MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I think it is my turn now, I beg leave to call the applicant, Mr Nortjč.
MR MPSHE: What is the reference?
MR LAMEY: His application, Mr Chairman, is in volume 2, it starts at page 176 to page 184, and then, Mr Chairman, there's a supplemented application, a relevant portion of which has been distributed to all the legal representatives, as well as I believe to the members of the Committee by the evidence leader. For convenience purpose, I would propose, Mr Chairman, that this supplemented portion, which is actually the major portion that I'm going to deal with in the evidence, be referred to as Exhibit U.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, now I'm confused. We have the hand-written application at page 176?
MR LAMEY: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You then have a typed application?
MR LAMEY: That's correct, Mr Chairman, which was signed on the 22nd of September 1997. Mr Chairman... (intervention).
CHAIRPERSON: We haven't got that much, and then we've got the other document of two pages.
MR LAMEY: Yes, Mr Chairman, that is an intention to amend certain aspects.
CHAIRPERSON: Now which are you saying should be Exhibit U?
MR LAMEY: I would submit, Mr Chairman, Exhibit U would be the typed portion, which is indeed a supplemented application. It is... (intervention).
CHAIRPERSON: Appearing on page 203, the annexure?
MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, I don't have a reference to page 203.
CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed, I'll find it later, it is here somewhere. Well we'll call that U1 and the other U2.
MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could we change that, I think it might be easier to do if we do what we've done with other people and call this not U, but 176(a), so it fits in with the others.
MR LAMEY: Very well, Mr Chairman, I'm in your hands.
CHAIRPERSON: So it will stay with the applications rather than become the... (intervention).
MR LAMEY: It would be then 176(a).
CHAIRPERSON: 176(a), (indistinct) amended (indistinct).
MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, shall we call then the amendment then 177(a), or 176(b)?
CHAIRPERSON: 176(b).
MR LAMEY: As it pleases you.
W A NORTJč: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjč, in these proceedings you're applying for amnesty for your involvement in the Cosatu House bomb explosion incident?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: You initially handed in a hand-written amnesty application which appears on page 176 and which is dated the 19th of November 1996, and to which was attached an annexure where you, on page 183 to 184 of volume 2 of the bundle, you also give certain particulars about your involvement in the Cosatu House?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Since you handed in your initial amnesty application, which I personally dealt with, you obtained legal representation and there is now a supplementary application, and that should be read as a supplement to the first application which you handed in?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjč, it is then also the position that during the proceedings you discovered that certain aspects were incorrectly stated and have to be amended in the current application, that is in paragraph 6(a) where the words "not applicable" were used, the words "National Party" at paragraph 6(b) "supporter", paragraph 8(a) there's an incorrect reference to December of 1974 when you joined the South African Police, that is a faulty reference, and that should be December 1974?
MR NORTJč: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: During the preparation for your amnesty application, it was your recollection that the incident took place in 1988, but is it true that you accept that it was in 1987 and you request that your application be amended in this regard?
MR NORTJč: Correct.
MR LAMEY: You also specifically referred to, in the involvement of Mr Hennie Rooies Coetzee as part of the Bomb Disposal Unit, who entered the building with you, and you came to the conclusion, during these proceedings, that your reference to him and his involvement was also incorrect?
MR NORTJč: Yes, correct.
MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjč, at the stage when you were involved in this incident, you were a sergeant and you were stationed at Unit C1, Vlakplaas, under the command of Colonel De Kock?
MR NORTJč: Correct.
MR LAMEY: You're applying for amnesty as far as this incident is concerned, and if I may refer you to page 35, that is the document marked 176(a), that is the supplementary portion - I beg your pardon, the reference is wrong there, you're applying for amnesty for your involvement in this incident, specifically malicious damage to property and any other offence or delict which might arise from the incident or your involvement therein?
MR NORTJč: That is correct.
MR LAMEY: In your supplementary application, Annexure A, that's No 176(a), and specifically Annexure A, you also give an overview of your background and training?
MR NORTJč: Correct.
MR LAMEY: You confirm that?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: You would also like to place it on record that you were with Colonel De Kock in Koevoet in the struggle in the former South West Africa, and that you followed De Kock to Vlakplaas more or less a year later, and that the continuation of the struggle at Vlakplaas, or you saw that as a continuation of the struggle which you waged in South West Africa?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: Your task at Vlakplaas was to help to combat the revolutionary struggle and was aimed against the ANC, PAC and similar liberation movements?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: You've also listened to the evidence in these proceedings, the evidence of General Van der Merwe and Mr Vlok and Mr De Kock. Am I correct if I should say that you agree in essence with what they said, especially the evidence of Mr Vlok and General Van der Merwe regarding the background and the motives which eventually led to this order being given?
MR NORTJč: Yes, I agree with that.
MR LAMEY: At the stage when you received the order from Colonel De Kock, you did not specifically know that the order came from as high up as Minister Vlok?
MR NORTJč: No, I didn't know that.
MR LAMEY: In your application you say that you understood that it was a problem of the Johannesburg Security Branch and that Vlakplaas was involved to assist in a security problem in this struggle, and you also inferred that this order followed the normal change of command and hierarchy and that it came via the Security head office, specifically Brigadier Schoon who was the overall commander of Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJč: Yes, that's how I understood it.
MR LAMEY: The particulars which you gave regarding this incident, as set out on page 35 to page 38, do you confirm that?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Your task in this regard was specifically to enter the Cosatu building with members of the Explosives Unit, you made use of bolt cutters to gain access by cutting through bars, and your task was specifically aimed at destroying a printing press which was in the basement of this building?
MR NORTJč: I may just say here, Chairperson, that I was the only one who had the bolt cutters and cut through the bars, and the fact of the printing press, that was information which I had beforehand, we had to destroy that as well, it was just a coincidence that I went with Mr Hammond when he put this device inside the printing press, I was with him, but we knew that there was a printing press and that it formed part of the motive for the operation.
MR LAMEY: Was it also your information that this printing press had been used in that building to print pamphlets and documents and to disseminate these?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: In your application, you also say that according to your recollection, the explosives weighed about 15 kilograms, are you sure about that or could it have been more?
MR NORTJč: It seems to me now, after listening to all the evidence, that it might have been a little bit more, but when I made this statement, I remembered that that was the approximate quantity or weight, I can't remember specifically why I said that, but ultimately it proved to be a bit more.
MR LAMEY: You also say on page 38, that massive damage was actually done to the building, but that the damage was actually more than you had foreseen?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Can you comment on any instructions regarding the injury or death of persons? You were also involved in the monitoring and reconnaissance of the building with Colonel De Kock?
MR NORTJč: Correct.
MR LAMEY: Do you also remember that there was an instruction given that precautions should be taken so that nobody be injured or killed as a result of the explosion?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: In paragraph 9(a), you say, however, that there was information that there might be people present in the very top floor of the building?
MR NORTJč: Yes. What I mean there is that we had seen lights burning in the building on the night that we did the reconnaissance, and we also saw lights in portions of the block of flats, but on that particular night when we went to carry out the operation, I think there were only lights on on the very top floor of the building, but I didn't see any people, but we assumed that there must be people.
MR LAMEY: With the quantity of explosives and also the placement of it in the building, did you foresee that any people might be killed or injured as a result of the explosion?
MR NORTJč: No, not at that stage.
MR LAMEY: And as far as you know, nobody was injured or killed as a result of the explosion?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR LAMEY: Mr Nortjč, on page 39 you also give particulars of the political objective pursued, and you say, amongst other things, that you understood this to be a Stratcom type of operation?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Could you perhaps just elaborate on that, why did you come to that conclusion?
MR NORTJč: I can say that at the time when I made this statement, this was 1994, it was the very first one, and I could never understand why I always thought that it was a Stratcom operation. I must have - something must have jogged my memory in that regard, or I must have been told that, and then during the week I remembered that in 1989 I attended a course where a Mr Michael Bellinghan gave a course on Stratcom and in this time it became clear to me that that was their objective. I formed this opinion that it was a Stratcom operation and that's, I'm assuming that that's why I always had this idea in my mind that it was a Stratcom operation.
MR LAMEY: But it was also a bit of a strange type of operation as far as you were concerned, because it was the first time that you were involved in a bomb explosion, a bombing of a legal organisation in the CBD of Johannesburg?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: Is that also the reason why you came to the conclusion that the objective here was to sow confusion in the ranks of the alliance, of which Cosatu formed part?
MR NORTJč: The fact that nobody was to be injured, and that only the building was to be damaged, that indicated to me that this was not a normal situation, in the sense that the effect of it had to be like a Stratcom operation, to persuade the people and that disinformation would follow and everything that went with that.
MR LAMEY: But as far as the rest of the motivation was concerned, as was testified to by General Van der Merwe and Mr Vlok, that you would not dispute?
MR NORTJč: No, not at all.
MR LAMEY: Your order in this regard you got from Colonel De Kock?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: And at that stage you were a sergeant and an operator at Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJč: Yes.
MR LAMEY: You were also not in a position to question any orders or the motivation therefor, to question this or to verify it, if these orders came from head office?
MR NORTJč: No.
MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
MR HUGO: Thank you, Chairperson, Mr Hugo on behalf of Mr De Kock.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Mr Nortjč, will you just look at page 35, paragraph - page three five, I put it to you that Mr De Kock says that that's not the way it happened and that in fact it came from the top, from the president to General Van der Merwe and from then on to Brigadier Schoon, what do you say about that?
MR NORTJč: I would agree with that, but that is how I remember it, I may have been wrong.
MR HUGO: And then in paragraph 2 at the bottom
"De Kock told me that it appeared to him that they would not be able to do it themselves and that is why they needed extra help, and the help that they referred to was the Security Branch, Johannesburg."
Mr De Kock says that that was not so, that he received the order directly from Brigadier Schoon?
MR NORTJč: That may have been one of his remarks at some point, but I will agree that that may not be specifically what he said.
MR HUGO: I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, Du Plessis.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Nortjč, I just want to ensure that I understand you correctly, do you agree that the only two members of the Bomb Disposal Unit who were involved in this incident were George Hammond and Pierre le Roux?
MR NORTJč: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: I would just like to know what your recollection is. Your evidence is that Pierre le Roux placed the charge near the printing press, and that Le Roux placed, Hammond placed the charge near the (no further interpretation)?
MR NORTJč: That is correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
MR RADITAPOLE: Mr Chair, I have something to say, however it doesn't relate to the witness. Just before we close it. I'll be very short.
Mr Chair, I'd like to take this opportunity, before I beg leave to leave these proceedings, both to excuse myself and my client, Cosatu, I'd just like to place on record that as far as Colonel De Kock is concerned, that Cosatu is satisfied that full disclosure has been made in relation to the bombing of Cosatu House, and that Cosatu would not be unsympathetic to Colonel De Kock and the operatives under him receiving amnesty in relation to this offence.
However, in relation to the people above Colonel De Kock in the chain of command, there are a number of unanswered questions. As a result, Cosatu is unable to extend the same sympathies. However, we leave that in the hands of the Committee. Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, what does that mean, is he opposing the other people or not opposing?
CHAIRPERSON: Well that is what I was going to ask. The unanswered questions, do you expect or hope that the questions are going to be answered and that you will, at a later stage, be in a position to indicate something? In other words are you asking us to delay a finding in respect of those two people till other hearings have been concluded, or what is the position?
MR RADITAPOLE: No, Mr Chair, I'm simply, I'm not asking you to do anything, I'm just saying that my client's position is that that decision will be in your hands.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Any other questions of this applicant?
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, no, but just apropos the remark of my learned friend on behalf of Cosatu, if it, can I just get clarity, because there are different branches involved here, such as the technical branch, who were people not, certainly not under the command of Mr De Kock, and also I'm appearing for the commanding officer of the Explosives Section, I would just like to know whether Cosatu intends opposing those applications, or whether my learned friend really refers only to the very top, to wit Minister Vlok and General Van der Merwe, just for clarity's sake, with the Commission's permission?
MR RADITAPOLE: Mr Chair, I'm referring to the, if you like, the chain of command that extends to the political authority, from, I'm referring to Brigadier Schoon and above, to General Van der Merwe, to Mr Vlok, where we would believe there are some questions unanswered, and those are people that have testified, and we are pulling out of the hearings at this stage.
MICROPHONES SWITCHED OFF
