ON RESUMPTION
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, the witness will testify in Afrikaans.
Mr de Kock, you are the applicant in this matter and you are applying for amnesty ...[inaudible] to planning or preparatory steps and the implementation thereof or any other offence or delict which was committed by you with regard to the damage of the ANC's offices in Penton Street, number 28, in Pentonville, London on the 14th March 1982?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct
MR HUGO: Mr de Kock is it also correct that your are also applying for amnesty for the planning of the damage to the South African Communist Party's offices in Goodge Street in London also during March 1982?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct..
MR HUGO: Is it also correct that your application is contained in bundle 3 of the paginated pieces before the Committee and more specifically from page 208 up to and including page 215 as well as the entirety of bundle 4, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And is it also true that the facts contained within these documents are true and correct and that you have personal knowledge thereof, that it has been appropriately undersigned within the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, is it also correct that you request that the evidence which is delivered by the former Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Johannes Vlok, as well as the former Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe, which was presented to this Honourable Committee with regard to the Khotso and Cosatu House applications also be incorporated with this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, may I just mention that we have the specific references and we will let you have these references when we argue the matter at the end, unless you want the references now?
MR DE KOCK: Could you please just grant me an opportunity? Do you have a problem with me?
MR HUGO: No, Mr de Kock, not at all. We are talking about something completely different.
CHAIRPERSON: I have heard that evidence and I have seen that evidence. I'm quite happy that you refer to it during your address, but I don't know if the other gentlemen here might want to see it with a view to questioning the applicant about anything contained therein. I don't know if they've all seen it. I think it's fairly safe to assume that everybody has seen General van der Merwe's representations? That was published as a separate booklet really, but I'm not sure that they would have seen Minister Vlok's.
MR HUGO: Well, I'm in the Committee's hands. If the Committee wants us to make copies of that particular portion, we're actually relying on the affidavit that was handed in by Mr Vlok at the commencement of his evidence which was a separate affidavit.
CHAIRPERSON: Well I think you should it make it available to your colleagues if they want, if they would indicate to you if they want to have sight of it.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, I would just like to discuss your background very briefly. At various prior occasions it has been discussed and this is contained in Volume 4 of the paginated pieces, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And more specifically it has referred to your background on page 54 and 55 of the annexed pieces, where there has been a brief representation of your background that you were born in George in the Cape Province?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: That you grew up in Springs?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct.
MR HUGO: Your primary school career was completed at Boksburg as well as your high school education?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And in the same pieces ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Is your bundle 4 paginated?
MR HUGO: Yes Mr Chairman it is.
CHAIRPERSON: Where? Well ours is not properly paginated, we have pagination from page 5 to 54 and then we started with - go back to 1.
MR HUGO: It's strange Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we can perhaps do something about that during the adjournment. What page have you referred to now?
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, the pages that I have been referring to are pages 54 and 55. It's part of a Professor van der Hoven’s report that we used during the criminal trial where she just set out the general background and the history and his schooling etc. I'm going to be very brief on the background if that might help you, Mr Chairman. Professor van der Hoven’s report starts immediately after page 54 of Volume 4. This is the same volume that we used during the Cosatu and Khotso House applications.
CHAIRPERSON: Well I've got a copy of that bundle upstairs which may be paginated. The one we've been given in this one isn't. Read the top of the page that you're referring him to.
MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, the top of the page that I'm referring to says "Evaluation Report" and that's by Professor A. van der Hoven.
CHAIRPERSON: Right.
MR HUGO: That's where the report starts and she deals with his background and history etc. Mr Chairman I understand that you ...[intervention]
ADV DE JAGER: The first one is by a person by the name of Du Plessis?
MR HUGO: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: And then there is one by Rovello?
MR HUGO: No the first report is by Professor van der Hoven.
CHAIRPERSON: End of page 54. Go to page 54 from the beginning. 55, 56, go on. There you are. We found it.
MR HUGO: I apologise Mr Chairman, I was led to understand that you would be in possession of the previous bundle as used in the Cosatu and Khotso House.
Mr de Kock, on page 61 of the documents, a brief description is given of your police training which you commenced in 1968 in Benoni?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: You were then also called up for a counter-insurgency course in Rhodesia in the same year?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: And then you were also in the State President's guard?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And after that you went back to Benoni in 1974?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.
MR HUGO: Mention is also made of the fact that you participated in the unrest control situation in 1976 in the East Rand in the black residential areas?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And then closer to your current application, you were transferred in 1977 to South West Africa and you became the Station Commander of Ruakana?
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: In 1979, that is when Operation Koevoet commenced?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And you were connected to the Koevoet unit until May 1983?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And just for the sake of clarity for the Honourable Committee, it's probably general knowledge and common cause that you were found guilty of a number of offences for which you are applying for amnesty. However, is it correct that your current application which has been served to the Committee is not one which has been judged by the criminal court?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HUGO: Then Mr de Kock, I would just like to study the initial planning phase of this operation which eventually led to the damage of the ANC offices in London. When did you meet Craig Williamson for the first time?
MR DE KOCK: That was in the early '80's. It could have been a bit earlier. That is when he visited the operational area in Ovambo.
MR HUGO: And can you remember what the purpose of this visit was?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, he wanted to bring himself up to date with the operational area and the operational situation and we accommodated this as such.
MR HUGO: Might I ask you directly, was the London operation ever discussed during this visit with you personally?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HUGO: And is it correct that you were called in by the Commanding Officer of your unit of Koevoet, General Hans Dreyer?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: And what did he tell you?
MR DE KOCK: He told me along with Lieutenant Adam that we were to go to Pretoria, that we were needed. He didn't even say that it was for an operation, he simply said that we were needed in that regard and on the contrary we were, both of us, quite surprised, Lieutenant Adam and myself.
MR HUGO: He didn't inform you that he had any knowledge of the purpose of the proposed operation or where you were on your way to or how long you'd be away?
MR DE KOCK: No, he simply said that we had to report to head office and that we had to report to Brigadier Goosen.
MR HUGO: Very well, when you arrived in Pretoria, might I just by the way ask you how you arrived in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: We flew with Air Force traffic.
MR HUGO: And when you arrived in Pretoria, who met you?
MR DE KOCK: I can't remember who fetched us from the airport. I can't recall that at all, however, I do remember that we reported to Brigadier Goosen. If I'm not mistaken it might have been on that very same day.
MR HUGO: Might I just ask you to return to Koevoet and to General Hans Dreyer. Did you have to fill in leave forms from Ondangwa or from the border area or were you just placed in a different mode of service?
MR DE KOCK: No, we had free movement in the operational area, we had no take leave and then were sent for service to head office just to clarify. Koevoet fell directly under the auspices of head office. The direct commanding officer of Koevoet was General Coetzee. With my transfer from the Security Branch to Oshakati, I was transferred to head office with the station as Oshakati. However, therefore I was a member of head office but I was stationed at Oshakati. After that it was General Dreyer and after that it was General Coetzee.
MR HUGO: I would just like to pause for a moment with the preparations which were made for the operation in London. When, after your arrival in Pretoria, did you meet Craig Williamson again?
MR DE KOCK: That could have been on the same day but I don't recall exactly. I know that we reported to Brigadier Goosen and I know that we slept at Daisy on the first evening, myself and Adam and along with us was Lieutenant Taylor and I think eventually, a day or so later, Lieutenant McPherson, also came to stay at Daisy. He was already married but I remember that he was at Daisy for the last two evenings.
MR HUGO: And Brigadier Goosen?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we simply greeted him. He devolved us later and my recollection is that I met Williamson but that I immediately began working with Captain Brune who began to make arrangements for passports and documentation. He was to create a cover for me and Adam and we compartmentalised in our functions and Brune only worked with my documentation as well as Adam.
MR HUGO: When you say they worked with your things, could you just more specifically tell us which documentation was provided for you and which documentation was obtained for you?
MR DE KOCK: A false passport and after that immunisation certificates were obtained for us as well as international driving licences. I think that that was still obtained in Johannesburg and not locally. Furthermore we were taken to Captain Koekemoer who was still a Lieutenant at that stage and he referred us to Volkskas bank. I think I withdrew approximately 5000 to 6000 dollars in foreign exchange, the same with Adam.
MR HUGO: Is it correct that the money which was withdrawn in the form of credit cards and travellers cheques was done by means of a false name?
MR DE KOCK: I did not receive any credit cards and that actually created some kind of problem for me later in London but we'll get to that later. I had the cash as well as the passport.
MR HUGO: You've also heard there's been evidence given by Mr McPherson regarding the provision of gas containers or canisters. Can you tell us what your recollection is of that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. It was a gas canister of a moderate capacity and by that I would mean the capacity of a usual underarm spray, it was white in colour. It had the usual rabbit ears which was similar to the Playboy logo. The content thereof was told to me by Captain Brune. It would be able to make a person lose his consciousness for at least ten seconds so therefore this person would not be able to defend himself adequately, therefore it wasn't teargas as I knew it in the unrest situation. I don't know how many of the canisters went along to London, however I myself never took one or used one. My function was somewhat different.
MR HUGO: Did you have any knowledge of where these gas canisters came from, who provided these gas canisters?
MR DE KOCK: No, I don't know. It was specially manufactured for the operation but I don't have any other information regarding the canisters.
ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, did you say you yourself never received one?
MR DE KOCK: No, there were enough when we planned, the planning of the bomb, but I didn't take one by nature of the situation. I had dealt with gas quite often enough to know that it could boomerang quite badly on one sometimes.
MR HUGO: Just regarding the preparation, did you have any knowledge of where the funding for this operation came from?
MR DE KOCK: No, I have no knowledge of that, rumours were by certain Koevoet members but I know that his lying.
MR HUGO: Did you have any personal knowledge?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HUGO: Then with regard to the objective of this operation, was this discussed with you before the time what the objective of the operation would be and against whom it was aimed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was discussed and lectures were presented at Daisy Farm, slides were shown to us, photos were shown to us, it was explained to us surrounding the currency which was used.
MR HUGO: I beg you pardon, before you continue. Let's just put the first aspect on record. Against who was this operation aimed?
MR DE KOCK: Primarily it was aimed against the ANC offices in Penton Street. Secondarily and not as importantly were the offices of the SACP, but both were targets.
MR HUGO: Might I just ask you the following then? I think I put this to you, you were a young lieutenant who came from Ovamboland, what was your attitude at that stage towards the ANC and the South African Communist Party?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was nothing other than a continuation of SWAPO and SWAPO objectives, ultimately it was based upon Black Nationalism. In retrospect this was also in conflict with White Nationalism. They were terrorists, whether you were a member of SWAPO, the SACP or the ANC, you were carrying out the objectives of the Kremlin.
MR HUGO: And is it correct that you participated with great enthusiasm in this operation because of the fact that it was aimed against the ANC and the SACP?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, everybody was enthusiastic. People would have had fist fights in order to be first in line. Today of course they're fighting to be last in line but I will tell you that everybody was enthusiastic about it.
MR HUGO: Before I interrupted you, you testified about slides which were shown to you. What else was shown to you at Daisy during the planning phase?
MR DE KOCK: In the general discussions we spoke of the currency, the monetary currency, counter-surveillance, I also remember that we were told that if we suspected that we were being followed we shouldn't immediately start running because then an entire team would follow you and you'd make yourself very obvious. We were shown maps of London, it was made very clear to us how the tube system worked, it was also explained to us what dangers we could expect at customs and excise.
MR HUGO: Once again I'll have to interrupt you. When you say that it was explained to you about certain occurrences which you could expect, who was the chief spokesperson who provided these explanations to you during the planning phase?
MR DE KOCK: That was Captain Williamson.
MR HUGO: Were any other preparations made?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. We received a clothing allowance as a result of the change in climate. We purchased certain items of clothing and in general we were psychologically prepared for this entire situation. It's not something which one could take lightly especially in my case where I'd spent a year or two in the bush and all of a sudden I was jetting off to London. We were all psychologically prepared.
MR HUGO: Could I just ask you if General Johan Coetzee offered any input during this phase?
MR DE KOCK: No, not that I can remember.
MR HUGO: Then just with regards to the documentation, who is the person who provided the documentation to you? I'm talking about the false passport and identity documents as well as the international driving licences?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can remember Captain Beukes organised this, he organised that we sign the forms for the application for the passport. We were told to practice our signatures so that we could avoid making mistakes on travellers cheques and so forth. You had to start living by your false name, you had to answer to that name, you had to make it a part of your life. It was Captain Beukes.
MR HUGO: Did he know what the objective of this operation was?
MR DE KOCK: Well he didn't appear to know but I'm assuming that he did know.
MR HUGO: Then just one further important aspect which I have to touch on and that is which information was given to you during the planning phase with regard to movement of people within the building which was used by the ANC as well as around the building?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we had general discussions about this and it would have been decided when we were to blow up the building with regard to the situation on ground level, that is the comprehension that I had of it. People were not to be injured, the information was somewhat scanty in my opinion who would be inside the building and what would be going on in there but I'm assuming that that would be on the basis of that I would know or I wouldn't know what I was supposed to know, but no one was to be injured and a specific date for the explosion had not yet been fixed upon.
MR HUGO: Then with regards to the same subject the size of the charge of the explosive which was to be taken along, was that ever discussed?
MR DE KOCK: No, we had no knowledge of that and that stage I did not know how the spring-charge or explosives would arrive there, how it would be transported there.
MR HUGO: Then after that you went to London and a ticket was issued to you under your false name?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct. Flight KLM to Nairobi, Nairobi to Schipol and after that to London.
MR HUGO: And then with regard to the execution of the operation in London, in which team did you act?
MR DE KOCK: Lieutenant John Adam and I acted as a team or at least as a component.
MR HUGO: You arrived together at Heathrow Airport in London?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.
MR HUGO: And could you just tell the Honourable Committee what happened then?
MR DE KOCK: I think it began in the R.S.A., we just didn't know about it, but he and I would then move independently of each other but what happened at the airport is that members of the Security Branch from Jan Smuts took our cases and booked them in together on one ticket so therefore the baggage tickets were all issued on one ticket and when we landed at Schipol, it was reasonably early, Lieutenant Adam arranged that we would leave early and he didn't arrange for our baggage to go along with us. When I landed at Heathrow, officials stopped us. I looked for a queue which I thought would be user friendly. There were people in front of me who were much taller than me. I was twentieth in line and when the customs official looked up, he looked me in eye and I knew that we would pick up trouble. And trouble came along in the form of who was with me, why did I have so much money on me, what was I doing there and then at that stage they discovered that Adam and I did not know each other at all but that our baggage had been booked in together on the same ticket. I think he had approximately 4000 dollars in his suitcase, something which the customs officials found rather strange.
I was detained for approximately three to four hours during which they hammered me quite considerably. Two other customs officials joined them but then they allowed me to enter London but not for six months as usual, only for the fourteen which had been indicated on my ticket.
MR HUGO: What other preparatory measures did you take in London directly before the explosion which took place?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson we then acted according to our cover story, that we were tourists. Adam and I had taken a camera from the Technical Division, we took photos, we travelled around and upon three or four occasions, my recollection is a bit shady, we actually did move through Penton Street and in White Lion Street there was a pub directly opposite the gates which gave access to the ANC building and we went there upon two or three occasions. We also learnt to understand the subway system, if it wasn't for Adam I still would be lost in the underground system of London today. I'm not saying that to be funny, I really mean it. We walked quite a lot. By nature of the situation we were followed, that is a fact, we were approached that evening in an hotel and for those in London, if you don't stay in a hotel you can't go into the resting rooms or into the reading rooms and for first six to seven days we were virtually under surveillance. I think that was actually the Narcotics Division or the Customs and Excise Division of the government.
MR HUGO: Very well, we know that it was not decided that the SACP offices would be damaged. Were you part of that decision?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HUGO: And ultimately it was told to you that you should proceed with the damage of the ANC offices?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR HUGO: Could I just ask you whether you know how the explosive device and the charges arrived in London?
MR DE KOCK: No, purely upon what I found out later but I can't testify about that.
MR HUGO: And then to the best of your recollection could you tell the Honourable Committee exactly what happened on the morning or on the evening when the explosive device was placed at the ANC offices?
MR DE KOCK: Approximately a day or two before the bomb was to be planted, and that was also our information, the gates at the back of the ANC offices giving access to the backyard were never locked, that they were never closed and the day before we were to plant the bomb, if my recollection is correct, those gates were actually closed. And as far as I know we conveyed this to Brigadier Goosen upon meeting him but we decided to go ahead and that we were going to climb over the gates. I didn't have a problem with that but what worried me was who would know that we were planning something. Had something not worked out, had made a mistake because if we went over the gates Scotland Yard might be waiting for us. I can only speculate that this had to do with the protest which was to take place the following day. However I was not aware of that protest march.
...[inaudible] took the tube and went to the apartment of McPherson and Taylor. I know that there was a vehicle, I think Raven, I'm speaking under correction, but I think Raven was with us or we might have picked him up later. At some distance away from the ANC offices we stopped and as far as I can recall this was in White Lion Street and we moved out at a varying tempo.
McPherson was driving and Raven would present himself as someone who was under the influence of alcohol. He would then go and sit behind the ANC offices on the pavement facing the pub, which was the biggest problem to me with regard to identification or that we might be noticed, I would then move in and Raven would move in a short area behind me. I would then go over the gates. I would search the backyard for a guard or any person who didn't have shelter, a homeless person, someone who might be squatting or sleeping there. I would then give McPherson a signal and then by that stage Raven would be eight to ten paces away from us. If lights were to go on or if there were police officers or if there was to be some kind of skirmish, Raven would go back, he would get rid of the charge and he would get away and it worked out exactly like that.
What happened was that after Raven had climbed I asked where the bag was with the spring-charge and I saw that it was still on the other side of the gate. I climbed onto the gate and asked McPherson to pass the bag to me. He passed the bag to me, it was a canvass bag, I can't recall exactly what colour it was, I hear that it was green but I can't remember. The bag weighed between four to five kilograms, I would say closer to five. I compared it with the weight of a landmine. I gave that to Raven and from there he and I moved to the back wall of the ANC building. I saw him open the bag and we reached the point where I saw a watch which was very similar to a Westclock Zobo watch. I moved away and went to complete my component of the work. I moved about four to five paces away from him and sat on my haunches and kept guard to see that the environment was clear and he carried on with his work.
MR HUGO: And after that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after he had set the device we went over the gates, I went behind him and we moved a number of paces away from each other, back to the vehicle, climbed into the vehicle and we stopped at a point, I won't be able to tell you exactly where that was because I can't remember and we met Captain Williamson there. I had gloves which I had to give back. We exchanged shoes and they also wanted that Adam and I meet Castleton. We both said that we didn't want to see him just in case we could be identified later and we left from there for our hotels. The following morning we went to the airport or at least Adam and I went to the airport.
MR HUGO: Can you remember for what time the explosive was set to go off?
MR DE KOCK: I have a reasonable recollection of that. The spring-charge would detonate by the time we were in the air. I'm not sure of exactly what time it was set for but that would be between nine and ten. I have a vague idea that by 9.30 my flight and Adam's flight would be in the air on the way to Brussels and indeed at that time, we were on our way to Brussels, we were already airborne.
MR HUGO: And when you arrived in Brussels, was there an announcement, can you remember what it was about?
MR DE KOCK: Yes there was an announcement shortly after we landed, approximately twenty minutes, that the Intelligence Department or information desk was calling for Joe Slovo. I decided to see if I could find him, I knew what he looked like as a result of photos which I had seen before. He was a very well known figure and what one would have done out of youthful foolhardiness one would have attacked him if one had found him in a secluded spot.
MR HUGO: And then after Brussels, did you go back to South Africa or did you go to Frankfurt first?
MR DE KOCK: I remember that we flew from Brussels but everybody else says Frankfurt, I won't argue. I know that in Brussels we adjusted our tickets, I don't have a problem with that however and I would concede to that.
MR HUGO: Very well, Mr de Kock, you would have heard that Mr Williamson and Mr McPherson said that one of the reasons for the justification of the attack on the ANC offices was the attack which had been launched at Voortrekkerhoogte during which British subjects had been involved. Do you know anything about that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes I had read about that, there had been security reports surrounding the attack at Voortrekkerhoogte. However, as far as I can remember I was still in Ovamboland at that stage, however it reached Oshakati and it had disrupted the military quite a lot. I know that members of the military command over there asked the question: "Why are we fighting here when we should be there?" It had a tremendous psychological impact that people were three thousand kilometres away fighting a war when a war was actually going on at home.
MR HUGO: Is it correct that Mr Williamson testified that one of the objectives of this operation was to show the ANC that they could also be attacked no matter where they may find themselves?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that they also have an Achilles heel.
MR HUGO: Yes and just briefly, I would like to discuss your arrival back in South Africa. Who met you at the airport?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can remember, members of the Security Branch were at Jan Smuts. I'm not certain whether or not they let us move through Customs and Excise. They took us through the back passages, we didn't have to go through Customs and Excise.
MR HUGO: Who was present when you were met by the Security Branch officials at Jan Smuts and taken through the back channels?
MR DE KOCK: I remember myself, Adam, McPherson and Taylor. I don't remember anything about any of the other members.
MR HUGO: And then, where did you go from the airport?
MR DE KOCK: I can't remember.
MR HUGO: Then you heard that Mr Raven testified there was a meeting in General Coetzee's office directly after your arrival back in South Africa, can you remember that?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HUGO: And did a so-called debriefing session take place at Daisy farm after this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Adam and I stayed at Daisy for a further evening or two. We received a day or two off during which he and I went to our respective homes but we had not been away for about three or four days until we flew back to Ovamboland to resume our duties.
MR HUGO: And regarding the travellers cheques and false documentation which was issued to you, what happened to that?
MR DE KOCK: The false documentation, I can still remember that I kept my passport. I'm not certain of Adam. The travellers cheques were all handed back to Captain Koekemoer as well as every receipt, and as absurd as it may sound, as travellers we were supposed to obtain receipts from taxi drivers, something which was firmly entrenched in the security world. For every single activity, for everything, there had to be a receipt which had to be handed back in.
MR HUGO: And then shortly after that you went back to Ovamboland?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.
MR HUGO: And when you arrived in Ovamboland did you report back to General Dreyer?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we simply told him that we'd arrived back. He said "Go ahead with your work". It happened exactly like that. I didn't ask him whether he knew, we didn't discuss the operation, he never ever referred to it again after that.
I heard three years later that some of the junior members in my command knew about this bomb explosion two weeks later but I didn't tell them about it, they told me about it later, three years later in fact and it was a surprise to me that neither Dreyer nor I had discussed it but that junior members were aware of it and that was rather surprising.
MR HUGO: Then briefly I would like to discuss the decoration. Can you remember when this decoration was presented to you or awarded to you? It was common cause that you were awarded for this operation.
MR DE KOCK: It was a certain period of time after we arrived back, I didn't know that it was going to be awarded but I can't remember the exact date upon which this took place. I can't give you a time indication but it was a certain period of time after the operation.
MR HUGO: And who was present during the award of this medal?
MR DE KOCK: The group that had gone to London, including Brigadier Goosen and furthermore General Geldenhuys, that's Mike Geldenhuys, General Johan Coetzee, Minister Louis le Grange as well as three other persons who were also present of which I knew only one because he had been one of my spring-charge mentors, but by nature of the situation I did not know what their operation was.
MR HUGO: Very well. After the medal had been physically awarded to you, at a certain point a certificate had been sent to you in memory of this award?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not receive anything like that. In 1988 or '89 with the Harms Commission, I received a certificate from someone.
MR HUGO: Will you just consult Volume 4 page 167? Is that the certificate to which you are referring?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HUGO: 167 Mr Chairman, the last page of bundle 4.
Mr de Kock, just some singular aspects which I'd like to clear up. You heard that Advocate Bizos ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to clear them up now or would you rather we take the adjournment now and you can continue tomorrow morning?
MR HUGO: I think we should rather continue tomorrow morning.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we will adjourn till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
