CHARLES ALFRED ZEELIE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw on behalf of the applicant Mr Zeelie. Mr Chairman, you will find the application by Mr Zeelie in Volume 1, page 92 and further. Page 92 to 114. Mr Chairman, I've also handed to the Committee and my learned colleagues a document which I propose we name Exhibit X which just sets out the background.
CHAIRPERSON: I think it should be 92(a), this should be kept with his application.
MR ROSSOUW: 92(a) then, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: That is the one that sets out his background, his Police career, the stuff that all the other people have got in their applications.
MR ROSSOUW: Indeed, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I note that it's five minutes to go before tea time, maybe I can just quickly deal with the background and then after tea we can start with the application itself.
I then refer you to 92(a), the background of Mr Zeelie.
Mr Zeelie do you have that in front of you?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: As far as your background is concerned you confirm the contents of the first page thereof?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Page 2 as far as your career ...[intervention]
ADV GCABASHE: I'm sorry, Mr Rossouw, could you just tell me "hierdie aansoek" right at the bottom should be read along with what? Can you just finish that off for me? The bottom of page 92.
MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, sorry yes, I forgot to deal with that aspect. The form that is in the bundle you will note mentions that it should be read with the application which will be submitted by way of the office of the Attorney General. This form, Mr Chairman, was submitted together with an application for another matter. You will see at paragraph 9(a) it deals with the Stanza Bopape incident so there is another form which was submitted to the office of the Attorney General which is, to which the application you will find from page 95, that part from 95 and further, that was part of the other form that was submitted by way of the Attorney General’s office.
ADV GCABASHE: Are you saying apart from the Stanza Bopape matter the A.G. is dealing with some other matter that we need to take cognisance of? Just clear that up for me?
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I hope that you will take cognisance of this matter which was submitted, these three incidents for which Mr Zeelie is now applying which is in the bundle, that is apart from the Bopape matter for which there was already a hearing. Mr Chairman, maybe I can explain it like this, it would appear that there was two form 1's submitted, this one in respect of Stanza Bopape and it then specifies that the rest of his amnesty application will be dealt with by way of the Attorney General's office and it was in that form to which the incidents for which we are now applying for amnesty, was included.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the time has now come that we can take the adjournment now and be back at 11 o'clock to continue, we hope uninterrupted then.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHARLES ALFRED ZEELIE: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: (cont)
Mr Zeelie to refer to 92(a) part by the general background, do you confirm the contents of this entire portion and you ask that that be also incorporated into your Amnesty Application?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Then just a couple of incidents I would like to focus on. On page 3 during your period in which you were attached to the Security Police in Johannesburg at the bomb disposal unit you were involved in about 160 bomb explosion scenes, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: Yes. I may just clarify that I investigated these.
MR ROSSOUW: And that included the Magistrates Court Johannesburg, Ellis Park, Wits Commando and Krugersdorp bomb explosions?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, those were motor bomb explosions.
MR ROSSOUW: And then specifically on pages 5 or 4 to 6 you give more information about specific incidents and you specifically included it here to indicate what the revolutionary climate was in Johannesburg from 1987, 1988 onwards during which time the incidents took place for which you applied for amnesty?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, if I can just refer you to page 4 on that document, paragraph 4, the first incident refers to the date 5 September 1994 - Mr Chairman that should be 1984.
Mr Zeelie, you are also requesting the Committee to read that to be able to understand the background situation in Johannesburg at the time?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 8 and follows, you give an indication of the arms caches which you found and weapons that you found there?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: Page 8 and 9, Mr Zeelie you're also requesting that this be seen in the context of the threat and onslaught which existed at the time against the existing Government order and also the Security Forces?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: And then as far as you personally are concerned, on page 10 and follows, you mention that you took the initiative in regard to precautionary measures relating to bomb explosions you took the initiative for the development of a bomb disposal vehicle and you got sponsorships from private bodies to sponsor that?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You said you contributed to the development of the STS Blast Bag, that is then a water bag which would be placed over limpet mines to prevent the explosion or to minimise the possible damage?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You also heard, there was evidence here about a device which was used at one of the Cry Freedom incidents and it had been removed from an identification board?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that you had developed this notice board which was erected at various public places to focus the public's attention on this threat?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: On page 12 you've set out your progress in the South African Police, is it correct that during these incidents of '87 and '88 you had the rank of a lieutenant?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: And in 1994 you left the South African Police and at that stage you held the rank of a major?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Then from pages 92 and follows of your application, Volume 1, bundle 1, do you confirm the contents of paragraphs 1 to 6 thereof?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: Then paragraph 7(a), were you a supporter of the National Party?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. May I just point out a small difference in the background? I said I was born at Waterval under and in the application it says Springs. Springs is where my birth is actually registered.
MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 194 is that your signature at the bottom of the statement, do you confirm that?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Then, Mr Zeelie, page 195 bundle 1, you applied for amnesty for your involvement in the preparation of an explosive device which was placed in the Alexandra Theatre. You heard that this was the King's Theatre in Alexandra?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: And then you also asked for amnesty for your involvement there and any other offences or ...[indistinct] which might have arisen from that?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You said that this incident took place in 1988 and you say that you were requested by Colonel Niels van Wyk to prepare an explosive device to be placed in the theatre to prevent the screening of the film Cry Freedom, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct, yes. It was not to be placed within the theatre but just that the building had to be damaged.
MR ROSSOUW: You say you prepared this explosive device with a Mr Dries van Heerden and it consisted of plastic explosives and a mini ignition device. Where did you get these explosives from?
MR ZEELIE: It was in my possession, it formed part of explosives which related to DLB's.
MR ROSSOUW: You said that your unit regularly made available such explosives to yourself?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: You then said that you prepared the explosive device and you handed it to Colonel Niels van Wyk. Could you perhaps then explain a little more about that?
MR ZEELIE: I didn't physically hand it to him, I took the device to him and just showed him what it consisted of.
MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that he in turn gave it to Joe Mamasela, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: No, that's not correct. It's not Joe Mamasela but Joe Matsamela.
MR ROSSOUW: Am I right in saying that he was a black member of the Security Police at John Vorster Square?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: And you also say that as far as your knowledge goes this explosive device was placed by one Sam, an informer, in this theatre complex?
MR ZEELIE: Yes. Just once again, I want to point out it wasn't placed in the theatre but at the back of the theatre. It was to be placed behind the screen, behind the wall which formed the screen. There was a little alleyway where there were pieces of corrugated iron and the explosive device was then attached to the wall outside.
MR ROSSOUW: Is it also correct that you travelled to Alexandra when the device was handed to Mr Matsamela and from there onwards to the informer?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: After the explosion you visited the scene?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: And you say it was clear that screening of Cry Freedom would not be able to continue at this theatre?
MR ZEELIE: Correct.
MR ROSSOUW: As far as you know, nobody was killed or injured but the theatre was damaged?
MR ZEELIE: Yes. Nobody was injured or killed.
MR ROSSOUW: Then Mr Zeelie, you listened to the evidence of General van der Merwe and Mr Vlok relating to this incident and especially the political objective which was sought to be achieved, do you agree with that?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that it was a Stratcom operation to prevent the screening of the Cry Freedom film?
MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.
ADV GCABASHE: Can I just stop you right there on that point? Just explain that Stratcom operation in light of what Mr Bellinghan has said and our current understanding of how Stratcom worked? What was your understanding of the operation?
MR ZEELIE: What I understood by that was that we had to make sure that the film Cry Freedom would not be screened in the theatre because it was a countrywide Stratcom action to prevent the broader public from seeing the film which would have led to, then perhaps becoming involved in incidents of unrest.
ADV GCABASHE: Who told you it was a Stratcom operation specifically?
MR ZEELIE: If I remember correctly, Colonel Niels van Wyk told me that but there might be a misunderstanding in that the Stratcom Operation was conveyed to me by Du Toit and I was told to go and see Captain Louis van Huyssteen regarding this matter.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie you also heard that General Piet du Toit testified that he channelled this order to you, in other words you concede that you also spoke to him about this matter?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: On page 197, paragraph 10(b) there you state the following that it was part of the countrywide Stratcom actions to try and prevent the screenings of that film, do you confirm the rest of the contents there?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: You did not derive any benefit financial or otherwise from your involvement in the preparation of this device?
MR ZEELIE: No.
MR ROSSOUW: And you also received an order, that's what you say on page 98, that you received an instruction from Colonel Niels van Wyk?
MR ZEELIE: Yes and I may add that it also came from Colonel Piet du Toit.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I will then deal with page 99. It's not in the chronological order of how the incidents took place but just for convenience as far as the bundle is concerned, deal first with the Khotso House incident.
Mr Zeelie, on page 99 of bundle 1 you there say that you're also for amnesty for your involvement in the bomb explosion at Khotso House and any other offences which the evidence might reveal?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: This incident took place on the 31st August 1988, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: You then on page 99 at 9(a)iv you refer to a statement which you made to the Attorney General on the 10th April 1995. That is an annexure to this Amnesty Application and it appears on page 107, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Before I deal with the contents of that you, on page 100 you state that you just want to correct something in paragraph 1.6 and 1.8 of annexure C.A.Z. on page 107?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE: I've lost you, which page are you referring to?
MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm referring to page 100.
CHAIRPERSON: We haven't got it, we go from 99 to page 102.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, can we perhaps just adjourn for two minutes?
ADV DE JAGER: No you must continue, we'll follow the evidence as you read it and then you must just hand in the pages.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I can just mention that the relevant pages are included in my bundle. I am referring to page 100 in that first paragraph there it mentions that the affidavit made to the Attorney General and more specifically paragraphs 1.6 and 1.8 thereof which you will find on page 107. Mr Zeelie would just like to make a correction as far as that's concerned.
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Yes Chairperson, the name of Mr Eugene de Kock I mentioned it there in both cases instead of the name of Mr Kotze.
MR ROSSOUW: In other words what you're trying to say is that Mr de Kock and the Vlakplaas contingent were not involved in the first unsuccessful attempt to blow up Khotso House?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. It wasn't an attempt in any event, it would have taken place so it wasn't as if it was an attempt.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, as far as the annexure on page 107 is concerned, there you state that you and Mr Beyers had a conversation with General Erasmus, how did that come about?
MR ZEELIE: Mr Beyers approached me on several occasions and complained to me about the activities which took place at Khotso House, the SACC Headquarters in respect of terrorists that were given shelter there and also financial assistance given to terrorists as well as potential terrorists and I then told him that I would take up the matter with General Erasmus; and then on a particular day we went to see General Erasmus and we put the problem to him. He was also aware of the problem. He then told me that he would take up the matter with head office and that he had to go to head office in any event on that day.
Upon his return that afternoon he called me in and told me that he had spoken to head office. He didn't mention any specific name and said that we were given permission to continue to blow up the building. I suggested to him that Jannie and I would take the explosives in small quantities into the building and then at a later stage we would cause an explosion in the building.
General Erasmus then told me that we couldn't do it in that way and that we had to act in cooperation with head office.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, is it correct that on the next day you went with General Erasmus and Mr Beyers to the Pretoria Security Branch head office?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: What happened there and thereafter?
MR ZEELIE: General Erasmus went into the building and Beyers and I were with him. I think we went to the seventh floor and we waited there for General Erasmus. He entered General van der Merwe's office, that is Erasmus. After a while he reappeared and he asked me to go through to the explosives head office, the office of Mr Paul Hattingh. We drove through to that place, when we arrived there, myself and Jannie Beyers and General Erasmus and we spoke to Colonel Paul Hattingh and told him what the situation was. He then called in Mr Hammond and Mr Kotze and the matter was then further discussed.
During that discussion these two members undertook to prepare the explosive device. Hammond also undertook to obtain canvass rucksacks in which the explosives would be packed and carried. We then went back to Johannesburg.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, who was to be in command of this first attempt if we can call it that?
MR ZEELIE: Hennie Kotze was our senior and he would have taken direct command.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, what happened during this first attempt?
MR ZEELIE: During that incident, I picked up Mr van Heerden at his house. We then went to a safe house in Honeydew. Various other members were there including myself, Nonnie Beyers, Mr van Heerden, General Erasmus, Mr Hammond and Mr Kotze. We then departed for Khotso House or the area where Khotso House was.
We drove around the building and at the insistence of Mr Kotze who said that there was too much movement around the building at that stage and that we could not carry out the operation then. We then aborted the operation and went back to Honeydew.
Mr Kotze then suggested that he would possibly call in the help of Mr Eugene de Kock.
MR ROSSOUW: And it was during the meeting at Honeydew, it was not decided during the meeting at Honeydew that you would approach Mr de Kock?
MR ZEELIE: No.
MR ROSSOUW: Colonel de Kock testified that you'd made such a request to him and that you met each other in a hotel in Johannesburg. What is your recollection about that?
MR ZEELIE: As far as I can remember I didn't contact Mr de Kock personally. Exactly how it came about that the two of us got together in Johannesburg is something that I can't recall, however, we met each other at the Johannesburg Sun where the matter was discussed. I also can't remember whether I told or asked him about Mr Hammond or Mr Kotze at that stage and that I took him to the building to show him where it was. There were certain discussions, I cannot recall them exactly, discussions about this operation to be carried out.
MR ROSSOUW: Then, Mr Zeelie, that particular evening, the evening of the operation, what was your function then?
MR ZEELIE: Because I was the head of the explosives unit in Johannesburg at the time and would automatically have been involved wherever an explosion took place, I took part in the operation itself but I would have had to go back home so that they could contact me after the explosion to then attend the explosion scene. I took part in the explosion by carrying some of the bags containing the explosives into the building and by placing these bags at the places where the explosion took place.
I can just mention briefly that the original plan was that the explosion was planned to be a car bomb explosion and the explosives where to be packed in a car and that would have made it look like a car bomb or it would have made it look as if explosives had been carried into the building and that an explosion had taken place for unaccountable reasons.
On the insistence of Colonel de Kock and once we saw what was going on in the building, we then decided to place the explosives at the lifts so that the explosion would cause as few injuries as possible. The facts are already on record that explosives would find the route of least resistance and the explosion of energy would actually have travelled up into the lift shaft and not necessarily move outwards where people could then be killed or injured.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, on this point could you just tell us what the role of Mr Douw Willemse was during this operation?
MR ZEELIE: As far as I can recall Mr Douw Willemse and one other member of Vlakplaas had to assist the members carrying the explosives, to scale the wall and then on their return to once again assist these members to be able to escape from the building quickly.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, you then withdrew from the building and in paragraph 1.13 on page 108, you say the following that Mr Hammond then took over command of the scene and Mr Kotze was also with him?
MR ZEELIE: Yes when I say that he took over the scene I mean that they prepared the explosive devices, it was in fact one device which consisted of several bags of explosives but the two switches were used and they connected these two switches. After I placed my explosive charge I immediately departed again and I left the building, I went to my car. Before we went to Honeydew I had parked my car about a block or so away from the building so that I could make a quick getaway and go back home.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, you also wore camouflage at the time?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: Why?
MR ZEELIE: I'm an easy target, everybody knows what P.W. and F.W. looks like and I actually look just like them so I'm an easily identifiable target and that's why I always wore a disguise during an operation. I wore a wig and glasses etc and disguised myself in that way.
MR ROSSOUW: Is it also correct that you had to return to the scene afterwards and you didn't want to be identified as being one of the people who was on the scene before the explosion?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You then received a call that the explosion had in fact taken place and you then went to the scene again in your car?
MR ZEELIE: Yes.
MR ROSSOUW: When you arrived at the scene you also met the Reverend Storey and the evidence which he gave at the trial of Mr P.W. Botha - Mr Chairman, I'm not certain what bundle that is, I think it's bundle 3, I'm not certain. Mr Chairman, my colleagues confirm that it's bundle three and you will find it on page 430, typed page 430 in that bundle.
Mr Zeelie, Mr Storey testified there that the scene was quiet and that they found you there. He says:
"I did not see any except Lieutenant Zeelie who accosted us, Mr Rees and I, he was quite aggressive and seemed to behave in quite a peculiar way and ordered us off the area."
Sorry, Mr Chairman, I've been misinformed by my colleague, Mr van der Merwe. Mr Chairman, you will find it on page 430 of typed page in bundle 4. I think it's line 22 and further.
Mr Zeelie can you comment of the evidence of Reverend Storey?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Firstly I would like to explain that during any explosive scene, regardless of who had caused it or in which way the explosion had occurred it was our training and we also performed it as such that the first priority during or at such an explosive scene would be to attend to those who were injured which indeed was performed at this scene and that is why I would like to deny the allegations made by Reverend Storey and furthermore I would like to place it on record that I am in possession here of a newspaper cut out from The Citizen of the 1st September 1988 and here is a photo of Reverend Pieter Storey and Reverend Frank Chikane as well as myself and if one looks at this photo you'll see that it was already light when I communicated with them and I did refuse entry upon the insistence of Reverend Storey and I'd like to read the section below the photo
"The Reverend Peter Storey, the Superintendent of the Central Methodist Church, leaving the site of the blast with Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, after they had been refused entry to Khotso House" take note, Khotso House. I refused them entry into the building because the building was in a dangerous situation at that point. It says "Lieutenant Charles Zeelie of Police Explosives walks behind them." and that is why I would like to take exception to the allegation made by Reverend Storey that I was aggressive and that he wanted entrance to another building on another premises and that there were people who were bleeding. At that stage, attention would already have been paid to all injured persons on the scene.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Zeelie. Mr Zeelie, furthermore, as the head of the bomb disposal unit you visited the scene and you compiled a statement with regard to your investigation there and this statement which would have been in the Police Investigation Docket has been mislaid and you have not been able to trace it?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And you disguised the fact that a coverup was attempted and admitted that it might have been somebody else who was responsible for the bomb and that you were not involved?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. In actuality I investigated the scene of the explosion as I would have done with any other explosion scene and I provided the facts in that statement, the facts regarding what I found upon the scene.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, in that light since Mr Zeelie is unable to trace the said affidavit, I'm not certain what the content thereof would be but I would presume that it would be similar to the affidavit that Mr Zeelie made after he investigated the bomb blast at Cosatu House which you will find which you did have a copy of in his possession and you will find on page 111 of the bundle.
It would appear to me that it is merely a physical description of the scene as Mr Zeelie found it and I would submit that the affidavit he made after the bomb blast at Khotso House would be similar to that and that it would not necessarily indicate who would be responsible for the incident.
ADV DE JAGER: Is there anything that you wish to add regarding Khotso House?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct. I would just like to put it on record that I'm in possession of a cut out from the New Nation also dated on 1st September 1988 and I would like to read a paragraph of the article to you, just to indicate that Cosatu was indeed using that particular building.
ADV DE JAGER: Yes but we are now busy with Khotso House.
MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct but I would just like to state that Khotso House was also used by Cosatu for their activities.
ADV DE JAGER: If you say that under oath then we believe it.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct. It says here that members of Cosatu Johannesburg Branch had a meeting in the building four hours before the explosion.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that would be hearsay evidence.
Mr Zeelie, regarding your investigation, do you know whether anybody was seriously injured or killed during the explosion?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as far as I know approximately thirteen persons were slightly injured but there were no serious injuries and definitely no casualties. I would just like to state this for the record with regard to the guard who was in the building, the perception which originated that the guard was injured during the explosion is incorrect, Chairperson. He was injured after the explosion that is as a result of the explosion but after the explosion he ran down the steps and as a result of the investigation on the scene we found his footprints in the dust as he had run down the stairs and when he reached the ground floor he fell because there was no floor.
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you. Mr Zeelie, regarding the political objective of this action did you listen to the evidence given by ex-Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe? Do you reconcile yourself with this and are you in agreement that this was the political objective of the explosion at Khotso House?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
MR ROSSOUW: On page 100 you mention that the South African Council of Churches were assisting ANC members and that the building was made available for offering residence to ANC members and refugees?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. As already stated I was a member of the investigative unit at John Vorster Square and at times it was brought to our attention by terrorists who made statements that they did indeed obtain financial assistance from the S.A. Council of Churches and that they also received residence there.
MR ROSSOUW: Did you have any financial benefit or remuneration from your participation in this action?
MR ZEELIE: No.
MR ROSSOUW: And you also carried this out under the order of General Erasmus?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct, it was a direct order from him.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, can I refer you then to page 102 of bundle 1 which is in connection with Cosatu House. You are applying for amnesty as an accessory after the fact and any offence arising from the incident?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: It is common cause that this explosion occurred on the evening of 6-7 May 1988 and you mention on page 103 of the bundle that you were not involved in the planning or execution of the bomb planting. In you capacity as head of the bomb disposal unit you visited the scene and compiled a report regarding the incident. This has been attached from page 111 to page 114 in the bundle and this explains the observations which you made as the head of the bomb disposal unit when you visited the scene at Cosatu House?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: And you request that this be incorporated into the document. You are applying as an accessory. Can you tell the Committee what was told to you before the bomb explosion and by whom?
MR ZEELIE: As already known on the day of an election, that evening we patrolled and the person who was in the vehicle with me, who was more senior than I was, conveyed to me that on that particular evening a large explosion would take place and that I would be visiting the scene and that I would visit the scene with the knowledge that this was a Stratcom action.
MR ROSSOUW: It was not conveyed to you which premises it would be?
MR ZEELIE: It was not specifically said to me which scene it would be.
MR ROSSOUW: And after the investigation you compiled the report and you indicated that it would be the South African Police who were involved?
MR ZEELIE: I would like to mention something regarding the facts about which questions were asked earlier with regard to movements in the street and whether or not there were nightclubs in that area. Indeed there was a nightclub approximately four blocks from the building but because of the fact that it was an election day all licensed premises were automatically closed for business and that nightclub would definitely not have operated, all nightclubs would have been closed for business.
ADV DE JAGER: So the person who had been sleeping in the car must have had his own alcohol?
MR ZEELIE: It was someone who had visited a shebeen.
MR ROSSOUW: You also state that nobody was injured or killed during the explosion?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Not a single person was injured, not to mention killed.
MR ROSSOUW: You have heard the evidence given by General van der Merwe and Mr Vlok with regard to this action as well as the evidence of Colonel de Kock with regard to the political objective thereof. Do you confirm this and do you reconcile yourself with this?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: You also state on page 104 that you were under the impression that this was a Stratcom operation which was to be lodged on the referendum day with the aim at discrediting the ANC/SACP Alliance?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that is the applicant's application.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairman. A few questions with your leave?
Mr Zeelie you evidence with regard to the Cry Freedom incident in Alexandra as well as Khotso House is not entirely in line with the evidence given by other applicants, could we ascribe this to the fact that your recollection as the other applicants have complained has also been letting you down with regard to the time which has elapsed since the incidents?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it may be the recollection of the
other applicants which is letting them down however, that which I have testified is according to my belief what happened and what I can recall.
MR VISSER: So therefore you're saying that you are right and the others are wrong on the points of difference?
MR ZEELIE: No, I am just standing by the facts which I have given here and I cannot make any changes regarding that at this point.
MR VISSER: Are you saying that where you differ you are the one who's right and they are wrong?
MR ZEELIE: No, I stand by my statement which I made.
MR VISSER: Please go to page 96 of Volume 2. You say that you received an order from Colonel Niels van Wyk. Do you see that? I beg your pardon, it's Volume 1 not Volume 2.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Did you hear what General du Toit said? Colonel
Niels van Wyk was on leave at that point.
MR ZEELIE: I can't comment on that, Chairperson, as I remember I did receive the order from him and I will stand by that.
MR VISSER: I see but you've also stated here today that it was conveyed to you that this was a Stratcom action?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that's correct.
MR VISSER: And you said that you received it either from Colonel Niels van Wyk or General du Toit?
MR ZEELIE: If I recall correctly I said that.
MR VISSER: So then indeed you did hear something from Du Toit?
MR ZEELIE: I have stated that.
MR VISSER: And General Du Toit has stated that he gave the order to you and Van Huyssteen, do you remember that evidence?
MR ZEELIE: I remember that General Du Toit testified to that effect.
MR VISSER: And this morning you said that when you heard about the Stratcom action, Du Toit said that you were to speak to Van Huyssteen?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I said that I would have spoken to both of them.
MR VISSER: Van Huyssteen?
MR ZEELIE: Colonel van Wyk and Van Huyssteen.
MR VISSER: Yes but you said that your recollection is very clear. I just want to put it to you that when you differ from the evidence given by the other persons who I am appearing on behalf of that they are correct in their recollection that you are incorrect and I will not take it any further.
MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I also believe that I am correct and that is why I delivered the evidence.
MR VISSER: Very well, let's refer to the Khotso House incident. I beg your pardon, yes it was Khotso House then. I'm not certain and I might just ask Mr Mpshe by means of the Chair whether these persons received notification because it would appear that he is implicated in these applications but that is something which Mr Beyers can see to.
MR MPSHE: He has been served.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Just one further aspect, there is something which I neglected to ask Mr Zeelie. You have amended Joe Mamasela to Joe Matsemela and Joe Matsemela would have been the one who gave the explosive device to Sam Mdaba, is that correct?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: According to the evidence as we understand it, Du Toit gave you and Van Huyssteen the order and Van Huyssteen gave Sam Mdaba the order to plant the bomb. Did you understand it like that as well, that's his evidence?
MR ZEELIE: Whose evidence? General du Toit?
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is how I understood it.
MR VISSER: And all that I want to put to you is those two persons have applied for amnesty as we have heard. Well, Colonel Niels van Wyk and Joe Matsemela according to our knowledge have not applied for amnesty. I'm just putting that to you on record if you wish to comment about that.
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I have already stated, that is my recollection of the events. If there is a possibility that they are not involved I will concede that but I would just like to tell you that that is my recollection.
MR VISSER: I'm not going to discuss the Khotso House incident from page 107 to page 108 with you now but I'm just going to put it to you as follows: do you deny that with regard to Khotso House, the orders were issued as testified here by Mr Vlok, General van der Merwe and Brigadier Schoon and may I add Colonel de Kock. Do you deny that that is how it happened?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I cannot comment on where from above the order came, I was not present during negotiations on the higher level. If there is a possibility that it is a convergence of circumstances, I will not argue that.
MR VISSER: And I will not put any further questions to you at this opportunity. Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Zeelie, how good is your recollection regarding the incidents at Cosatu House and Khotso House?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it happened a long time ago and there are certain facts which I would be able to recall much easier than others.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well one can make mistakes.
MR ZEELIE: Well we are only human Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: And the mistakes which appeared on page 107 and 108 of the affidavit, you have conceded that you have corrected these errors?
MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct and furthermore I would like to explain that when I made these affidavits, once again I would like to place it on record I was under tremendous pressure. There was a lot of disinformation that was being distributed about me and I must add at that stage I did not trust the staff at the offices of the Attorney General and I conveyed the sentiments to the Attorney General himself and once again the affidavits were made under tremendous pressure and I wanted to move away from these people as swiftly as possible and I was playing for time until I could achieve certainty regarding the true circumstances regarding the Truth Commission and whether or not we would be able to trust the Commission.
MR DU PLESSIS: If there are small differences between what you say and what my client's say, that's Mr Hammond and the others, we are not going to argue about this.
MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson, I would just like to indicate that there are words which were used such as, amongst others, Mr Kotze was afraid, that's incorrect.
MR DU PLESSIS: That would have been one of my questions.
MR ZEELIE: I know that certain people were unhappy about that choice of words but those were the circumstances under which the affidavit was compiled and we were just satisfied that the facts were the basic rendition of the facts and I signed the affidavit and completed it.
MR DU PLESSIS: So paragraph 11 where you say that Mr Hammond and members of Vlakplaas were panicking, you don't know him as somebody who panics rather easily?
MR ZEELIE: No, I have known him for quite some time, I have a photo of him and myself together in 1976.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Zeelie, please, I don't know what the relevance of that is, as far as we know, Mr Hammond planted the explosives and he was responsible for the actual explosion whether or not he was nervous or afraid, he committed the deed and he admitted it and you said that as well.
MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct, the only reason why I incorporated that was because it was part of my career where I was involved with the reality of unrest where the first doctor who was killed ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Zeelie, we're dealing only with Khotso House at this occasion so answer the questions about that. We don't want to hear about any other incidents or any other casualties at any other places.
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I would just like to state that I asked the previous question as a basis for my following questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, paragraph 1.12, the next paragraph, it appears to indicate that it was Mr Zeelie who decided the explosives should be put next to the lift shaft to avoid damage. I understood it was Colonel de Kock?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, yes I can comment on that. I was also an officer at that stage and the explosion took place in my region. As I have already mentioned, originally it would have been placed in a car and it could have been stated incorrectly here that I took the direct decision. However it was a joint decision. Mr de Kock was there and I agreed with him regarding this.
MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Zeelie, in that respect I want to put something to you and that is that Mr Kotze and Mr Hammond said that it was a joint decision?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct, that is what I'm trying to convey.
MR DU PLESSIS: And they agree that it was decided that quicker action had to be taken that it couldn't be placed in a car, that it had to be placed in a lift shaft?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct and automatically then that would have led to fewer injuries.
MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Mr Zeelie, then you would agree with me then that what you say in paragraph 1.9 that it took place on the following evening, that this was not in fact the following evening, my instructions are that this took place a week after the first incident?
MR ZEELIE: That correct, Chairperson, I think under cross-examination I have already conceded that it might have occurred an evening or much later according to my recollection which was refreshed with regard to the gathering with Mr de Kock at the hotel.
MR DU PLESSIS: On page 10 you state that Mr Hammond asked you where his ladder was and you would agree that it wasn't his ladder, the ladder which was used?
MR ZEELIE: No, that was also put incorrectly, to a certain degree I'm referring to the ladder which had been left on the scene and I assumed that he knew that I was to investigate the matter as a Stratcom matter.
MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know whether or not you have read Mr Hammond's Amnesty Application but mention was made of persons who were injured and he retrieved that information from official sources?
MR ZEELIE: Is that with regard to Khotso House?
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that's correct and I think you have just testified and I don't know if you realised what you were saying. You testified that there were no injuries and I want to put it to you that there were indeed injuries?
MR ZEELIE: No, I said that with regard to Cosatu House there were no injuries.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV MPSHE: Mr Zeelie, page 113 paragraph 12
"during the explosions 28 black persons were in the building"
Was that a mistake or were they in actuality in the building?
MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as Mr Eugene de Kock has already testified he also observed that there were in fact people in the building and those were the facts which I obtained as a result of my investigation at the scene.
ADV MPSHE: Yes but were they there during the explosion or when you visited the scene?
MR ZEELIE: That is my information which I obtained from the person at the building that they were in the building.
ADV MPSHE: Do you know what happened to these people?
MR ZEELIE: No I don't know what happened to them. As far as I knew they had to evacuate the building automatically, it would have been impossible for them to continue living there. I don't know what became of them.
ADV MPSHE: Where exactly where they in the building?
MR ZEELIE: At this point I can't tell you where exactly in the building they were but I think that Mr de Kock testified that, and I can't remember exactly which floor it was, but they were on one of the floors.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock said that there were people in the building, they had a laundry there, but he didn't say that they were there at the actual moment of the explosion that they observed people there at that time. He said that people were in the building during the week and that they might have been living there.
MR ZEELIE: That's correct Chairperson, I don't believe he testified that there was nobody in the building at the time of the explosion.
ADV DE JAGER: Now this information, can you just tell us, of these 28 people, did you find them there when you were investigating the scene and was it their direct testimony that they were there in the building when the explosion took place?
MR ZEELIE: I think that they were asleep but it was very clear that people were definitely living there.
ADV DE JAGER: Were any of them injured?
MR ZEELIE: None of them were injured.
ADV GCABASHE: I was just going to ask for a minute. Oh, thanks that's much better, thank you, there was just a bit of an interference.
MR SIBANYONI: Mr Zeelie, I was looking at your political objective for the Khotso House and what I noticed is that page 100 of Volume 1 that you only speak about the financial support which the SACC or Dr Beyers Naudè was giving to the ANC. What is missing there is the allegation that there were some explosives kept in Khotso House. What do you say about that?
MR ZEELIE: I did not testify during my evidence in chief that there were explosives in the building, what I said was that from the statements of other terrorists we got information that they were receiving financial assistance from the SACC and also were given shelter but I didn't mention explosives.
MR SIBANYONI: Yes, exactly, that is my question to say according to you or according to what you have said, you didn't have any knowledge whether there were any explosives kept at Khotso House.
MR ZEELIE: No, at this stage I have no recollection of whether there were explosives in the building specifically.
MR SIBANYONI: Because Khotso House was in your area in Johannesburg shouldn't one presume that you were the first person to hear or to know about such allegations?
MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson, that would have been dealt with by the Church Affairs Desk and it would have been investigated by them and if they obtained any facts and if there was an action then I would have become involved.
MR SIBANYONI: No further questions, Mr Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE: I've just got a couple, Chair.
Who was responsible for surveiling the area, reconnoitring the area before let's call it the first attempt, the aborted attempt?
MR ZEELIE: Nonnie Beyers did the observation of the place before he also joined Honeydew.
ADV GCABASHE: And what made you also decide to go on that particular day, what information did you rely on in deciding to go to Khotso House on that first day, the aborted day?
MR ZEELIE: I can't give you a specific reason why that specific day was decided upon, just as I also can't tell you why we went on the particular day when the explosion did take place?
ADV GCABASHE: Are you saying that that reconnoitring was not one of your areas of competency, other people made that decision?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct. I didn't specifically say that we should act on that particular day.
ADV GCABASHE: So it would not have been your duty either to decide on the effect or the impact of the bomb on surrounding buildings, you would not have had any input at all on that?
MR ZEELIE: I assumed and I knew that there would automatically be an impact on the surrounding buildings. As I have already said, I have experience, I have been involved in about 160 bomb scenes, so there is a release of energy which would then automatically impact on the buildings, the surrounding buildings and it wouldn't necessarily cause structural damage but it would break windows.
ADV GCABASHE: The question was did you have a specific input into the discussions around the impact on the surrounding buildings and the people in those buildings, just you personally?
MR ZEELIE: No.
ADV GCABASHE: Then just to take you back a little to your discussion with Nonnie Beyers about what was happening at Khotso House. You didn't verify any of that information?
MR ZEELIE: To whom? I accepted what he told me or I accepted his integrity and he knew what was what regarding church affairs.
ADV GCABASHE: So the short answer is you did not verify the information?
MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson.
ADV GCABASHE: Then you say that you mentioned Khotso House to General Erasmus. Was that on the same day that you and Nonnie Beyers had discussed Khotso House?
MR ZEELIE: No, Nonnie Beyers told me on several occasions that we should take action against Khotso House and that is why I said that I would go with him to General Erasmus to discuss the matter.
ADV GCABASHE: Do you remember when you went to see General Erasmus specifically, do you remember the date at all?
MR ZEELIE: I can't remember a date.
ADV GCABASHE: In relation to the 31st August which is the day that the Vlakplaas team successfully completed this operation, in relation to that when did you see General Erasmus, one week, one month, two months before?
MR ZEELIE: It could have been a week, even two weeks beforehand but I would have to speculate if I wanted to give you an exact date.
ADV GCABASHE: You see, in that speculation what would assist you is the aborted attempt, you know, what we've come to call the aborted attempt, which you had placed at about a week before, very roughly. Again, you're just trying to remember, I recognise that.
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE: Now if you work backwards would you then say another week, working backwards?
MR ZEELIE: It's possible, it's very difficult at this stage to give you an answer to this.
ADV GCABASHE: What makes it so difficult, Mr Zeelie?
MR ZEELIE: It happened a long time ago and it's really difficult for me to give an answer to that.
ADV GCABASHE: So it's more recollection, it's the recalling that's difficult?
MR ZEELIE: That is correct.
ADV GCABASHE: Now on the day that you mentioned this to General Erasmus, he said to you he would like to talk to head office about this, that's what you said?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
ADV GCABASHE: He then reverted to you. Now when he came back to you on this was it on the day that you had mentioned it to him or at a later stage?
MR ZEELIE: No, it was the same day.
ADV GCABASHE: Right, now in relation to that day when did you go to Pretoria, the very next day?
MR ZEELIE: The following day, yes.
ADV GCABASHE: So as far as you were concerned, this was a plan of action that was authorised by General van der Merwe downwards, you knew nothing beyond the General van der Merwe level, just you personally?
MR ZEELIE: It's very difficult to say. When General Erasmus came back and said that authorisation was already given, I accepted that so the perception might have arisen that there was already an authorisation for that from higher up.
ADV GCABASHE: I'm trying to determine that "van bo af", how high, your perception. I know you were at General van der Merwe's office, you were standing outside his office anyway, how high your perception, you were an officer who was involved, you were there. How high up?
MR ZEELIE: It could have meant for me from General van der Merwe upwards, it might even have gone as far as the State President. I didn't ask any questions about it, it would have been wrong for me to question any of my senior officers about it.
ADV GCABASHE: Then in relation to this being a decision by Mr Vlok and Mr van der Merwe as opposed to a Stratcom decision, can you give any input on that at all, would you have any sense at all of a decision by two rather than as a policy decision? Can you give us any help with that?
MR ZEELIE: Do you mean at Khotso House, that it was a Stratcom action?
ADV GCABASHE: Both essentially, I'm just trying to understand. You've heard all the evidence and we have heard evidence that, this is Cosatu House, was P.W. downwards. Khotso House it was inferred that it was P.W. downwards and I'm trying to understand that instruction from the officers as against to a policy decision by Stratcom and we've been told that Stratcom did not authorise illegal activities. Now I'm looking at Stratcom as a separate entity, as a government policy decision making body authorising this as opposed to individuals authorising these types of actions, illegal actions.
MR ZEELIE: If I understand the question correctly then this action was an action against the building from which these organisations operated. I personally can't really give an answer as to what the true reasons of General van der Merwe or even Minister Vlok or Mr P.W. Botha might have been. I went to General Erasmus, he said there had already been given an order for that and I just carried out.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Mr Zeelie.
CHAIRPERSON: One point I would like to clarify with you and you've told us that after the explosion the caretaker of the building ran down the stairs?
MR ZEELIE: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Now he gave evidence at the hearing at George where as I understand his evidence he said he was sitting at the reception which I take it would have been at the entrance?
MR ZEELIE: The inference which I made as I already said is after the explosion one could clearly see his footsteps from up above.
CHAIRPERSON: How can you say they were his footprints, you
may have seen footprints on the stairs?
MR ZEELIE: That's what I was going to explain now, that was the only conclusion that I could draw that those were his footsteps because there was nobody else who came forward in respect of being on a higher floor and Mr Weyers's information was that only the night watchman was right there.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought you told us there were 28 people or something in the building?
MR ZEELIE: That's Cosatu House.
CHAIRPERSON: Cosatu House was it, not Khotso?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I may just point out in respect of that guard as far as my information goes, a witness or a statement was taken from the guard at the stage of the inspection afterwards and I don't know if that statement was at all utilised during his evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: He talks in his evidence of someone else having come down from the third floor.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I haven't had sight of that statement but I think as far as I know that statement possibly contradicts the evidence that he gave in that trial but that's as far as I can take it.
CHAIRPERSON: You haven't seen it so how can you say that?
MR DU PLESSIS: I have instructions in that.
MR ROSSOUW: I've got no re-examination Mr Chairman, can
the witness then be excused?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly.
WITNESS EXCUSED
