Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. The page is 81. No, not an amendment Mr Chairman - Visser on record, you will recall that on a prior occasion or two, there were, we had the problem that because of the way in which the written application was formulated, there was only once a reference to the political background in paragraphs 10(a) and (b) and thereafter, there was a cross-reference back to those pages and they have been left out consistently every time Brigadier Schoon has appeared before you.

Again, would you please accept them, and we have marked them 86(a) - (e) Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Brigadier Schoon is available to give evidence.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, on one matter of record, yesterday after the adjournment, a copy was made of a document handed in by Mr Maharaj and the original has been given back to his attorneys, and I have a copy. I take it that is in order for my client to peruse that.

CHAIRPERSON: The copy, yes.

MR LEVINE: It previously didn't want to come on, now it doesn't want to go off.

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier Schoon, you just took the oath, do you apply before this Amnesty Commission for amnesty according to the Act for any illegal deeds committed by you in an attempted murder of Marius Schoon in Botswana during 1980?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Your application for amnesty, your written application, appears in volume 2 from page 81 to 88. Do you have that piece in front of you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: And do you confirm that the written part must also be incorporated into your oral evidence?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You were born on the 1st of March 1931 in Ngome, KwaZulu Natal, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You were a supporter of the National Party?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is true.

MR VISSER: Mr Chair, may I interrupt myself, you will also recall that that amendment had already been granted previously and we will not waste any time to do so again.

Can you tell the Committee, Brigadier Schoon, just in short, a short background sketch, the environment in which you grew up, your parents' home.

BRIG SCHOON: My parents were both conservative and supporters of the National Party. From childhood, I aligned myself with the goals of the National Party. That also counts for the policy of separate development, as well as the majority of the white population of the country's ideals and policies.

There was no influence that could tell me that this policy was wrong. Most of the people around me, supported and believed this policy.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I am sorry to interrupt, I will be cross-examining Brigadier Schoon on behalf of Mr Marius Schoon, and I see that Brigadier Schoon is reading from a prepared statement. We have no objection with that, but we would like a copy of that please.

MR VISSER: My learned friend is welcome to a copy, except that we didn't make because on the last occasion, you will recall Mr Chairman, my learned friend Mr Bizos objected to us handing up copies to you.

At this stage Mr Chairman, we haven't made copies, but we have absolutely no objection. In fact, we would have preferred to have given it to you, because we would have gone quicker.

MR BIZOS: The objection was to reading from the document Mr Chairman, but I don't want to make anything of it. Perhaps we can have a copy.

MR BERGER: And that objection was overruled, so could we please have a copy of the statement?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you know, really, I am going to present this application to you in whichever way I see fit until you stop me Mr Chairman. I haven't got a copy for my learned friend.

Brigadier, is it correct that you ask this Amnesty Commission to - that is Exhibit 46, 47, that is a presentation to the Commission by Gen Johan van der Merwe, and certain declarations by the Commission, that has served or has been in front of this Commission for quite a while, but you would like to incorporate all these documents into your evidence?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct Brigadier that you, yourself, at various opportunities gave evidence? You for example testified in front of this Commission in the Khotso and Cosatu House incidents in which you also applied for amnesty?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also testified in terms of witness subpoenas that you received from or in accordance with the TRC Act, and that is the Investigation Unit of the TRC did this on the 19th of November 1996?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You also in the case of the amnesty application of Mr Dirk Coetzee, Captain Dirk Coetzee, made an affidavit that was submitted and on the 9th of October, 1997, you testified in the so-called Armed Forces Hearings in front of the Human Rights Violations Commission of the TRC and that evidence or testimony is on record?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you just refer to page 82 of your application under paragraph 8(b). Your history as a policeman is explained in short. The main points are that on the 6th of September 1949 you joined the South African Police, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: You were then transferred to the Security Branch in 1963, when you started in Durban. And from the 1st of January 1972, you were at the Security Head Office in Pretoria?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Could you just in short, give a short background of your personal experience and the insights that you gained while you were a Policeman?

BRIG SCHOON: During my career as a Policeman, I got into contact with various facets of terrorism. It was assassinations of Security Force members and especially in the South African Police, car bombings, land mines, etc.

ADV DE JAGER: Brigadier, unfortunately the Interpreters also do not have a copy, so they now have to interpret every word that you say. I would like to ask you that the representatives would not then follow the normal route, and make copies of this so that the Committee will not be drawn into your in-fighting.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, my attorneys' copies have notes on. If you do not mind that, I can give a copy to the Interpreters, although there is a note on it, it would make no difference to them.

ADV DE JAGER: If you do see Mrs Burt, unfortunately our Secretary is not here, if somebody could just make a copy of this for us.

MR BIZOS: We find it very difficult to make a note of the evidence given if it is read out and we will appreciate a copy Mr Chairman, if the witness is allowed to read out his evidence.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am certain that we can make copies within a few minutes, ten minutes.

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairman, I will start from the beginning. During my career as a Policeman, I had contact with loads of facets of terrorism. This was characterised by assassinations of Security Branch members, car bombings, land mines, limpet mines and other explosives where the targets were mostly civilians, innocent civilians whether black or white.

We as members of the South African Police, especially the Security Branch members, realised that we were the only defence or line of defence, and in my official capacity, I had access to publications of radical organisations such as the ANC, the SACP as well as the PAC.

The cold blooded manner in which the masses of South Africa were incited by these publications to commit violence, convinced me that revolutionary onslaught had to be resisted with all the forces we had.

Apart from that, certain experiences had such an influence on my life, that I did everything in my ability to fight this revolutionary struggle.

The struggle of the past, but especially the ANC/SACP alliance where they attempted to overthrow the government through violent means and to kill innocent people and to maim innocent people. That made members of the Security Branch and including myself, made us more determined to face this onslaught.

The protection and development of the government's policies, etc, were always first in my mind.

MR VISSER: Brigadier, did you as a Policeman, commit any crime for your own gain or because of reasons that was not in line with any political motive?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: The matters for which you apply for amnesty, how do you see the political motivation in that?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I see it as a struggle that we had to uphold the, or to keep the NP government in power.

MR VISSER: Could you just continue and give us a political background and motivation for it?

BRIG SCHOON: The struggle that was fought by the Security Branch of the South African Police, was very sophisticated.

The onslaught that we had to resist, existed out of political and psychological and economic aspects. The ANC/SACP alliance threw everything into the struggle to take over political power. In order to achieve this objective, the ANC/SACP alliance focused on creating a people's war, which they described or defined as follows and I quote "a war in which the entire nation in engaged. Umkhonto weSizwe, the People's Army, workers, the rural masses, women, intellectuals, the religious community, selectively in groups or as organised individuals who use all forms of revolutionary warfare, armed or non-combat, legal and illegal means, to attack and destroy all symbols, structures and organs of apartheid power, including all those who man them."

This quote was issued by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party and was entitled Forward to the People's Power, the Challenge Ahead.

According to the ANC/SACP alliance, the revolutionary war was established on four pillars, that being the armed struggle which was waged by Umkhonto weSizwe, the mobilisation of the masses, the underground structure of the ANC, the international onslaught in isolating the RSA. In its attempt to achieve a violent takeover of political power the ANC/SACP alliance, focused all the more on garnering mass participation for the armed struggle.

Where the internal supporters of the ANC/SACP alliance could not succeed in achieving mass participation for the armed struggle, intimidation was used on a very large scale.

Those moderate inhabitants of black areas, lived in fear and were forced to participate in stay away actions, boycott actions, strikes and marches and so forth.

During my career as a member of the Security Branch, it was expected of every member consistently, to be irrevocably loyal to the South African Police. There was a team spirit among the members of the Security Branch and reciprocal trust was established, which is some cases would have led to blind loyalty.

Despite the fact that the violent onslaught against the government was kept under control, the ANC/SACP alliance succeeded by means of intimidation and the persuasion of the majority of the black population, against the government and the Police, to create resistance.

The political situation worsened gradually and it was only the actions of the Security Forces, which prevented chaos and anarchy throughout the nation.

Aside from that, supporters of the ANC/SACP alliance, by means of intimidation, dominated most of the black residential areas in the country. The South African Police to a very large degree stood powerless in the prosecution of activists, because witnesses feared for their lives and bluntly refused to appear in court.

Persons who cooperated with the Security Branch or in any way were suspected or cooperation, were cruelly murdered, often by means of the necklacing method and their houses were burnt down.

The members of the Security Branch gradually became more involved in performing tasks which went beyond the ambit of their duties and the law. Despite the terrible situation which they found themselves in, the Security Forces managed to combat the efforts of the ANC/SACP to create total anarchy and chaos.

The Security Branch played a decisive role in the process and many assaults and attacks on civilians were prevented or thwarted as a result of gathering Intelligence and actions which were taken by members of the Security Branch.

Many lives, the lives of defenceless civilians, were protected in this manner. In order to maintain this level of effectiveness, the Security Branch had to work long hours under very difficult circumstances.

They were exposed to all forms of violence on a daily basis and despite the fact that super-human demands were made on them, they performed their tasks with dedication and enthusiasm.

They were completely loyal towards the government and irrevocable in their attempt to thwart the attempts of the ANC/SACP alliance to throw the country into chaos. Mr P.W. Botha said that he was not prepared to make excuses for the struggle which was made by these individuals who tried to prevent the takeover of the government, and I quote "it was a war and the ANC/SACP alliance wanted to grab power by means of violence. It was the duty of the government to protect or defend the government".

Unfortunately both the former government and the ANC/SACP alliance, in their attempts to occupy the moral high ground, maintained double standards and for those who actually had to fight the struggle, they made it impossible to do so.

The former government maintained that the RSA was not involved in a war, and that the existing law supplemented by security legislation and the emergency regulations, would be sufficient to ward off the onslaught.

Members of the South African Police and the South African Army, were expected to stop the onslaught at every cost, even they had to move beyond the parameters of the law, as if it was a war situation.

The ANC/SACP alliance on the other hand, unchained forces which could not be controlled, and this led to necklace murders along with the death and mutilation of defenceless citizens.

A situation much worse than a conventional war, developed and these persons who on grass roots level, fought in the struggle, often in certain situations, had to make their own decisions regarding how the interest of their masters could be served at best.

During the struggle of the past, many people were killed and injured.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon Brigadier, page 9, paragraph 33 Mr Chairman.

BRIG SCHOON: During the struggle of the past, many people were killed and injured and much damage was done to property by radicals who were opposed to the policy of separate development and wanted to take over political power with violence.

This led to the motivation of the average member of the South African Police, to support the policy of the government by in the exercising of their duties to maintain law and order, and secure internal security, they would do everything to stop the struggle.

Throughout the years, I was very strongly influenced by speeches and statements of many national leaders and politicians, who warned against the communist takeover of the country.

This led me to support the government's policy. I was completely convinced that winning the struggle, or that the ANC/SACP's victory in the struggle, would destroy everything that was of value to me.

Aside from that, I was repulsed by the murder, death and injury of people which was brought about by the radicals. I am convinced that the largest majority of the members of the South African Police were motivated by this to combat the violent onslaught and the accompanying unrest.

MR VISSER: Brigadier, you testified earlier and I ask you just to comment on that once more. You said that you as members of the Security Branch, experienced tremendous pressure to normalise the situation.

Was it at all possible for you to return to normality in the normal sense of the word, while the struggle was under way?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it was not.

MR VISSER: And did this pressure increase gradually as things worsened?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it became all the worse.

MR VISSER: During 1981 we know that Mr Marius Schoon was in Botswana and you applied or you are applying now for an attempt on his life. Would you please inform the Committee regarding how you recall those circumstances and the events?

BRIG SCHOON: During 1981 and I am not certain exactly when it was, it could have been in the middle of 1981, it could have been later in the year, former Captain Dirk Coetzee came to me and he informed me that he had the capacity to get rid of Mr Marius Schoon.

He added that for this purpose he would be needing a firearm.

MR VISSER: Yes, and on the 19th of November 1996 you told the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC the following in evidence. You stated conspiracy to murder Marius Schoon in October/November 1981 in Pretoria and Zeerust. You were in Pretoria and who was in Zeerust?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I can't really remember, it is very vague. I cannot connect the Zeerust incident with this story.

MR VISSER: Very well, but you told the Truth Commission then I can recall that Captain Dirk Coetzee approached me with a suggestion that he could arrange the assassination of Marius Schoon, who was living in Botswana. Reliable information had shown that Mr Schoon was involved in acts of terrorism and other acts compromising the safety of the State within the Republic of South Africa and that he was regarded as one of the "enemy". Clearly Mr Schoon was actively assisting terrorists on route to and from the RSA for purposes of committing terrorist acts inter alia against innocent civilians.

The SAP had no legal remedy to address this specific situation, and the horrific results thereof especially Mr Schoon's involvement therein. In view thereof, I gave Captain Coetzee a .38 revolver with ammunition, and told him that he could proceed with his suggested plan of action. At a later stage Captain Coetzee reported to me that the person he had sent to Botswana, had been confronted by the ANC. In the process, he had been assaulted and robbed of the revolver, and was therefore unable to proceed with the operation.

Thereafter I learnt that a parcel bomb had been sent to the Schoon family in Angola, killing the wife and a daughter. I was definitely not involved in the planning and execution of this operation and have no personal knowledge thereof.

This according to the record, is what you stated before the Truth Commission. Is that in essence correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, let's just look at the detail. You refer there that Marius Schoon according to your insight, was involved in active terrorism? Page 12, could you explain why you said that?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I was aware of the fact that in 1964 Marius Schoon had been found guilty on charges of sabotage and that he had been sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.

In 1976 he was released from prison and he left the RSA the following year. I was aware that approximately in 1978, he underwent training in among others combat and weapons warfare and sabotage at the Funda camp in Angola.

MR VISSER: If I might just interrupt you there for a minute Brigadier, that is your recollection that this was in the Funda camp. Are you prepared to concede that this could have been somewhere else?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, that is what was in his file, that this had taken place at Funda camp.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you don't have any further personal knowledge?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue.

BRIG SCHOON: Marius Schoon and his wife, Jeanette, became very important links for the ANC in Botswana, where they offered help to terrorists and also carried out tasks.

MR VISSER: Are we talking about 1981 here?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct. When Captain Dirk Coetzee spoke to me about the possible killing of Marius Schoon, I withdrew Marius Schoon's file as well as any other information which was available regarding him, at the Security Branch.

I informed myself regarding the role which he played in the struggle, and the dangers which he presented as a result of his activities.

I weighed up his murder against the role which he fulfilled. Reliable information indicated that Mr Schoon had been involved in acts of terrorism in the sense which I have explained above, and in other actions which were aimed at endangering the security of the Republic of South Africa, and that he was regarded as one of the enemy.

It was clear that Mr Schoon provided assistance to terrorist going to or coming from the RSA, in order to commit acts of terrorism against innocent civilians among others.

MR VISSER: If I might just interrupt you here, yesterday we received a document here which was submitted as Exhibit RR. According to this document and I won't take it any further than this, the suggestion is made that the Schoon's would also have been involved, page 11 Mr Chairman, paragraph 3, in the establishment and maintenance of routes along which weapons and ammunition and explosives and explosive devises would illegally be brought into the country. From your own personal knowledge, do you know anything about that?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that report was already in the file when I studied it in 1981.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

BRIG SCHOON: I was convinced that if Marius Schoon could be eliminated, it would be quite a significant blow to the ANC/SACP alliance and MK, especially with regard to the infrastructure and attacks on South Africa from Angola and Botswana.

The fact that from 1980, a yearly increase in terrorist attacks had appeared in South Africa, and that certain attacks had been connected with insurgents from Botswana, contributed to my persuasion that I should reconcile myself with an attack on his life.

During this period of time, the Schoon's resided in Botswana. The Security Branch had no capacity to act against him. Should he be stopped, it could be only by means of an illegal action.

Nonetheless I did not draw this inference very easily, but considered it for a day or two. I was aware of the dangers which the project presented, especially if things were to go wrong.

Nevertheless, because of the high profile of Marius Schoon and the threat which he presented for the security of the public and Internal Security of the RSA, I ultimately decided that I would proceed with Captain Coetzee's suggestion.

I made a .38 revolver available to Captain Coetzee, the revolver was not registered and therefore could not be traced back to the Security Branch. I told Captain Coetzee that he could go ahead with the plan.

Captain Coetzee later reported to me that the person who he had sent to Botswana, had been confronted by the ANC in Botswana, that he had been assaulted and that he had been robbed of the revolver, and that he consequently could not proceed with the mission.

MR VISSER: You are aware thereof that Captain Coetzee in volume 2, page 136 applied for amnesty for the attempt on the life of Mr Marius Schoon and he also explained there that you had called him to your office and told him that he was to report to Mr Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee in Zeerust, in the Security Branch there and that he was told by you that the operation was about the planned elimination of Marius Schoon and that after he had made the preliminary preparations, just before he was set to leave, you called him to your office and told him that this operation had been cancelled.

BRIG SCHOON: I don't remember anything like that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If such an event had occurred, you would not have been involved then? If there was an incident during which you called him to your office and sent him and so on and so forth, as Captain Dirk Coetzee has explained here, this would not be the incident to which you are referring here?

BRIG SCHOON: As it is put here, it doesn't really say much, because I can't remember any such incident.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you remember that you provided him with a .38 unregistered revolver and that a report was later on received from him?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: This revolver, where would this revolver had come from?

BRIG SCHOON: When I took over from the then Colonel Victor, he handed over certain property to me. Among others, there were six .38 revolvers which was still in their original containers. He didn't tell me from where they came and later I heard that these were weapons which were on account with the Secret Fund, Colonel Koekemoer was responsible for that and I had to account to him if any of these items were to be used.

MR VISSER: Very well, it is not necessary to go into that much detail.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, can I interrupt here. I think that Mr Coetzee is sitting in the audience. Was he given notice that he is an implicated party?

MR WAGENER: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was given notice of the allegations made by Brigadier Schoon, was he?

MR WAGENER: Yes Mr Chairman, we received notice.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. My attorney has just requested me to request of you to explain to the Committee, in 1981 what exactly was your position in the Security Branch in Pretoria, so that they can just understand what part of the structure you fitted into at that stage?

BRIG SCHOON: I was in control of what they called

C-Section, specifically the Terrorism Desk.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further evidence to present.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

ADV DE JAGER: C-Section, was that also Vlakplaas?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was the Group Leader of Group C, and under that, C1, C2 and C3 and ultimately then C4 resided and these were the different subdivisions.

ADV DE JAGER: Was Vlakplaas a subdivision of the chief division of which you were in control?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you recall which Section that was?

BRIG SCHOON: That was C1.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Brigadier Schoon, you were the Head of the Security Branch Anti-Terrorism Desk in C1, in Group C?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: And how many years' experience did you have of the ANC and the South African Communist Party?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, since 1963 until my retirement I was involved with the Security Branch, and throughout all those years the activities came to my attention at a daily basis.

MR LEVINE: When did you retire?

BRIG SCHOON: In October 1989.

MR LEVINE: That will then mean that for approximately 25 years you had experience of those bodies?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: I would also like to discuss SACTU, South African Congress of Trade Unions. Are you aware of that body?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Was that a component of the so-called revolutionary alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: That was the workers' wing of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: Was SACTU like the ANC and SACP, an illegal organisation?

BRIG SCHOON: No, SACTU was not illegal.

MR LEVINE: So it was simply a wing of the alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: Who controlled SACTU?

BRIG SCHOON: To the best of my knowledge, it was the ANC who controlled SACTU, as well as the SACP.

MR LEVINE: And was SACTU's role in the revolutionary alliance, that of promoting the struggle of the workers, according to your knowledge?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR LEVINE: Would you say that this was part of the ANC/SACP revolutionary plan?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I viewed it as the internal wing which was on behalf of the ANC/SACP alliance, acting legally.

MR LEVINE: Do you have any knowledge of whether any officials of SACTU were members of Umkhonto weSizwe?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, several of them.

MR LEVINE: During the years 1970 and from 1980, who would you say were the five prominent white members of the ANC, if you could mention only five names, who would that be according to your knowledge?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I would have placed as number one, Mr Joe Slovo, perhaps his wife to a lesser degree.

MR LEVINE: That would be Ruth?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct, Ruth First. Then Mr Ronnie Kasrils, Marius Schoon.

MR LEVINE: Jeanette Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. And that would have been your five prominent persons?

BRIG SCHOON: Those would have been five of the most influential members of the ANC/SACP alliance.

MR LEVINE: The Slovo couple, the Schoon couple and Mr Kasrils?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What about the other white people?

BRIG SCHOON: There were others as well Mr Chairperson. I can't recall their names immediately.

MR LEVINE: But those five members or people were the most well known to you, the most influential?

BRIG SCHOON: Those who stood out were Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils, as far as it concerned me and to a lesser extent, Mr Marius Schoon.

MR LEVINE: And Mrs Jeanette Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, she was also involved.

MR LEVINE: And Mrs Ruth Slovo?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Concerning the Schoon couple, were they targets of the Security Branch in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: Not as far as I know.

ADV DE JAGER: Brigadier, I do not understand now.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not quite understand the question. I assumed if they were targets of the Security Branch in Botswana, in other words the Botswana Security Branch.

MR LEVINE: No, the Security Branch when you were in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, of the South African Security Branch, yes.

MR LEVINE: I apologise if I did not explain it very well, but according to your knowledge, they were targets of the South African Security Branch members in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Did you know of the Schoon's transfer to Lubango?

BRIG SCHOON: I may have heard of it much later, but not at that stage, no.

MR LEVINE: If the Schoon's were in Gaberone in June of 1985, would they be attacked on that day?

BRIG SCHOON: I believe if we had that information, it would be so, yes.

MR LEVINE: So in all probability that would be the position?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: What is the date that you gave?

BRIG SCHOON: 1985.

MR LEVINE: It was in the middle of June 1985, that is to say to be specific the 14th of June 1985. Is that the correct date?

BRIG SCHOON: I am not sure about that, no.

MR LEVINE: The Schoon couple, were they transferred from Gaberone to Lubango and when you got to know of the explosion in the flat of the Schoon's in Lubango, what was your reaction to that?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot say to you what it was, because at that stage I was not really interested in them any more.

MR LEVINE: Was that after the failed attempt, you were not interested in them any more?

BRIG SCHOON: No, when that attempt failed, I was glad that it failed.

MR LEVINE: Why would it be if you then gave the order that they have to attempt to kill them?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it was something that happened, and after I considered it or thought about it again, it just did not seem right. I realised that I did not do the right thing here.

MR LEVINE: Who did you think would be responsible for the explosion and the death of Mrs Schoon and their daughter in Lubango?

BRIG SCHOON: I had no idea Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it that you did not want to know?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, it was not a question that I did not want to know, but who was I supposed to ask?

CHAIRPERSON: Probably the Police. Do they not receive information concerning this in Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, they do receive their information.

MR LEVINE: Brigadier Schoon, I would like to ask you if you agree with the following. I will firstly mention Exhibit N and I will quote in English

"Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation"

It is dated 12 May 1997. Do you have that document in front of you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Would you be so kind as to page to page 40.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Do you see there 3.9.1., could you read this carefully.

BRIG SCHOON

"The Botswana IPC 1976 - 1980 was led by Henry Mahoti and Dan Hlume. At various times Jenny and Marius Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald, Magurle Sexwale, Jakes Tolo, a negro also served on this structure."

MR LEVINE: Would that correspond with what you remember happened?

BRIG SCHOON: I can only remember of the Schoon couple who was part of this.

MR LEVINE: But can you remember that they were there?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: In a senior position in the Botswana IPC?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I only knew that he had a senior position in the ANC.

MR LEVINE: And Jeanette as well?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Would you be so kind as to page to page 43, could you just read 4.6.2?

BRIG SCHOON

"Botswana Senior Organ 1980 - 1983. Chair Henry Mahoti, succeeded by Lambert Moloi. Leading figures in the Senior Organ during this period were Billy Masetla, Keith Mokwape, Dan Hlume, Marius and Jenny Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald. The latter three were forced to leave Botswana during this period, Wally Serote, Tabang Magwetla, Hassam Ebrahim."

MR LEVINE: According to your knowledge or the knowledge that you had, is that also correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I cannot really comment because the names do not make a lot of sense, except for the Schoon's that I could remember.

MR LEVINE: I am just talking about the Schoon's.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: What did you know about Fitzgerald?

BRIG SCHOON: I may have remembered or I may have known something, but I cannot remember today.

MR LEVINE: Concerning the Schoon couple, could you just go to Exhibit AA.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I have it.

MR LEVINE: Can you please page to the last paragraph. That is a paragraph concerning Jeanette Schoon's life.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I can see it.

MR LEVINE: I will quote once again in English "our late dear comrade in arms, Jeanette Schoon", what does that indicate to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, the comrade tells me that she was a communist, an ANC figure.

MR LEVINE: Yes. It was your feeling before that time and during that time?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not see it at that stage, I only see it today for the first time.

MR LEVINE: But that correlates with your feelings as it were during that time?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Could I ask you to answer only yes or no or the machine won't be able to pick it up.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Thank you. I would like to refer now to Ruth Slovo, Exhibit L and page then to page 68. Just bear with me one moment please Mr Chairman.

Could you just turn back to page 67, in the middle of the page. Can you see that paragraph:

"one probably does not deserve the privilege of writing a little tribute to comrade Ruth First, particularly when one considers the fact that we who joined the African National Congress only after the 1976 Soweto Uprising, are actually decades away from really knowing her. Her colleagues are our present leaders. When she together with Nelson Mandela, Lilly Nkoyi, Oliver Tambo, Moses Mabindla and others, were active in the campaign of the 1950's, most of us were not even born yet. Comrade Ruth however, and this will certainly come as a shock to those enemies of the ANC and the SACP whose propaganda seeks in vain to show that the ANC is led by white communists, was at one time a member of an ANC Unit in Mozambique of which I was the Chairman."

What was your perception of Ruth Slovo?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I did not have a lot of contact or dealings with these people. I was more involved in the physical prevention of terrorism within the Republic of South Africa and that came across my desk in the form of documents. I read that and that went or passed.

In other words I cannot say anything with authority about these people.

MR LEVINE: Could you please go to Exhibit M, page 107. ADV DE JAGER: Exhibit N or M?

MR VISSER: Can we just see what the document looks like?

MR LEVINE: Certainly. Do you know where those pages come from?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, these are extracts from the terrorism documents.

MR LEVINE: And Ruth Slovo appears there in that index?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: With the number?

BRIG SCHOON: ST69.

MR LEVINE: Thank you. Then in conclusion concerning documents, let's look at Exhibit KK. Do you have that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Please look at the third last paragraph of the first page.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: It begins with

"I am certain that I speak on behalf of"

Do you see that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Then there are various names there, Oliver Tambo, Moses Kotani, Joseph Dadu, JB Marx, Lilian Ngoi, Florence Mposha, Kata Molale, Alex Leguma, Helen Joseph, Joe Slovo, Braam Fischer, Moses Mabida. What is your knowledge concerning these people mentioned here who were in alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: These were all senior members of the ANC/SACP.

MR LEVINE: The last name that was mentioned there?

BRIG SCHOON: That was Ruth First.

MR LEVINE: In other words she also falls in this category?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, she is mentioned with these other names.

MR LEVINE: What was your perception concerning the viewpoint of the views of the 1970 and 1980's, was there a war waging within the Republic and outside of the Republic?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that was my perception that there was a war, it was undeclared and it was between the Security Forces of the Republic of South Africa and the ANC/SACP alliance.

MR LEVINE: I think you were there when at previous sittings video recordings were shown?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was present.

MR LEVINE: What was shown on those video's was that the perception that you had of the war, was accurately confirmed?

BRIG SCHOON: Certain parts of it yes, I would say.

MR LEVINE: The violence and what was going on?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: It was alleged by my learned friend that Ruth First was only an academic up until the date of her death. Do you agree with that, or would you say or was she considered as a important member of the ANC/SACP alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: According to us or as far as we were concerned, she was still a member. If she was active or not, that I cannot testify about.

MR LEVINE: You said that we considered, is we the Security Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: It was also alleged that the Schoon couple went from Botswana to Lubango, they were transferred because of the fact that they were targets when they were in Botswana. Can you remember that?

BRIG SCHOON: That is possible yes, but personally I do not know about that, except for the one time when I was involved.

MR LEVINE: Were they also during the death of Jeanette Schoon and unfortunately the daughter, as the Security Forces considered them, prominent members of the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LEVINE

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, you would agree with me that it is not easy to kill a person?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I agree.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it was also not easy for you to give the instruction that Coetzee must act against the Schoon's?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were certainly relieved because this attempt failed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is what I said earlier on.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that is the reason why you were relieved?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now when you gave this instruction to him to act against the Schoon's, did you believe that your instruction was to act against Marius?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you believe that in the circumstances, that it was fair at the time when you gave the instruction?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was convinced.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that was based on the information that was available to you at that stage concerning them?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You testified about what they did and what they were involved in?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Anybody else in the Security Forces, if they decided to act against Marius Schoon, then you would not have a problem with such actions?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I would not like to be part of that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you then accept that Mr Schoon can be considered or was considered by the Security Force as a valid target?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. I do not doubt that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then you testified that at one stage you said that you thought again about this issue, and you realised that you acted wrongly. Was it now recently with the beginning of the TRC?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, no. It already happened then when the attempt failed, then I felt relieved that it did not succeed.

MR DU PLESSIS: When you testified, did you intend to refer to the fact that you were glad that murder was not committed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You did not intend to say that you were wrong and that it was not a valid purpose or goal?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I was convinced that it was the right thing and maybe valid, but I felt that it is not my style. I would not like to see him dead because of a decision that I made.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words what you are saying is that you would not give the instruction again?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: But if someone else gave the instruction later on, you would not have a problem with that?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I would not have a problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you think that it was wrong to kill someone, because it was murder?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I do know that. I did not feel good about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, you do concede that it was a war situation as you testified, and that is why if I understand you correctly, your testimony is that if it was done by the Security Forces, you would have considered it as a valid action within a war situation?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. Various other incidents occurred where I had to agree with or live with.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that is something that occurs in a war situation?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is true.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you would not under normal circumstances kill someone just for your own gain, for money or something like that?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, I then accept that in the circumstances, or from your perspective, you do not have a problem with the motive in which Mr Williamson acted?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I do not.

MR DU PLESSIS: You understand the motive?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you do agree with that, that he did it from a political point in the struggle against the ANC/SACP alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I agree with that.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you then also agree that from your perspective at that stage, and his perspective, that coincided or that they were the same?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, we will probably hear a different version from Mr Schoon and we also heard a different version from Maharaj, but his evidence is not complete yet, about the Schoon's involvement concerning the struggle. I refer specifically to your evidence that you were under the impression that they helped terrorists but I got the idea that Maharaj do not necessarily agree with it, but we will still ask him that in cross-examination, but can I just ask you this, that which you testified about, was that within your perception and what you understood, occurred?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: That would also have been the subjective perception of other members of the Security Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: If that had been the perception of Mr Williamson, you would not have questioned that?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: You were questioned about SACTU. SACTU was involved in the entire Trade Union scenario in South Africa during that time, that was in the mid 1980's and the early 1980's, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No, much earlier than that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Earlier than that, so towards the 1970's then?

BRIG SCHOON: No, even before that still?

MR DU PLESSIS: Would it have been before that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, during the 1960's SACTU was already very, very active.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did SACTU associate themselves completely with the ANC and the struggle?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't believe that they openly acknowledged it. They shared the same objectives as the ANC.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, if the Schoon's had acted to the advantage of SACTU, would you have regarded such actions as contributing to the struggle of the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, definitely.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then just for the clarity of the Committee, in 1985 Gaberone attack, my information if it is correct, says that it was a day before the conference of the ANC and it was actually aimed at disrupting this conference which was due to take place. Do you know anything about that?

BRIG SCHOON: Not that I can recall at this very moment.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen, on behalf of implicated party Mr Dirk Coetzee and the applicant in another hearing.

Brigadier, please excuse me if I sound a little sceptical regarding certain aspects of your evidence, but I am sure that you will agree with me that you are a person who has told lies under oath at several instances in your life?

BRIG SCHOON: That I have told lies under oath?

MR JANSEN: Yes. I don't think that that should be under dispute any further.

BRIG SCHOON: Such as when?

MR JANSEN: Are you denying this?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I deny that.

MR JANSEN: So in other words, you did not lie to the McNally Commission, you did not lie to the Harms Commission, you were not part of the misleading component of the Goldstone Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: I testified before the Harms Commission and there I told the truth. I made a statement to Mr McNally and to him I also told the truth. With regard to the Goldstone Commission, I never appeared before that body and if you are implying that the lies which Mr Coetzee told about me, are the issue at hand here, then my advice to you would be to question your client somewhat better.

MR JANSEN: I am rather surprised by your response, but we can investigate that a little further later on.

At least you have not admitted to any offences or crimes before the McNally Commission or before the Harms Commission for that matter?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR JANSEN: And now in your amnesty applications, you admit and I think that it is somewhere in the environment of 18 incidents that you were involved with?

BRIG SCHOON: I think it is 17. One is a duplicate.

MR JANSEN: If you didn't lie to the Harms Commission, can we then at least assume that you stated things on a very technical level, like Mr Bill Clinton did?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the most for which I am applying is with regard to cross-border operations and the Harms Commission did not have anything to do with that.

Other incidents were not at all mentioned, and I was not questioned regarding that. Those are incidents which I am mentioning in my amnesty applications now.

MR JANSEN: Very well, let's get to the facts. What do you think today if you would say in retrospect, would have made Captain Dirk Coetzee feel that he had the freedom to go to you and make a suggestion that someone in Botswana should be murdered?

BRIG SCHOON: At that stage Chairperson, there was no reason for him to make these allegations. If I could just inform the Committee somewhat, they might have a better understanding of this issue.

Before Mr Dirk Coetzee left the country in 1989, as a final cry for help, he went to Brigadier Jan du Preez, to canvass his cause with him, because he was a confidant of Brigadier Jan du Preez, and I believe that they decided there and then to ascribe these deeds regarding which he had confessed to the Vrye Weekblad and other agents, and he protected Du Preez and made me the scapegoat.

MR JANSEN: You have now told a story which has absolutely nothing to do with my question, but nonetheless that in itself is of course completely untrue because when he spoke to Du Preez, he was not with the Vrye Weekblad yet.

I must just hasten to add that today's gathering is not the forum at which to discuss this issue, but my question is why would Dirk Coetzee have thought in 1981 that there was any chance that you would listen favourably to this story, because this was a very serious crime which he was suggesting?

BRIG SCHOON: Coetzee knew that we were acting against the enemy and he was free to come to me with such suggestions.

MR JANSEN: That is correct, he knew that the Security Police was using illegal methods in acting against the enemy and he also knew that a person as senior as yourself, who fell directly below the Head of Security, would be aware of this as well, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that may be so. I can't think for him.

MR JANSEN: In very broad terms, I would like to discuss some of the other incidents. You will agree with me that apart from this incident and the differences in versions regarding this incident, regarding all the other incidents, there are also reasonably wide differences.

It is either unknown from your side, or it is a completely different version, would that be a fair summation?

BRIG SCHOON: What are you talking about?

MR JANSEN: I am talking about Dirk Coetzee's amnesty application and your amnesty application.

BRIG SCHOON: Well, I only read his amnesty application with regard to the attempt on Marius Schoon's life, I did not read any of his other applications.

MR JANSEN: Did you ever hear what his version was with regard to other incidents with which he is involving you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: It was discussed with you by your attorney and he appeared at Mr Coetzee's amnesty hearing in Johannesburg, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: That document which was submitted there, I would like to put this on record, you would agree with me that in your evidence, this was done under oath. Would you agree with me that this was not taken under oath, this was a letter from the attorney in which he stated what his instructions were?

BRIG SCHOON: I think I actually made an affidavit, didn't I?

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, maybe our learned friend Mr Visser, can help me, it is just that I hadn't made copies of this, because I never expected that that Annexure O to the Johannesburg hearings, would be stated as being under oath.

I mean the document on its face, is not under oath. Nothing serious, there is nothing serious on the point, it is just something that I want straightened.

CHAIRPERSON: Annexure O is a statement by his attorney, not by Brigadier Schoon. The first paragraph reads, I appear herein on behalf of Brigadier W.F. Schoon and it goes on and gives the name of the attorney.

It is not under oath.

MR VISSER: If I may Mr Chairman, my attorney informs me, I wasn't involved at the time, but my attorney informs me that the confusion may arise from the fact that Mr Schoon later made an affidavit in which he referred to this particular letter by the attorney and wherein he confirms the correctness of that.

That is a different document.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not a letter, it is a statement.

MR VISSER: Or a statement, yes. But the affidavit I think, that Brigadier Schoon is referring to, came later Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: I think at the stage, it was at the beginning of the hearings and the question was whether they should appear or not appear or whether they could make a statement saying we are denying, we are not opposing, but we are denying certain facts, and leave it at that but to put on record that you don't agree with what the other party said.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. I would like to point out an example purely as illustration for my point. One of the incidents which you deny with regard to Mr Dirk Coetzee is that, or you deny it on this basis, he says that you gave him money for the sale of a certain kombi and you say that he told you that it was a private transaction between him and Brigadier Van Rensburg?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson, I don't believe that I ever said anything like that.

MR JANSEN: Or you assumed then?

BRIG SCHOON: I assumed that it was a private transaction because he came to me and said here is an envelope with money inside and this is for Van Rensburg and if he were to come there, I was to give him the envelope and I locked the envelope up in my cupboard and kept it there for a while.

I didn't know what money it was, where it came from or what it was for.

MR JANSEN: Can you think of any reason why Brigadier Coetzee who was prepared to discuss a murder with you, would not be prepared to discuss a less serious offence?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, he was free to do what he wanted.

MR JANSEN: Dirk Coetzee's version is that he didn't know who Marius Schoon was until he was informed regarding the fact that there was an operation of which he would be part, and that this operation was to murder Marius Schoon, would you comment on that, can you deny this?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know anything about it.

MR JANSEN: Would you then agree with me that Dirk Coetzee never really worked as a person who gathered Intelligence, he was an operative from the beginning to the end of his work in the Security Police?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, to be an operative included the gathering of Intelligence.

MR JANSEN: Very well, but Mr Coetzee maintains that apart from a short while in Middelburg, he never worked with files. Can you deny that?

BRIG SCHOON: I deny that.

MR JANSEN: Firstly, wouldn't it be correct that the persons who had a special interest in Marius Schoon, would have been Group or Division A of Security Head Office?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. The various racial groups were divided into different sections and Group A for example, dealt with whites.

Anything that had anything to do with whites, went to Group A.

MR JANSEN: Well, whatever the logic of that was, Dirk Coetzee said this in his manuscript in 1989 already, that for some or other reason there was this distinction white operatives of the ANC, Division A, black operatives Division C, along with the Regional Commanders. Is that a correct statement on Dirk Coetzee's behalf?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I can't agree with that.

MR JANSEN: Is it correct that Western Transvaal, that would be the Zeerust people of the Security Police, would have had an acute interest in what was happening in Botswana and who was active there?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: That would have been Rudi Crause and that would involve him in the interest and activities carried out by Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I would assume that.

MR JANSEN: And we also know from evidence of the well know figure, Joe Mamasela, who worked very closely together with Jan Coetzee in Krugersdorp, are you aware of that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Joe Mamasela is probably the askari or the person who had the closest knowledge of the individuals and the structures within Botswana, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Well, doesn't it sound highly possible to you that that which Dirk Coetzee says in his evidence and in his manuscript, you say to him report to Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee in Zeerust. There is going to be an operation to kill Marius Schoon.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, no. Jan Coetzee was stationed at Krugersdorp, he was not stationed at Zeerust.

MR JANSEN: In your own evidence you said that you were fully aware of the dangers connected to such an operation?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: What did you ask Dirk Coetzee, didn't you ask him what he was planning, with who he was planning, when he would carry out the exercise, from where he was gathering his operational Intelligence?

BRIG SCHOON: If I remember correctly, he would have used Joe Mamasela and Joe Mamasela would then be the person who would ultimately have been confronted in Botswana by the ANC.

MR JANSEN: You see, as your evidence progresses, we are getting closer and closer to the truth, because Mr Coetzee maintains that at a certain stage, he remembered that there was talk of a person who was stopped in Botswana when an attempt was made on Marius Schoon's life, and his recollection is that this was something in which Joe Mamasela and Jan Coetzee had been involved.

Let me put it to you this way, is it possible that you are confusing that incident with the one in which Dirk Coetzee was involved?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR JANSEN: Are you saying that there could be no chance of such confusion?

BRIG SCHOON: I still asked him for a report regarding the revolver which was lost, so that I could submit this to Colonel Louis Koekemoer in order to give account of the weapon which had gone missing and he did prepare such a statement for me.

MR JANSEN: It is also denied by Mr Coetzee. Do you know the stories which Mr Coetzee told regarding the various weapons which he had on himself and in his vehicle?

BRIG SCHOON: I never saw any weapons on his vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, what happened to this weapon which got lost? He wrote a letter?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson, he had to submit a report to me to explain under which circumstances the weapon had gone missing, because we had to account for that weapon.

CHAIRPERSON: To whom?

BRIG SCHOON: To Colonel Koekemoer who was the person in control of the Secret Fund's property.

CHAIRPERSON: So there would be a record of that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel Koekemoer? Would that report say that Mr Coetzee had lost it?

BRIG SCHOON: There would be a report in which he would stipulate under which circumstances the weapon had gone missing. In other words, if it had been Joe Mamasela, that the weapon was issued to him, that he went to Botswana and that it was removed or confiscated from him there.

MR JANSEN: You see, there is another problem and I think it might just be your memory which isn't all that good, because Joe Mamasela had a problem in physically carrying out that component of the operation which involved an action in Botswana, such an assassination, because he had already been exposed as an agent in Botswana.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, as far as I recall, he still visited Botswana and he still brought information back.

MR JANSEN: Yes, he brought a lot of information. We know that he was involved in the Joyce Mpale incident in Botswana at night. He provided a lot of operational Intelligence.

My question to you is this, isn't it probable with regard to the fact that you were concerned regarding the dangers inherent to this operation, that you would put detailed operational questions to Dirk Coetzee regarding this operation?

BRIG SCHOON: He assured me that he had a person who was competent to carry out this operation and that all that he needed was a weapon, and I agreed with him then.

MR JANSEN: Well, if you will just comment regarding this aspect, because this is something which I am definitely going to argue. One thing that Mr Coetzee didn't need to ask anybody else for, was a firearm.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that is the request which he gave to me, I don't know.

MR JANSEN: Was it custom to keep thorough account of these clandestine weapons?

BRIG SCHOON: I received six of those weapons and during my nine years at Head Office, I used two and I had to account for either one or both of them.

MR JANSEN: During those nine years, a massive arsenal was systematically built up at Vlakplaas, so much so that one could have started a mini war from there. Was any account ever given regarding those weapons?

BRIG SCHOON: As far as I know, record was kept of those weapons.

MR JANSEN: Well, I think that the evidence of other persons such as Eugene de Kock, differs from yours regarding that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, is that a fair question or a statement, he was never asked about that as far as we know. When - could my learned friend just point us to the evidence of Mr Eugene de Kock where he said that no record was kept of explosives at Vlakplaas, because we are not aware of that?

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, the witness can comment on the statement I made. I said as far as I know is the evidence of Mr De Kock.

ADV DE JAGER: But I think really if you put it to him that another person said something as far as you know, please make sure that that person did in fact say that otherwise I think it borders to an unfair statement towards the witness.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect, we are living some seven, eight years after incidents that started off with truck loads of arms being smuggled away from Vlakplaas for purposes of the Harms Commission. Everybody knows about it, Brigadier Schoon knows about that.

The only possible reason that could have been is because there was never any record. That was just simply weapons used for clandestine operations, but I accept, I cannot make such a positive statement, and I don't think it is proper to even call it ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: If I recall correct, De Kock said that weapons from Vlakplaas were taken to Krugersdorp or somewhere for that video at a stage, so I think that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Not only that, but it was the arsenal held at Vlakplaas, but when the Harms Commission started, it started off with a visit to Vlakplaas and all those weapons had to be removed from the farm and the obvious reason was because there wasn't record of that.

That is why, I don't think it is in the context an unreasonable statement, but I won't pursue that line any further Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: In 1989 I might just add, Brigadier Schoon was already on pension Mr Chairman, but be that as it may.

MR JANSEN: Just to finish off, you were aware of all the weapons, the East Block weapons which were kept at Vlakplaas?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was aware of it.

MR JANSEN: Thank you. You would also not dispute the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon's representatives that information was given by British Intelligence which warned that there would be an attempt on his life, or that this was being planned?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot deny that.

MR JANSEN: Would you agree with me then that if it had been an askari or a member of C who had conveyed that information, then it probably would have gone to the ANC, because they were formed ANC members, and some of them also, most probably, double agents.

Would you agree with me that the source of that information, it is highly improbable that this would have been an askari who was stationed at Vlakplaas?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't comment on that.

MR JANSEN: Can you think in any way where the British would have received their information from that the Security Police, or that the South African Forces at least, were planning to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't respond to that.

MR JANSEN: You probably also wouldn't be able to respond with regard to who definitely conveyed that information, but would you at least agree with me regarding the probabilities that the information would have meant or indicated that it was the Security Police who were trying to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't comment on that.

MR JANSEN: So you are not prepared to comment on that?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't comment on that.

MR JANSEN: Would you comment on the statement of the probabilities?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR JANSEN: That it was information which came from police Headquarters, from another source than C?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't comment on that.

MR JANSEN: You see, you would agree with me, or what I find strange in the context of all these incidents together, is that you and other Section Heads, such as Brigadier Jan du Preez who was Gen Johan Coetzee's second in command, were all involved in serious incidents but that for a period of three years, Gen Johan Coetzee knew nothing about it and for a further period as Commissioner, he still knew nothing about it.

Don't you find it strange?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it does appear rather strange.

MR JANSEN: Yes, because just as Captain Dirk Coetzee could make that assumption that he could discuss a murder with you, so also everybody knew who had spent 20 to 30 years in that Security culture, that every person to a lesser or greater degree, knew about these activities, would you agree with me?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: And if somebody didn't know about it, it was because that person preferred not to answer or ask uncomfortable questions, or that he didn't know anything about it genuinely?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: The information that you have about these .38 revolvers, that was at Koekemoer as Head of the Security Police or the Commissioner of Police, to look at it whenever they wanted to?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it was open for auditing, for inspection.

MR JANSEN: Vlakplaas was also there open for any inspection when anybody wanted to?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: In your testimony you say that you realised that after this incident, after you thought about it, that you made a mistake?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, I will not say that I made a mistake Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: That is what you said?

BRIG SCHOON: I realised that it is not in my nature, I do not like it.

MR JANSEN: Brigadier Schoon, surely one would not like it, but it was not the first time that you would kill or it would not be the last time, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I never killed.

MR JANSEN: You only told other people to kill?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not do that either, except in one instance.

MR JANSEN: You were not part of operations or plannings where people were killed, is that what you are saying?

BRIG SCHOON: No, there I was involved, yes.

MR JANSEN: We are aware of the various evidence of amongst others, Mr Coetzee, that where it got to the killing itself, it was not very nice, then you got other people to do it.

The point that I would like to make Brigadier, did your answer in any instance, did it mean that you thought that it is something that is not part of Security Police work?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not understand.

MR JANSEN: Let me ask that from a different point. You did not have the authorisation from your superiors to get permission and instruction that they must go ahead with the elimination of Mr Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not.

MR JANSEN: Gen Coetzee's evidence, or you heard the evidence of Gen Coetzee, and he was well known amongst his people according to him, and there could not have been an illusion that he was not part of anything illegal, did you hear that evidence?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I did.

MR JANSEN: Do you agree with that?

BRIG SCHOON: I have to agree with that.

MR JANSEN: Why do you have to agree with that?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I cannot deny it.

MR JANSEN: I am asking you what was your perception, if you went to him with an operation like this, would he then say that you must be arrested?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, it was news when he said that it was against his nature.

MR JANSEN: Brigadier Schoon, it was for all of us news, it was surprising news, but what is strange to me now is that you have to agree. You can just say to us it was news to you and you did not understand it in that way.

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, if you give permission to go and eliminate someone across the border, then it does not really matter if it is a white person or a black person, you gave the permission to take the life of a living being.

In many instances, where permission was given to eliminate people, where those who planned it sat around a table and where the Defence Force was sent in to kill people, and that is why I think it is strange to say I would agree that ABC must be shot and killed in Botswana and that number X, because he is there and he has a white skin, I do not agree with that.

MR JANSEN: You see, except for the instructions or definite instructions that you have received, Gen Johan Coetzee and if you have to accept his evidence, it also means then that you did not have grounds for the fact that you thought that you had authorisation for what you did?

BRIG SCHOON: No, for example the incident that was mentioned here where we reported to him about the operation in Swaziland, where three people were killed, he did not ask difficult questions.

MR JANSEN: He did not have a team of CID's, he did not put them on. In other words he did not know and he wanted not to know.

BRIG SCHOON: That is what you said.

MR JANSEN: We will argue that later. Sorry Mr Chairman, I noticed it is seven minutes past eleven already.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you like to take the adjournment?

MR JANSEN: Yes, I would like to have a look at a few notes, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the short adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: (continued) I am instructed Mr Chairman, that two affidavits have been placed before you, both relating to this witness. I submit they should be marked UU.

CHAIRPERSON: UU1 and UU2.

MR JANSEN: Chronologically the short one follows first.

CHAIRPERSON: Then that should be UU1.

MR JANSEN: Yes, and the next one was Exhibit B144 in the Harms Commission, that was the second affidavit.

Brigadier, can you please look at the affidavit UU1. Do you recognise this document?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: That is the affidavit that you made for Advocate McNally?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: I will read in the half of it, "I deny that I have got any knowledge of any member who served under me, was involved in any assassinations, murders within the borders of the Republic of South Africa or outside."

That is not the truth?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: What I am saying now, what is standing here, is not true? In other words you did lie to Adv McNally?

BRIG SCHOON: In this regard, yes.

MR JANSEN: In this regard, this paragraph, this small little paragraph?

BRIG SCHOON: No, the paragraph.

MR JANSEN: In other words when you told this Commission that you did not lie to McNally you told a lie to this Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: In other words, you are still telling lies?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Not?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR JANSEN: I would not like to get into an argument about what the definition of a lie is, because apparently you do not know what the difference is.

Please look at UU2, paragraph 5 on the second page. Just for the record, this is your affidavit that you submitted to the Harms Commission, an investigation?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Paragraph 5, as previously mentioned

"I have no knowledge of the murder on the attorney Mxenge in Durban, during 1981. My knowledge regarding this incident, is what I read in the newspapers and what I heard from people orally since then."

It is correct that you knew that Mxenge was murdered by the Security Police?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, after that I heard about it.

MR JANSEN: Yes, you are now applying for amnesty for this?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: In other words this is also a lie to the Harms Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: In other words when you earlier on told this Commission that you did not tell lies to the Harms Commission, you then also told a lie?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: At the bottom of page 3 of this document, paragraph 7 starts with that you have no knowledge of the alleged theft of this white kombi, but in the last two lines of page 7 you say, or four lines, that

"The alleged money from the kombi was kept at Security office and was then sent to Colonel Erasmus to Lady Grey where it was handed over to Brigadier Nick van Rensburg - any other suggestion that I was involved or had knowledge of that incident"

Can you see that there?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: And since then, you said that you still deny that you had any knowledge of this incident, but you said that you could remember the money?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I remember that this money was handed over to me in an envelope.

MR JANSEN: So in other words by not saying to the Harms Commission that you remembered the money, you were trying to mislead the Harms Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: No, at that stage, I could not bring the theft of the kombi and the money together.

MR JANSEN: In other words, only later on did you remember this?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: You see, let me tell you what the truth is. You did not want to admit that at that stage, because you did not want to implicate Nick van Rensburg by something that is suspicious, you wanted to make a complete denial.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not know Nick van Rensburg at all.

MR JANSEN: No my statement to you is the reason you are still trying to run away from the truth. You did remember it at that stage, or at least in your version you did.

You just could not say that there was that money or that money was there, because that would involve Van Rensburg and that would create cross-examination material for the Harms Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairman, I did not know Van Rensburg at that stage and I did have no reason to try and protect him.

MR JANSEN: In other words this allegation that was made about the money, you just forgot about this, that you knew about this money and that it was a private transaction?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is true.

MR JANSEN: In paragraph 17 of this statement, page 8, that general statement that I read, the affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Coetzee and the explanation that he gave of the workings of Vlakplaas Unit is correct and is still the same. I also refer in this instance that that was handed out, and it was attached as Appendix WFS1 and that is also a positive misleading to the Harms Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: You say this is not misleading? They would not be interested in all the clandestine weapons, all the covert operations, it was just like that Appendix say, the identification of insurgents?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not try to cover anything up.

MR JANSEN: Brigadier Schoon, I would like to put it to you that your answer is not satisfactory. Do you want to comment?

BRIG SCHOON: No, no comment.

MR JANSEN: I would like to come back to a question that I asked you earlier on that you did not answer.

Did you ask Dirk Coetzee details about operational activities in his plan to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not.

MR JANSEN: Well, if you were so concerned then, why not?

BRIG SCHOON: I had no reason, I saw no reason to ask him about that. I accepted that he came to me with a plan well thought through.

MR JANSEN: You see, you were also one of the individuals who still make the allegations that Dirk Coetzee in the Joe Pillay case, acted outside of the instructions that were given to him and on his own initiative, took out the person there and that you were all very disappointed in him.

Am I summarising this correctly?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, his instruction was to gather information and with that information then, go to Head Office after which it will then be evaluated and then further steps would then be taken. They thought that if they could then abduct the first person that they meet there, and bring back to the Republic.

MR JANSEN: That is now January 1981 and he does this thing without thinking and he then abducts a prominent ANC member.

BRIG SCHOON: He was not a prominent member Mr Chairperson, he was wrongly recognised, or they abducted him and they thought it was the brother of this person.

MR JANSEN: The point that I would like to make Brigadier Schoon is that you are still allege, you and Johan Coetzee, that you were really shocked about Coetzee's action during the Pillay incident and you were disappointed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: And that is - I would just like to make sure - this is still your version?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot change the feeling I had then, now.

MR JANSEN: No, although I would like to find out, when you told that story for the first time, that you were not lying?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I wasn't.

MR JANSEN: In other words this is one aspect that you told the truth about in 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Is that what you are saying?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, there were other incidents as well.

MR JANSEN: Maybe, but let us keep to the one aspect. That was the truth according to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: What would make you think Coetzee this time, had a plan that he thought about for a long time, and you can now trust him with your operational problems, while he goes and kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, that was a chance I had to take.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but you wouldn't like to enlarge this chance by asking a few logical questions for example Dirk, do you know where Marius Schoon is?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I assumed or accepted that he knew all these things before he came to me.

MR JANSEN: Why did you accept this, he is then this renegade person who does anything, or he does things on his own?

BRIG SCHOON: I accepted it Mr Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: You see, your evidence does not make sense. The point is, I would put it to you that a person in your position, would at least have said let us look over the facts in Section A, find out what they know about Schoon, let us go to the Western Transvaal, find out about the operational activities or let's go further, or on your knowledge or on Mr Coetzee's, let us go and find out how Joe Mamasela can help us.

What is your comment on that?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, after he came to me with the suggestion, I took Marius Schoon's file to ascertain what his activities were and on those grounds, I decided that it would be worthwhile to try.

MR JANSEN: Brigadier, you are not answering my question. You knew that the information in that file, you primarily presented in order to legitimise him as a target, that was only one part of the operation.

BRIG SCHOON: The other part is operational information, fresh information, where is this person now, where would you find him, or where can you intercept him.

MR JANSEN: Well, where would Dirk Coetzee then get his operational information from?

BRIG SCHOON: From the people, and I would say from the people there, I would say it was Joe Mamasela.

MR JANSEN: You cannot remember earlier on you could not remember who this black person was?

BRIG SCHOON: I was never sure, I said I thought that he would be the person.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he that person?

BRIG SCHOON: I presume so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you ask?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: When Coetzee said that he was attacked, that the pistol, didn't you ask him who was it?

BRIG SCHOON: Afterwards reports were written and out of them, it became clear.

CHAIRPERSON: But didn't you ask Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I asked him and he gave me a report and he said how this weapon got lost.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you ask him who the person was that went there when he caught this ANC member?

BRIG SCHOON: It was only afterwards, after he returned, then he told me it was Joe Mamasela.

MR JANSEN: You are also aware of Dirk Coetzee's version where he says that this operation was stopped under these circumstances because Jan Coetzee came in and said that it is cancelled by Gen Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know anything about that.

MR JANSEN: I would like to put it to you that the operational requirements of an operation like this, the fact that different Units would be involved, that this instruction did or that the probabilities would be coordinated at a very high level. Have you got any comment on this?

BRIG SCHOON: Is this the operation where I was involved in or was this another operation?

MR JANSEN: An operation during 1981.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not care about what the operation was.

MR JANSEN: Any operation would have these requirements or characteristics?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that may be so.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius on behalf of McPherson. Following the thorough cross-examination by my esteemed colleague, Mr Jansen, I don't have any questions, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Chairperson, despite the thorough cross-examination by my learned friend, Mr Jansen, I do have some questions.

Brigadier Schoon, Berger, Brigadier Schoon, is it correct that the order to kill Marius Schoon, came from Gen Johan Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that the plan to kill Marius Schoon was a covert operation?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that all authorisation for covert operations, came from a level above you?

BRIG SCHOON: In most instances, yes.

MR BERGER: Let me read to you what you said at the Armed Forces Hearings, page 163, the top of the page.

"MR JANSEN: What were the rules for covert operations,

where would authorisation come from?

BRIG SCHOON: Authorisation had to come from

Headquarters.

MR JANSEN: Would that involve you?

BRIG SCHOON: It had to come through me.

MR JANSEN: Would you use your discretion whether you would approve it yourself or would you consult your superiors?

BRIG SCHOON: As a general rule, I got clearance from the next senior person or from the Commanding Officer.

MR JANSEN: That would be the Head of the Security Branch itself?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so."

Did you say that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I did say it.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger, is that an Exhibit, already an Exhibit with us in this case or was it handed in previously? I know it was handed in previously, where you are quoting from?

MR BERGER: No, Commissioner De Jager, it is not an Exhibit in this case.

ADV DE JAGER: Not an Exhibit in this case, okay.

MR BERGER: You said that at the Armed Forces Hearings, and was that the truth Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that was but there are always the exceptions on the rule.

MR BERGER: Your answer was authorisation had to come from Headquarters. In connection with, I see it is in front of you, in connection with the plan to kill Mr Marius Schoon, was there authorisation which had come from Headquarters?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I took it upon myself to give those instructions myself.

MR BERGER: Your next sentence was it had to come through me.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: In this case, you are saying the order didn't come through you, it emanated from you?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: At that time, you had no recent information about Mr Marius Schoon, did you?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, except for the information that I saw in his file, yes, that was all that I made.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on) Arranging meetings with him, getting information with him, you didn't bother to find out. You just let Coetzee go ahead?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, you say in your statement that you were reading from this morning, paragraph 47 on page 13, I did not come to this conclusion very easily but first considered this for a day or two.

I was aware of the dangers of this project in case things go wrong. Even so, the high profile of Marius Schoon and the threat that he had for the safety of the Republic and the internal safety of the Republic, I in conclusion, decided that I will follow Captain Coetzee's suggestion.

You thought about this for two days before you gave the order to Mr Dirk Coetzee, to go ahead and kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson. I first studied the file and after that, I had to seek ammunition for the revolver because I didn't have any ammunition in supply.

MR BERGER: Your office at Headquarters was very close to that of Gen Coetzee's, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: On the same floor?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, approximately 30 metres from each other.

MR BERGER: There also had to be authorisation for the gun that was to be used, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No, the firearms were in my possession, and I could use it as I saw fit.

MR BERGER: It was in your possession to be used for covert operations?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not necessarily for that. Precisely for what the firearms were purchased, is unknown to me, but I inherited it from my predecessor and simply assumed that it was to be utilised for covert actions.

MR BERGER: What were you doing in possession of six unlicensed firearms? Brigadier Schoon, I apologise.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I took over from Colonel Victor and these firearms were in a cabinet which he handed over to me. What they were purchased for originally is unknown to me.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but probably for covert operations, because otherwise one would have used licensed firearms?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I thought so at that stage. For example, of those six, I used two.

The one I gave to the now deceased Brigadier Schoon, who told me that there was an informer who was working at a certain newspaper who felt threatened, and that he needed protection, and I gave him one of these firearms.

The other four, when I retired, I gave to Colonel De Kock because there was nobody else to whom I could give them.

MR BERGER: Why if you were so troubled about this plan to kill Marius Schoon, did you not consult your superiors?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know if they were there at that stage, because especially Gen Coetzee travelled much, and it was often that he would not be in his office.

Possibly I mentioned it to Brigadier Du Preez later, but I did not specifically approach him.

Chairperson, I thought that at that stage I was competent enough to deal with it.

MR BERGER: (microphone not on) did you not?

BRIG SCHOON: In the beginning, no. Later, yes.

MR BERGER: No, no, go back to paragraph 47 on page 13 of this document that you were reading from. You say nonetheless, I did not reach this conclusion very easily, but considered it first for a day or two.

To go ahead with the plan or not go ahead with the plan, and you weighed up in your mind what the possible pros and cons were, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: From the beginning I felt that we should go ahead with the plan. It seemed to me to be a very good plan initially.

MR BERGER: What were you thinking about for a day or two?

BRIG SCHOON: I had to consult the file first, and then after that, I had to obtain ammunition.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, please will you explain the first paragraph 47? Why was it not easy for you to come to the decision to kill Marius Schoon? What was the difficulty involved?

BRIG SCHOON: I had to determine whether or not it would be justifiable.

MR BERGER: And what was the difficulty?

BRIG SCHOON: To reach that decision.

MR BERGER: Right, so for two days you agonised over the decision to kill Marius Schoon, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And you were particularly concerned about what would happen if things went wrong, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And if things went wrong, you wanted to make sure that you wouldn't get into trouble, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No. I didn't believe that things would go wrong.

MR BERGER: The second sentence of paragraph 47 reads I was aware of the dangers which the project presented, especially if things were to go wrong.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: So you considered what would happen if things went array, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And you didn't want things to go array because then your job would be on the line, or not?

BRIG SCHOON: That is a possibility.

MR BERGER: Yes, it is a possibility which you thought about, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, I don't know if I thought about that.

MR BERGER: Why did you not consult your seniors because that was the usual position?

You say at page 163 of the Armed Forces Hearings, as a general rule, I got clearance from the next senior person, or from the Commanding Officer. Why did you not get clearance in this case?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I simply didn't do that. I didn't get it.

MR BERGER: My question to you Brigadier Schoon is, why not?

BRIG SCHOON: I didn't regard it as necessary.

MR BERGER: Why not?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I did not regard it as necessary.

MR BERGER: Why not?

BRIG SCHOON: I did not see the necessity of it.

MR BERGER: Why was this case different from all the other cases where you got clearance from the next senior person, or from the Commanding Officer?

BRIG SCHOON: Because this was the first one with which I took such a decision.

MR BERGER: This was the first case in which you decided to kill somebody or to have somebody killed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, on my own.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely, this must have been one of the most serious decisions you had ever been asked to make, to kill somebody?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you ask advice from your senior? No reply?

MR BERGER: What I want to put to you Brigadier Schoon, is that your inability to answer the question which has just been put to you, and your failure to apply to it, is because you are at this moment, protecting Gen Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: That is not so.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that there was a general perception within the Security Forces and the Security Police, that illegal acts were allowed if legal means were unworkable?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, one could put it that way, yes.

MR BERGER: Is it also correct that you acted as a conduit for orders coming from a higher level?

BRIG SCHOON: Sometimes, yes.

MR BERGER: You said that this was the first occasion that you had ever been involved in the death or potential death, of an ANC member? Is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: As far as I can recall, yes.

MR BERGER: Is it not correct that during July or August of 1972, you were involved in the death of two ANC members?

BRIG SCHOON: Could you please provide some more details regarding that?

MR BERGER: Yes. Does the name Alexander Mambaris ring a bell?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it does ring a bell.

MR BERGER: Do you remember the incident where two ANC members were killed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I think that that would be one of the cases for which I am applying for amnesty.

MR BERGER: Correct, and were you involved in that?

BRIG SCHOON: To a lesser degree, yes.

MR BERGER: You are applying for amnesty in respect of your involvement in the death of those two ANC members, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And that was in 1972?

BRIG SCHOON: Correct.

MR BERGER: And then in 1981, is it correct that you were involved in the murder of two PAC detainees?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: When was that in 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't recall what the date was.

MR BERGER: Was it before or after the plan to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I think it was afterwards.

MR BERGER: Why do you say that?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I don't believe that it was actually in 1981, I think it was during 1982.

MR BERGER: You have applied for amnesty for the murder of two PAC detainees in 1981, the Komatipoort incident.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I don't believe it was in Komatipoort. The facts, I think, are completely different. I could not determine who the person was who ultimately would have committed the deed.

I assumed or suspected that it was Colonel Cronje, but he assured me that it was not him. I don't know who the person was.

MR BERGER: What was your involvement there?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the person in command of detentions requested that I and the then Commander of Vlakplaas go to his and Colonel Broodryk's office.

There they then said that we were to take these two persons and get rid of them.

MR BERGER: And you participated in that, yes.

MR BERGER: We have also heard this morning that you are applying for amnesty in respect of the Mxenge murder in 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You are not saying that you participated in that murder, but you are saying that you received certain money at a later stage?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: How did you - and you linked Mr Dirk Coetzee to that murder, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is so.

MR BERGER: How did you link Mr Coetzee, Dirk Coetzee, to that murder?

BRIG SCHOON: A day after the murder, his direct commander, Colonel Roelf van Rensburg informed me that they were in Durban and that it was probably them who were responsible for the murder.

MR BERGER: You never heard it from Du Preez?

BRIG SCHOON: No, except for the money which was given to me.

MR BERGER: And the Du Preez that I am referring to, was the Du Preez, Gen Du Preez who was your senior?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Brigadier Du Preez.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Du Preez, I beg your pardon, the Deputy Head of the Security Police?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: So it was Van Rensburg who told you that Dirk Coetzee was involved?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, he drew the inference because he didn't know either.

MR BERGER: You were also involved in the 1981 kidnapping of Mr Joe Pillay from Swaziland?

BRIG SCHOON: After he had been abducted, I was involved in the handing back.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that you knew how Mr Joe Pillay had come to be in the custody of the police?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that you were party to a lie to the Courts as to how Mr Joe Pillay got to be in the custody of the police?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: Is it also correct that in 1982, this is February 1982, you were involved in the murder of three COSAS members in Krugersdorp?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I enquire what the purpose of this cross-examination about other incidents for which the Brigadier has applied for amnesty for, might be?

With respect Mr Chairman, and really the argument on credibility is just not going to suffice with respect. It is been consistently the rule of Committees of the Amnesty Committee, that where an applicant appears before it, the other amnesty applications which are not dealt with during that session of that amnesty application, do not fall within the scope of the investigation, and unless there should be a very good reason for referring to another amnesty application at the time, the other amnesty applications, do not fall to be considered when you consider a particular amnesty application.

We have had no authority in deciding Mr Chairman, what amnesty application should be placed. Certainly we would have preferred all the amnesty applications of a certain applicant to be placed. We understand that there are pragmatic reasons for that not to be able to be done, but Mr Chairman, with all due respect, it is grossly unfair to allow cross-examination of a witness in regard to other incidents, which are not on the table at the present.

CHAIRPERSON: He is not being cross-examined about the other incidents Mr Visser. He is asked, he has been asked whether he was involved in them, on the basis that he had earlier said this was the only incident that he was involved in.

I don't recollect any questions being asked about what happened in the other incidents, what part he played or anything of that nature.

MR VISSER: Can I give you an example Mr Chairman, he was asked, Brigadier Schoon was asked didn't you hear from Brigadier Jan du Preez that Mxenge was killed by Dirk Coetzee. That is exactly what we are talking about here Mr Chairman, it is going to create a completely wrong impression if one just allows that one question in isolation.

In his amnesty application, he says so but Mr Chairman, there are reasons for that, and we don't want to go into that side.

CHAIRPERSON: I agree, we don't want to go into details about what he did. I do not see that we should not know if he said something here that is not truthful, that can be shown by his having made applications for other events.

MR VISSER: Certainly, that is a different matter Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think you should ask any questions about the facts relating to events.

MR BERGER: I will do so Chairperson. I was dealing with the incident on the 15th of February 1982 in Krugersdorp where three COSAS members were killed. You were involved in that murder, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not relevant is it? I understood the purpose of this questions was to show that he was not being entirely frank when he said the first time he was involved, that this was the first time that he was involved in the potential death of an ANC member, that happened in 1982, afterwards.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, there is a dual purpose in my questions. It first relates to his answer that this was the first time that he had to think about the death of an ANC member.

The second is that during his cross-examination by my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis, Brigadier Schoon said that when the action failed, he was relieved because and this is the note that I have, I felt it was not my style of work and I am attempting to show what style of work, Brigadier Schoon was involved in.

Only by asking him have you made amnesty in respect, applied for amnesty in respect of a particular act? He can say yes or no, and I am not going to take it any further than that.

Might I continue Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Have you applied for amnesty in respect of that event?

BRIG SCHOON: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BERGER: You have also applied for amnesty in respect of the kidnapping from Lesotho of Mr Lemmy Boy Mbali in 1973, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Your participation in the 00-Hour hand grenades in 1986?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Your participation in the attack on an ANC house in Swaziland in December 1985, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: We know about your participation in the Cosatu House bomb and the Khotso House bomb, May 1987 and 1988 respectively, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Your participation and I need to just sketch the facts briefly, in an incident where Gen Johan Coetzee and Gen Mike Geldenhuys ordered you to stage a weapons discovery to provide justification for a large attack by the Army on Botswana, that was March 1988?

BRIG SCHOON: Gen Coetzee didn't have anything to do with that, he was already on pension at that stage.

That is also a point from which I have veered off once again, because my facts were not correct, it was Gen Kat Liebenberg who came with the request that we should establish a weapon stockpiling point.

MR BERGER: That was the incident where the arms cache was discovered and people were killed. "Discovered" and people were killed as a result, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: You were also involved in the attack on Swaziland on the 15th and 16th of December 1986 where people were killed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: You were involved in the June 1986 kidnapping of Msibi in Swaziland, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: You were involved in the death of three MK cadres in Mbabane, Swaziland, 14 to 16 December 1986?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that would be the same as the one which we discussed a moment ago, of the 15th to the 16th of December during which three were killed, it is a duplication.

MR BERGER: You were involved in the attack by the Army on an ANC transit facility in Gaberone in 1985?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: You were involved in the attack on MK cadres in Botswana in October 1986?

BRIG SCHOON: Correct.

MR BERGER: And finally you were involved in the death of two MK cadres, Nyanda and McFadden in Swaziland?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: All of these actions were authorised from above, from a level higher than you, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: The only action that was not authorised from above you say, is the plan to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Isn't that a little convenient Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, I wouldn't know if that is so, but those are the true facts. I don't know if you want me to lie.

I took that decision myself, and nobody else.

MR BERGER: Well, you have already lied, you don't have to stop now.

BRIG SCHOON: Well, that is correct. I don't see why I should lie any further.

MR BERGER: You also told a lie, is it not correct, when you said to the Committee that participation in a murder, was not your style? That was a lie, wasn't it?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I don't like that.

MR BERGER: But it was your style, am I right? To participate in the murder of ANC members?

BRIG SCHOON: I was coerced into participating into these operations, not out of my own free will.

MR BERGER: What did you mean when you said the plan to kill Marius Schoon, was not your style?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I am not a murderous type of person, despite what these applications before the Committee, would indicate.

MR BERGER: You would agree that your style tells a different story, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it may appear as such.

MR BERGER: How were you forced to participate in any of the murders for which you have applied for amnesty?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, in the course of events and circumstances. The circumstances which we had during that period of time, the undeclared state of war in which we were involved, necessitated one's participation in these operations, whether one wanted to do so or not.

MR BERGER: Are you saying you felt it was your duty?

BRIG SCHOON: It was definitely our duty, that is what I said this morning when we began.

MR BERGER: And so was the murder of Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: It could be seen like that.

MR BERGER: Did you express your reservations to anyone?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: And at no stage in your 26 year career as a Security Policeman, did you ever say to anybody I think what we are doing, is wrong?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not say it in so many words, but at various opportunities if people would come to me with suggestions, I would say no, I do not agree with that.

MR BERGER: Isn't it correct that when people came to you with suggestions for the killing of ANC members, there were instances where you discussed the matter with your superior, Brigadier Du Preez?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Got his approval, and then continued?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: But not in the case of Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: You know what Mr Dirk Coetzee says about his attempted, or his role in an attempt to murder Mr Marius Schoon. You know that his version differs completely from yours?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: You know that he says that one day you called him in and said that he should report to Captain Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee at Zeerust?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot remember that, no.

ADV DE JAGER: Dirk Coetzee?

MR BERGER: Mr Dirk Coetzee, yes. And you said to Mr Dirk Coetzee that the mission was to kill Marius Schoon. You told him that Marius Schoon was a white ANC member living in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you told him that Captains Crause and Jan Coetzee, would brief him on the mission in Zeerust?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: You say no, does that mean that never happened?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I never said that.

MR BERGER: But you know that these are the allegations that Mr Coetzee is making against you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I do know that.

MR BERGER: You also know that he says this is Dirk Coetzee, that he was ready to depart when you called him in to your office and he says that Brigadier Jan du Preez was there and he, Dirk Coetzee, was told that Gen Johan Coetzee, the Chief of Security, had called off the mission?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know anything about that.

MR BERGER: Well, you know that that - you say that never happened?

BRIG SCHOON: As far as I know, that did not happen, no.

MR BERGER: Well, does that mean it is possible that it did happen?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it did not happen.

MR BERGER: Didn't you say earlier today that you have no knowledge, you can't recall such an incident?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, did say that.

MR BERGER: Well, there is a difference between saying I can't recall it, and I know that it never happened. There is also a difference between saying to the best of my knowledge, I can't recall it, and I know it never happened.

Why are you not prepared to say I know it never happened?

BRIG SCHOON: As far as I know, it did not happen.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, if you wanted to protect Johan Coetzee, then this would be the ideal opportunity to say that Coetzee, when he heard it, just denied it or cancelled it?

BRIG SCHOON: Gen Coetzee did not know about this attempt and I've got no reason to protect him.

MR BERGER: Mr de Jager, I think it goes further than that, but I think I will leave it for argument.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, it is something that has been worrying us, and Mr De Jager's question has brought that matter very much to the fore.

It may yet, and we will argue it and I want to put it on record now, that there is a possible reason why this witness is constraint to implicate Gen Coetzee, because he shares with him an attorney and counsel Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Chairman, I suppose I must now reply.

CHAIRPERSON: He has merely put it on record, you can reply when we get to the argument stage.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, Mr Dirk Coetzee you have heard, denies that you gave him a .38 revolver and he says that for his mission, he was going to use a black briefcase that was fitted with a 9 mm machine pistol with a silencer. You have heard about that briefcase, I am sure?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I heard about that.

MR BERGER: What I want to ask you is this, on your evidence, everything in relation to this attempt on Marius Schoon's life took place in Pretoria, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson. The person who was sent, was in Botswana and that is where he was attacked.

MR BERGER: Yes, there was a plan in Pretoria and the attempted execution of the plan, was in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Now, Mr Dirk Coetzee talks about him being ordered by you to report to Captains Rudi Crause and Jan Coetzee at Zeerust. You say that never happened?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: At page 11 of your statement that you were reading from this morning, paragraph 37 you say the following

"In my presentation to the TRC on the 19th of November 1996, in this regard I said the following:"

And then there is a quote:

"conspiracy to murder Marius Schoon in October/November 1981 in Pretoria and Zeerust".

Now how does Zeerust feature in the conspiracy to murder Mr Marius Schoon on your version?

BRIG SCHOON: It was in his application that Zeerust was mentioned, not in mine.

MR BERGER: No, no, this is your evidence.

BRIG SCHOON: That was in answer to his allegation that this conspiracy took place in Pretoria and Zeerust. That was put in quotations.

MR BERGER: Yes, it is in quotation marks because it is your evidence.

ADV DE JAGER: Wasn't that sort of a heading to a next subject that he was asked about?

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got that report before you?

MR BERGER: Which report?

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence he gave to the Committee?

MR BERGER: No Chairperson, this was led by my learned friend, Mr Visser and Mr Visser said that this was the evidence that was given at that hearing.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman no, but there is, I didn't want to interrupt, but there is a very simple explanation. It was a Section 29.

I have just been handed by my attorney, a document Mr Chairman, it deals with submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and it deals with questions and I am going to hand it to you.

What this deals with is the heading "Conspiracy to murder Marius Schoon in October/November 1981 in Pretoria and Zeerust."

CHAIRPERSON: So Mr De Jager's suggestion is correct, this is a heading - it is quite clear here, it is a heading, it is in bold type and thereafter is the reply.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson. Why when you were asked in your evidence in chief this morning, Brigadier Schoon, to explain the use of the work Zeerust, were you unable to?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not understand this question, could you please rephrase?

MR BERGER: You were asked by your counsel what is the relevance of Zeerust and you said I don't know?

BRIG SCHOON: There I meant that I do not have any knowledge about any conspiracy that took place at Zeerust.

MR BERGER: That wasn't what you said, we will leave that for argument.

When did you learn that a parcel bomb had been sent to the Schoon's in Angola, killing Jeanette Schoon and Katryn Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I think it was after it had appeared in the newspapers and I believe that it was at a morning conference mentioned, because it would have been of importance.

MR BERGER: This would be the Sanhedrin meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, the morning conference.

MR BERGER: Who would have announced it at that meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: The desk who dealt with that same file, that would be the A Section.

MR BERGER: Well, who would that have been, Captain Williamson?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I think he was at Intelligence.

MR BERGER: Well, wasn't A Section Intelligence?

BRIG SCHOON: It was a leg of it. No G was.

MR BERGER: Don't look at Mr Williamson for a response.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, really, can we leave personal matters out of cross-examination?

MR BERGER: Mr Chairman, with respect, that is not personal and Brigadier Schoon looked at Captain Williamson, or Major Williamson for an answer.

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: It is my duty to put that on record.

MR VISSER: I am sorry Mr Chairman, how is it suggested that Williamson could give an answer across the floor to Brigadier Schoon, I would like to know that?

CHAIRPERSON: By shaking or nodding.

ADV DE JAGER: For the record, I watched him and he didn't do so. Let that be on the record too.

MR BIZOS: Let it be on record Mr Chairman, that I saw it on none less than two occasions, deliberately looking in that direction.

Mr Visser is sitting in a position, where he could not possibly have seen it Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman ...

MR BIZOS: I am told Mr Chairman, by my attorney, that in fairness to Mr Williamson whom she was watching, that he did not respond.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, that is what I wanted to put on record.

MR BIZOS: Oh, is that what, I am sorry.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, that is what I am putting on record.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry Mr Chairman, I thought that Mr De Jager had said that the Brigadier, I am very sorry Mr De Jager.

ADV DE JAGER: Because I also saw him looking at Williamson and that is why I looked at Williamson to see whether he is responding.

MR BIZOS: Then there is no dispute.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I have already objected and I raise it again, if Mr Berger is seized of the witness, it is Mr Berger's task, I have clarified this with a number of counsel who have in fact agreed with me that if Mr Berger is seized of this witness, then it is really of little help whether Mr Bizos is leading him or not, for Mr Bizos to become involved in a debate.

I merely raise it Mr Chairman, because it is the second time that this has occurred.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, for the record my name is Berger, not Burger. Brigadier Schoon, I am sorry, I am just looking for a document. Here we are, I have it.

I have - well, let me ask you this, is it not correct that Group A headed by Colonel Goosen, had five Sections and Unit A5 was the Section, Intelligence Section, headed by Captain Williamson, is that not correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it could have been the case in 1981, but afterwards they broke away from A Section, and then they became G Section.

MR BERGER: When did that break take place?

BRIG SCHOON: That was a few years later on.

MR BERGER: What was A Section after that, after the breakaway?

BRIG SCHOON: I think they continued with the same work, they dealt with the whites.

MR BERGER: And A5 became G Section, which dealt with Intelligence?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is what I think, I am not sure about this.

MR BERGER: So who would have announced the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon at this Sanhedrin meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: The person who received the report, or the people who go through the newspapers, who make or cut articles out of these newspapers.

MR BERGER: What was reported?

BRIG SCHOON: Well that so and so was killed in a package bomb attack. Usually you could hear it broadcast over the radio.

MR BERGER: Was there a round of applause?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I do not know.

MR BERGER: But you were there?

BRIG SCHOON: If I was there, I wasn't always there.

MR BERGER: You were there when the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon was announced at a Sanhedrin meeting, you said so.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is where I would have heard it.

MR BERGER: That is what I asked you, where did you hear this, you said at a Sanhedrin meeting.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. I am saying that is where I would hear this type of news.

MR BERGER: Did you accept at the time, or was it your understanding at the time, that the Security Forces were responsible for the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I had the suspicion.

MR BERGER: Did you ask any questions?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not ask any questions.

MR BERGER: Why not?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I would not get answers to the questions.

MR BERGER: The document that you read from this morning, which is headed Brigadier Willem Frederick Schoon, is this a document that was drafted by you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, with my legal advisor.

MR BERGER: Yes, and after it was drafted, you satisfied yourself with its contents and you were happy that its contents were accurate and correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, seeing as a reference has been made to this document, might it be handed in as an Exhibit? It will be Exhibit VV.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I am sorry to interrupt, I certainly haven't seen that document and if questions are going to be asked about it, I believe those representing applicants, should be entitled to have copies before then.

CHAIRPERSON: We can do that during the adjournment.

MR BERGER: Your amnesty application, which appears in bundle 2, from page 80 through to 88, was supplemented this morning with pages 86(a) through to 86(e).

86(a) through to (e) deals with your political motivation for the crime for which you seek amnesty, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: You confirmed that the contents of your amnesty application, are true and correct. What I want to ask you is, who drafted the document from 86(a) through to (e)?

BRIG SCHOON: It was mainly done by my legal advisors with my cooperation.

MR BERGER: So your legal representatives drafted it, showed it to you and you said that is okay?

BRIG SCHOON: No, they made statements to me, asked me if it was right or wrong, and then I would say yes or no and then they would include it.

MR BERGER: So you associated yourself completely with pages 86(a) to (e)?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, yes.

MR BERGER: Do you know a person by the name of Herman Frederick Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is Mr Schoon sitting there.

MR BERGER: No, it is not Mr Schoon sitting there, that is Mr Marius Schoon. I asked you do you know a person by the name of Herman Frederick Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, he is unknown to me, except if it is Mr Schoon's son.

MR BERGER: Let me put certain facts to you. Mr Marius Schoon had a father whose name was Herman Frederick Schoon. I have just been attacked by a water cannon from outside. His father's brother, was Willem Frederick Schoon who was a school inspector, living in Lichtenburg. Do you know of such a person?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I do not know him.

MR BERGER: The son, there was a son, Willem Frederick Schoon had a son called Fritz, who was killed in a mine accident in Springs in the 1940's.

BRIG SCHOON: Unknown to me.

MR BERGER: What was your father's name?

BRIG SCHOON: Willem Frederick.

MR BERGER: Are you not perhaps a distant relative of Mr Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: It could be so, I am not sure.

MR BERGER: Did it ever cross your mind the very first time you saw the name?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: When was that?

BRIG SCHOON: That was many years ago.

MR BERGER: Was that when Mr Dirk Coetzee came to you?

BRIG SCHOON: No. That was I would say in the 1960's.

MR BERGER: When Mr Dirk Coetzee came to you to suggest that he kill Mr Marius Schoon, did it cross your mind that this might be a member of your family that was going to be killed?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it did Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And it played no part in your decision?

BRIG SCHOON: No, what did play a role was that he was on the other side of the fence.

MR BERGER: And that hurt you didn't it, that here was a potential member of your family who was a traitor to the cause?

BRIG SCHOON: Not necessarily Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well, what did you think when you realised that there is a potential family member on the other side of the fence?

BRIG SCHOON: I did not see him as a family member.

MR BERGER: Because of what he was doing?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, because there was no certainty on my side that he was a family member. The surname is the same, but there are various Schoon families in South Africa.

MR BERGER: Isn't it correct Brigadier Schoon, that Afrikaners who were on the other side of the fence during the apartheid fence, were viewed with particular hatred from Afrikaners who were part of the apartheid establishment?

BRIG SCHOON: I would not say with hatred, but definitely with some malice.

MR BERGER: The fact that there was a possible member of your family on the other side of the fence, that made the hate even more severe, isn't that right?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I am moving on. Would this be an appropriate time to take the adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on) We will adjourn until two o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: I am not quite as optimistic as he is, I don't think the speeches will be over in half an hour, but I would say 11:30, make arrangements to be here at 11:30 tomorrow.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (continued) Thank you Chairperson. Brigadier Schoon, did you attend a meeting before you submitted your amnesty application, where you and others decided on the way in which you would approach the whole amnesty process?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, yes, I did attend a meeting at the Police College which was addressed by certain people who were experts on the Truth Commission.

MR BERGER: When was that meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that was in 1996.

MR BERGER: And who attended that meeting, who was in the audience?

BRIG SCHOON: There were a couple of hundred people there, if I am not mistaken, from all over the country.

MR BERGER: And these were policemen?

BRIG SCHOON: All of them were policemen, yes.

MR BERGER: Including Gen Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know whether he was there, I doubt it.

MR BERGER: Why do you doubt it?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I would have seen him if he was there, it was on a Sunday morning.

MR BERGER: And there were hundreds of policemen there from around the country?

BRIG SCHOON: There could have easily been 200 policemen there from all over the country.

MR BERGER: Who had been called together to discuss a common approach to the TRC?

BRIG SCHOON: No, to be informed regarding the procedure which the Truth Commission would follow.

MR BERGER: And who addressed that meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot remember who it was but it was an expert regarding the Truth Commission legislation.

MR BERGER: A policemen?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not as far as I know, I think he was from Justice.

MR BERGER: Did you attend a meeting after that?

BRIG SCHOON: After that I went to Gen Van der Merwe's house and attended a meeting there.

MR BERGER: When was that?

BRIG SCHOON: That was also during 1996 I think.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, please could you speak up a bit.

BRIG SCHOON: I think that was also in 1996 or early in 1997. I think it was actually 1996.

MR BERGER: And how many policemen were present at that meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: There were approximately 10 to 12.

MR BERGER: And who were they?

BRIG SCHOON: I remember Gen Van der Merwe, I was there, Gen Dreyer was also present, Geldenhuys was there, and several others.

MR BERGER: You can't remember any of the others?

BRIG SCHOON: Not immediately.

MR BERGER: Gen Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: No, he wasn't there.

MR BERGER: What was the purpose of this meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: There we were informed by Gen Van der Merwe that this was the final opportunity which we were being offered to apply for amnesty and that all other unnecessary details were to be set aside and that if we were honest with our amnesty applications, we would have to expose everything.

MR BERGER: Was it discussed at that meeting what the approach would be to the amnesty process?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not as far as I know.

MR BERGER: How long was that meeting?

BRIG SCHOON: It was approximately, it was actually less than an hour.

MR BERGER: You can't remember anyone else who was there?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, if you could refresh my memory.

MR BERGER: Your career as a policeman was directed at keeping the National Party government in power, would that be correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No, firstly it was the maintenance of law and order and the observation of the Police Act and then since 1963 when I was transferred to the Security Branch, my chief task was security work.

MR BERGER: I thought I understood your evidence in chief to say that you were asked a question about the applications in plural that you had made for amnesty, and what your political motive for that was and your answer was, my English note is it was a struggle to keep the National Party in power. Would that be incorrect?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is what I said because since I began my duty at the Security Branch, that was of course the chief objective.

MR BERGER: Would you agree that it was for the maintenance of apartheid that you struggled?

BRIG SCHOON: I think partially so, yes.

MR BERGER: In fact if one reads your application, page 86(b) at the bottom, you say there to attempt that everything which was established on South African ground would be chiefly kept by the white minority and to maintain the status quo in terms of what we in the Security Forces regarded as a normal South African lifestyle. Would you agree that it was a racist ideology which you supported?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Would you agree that you at the time were a racist?

BRIG SCHOON: I would concede.

MR BERGER: Are you still a racist?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: Why not?

BRIG SCHOON: Because I live in the changed South Africa and I would like to be a part of this new dispensation. That is why I have applied for amnesty in order to help realise the process of reconciliation.

MR BERGER: Did you cease being a racist on the 27th of April 1994?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I enquire how this relates to the merits of the application by Brigadier Schoon? He is not applying for an attempted murder on a person of a different race.

What has the fact, whatever a racist is in the definition of my learned friend, Mr Berger, what that has to do with the present application, is unclear to me Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you would like to explain if you can, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: I can Chairperson. The political objective of this witness is one of the essential requirements for amnesty. He is being asked about his political motive.

I am suggesting that he had another political motive in the 26 years that he was in the police force and that that was for the maintenance of racism in South Africa, in support of a racist system.

I am sure my learned friend, Mr Visser, knows what a racist is and I don't have to go into the definition of that. That is the relevance of these questions. We have been told that it was a struggle against communism, that it was part of the world-wide struggle against communist and against communist domination and I am suggesting to this witness, that he had another motive and that was pure racism.

CHAIRPERSON: So are you suggesting that he had a political objective, because that, racism, is political, is it not?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, as I understand certain rulings of this Committee, pure racist motives are not sufficient to qualify as a political objective within the meaning of the Act.

CHAIRPERSON: It was to maintain apartheid, you put to him, which was the policy of the National Party?

MR BERGER: And I am going further, I asked him whether he was a racist and he said yes, I was a racist and I am asking him when he changed and when he no longer became a racist.

CHAIRPERSON: He has told you, get on with something else.

MR BERGER: Just to complete the point Brigadier Schoon, paragraph 3 of your statement which is Exhibit VV, you say there that you believed in the policy of separate development which meant that church, school, the national press - I beg your pardon, which was supported, which was subscribed to and defended by church, school and national press and the majority of the white community and you identified with that, didn't you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And at the risk of incurring the wroth of the Committee, can I ask you this question, is it correct that you were, that your actions were motivated by keeping the whites in power at the expense of blacks?

BRIG SCHOON: One could see it that way if one chooses to interpreted it that way.

MR BERGER: At the time that you were Head of C Section, this is 1980, where was Mr Williamson?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, in the beginning of 1980, he arrived at Head Office and he was then I think with Brigadier Goosen's staff.

What exactly his task was, I don't know.

MR BERGER: He broke his cover at the beginning of 1980 and you became the Head of C Section at the end of 1980, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: So from 1980 right through until 1985, you were in close contact with Mr Williamson, would I be correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson, he functioned entirely on his own and I had very little to do with him.

MR BERGER: So you never accessed or related to the Intelligence Section of the Security Police, you operated completely independent of them, would that be correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Where did you get your Intelligence from?

BRIG SCHOON: Primarily from those who had been arrested and who had been interrogated.

MR BERGER: And you never shared that Intelligence with the Intelligence Section?

BRIG SCHOON: No, that was recorded and circulated throughout the country, everybody had access to that.

MR BERGER: But you never had discussions with the Intelligence Section?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it did occur that one would sometimes have to ask them about something, they for example had the use of a helicopter and if anybody needed a ride with the helicopter somewhere, they would have to clear it up with his division.

MR BERGER: Isn't it correct that you would have had regular dealings with the Intelligence Section, swopping and getting Intelligence from them?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is possible.

MR BERGER: And the person that you would have liaised with as the Head of your Section, would have been the Head of the Intelligence Section, Major Williamson?

BRIG SCHOON: On our level, Brigadier Goosen was my equal and I would have consulted with him.

MR BERGER: So you would have consulted with Brigadier Goosen?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Regularly?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, we met regularly and had meetings.

MR BERGER: Well, you came together every morning at the Sanhedrin meetings?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, every morning.

MR BERGER: If I could refer you to page 84 of your application, you talk about when Captain Dirk Coetzee came to you in 1981 and in the second sentence under paragraph (iv) you say

"reliable information indicated that Mr Schoon was involved in acts of terrorism and other actions which were aimed at endangering the security of the Republic of South Africa and that he was regarded as one of the enemy."

Where did this reliable information come from?

BRIG SCHOON: From his file.

MR BERGER: Is that the only source of information that you had?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And what was in Mr Schoon's file at the time when you looked at it in 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: In his file there were documents and then if I remember correctly, there was also a summary of certain information which was in memorandum form, which made it easier to see in a nutshell exactly what was going on in the file, and that is what I read, the memorandum.

MR BERGER: How thick was this file?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, it was a reasonably thick file already, I don't know which volume it was.

MR BERGER: You indicated about two centimetres?

BRIG SCHOON: Usually it was that thickness, 20 centimetres. If it was any thicker, it would be filed in a cabinet and a new file would begin.

MR BERGER: Yes, but there was only one file that you looked at?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: Where did you get that file from?

BRIG SCHOON: From the file storage room.

MR BERGER: Who was in control of that?

BRIG SCHOON: I can't remember who it was.

MR BERGER: And this was a file on Mr Marius Schoon only?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: There was nothing in the file about his wife, Jeanette Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, there would have been documents in which she was mentioned, because every person who is mentioned in a document, a copy would be made of that document and placed in every person's file.

In other words if Marius Schoon and his wife were mentioned, then a copy would be made for his file, for her file and any other person who was mentioned in that specific report.

MR BERGER: What was Operation Daisy?

BRIG SCHOON: Daisy was the farm which was purchased by Mr Williamson and the others.

MR BERGER: Yes, but what was Operation Daisy?

BRIG SCHOON: It was one of their operations, I don't know what it involved, I had nothing to do with it.

MR BERGER: You had absolutely no idea what Operation Daisy involved?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I simply know that Mr Williamson was involved in it.

MR BERGER: Yes, but what?

BRIG SCHOON: I had absolutely no idea what Daisy was involved with.

MR BERGER: Or what it did?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't know.

MR BERGER: Or what it was designed to achieve, you didn't know?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not know.

MR BERGER: I thought that you had read Exhibit RR when you perused Mr Schoon's file?

BRIG SCHOON: I perused it, but I read the summary which was in the file.

MR BERGER: So you didn't read the whole of Exhibit RR?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't.

MR BERGER: You didn't read the whole file?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I simply looked at the summary which indicated the highlights.

MR BERGER: Okay, please have a look at Exhibit RR and could you please indicate what summary you were looking at?

BRIG SCHOON: There is no summary in Exhibit RR, every file there would be a memorandum attached, which would indicate only the highlights of information which was contained within the file.

That was in order to make it easier for someone who wanted to study the file, to see immediately this, this and that is what is going on in this file.

MR BERGER: Did you read any of Exhibit RR, yes or no?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that which was contained in the memorandum.

MR BERGER: Did you read any of the document which we have before us now as Exhibit RR?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I don't believe so, because it was quite a thick document.

MR BERGER: All right, well, so nothing in this document, absolutely nothing, was read by you?

BRIG SCHOON: That which appears on the memorandum, is what I read.

MR BERGER: Yes, and now the memorandum is something separate from Exhibit RR?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it is something entirely different.

MR BERGER: What did the memorandum say?

BRIG SCHOON: According to the memorandum the Schoon's were involved in giving assistance to terrorists who were on their way back, and fledgling terrorists who were on their way out for training.

And they also had some or other network which they established, which they were maintaining.

MR BERGER: You say in your application and you say in Exhibit VV that you had reliable information which indicated that Mr Marius Schoon was responsible for acts of terror.

I want to ask you which acts of terror was Mr Marius Schoon responsible for?

BRIG SCHOON: By implication he was responsible for the deeds which people had committed in which he had assisted.

MR BERGER: Which acts?

BRIG SCHOON: Sabotage which was committed here.

MR BERGER: You are not referring to any specific act?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: You are just saying in general, he was responsible for acts of terror?

MR VISSER: With respect Mr Chairman, it is a misleading question. He did not say in his application that he was responsible for it, he said he was involved in that. There is a difference, page 84 Mr Chairman, that he was involved.

MR BERGER: We will stick to involved, that he was involved in acts of terror. You are saying there that the information did not specify any particular act of terror, would that be correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is possible, yes. But you know we are talking about 18 years ago.

MR BERGER: Yes, but we are talking about an incident which according to you, was the very first time that you had decided to kill or to approve the killing of an ANC member and you agonised about it for two days.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, but that remains 18 years ago.

MR BERGER: Now in agonising about whether to approve of the killing or not, you must have weighed up in your mind, the things that Marius Schoon was accused of doing before you came to the conclusion that yes, this man must be killed.

What were these incidents, you don't know?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, I can't simply remember it right away now.

MR BERGER: What happened to that summary which you supposedly read, that memorandum?

BRIG SCHOON: Well, it must have been in the file.

MR BERGER: Where is that file now?

BRIG SCHOON: I left the Police nine years ago, I don't know.

MR BERGER: You don't know if it has been destroyed or if it is still there?

BRIG SCHOON: I have no idea.

MR BERGER: You see the problem that I have is that RR is apparently taken from Mr Schoon's file and yet there is no summary there. The summary that you are referring to. You can't assist?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I cannot.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't know, but it starts off saying this memorandum has been prepared.

MR BERGER: Yes, it does.

ADV DE JAGER: So it is talking about a memorandum. I don't know whether it was this few pages at the beginning, stating it is a memorandum?

MR BERGER: Well, Chairperson, or Adv De Jager, that is why I asked Brigadier Schoon, whether any part of Exhibit RR was read by him, and he said no.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MR BERGER: So that takes care of that possible angle.

ADV DE JAGER: No, I am not disputing that, I am only saying that you said there is no memorandum in the file.

There is, maybe there is not the memorandum that he is talking about, but page 1 implicates a memorandum?

MR BERGER: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: Which must be read with the May 1980 memorandum?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So there is another memorandum in existence?

MR BERGER: The question is, where is that memorandum?

CHAIRPERSON: You should have asked the person who produced RR, shouldn't you?

MR BERGER: Mr Maharaj?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. When he took RR out of the file, was there a memorandum there?

MR BERGER: As I understood Min Maharaj's evidence, RR was handed to him, he didn't take it out of any file.

In any event, Brigadier Schoon, the summary that you are referring to is not in Exhibit RR, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it is not this one. It is a very short memorandum in which the pieces in the file, is dealt with piece by piece.

MR BERGER: If that was an earlier memorandum which spoke about acts of terror, is there any reason why this memorandum and this document, RR, doesn't speak about acts of terror in which Mr Schoon is involved?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I am sorry, I cannot explain this.

MR BERGER: Who was Mr Chris Wood?

BRIG SCHOON: He is unknown to me.

MR BERGER: Would you agree that the summary which was read by you, would have included a reference to the contents of Exhibit RR?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I believe it could not have included the summary of that document.

MR BERGER: If you look for example at page 9, you see there under the Schoon modus operandi, the Schoon network relied heavily in its initial stages on the Daisy Courier System for maintaining and establishing communication with ANC/CP operatives and potential ANC/CP recruits within the RSA.

If one simply looks at the Schoon's file, without correspondence of this report, one gets a very shallow view of what exactly the Schoon's were doing. In other words, until one has a look at the correspondence in this report, one doesn't get an idea, one gets a very shallow view of what the Schoon's were up to?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, the source of this report was not the only source out of which information was gathered in the Security Branch.

Information was received from other information sources, resources that acted independently from these.

MR BERGER: If you look at page 10, SACTU policy, the Schoon's attended a conference in Botswana on 18 October 1977 as SACTU representatives.

At this conference they stated that the worker in the RSA would be harnessed for the purposes of strike action and industrial sabotage in order to cripple the South African economy.

It is in the light of this statement that one must see the activities of Anderson, Fine, Wellman, Berger, etc, etc as extremely dangerous. Would you agree with that?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I had nothing to do with this and in other words, I cannot comment on it.

MR BERGER: Well, you have been asked earlier today about your perception. Was your perception ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: I was asked about SACTU internally.

MR BERGER: Yes, was it your perception that Trade Union activities, strike action and industrial sabotage, that people who were involved in the Trade Union movement, were to be viewed as extremely dangerous from that point of view?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I would say that it was a big risk, that is the safety of the Republic of South Africa.

MR BERGER: Because of the damage which strike action and industrial sabotage would do to the economy?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: Was it your perception at the time that Trade Unionists were legitimate targets for assassination?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So then you would agree that Jeanette Schoon, whose work in Botswana centred mainly on SACTU activity, would not have been a legitimate target for assassination?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I do not exactly know what her activities were in Botswana, but if it was purely SACTU activities, then I would agree with you, yes.

MR BERGER: If you turn over the page to page 11, underground routes into the RSA. In 1977, shortly after the arrival of the Schoon's in Botswana, Chris Wood reported that the ANC were looking for underground routes into the RSA.

You say you don't know who Chris Wood was. Would you assume from this report that Chris Wood was an Intelligence agent, an agent of the South African Intelligence Services?

BRIG SCHOON: If you tell me so Sir, I accept that.

MR BERGER: This included methods of cross-border travel, such as illegal routes through the fence, the use of aircraft, private yachts etc.

The purpose of such routes was for the conveyance of arms, explosives, pamphlets and receiving sets. Quite clearly the reference to private yachts couldn't have been a reference to routes from Botswana to South Africa, you will agree with that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I agree with that.

MR BERGER: If we go on further, evidence from evaluated material shows an increase in ANC pamphlet distribution for June 1980. It must be assured, I think that must read it must be assumed that the Schoon's and other ANC operatives in Botswana have opened up various routes to the RSA.

For this reason special attention should be paid to people such as Cedric Mason who was planning to involve himself with this type of activity.

That would be an increase in pamphlet distribution, do you agree?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I agree with that.

MR BERGER: Can you refer to any part of Exhibit RR which says that Marius Schoon was involved in acts of terror in South Africa?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I did not read the whole document, but as far as I know, no mention was made to something like that.

MR BERGER: What exactly was your information in relation to what Marius Schoon was doing, what his involvement was in these so-called acts of terror?

BRIG SCHOON: Mainly that he received fledgling terrorists or recruits and that he had the means to go further with them and that he also received trained terrorists and to send back into the Republic.

And as well as assisting in the provision for example of weapons.

MR BERGER: He provided weapons for these people?

BRIG SCHOON: That was the routes that he opened up.

MR BERGER: When you talk about terrorists, are you referring to MK cadres?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: So the information that you had, was that Marius Schoon received MK cadres who had fled South Africa?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Mr Chairperson, that is not what I said. I said they were on their way back to infiltrate.

MR BERGER: You are not talking about people who fled from South Africa, you are talking about people who are going back into South Africa?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: You referred to both actually. He received people going out for training and then received them coming back. You referred to both in evidence.

MR BERGER: I apologise, I didn't know what fledglings were. I am told it is ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: It is not a "kweekskool", "kweekskool" would refer to priests, at Stellenbosch for instance.

MR BERGER: I thought it was a plant nursery. Brigadier Schoon, these recruits according to your information, would be recruits for Umkhonto weSizwe?

BRIG SCHOON: Mainly yes. Many of them went under the cover that they would like to study further, that they received bursaries.

MR BERGER: Well, those weren't the terrorists that you referred to?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: The terrorists that you referred to were people who were being recruited by Marius Schoon for Umkhonto weSizwe?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not say that he recruited people, he received them, or they stayed over at his house on their way back to South Africa, after they had received training.

MR BERGER: What you are saying is that when they left the country, Marius Schoon might not have known that they were going to be recruited by MK?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I would say those were people who had already been recruited, who then stopped over at his place and he provided them with further assistance.

MR BERGER: You see, I am sorry, I am terribly confused because you said some of them were students fleeing the country so that they could go and study further abroad?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, some of them did this but under the cover of pretending to go and study further. They also did this under false pretence and when he leaves the country, he would go to a military camp to receive training.

MR BERGER: Your information was that Marius Schoon and this is a question, was that Marius Schoon was part of an MK structure that would receive recruits, facilitate their being sent on for training and then receive them when they were trained MK soldiers, and infiltrate them back into the country? That was your information?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, in those lines.

MR BERGER: And that you got from Marius Schoon's file?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: That was according to you, early 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I said it could have been the middle of 1981.

MR BERGER: You see because that information is completely false. One wonders where you could have got that from.

Mr Williamson who knew the structures in Botswana, would have known what Marius Schoon's involvement was, and would have known that Marius Schoon was not involved in MK activities.

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, as I said it was not just Mr Williamson and his team who provided us with information about the Schoon couple. There were other independent sources who also provided us with information.

MR BERGER: All we have to support that, is your say so.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, I don't want to come in here unnecessarily. I just want to have something clarified, my learned friend says or made the statement that that information is completely false. I suppose his client, Mr Schoon, is going to come and testify that?

I just want to make sure about that?

MR BERGER: Of course Mr Schoon is going to testify, it has already been arranged that he is going to testify.

MR VISSER: Yes, I am actually referring to the normal procedure that when you put something which is your version, your client is going to come and testify that, that you say that your client is going to come and testify that, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: That is not the normal procedure. What other actions are you referring to at page 84?

BRIG SCHOON: That is the assistance that is provided to fledgling terrorists and terrorists who wanted to infiltrate into the country.

MR BERGER: It is the same thing about being involved in acts of terror?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Do I understand you correctly when you say that he was perceived as one of the enemy, which you put in quotation marks, because he was involved in these acts of terror? Was that why he was perceived as one of the enemy?

BRIG SCHOON: That is so, yes.

MR BERGER: So you would agree then, would you not Brigadier Schoon, that being a member of the African National Congress and being involved in political activity as opposed to recruiting soldiers for MK, that would not justify a label enemy for the purposes of assassination?

BRIG SCHOON: It depends what your approach is.

MR BERGER: Please would you explain that?

BRIG SCHOON: For me as a member of the Security Branch, I saw him as the enemy and not as a friend.

MR BERGER: But you had known about Marius Schoon since the 1960's?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I then heard of him.

MR BERGER: And you knew that he was a member of the ANC, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: What you knew now, the new stuff that you knew, is having read his file, this is a man who is involved in acts of terror and involved, he gives assistance to MK soldiers?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: In fact he infiltrates them back into the country?

BRIG SCHOON: And he was a person who himself received training.

MR BERGER: We will come to the training in a moment.

Do you agree with me that being a member of the ANC in 1981 through to 1989 when you left the Force, being a member of the ANC was not justification enough for assassination? I don't know if you understand what I am saying?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I agree with you.

MR BERGER: You had to be more than a member of the ANC, to warrant the attention of the Security Forces for assassination, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: You also said that being involved in Trade Union activities, did not warrant a death sentence, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Being involved in political work of the ANC, would also not warrant a death sentence, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Correct, yes.

MR BERGER: It was only if you were involved in military operations of the ANC, that you were then justified in being sentenced to death, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: And provision of assistance to people who wanted to go into the country.

MR BERGER: Yes, in other words if you facilitated the return, if you infiltrated MK soldiers back into the country, you were then a legitimate target for assassination?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: But unless you were directly involved in MK activities, you did not warrant getting a death sentence from the South African Security Forces, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct yes, but as far as my information, or the information that I had, was, that he was involved.

MR BERGER: We will deal with that, but I am asking you at the time, your perception was it was only those people who were directly involved in MK activities, who warranted being assassinated by the Security Forces, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: You also say that you had no lawful way of getting at Mr Schoon to get him for his involvement in these gruesome acts, page 84 - 85, not the years.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, my reference to these deeds is not that which were committed by Mr Schoon, but by the people who infiltrated the country, and then committed acts of terror here.

MR BERGER: Yes, but his involvement, that is what you are saying?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Why couldn't you apply for his extradition? Here was a man who was responsible or involved in acts of terror in South Africa?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I do not think it is that easy to extradite people with a political background, especially in those years where South Africa was mostly isolated, stood alone, with no diplomatic ties.

There is no talk of extradition.

MR BERGER: You knew that the Botswana government was turning a blind eye to the ANC but were not housing the ANC like the Mozambique government was?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, they were not quite as disposed towards the ANC, compared to what occurred in Mozambique.

MR BERGER: Did you ever make any attempt to either get the Botswana government to deal with Mr Schoon or to get the Botswana government to have Mr Schoon sent back?

BRIG SCHOON: I know that Gen Coetzee on more than one opportunity or had the opportunity to discuss with the Head of their Police, in their Security Branch in Botswana and went to them with these questions or statements.

MR BERGER: So this was a particularly dangerous man in your view who needed to be killed, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: At that stage, yes, I thought so much.

MR BERGER: Why did you change your mind after the attempt failed?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I tried to clear this up for myself and I told myself that is not a morally good deed or it is morally not right, to do this.

For me it was personal.

MR BERGER: But it wasn't only that you thought this, according to you, that this was not a very moral thing to do, but you no longer were interested in Marius and Jeanette Schoon, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I would not say that.

MR BERGER: I will tell you why I say that, because you were asked a question by Mr Levine, what was your thought when you heard of the explosion in Lubango and your answer was I can't say, because I was no longer interested in them. Do you remember that evidence?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Here was a dangerous terrorist living in Botswana, who you had tried to kill in 1981 and for some reason by 1984, you were no longer interested in him. The question is why?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, because he was not available any more, where we could have done something, he was now further away.

We did not have the capacity to act in Angola.

MR BERGER: Who is we?

BRIG SCHOON: The Security Branch and in particular the C Section.

MR BERGER: When did you lose interest in the Schoon's?

BRIG SCHOON: Must have been after they moved to Angola.

MR BERGER: When was that?

BRIG SCHOON: I think that must have been in 1983, 1984.

MR BERGER: It was the middle of 1983 when they left Botswana, which means that you were monitoring the Schoon's from 1981 until 1983, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is possible. Personally I do not carry any knowledge of this.

MR BERGER: Well, if you don't have any knowledge, how was it possible that you were monitoring them?

BRIG SCHOON: No, you made the statement.

MR BERGER: Well, were you monitoring the Schoon's from 1981 to 1983?

BRIG SCHOON: I said I do not know, it could have been possible.

MR BERGER: You are not aware of it?

BRIG SCHOON: No, because reports did come in and by reporting on someone, it is certainly monitoring.

MR BERGER: No, but you were reading those reports or were you not?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I did read some of them.

MR BERGER: And at no stage from 1981 to 1983, were you involved in another attempt to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Why did you say in your evidence in response to Mr Levine when you were asked who was responsible for the bomb who had killed Jeanette and Katryn Schoon, you said you had no idea who was responsible for the bomb?

BRIG SCHOON: I had no idea who was responsible for it.

MR BERGER: You did not think that the Security Forces were responsible?

BRIG SCHOON: I could have thought what I wanted to, but I did not know.

MR BERGER: Did you think that the Security Forces were responsible, yes or no?

BRIG SCHOON: It was a possibility. But I had no personal knowledge of this.

MR BERGER: Why did you say in your answers to Mr Levine that you were happy when the attempt to kill Marius Schoon had failed, because and this is my note, I realised that I had acted incorrectly?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I didn't want to be known as the murderer of Marius Schoon. I was glad when the plan fell through.

MR BERGER: Yes, but you said I realised that I had acted incorrectly, what part of your actions were not correct?

BRIG SCHOON: How did I put it, did I say that I had acted incorrectly?

MR BERGER: Correct.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that I should never have involved myself in this.

MR BERGER: I am sorry.

BRIG SCHOON: I should never have involved myself in being part of this attempt.

MR BERGER: Why not, it was a war, Mr Schoon was responsible, I beg your pardon, involved in acts of terror, this is according to you obviously, why was it wrong to kill him?

BRIG SCHOON: I wouldn't say that it was wrong to want to kill him, but for me, it was not the appropriate thing, for me personally.

MR BERGER: Why? You had no problem being involved in the murders of other people, why was it a problem being involved in the attempted murder of Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know Chairperson, but I simply didn't feel very good about it.

MR BERGER: Isn't it correct that - isn't Mr Dirk Coetzee correct that there was an attempt to kill Marius Schoon which was called off by Gen Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: It is possible, yes, but I don't know about it.

MR BERGER: Mr Marius Schoon can or is aware of two attempts to kill him, at least two attempts.

The first attempt involved a coloured man from Newclare in Johannesburg, whom he met at the Culture and Resistance Festival in Gaberone in July of 1982. And six weeks later, this man reappeared, six weeks or two months later, he reappeared again in Gaberone and he had discussions with Mr Schoon and Mr Patrick Fitzgerald. Do you know anything about that?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I don't know anything about that.

MR BERGER: And they were discussing about establishing an ANC group in Newclare, drawn from political activists in the community. This man was instructed to make a further contact in Botswana to report on the formation of this structure.

BRIG SCHOON: I am totally unaware of that.

MR BERGER: And this man sent two young men to Gaberone, two or three weeks later, and these men were housed at certain offices where Mr Fitzgerald was staying and certain conduct of theirs raised suspicions and Mr Fitzgerald went through their bags and he found a pistol.

This was reported to ANC Security who took these two young men away.

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know anything about that.

MR BERGER: That was the first attempt. And you see that was in July, no it wasn't July, it was after July of 1982. Is it possible that the incident that you are referring to, with the man being sent up, happened in the second half of 1982 and not in the middle of 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: In fact it is Mr ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: The man who according to allegation in my case would have gone, was assaulted in Gaberone and robbed of his pistol. It was only one, not two.

MR BERGER: And it wasn't in September or October of 1982 that that happened?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And there is a second incident. It is not disputed of course that there were other incidents, such as the one that Mr Dirk Coetzee refers to, but that obviously Mr Marius Schoon would have no knowledge of, because it was aborted before he left South Africa, but the second incident of which Mr Marius Schoon is aware, was an attempt to blow up his vehicle.

One morning he went to the vehicle, and he observed something which looked like a woolly toy, with a curly tail against one of the wheels of the passenger side. He walked around the corner to where Mr Fitzgerald was staying and they came back to the complex where Marius Schoon and his wife and family was staying, and this curly tailed object was still against the wheel.

They went away in Mr Fitzgerald's vehicle and came back with Mr Billy Masetla and when they came back, this object was gone. Mr Schoon believes that that was an explosive device which had been placed under the vehicle?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know anything about that.

MR BERGER: This was some time late in 1982.

BRIG SCHOON: It is unknown to me.

MR BERGER: You mentioned that cross-border operations were often the subject of round table meetings, do you remember that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Where Security Force and Security Police leaders discussed the pros and cons of a particular mission, do you remember that?

BRIG SCHOON: I think that I spoke about operations for which the Army received counselling and would then be initiated.

MR BERGER: Sorry, I didn't catch the end of your sentence.

BRIG SCHOON: Meetings were held regularly with the Army where there would be briefing or counselling sessions and afterwards they would initiate missions.

MR BERGER: You are not aware of any round table meetings to discuss the death of or to discuss plans to murder Mr Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I don't know anything about that.

MR BERGER: You were aware of this very dangerous man, and yet you never discussed with a single other member, other than Mr Dirk Coetzee, you never discussed the possibility of eliminating, taking out, killing Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not after this aborted attempt.

MR BERGER: And before it?

BRIG SCHOON: Not before it either.

MR BERGER: What about the Target Identification Committee, were you ever present at their meetings?

BRIG SCHOON: No. I know that there was such a body, but I didn't serve on it.

MR BERGER: Didn't it trouble you that here is this man in Botswana who is causing all this trouble in South Africa and we are not doing anything about it? Didn't that bother you?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: No?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: You never discussed with the Intelligence section, you never discussed with Brigadier Goosen for example about ways in which to eliminate Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Nor with Mr Williamson?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

ADV DE JAGER: Brigadier, this Section of which you were the Head, with which aspects did you have to do, which were your responsibilities?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson my responsibilities were chiefly terrorism. The combating of terrorism, rehabilitation of arrested terrorists and their application after their rehabilitation.

ADV DE JAGER: So it had to do with people coming in from abroad?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So in that regard people coming through from Botswana, were directly your responsibility?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Be that as it may then, you would find someone who was providing assistance to bring them into the country, why didn't you devote more attention to the activities of that person?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, attention was devoted to every single person about which information was brought in.

This information was presented in the forum which they later called Trevits, but before that, it was made available to members of National Intelligence and the Defence Force Intelligence Division.

ADV DE JAGER: When did Trevits originate?

BRIG SCHOON: It only originated approximately in 1985, 1986.

ADV DE JAGER: So at that stage, 1981 until let's say 1984, 1985, there was no planning undertaken by other people regarding who would be targets?

BRIG SCHOON: No. Except that at the Security Branch, there was a permanent member of National Intelligence and from the Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: But we are not talking about Intelligence, we are talking about Security Police activities against somebody who was to your knowledge, helping terrorists come into the country.

This was a police matter.

ADV DE JAGER: As the Chairperson has said to you, that is what I am getting at. It was your task to prevent terrorists from coming into the country?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Now there is this person who rightly or wrongly it has been said to us today, assisted these terrorist in entering the country. Is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And according to the evidence, you say that Marius Schoon helped these terrorists to enter the country?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Now shouldn't it be of cardinal importance in your controlling of entry into the country, that you should devote attention to those persons who are assisting terrorists entering the country?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Then why wasn't more attention given to Marius Schoon than what you are telling us?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, Botswana was not allocated to the police as a target territory. It was assigned to the Defence Force and we were tasked to provide Military Intelligence with all information which we gathered regarding Botswana and it was then their task to take any action.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR BERGER: But if that is so Brigadier, why when Mr Dirk Coetzee apparently came to you and said he's got a plan to kill Marius Schoon, why didn't you pass that on to Military Intelligence?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, at that stage this matter hadn't really been cordoned off as such, it was in the process of being cordoned off and consequently I did not regard it as necessary to convey this information to them.

MR BERGER: You are not being honest with this Committee, are you Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I am Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The order to kill Marius Schoon came from higher up, through you, isn't that right?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the order came from me. I plead guilty and that is why I am here today. I am in the hands of this Committee and I am definitely not going to put the blame on somebody else, who actually had no share in it at all.

MR BERGER: You are applying for amnesty in respect of other acts where the order came from higher up and through you, are you not?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Did you ever send people to Botswana to do reconnaissance for you and to post certain articles?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR BERGER: To do reconnaissance?

BRIG SCHOON: Also not.

MR BERGER: Who was on this Target Identification Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: In my Division it was Colonel Buchner, yes in C Section it was him, and I think with Major Williamson's Division, there were also one or two.

MR BERGER: And who would be one or two from Mr Williamson's Section?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know.

MR BERGER: What period was this?

BRIG SCHOON: It was in 1983, 1984, around there.

MR BERGER: 1983, 1984?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. And perhaps later on as well, I am not certain.

MR BERGER: And also before, from about 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: You have said that you read in the report that Mr Marius Schoon had received training at Funda camp. This is in Mr Marius Schoon's file?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is what I remember.

MR BERGER: This would have been from, the information would have come from somebody who was at Funda camp, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Somebody who had seen Mr Marius Schoon there and seen what he was involved in?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: He was only there for about two weeks and he was trained to make devices to shower ANC leaflets in populated areas and he also received training in the use of small arms for the purposes of self-defence.

Was that the kind of information that you read?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, what would happen if someone had been arrested who had entered the country, this person would be interrogated, a photo-album would be shown to him, he would identify faces that he knew and he would say this, this and that person he had seen at this or that camp. This is what he knew about that person and then it would be briefly noted and a copy of that information, would then be placed in the person's file.

MR BERGER: So all you knew was the fact that Marius Schoon had been at Funda camp?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: How long he had been there, what he had been trained in, you didn't know?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't think that that was stipulated in the file, no.

MR BERGER: You didn't know?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't see it there.

MR BERGER: When you were agonising about whether or not you should say yes to the order or give the go ahead, why didn't you refer the matter to the Target Identification Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Coetzee came to me and said that he had the capacity and I saw this as an opportunity at that time, and said okay, after I had thought about it, let's go ahead.

MR BERGER: But you didn't know how it was going to be done, where it was going to be done, you didn't know anything about the dangers inherent in the mission, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: I did realise that a certain level of risk was attached to it.

MR BERGER: There is no mention in your amnesty application, about Jeanette Schoon, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And the reason for that is because you never saw her as a target, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't see her as a target.

MR BERGER: And after the Schoon's had moved to Lubango, you no longer saw them as targets, either of them as targets, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, they were beyond our reach.

MR BERGER: What were the reports coming in about what they were doing in Angola?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I can't remember that.

MR BERGER: But there is nothing that sticks in your mind about them being the masterminds of terror in Angola, that they should be eliminated?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: Isn't it correct that you were very close - I beg your pardon, let me just check something - were you very close to Piet Goosen, Brigadier Piet Goosen?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson, he was a colleague, we worked together. That is as far as it went.

MR BERGER: Was Gen Coetzee very close to Piet Goosen?

BRIG SCHOON: Gen Coetzee had very good relations with all his staff members.

MR BERGER: Was there a written motivation ahead of the plan to kill Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Not that I knew of.

MR BERGER: But there was a written report afterwards, you say?

BRIG SCHOON: No. I don't understand you very well.

MR BERGER: Have you forgotten your evidence that you gave earlier.

MR VISSER: With respect Mr Chairman, there was a report in regard to a firearm that was lost.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but that was the only written report he referred to.

MR BERGER: The report that you referred to, was a firearm which had got lost and the circumstances under which it had gone lost, were described in the report as having been lost in Botswana after Mr Joe Mamasela was sent up there, isn't that what you said?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is what I said. I said that a report was compiled in which it was stated that Joe Mamasela had been assaulted by the ANC and that they had confiscated the revolver. I did see a report like that.

MR BERGER: And wasn't it stated in that report, according to you, that Mr Joe Mamasela had gone up to Botswana to kill Mr Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

BRIG SCHOON: The report simply stated that he was confronted by the ANC in Gaberone if I remember correctly, and that they assaulted him and that they confiscated the weapon.

MR BERGER: And the circumstances under which Mr Joe Mamasela found himself in Botswana with an unlicensed firearm, were not explained in the report?

BRIG SCHOON: Not as far as I know. It was a source report.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, was there every any report which you saw regarding which a Security Policeman had come back and reported saying, I had gone to eliminate someone, I was confronted, assaulted and my weapon was taken? Was anything ever reported like that, in written form or in any of the documents which you saw?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

ADV DE JAGER: Was this not an aspect of those things which were disguised?

BRIG SCHOON: This was a separate source who submitted this information regarding Mamasela who had been assaulted and whose weapon had been confiscated.

ADV DE JAGER: But the source didn't say what he had gone to do there?

BRIG SCHOON: The source didn't know what he had gone to do there.

MR BERGER: I thought the author of that report was Mr Dirk Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson. I asked Dirk Coetzee to write a report for me in order to explain the loss of the firearm, because I had to give account of that.

MR BERGER: And did he write a report explaining the loss of that firearm?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, he did.

MR BERGER: What did he say in that report?

BRIG SCHOON: That he had sent Mamasela or whoever, to Botswana to perform a certain task and that this person was robbed of their firearm. He didn't explain why.

MR BERGER: He said that he had sent Mr Joe Mamasela up to Botswana to do a task with an unlicensed firearm?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, with a firearm.

MR BERGER: Well, it was an unlicensed firearm and that was common knowledge to everyone?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I don't believe so.

MR BERGER: Well, you had to explain the loss of an unlicensed firearm, it was recorded as an unlicensed firearm in your registers?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it in your register? I understood these six firearms had been purchased with Secret Funds?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And they were in the possession of the Commanding Officer, they were not part of the ordinary ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: No, they were in my possession and I had complete control over these items.

MR BERGER: Well then, why was there a need to report on the loss of these secret firearms, who was the report going to?

BRIG SCHOON: I had to give account of these six firearms and if one of them had been issued, I would have to explain what happened to it.

In this case, it was robbed from a source and I submitted a report to the Caretaker of the Secret Fund, so that he could write off the weapon.

MR BERGER: This was a report which would have been seen by the Auditors?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct. Only the Auditors or the Commanding Officer.

MR BERGER: And this report accounted for an unlicensed firearm?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: But surely it wouldn't be mentioned in that report that Mr Mamasela had been sent by Dirk Coetzee up to Botswana to do a certain act with an unlicensed firearm?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson it was an independent source that had absolutely no knowledge who or what Mamasela or Dirk Coetzee were. He submitted a report to state that this person, Mamasela, had been confronted by the ANC at a certain place, that he had been assaulted and that they took his weapon.

MR BERGER: Then if I understand you correctly, there were two reports, one from the source and one from Dirk Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And the one from the source was going where?

BRIG SCHOON: That followed the normal information streams.

MR BERGER: For whose attention?

BRIG SCHOON: That was general information, it was a source that reported about an incident of which he received knowledge about, that occurred in Botswana.

MR BERGER: Who was the source?

BRIG SCHOON: That I cannot say to you, I do not know.

MR BERGER: Somebody from Botswana, someone within the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I do not know if it was an ANC person or not, it was a registered informant who reported back.

MR BERGER: To you?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not to me.

MR BERGER: To whom?

BRIG SCHOON: To the person under which he resided. That report came to my office.

MR BERGER: And it then got put into somebody's file?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Whose file?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know, the people who were mentioned in this, their files.

MR BERGER: In this report he just described Mr Mamasela losing a gun after being confronted by the ANC in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: And being assaulted.

MR BERGER: And this was connected somehow to a gun which had been lost or which had been stolen?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I do not understand now.

MR BERGER: I am not trying to be obtuse, but I understand now you are saying that there were two reports, the one report came through independently from an informer, describing how Mr Mamasela was assaulted in Botswana and his gun was taken from him.

Another report was a report which was handed to you, a written report by Mr Dirk Coetzee, which stated that he had sent Mr Mamasela up to Botswana to perform a certain act, that he had been assaulted by the ANC, his gun had been stolen and he had returned to South Africa?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, the written report came from a source who did not know about Coetzee or Mamasela. He saw an incident happening or he got information about an incident and that is that Mamasela was confronted by the ANC, that he was assaulted, that they took a weapon from him, and that was the report.

That followed the main stream of information, the ordinary or usual stream of information.

I was informed that this happened to Mamasela and that he could not continue with his mission.

MR BERGER: So the report from the source made no mention of Mamasela and made no mention of Dirk Coetzee?

BRIG SCHOON: No, he did mention Mamasela, because he was the person who was assaulted.

CHAIRPERSON: But did he mention the name or did he just say somebody was assaulted?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I think he did mention the name, because Mamasela was well known in Gaberone.

But he did not mention Dirk Coetzee.

MR BERGER: But you see this report that you are talking about from a source, about somebody - a gun being stolen in Botswana, it might not have been your gun at all, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: If he gets a report saying, from a source saying Mamasela was assaulted and his gun was stolen, and if Dirk Coetzee has told him that Dirk Coetzee was assaulted and his gun was stolen, isn't it the same gun?

MR BERGER: I beg your pardon Chairperson, the report of the source, I must have missed it, the report of the source specified Mamasela by name?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Dirk Coetzee's report was handed to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I asked him to write a report in order to give account for this weapon that disappeared.

MR BERGER: And you then forwarded that report on to someone else?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I first left it in the slot where the weapon was, and I either gave it to Koekemoer beforehand or afterwards to Colonel De Kock, after I retired. I had to give account for six weapons.

MR BERGER: So there was a record kept of these six firearms?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And that record was audited?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And so the Auditors would have seen a report from Dirk Coetzee to you, saying that Joe Mamasela had been sent up to Botswana to do something with one of these unlicensed firearms?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct yes.

MR BERGER: And that he had been assaulted and he had lost his firearm and that is how it had gone missing?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You say it was audited. Did they come to your office every year?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson. Koekemoer just asked me if I still had these items and he only needed to say or assure the Auditors that these items were still in my possession.

ADV DE JAGER: These secret equipment or documents, were this checked by internal auditors and not the attorney General?

BRIG SCHOON: No, but later in the 1980's, ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Are you saying that after the 1980's the Auditor General then had access again to these secret documents, but beforehand it was your own, internal auditors that dealt with these matters?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is true.

MR BERGER: And the Rudi scandal was in 1977, am I right?

ADV DE JAGER: I think 1979 was actually the Erasmus report.

MR BERGER: In any event, it was before 1980? So from 1980 onwards, external auditors would have seen Dirk Coetzee's report?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: I am sorry, it is not on record?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that is what I am asking again, did they come to your office and you said you would have put this report with the other five guns?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, the weapons were with me in a cabinet and Koekemoer only asked me once, do I still have these weapons and I said yes, and he would just give the Auditor the assurance that I still have these weapons and it was open for inspection.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they come and inspect?

BRIG SCHOON: Not once.

CHAIRPERSON: And the letter was laying with the guns?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is so.

ADV DE JAGER: Did Koekemoer ever come to have a look?

BRIG SCHOON: No, he just asked me and that is when I realised that this is a secret fund property, or that the weapons came from a secret fund.

ADV DE JAGER: That was before you handed this out?

BRIG SCHOON: No, long after that, but fortunately I did make certain arrangements and got the documentation saying what happened to this weapon.

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, why then did you agree with me on several occasions, when I said that the external auditors would have seen Dirk Coetzee's report to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, if I gave it to Koekemoer it would be on file with him, and they would have seen it. I cannot remember at what stage I got rid of this.

MR BERGER: I have a note here, perhaps you can tell me if I am wrong, that at one point in your questioning by Mr Levine, you told the Committee that you did not know that the Schoon's left Botswana for Angola? Did you say that?

BRIG SCHOON: I might have said that, yes, because I do not know when they went to Angola.

MR BERGER: You were referred to Exhibit N, page 40, paragraph 3.9.1. Do you know who Henry Mahoti was or is?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I only know that he was a senior member of the ANC.

MR BERGER: When was the first time you heard his name?

BRIG SCHOON: I could have heard it earlier on, but I cannot say that it leaves an impression.

MR BERGER: I get the impression and perhaps to try and short circuit this, you can correct me if I am wrong, that the only people that you, or the only person in fact, that you can talk about mentioned in paragraph 3.9.1, is Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Dan Hlume was known to me yes, he was a representative in Botswana for years.

MR BERGER: Patrick Fitzgerald?

BRIG SCHOON: He is unknown to me.

MR BERGER: Magurle Sexwale?

BRIG SCHOON: Also unknown to me.

MR BERGER: Jakes Tolo?

BRIG SCHOON: Unknown.

MR BERGER: Was Henry Mahoti, senior or junior to Marius Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know.

MR BERGER: Do you know who Billy Masetla was?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Keith Mokwape, do you know who he was?

BRIG SCHOON: I heard his name often, but personally I do not have any knowledge of this person.

MR BERGER: Where were these people during the 1980's?

BRIG SCHOON: They were in the neighbouring States?

MR BERGER: Where?

BRIG SCHOON: In Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola, Lusaka. They moved around regularly, they never stayed at one place for very long.

MR BERGER: But you don't even know who Billy Masetla is?

BRIG SCHOON: There were so many names, I cannot say that the names really made any sense to me.

MR BERGER: Patrick Fitzgerald, that doesn't ring any bell?

BRIG SCHOON: No, he is unknown to me. I may have heard the name, but I did not personally work or deal with these people's files. I saw a name and then forgot it.

MR BERGER: But you read Exhibit RR?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I did look at it briefly.

MR BERGER: I could go on, Wally Serote. Do you know Wally Serote?

BRIG SCHOON: I heard about him yes.

MR BERGER: Where was he? If your attorney could just leave you?

BRIG SCHOON: Their names do sound familiar, but where they were at what stage, that I really cannot say.

MR BERGER: Tabang Magwetla?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it is one that is unknown.

MR BERGER: Hassam Ebrahim?

BRIG SCHOON: Ebrahim, he does sound familiar.

MR BERGER: From where?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know from where, yes.

MR BERGER: Hassam Ebrahim, not Ebrahim Ebrahim?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I am afraid I do not know him.

MR BERGER: Lambert Moloi?

BRIG SCHOON: I heard about him often.

MR BERGER: From where?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot exactly say.

MR BERGER: Just a name to you?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: You didn't read any files Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I read hundreds of reports, documents. After a while you just look at it, and just read on.

MR BERGER: What position did Marius Schoon hold in the ANC in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: He was one of the senior ANC representatives there?

MR BERGER: What was his position?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know exactly what his position was.

MR BERGER: What were the structures in Botswana?

BRIG SCHOON: It appears in the documents, but I have forgot it.

MR BERGER: What positions did Marius and Jeanette hold in Angola?

BRIG SCHOON: I heard here that they were at the University of Lubango.

MR BERGER: That is what you have heard?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, now here, in this hearing.

MR BERGER: What positions did they hold according to you in 1984, what did you think in 1984 they were doing?

BRIG SCHOON: In 1984, I do not know what they did.

MR BERGER: You were referred to Exhibit AA, could you have it before you please.

Do you have Exhibit AA?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct yes.

MR BERGER: This is a press statement issued at the time of Jeanette Schoon and Katryn Schoon's death. Have you read this document?

BRIG SCHOON: Only today when it was brought under my attention, I read a part of it.

MR BERGER: And you were referred to the last paragraph, in fact you weren't even referred to the whole paragraph, you were just referred to two words, three words, comrade in arms and you said well, that means she is a communist?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I said a communist, ANC supporter or member.

MR BERGER: So, a comrade could refer to an ANC supporter or an ANC member?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is a general term used.

MR BERGER: Did you know that Jeanette Schoon was not even a member of the Communist Party?

BRIG SCHOON: I heard about it that she was a member, but that she didn't support the ideology any more.

MR BERGER: You are making the first mistake as the Business Day, that is Ruth First that you are referring to?

BRIG SCHOON: Oh yes, I am sorry.

MR BERGER: Is there anything in Exhibit AA that you can contradict or say is not correct?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot deny anything here.

MR BERGER: Then Exhibit L the document by comrade Nzala, tribute to comrade Ruth First. Have you read Exhibit L?

BRIG SCHOON: I think the only part that I read in it, was a really short bit.

MR BERGER: You haven't read the document?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I did not.

MR BERGER: You knew nothing about Ruth First, correct?

BRIG SCHOON: You could say that yes.

MR BERGER: Other than that she was a high profile anti-apartheid speaker, internationally known.

BRIG SCHOON: And the wife of Joe Slovo.

MR BERGER: And that was important for you that she was the wife of Joe Slovo?

BRIG SCHOON: In a sense, yes.

MR BERGER: Enough to have her killed?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, this witness hasn't applied for amnesty for Ruth First or Jeanette Schoon. My learned friend has his wires crossed.

MR BERGER: With respect, my learned friend, Mr Visser, did not object when Mr Levine asked these questions in cross-examination, nor when my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis asked questions.

MR VISSER: They did not suggest Mr Chairman, that this witness should know things about Ruth First and Katryn and Jeanette Schoon, which he obviously doesn't know.

MR BERGER: Oh, but they did Chairperson, they most definitely did and the record will speak for itself.

I can move on.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, may I enquire from my learned friend Mr Berger, where did I suggest in cross-examination in any way whatsoever, that Brigadier Schoon was involved in the killing of Jeanette Schoon and Ruth First? I would like to know that otherwise the record is going to reflect his statements, without me saying anything about that.

MR BERGER: I never suggested that Chairperson. I never suggested that my learned friend suggested that Brigadier Schoon was involved in the murders of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and Ruth First.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think the witness said it, I don't think he at any time acknowledged that he was involved in the killing of First or the killing of Jeanette Schoon, so please carry on to the next question and let's see whether we could finish perhaps this witness today.

MR BERGER: As you please Adv De Jager. You were referred to the extract from the Terrorist Album, Exhibit M?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BERGER: But you have no knowledge which can contribute to the activities, to further elucidation of the activities of Ruth First?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BERGER: You were referred to Exhibit KK, the address by President Nelson Mandela to the closing session of the 50th National Conference of the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And you were referred to the third last paragraph on the first page?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: And you said that all the people mentioned in that paragraph, were senior leaders of the ANC/SACP alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Does that include Ms Helen Joseph?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, she is also mentioned here.

MR BERGER: Who was Mr Moses Kotani?

BRIG SCHOON: He was a big leader in the ANC, he was a prominent person in the ANC.

MR BERGER: Who was Ms Florence Moposho?

BRIG SCHOON: That is one that I do not know.

MR BERGER: Oh, you don't know her?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I do not know her.

MR BERGER: Kate Molale?

BRIG SCHOON: She is half known to me.

MR BERGER: Alex Laguma?

BRIG SCHOON: Alex Laguma, yes, I heard a lot about him.

MR BERGER: From where?

BRIG SCHOON: In documents.

MR BERGER: What were his activities?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot say off hand.

MR BERGER: Wasn't he a writer?

BRIG SCHOON: That is possible yes.

MR BERGER: You don't know?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know.

MR BERGER: And then it goes on, the next paragraph, it is in their name that we say to you here are the reigns of the movement, protect and guard its precious legacy, defend its unity and integrity as committed disciples of change, pursue its popular objectives like true revolutionaries who seek only to serve the nation.

Aren't the people mentioned in the third last paragraph, deceased people who were committed disciples of change?

BRIG SCHOON: That is the impression that I get here now, yes.

MR BERGER: Not to say that they were all leading members of the ANC, Communist Party alliance, they were people who had advocated a free and democratic South Africa, isn't that what the connection is?

BRIG SCHOON: I would not deny that, no.

MR BERGER: You were asked about the video's that were being shown before this Committee. One such video was about an arms cache which had been discovered. You know from your own experience do you not, that that video does not reflect the true reality of what was going on?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Mr Chairperson, it was one that was placed by us.

MR BERGER: You said in relation to Mr Levine that the Schoon's after they were transferred to Lubango, were prominent members of the ANC/CP alliance, but the truth is you don't know that, do you Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: According to his file, he would have been a prominent leader.

MR BERGER: This was a file that you looked at in 1981?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: I am talking about 1984, you had no idea what he was?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you ever hear that they resigned?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

ADV DE JAGER: Or that they distanced themselves from the ANC/SACP alliance?

BRIG SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: I can see that the Advocates look at me as if I asked something strange, you did not try to find out if they had retired, and I do not think that this is the case that Mr Schoon ever distanced himself from the ANC, he was always a supporter of the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: That is the impression that I have Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But nothing focused your attention on the fact that after they left Botswana, they were still members or not members of the ANC?

BRIG SCHOON: That is true, yes.

MR BERGER: You stated Brigadier Schoon in response to a question by my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis, that you agreed that Mr Williamson acted with a political motive. My question to you is have you discussed these applications with Mr Williamson?

BRIG SCHOON: I never discussed this application with him.

MR BERGER: You don't know what his motive was other than what he has told the Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: I do not know.

MR BERGER: You told the Committee under questions from my learned friend, Mr Jansen, that the different sections of the Security Police, dealt with different racial groups. What group did you deal with?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I dealt with the terrorists and that included all races.

MR BERGER: Your job was to use your words, stop and correct me if I am wrong, to stop black and white terrorists from committing acts of terror in South Africa, that was your job?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, amongst other things, it was one of my tasks.

MR BERGER: And you viewed Mr Marius Schoon as a terrorist?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it was by chance that Mr Dirk Coetzee came to me that we could eliminate him, and I did see him as a terrorist, yes.

MR BERGER: Did you - you were in overall command of Vlakplaas, am I correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: And you have confirmed that there were huge caches of Eastern Block weapons stored at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, those weapons at the beginning of 1989, Colonel De Kock brought these weapons. It is weaponry that comes from Namibia and I told him I am not very happy about this, because I already knew at that stage that I would leave the Force, I allowed him to continue and to stash these weapons there.

He documented it in a proper way and kept it in a safe place. I was aware of it, yes.

MR BERGER: So you saw registers or documents which listed the Eastern Block weapons at Vlakplaas?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, he had a register of each and every weapon. It was in a large room with shelves and they were stacked neatly in this room.

MR BERGER: Were you present on occasions when Gen Coetzee visited Vlakplaas?

BRIG SCHOON: Gen Coetzee rarely visited Vlakplaas, I think it was two or three times that I know of.

MR BERGER: When you were present?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Why did you tell lies to McNally?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, at that stage I feared for my life if I would reveal this whole truth. Then I would have to go to Mauritius with Mr Dirk Coetzee.

MR BERGER: Was that the same reason you told lies to the Harms Commission?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: What is the reason that you told lies to the Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: In which sense?

MR BERGER: You admitted in response to a question by my learned friend, Mr Jansen, that you told lies to this Committee today, what is the reason for that?

BRIG SCHOON: What lie was that?

ADV DE JAGER: You initially said you did not tell lies to McNally, that was a lie that you told us.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes. No, I did not see it in that light.

MR BERGER: Sorry, you lied to Adv McNally, you lied to Judge Harms because you were afraid for your life?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Why did you lie to this Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: It was not intentional.

MR BERGER: You were specifically asked whether you had lied to the Harms Commission and whether you had lied to Adv McNally and you said no. You are saying that that no, was not an intentional no?

BRIG SCHOON: No, it wasn't.

MR BERGER: It wasn't?

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, we could not hear your answer, what was it? Was it a purposeful no or was it an non-purposeful no?

BRIG SCHOON: It was not a purposeful no.

ADV DE JAGER: What did you mean to convey when you answered no?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I did not remember the wording of my statement at that stage any more, and that is why I said today that I did not lie. I kept quiet and in that I made myself guilty.

ADV DE JAGER: But what you are saying is that you are admitting that you lied, well, then if you have admitted this, then you are admitting that you have lied, and a lie is a purposeful silent, non-truth which you are trying to convey, so how can you say that you didn't mean to tell a lie?

MR BERGER: Brigadier Schoon, if you truly feared for your life when you lied to Adv McNally and to Judge Harms, you would have remembered when my learned friend, Mr Jansen, asked you that you had lied to those people, not so?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: But you lied here and you said no, I didn't lie there. My question to you is, if fear was the reason for your lies then, what is the reason for your lies now?

BRIG SCHOON: It was not my intention to lie. My honest intention was to come and tell the truth here, and that is what I have done.

MR BERGER: At the time when you lied to Adv McNally and Judge Harms, Mr F.W. de Klerk was the President of the country, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I think you are correct.

MR BERGER: Gen Van der Merwe was the Head of the Security Police, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR BERGER: Your attorney is shaking his head, maybe I've got in wrong.

MR VISSER: I think Johan van der Merwe was Commissioner in 1990 Mr Chairman. De Witt, I think, De Witt departed in 1989, but I may be mistaken.

MR BERGER: It doesn't matter. Who were you afraid of? You could have gone to Mr F.W. de Klerk and told the truth, couldn't you have?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I probably could have done that, but I didn't.

MR BERGER: You didn't lie out of fear, you lied because there was this great cover up and you were party to that, isn't that right?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson. I don't know whether or not it was a cover up, it may be so.

MR BERGER: And you are lying here because you are covering up again, isn't that the truth Brigadier Schoon?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I am not trying to protect anybody. I am here because I am guilty.

MR BERGER: You also could have gone to Judge Goldstone in his protection programme, am I right?

BRIG SCHOON: I could have, but I didn't. I was not asked.

MR BERGER: Thank you Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I've got no questions for this witness.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one matter arising Mr Chairman, with your leave.

Brigadier you said a few moments ago that you would not have lied purposefully here this morning. When you were confronted by my learned friend, Mr Jansen, that you had lied before McNally and Harms, could you at that point have remembered what the content of the statements were, the statements which you made to Mr McNally and Judge Harms' investigation team?

BRIG SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Afterwards you received the two statements, UU1 and UU2.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And after you had read it, you immediately conceded that it contained lies?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR SIBANYONI: Just one question Mr Chairperson. Brigadier Schoon you say you were sort of hesitant before you authorised the plan to assassinate Mr Marius Schoon, but why didn't you give yourself time enough to go through the whole file, rather than just to look at the memorandum?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, the information which was immediately to be seen in the file, I regarded as sufficient in order to be able to make my decision.

MR SIBANYONI: You also said that you were happy that the plan didn't go on, it was called off. Was the consideration not maybe that of the fact that you might have suspected that Mr Marius Schoon is your distant relative?

BRIG SCHOON: It could have been a contributing factor which led to my feeling of relief.

MR SIBANYONI: No further questions Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You have been asked about the time factor, about making up your mind to give Mr Coetzee authority to carry out his plan.

Were you during those two days, doing your ordinary work as well?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I continued with my usual duties.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the evidence that you are going to lead, is it Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I have just heard, it will conclude the evidence, barring one thing - I understand that the witness wants to say something.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I would like to express my deep regret over Marius Schoon, that I had involved myself in an attempt to kill him.

I deeply regret it and in the spirit of reconciliation, I would like to offer my serious and deep apology. Whether or not he accepts it, does not matter, but I feel that this is something that I must say.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, yes, and that also concludes the evidence which we intended to place before you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I had said that I wished to sit late this afternoon to make up for time we will lose tomorrow, is that convenient for all of you, have you been able to make arrangements?

MR VISSER: For tomorrow Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Today?

MR VISSER: For today, we are here until five o'clock as you have ordered. I don't know if we have got something to go on with, though.

MR BIZOS: The next witness will be Mr Marius Schoon Mr Chairman.

There is a question though, that it appears to us that we are not going to finish during the course of this week, having regard to the number of the witnesses that we have to call.

The telephone lines have been very busy with the two Parliamentarians that have agreed to come. If no other possible arrangement can be made, they will have to absent themselves from Parliament on Thursday, Mr Maharaj has no problem with Friday, but the other two will have to - to give you an example, the Deputy Minister of Finance has to speak in the morning, on Thursday morning, she has volunteered to rush to the airport and come here for the afternoon in the hope that she will be able to finish during this session Mr Chairman.

We have four other witnesses to call during the course of this week. In my assessment, we will not finish with those four witnesses, even with those four witnesses this week, having regard that we have to hear Mr Maharaj on Friday morning.

I would ask for leave Mr Chairman, to release those persons from their undertaking to try their best to come here, because it is creating havoc with the legislative programme and their participation in it Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that what we are going to have to meet every time when we sit, they will always have these problems, won't they?

MR BIZOS: You will remember particularly the last week when the most activity takes place, and things have got to be done, and there isn't any possibility of shuffling the order paper.

It seems to us Mr Chairman, that they will come here on Thursday, they will probably - even, we will have to interrupt with ...(indistinct), we will have to possibly not finish one or both of them during that day, they are not available on Friday and I would ask for leave to say to them that they can carry on with their activities in Cape Town and other dates will be arranged Mr Chairman.

We are not going to finish anyway Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, the trouble is we had a look at our programme, we are sitting on different Committees for the rest of the year, so there is no possibility of a reconvening of this panel during this year.

MR BIZOS: We are mindful of that Mr Chairman, and it was under protest that the Parliamentarians agreed that they will try their best to come during this week, because one or other of us was not available during any other time this year, Mr Chairman, and that was the basis on which we persuaded them to agree.

Once it has become clear that we are not going to finish, then it would be a pity if they lose their day in Parliament and ... (microphone not on)

ADV DE JAGER: Can we really not finish, we've got how many witnesses still?

MR BIZOS: Four, possibly five, other than the two Parliamentarians Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You say four new witnesses, the two Parliamentarians and Mr Maharaj to complete his evidence? So there is possibly seven.

MR BIZOS: This is a physical impossibility, having regard to the pace at which we have been moving, and I have no reason to believe that the pace will increase Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: If I may be permitted to say something Mr Chairman, if we had been informed as to who all these witnesses are and given statements as to what they might say first of all, we won't compound the problem of finishing, by having to ask you to stand down to prepare, because we would be able to prepare beforehand for cross-examination, if any.

Even more so, it may even be that there is nothing that we wish to contend in such statements, or in such evidence Mr Chairman, and really perhaps the normal rule of presenting statements of witnesses that are going to be called, should be adhered to in this case.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I don't want to lay an egg as well, but if Mr Bizos chooses to present his case without putting to applicants what other witnesses are going to come and testify, that is the risk he takes Mr Chairman.

If he wants to do it that way, I don't have any problem, then we must deal with the evidence as it comes. I don't think Mr Chairman, in all fairness it would be proper for you to tell Mr Bizos, how to do his case. If he doesn't want to put the evidence of his witnesses as is the practice in the normal way, and he wants to do it that way, then it is his case Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I don't think that I am being understood. I am not asking for directions as to how to run my case Mr Chairman.

My application is a simple one, that we are holding on an undertaking by responsible people in this country, for them to make themselves available on Thursday at great inconvenience to them and to the legislative process, because we are not going to finish, I want an indication from the Chair, Mr Chairman, to release them from that undertaking.

As far as shortening the proceedings, Mr Schoon Mr Chairman, must give evidence. I don't know that I can ask anybody to make admissions in relation to that. In fact the issues have been defined, it is not correct that we have not said what witnesses will say.

I recall very well that we have put versions to witnesses, it is quite unfair, quite unfair for my learned friend to say that we did not put our version to witnesses.

We put what happened in Ruth First's office in Maputo quite clearly. We indicated the identity of the persons who would give evidence in relation to that.

We indicated that Mr Mahoti is, I am sure that if their clients knew anything about what they were doing, they would have recognised him, he is at the back of the court. We have put the evidence of Mr Van Jaarsveld, which was hotly denied by Mr Williamson. What evidence did we not put Mr Chairman?

I would ask for an apology Mr Chairman. Such statements are not made about one's colleagues where there is no basis at all.

MR DU PLESSIS: No Mr Chairman, I will not apologise because I will argue that point. I have been going through the record exactly what was put, I know what was put. There was a lot of evidence today that was never put to any witnesses.

Neither Mr Williamson, nor my client. I will argue that point and I will take it up with any witness Mr Bizos calls.

The point I tried to make Mr Chairman, is that I differ from Mr Visser in asking you to ask Mr Bizos to present us with evidence of his witnesses. I don't have a problem if Mr Bizos decides to do that, but I differ from his viewpoint that that should come from the Committee.

If Mr Bizos wants to do that Mr Chairman, he can do that. If he doesn't want to present us with versions, if he doesn't want to put his version in cross-examination, that is his case Mr Chairman. That is all I wanted to say. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I am depressed that we have not, and I am now speaking about the Committee and not you gentlemen, managed to properly bring into effect our idea of pre-trial conferences, where these matters could have been thrashed out, it wasn't done.

If we are not going to finish today, I feel we must fix a date for the adjourned hearing, I propose a date in January and I would ask you all to get your diaries so that we can fix that date and that we don't adjourn again for another six months.

I see Ms Patel is shaking her head.

MS PATEL: If I may Honourable Chairperson, your Committee member Mr Sibanyoni is involved in a part-heard which will run to the end of January, so if we reconvene, it will have to be in February. That is the earliest.

CHAIRPERSON: Who is involved in the part-heard, me?

MS PATEL: Mr Sibanyoni, in the Boipatong matter, that is set down until the end of January.

CHAIRPERSON: Starting when?

MS PATEL: On the 18th.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am available Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we will fall in.

MR BIZOS: ... on edge, because they will not be called on Thursday Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, could we perhaps, could I suggest that we carry on until tomorrow afternoon. Would it be inconvenient to let them know tomorrow evening because it may be that we could at least finish say one of them on Thursday?

MR BIZOS: Can we make it lunch time, because I have actually suggested to them on the telephone, to both of them, that the position will be clarified by tomorrow and if we could by lunch time tomorrow clarify the position instead of the end of the day, because they may have to make bookings and matters of that nature.

Could I say that by lunch time tomorrow, we will give them an indication of what the position is?

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) bookings, they would be able to get the last seat on the plane.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes very well Mr Bizos, and could I then in the light of that suggest, I said 11:30, I now say eleven o'clock tomorrow morning. We will make an effort to get started and can we now start with the witness?

Certainly we will take a very brief - I don't think it has come into law yet, has it, the smoking in public?

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR BIZOS: Mr Marius Schoon will affirm to speak the truth, Mr Chairman.

MARIUS SCHOON: (affirms and states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Mr Schoon, you are or you were the husband of Jeanette Schoon and the father of your two children?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: How old are you now?

MR SCHOON: I am 61 Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Did you get a degree at Stellenbosch University?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I have a degree from Stellenbosch University and I have two degrees and a Post-graduate diploma from UNISA.

MR BIZOS: Were those, the latter degrees obtained whilst you were in prison?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: We have heard that you were convicted of sabotage and served 12 years imprisonment?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: When were you married to Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am not certain of the exact date. We were married on the afternoon before we left to go to Botswana illegally, it was some time towards the end of June of 1977.

MR BIZOS: Were you both restricted persons?

MR SCHOON: I went under house arrest and had very stringent banning orders and Jeanette had banning orders for her Trade Union activities.

MR BIZOS: Had Jeanette been a prominent leader in NUSAS?

MR SCHOON: She had Chairperson, she had in fact become Deputy Chairperson of NUSAS. She subsequently worked in NUSAS' welfare structures, called if I remember correctly Naswell and from Naswell, she was instrumental in forming the Wages Commission which contributed considerably to the re-emergence of the black Trade Unions in the country.

MR BIZOS: Yes. In view of some of the things that maybe strange to the people that were watching you and restricted you, was the object of the Wages Commission, to organise the Trade Union movement in South Africa at a time after there was violence on the shop floors, particularly in Natal and was it the view of the Wages Commission, that structures were necessary in order to channel the conflict that would inevitably be between employers and employees?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I was not around at the time, I was still in prison. My understanding is that the object of the Wage Commission were two-fold. Firstly to channel the energy and the frustration of workers in South Africa in order to avoid violence on the shop floor, and secondly to get workers a stronger and more organised voice than they had possibly for the previous 15 or 18 years.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that the work of the Wages Commission was an issue in the, what became known as the NUSAS leadership trial, where attempts were made to prove that the work of the Wages Commission was furthering the objects of communism in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: I have been informed of that Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Were you informed that a Regional Magistrate that heard the case for ten months on that and other counts, acquitted the five accused?

MR SCHOON: I am aware that the accused were acquitted, I am not aware of the Magistrate's reasons Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was Jenny part and parcel of that group of people pushing forward the Wages Commission work and getting employers to understand it, writing about it?

MR SCHOON: She was definitely doing that, both as regards the Wages Commission and subsequently working through the Industrial Aid Society which she helped found in Johannesburg.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether leading academics at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of Natal, were involved in an advisory capacity in the Wages Commission, that your late wife was involved in?

MR SCHOON: That is my understanding Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You went to Botswana, in what capacity did you go there?

MR SCHOON: We went there under instructions from the ANC, I think it was during May of 1977, it became clear from newspaper reports that I was likely to be involved in the second Breytenbach trial. We discussed it with comrades in Johannesburg and a decision was taken that we should join the ANC's external mission.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did you present yourself in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: We arrived in Botswana, we made immediate contact with the ANC's representative in Botswana and within days we were registered as refugees by the UNHCR, working in Botswana.

MR BIZOS: What do the initials that you mentioned, stand for?

MR SCHOON: UNHCR is the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

MR BIZOS: Did you eventually find employment in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I started teaching at a secondary school in Botswana in January of 1978.

MR BIZOS: And your wife?

MR SCHOON: She was unable to find employment. At least for the first year we were in Molepolole in Botswana, subsequently she was also teaching at the secondary school with me.

I think possibly from round about April of 1978, but I am not clear on the date. No, April of 1979, I beg your pardon.

MR BIZOS: Did you continue teaching there?

MR SCHOON: We continued teaching at the secondary school until July of 1981. July of 1981, we took up new jobs, working as Joint Field Officers for a British organisation called International Voluntary Service, which is an organisation which places young people to come and work in a developing situation.

MR BIZOS: Was there an ANC presence in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: There was a Chief Representative in Botswana, there was an ANC residence where a number of people were staying, and there were also ANC comrades staying in various parts of Botswana.

MR BIZOS: Did you regard yourself as a member of the ANC whilst you were in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Without a doubt, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And your wife?

MR SCHOON: Without a doubt, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: You were or had been a member of the Communist Party. Did you continue being a member of the Communist Party whilst you were in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was not a question of continue. I had had long discussions with Braam Fischer while in prison, and Braam had suggested that I should join the party as soon as I came out of prison.

I made approaches to Dan Hlume whom I knew to be a party member, and I was incorporated into a party group for the time that I was in Botswana.

MR BIZOS: Mr Hlume was in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Mr Hlume had been in Botswana I think possibly since the early 1960's.

MR BIZOS: Was he also an ANC member?

MR SCHOON: He was a member both of the Central Committee of the party, and of the NEC of the ANC.

MR BIZOS: Did Jeanette ever become a member of the Communist Party?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot say that definitely, because of the way the party structures worked, but to my knowledge, Jeanette was never a member of the party. To my knowledge, she was never approached to join the party.

MR BIZOS: You are shown on a document Exhibit N, as being - I just want to use the precise words Mr Chairman, you have seen the document.

MR SCHOON: What document is that?

MR BIZOS: The one, the submission, the ANC submission.

MR SCHOON: I have seen the document.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now that document has on page - can he have a copy please - if you would turn to page 36, it shows ...

ADV DE JAGER: It is Exhibit N, page 36 that you are referring to?

MR BIZOS: Yes. Page 41, have you got it?

MR SCHOON: Page 41?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: I have it.

MR BIZOS: There is a rectangular, in a rectangular block Botswana Senior Organ. Underneath that, three smaller almost square blocks, Military Committee, Political Committee and NAT, which we were told, dealt with Intelligence.

Could you please tell us whether you were a member of any one of these structures?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I was a member of the Political Committee.

MR BIZOS: Were you on the Senior Organ?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, not only did I never serve on the Senior Organ, I only know the names of individuals that were my link to the Senior Organ, I do not know the whole membership of the Senior Organ.

MR BIZOS: According to your information or surmise, who were the members of the Senior Organ?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I can only speak about the people that were my link to the Senior Organ. To begin with, it was Henry Mahoti.

MR BIZOS: Henry Mahoti.

MR SCHOON: Henry Mahoti.

MR BIZOS: Did he have a nom de plume?

MR SCHOON: I sure he has had many nom de plume, I knew him as comrade Squires since the early 1960's.

MR BIZOS: Comrade Squires? Is he sitting ...

MR SCHOON: He is sitting here.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the person on the front row.

MR SCHOON: He was removed from Botswana. My recollection is that it was either late 1979 or early 1980.

MR BIZOS: Who took over?

MR SCHOON: No, I don't know who took over his position. I know who my link to the Senior Organ was.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: My link to the Senior Organ was then Mr Lindelwa Mabandla.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: Subsequently my link to the Senior Organ was a comrade who at the time, I knew as David, who I now know is Mr Jerry Masatela who is our Ambassador in India.

In the period shortly before we left Botswana, my link to the Senior Organ was Mr Billy Masetla.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Who else was on the Political Committee?

MR SCHOON: When we arrived in Botswana, the Political Committee consisted of myself, the Political Committee was Chaired by Henry Mahoti, the members that attended those meetings in the period to begin with, were myself, Jenny and Magurle Sexwale.

That lasted possibly for about a year, possibly until round about June of 1978.

MR BIZOS: Could you please tell the Amnesty Committee what yours and your wife's work was on this Political Committee?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the Political Committee was charged with firstly political mass mobilisation of people working at home, of people living at home. My responsibilities and Jenny's were particularly to do with the PWV area, to a very limited extent the rural areas of what is now the Northern Province and what is now North West Province.

Secondly we were charged with recruiting comrades, either individually or people who could bring an existing structure with them, to be members of the ANC where their duties would be firstly to send to us regular reports on what they regarded as strategic happenings in the areas in which they had influence in networks which they had.

Secondly, to establish themselves as propaganda units, to distribute ANC material inside the country and thirdly, to suggest the names of other possible recruits to the ANC.

MR BIZOS: Did that continue throughout your stay in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That continued throughout our stay in Botswana, though I became less involved in the work possibly towards the end of 1982.

Jenny had further responsibilities in Botswana, in that the bulk of her work was doing SACTU work within the labour movement, which again consisted of sending regular reports to SACTU's Executive in Lusaka on developments within the country, and that was the country as a whole, not the PWV area.

Establishing areas of influence within the emerging Trade Union movement, to propagate the ideas of the ANC and SACTU, and to attempt to use influence from Botswana and from comrades working inside the country, to try and bring about unity within the emerging Trade Unions.

MR BIZOS: Who represented South Africa at the International Labour Organisation during the apartheid years?

MR SCHOON: I am not certain Chairperson, but my recollection is that the South African government delegation either withdrew or was expelled.

I should imagine that SACTU possibly represented South Africa, but I don't have certainty on that.

MR BIZOS: Was SACTU declared an unlawful organisation in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Never Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether its membership with the International Labour Organisation, or rather representing South Africa at the International Labour Organisation, had anything to do by the apartheid government's failure to ban it?

MR SCHOON: I could speculate Chairperson, I don't have any knowledge.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now, I want to refer you to the text of the representations made by the African National Congress and if you would please have a look at page 40, paragraph 3.9.1.

MR SCHOON: What page please?

MR BIZOS: Page 40.

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Paragraph 3.9.1. The Botswana IPC, what does that stand for?

MR SCHOON: It stands for the Internal Political Committee.

MR BIZOS: 1976 - 1990, was led by Henry Mahoti and Dan Hlume, what do you say to that?

MR SCHOON: I knew that Henry Mahoti was in very close contact with Dan Hlume. I did not know that Dan Hlume was heading the IPC in Botswana, but it comes as no surprise to me to find that he was.

I knew that Henry Mahoti had a very senior position in the IPC.

MR BIZOS: Incidentally, what had Mr Mahoti's occupation been before he went into, or rather, whilst he was in South Africa up to a certain stage?

MR SCHOON: Immediately before, no in the few, for some time before going into Botswana, his occupation was breaking stones in the quarry in Robben Island.

Prior to that, Mr Mahoti had been a teacher and in a very principled fashion had resigned the teaching position with the introduction of Bantu Education.

MR BIZOS: At various times, Jenny and Marius Schoon, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Patrick Fitzgerald?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot recall that Patrick actually attended IPC meetings. My recollection is that after IPC meetings, either Jenny or I would pass on relevant information to Patrick.

MR BIZOS: Magurle Sexwale?

MR SCHOON: Magurle, part of that Committee, in the first period we were in Botswana, she was redeployed to Lusaka, I think before Henry Mahoti was, but in the period that she was in Botswana, she served on that Committee.

MR BIZOS: And Jakes Tolo?

MR SCHOON: I do not remember.

MR BIZOS: And "Negro"?

MR SCHOON: I remember comrade Negro attended some meetings of the IPC, but I don't think he attended on a regular basis.

He also left to further his studies fairly soon after we came to Botswana.

MR BIZOS: I would like you to please turn to page 43.

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Paragraph 4.6.2. Botswana Senior Organ, 1980 - 1983. Chair Henry Mahoti succeeded by Lambert Moloi. What do you say to that?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, my recollection is that Henry Mahoti left Botswana fairly early in 1980, so if he was Chair of that Senior Organ, it would have been for a very short time.

I do not know Lambert Moloi. I never served on this body.

MR BIZOS: On the Senior Organ?

MR SCHOON: I never served on the Senior Organ and if I may Chairperson, I have discussed this submission by the ANC with both Mr Patrick Fitzgerald and Mr Hassam Ebrahim, and they both assure me that they also never served on this body.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You say that - did you know Mr Billy Masetla?

MR SCHOON: Masetla, I know Mr Billy Masetla very well indeed. In fact, during this period from 1980 - 1983, he was one of the people that was my link to the Senior Organ.

MR BIZOS: I see. And Keith Mokwape?

MR SCHOON: I knew Keith Mokwape. He lived at the ANC residence in Gaberone. We had basically social dealings with him. I never actually worked with him.

MR BIZOS: And Dan Hlume, you have told us about.

MR SCHOON: I did not mention Chairperson, that on the SACTU Committee on which Jenny worked in Botswana, Dan Hlume was Chairing that SACTU Committee.

MR BIZOS: Had he been involved in Trade Union affairs?

MR SCHOON: He had been a Trade Unionist possibly from the early 1930's Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Then yourself and Jenny?

MR SCHOON: Neither Jenny or I served on that Committee.

MR BIZOS: Patrick Fitzgerald?

MR SCHOON: I have spoken to Patrick, and he assures me that he never served on that Committee. I have similarly spoken to Hassam Ebrahim.

MR BIZOS: Do you know Mr Wally Serote?

MR SCHOON: I know Mr Wally Serote. I did not know that he was a member of the Senior Organ.

MR BIZOS: What prominence has Mr Wally Serote achieved in life?

MR SCHOON: Mr Wally Serote is one of the great South African poets of the century. He has written an excellent novel.

Mr Wally Serote is now a Member of Parliament, Chairing the Standing Portfolio Committee on Culture in Parliament.

MR BIZOS: Mr Tabang Magwetla?

MR SCHOON: I do not know who that is Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: This Senior Organ, was it a secret council?

MR SCHOON: Members of the sub-structures of the Senior Organ, did not know who the members of the Senior Organ were, except for the one person that was their link to that body.

ADV DE JAGER: I see. So you wouldn't know whether they were there or whether they were not members, except for those you have asked now?

MR SCHOON: The only two people whose names are mentioned there, that I can say definitely were members of the Senior Organ are Mr Henry Mahoti, who we used to report through and Mr Billy Masetla, who we subsequently reported through.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: You have heard the evidence of Brigadier Schoon that you were regarded by him as having been involved in terrorism.

MR SCHOON: I heard the evidence Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: That was the evidence of his information. And also that you facilitated the passage of people going out for military training, according to his information and people, you facilitated people who had had military training, and came to Botswana, you facilitated their passage into South Africa. What do you say about those allegations on the information of Brigadier Schoon?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I would like to say two things about that.

Firstly, I noted with great interest that Brigadier Schoon was not able to give any specific information whatsoever. It was to my mind generalities. That was not my job in Botswana. My job in Botswana was not to facilitate bringing people out of the country for military training, or sending trained cadres back into the country.

MR BIZOS: I don't know whether the Committee considers this an appropriate stage?

CHAIRPERSON: You know how much longer you are going to be.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: There were two, and he said firstly. Secondly?

MR SCHOON: I said the two things Mr Commissioner, I said firstly that I did not hear Brigadier Schoon being able to state anything specific to support his assertions, and secondly I said that that was not my job in Botswana and I deny that that was what I was doing in Botswana.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS