it that these activists who were under discussion had to be killed as it had already been mentioned at the meeting that the normal, legal options had no solution to offer for the anarchy that was taking place.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Now, is it fair to say Mr Snyman, that you surmised that you had authority to carry out the Pebco 3 operation?

MR SNYMAN: As a result of what was submitted to me and the situation at grassroots level, at that stage I thought that it was the right decision.

MS HARTLE: Did the then Minister, Mr Le Grange name Messrs Godolozi, Hashe and Galela?

MR SNYMAN: He did not mention names. He told me that we had to make a plan with the activists in the Eastern Cape and this included Cradock and the whole Eastern Cape Security Branch division.

MS HARTLE: Is that all he said in relation to the Pebco 3, in relation to the Pebco activities?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Was a statement made in relation to a particular incident or particular incidents which had occurred and which were perhaps discussed at the meetings which you had held, or in your informal discussions with him?

MR SNYMAN: Before I had the informal discussions with the Minister, I had a properly motivated report which I gave to the meeting present that day at Cradock.

MS HARTLE: Was that report in writing?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, it was in writing.

MS HARTLE: Does that report exist today?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot say.

MS HARTLE: What did that report say Mr Snyman?

MR SNYMAN: That report dealt with the unrest situation in the Eastern Cape area.

MS HARTLE: What in relation to the Pebco activists rendered it necessary to eliminate them?

MR SNYMAN: As we have already said previously in our statements and in our testimony, that the situation at grassroots level at that stage, was one of absolute anarchy. It was totally uncontrollable and it is in this form that the report was given to the Minister.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I am not interested in what submissions your colleagues have made. You have made the decision to eliminate the Pebco 3, I want to hear from you what it was that you considered justified that decision?

MR SNYMAN: That which was conveyed to me by Major Du Plessis, which he had motivated properly and which I saw in the reports which were sent through to me, I based my decision on this, although I said that I was doing this against my will, but I based my decision on that.

MS HARTLE: Mr Du Plessis must have furnished compelling reasons then for you to make that decision. I want to know what those reasons were that were furnished to you?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I cannot recall everything that he said in his motivation, but what he did say was as things had been happening at grassroots level, the ungovernability of the black areas, the murders, etc.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what in relation to the three deceased rendered it necessary for you to make that decision to eliminate them?

MR SNYMAN: Because at that stage they were the leadership who had brought about this situation in the black areas.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, is there any reason why members who served under you such as Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl, wouldn't have been better candidates to sit on those Committees as they had first hand knowledge of what was happening in the area at the time?

MR SNYMAN: Which Committees are you referring to?

MS HARTLE: The security meetings that you attended and to which you refer in your submissions?

MR SNYMAN: It was my prerogative as Commanding Officer of the Security Branch, to submit those reports to JSMC and to Head Office etc.

MS HARTLE: There was ultimately dangers, Mr Snyman, because you could not give first hand information, you never had first hand knowledge of what was happening on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: That statement is not correct. I was informed on a daily basis as to the situation on grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: And the information furnished to you, may have been incorrect or exaggerated, do you agree with that?

MR SNYMAN: No, it was not exaggerated. The proof was there, vehicles, necklaced murders, etc.

ADV SANDI: Can I ask a question Mr Snyman. In the course of the discussion with Mr Du Plessis when he came to see you, did he specifically discuss specific activities by the three deceased, or was this just a general statement that a time has arrived to eliminate these Pebco activists?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. He sketched the situation as we were experiencing it at grassroots level at that stage.

ADV SANDI: Maybe you didn't get the question clearly. Mr Snyman, did he discuss anything with you specifically about Mr Galela, Mr Godolozi and Mr Hashe?

MR SNYMAN: Everything that he reported to me, was in line with what was happening at grassroots level and he also explained to me that those three people were the leading figures in the situation which was prevailing.

ADV SANDI: What did he say to you Galela for example, Mr Galela was doing?

MR SNYMAN: With respect, Your Honour, at this stage I cannot recall word for word but what was told to me was that what was happening at grassroots level at that stage, and we mentioned a great many incidents that policemen could not even live in their homes in the black areas, they had to be given other housing.

In other words the situation was really ungovernable.

MS HARTLE: You said that Minister Le Grange had informed you that you should make a plan with the agitators in the Eastern Cape. Were other members of Pebco named as being agitators, were they discussed in your meeting with Mr Le Grange?

MR SNYMAN: The submission which was made, was about the unrest in general in the Eastern Cape, which included the Pebco 3, the UDF people as well as the Goniwe 4 in Cradock. The unrest was as a result of their actions and the politicisation thereof.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, was it your personal decision that Messrs Godolozi, Hashe and Galela should be eliminated, rather than other leaders in the Pebco structures?

MR SNYMAN: After the submission of Major Du Plessis we reached the conclusion that these were the three leading figures who in general, were responsible for the situation as we were experiencing it at grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I put it to you that you could not have known at that stage that the Pebco 3 would be at the airport at the 8th of May together?

MR SNYMAN: I have no knowledge of that, I was not involved in the operation.

MS HARTLE: I put it to you that it is absolutely strange that you should say that those three were identified at that stage as the three required to be eliminated and then coincidentally the three of them arrive at the airport, on the 8th of May, together and they are then abducted?

ADV DE JAGER: Was it coincidentally or was it organised? Were they sort of invited to be there, so it wasn't a coincidence, they in fact organised it that they should be there?

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, there was mention made of the fact that Messrs Fassie and Mgoi would also have been at the airport on that occasion. Perhaps I can rephrase the question.

Sorry, there was an expectation that five of the Pebco leadership would be at the airport at that evening. You could not have known that at the time you decided to eliminate Mr Godolozi, Mr Hashe and Mr Galela?

ADV BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, I must also object to that question to that. Where does my learned friend get that from? There was a newspaper report attached to Nieuwoudt's affidavit which just referred to that, but nowhere in any of the statements is it stated that that was the intention.

CHAIRPERSON: You say it was only in a report in a newspaper?

ADV BOOYENS: I think there was a newspaper report attached but that is what the Pebco people alleged that they were all five supposed to be there, but none of the applicants have stated that the intention was to get all five of them there. In fact the applicants all along and even from Nieuwoudt, which hasn't testified yet, which was the people involved in the planning, there is no reference that the whole Pebco leadership, all five, would be there.

CHAIRPERSON: Is she not entitled to put to the witness even that version in the newspaper for his comment?

ADV BOOYENS: Yes, but not on the basis that it was stated by one of the applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, certainly yes, if it was not stated by them. But I would rather think that even if it was stated in the newspapers, she is entitled to put that version to the witness for his comment.

MS HARTLE: Mr Chairman, with respect, I never suggested that one of the applicants had said as much. I am referring to the newspaper report at page 253 of the record, which forms an annexure to Mr Nieuwoudt's application.

Perhaps if I could put the question differently Mr Snyman. Messrs Fassie and Mgoi said that they might have been included in the Pebco leadership who arrived at the airport on the 8th of May 1985 and you could not have known at the time that you had the discussion with Mr Le Grange or Mr Du Plessis that you would get an opportunity where those three Godolozi, Hashe and Galela would be at a certain place at a certain time on their own.

MR SNYMAN: I can only comment on what I was told by Major Du Plessis in his report, in which the Pebco 3 were mentioned by name. No other names were mentioned and I am not aware of what happened at the airport.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, you've heard it being put to some of the previous applicants that Mr De Klerk in the National Party's amplified submissions, made on 14 May 1997, in response to the question whether the NP claimed involvement for the killing of the Pebco 3 specifically responded that the killings were unauthorised and mala fides.

How do you clarify that, how do you explain that?

MR SNYMAN: I do not have any explanation for that, nor did I ever listen to Mr De Klerk's report.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I am putting it to you that this is what he said. That the killings were unauthorised and mala fides. How do you explain that now, with hindsight?

MR SNYMAN: I am explaining it only as I have just testified, that arising from the discussion with the Minister of Law and Order and the later discussions between Major Du Plessis and I, that the decision was made to eliminate these three people.

MS HARTLE: Once you had decided that these three were to be eliminated, how did you advise those serving under you of the instruction?

MR SNYMAN: I never informed anyone. This took place on a need to know basis. It was a clandestine operation and only the people who are involved in the amnesty applications, were aware of that matter.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what information did you give to those serving under you who were required to carry out the operation? What was the information given to them?

MR SNYMAN: I gave no information to those serving under me. This operation was carried out by Major Du Plessis and others and they in turn, gave the necessary instructions.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I put it to you that even clandestine operations require some sort of detailed planning to obviate detection, what exactly did you inform Du Plessis, he was to do and how was he to do it?

MR SNYMAN: I did not tell Du Plessis how the operation was to be carried out. He did it on his own initiative. I only gave permission after he had motivated it to me.

MS HARTLE: You must have given some thought to the operation failing? Did you consider that?

MR SNYMAN: That is a possibility.

MS HARTLE: In the other matters in which you are seeking amnesty, was there also a lack of detail with regard to the specific operations? Was it just a decision given by you that a plan had to be carried out, were you also not involved in the practical implementation of those deaths?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Did you consider that the operation had been a success?

MR SNYMAN: I allowed myself to be led by Major Du Plessis who reported to me that the operation had been a success.

MS HARTLE: In carrying out the operation, what did you hope to achieve on the ground?

MR SNYMAN: I was not involved with the operation at grassroots level.

ADV DE JAGER: That is not the question. The question before you is what did you want to achieve by executing this operation?

MR SNYMAN: The motivation which was given to me by Major Du Plessis and the ungovernability which prevailed at grassroots level, made us arrive at this decision, and he went further with the execution of the operation. I was not involved with it in any way, nor did I have any details about this operation.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, when you make a decision to eliminate persons, there must be a reason in your mind why that was necessary and how it would impact on the ground? In other words did you expect that people would know that the Pebco 3 had been killed and that it would serve as a deterrent? Were you expecting that if the three were simply removed, the leadership element was removed, that there would be less activity on the ground? What did you understand was going to happen if your operation was carried out?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we believed that the elimination of the leadership, would stabilise the situation because they were the brain power at that stage with the unrest that we were experiencing.

MS HARTLE: And you didn't consider that there would be other leaders to replace those three almost immediately after their disappearance?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, but at that stage we thought that they were the brain power and they were the leaders who had brought about the situation in the black townships.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I want to refer you to page 10 of your submissions, paragraph 3(b). In response to the question what your motivation was for the act. You responded as follows as a result of facts in the above-mentioned paragraph, it was essential to eliminate these persons to neutralise the anarchy and the violence that was increasing.

As a result of the elimination of the three leadership figures of Pebco, the organisation was left without leaders and this contributed to the decrease of unrest and violence in the area.

ADV DE JAGER: Are you referring to page 23?

MS HARTLE: It is 24, typed 10 of the submissions, it is page 24, the paginated page 24. Mr Snyman, my emphasis is on the last sentence, it contributed to the large scale decrease of unrest and violence in the area.

Can you please explain that submission?

MR SNYMAN: We believed that after these events the unrest would decrease and we thought that this would contribute to a partial decrease in unrest and violence in this area.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, you say that is what you believed. I am asking you what effect the elimination had in relation to the statement you make there, it contributed. How did it contribute?

MR SNYMAN: There was a decrease in the situation at that stage.

MS HARTLE: Are you at liberty to give us details Mr Snyman, or are you making a bold statement?

MR SNYMAN: It is impossible for me now after 12, 13 years, to say exactly what happened at grassroots level.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman, that it stirred up more unrest because the Pebco leadership had disappeared and people were wanting to know what had happened to their leaders?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible, I cannot recall.

MS HARTLE: What was the purpose of giving the Commission the minutes of the special GOS meeting held on the 7th of June 1985?

MR SNYMAN: I do not know which document you are referring to now.

MS HARTLE: It is Exhibit K.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the question?

MS HARTLE: What was the applicant hoping to demonstrate by handing in this exhibit, what is it supposed to prove to the Commission?

MR SNYMAN: It was clear that in the ranks of the Defence Force, plans were made and this is the reason that we handed it. Because these people are highly trained task forces, who are only there for one reason and that is to eliminate people.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, I want to refer you to page 2 of the minutes of that meeting, which were held on the 7th of June 1985, approximately a month after the disappearance of the Pebco 3.

And in particular to paragraph 4(b), under the heading Conflict UDF and AZAPO. Where the minutes state that approximately 200 women went to Rev Makwena and he told them that the violence between UDF and AZAPO will continue until the heads of five UDF people have rolled and then you name them. Edgor Ngoi, Henry Fassie, Mono Padela, Africa Naqolo and Nkoseli Jack.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, that is the information which came through at that stage.

MS HARTLE: Now this is a meeting which was held approximately a month after the disappearance of the Pebco 3, the abduction of the Pebco 3 rather I should say and at that stage there seem still to have been a major problem on the ground? And there was a suggestion that these five leaders then should be eliminated if one has regard to the terminology employed there?

ADV BOOYENS: No, with respect, my learned friend should read that paragraph again. It has got nothing to do with - these five leaders, when translated this means that informers reported that about 200 women went to Rev Makwena of AZAPO and that he informed them that because of the dispute and violence between the UDF and AZAPO will continue until the heads of the five UDF persons had been taken, namely - it certainly does not indicate that it was part of the elimination by Security Forces.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, what I am putting to you is that even after the abduction of the Pebco 3, the problems continued, the unrest continued. Even after those three leadership had been removed, there was still a suggestion that there couldn't be peace until the other five leaders had been removed?

MR SNYMAN: As my learned friend said, it was at our insistence, it was not said at our insistence and I cannot comment on that story at all. This is a feud that existed between them.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, I think that portion is being contrasted with the last sentence on page 10 which was read to you a short while ago where you said after the elimination of the three, there was a large scale decrease of unrest and as I understand the question, paragraph 4(b) is being put to you to indicate for whatever reason, there was still some unrest in the area even after the elimination of the people, isn't that the question Ms Hartle?

MS HARTLE: That is correct, thank you.

ADV SANDI: She is putting to you that even after the elimination of the Pebco 3 there was still some unrest in the area, it didn't decrease.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, but as my other friend has said in his testimony that there was a decrease because they were working on grassroots level every day. We described it as a partial decrease.

ADV SANDI: But Mr Snyman, when one goes through this whole document of the minutes of this meeting which occurred a month later after these three gentlemen were eliminated, you do not get the impression here that there is a decrease in the violence.

MR SNYMAN: As I said, there was possibly a partial decrease, but then I believe it was incited again until finally a state of emergency was announced.

ADV SANDI: How long was this partial decrease?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot reply to this specifically.

ADV SANDI: The partial decrease as you called it, lasted up to the time it became necessary to declare the state of emergency, is that what you are saying?

MR SNYMAN: That is possible.

ADV SANDI: Carry on Ms Hartle.

MS HARTLE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: The state of emergency that was announced, was it only valid here in Port Elizabeth or do you know how wide it stretched?

MR SNYMAN: If I remember correctly it was in the Eastern Cape and the Witwatersrand area. I am not quite sure.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, the minutes also suggest that the organisation was not without leaders.

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I cannot recall when a new Chairman or President was elected. I am not capable of replying to that at this stage.

MS HARTLE: And you never considered in making the decision to eliminate the three, that the leadership would grow up again almost instantly? That wasn't a consideration of yours?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, those three leaders were the people who had incited the unrest and at that stage it was decided that they were the people who had to be eliminated.

MS HARTLE: Colonel Snyman, would you say the same of the five members names in the minutes of the meeting, that they also stirred up unrest?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that now. I don't know, I do not have the statistics in front of me and that which was said or done in unrest situation at that stage, I cannot say.

MS HARTLE: Are those names familiar to you, Mgoi, Fassie, Padela, (indistinct) and Mr Jack?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, the names are known to me.

MS HARTLE: Were they a problem, did they pose a problem to the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: Most definitely they had files on them and their activities were being monitored.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman, that if you had planned to eliminate the three, that it was an absolutely futile decision? The consequence of the elimination was futile?

MR SNYMAN: No, at that stage we believed that this would improve the situation.

MS HARTLE: If you merely believed that it would make it better and it hadn't achieved that result, why do you persist in your application in saying it contributed to the large scale decrease of violence in the area?

MR SNYMAN: It should have been in the reports which were given to me thereafter that in a small or partial degree there had been a decrease in violence.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, this information must have been necessary at the time you drafted this application for amnesty, you must have considered whether or not indeed there was political motivation for the atrocity and you are stating now, with hindsight, that it did contribute to a decrease in unrest and violence or be it partial?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

MS HARTLE: Do you hold that belief now?

MR SNYMAN: As I said earlier in my testimony we were employees of the State and at that stage we believed that the government did not want to hand over power and activists wanted to take over the country and we believed at that stage, that what we were doing, was correct.

But if I look back now, after so many years, as I have said earlier, where a large portion of the population were discriminated against in this country, then I now think that it could have been wrong.

MS HARTLE: Isn't it so Mr Snyman that you persisted with this allegation in your submissions, because you want to be successful in this application for amnesty, on the basis of the act having been politically motivated?

MR SNYMAN: It was definitely politically motivated. We were in the employ of the State, we had to protect the State and its establishment and structures, we had to keep them in power.

MR BRINK: Mr Chairman, I hesitate to interrupt, but I think with great respect to my learned friend, this has been dealt with at some length and I think it is getting somewhat repetitive and I am a bit concerned about the time that this cross-examination is taking.

MS HARTLE: I will move along. If you look at paragraph 11(b) you say that you have taken the order from none other than yourself? Is that correct? It is at page 24 of the record.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct. I took the decision after I had the informal discussions with the Minister at Cradock and also the submission was given to me by Major Du Plessis with regard to the situation on the ground.

MS HARTLE: Would it not then have been correct to state that your instruction came from Minister Louis le Grange?

MR SNYMAN: It actually also contributed to the decision that we took.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, when the families brought the applications, the (indistinct) applications for their loved ones to be produced, is it so that the Security Branch was embarrassed by virtue of the allegations that they had been seen in Alexandra and elsewhere?

MR SNYMAN: It was that we didn't detain them at that stage and with the facts that we now present to the Amnesty Committee, it wasn't at that stage mentioned.

MS HARTLE: What did you decide to do once the applications were brought? After the first application was brought and there were allegations made that the persons were not dead, but that they had been abducted from the airport?

MR SNYMAN: I am not understanding quite clearly what you are asking?

MS HARTLE: Did you discuss with anybody that?

MR SNYMAN: No.

MS HARTLE: You kept that information to yourself?

MR SNYMAN: We all made statements in that case where we denied it.

MS HARTLE: Mr Snyman, how were operations of this nature kept a secret. What was the policy of the Security Branch in relation to these events in which you had complicity?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said earlier in my testimony, quite a few of these things happened and we assumed that our own Head Office and on Ministerial level, it was tacitly seen, it was a clandestine operation and we didn't report it to Head Office.

MS HARTLE: Did all of those who were involved in the operation take an oath of secrecy that if any of the allegations ever surfaced, nobody would claim to have any knowledge of the events?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we all took an oath of secrecy.

MS HARTLE: If the Committee would just bear with me for a moment? I have nothing further, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS HARTLE: .

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink?

MR BRINK: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nolte, I did not refer to you earlier on. Did you want to put any questions on behalf of Mr Van Zyl or is there no need for that?

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, no thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NOLTE: .

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, just one or two questions from me at this stage. As I understand this aspect of your evidence, the elimination of the Pebco 3 contributed to bring about what you referred to a partial decrease in violence, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: We believed that at that stage.

ADV SANDI: But later there was an upsurge of violence with the result that a state of emergency was declared?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV SANDI: Now, if that is so, why were the other Pebco members not eliminated?

MR SNYMAN: The submission which was given to me was that only those three people who were the leaders of Pebco, it was only the three of them who were the leaders.

ADV SANDI: We have also been told that one of the things the Pebco 3 would do would be to incite members of the public into committing acts of violence. Are you aware of that?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, we experienced that on the ground.

ADV SANDI: I have seen from a copy of a microfilm on the file of Mr Godolozi, that he addressed not less than 27 meetings. Are you aware of that?

MR SNYMAN: It is possible that he addressed those meetings, but I am also aware of the fact that later on these meetings were prohibited.

ADV SANDI: You have not thought to furnish this Committee with a tape of maybe one of the speeches of incitement?

MR SNYMAN: It is impossible for me. Since 1986 I am not a member of the South African Police and at this stage I cannot do it, I am sorry.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Snyman, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you discuss what Mr Le Grange told you, with Brigadier Swart at any time?

MR SNYMAN: No, I never discussed it with him.

CHAIRPERSON: If that is how you understood Mr Le Grange that what he was saying was that you could go and kill, shouldn't you have discussed that with Brigadier Swart?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said earlier in my evidence, this was a clandestine operation, it was on a need to know basis and none of the other organisations were informed at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am talking about the situation before you actually eliminated these people. Mr Le Grange was supposed to have, according to you, given an approval to go ahead and eliminate these people. At that stage you could have discussed that with Brigadier Swart, because as yet there had been no clandestine operation that had taken place.

If anything, he could have been party to that clandestine operation?

MR SNYMAN: No, I didn't discuss it with the Divisional Commissioner.

CHAIRPERSON: But shouldn't you have done that?

MR SNYMAN: As I have said in my evidence this morning, it was a great problem for my conscience to reach this decision, and I didn't take it further, I didn't report it to the Divisional Commissioner, I didn't report it to JSMC, I didn't go back to the Minister.

CHAIRPERSON: So Brigadier Swart was never told the truth at any stage about what happened to this three people?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He was your immediate senior, shouldn't you have confided with him about this?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct, he is my immediate senior, but as I said it was a clandestine operation and we didn't do it.

CHAIRPERSON: The deceased were abducted on the morning of the 8th I believe, of May. Did you discuss the operation that morning with Mr Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry, I am being reminded by one of the Committee members that the abduction was on the evening of the 8th, so that day the 8th of May, you never discussed the elimination with Colonel Du Plessis?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot really recall with regard to the different dates, but at several occasions this matter was in fact mentioned and at one particular incident the motivation was given, the decision was taken that the elimination should take place.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know beforehand that these people are going to be abducted at the airport?

MR SNYMAN: No, I had no knowledge of how the operation would be carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: You were referred to a statement by Mr de Klerk to the effect that the killing was unauthorised and mala fide I think. Was Mr Le Grange not in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk?

MR SNYMAN: I don't know whether he was in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk, but we based our view on the tacit approval of members of the Cabinet when such events happened and also with reference to the document that was handed in this morning, that no enquiries were made and no investigation was launched.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Snyman, perhaps I can assist you. Mr Le Grange was Minister of Law and Order in the cabinet of Mr P.W. Botha.

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And Mr Vlok, I think he took over in 1987 from Mr Le Grange.

MR SNYMAN: That is possible, I was already not part of the SAP.

ADV DE JAGER: So he was not in the Cabinet of Mr De Klerk, he was not Minister of Law and Order, he was at that stage Speaker of the Parliament, when Mr De Klerk became President.

MR SNYMAN: It may be the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

ADV BOOYENS: Chairperson, could I perhaps just add for clarity. I had a look at page 240, Mr De Klerk was at that stage the Minister of Internal Affairs and National Education in the Cabinet of President Botha, just to make it hundred percent clear.

You will see that on page 240.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. My impression though is that if the media is anything to go by and it may just be wrong, it may be that P.W. Botha was being wrongly quoted, I can't guarantee that, but the impression which one gets is that his view is that he did not have a policy that people be eliminated.

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, but as we said that this document that was submitted where these items have been eliminated, there must have been some of those who actually had knowledge of the events in the country.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you think that you might have misunderstood Mr Le Grange when he said go and make a plan? Did you really think that he actually meant that you could go and kill people?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage, after the briefing and after we had mentioned everything that we had done and the legal options weren't working any more, I could only make one deduction and that is that he actually meant that.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, do you have any questions?

RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, yes. Just to clarify a few technicalities. Mr Snyman, Mr Swart was the Divisional Commissioner, is that correct?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: We weren't all policemen - was the Divisional Commissioner in command, was he the senior officer in the province in command of all the different divisions, Robbery, Detectives, everything?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to specific security work, in other words security work, clandestine operations, infiltrations and so forth, did you do it through Swart or Security Headquarters in Pretoria?

MR SNYMAN: Our reports were made to Security Head Office in Pretoria and the only time that we contacted with Swart, was when we had to inform him of the security situation on the ground, on a daily basis.

ADV BOOYENS: He didn't control your security operations, that was done through Head Office?

MR SNYMAN: Yes.

ADV BOOYENS: He was in a coordinating capacity?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps there could have been a problem with understanding between you and my colleague on the other side, you said she asked you whether you after you killed these people, whether you took an oath to secrecy and you said we all signed an oath of secrecy. Did you refer to this or was it that one for security? That was before you get this clearance for security situations, you have to sign

an oath that you would not publicise anything that came to your knowledge?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Was there anywhere an oath, where you took a blood oath, with regard to this operation? It would now be you and those involved, the other applicants, did you ever take such an oath?

MR SNYMAN: No.

ADV BOOYENS: With regard to the partial decrease of the violence after the death of these people, is it really possible to give a percentage that it decreased by such a percentage or was it clear from reports that there was a decrease, that you made this inference?

MR SNYMAN: Yes, we actually drew this inference from reports.

ADV BOOYENS: When the state of emergency was announced, two months later, could you determine whether this state of emergency was declared or was it already, were there more violence or was there less violence before these people were removed? Can you in any way recall, we will understand if you can't.

MR SNYMAN: I really can't remember that well, but I would believe that it actually started to escalate and that is why the state of emergency was declared. I am not quite sure about this, it was about 12 years ago.

ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: I would assume that your relationship with Mr Swart, Brigadier Swart having been cleared now, I would assume that if you wanted to submit sensitive reports on security matters, you would send it to somebody in Pretoria?

MR SNYMAN: All security reports were sent to our Head Office in Pretoria. It was only in instances where the Divisional Commissioner had to be informed with regard to a meeting, or something in this Division, we would then inform him so that the uniformed side would also be present at such a meeting or such an action.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume you did not inform anybody in Pretoria about this incident, that is you did not tell the truth to anybody about exactly what happened to these three people?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But the hugh and cry that followed the disappearance of these people, the litigation that followed thereafter, how did you manage to keep the lid on this thing so much so that even the police did not know the truth?

MR SNYMAN: At that stage we believed, as Major Du Plessis said, that after the elimination of these three people and because they waited for another day before the operation was executed to prevent it that anyone would have or get any information about this.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but as I understand the situation, later there were some allegations that you were involved, the Security Branch were involved with regard to the detention and or disappearance of these people, how did you manage to keep everybody fooled as it were?

I mean, the police did not make a breakthrough. The authorities did not really come to know about this? You were the highest person as I see things, you were the highest, the most senior person to know the truth?

MR SNYMAN: If I can remember correctly, one of the people was detained at some stage. I can't remember whether it was Mr Hashe, but that is all that I can remember where they had been detained by the Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was he held by the Security Branch?

MR SNYMAN: No, that I can't remember. And the other incident of Mrs Hashe where they alleged that it was through the Security Branch, that was not true, we ascertained that it was through Murder and Robbery and not the Security Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was this person held?

MR SNYMAN: I cannot comment on that, it was done by a different branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what I am talking about, do you know the person that I am talking about? We must not misunderstand one another. I understood you to say that when I asked you about how you managed to keep this thing under the lid, you said there was some, say one of them was detained. I assumed you meant one of the deceased was detained?

MR SNYMAN: No, that must have been before the elimination. I can't remember the facts, but I take it it was before the elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me put this to you, was there a conspiracy on a larger scale than we really are told? Conspiracy to cover up?

MR SNYMAN: No. The elimination of the three we regarded as a clandestine operation on a need to know basis, only those people who were involved, and that was the end of the story.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let me put it, as far as your version is concerned, the only people who knew, really knew what had happened to these people was yourself, Du Plessis, Van Zyl and Lotz?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now how did you, just the four of you, how did you manage to keep this - the truth away from everybody, from the rest of South Africa?

MR SNYMAN: We viewed it as a clandestine operation and that is why we didn't even report it to the JSMC.

CHAIRPERSON: But how did you succeed in misleading the police?

MR SNYMAN: Which police are you referring to now?

CHAIRPERSON: Any police in the Eastern Cape, I don't know, perhaps also in Pretoria. People made a noise about this, the fact that these three people had disappeared.

MR SNYMAN: As I said earlier in my testimony, we think it was tacitly approved by the people who knew on Head Office level and also on ministerial level. There were no enquiries, no investigations.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may be excused.

ADV SANDI: Mr Snyman, I don't want us to talk at length about your relationship with Mr Swartz. It seems to me that the situation you were facing as you have tried to give the picture, was a matter of concern to everyone in the Police Force, not so?

MR SNYMAN: I couldn't hear the last part.

ADV SANDI: This situation of political unrest in the Eastern Cape, was it not a matter of concern to everyone in the Police Force, including Mr Swartz?

MR SNYMAN: Definitely it was a point of concern.

ADV SANDI: Now, if one of you and in this instance, the Security Police, had taken a further step by way of the elimination of those people who were perceived to be behind the problem, was it not important for someone like Mr Swartz to know even if in vague general terms, that you were doing something about this problem? Did you not at some stage confide in him in vague, general terms about this elimination?

MR SNYMAN: No. As I have said earlier in my testimony it was a clandestine operation and it was on a need to know basis and we did not inform any of the other institutions.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

FURTHER RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps just to clarify this question of the detention Mr Chairman. If I can refer you to Exhibit A3. The detention that you referred to of Mr Hashe is that detention before this operation was authorised?

MR SNYMAN: That is correct.

ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, that appears actually very cryptic as it is, at the third last page of A3 - 02-09-93. According to Section 29(1) and then on the 29th of September he was released because of insufficient evidence?

He was previously also detained and restricted and he had been sentenced, but that is the last one that appears on his record.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, thank you, you are excused.

MR SNYMAN: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until two o'clock.

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