Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: ... to fix a date for the adjourned hearing in February, because one of my Committee members will not be available in January, he has already got a part-heard matter, and I asked you to bring your diaries with you today, so that we could fix a date.

Mr Bizos, since then, somebody, I am not sure who, told me that Parliament commences sitting again in February, so when you talk to your potential witnesses, will you please ensure that if we do fix a date in say the first week of February, that they will be available, and that we won't find that we have the same problem. You said you will be phoning them.

MR BIZOS: Yes Mr Chairman, we did take those steps and we have consulted amongst ourselves and subject to your approval, we would ask that the matter be postponed to the last week in February.

The reason for that is that we were informed that Budget Day is the 17th of February and one of the witnesses is not only, doesn't only have to be there on the 17th, but obviously has to take a part in the preparation for how they are going to take some of our money away from us.

I would suggest that the date, I think is the 22nd, yes the 22nd. I have reason to believe that everyone can make themselves available, and I want to thank our colleagues for their cooperation. If it is in order with the Committee, then I suggest that we postpone to that date Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we tentatively mark that date, and we will go on now and see how we do?

ADV DE JAGER: And what about the first week in February for instance?

CHAIRPERSON: That is just before the budget.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, it is two weeks before.

MR BIZOS: It is the opening of Parliament, the ceremonial opening of Parliament, when everybody has to be there. There is, as you know, the President's speech on the Monday, Tuesday and the debate of the President's vote during that period, so ...

ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on)

MR BIZOS: Yes, we understand that they will - the official opening will be the 1st of February, the first Friday of February. Thank you Mr Chairman. Can we - we will indicate later Mr Chairman, that there is no possibility of their being called during this week, we have reassessed the position and it seems almost impossible that we will reach that.

We have even made provision to have a witness here on Friday, should Mr Maharaj not be as long as some of our colleagues said.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, let's continue now.

MARIUS SCHOON: (affirmed)

EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (continued) Mr Schoon, I want to ask you about your knowledge of the various attempts to assassinate you, by the Security Police that we have heard about in evidence and documents in this case. What knowledge did you have of those matters?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am aware of two attempts to assassinate me in Botswana while we were living in Gaberone.

The first occurred Chairperson, in September or October of 1982. There was a Cultural Festival in Gaberone in July of 1982, called Culture and Resistance. At Culture and Resistance a coloured gentleman from Newclare outside Johannesburg, made contact with us, spent some time talking to me. He indicated that he had previously been very much involved in SANROC, that is the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, an organisation which had been started by Prof Dennis Brutos.

Some time after the Culture and Resistance Festival, I would say something like six weeks to two months after the Festival, he appeared in Gaberone and indicated that he was prepared to start an ANC group in Newclare, where he would draw in people who were active in the community at the time.

We had a long discussion with him Chairperson, and it was decided that he should come up to Botswana once more, to indicate how the formation of this ANC group was going, and that we would then have further discussions about how we would be communicating with him in the future.

A little while later, possibly three weeks later, two young coloured men arrived in Gaberone, indicating that they had been sent by this gentleman that I have been speaking about.

They seemed very uncomfortable, they seemed, in some ways I might even say, they seemed rather shifty. We had a brief, preliminary discussion with them. They were being housed at the office of the International Voluntary Service, where I was working, where Mr Patrick Fitzgerald was staying at the time.

They then indicated that they were going to go into town, go into Gaberone for some reason which I cannot recall, and we arranged that we would meet again that evening at 8 o'clock, to carry on the discussions that we had had.

They didn't return at 8 o'clock, and in fact they hadn't returned by after 10 o'clock. Mr Fitzgerald then decided that there was something very suspicious about these people and he went through their bags, which I think had in fact been left in his room.

In their bags he found a pistol. We informed ANC Security and when the two young men returned, they were taken away in a car by ANC Security. That is the first incident Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What happened to them thereafter?

MR SCHOON: I do not know what happened to them Sir.

The second incident, Chairperson, in some ways, I find even more disturbing. A short time after this incident that I have just described, let me go back a step Chairperson, I was staying with my family in a townhouse complex and our vehicle had to be parked outside, there was not secure parking for the vehicle.

One morning I got up to go to the office and looking at the vehicle, I saw on the - underneath the chassis of the vehicle, against one of the wheels on the passenger side, a gift-wrapped parcel with a curly tail coming out of the gift-wrapped parcel.

I walked around the corner to where Mr Fitzpatrick was staying, we came back in his vehicle, and this object was still against the wheel. We then went away in Mr Fitzgerald's vehicle, and came back with Mr Billy Masetla and when we came back, the object had been removed.

Chairperson, I would just like to underline that we had two small children in the house, who would definitely have been interested in a gift-wrapped parcel with a curly tail coming out of it.

I am convinced that this was in fact an attempt to blow up the vehicle and in all probability, perhaps an attempt to blow up the children as well.

MR BIZOS: You say that these persons were to be drawn in, drawn into what for the purposes of clarity?

MR SCHOON: Which persons are you referring to?

MR BIZOS: The persons when you were discussing the formation of a group in Newclare or in Johannesburg, you used the expression that they wanted to be drawn in. Into what?

MR SCHOON: They wanted to be drawn in into working in an active ANC structure.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Can you give us a time when these two incidents occurred?

MR SCHOON: As I said Chairperson, I met this gentleman from Newclare at the Culture and Resistance Festival in Gaberone, which was in the middle of July of 1982. He came up, I would say two months after that, so it might have been September or October of 1982. He then sent the two young men up, three perhaps four weeks, after that. So it would have been October or November of 1982.

ADV DE JAGER: You have met him twice and you have later on received a message that the others were sent by him?

MR SCHOON: No, we did not receive a message, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Not a message, the others told you, that is what I mean.

MR SCHOON: The others told us that they had been sent by him.

ADV DE JAGER: So you knew the name of this man?

MR SCHOON: I knew the name then, I am afraid, I no longer know his name.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Why was Billy Masetla called to come to your vehicle?

MR SCHOON: Billy Masetla was the person that we were reporting to, through to the Senior Organ. We wanted to inform him of what was happening, we wanted to be advised by him, what steps we had to take.

MR BIZOS: I see, yes. Whilst you were in Botswana, did you have any contact with Mr Heinz Klugg?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, I had very close contact with Heinz Klugg. Heinz Klugg arrived in Botswana, I think it was June or July of 1979.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And what was the nature of the contact that you had with him?

MR SCHOON: Mr Heinz Klugg arrived in Botswana a few months after Mr Patrick Fitzgerald did.

Mr Patrick Fitzgerald was at the time living in the house belonging to SANA, in Boncleng in Gaberone. Heinz Klugg informed us that he had had discussions with Carl Edwards about leaving the country. Mr Klugg had been involved in an organisation called SASPU, the Southern African Students Publications Union, which I think Mr Klugg had in fact started.

He started to feel, because of pressures from the Army and pressures from the Security Police, that it was necessary for him to leave the country, and Mr Carl Edwards had in fact, spoken to him and convinced him that he should come and work for SANA in Gaberone.

MR BIZOS: What is the abbreviation?

MR SCHOON: Sorry, sorry SANA, the Southern African News Agency.

MR BIZOS: Yes, is that the one that was publishing the newsletter or news sheet?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Had you known Mr Williamson and had your wife, Jeanette, known Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: My recollection Sir, is that Jenny had in fact known Mr Williamson while he was supposedly a student activist, reporting on student activities to the South African Police.

I had not met Mr Williamson previously. I knew of him. During the first period we were in Gaberone, I think this was while Mr Chris Wood and Mr Julian Sturgeon were still running SANA, both Mr Laas Gunner Erickson who was the Head of the IUEF for whom Mr Williamson worked, and Mr Williamson, paid at least one visit to Gaberone and we had some contact with both Mr Laas Gunner Erickson and Mr Williamson. They visited Gaberone, my recollection, separately.

Again my recollection is that we met Mr Erickson twice and Mr Williamson, once.

MR BIZOS: Did he, Mr Williamson, ever stay at your home?

MR SCHOON: That was subsequently Sir. After we had moved to Molepolole, Mr Williamson came down to Gaberone, supposedly to have discussions about the future of SANA.

During that time, he stayed with us in the house in Gaberone, in Molepolole Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MR SCHOON: Molepolole.

MR BIZOS: In what year was that?

MR SCHOON: I think it was possibly late 1978, no, it was before Heinz and Patrick came to Botswana, so it was possibly early 1979, I can't place the date exactly.

MR BIZOS: Yes. When he came to Botswana, when Heinz came to Botswana, at or about that time, were there allegations that Mr Williamson was in fact working for the South African Police?

MR SCHOON: There were both very strong suspicions and allegations. Chairperson, a very short time after Heinz Klugg came to Botswana, we sent him on a mission into South Africa, which he entered illegally through Lesotho, and I recall very distinctly that part of the instructions that were given to Mr Klugg before he went into South Africa, he was going to be seeing a number of people that he was close to in South Africa, he was going to be establishing the basis of new ANC networks inside the country, and one of the instructions that Mr Klugg was given was that he was to warn all the people that he saw that they would have nothing whatsoever to do with Mr Williamson.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, you said we sent him into South Africa?

MR SCHOON: The Unit for which I was working Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: And who in fact was the names, were you involved, did you send him?

MR SCHOON: I was involved, I discussed his instructions with him to in considerable detail, together with my wife, Jeanette, with Mr Patrick Fitzgerald and we were being advised about Heinz' mission into the country, by Mr Henry Mahoti.

MR BIZOS: What made you send Mr Heinz Klugg to this mission to warn everyone not to have anything to do with Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, by that time, we were receiving reports from inside the country, from people that we regarded as trustworthy, almost on a weekly basis indicating their very deep suspicions of Mr Williamson.

MR BIZOS: Were there any steps taken to either verify the allegations, or clear him of the suspicion?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot remember if this was just before or just after Heinz went into the country, but he had been sent to Botswana to work for SANA by Carl Edwards, there were also very strong suspicions about Carl Edwards, that he was in fact working for the police.

Carl Edwards contacted Heinz Klugg to indicate that he would like Heinz and Patrick to establish a dead letter box just on the South African side of the border, next to the Gaberone dam.

Heinz and Patrick discussed this with Jenny and me and we devised the following plan Sir. Firstly, we definitely did not see our way to establishing a dead letter box on the South African side of the border, we thought that that would be putting people at risk.

Patrick and Heinz went out to the dam with a camera and it was a camera which had no film in Sir, and they were pretty certain that they were being observed from the South African side of the border, they appeared to take a number of photo's of the place where they were going to establish the dead letter box. They then sent a communication to Mr Edwards in which they indicated where the supposed DLB had been established, and informed him that the photographs were coming in a separate envelope.

My recollection is that virtually immediately Mr Edwards contacted them. I think in fact he sent a black person up to speak to them, who they were reasonably convinced was a Security Police agent, and informed them that the photo's had in fact not arrived. There in fact were no photo's.

They then informed Mr Williamson, or they informed me that they had informed Mr Williamson that they had sent these photo's to Carl Edwards, and that Carl Edwards claimed they had not arrived.

They said they felt that this indicated either that Mr Edwards' communications had been completely penetrated, or else, that Mr Edwards was in fact working for the illegitimate regime.

They subsequently informed me that Mr Williamson had been in touch, I think with Heinz, it might have been with both of them, to say that their suspicions of Mr Carl Edwards is completely unfounded, and that they must continue to use his communication channels.

Chairperson, Mr Williamson's reaction to this rather convoluted story, we found very suspicious at the time.

MR BIZOS: Did you believe that as a result of this event, that there was substance in the allegations about - the allegations that Mr Williamson was working for the Security Police?

MR SCHOON: We felt that it was a further piece of evidence Sir.

MR BIZOS: Did you report to anyone of this event and the confirmation of your suspicions about Mr Williamson's loyalty to the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I would definitely have reported it to my structures. I would in all possibility also have informed Mr Mac Maharaj in Lusaka of what had taken place.

I was constantly sending Mr Maharaj the communications that we were receiving from home, indicating suspicion of Mr Williamson.

MR BIZOS: Do you have any reason to believe that Mr Williamson may have come to know about the role that you played in trying to establish that he was a policeman or not?

MR SCHOON: I think the Carl Edwards incident which I have just described, must have made Mr Williamson suspect very strongly that Jenny and I were in fact, passing information on to our superiors about suspicions.

I think that Mr Williamson must have had a very shrewd suspicion that all was not well with his relations with the ANC and that Jenny and I were playing a certain part in it. Could I continue Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Yes, please do.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I would like to speak about the SANA BULLETIN, if that is appropriate Sir.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that is all part of this picture of what you knew about Mr Williamson and what he may have learned about your efforts.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, when we arrived in Botswana, we made immediate contact with Mr Chris Wood who had been a close friend of Jenny's and they had in fact been student activists together and had lived in the same house, I think it was in Woodstock in Cape Town.

We knew that Chris had gone into exile in Botswana because of the Army. When we arrived in Gaberone, we found that Chris had very recently started on behalf of Mr Williamson, the Southern African News Agency.

Very soon after we arrived in Botswana, I think it was a matter of a few months, Mr Julian Sturgeon also arrived in Botswana and he had been sent by Mr Williamson to strengthen SANA in Botswana.

My recollection is that some material was produced in Botswana. It was then sent to Geneva and the printing in fact, took place in Geneva. I am not one hundred percent certain about that Sir.

We were often not very happy with the actual content of the SANA News Agency's publication. We felt that the material that Chris and Julian were sending to Geneva, was being subbed in such a way that it did not have quite the political impact that we would want. There was sometimes also other material which had been added in from somewhere else, presumably from Geneva, which we felt was not completely supportive of the ANC's position at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you know that this other information had been added in in Geneva?

MR SCHOON: I say I presume it was added in in Geneva Sir, it might have come from ...

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't say presumed, you say it had been. Were you responsible for preparing the stuff of SANA, did you see it before it was sent to Geneva?

MR SCHOON: I would see the stuff that Chris and Julian were preparing, yes Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were playing an active part with them to that extent?

MR SCHOON: I was playing an active part with them, to that extent.

MR BIZOS: With the greatest respect Mr Chairman, both my Attorney and my learned friend, Mr Berger, say that he did say I presumed it was in Geneva.

CHAIRPERSON: He has just said he was playing an active part with them, which is the point of the question Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Oh, I see, yes.

MR SCHOON: Then Sir, after Chris and Julian left, SANA was being run by Mr Patrick Fitzgerald and Mr Heinz Klugg. They had constant discussions, both with Jenny and me, and on occasion with Mr Mac Maharaj, about the actual content of SANA and my recollection is that they started to insist that they had to have control of all the material that was in the Bulletin, and that in fact it had to be produced completely in Gaberone.

From that time on Sir, until the fake bulletin which I would like to speak about just now.

ADV DE JAGER: When you say from that time on, would you perhaps give us an indication of from what time on? Where are we round about now?

MR SCHOON: We are possibly somewhere in the second half of 1979.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR SCHOON: We are somewhere in the second half of 1979, perhaps the early part of the second half.

From that time on Sir, the material that was being produced by Patrick and Heinz was completely in line with ANC policy. I am informed by Mr Maharaj, that in fact there was some dispute between him and Mr Williamson about who was going to control the content of the newsletter.

But we felt very strongly that we were using SANA from possibly earlier than September of 1979, to actually propagate a correct view of ANC policy and of the way in which the ANC saw developments in Southern Africa as a whole and inside the country.

MR BIZOS: Yes, do you want to deal with the fake bulletin now, or later?

MR SCHOON: I am happy to deal with it now Sir.

MR BIZOS: Please do so, that we can finish the SANA situation.

MR SCHOON: I think that Mr Williamson must have been aware that Jenny and I had played a considerable role, in fact in developing the SANA BULLETIN as yet another mouthpiece for ANC policy.

I think we can see how aggrieved he was by this, that shortly after Mr Williamson broke cover, a fake SANA BULLETIN was produced, and presumably distributed to the SANA distribution list, which came out with a broad sheet which was very, very attacking of the ANC's positions about a variety of things.

MR BIZOS: Even before the Klugg matter and the SANA dispute about control, had you given Mr Piet Richter anything to deliver to Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: Mr Piet Richer?

MR BIZOS: Richer, is it?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. Piet and Lorraine Richer were also South African refugees that we found in Botswana when we arrived there.

Jenny had known them when she was a student activist. They started working in a SACTU unit with Jenny. We would see them on a regular basis, they were living in Mahalape and either we would drive up there for a weekend or they would drive down on a very regular basis. We were seeing each other at least once a month.

In addition to the SACTU work that they were doing, there was also a great deal of discussion about how we saw political events at home.

I recall Sir, that the first time that Mr Richer went up to Lusaka, which I would say would have been some time in 1978, possibly in the first half of 1978, Mr Piet Richer and Jenny and I, drew up a report of all the information that we had been receiving about suspicions of Mr Williamson. We compiled this report jointly and when Mr Richer went up to Lusaka on ANC business, he gave that report to Mr Mac Maharaj.

MR BIZOS: You spoke about this fake SANA, there is just one supplementary question. I don't think you told us who you thought, might have been responsible for the production of the fake edition of the newsletter?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I say very definitely thought, not know, but we thought very strongly that there was no doubt that it was Mr Williamson.

MR BIZOS: During 1979, did Mr Williamson come to Gaberone?

MR SCHOON: Sir, are you talking about the time when he came to stay with us?

MR BIZOS: Yes, was it Gaberone or Molepolole?

MR SCHOON: It was Molepolole.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you.

MR SCHOON: It was Molepolole, I can't place the time exactly Sir, but I know that Heinz and Patrick had not yet arrived, so it was possibly in the first three months of 1979, when Mr Williamson spent, I think two nights with us in Molepolole.

MR BIZOS: Were you instructed to tell him anything?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR BIZOS: By whom and what?

MR SCHOON: When we realised Mr Williamson was in Gaberone, and I think he made contact with us. I think we met him at a hotel in Gaberone, we then went to have a discussion Sir with Uncle Dan Hlume and there was another member of the NEC there at the time. My recollection is that it was Mr Chris Hani.

We had a discussion with the two members of the NEC. They indicated to us that it was necessary for us to try and spend as much time as possible with Mr Williamson. I think the suggestion was made that we should in fact invite him to the house in Molepolole and our instructions were that at this meeting, we were to speak to Mr Williamson about ANC structures.

The indication that was given to us was that the information that we were going to be giving Mr Williamson, was in fact already basically in the public domain, that we were not endangering anything. We were then to give Mr Williamson an introduction to a senior person in SACTU in Lusaka.

MR BIZOS: What was the purpose of these instructions?

MR SCHOON: We were not informed, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Did you draw any inferences as to why you should have been giving these instructions?

MR SCHOON: The inference that I drew was that two very senior members of the NEC and in the case of Uncle Dan Hlume, a very senior member of the Central Committee of the Party, in fact had grave suspicions about Mr Williamson, and were possibly preparing something in order to expose him.

MR BIZOS: Can you place a month and year to that meeting?

MR SCHOON: I cannot place anything exactly. It was definitely before Patrick and Heinz arrive. I have spoken to both of them, and they say they were not in Gaberone at the time.

Patrick arrived in Gaberone either April or May of 1979. So it would either have been in the first few months of 1979, it might have been right at the end of 1978.

MR BIZOS: During his stay, did he - with you, did Mr Williamson try to get you to do anything?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR BIZOS: What did he do?

MR SCHOON: Mr Williamson tried to convince me to work full-time for SANA. Jenny and I in fact discussed it at some length and we decided that given what we saw as the fairly precarious position that SANA was in, with funding completely dependent on the goodwill of the IUEF, that there could well be financial problems in the future, if I agreed to work full-time for SANA and I informed Mr Williamson that in fact I was not prepared to be doing that.

He then had further discussion with me, and suggested that on a periodic basis, I should be acting as a roving correspondent for SANA for the whole of Southern Africa. I agreed to this Sir and Mr Williamson then gave me, my recollection is that it was a cheque not cash, for what at the time was a considerable amount of money.

Mr Maharaj testified that it was R1 000 pula, my recollection in fact is that it was more money than that, but I cannot be certain. Mr Williamson said this money was to be used for any expenses that I might have, or for any costs that we as a family might have, and he indicated that this money was in fact not going to be followed up in any way by the IUEF.

A very short time later Sir, I think it was a matter of weeks, Mr Maharaj was in Gaberone and at a meeting with Mr Maharaj, I discussed this money with him, and Mr Maharaj gave me what proved to be very good advice and he said under no circumstances must you touch that money.

Put it into a separate savings account and just forget about it. I did this Sir, I opened a separate savings account and deposited this money. Some time later, I think it must have been shortly Mr Williamson broke cover, I received an extremely aggressive letter from the IUEF in Geneva saying why had this money not been accounted for and intimating in fact that I had embezzled this money.

I rode straight down to Gaberone and had that money transferred telegraphically to the IUEF account. I would say Sir that Mr Williamson's attempt to entrap me, had not been successful. Could I add one thing please Sir?

MR BIZOS: Yes please do.

MR SCHOON: As instructed by the senior comrades, we in fact wrote a letter of introduction to Mr Williamson for a senior person in SACTU. I can't remember if it was to John Motswane or to Ray Alexander.

I would assume that the letter was written by Jenny, because Jenny was in fact working with SACTU, whereas my involvement with SACTU was peripheral.

We gave that letter to Mr Williamson. At the same time we gave a report of what had occurred during the weekend that Mr Williamson was with us, to Uncle Dan Hlume who indicated that he would see that the person to whom we had given the letter of introduction, also got a full report of what had actually happened that weekend.

MR BIZOS: You have given us a number of incidents. Have you any reason to believe that Mr Williamson at the time of his exposure as a police informer, that that expose was partly due to your and Jeanette's efforts?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I recall Mr Williamson's evidence, what he is putting in front of this Commission, is that his exposure and his being withdrawn from working in Geneva, was due to the defection of another South African agent.

I think that that played a part Sir, however, I also think that Mr Williamson was astute enough to know that by mid 1979 if not earlier, that there were considerable suspicions about him within the ANC. I also think that Mr Williamson, and again I say think, not know Sir, that Mr Williamson is astute enough and a well enough trained Intelligence Officer, to have been aware that Jenny and I were playing, I think some considerable part in building the pyramid of suspicion that the NEC in Lusaka was now aware of.

MR BIZOS: These transactions with Carl Edwards, was it eventually revealed which side Mr Edwards was really on?

MR SCHOON: Mr Edwards is a serving policeman at the moment.

MR BIZOS: And was so at the time?

MR SCHOON: And was so at the time.

MR BIZOS: And whilst you interacted with him, did you have any reason to believe that he was in close contact with Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: He and Mr Williamson were clearly in very close contact. While Mr Williamson was funding SANA, Mr Edwards had established the communications that SANA were using. It was very clear right from the beginning, that Mr Edwards and Mr Williamson were working very closely together.

Can I speak about Mr Edwards Sir?

MR BIZOS: Yes, please do.

MR SCHOON: To begin with, when we came to Botswana and we were starting to establish a functioning network at home, we made use of Chris Wood's communications with home, which were in fact being run by Mr Edwards.

I think even before the, we arrived in Botswana either late June or early July of 1977. I think even before the end of 1977, it became very clear to us that there was something seriously wrong with Chris Wood's communication channel.

We were instructed by Mr Maharaj, to continue to make use of that channel in a very limited way, but to establish our own communication channels for sensitive things as a matter of great urgency and this we did, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Julian Sturgeon have any role to play in all these aspects or in some of them?

MR SCHOON: Mr Julian Sturgeon was in fact working as the Editor of the SANA BULLETIN. I do not recall exactly Sir, whether Mr Sturgeon continued to use the communications channels that had been set up by Carl Edwards, but neither Mr Chris Wood, nor Mr Julian Sturgeon were ANC members. Because of that they were not working in our structures, and we were not completely aware of what they were doing.

I would imagine that they continued using those channels possibly until the time that they left Botswana, which was some time early in 1979.

MR BIZOS: Did it later emerge as to who they were working for or where their sympathies lay?

MR SCHOON: Not to my knowledge Sir.

MR BIZOS: Before the emergence of Mr Craig Williamson as a policeman, what sort of security arrangements did you have for yourself, your wife, and your children in Botswana? Were you leading a fairly normal existence?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, you do not live a normal existence as an active member of a liberation organisation, within a couple of miles of an extremely hostile border.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you know of no attempt to assassinate you prior to the emergence of Mr Williamson as a policeman?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I know of, I do not have knowledge, or I am not aware of any attempt to assassinate me before that. I am aware of the South African Police, or supposedly the South African Police being involved in what I regard as an exceptional dirty trick.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Well, perhaps you could tell the Committee about this dirty trick.

MR SCHOON: Sir, shortly after I returned from the very brief period that I spent in Funda, I was seriously ill with Hepatitis, I was hospitalised, I was possibly as ill as I ever have been in my life.

Just as I was starting to recover, one day about lunch time, while I was still in hospital, Jenny came in with her father, who we were not expecting and he looked at me and Jenny's father was not an emotive person, it was very difficult for him to show emotion, and he came over, he touched my shoulder, and he said I just had to see you and then he looked as though he was actually going to cry and he went out.

I said to Jenny, so what is all this about? We weren't expecting your parents? She said - we were not on the phone in Molepolole - so it was very difficult to contact us. She says look, they arrived here half an hour ago, both of them in a terrible state because they had received a phone call at about half past four that morning, supposedly from the police in Molepolole saying that I had died in the hospital in Molepolole and they had come up immediately.

MR BIZOS: Yes? Once you have mentioned Funda, you could perhaps tell the Committee why you went there and what you did there?

MR SCHOON: Certainly Sir. I started teaching at Gosigari Sacheri at the beginning of the school year in 1978. Arrangements were made that I would go during the first school holidays, which must have been over the Easter period, to Angola to receive training which could be passed on to people at home, on how to manufacture leaflet bombs. I can't remember exactly how long I was in Funda Sir.

It was the school holiday, I know I spent a couple of days in Lusaka before I flew to Luanda. I spent three or four days in Luanda, before I was taken to Funda. At the very most, it would have been three weeks, I would suggest it is more likely to have been two weeks, in Funda.

During the time I was in Funda, I received instruction in how to manufacture these devices and how to train people to use them. The Camp Commander then suggested that it would also be advisable for me to have training in the use of small arms for self protection for myself and my family back in Botswana.

I underwent a very rudimentary course in maintaining and assembling a Makarov pistol. That was the extent of my exposure to Funda.

MR BIZOS: Did you consider that as military training?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am going to reply to that in this way. I neither applied for nor received the military pension, because I did not regard myself as a member of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR BIZOS: Yes. During - from 1981 onwards and after Mr Williamson had been exposed as a policeman or a police informer or both, what were you doing in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, we got new jobs which we started in July of 1981. We got jobs working as Joint Field Officers for an organisation called International Voluntary Service, which was an organisation which sent British volunteers to work in developing countries.

Our job was to co-ordinate the program, to examine new placements, to give support to the young people who were working in the programme.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And a question about your security in Botswana raised in 1983?

MR SCHOON: Sir, in I think May of 1983, we got a phone call from Lester where the Headquarters of IVS, the International Voluntary Service, were.

We were informed by the Secretary of the organisation, the person in charge of the organisation, that he would be arriving in Botswana in two days' time and that he had to have urgent discussions with us.

Mr Nigel Watt, the Secretary, arrived, we met him at the airport, we took him to the office. Mr Watt clearly found what he was saying, very embarrassing. He indicated to us that he had been called in by the Overseas Development Association, ODA, which was the British government's development wing.

The bulk of IVS' funding in fact came through ODA. He told us that he had been informed by a very senior person in ODA, that they regarded the presence of Jenny and myself in the IVS programme in Botswana as endangering the lives of the British volunteers in Botswana, and in fact of endangering lives of other British persons in Botswana.

They had indicated to Mr Watt that if IVS did not terminate our contracts, ODA would terminate world wide all funding to IVS. Mr Watt, as I said, was clearly very embarrassed by this. We had lengthy discussions stretching over a number of days.

It was decided that we would stay on in the Botswana programme until a successor had been recruited. We also came to some form of a financial arrangement about the length of our contract, the period of our contract which still had to run.

MR BIZOS: And in June, did any diplomatic office communicate with you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, in around the middle of June of 1983, we were called in to see the British High Commissioner in Botswana.

The British High Commissioner informed us that he had what he regarded as good intelligence information, that I was to be shot in Botswana and he advised us, the advice he gave us was that we should leave the country immediately.

So we expressed a certain amount of scepticism about the British government actually caring anything about us at all. The High Commissioner then took us to see a gentleman called Brigadier Hersfield, who was at the time, the Head of the Special Branch in Botswana.

Brigadier Hersfield basically told us exactly what the British High Commissioner had told us, however he added I am not going to declare you prohibited immigrants immediately, but I will if you are still here in a fortnight.

We went straight from the meeting with Brigadier Hersfield, to go and speak to the ANC's Chief Representative in Botswana, Mr Isaac Makopo.

We had a long discussion with Bokopsi, and he indicated to us that he was going to Lusaka within the next few days for a very short period, and that when he returned from Lusaka, he would bring instructions about how we were to react.

When the Chief Rep returned in three or four days' time, he came round to see us and he said the instructions from Lusaka are that you are to be redeployed immediately to Lusaka. We had some discussion. We indicated that we would like to take our personal vehicle to Lusaka. The Chief Rep indicated that he had no objection to Jenny and the children driving up to Lusaka, through Zimbabwe, however, he thought it was necessary for me to fly and not to fly from Gaberone, so in fact I flew to Lusaka from Francistown.

MR BIZOS: Did you arrive in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: We arrived in Lusaka and I was joined there a few days later by Jenny and the children, and she was accompanied by her brother who was on holiday from Australia in Southern Africa.

MR BIZOS: Did you get to Lusaka in December, it was late in June?

MR SCHOON: It was either late June or early July, I think it was late June Sir.

MR BIZOS: What did you do in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: In Lusaka we lived in a house with Mr Henry Mahoti and both Jenny and I worked both in Mr Mahoti's office, Mr Mahoti was at the time Secretary for Education in the ANC and in the office of Ms Barbara Masekela, who was at the time Secretary for Arts and Culture in the ANC.

Jenny and I spent time in their offices, assisting them with institutional questions in order to try to establish structures which were in fact going to be effective in all the foreign missions of the ANC.

MR BIZOS: To the membership of the ANC working in Lusaka and others that had access to the ANC, other members, were you working quite openly in these offices, doing this work?

MR SCHOON: Oh yes, Sir. We would go to the office in the morning, our vehicle would be parked there, we could seldom both be there, because we had the small children to look after, but it was quite clear that we were working openly in those offices.

MR BIZOS: For anyone in Mr Williamson's position at the time as a highly placed Intelligence Officer, would there have been any difficulty for him to find out what you were doing in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: I am sure the offices were under surveillance virtually all the time. I am sure reports were made that we were now working in the Department of Education.

ADV DE JAGER: But if your life was in danger in Botswana at that time, and that was the reason for urgently leaving Botswana, wouldn't you have felt threatened in Lusaka too?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: And what security measures did you take there?

MR SCHOON: We were both working and living within ANC structures and we would be periodically told we must vacate the place where we are sleeping, to go somewhere else for the night, as a South African raid is expected.

MR BIZOS: Did either you or Jeanette go to the United Kingdom whilst you were in Lusaka?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, may I begin a little bit further back?

MR BIZOS: Please do.

MR SCHOON: The first time that either Jenny or I had been outside of Africa, was when we went over for the final interviews for the IVS jobs which to my recollection Sir, was in the Easter holidays of 1983, before we started working with IVS. That is the first time that we had been out of Africa.

The arrangement that had been made with Mr Nigel Watt when he had spoken to us in Botswana, was that one of us would fly over to participate in the IVS interviews for our successor. Jenny in fact flew to London and then went on to Lester shortly after we arrived in Lusaka, so it would have been some time in July of 1983, to go and participate in those interviews and at the same time, she spent a little bit of time with her sister who had been living in the United Kingdom for some time.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Would it have been difficult for anyone in Mr Williamson's position, whilst you were in Lusaka, to ascertain whether Mr Mahoti or Masekela were involved in the armed struggle in any way?

MR SCHOON: You will recall Sir that Mr Williamson's evidence, he indicated that he thought that we had gone from Botswana to the United Kingdom on what, in my understanding was a fairly permanent basis. I think he would have had no difficulty to ascertain that we were working in those offices in Lusaka and he would have had access to information indicating the role that Mr Mahoti and Ms Masekela were playing in the ANC, where at the time, both of them were involved either in education or arts and culture.

MR BIZOS: Yes. How did you come to go to Angola?

MR SCHOON: In discussion with us shortly after we arrived in Lusaka, Mr Mahoti indicated to us that the ANC had received a request from the Angolan government, to supply English teachers to tertiary institutions in Angola.

He spoke to us about whether we would be prepared to go, we indicated our willingness. Then there seemed to be all sorts of difficulties on the Angolan side. They continually would say to us your going has been postponed and eventually we flew to Angola in early December of 1983, to go and teach at a University in Southern Angola.

MR BIZOS: In what town?

MR SCHOON: In Lubango.

MR BIZOS: Please describe in view of what the Committee has been told about it, you were there, please tell us what this town was, what this University was, what you were doing there?

MR SCHOON: Lubango is a town in Southern Angola which had in fact been the South African Defence Force's Headquarters in their first invasion of Angola shortly after independence.

In a smallish aircraft, it is approximately two and a half to three hours' flying time from Luanda.

MR BIZOS: Whilst we are on distances, how far from the Namibian/Angolan border?

MR SCHOON: Possibly about 800 kilometres, but I am not certain.

MR BIZOS: Please carry on.

MR SCHOON: At the time we arrived in Lubango, the South Africans had yet again invaded Angola. In fact the invasion took place virtually the same day that we arrived in Luanda.

Lubango, there was an exceptionally strong military presence there. You saw Cuban troops and Cuban vehicles in the streets all the time. You saw Angolan troops, South Africans had in fact on a couple of occasions, bombed the airport in Lubango. It was not very easy living in Lubango. Food was exceptionally scarce, it was difficult to get water.

Jenny and I were both teaching at the University in Lubango, we were teaching English. We were both teaching English. Jenny took first and second year students, I was teaching third year students. In addition to teaching English, I was teaching my students linguistics.

The students were drawn from a local community, this was in fact the tertiary institution that served the whole of Southern Angola. I had seven or eight students to my recollection. All but two of them were teaching in local schools and were busy upgrading qualifications.

One of them worked for the Administration of the University. One of them was a functionary of the MPLA, working in an administrative capacity for the MPLA.

MR BIZOS: And Jeanette, what students did she have?

MR SCHOON: Her students would have been local young people, possibly also teaching. I think one of her students was working in the offices of the Ministry of Education in Lubango as well.

MR BIZOS: Would the South African Police, particularly its Intelligence Department in which Mr Williamson was highly placed, have had ways of receiving accurate information as to what you were doing in Angola?

MR SCHOON: Sir, there was a very strong SWAPO presence in Lubango. We know that SWAPO was thoroughly infiltrated by the South African Security Forces and I have no doubt whatsoever that reports were being made through those informers within SWAPO of what Jenny and I were doing, of what the children were doing, and what the two other South Africans in Lubango at the time, were doing.

MR BIZOS: Did UNITA have any presence in that part of the world, that part of Angola?

MR SCHOON: When the South Africans had occupied Lubango, they had tried to install Savimbi in Lubango with a view to his forming a breakaway part of Angola.

In fact the tribal grouping that Savimbi belongs to, lives around the area of Lubango. However, after the liberation of Lubango, in the mountains around the city, were discovered literally thousands of bodies of people who had been massacres while UNITA was South Africa's puppet in Lubango. There was very little support for UNITA.

However, bandits, some of them possibly UNITA supporters, some of them just brigands, were very active in the city. There would be shooting almost every night. The Cuban helicopters would fly day and night, more or less at the level of the balcony of our flat to maintain as much stability as possible in the city.

MR BIZOS: Did you have any South African friends in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: Sir, there were two other South Africans working in Lubango, both of them also teaching at the University. Teaching both English and Mathematics.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Was there an ANC unit or any ANC presence in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: There was no ANC presence apart from the four adults and the two children who were attached to the University.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever leave Lubango, did you or Jeanette ever leave Lubango in order to go anywhere else in Angola?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I think from round about the end of February, the ANC Chief Representative in Luanda suggested that he would like either Jenny or me to come and spend a few days, once a month, in Luanda where we could be assisting in the planning and further implementation of the ANC's development projects around Luanda.

MR BIZOS: Was there any particular ANC project that you assisted in in Luanda?

MR SCHOON: The project that we gave most time to Sir, was a Finnish funded training project just outside Luanda, where we were establishing a vocational school and where we were establishing certain other training facilities to give people skills which they would be able to take with them into the rest of their lives.

MR BIZOS: Which people were those?

MR SCHOON: Those would have been ANC members.

MR BIZOS: In military camps or other sort of ... (intervention)...

MR SCHOON: They would have been part of the Army, but they were now moving to a new area where they were in fact being trained for the future, they were not being trained for the Army at the vocational school.

MR BIZOS: Is that the Finnish funded school?

MR SCHOON: The Finnish funded school. The bulk of that funding was from Finland.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and what assistance were you to them? What did you and Jenny do?

MR SCHOON: We assisted with the planning of the expansion and development of the school. We had discussions about possibly accreditation for the students, either from Finland or from elsewhere.

We would advise on institutional structures for the school, to have it administered effectively.

MR BIZOS: What do you say to the suggestion or the direct evidence by Mr Williamson, that your presence in Angola was in order to further the ANC's military struggle and or to prevent Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa, or that you were teaching Cubans English in order to assist them to become pilots. Do you know anything about those suggestions, and how do you deal with Mr Williamson's assertions to this effect?

MR SCHOON: I would like to say that I find Mr Williamson's assertions ludicrous, I find that if in fact that is what Mr Williamson believed, that as Head of Police Intelligence in the old ...(indistinct) State, they were not particularly effective if that is the type of information that he was getting.

I would also like to add Sir, that while we were not teaching Cubans English, I would not regard teaching Cubans English, as deserving a death sentence.

MR BIZOS: What sort of home did you have in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: We had a flat Sir.

MR BIZOS: In a small or large apartment building?

MR SCHOON: It was either three or four storeys high, I think it was in fact four storeys high. There were Angolan people living on the first two floors. The top floors, Angolan people living on the first two or three floors. The top two floors, the flats were all occupied by people teaching at the University.

So it was the four South Africans, there were a number of Vietnamese people teaching at the University and there were either I think possibly four flats occupied by people from East Germany.

MR BIZOS: What was the postal service like to this place that you have described?

MR SCHOON: Well you know, it was a city that was hardly functioning, so one could not say that everything was going all that well.

We sometimes received post through the University. We subsequently hired a post office box, which we used solely to communicate with Jenny's sister in the United Kingdom, who would forward us communications from Jenny's parents.

MR BIZOS: Where was the post-box?

MR SCHOON: In the post office.

MR BIZOS: In Lubango?

MR SCHOON: In Lubango.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: We received very little mail. We did however, also receive communications through the ANC office in Luanda.

MR BIZOS: Did you, was that forwarded to you in Lubango or did you pick it up when either you and or Jenny went up to Luanda?

MR SCHOON: It was exceptionally seldom that anybody from the office in Luanda came to Lubango. In fact I can only remember, I think two occasions.

We would collect it when we went up for the three or four days, in Luanda.

MR BIZOS: According to the sketchy evidence that we have had from the applicants in this case, the instrument of death that killed Jeanette and Katryn was supposed to have come from Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I do not believe it Sir.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR SCHOON: Firstly, non of the comrades that we had left in Botswana, would have considered communicating with us through the postal service. Should they in fact wanted to communicate with us, stuff would have been sent up from Botswana to Lusaka with an ANC courier, it would have gone from Lusaka to Luanda with an ANC courier.

In fact I do recall one instance where we received a parcel in Luanda which had come from Botswana, and where friends in Botswana were sending us spices.

I also Sir, the people that I was in Botswana with, are in fact still one of my main reference groups. They are the people that I trust, they are perhaps the people that I am closest to in the world.

I cannot believe that if somebody had made the mistake to send us something through the post from Botswana, that my friends and I am talking now about my friends, would not have come to me and said Marius, it is terrible, I actually sent that letter.

Nobody has done that. I actually don't think that that letter came from anybody connected with the ANC. If I may speculate, it might have been posted by somebody working with Mr Williamson in Botswana, it might in fact not have existed at all, and purely been constructed in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: Where were you when Jeanette and Katryn were killed?

MR SCHOON: I was in Luanda Sir.

MR BIZOS: Doing what?

MR SCHOON: As I said earlier Sir, we were spending, taking turns to spend three or four days a month, in Luanda to assist the ANC Chief Representative's office with our development programmes around Luanda. I had flown up to Luanda and in fact we celebrated my birthday a few days early, the night before I flew up from Lubango to Luanda.

I had been in Luanda for a few days and the Chief Representative came into the house where I was staying, to inform me about their deaths.

MR BIZOS: Unhappily I have to ask you what did you find when you got back to Lubango?

MR SCHOON: Sir, when we landed in Lubango, on the tarmac next to the plane, was one of the comrades who was teaching with us and he had my boy, Fritz, in his arms.

MR BIZOS: How old was Fritz then?

MR SCHOON: He had just turned three Sir.

MR BIZOS: And Katryn?

MR SCHOON: Katryn had just turned six.

MR BIZOS: Please carry on.

MR SCHOON: I took Fritzie from comrade Harold, he clung to me, we were taken by Landrover down to the flat, a fair distance from Lubango airport on a fairly bad road into the centre of the city.

Fritzie only said one thing to me as we went into town. He said to me, the enemy didn't kill Jenny, they just broke her. Now, I was informed subsequently Sir that in fact Jenny had been decapitated and that an arm and a leg had been blown off.

When we came to the block of flats, it was cordoned off with a very heavy Army presence. There was glass all over the street. Basically every pane of glass in the building where we lived, had been blown out and a large number of windows on the other side of the road, had been blown out.

I gave Fritzie to comrade Harold, because I did not want to take him up to the flat. I was taken up to the flat and shown it. On the wall just opposite the entrance door, there was blood from floor to ceiling, that had been Jenny Sir.

On the floor, there was a little pile of flesh and blood which had been Katryn. Most of the furniture in the flat was smashed.

MR BIZOS: Would you briefly tell us what the effect of the killing of Jenny and Katryn, has had on you?

MR SCHOON: Excuse me. Chairperson, I told you about Fritzie speaking to me in the car, in the Landrover coming from the airport.

Those were the only words he said for the next three or four days, I thought the child was never going to speak and in fact for the next five or six weeks, he barely spoke at all.

While we were staying in Luanda just before or just after the funeral, Fritz had an incident with a monkey which haunted him basically for the next two years.

The child was often hysterical. He had always been a very independent boy, he would barely move away from my side. He had bad dreams and would wake up screaming. It in fact I think Sir, took possibly at least 18 months, perhaps longer, for the child to come on a moderately even keel again.

MR BIZOS: Have you established where he was when this letter bomb was sent?

MR SCHOON: Sir, our comrade Harold, my friend Harold, had walked down from the University with Jenny and on the way down, she had collected post. He recalls that.

He went up to the flat with her, they must have collected the children on the way. He went up to the flat with her, and he was not feeling well. He went to see a Doctor and while he was at the Doctor, he heard the explosion.

By the time he came back from the Doctor, there was glass all over the street, the street was already cordoned off and at the entrance to the flat, he found Fritz being held by one of the Vietnamese teachers.

It is difficult for us to establish whether Fritz was actually in the flat or whether he was playing on the landing outside. However the remark that he made to me in the Landrover coming from the airport, the enemy didn't kill Jenny, they just broke her, makes me fairly certain that if he was not in the flat when the explosion took place, he came in virtually immediately afterwards.

MR BIZOS: Yes. What effect did it have on you?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I think it made it very difficult for the people who were supporting me at the time.

For many months, I hardly slept at all. Sometimes only two hours a night, seldom more than four. I needed to be talking to people all the time I was awake. We went Sir from Luanda, we had already arranged that we were going to be spending a holiday in Ireland during the University vacation. I kept those arrangements in place.

We spent a little while in England with Jenny's sister and her family. We then went over to Ireland with friends and stayed in the west of Ireland. My three friends used to have to sleep in shifts Sir, so that somebody could be talking to me basically 22 hours a day.

I still dream regularly and with the vividness that I would prefer was not there, of the scene in the flat when I came into it.

And yet Sir, through the generosity and the love of both my partner and my son, I have been able to rebuild my life. I think I am actually living a fairly adequate life.

MR BIZOS: And you are in a responsible job?

MR SCHOON: I am in a responsible and a challenging job which I think I am making a difference to the future of my country.

MR BIZOS: You have heard what Mr Williamson said and what Brigadier Schoon has said about the murder of your wife and child and the attempts made on your life by the latter.

Do you believe what they told the Committee?

MR SCHOON: No Sir. That is not for me to decide.

MR BIZOS: No but, I am asking whether you believe them or not?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR BIZOS: Mr Williamson may have made some attempt to apologise to you whilst he was giving evidence, and most certainly Brigadier Schoon has done so. Do you want to say anything about that?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, I do. I deliberately did not listen to Brigadier Schoon, because any apology from him to me is meaningless. I listened to Mr Williamson and if I may say so Sir, it sounded to me remarkably like the dropping of crocodile tears.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Is there anything else that you want to say?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, there is something that I most definitely want to say.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, one of the things that has both angered and confused me about this whole process of the TRC and my personal involvement in it, is that over and over again, media coverage to a large extent, the way that this process has been run and controlled here, it looks as though what we are involved in, is Jenny and me.

I think that Katryn, my daughter, has become also a ...(indistinct) in this process, it is as though she has been forgotten. It is as though the process basically has nothing to do with her accidental or whatever.

As far as I am concerned Sir, for this process to have any value to me, I would hope that there is a recognition that we are not just dealing with Jenny's death, but we are also dealing with the death of Katryn, a young South African who would now be 20, who would be embarking on a period of serving this country, building this country, of seeing that the sacrifices that had been made in the past, had not been in vain. Thank you Sir.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the adjournment till 2 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MARIUS SCHOON: (s.u.a.)

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I think Mr Bizos just wants to deal with his witnesses.

MR BIZOS: It has been resolved, thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Chairman, may I just place something on record in that regard then?

I believe I speak for myself and Mr Visser will agree with me, is that we in no way retract from our position pertaining to the relevance of the evidence of for instance Jill Marcus on the London bomb incident, you know about the argument.

I just want to place that on record for purposes of the record that we still reserve our rights pertaining to that argument and the question if she can give evidence here.

ADV DE JAGER: While you have mentioned that, we have requested counsel to furnish us with argument about the relevance in general, not only pertaining to this case, I don't know, but I have only received argument I think from two counsel.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, I think I mentioned that I will present you with argument during the week, I am busy working on it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, may I perhaps request if Mr Schoon, it is a bit difficult for me where he is sitting, if he can perhaps move to next to Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: I think the Court in the proceedings, may need a little time to rearrange themselves, judging by previous experience, but we have no ...

CHAIRPERSON: I understand Ms Patel will not be here this afternoon. He could sit in her chair and use her microphone.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Mr Schoon, may I just say from the outset and this is from me personally and from my client, Mr Raven, that I have grave sympathy with you for the loss of your wife and your daughter. Unfortunately it is one of those incidents, one of those unfortunate incidents in our country's history and I hope you accept it on that basis.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. You realise I have a job to do and I hope you accept that as well.

MR SCHOON: I am aware that you have a job to do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Schoon, I accept that you tried to explain to the Committee everything you know as truthfully as possible.

MR SCHOON: I hope so, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Before today when you discussed everything with your legal advisor, I presume you discussed everything with them in exactly the same fashion relating to the same facts and you gave them the same facts, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Schoon, can I ask you this about - may I speak about her as Jeanette, it is going to make it easier, about Jeanette's father. Do you know him well?

MR SCHOON: I know him well.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you would accept that whatever he said or says, will not necessarily be an untruth or a lie?

MR SCHOON: I would admit that it would not be a lie. I would not of necessity accept that anything that Jack says, I would regard as correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Why not?

MR SCHOON: I for instance do not believe that one can foretell all future history from measuring the great pyramids.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now I don't understand you.

MR SCHOON: My father-in-law, my ex-father-in-law, Jack Curtis, is into a particularly mystical sort of Christianity which I often do not accept.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but that wouldn't make him a liar, would it?

MR SCHOON: No, I am not saying he is laying, I am saying I often disagree.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And do you have first hand experience of him ever having lied?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't? Alright. Mr Schoon, your involvement in the struggle and Jeanette's involvement in the struggle come from a long time ago, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: My involvement in the struggle, comes from the late 1950's.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: Jenny's involvement in the struggle came from the early 1970's.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and you persisted in your participation in the struggle throughout?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. I am still an ANC member.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you haven't changed your views, they have remained steadfast and according to your principles all the time, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: And I would hope, loyalty.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And the same for Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: I would say the same for Jeanette.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and during this time Mr Schoon, you identified with the ideals of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: A democratic South Africa, one man one vote, and everything that goes with that.

MR SCHOON: One person one vote.

MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, I am sorry, one person one vote. You see, sometimes the old South Africa is still there, and then I mean the very old South Africa.

Now Mr Schoon, and the same goes for Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and there was no stage during this time when you identified with the struggle, that you seriously differed from the policy of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Not to my recollection, no Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and you never publicly criticised the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Never.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the same with Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: And the same with Jeanette.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what are your views on the SACP?

MR SCHOON: My present, my current views on the SACP?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, let's go back to 1950's, the start of your involvement in the struggle? Were you a member of the SACP?

MR SCHOON: I joined the SACP when I came out of prison and went to Botswana, I joined the SACP in 1977.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you testified that.

MR SCHOON: I always viewed the SACP and those people that I knew were involved with the SACP, as making a particular and in particular a disciplined contribution to bringing about democracy in the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and you also in broad terms, supported the SACP's ideals and ideology?

MR SCHOON: I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the same for Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Possibly less so. She was more critical of the party than I was.

MR DU PLESSIS: But she was a member?

MR SCHOON: She was never a member of the party.

MR DU PLESSIS: You testified that you don't know if she was a member, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, to my knowledge she was never a member.

MR DU PLESSIS: And I understood you that from the way the party functioned, it may have been possible that both of you may have been members, but that she wouldn't have known about you and you wouldn't have known about her?

MR SCHOON: It would have been possible, but knowing Jeanette I would have been surprised if she was a member of the party.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Schoon, this means that you identified yourself with the struggle to overthrow the South African government at, right from the start until 1994?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was your aim and your purpose?

MR SCHOON: Perhaps it was the centre of my life, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Throughout your life?

MR SCHOON: Well, basically from the time when I was just leaving university.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you gave up a lot of material benefits and you gave up a lot else, other good things in life, for this purpose and this ideal?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, but I also gained things.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and the same goes for Jeanette, is that right?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you also believed eventually that the only way to achieve this goal was by an armed struggle, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: I accepted the ANC's view of the four pillars of the revolution, I saw the armed struggle as one of the components of bringing about change in the country. I agreed with the former President of the ANC, Chief Albert Luthuli when ...(indistinct) of complaint was launched on the 16th of December 1961 when he said I have been knocking on the door for years, and it has remained closed, we have no other alternative.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you agreed with the armed struggle, you identified?

MR SCHOON: I agreed that the armed struggle was a component necessary for the liberation of the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: You identified therewith Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I identified with it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Jeanette as well?

MR SCHOON: Jeanette as well.

MR DU PLESSIS: So, that means that you identified yourself with actions taken by the liberation movements, as part of the armed struggle, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: I identified with those actions taken by the liberation movement which were in fact sanctioned by the movement. Certain actions were not sanctioned by the movement.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that would have been the Church Street bomb for instance?

MR SCHOON: The Church Street bomb I saw as attacking a military target.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I know that there is the official ANC view on that. All I want to know is you identified with that?

MR SCHOON: I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you supported it?

MR SCHOON: I did indeed, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: The same with the Silverton attack, the attack on the bank in Silverton?

MR SCHOON: I was less happy about the attack on the bank in Silverton.

MR DU PLESSIS: But nevertheless you identified with it, and you supported it, isn't it?

MR SCHOON: No, I was puzzled by it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because it wasn't the ANC's way to take hostages, isn't that?

MR SCHOON: It wasn't the ANC's way to take hostages. I did not understand why that happened.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, we know what the official policy is. All I am asking you is in broad terms, you identified with it and you supported that? In broad terms, not the taking of hostages, but in broad terms?

MR SCHOON: In broad terms I was unhappy about Silverton, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, let's go to the Magoo’s Bar bombing?

MR SCHOON: I actually do not know about the Magoo’s Bar bombing. It is stuff that I have learned about subsequently.

At the time I had no view about it, because I did not know about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but do you know now about it?

MR SCHOON: I would say I would see it as an unsanctioned action.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is not how I understand the ANC presentation to the Truth Commission. The ANC's presentation to the Truth Commission tries to justify the attack on Magoo’s Bar?

MR SCHOON: I have not seen the submission.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but if I tell you that is the case, I can show it to you.

MR SCHOON: I will accept what you are saying. I basically know nothing about the incident, I can't really have a view on it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it was an attack where I think there were three people killed, it was a bar that was frequented by I think Army personnel, but the three people who were killed as far as my recollection goes, were civilians.

MR SCHOON: Yes, I am not aware, I accept what you say.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and you have no problem with that as part of the ANC's fight for democracy?

MR SCHOON: No, I have problems in accepting anything that I don't have some details about.

At the moment, I do not have a view on Magoo’s Bar.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I can read to you what happened there from the ANC's submission, I don't want to waste time. All that I am asking you is if such an attack is sought to be justified by the ANC, a bomb attack where three civilians died, sought to be justified by the ANC in their presentation to the Truth Commission, do you have any reason to differ from that?

MR SCHOON: If the ANC has made a presentation to the Commission, I would need very strong evidence to the contrary to disagree with it because it is made by my organisation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you steadfastly stand behind your organisation, you are a true and loyal member of the organisation?

MR SCHOON: That is how I see myself, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you, yourself, at the time when you were involved in the struggle, believed that these actions were justified?

MR SCHOON: I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and you also believed that the actions taken by members of the ANC, where people were killed in the process, were justified as part of the armed struggle?

MR SCHOON: I did.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, the same would go for a case like the Church Street bombing where innocent people were killed in the process?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And the same goes for Jeanette, isn't that right?

MR SCHOON: In so far as I can speak for Jeanette, that would be my understanding.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, well you are the only person we can ask about this, so we will have to accept what you say Mr Schoon, about that.

Now, you were present I think through all the hearings, and you heard the evidence of my client, Mr Raven.

MR SCHOON: I heard his evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you heard his evidence about his view of the struggle.

MR SCHOON: I heard his view.

MR DU PLESSIS: And what he said what he thought he was doing, why he was doing it, and that he thought that what he was doing, was right.

MR SCHOON: I heard what he said.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he also testified that at that time he believed that what he was doing, was right?

MR SCHOON: I heard him say that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. He supported the South African government and National Party, the struggle to uphold apartheid, the fight against the liberation movements and the fight against the communism.

MR SCHOON: I heard him say that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, do you accept what he says or what he testified?

MR SCHOON: You know the Truth Commission itself, has reaffirmed that apartheid was a crime against humanity. I think that those people who supported that particular crime, have to look inside their hearts very, very carefully to see why it was that possibly sincerely, they believed what they did in the past, was correct, when it was obvious to the rest of the world that in fact it was criminal activity.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Schoon, that is what this process is about.

MR SCHOON: That is what this process is about.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and can I tell you something, I have experienced this process from the side of those people, more than anything else.

The one thing that has struck me of this process, is the fact how many of those people mean it when they say that when they look back at it now, after the world has opened to them, that they know that they were wrong.

MR SCHOON: I am pleased to hear you say that Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and one of those people is Mr Raven. That is what he testified.

Have you any reason to doubt Mr Raven about that?

MR SCHOON: It was difficult for me to decide, I am giving you as honest an answer as I can, it was difficult for me to decide because I do not know Mr Raven, whether he was actually speaking what was inside his heart, or whether he was speaking what he thought the Honourable Commissioners would like to hear.

I could not make up my mind about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Schoon, but in the same way as you explained your subjective view to us now when I asked you these questions, Mr Raven testified about his.

Now, let me put the question to you this way, do you have any grounds upon which you can dispute the honesty and sincerity of Mr Raven pertaining to his subjective views about the whole history of the struggle?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I heard what Mr Raven said. I have no grounds for either saying that he was sincere or for saying that he was not sincere. I could not make up my mind about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that is for the Commission to decide eventually, if he was a truthful witness. You have really answered me, you don't have any grounds to lay before the Committee, any facts to lay before the Committee to indicate that Mr Raven was not sincere in what he said, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: I have no hard facts whatsoever.

MR DU PLESSIS: Correct. Alright, now Mr Schoon, in this struggle certain elements or certain factions or certain groups were important, isn't that right?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: MK was the armed wing of the ANC, that was an important cog in the wheel? Right, another important cog in the wheel as far as I can see, as I know the history, was the Trade Unions?

MR SCHOON: The Trade Unions played a considerable part in the struggle, and had done so from the early 1950's, perhaps even the 1940's. In fact really from the 1940's, from the minor strike of 1946 until the Trade Union movement was more or less broken by the old regime in the late 1960's, and it took it possibly seven or eight years, to resuscitate itself.

But it was key element in the ANC strategy, it was a key component of bringing about a transparent democracy in the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, wouldn't you agree with me if I say that within the country, within South Africa, the Trade Unions and their involvement in the struggle, was the key element?

MR SCHOON: No, it was one of the key elements. I think the - if we look at the history of our country a little bit later than what we have been speaking about, I think the key element in the struggle was the UDF and the UDF structures in which Trade Unionists were involved.

I think in the period from 1976 on, possibly for the next three or four years, the key element was the involvement of youth in the struggle, but the Trade Unions played a very significant role.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Schoon I accept what you say the youth, COSAS, we know COSAS played a role and certain youth organisations played a role.

But may I ask you this, the leading figures in the internal part of the movement in South Africa, the key figures were all Trade Unionists, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: I am not sure.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Ramaphosa and a lot of other people?

MR SCHOON: There were a lot of people who were Trade Unionists.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: I am not sure that Mr Terror Lekota was a Trade Unionist.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am not saying everybody, but I am saying the key persons.

MR SCHOON: There were a number of key leaders of the struggle at a particular period, who came from Trade Union background, and in fact if we look at the NEC of the ANC while we were in exile, there were a number of people on that NEC who came from Trade Union background.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and in fact today still the Trade Unions play a major role in South African politics?

MR SCHOON: Yes, indeed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, and as I understand you SACTU was a predecessor for the umbrella Trade Union organisations which developed later in the 1980's, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: No, that is not true of FOSATU. There was in fact considerable disagreement about the then leadership of FOSATU, which we regarded as being ultra left at the time, there was considerable differences of opinion, differences as regards strategy between the FOSATU leadership and that of SACTU.

However, once FOSATU transformed itself into COSATU, there was very close agreement between SACTU and COSATU.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now I also understand and just help me if I am wrong, the philosophy behind involving the Trade Unions, would have been that that would have been a very easy way of mobilisation of the masses, isn't that right, and mobilisation of the workers?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because they were already grouped in a group, in a Union?

MR SCHOON: I think the chief reason for involvement in Trade Union activities, is for improvement of conditions of those workers that are effected, however SACTU's position, unlike that of the Federations inside the country, was that one could not divorce political rights from workers' rights.

So SACTU was always involved in the political arena as well as purely a shop floor.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, alright, and SACTU inter alia if we can concentrate on SACTU, identified with the struggle in the same way that you did? That you testified for us just now?

MR SCHOON: Again, with certain exceptions.

MR DU PLESSIS: You mean certain individuals or ...

MR SCHOON: Both certain individuals and certain tendencies.

MR DU PLESSIS: What would the exceptions have been?

MR SCHOON: There were certain individuals who were very involved in SACTU, who in fact were very critical of ANC policy. There were not many, but there were some.

Then during the 1980's, there was a break away group within SACTU which was called the SACTU Marxist Tendency, which in fact was strongly opposed to the ANC. However, they never managed to rest control of SACTU as a whole, but they had influence on the Trade Union movement in both outside and inside the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.

ADV DE JAGER: The latter group, did they support the SACP?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, they were completely opposed to the SACP.

ADV DE JAGER: And they were opposed to the ANC too?

MR SCHOON: They were opposed to the ANC chiefly because it was in alliance with the SACP. They came from a very ultra left position, some of them from ...(indistinct) position, and were very critical of the South African Communist Party.

MR DU PLESSIS: So they were left from the ANC and the SACP?

MR SCHOON: And they argued from an ultra left position, that following Trotski's ideas.

MR DU PLESSIS: But how far left could they go Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: Well, you know, there are fairly - there are lots of organisations to the left of the ANC and the SACP. Trotski's view which was opposed by Lenin was that there was a possibility of a one stage revolution. One could move from repressive capitalism to socialism without going through period of ...(indistinct) democracy. That was in fact the view of the people in the SACTU Marxist Tendency.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, I don't want to go into too much of the philosophy.

MR SCHOON: We can speak theory outside this room.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I would like to do that with you Mr Schoon, it would be very interesting, I must say and I will take you up on your offer there, I promise you because I think our views differ a little bit.

Mr Schoon, do you agree with me that the Trade Unions in South Africa, I am sorry, steadily built up to in the middle 1980's, to have been a great force in the unrest situation in South Africa?

They were involved in unrest related incidents? Do you agree with me, there is lots of evidence on that?

MR SCHOON: Unrest is perhaps not the word I would use.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, let's take examples. They were involved in mass rallies.

MR SCHOON: They would have been involved in mass rallies, they would have been involved in mass mobilisation, they would have been involved in mass protest, I agree with that.

MR DU PLESSIS: And strikes?

MR SCHOON: They would have been involved in strikes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And during these actions, things happened, people threw stones, people burnt cars, people burnt buildings, do you agree with me?

MR SCHOON: I would agree with that, but I would add to that, sometimes under considerable provocation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. But people were killed in these processes?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: In whatever way, by the police or they killed others, or they killed collaborators who they thought were collaborators, necklaces took place, do you agree with me on that?

MR SCHOON: I would agree.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and we also know about those reports that were in the newspapers about women who went to buy groceries who were being forced to eat raw eggs and drink sunflower oil and things like that?

MR SCHOON: I am not aware of such reports.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, well, I put it to you because I remember that when I read that from that time.

But you agree with me that the whole Trade Union movement eventually resulted in an unrest situation which caused the deaths of people? Do you agree with me?

MR SCHOON: I agree with you, but it was not the only factor.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it wasn't the only factor and the death of the people were not the intention. But it was the result of whatever happened, and it was the result of what the Trade Unions did.

MR SCHOON: I would accept that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Now Mr Schoon, your involvement and Jeanette's involvement in the Trade Union activities, go back a little bit to the early 1980's, with SACTU and as I understand it, you were involved in trying to build up the organisation within South Africa?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And am I correct in saying that you were trying to obtain more members for the ANC or how exactly physically, practically were involved in the Trade Union activity? You and Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Okay, I was peripherally involved in the Trade Unions.

MR DU PLESSIS: Jeanette then?

MR SCHOON: Jeanette, firstly used contacts that she had at home, in the reemergent Trade Union, to firstly have a policy dialogue with those people, to see how they saw the way forward for the Trade Union movement, to see whether what they were putting forward, was in accordance with SACTU policy as it then was, and on certain occasions, after lengthy discussions with Trade Unionists from home, SACTU policy was in fact clarified.

The people that she was working with, were there to try and form a coherent element within the emerging Trade Union structure, to actually be propagating what we regarded as a progressive Trade Unionist.

The people who were actually doing SACTU work with Jenny, I think very few of them were actually recruited into ANC structures.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you knew at that stage that the whole intention of the involvement of the Trade Unions in the mass movement, would have been an eventual people's war and uprising which would overthrow the South African government, you were aware at that stage when you were involved with that, is that not so?

MR SCHOON: Okay, we are on theoretical grounds again.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am asking you a factual question.

MR SCHOON: I was never convinced that there was going to be a people's war, leading to a general uprising, which was going to be successful.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but Mr Schoon, when you were involved in these actions, that was what it was leading up to, isn't that?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was the whole intention of the Trade Unions and the utilisation of the Trade Unions in the whole struggle of the liberation movements?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: The primary objective of working in the Trade Unions, was the betterment of conditions for workers and that would involve the political struggle as well, given the nature of society.

But involvement in a workers' movement is not in order just to block the workers and bring them into another situation. The primary thing was workers' rights.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that was part of it Mr Schoon, but that was part of the whole struggle. That was part of the whole struggle, what I am trying to say to you is, that at the end of the day what you worked for, was to create strong Trade Unions so that the Trade Unions could be involved in the eventual reaching of the goal of the ANC namely an uprising?

MR SCHOON: No, that was never one of the aims of the ANC.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, an eventual national convention which would be enforced by pressure upon the government because of the unrest situation, which would lead to a new constitution, that would lead to a new country.

MR SCHOON: An eventual accommodation, I would accept that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, no, no, we know, I may sit on the other side Mr Schoon, but I know a little bit about the liberation movements.

The question I am coming back to is that the Trade Unions were involved in the struggle and it eventually led to uprisings and it eventually led to the things that we have dealt with just now?

MR SCHOON: I agree with that.

MR DU PLESSIS: All I am asking you is, when you were involved in that, you were building up the Trade Unions to make them strong, you were part of that isn't that?

MR SCHOON: We were building up the Trade Unions to try to make them strong in very splintered conditions that they were in.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you knew that could eventually result in mass uprisings and mass protest which could lead to all sorts of problematic things such as killings?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And that was something that you accepted was part of your involvement with the Trade Unions, and it could have led up to that situation, isn't that?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that is actually what happened eventually, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if I say to you today that people in the ANC should honour you and Jeanette for your considerable contribution to the ANC's struggle and the role that the Trade Unions played in the struggle, would you agree with me?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, I would agree as regards Jenny. My role as regards rebuilding the Trade Unions was peripheral.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but you agree with me as regards Jenny?

MR SCHOON: As regards Jenny, I would agree with you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And I would even go so far as to say that both you and Jenny should be regarded by supporters of the ANC today, as heroes of the struggle?

MR SCHOON: Well, that is perhaps flattery. We did what we could Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but that is my perception of you and Jenny, you don't disagree with that? You don't have to say, I am just asking if you don't disagree with that Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I don't disagree with that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, and you would also not regard the work that you did in a negligible light, the work that you did was important work?

MR SCHOON: I think it was a contribution. I think it was an important contribution, it was perhaps not as big a contribution as we would have liked.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but it was a major contribution, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: Okay, I would prefer to leave out the qualifying adjective. It was a contribution.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And would you say that the whole, everything that happened during the late 1970's, early 1980's, everything that the ANC stood for, and everything that they achieved during that time, if you and Jenny had remained within South Africa, the struggle would have been poorer for that?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I am not convinced.

MR DU PLESSIS: Excuse my English, I mean it is ...

MR SCHOON: I understand your English perfectly, your English is very good.

I am not sure of that. I feel sometimes, a certain sense of guilt that we did not stay at home to work with comrades in actually building the ANC structures at home. I think in fact that the contribution that was made by people who stayed at home, who got the UDF off the ground, who worked within the UDF structures, was possibly greater, and I think that if we had stayed, we would have been involved in that.

I am not saying that I am dissatisfied with what we did, but I am not convinced that the struggle would have been the poorer if we stayed at home. It might have been stronger.

MR DU PLESSIS: You might have made a larger contribution if you had stayed in the country, yes?

MR SCHOON: I think it is possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you think you would have had the freedom to do so?

MR SCHOON: I would have had intermittent periods of freedom Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: After serving your first sentence of 12 years, what do you anticipate the next one would have been?

MR SCHOON: Well Sir, perhaps we would have had a more sympathetic Judge to sit.

ADV DE JAGER: I am only trying to convey Mr Schoon, that if things were in an ordinary way and you would have had the freedom of movement and speech, your contribution might have been considerable within the country, but that wasn't allowed at that time?

MR SCHOON: Mr Commissioner, I agree with what you are saying. However, I think both in 1964 when I went to prison for the first time, and in the mid 1980's, when I would have been likely to go to prison again, having white supporters of the liberation movement in prison, was in fact sending an important message and it was in itself a contribution.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Schoon, let us put it this way. Your contribution is different because you were outside the country?

MR SCHOON: My contribution is different.

MR DU PLESSIS: It would have been different if you were ...

MR SCHOON: My contribution is different because I was in Botswana, not in Lesotho. Or because I was in Botswana and not in Stockholm.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you played an important role in Botswana and Jeanette played an important role in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I like to think so, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you were held in quite high esteem by the higher echelons of the organisation, it seems to me from listening to Mr Maharaj?

MR SCHOON: I think that is correct Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. We will ask him that question directly, but I don't think he is going to give any other answer than that.

Mr Schoon, while you were in Botswana, apart from the work in respect of the Trade Unions that Jenny concentrated on mostly, what other work that benefited the ANC, were you involved in?

MR SCHOON: Jenny also was part of the political mobilisation work that I was involved in.

MR DU PLESSIS: Practically, what did that involve?

MR SCHOON: That involved recruiting people from home to the ANC, to perform a variety of tasks at home.

Firstly, to supply ongoing information to us in Botswana, which would then be passed on to Lusaka about what was regarded as strategic issues at home and not all people were given all of these tasks.

Secondly, there would be the question of being involved in mass mobilisation through the organisations to which people belonged.

Thirdly, there would be the question of establishing functional propaganda units for the distribution of leaflets and ANC information at home.

And fourthly, there would be suggestions about possible other recruits to the ANC.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, so you were involved in recruiting people to the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: In establishing a communication channel between Botswana and people inside South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: In whatever way, letters, dead letter boxes?

MR SCHOON: In whatever way, using couriers.

MR DU PLESSIS: Using couriers, etc? You were involved in Intelligence gathering?

MR SCHOON: We were involved in Intelligence gathering, even though we were not an Intelligence unit?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And you were involved also in respect of gathering Intelligence about what was happening in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that Intelligence that you gathered in such a way, would that have been passed on to the higher echelons in the ANC?

MR SCHOON: It would have been passed on to our own structures and from there, it would have been passed on to Lusaka.

MR DU PLESSIS: Let us say for instance that you were in correspondence with somebody that we have seen in Exhibit RR, I am thinking of Prof Dugard, but he wouldn't have been a ...

MR SCHOON: Prof Dugard was never a member of the ANC to my knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes, no, let's forget him. Let's take somebody that was involved on the ground, and you received important information from him or that person, about some action that was going to be taken by ANC supporters in respect of a mass rally, or something that is planned, and you received that information let's say by way of a letter, you would have passed that on, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Let's say for instance you got information about something that was planned that was unauthorised, that wasn't part of the ANC's policy at that time, you would have passed that on as well because it would have been important for them to know?

MR SCHOON: We would have passed it on.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. So, you were also a conduit for a lot of important information going to and fro from and to South Africa?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And that also goes for Jenny?

MR SCHOON: Perhaps even more so, because Lusaka was very badly informed about the reemergent Trade Unions, and particularly badly informed about the very real tensions that there were.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And Mr Schoon, you eventually succeeded in setting up a network of people with whom you had contact and from whom you got information?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and as I gathered from your evidence and from this file that I read, is that that was quite an extensive network?

MR SCHOON: Considerably more extensive than appears from that file.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, no, that deduction I have made when I read through the file. And it seems to me from reading this file, that and this was a file compiled by the Security Police, that they had a lot of respect for you. I am referring to the one incident that you probably also would have seen where they say that with professional, I think with professional capability, you sent out certain information in the letters as traps and then they praise themselves and they say they evaded the traps with equal professional capability. Have you seen that in the file?

MR SCHOON: My lawyers only gave me this file yesterday again. I read this file when the Weekly Mail ran stories about it some years ago. My recollection of the file is fairly hazy.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but you won't doubt me if I tell you ...

MR SCHOON: I don't doubt what you are saying.

MR DU PLESSIS: And would it be wrong for me to say that your network which you established, contributed to a large extent to the information that was gathered in Botswana about what was going on in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and were you requested, did you get requests sometimes from the higher echelons to obtain certain information, did you receive a task saying could you use your network in ascertaining this for us or that for us?

MR SCHOON: We did.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you executed that as well?

MR SCHOON: Sometimes we were able to, sometimes we weren't.

MR DU PLESSIS: Give us an example, what kind of instructions would you have received?

MR SCHOON: I am talking about the events that led to Barbara Hogan's arrest. Barbara was convicted basically for setting up an ANC structure which brought together particularly in Johannesburg, but also in other parts of the country, all the important but very desperate elements of the white left at the time.

Shortly before Barbara's arrest, we were asked by Lusaka to obtain information on specific difficulties that they had become aware of in the white left, and we in fact did obtain that information.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and Mr Schoon, I have listened this morning with considerable interest to your evidence about how Mr Williamson, how it was determined and how your suspicions grew about Mr Williamson's involvement with the South African Police and I must say I actually conjured a James Bond picture in my mind's eye about your involvement and the whole situation.

It is the stuff spy stories are made of.

MR SCHOON: We lived very strange lives.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I accept that, but gathering from that, I presume and tell me if I am wrong, that your, the whole system that you set up, the network that you set up was a highly sophisticated professional network that worked?

MR SCHOON: It was not as sophisticated as it should be Sir, there were too many people arrested.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, alright, but it was a professional network.

MR SCHOON: It was as professional as we could make it, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, and would you say Mr Schoon, that in general with setting up this network, you succeeded in achieving your goals that you set for yourself in Botswana, you and your wife?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I think one of the lessons one learns from life is that you never achieve your goals.

I think we had successes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you never achieve it the way you want it.

MR SCHOON: You never achieve it the way you want to.

MR DU PLESSIS: Otherwise we all would have been Presidents, yes, but ...

MR SCHOON: If that is what we have wanted to.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but you achieved successes, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: I think we achieved successes.

MR DU PLESSIS: If I can refer you to Exhibit RR, I don't know if anybody has it available there.

MR SCHOON: I have it here.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't want to refer to it extensively, I just want to take you to a few pages.

Page 1, you will see the third paragraph, the last sentence that is underlined there. It says this memorandum helps to emphasise the lack of knowledge we have of the ANC/CP networks operating from neighbouring States. It seems to me at the stage when this was written, the Security Forces regarded themselves as having a lack of knowledge. Do you have any comment on that?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. It has never been clear to me when this report was actually compiled. The covering letter to the Commissioner of the South African Police, is dated 1980.

I would suggest that this report was in fact compiled possibly early 1978. By that time, we were already distancing ourselves almost completely from Carl Edwards' communication systems. I would say that for the subsequent period, there was possibly even less knowledge of how the ANC's networks were operating.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now Mr Schoon, the information that you gathered, that would have also related to routes of infiltration into South Africa and routes to take people out that had to come out, like you and Jenny had to do?

MR SCHOON: We had information on routes, we knew how we'd come in, we had spoken a fair amount about other possibilities. It was never a major part of our work to be involved in designating routes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but you gathered information, or you would have received information.

MR SCHOON: We had some information, but it was by no means extensive.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Alright, now if we turn to page 5 of that document, you will see there in the middle of that page, there is reference to the reconstruction and developing of the ANC's internal networks and the department includes the creation of Intelligence and SACTU organisations structure.

Did your work fall under this department?

MR SCHOON: It did Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: This in fact Sir, is the department which Mac Maharaj subsequently became Secretary of.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and then it also says a little bit further on, the manner in which this was being done is that a list of potential ANC recruits has been drawn up and they were systematically approached?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was done?

MR SCHOON: That was done.

MR DU PLESSIS: People were recruited and they either remained in South Africa or they came out of South Africa?

MR SCHOON: To my recollection Sir, everybody stayed inside South Africa until such time as it looked at though they were going to be arrested.

We were not charged with recruiting people to bring them out of the country immediately, we were charged with establishing internal units.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and on page 6 you will see (i) on page 6, it says the Schoon's are building a white underground structure for the ANC/CP?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And that is what you were doing?

MR SCHOON: We would have said it was for the ANC, but the ANC was in alliance with the Communist Party.

MR DU PLESSIS: With the SACP, yes. But that is what you were successful with, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: I think we were Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and then four, it is clear that the line of command extends rigidly from a group comprising Maharaj and then a lot of names there in Lusaka, down to a regional level comprising Mahoti and the Schoon's. From the Schoon's the lines of control extend into the RSA where white underground workers are responsible for certain ANC/CP tasks?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: It wouldn't be unfair of me to say that you in your position, had a fair amount of control over people in South Africa and what they were doing to further the struggle, in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Sir, the way that the ANC works, is that decisions are very seldom at least at the level at which I functioned in the ANC, taken individually.

Things would have been discussed, we would have passed on whatever instructions we received from our leadership to the people we were working with. In the same way we would have suggested to leadership that we are likely to be seen X this coming weekend, and we suggest that they should be tasked with this.

But it was only rarely that we had to make autonomous situations, and that would be in a semi-emergency.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but Mr Schoon, let's say for instance the ANC had a very, at that time, a very important message that had to go to important Trade Union leaders in South Africa, they would have utilised your network?

MR SCHOON: They would Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Right, and that is confirmed on page 11 of Exhibit RR. The last paragraph, or the second last paragraph says Chris Wood reported that the ANC were looking for underground routes into the RSA.

And then we have read the last paragraph. Then evidence from evaluated material shows an increase in ANC pamphlet distribution for June 1980. It must be assured that the Schoon's and other ANC operatives in Botswana, have opened up various routes into the RSA.

For this reason, special attention should be paid to people such as Cedric Mason who was planning to involve himself with this kind of activity. Do you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: I agree with the second part of that sentence. As I said in my evidence Sir, Chris Wood was not a member of the ANC, but he had contact with a large number of people in the ANC.

It is not absolutely clear that the looking for underground routes into South Africa, refers to us, because that was never a major task of ours.

If you just care to read that sentence again.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes, I am actually not interested in the first paragraph really.

MR SCHOON: Okay.

MR DU PLESSIS: The second paragraph is what interests me.

MR SCHOON: But I would like to exclude the private yachts as well.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I was imagining a yacht on the Limpopo because that is the closest one can get, but Mr Schoon, the second paragraph there, the increase in pamphlet distribution and then it says it must be ensured that the Schoon's and other ANC operatives in Botswana have opened up various routes into the RSA, do you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, but they were still vestigial in 1980. Our communication system by 1982, possibly by the end of 1981 was considerably better than it was in the 1980's.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and that was because of your contribution?

MR SCHOON: I think so yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and then page 52. I am sorry, let's leave 52, page 58, the last sentence there, it refers to a certain Vlotman.

MR SCHOON: I can't find it, my document is only numbered up to page 25. Oh no, hang on. Are we looking at page 52?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 58 please.

MR SCHOON: What does it deal with Sir?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can't see the heading, there is just one paragraph that deals with a certain Mr Vlotman and Richer.

MR SCHOON: Ms Vlotman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, Ms Vlotman, sorry.

MR SCHOON: And Richer.

MR DU PLESSIS: Richer?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I can speak on that without looking at the document.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, let me just ask you this. It says in the document under the firm hand of the Schoon's they are now highly dangerous and we must view all their contacts and visitors from the RSA in the same light. Can you comment on that?

MR SCHOON: Well Sir, Mr Richer now has a very senior position in National Intelligence. Ms Vlotman, they are now married, has a very senior position in the Land Bank. They were people of considerable quality.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but do you agree that they were, or do you agree with the view of the Security Police that they were a danger to the Security Police in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: Within the paradigm of the Security Police, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, alright. Then page 102.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, my page numbers stop at a certain stage.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, forget about that, let me refer you to the question that is dealt with there.

It refers to Operation Daisy and to Cedric Mason. It says Cedric Mason admitted that he took Horst Kleinschmidt from the RSA by aircraft to Mahalapye in Botswana. It is also probable that he organised Theo Kotze's escape from the RSA and then there is a letter from yourself to Mason from which they deduct that you were, that there was a close involvement between you and Mason in respect of this escape from the RSA, from Kleinschmidt. What is your comment on that?

MR SCHOON: I am unaware of how Horst got out of the country. I know now that Cedric played some role in it.

I am aware now that Cedric played some role in getting Theo Kotze out of the country. Cedric never worked in a unit that was reporting to us. He was reporting through other structures.

We were aware that he was doing work for the ANC, both he and his wife came to see us a couple of times in Molepolole, but they never reported through us.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and then on page 108, these are just some examples that I am taking out here, page 108 it is stated there that Mark Lavender was recruited as an ANC/SACP agent by the Schoon's, is that correct? Mark Lavender?

MR SCHOON: Mark Lavender was a friend of Jenny's. He came to see us a couple of times in Botswana. It might well be true that he was recruited. Jenny dealt with him.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Schoon, would you agree with me that everything we dealt with up to now, if the Security Police had done their homework properly as we have seen Mr Bizos suggested to you in cross-examination, one expected them to do, and which you agreed with one expected them to do, they would have known about you, what you have testified to us now, do you agree with me?

MR SCHOON: I would go further Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes?

MR SCHOON: We knew that we were targets in Botswana because of what we were doing. We were not killed in Botswana for whatever reason. And from the point of the Security Police as regards our Botswana activities, we could perhaps have been regarded as legitimate targets.

I do not think Sir, that we were in any way legitimate targets in Angola.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, we will speak Angola now. And it was because of the fact that what you did in Botswana posed considerable difficulties and dangers to South Africa?

MR SCHOON: I agree Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Alright, now, during your time in Botswana you worked for the British Volunteer Service, is that right?

MR SCHOON: No, for the International Volunteer Services.

MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, the International Volunteer Services, I am sorry.

MR SCHOON: Which was funded to a large extent by the British government.

MR DU PLESSIS: How long did you stay in Lusaka before you left for Angola?

MR SCHOON: We arrived in Lusaka either the last week of June or the first week of July and we flew to Luanda I think it was during the first week of December of that year, so we were basically there for less than six months.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and what was the reason, why did you go to Angola?

MR SCHOON: We were asked to go to Angola by Mr Henry Mahoti to go and teach English at the University in Southern Angola.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, so you didn't leave Botswana and you didn't go to Angola because of the safety problem in Botswana, you left Botswana to go to Lusaka because of the safety problem?

MR SCHOON: We were redeployed to Lusaka Sir, we did not know what was going to happen with us from there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I mean that was where you were redeployed to because of the safety problem?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Your transfer to Angola was something completely different.

ADV DE JAGER: How I understood it, you were actually forced out of Botswana?

MR SCHOON: We were virtually declared prohibited immigrants in Botswana.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, and that is the reason why you had to leave?

MR SCHOON: Yes, but we could have been asked to stay in Botswana in an underground capacity, but Lusaka decided that they were actually going to remove us.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. This one incident that you testified about, this coloured man that you spoke about, that is an example of somebody who you spoke to in Botswana about recruitment of possible people to the ANC, isn't that so, that is a practical example?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if there wasn't anything strange to it, it may have been possible that that person could have been recruited to the ANC?

MR SCHOON: And it could have been possible that he set up a functioning ANC unit in Newclare.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that was where you were going in that, hypothetical in that situation.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, that man didn't require recruitment. He approached you about starting a branch in Newclare.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, we had had some conversation with him previously at the Culture and Resistance Festival, but he in fact came with the suggestion that he wanted to be starting an ANC unit in Newclare.

He virtually recruited himself Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but the gist of my question is not the question of recruitment. The gist of my question is if somebody like that approached you in Botswana and started speaking to you about the ANC and shown interest, you would have tried to recruit him?

MR SCHOON: We would have had conversations about recruitment with him, and we would then have checked with our leadership whether they had any sources of information on this person whether the indications were that it was halaal to work with that person or not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. You said halaal to work with that person?

MR SCHOON: I did Sir.

MR BIZOS: We all know what he means.

MR DU PLESSIS: I thought I heard right, but I wasn't sure. Mr Schoon, what is your religion if I may ask?

MR SCHOON: I have no religion Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Schoon, then in respect of your situation in Angola, let us deal a little bit with that.

The University, what University was that?

MR SCHOON: It is a campus of the University of Angola which is now called the University Augustina Netho.

It was called ISCED, which was ...(indistinct).

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and wasn't it called the University of Luanda?

MR SCHOON: There was a University in Luanda which was part of the University of Angola. The University of Angola had a number of campuses of which the one in Luanda was a campus.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that was what I was getting at, it was a satellite campus of the University of Luanda, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: The University of Angola, Luanda was a satellite campus.

MR SCHOON: Of the University of Angola. The University of Angola was a controlling body which controlled I think there were three universities in the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, nothing turns on that, the reason why I am asking you is ...

CHAIRPERSON: Can we get on with something if nothing turns on that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I am busy going to a specific point if you would let me please.

Mr Schoon, the reason why I was asking you, in a lot of newspaper reports it refers to the University of Luanda.

MR SCHOON: Of Luanda?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: We never taught at the University of Luanda. In fact I have never been on the campus of the University of Luanda.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but let's leave it there.

Now, just explain to me exactly what the ANC presence in Angola was at that time.

MR SCHOON: Sir, we had a considerable military presence in Angola. I am not aware of how large or where it was. We had a Chief Representative's office in Luanda, we had a vocational training programme just outside Luanda. However, we did not fall under any of those structures, except indirectly as regards to vocational training programmes in Lubango itself, there were four adult South Africans and two children.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And explain to us a little bit your functions which you fulfilled in Luanda on the three days a month that you or Jeanette went to Luanda. What exactly did you do practically?

MR SCHOON: We were assisting a young comrade who was trying to do the development work in Angola and who had no development background whatsoever.

Most of the time that we were in Luanda, it would be discussions about how to take the vocational training programme forward.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the ANC office in Luanda, how many people were there?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I cannot say definitely.

MR DU PLESSIS: Just give us an estimate, 5, 10, 20?

MR SCHOON: There was the Chief Representative, there was Mr ...(indistinct) who is going to be giving evidence subsequently, there was somebody working as a secretary. Perhaps two other people, I would say five or six.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and you can speak English, Afrikaans?

MR SCHOON: That is what I can speak.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: I speak a little bit of Setswana but not enough to actually carry on a conversation.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Jeanette spoke English and a little bit of Afrikaans.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Schoon, your background, what are you qualified for?

MR SCHOON: I have three degrees Sir. I have three bachelor's degrees because we were not allowed to do anything except bachelor's degrees in prison.

My first degree is in English and Roman Dutch law. My second degree is in Anthropology and what at the time was still called Native Administration or Bantu Administration. My third degree is in Afrikaans Nederlands and Library Science and I have a post-graduate diploma with a sub-major in Southern African Archaeology.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Schoon, and you - both of you taught at the University and both of you taught English?

MR SCHOON: That is correct and I taught a bit of linguistics as well.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, and were you busy the whole day or did you teach in the morning only or what was the position?

MR SCHOON: We did not have all that heavy a teaching schedule, but preparation for our lessons were very time consuming, because we had no text books, we had to produce all the teaching material ourselves.

In addition to that, there was very little food, so we had to spend a considerable amount of time, being able to feed both ourselves and our children and to ensure that the children were living in a loving environment.

We were busy, we were busy.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, were there any other ANC representatives or ANC members in that area of Angola?

MR SCHOON: Just the two who were teaching with us at the University.

MR DU PLESSIS: Nobody in any of the other surrounding towns?

MR SCHOON: Not to my knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: So the closest people to you were the ANC in Luanda?

MR SCHOON: In Luanda, perhaps wherever our camps were. There may have been camps between us and Luanda, I am unaware of that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. You don't disagree with me that the military training camps of the ANC were in Angola.

MR SCHOON: It is common knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. I think they were to the north of Angola if I am correct?

MR SCHOON: Most of them, I think, were in Central Angola and to the north. To a large extent, I think in Malangi province.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. If anything official had to be done in Lubango, the obvious people who would have done that, would have been you and Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Official of what nature?

MR DU PLESSIS: Anything official?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I remember Jeanette spoke at an Africa Day Commemoration in the University. That is the only, and I spoke at the memorial service held in the University for Jenny and Katryn. I think those were the only official type things that we ever did in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: People there knew you were ANC members?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: That wasn't a secret?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you would have been the obvious people to have represented the ANC in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: Well Sir, I can't imagine what the ANC would need to be represented on in Lubango. If it had been something important, somebody from the office would have come down in Luanda.

We were not given a mandate to say you are actually representing the Chief Representative in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but let's say for instance something important happened and somebody had to do something on behalf of the ANC, you would have been the obvious person to do it?

MR SCHOON: We would have been asked, and we would have decided if we should do it or not. We would possibly have phoned the office in Luanda.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: With all the difficulties that that entailed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. How big is Lubango, how many people live there, can you give us an estimate? With reference to a well known place around here like Brits, Rustenburg, Pretoria, how big is it?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I in fact thought I would be asked this question. I tried to access Lubango on the Internet site, there is actually an entry but you can't get any information from there.

MR DU PLESSIS: I tried also. Nothing.

MR SCHOON: I would say that Lubango was possibly slightly smaller than Maritzburg. Maritzburg excluding the townships. Old white Maritzburg.

MR DU PLESSIS: Old white Maritzburg, alright. And from your evidence I accept that you won't quarrel with me if I put it to you that it was a military base?

MR SCHOON: It was a military base for the Cubans and for the Angolan Army.

MR DU PLESSIS: For the Cubans MPLA and for SWAPO?

MR SCHOON: And for SWAPO.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: No, it was not a military base for SWAPO. SWAPO's bases were outside Lubango. But SWAPO had a presence in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, there was a strong presence there. And it was, would you agree with me that it was one of the main air defence areas of the Angolan Army?

MR SCHOON: I have heard that in this room Sir, I was unaware of that at the time.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you also say that it was not a stable place because of the fighting between the MPLA and UNITA at that time?

MR SCHOON: Angola was not a particularly stable place.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, anywhere.

MR SCHOON: Anywhere.

MR DU PLESSIS: You say you heard shots being fired every night?

MR SCHOON: Virtually every night you would hear automatic weapons being fired.

MR DU PLESSIS: And helicopters flying around.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, could I just interrupt. You were a key factor in the network you have established while you were in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Now when you left Botswana and you went to Lusaka, what happened to the network, did you still have contact with them?

MR SCHOON: I had no contact with them Sir, the network was taken over by Mr Patrick Fitzgerald who had been involved in building it, and Mr Billy Masetla.

ADV DE JAGER: The main quarters of the network remained in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Were there any similar networks in Angola?

MR SCHOON: In Angola?

MR DU PLESSIS: Of the ANC, yes.

MR SCHOON: It would have been absolutely impossible to internal political mobilisation within South Africa from Angola because of the distance and the difficulties of communication.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and Intelligence gathering there, would also have been very difficult, in that whole area?

MR SCHOON: Intelligence gathering as regards what was happening inside South Africa?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, in regards with what was happening in respect of the South African presence in Angola.

MR SCHOON: I don't know to what extent South Africa's Intelligence Services were able to say that.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not talking of South African Intelligence Services, I am talking of you.

Would it be easy, would it have been easy for you to set up an Intelligence gathering network in Angola to obtain information about South Africans operating clandestinely in Angola?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because that happened at that time.

MR SCHOON: It would have been impossible.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because of the instability of the situation?

MR SCHOON: And also because of the way the military structures were organised. I was not part of military structures. I would not have been able to access that information.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and so the more it would have been difficult for the South African Security Police in Pretoria to obtain information about what was going on in Lubango, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: Sir, can I give you the reply that I gave to my Attorney, to my legal representative today. It is quite clear that SWAPO had been heavily infiltrated and I have no doubt whatsoever that through that infiltration, it would have been possible for Pretoria to obtain very precise information about what we were doing in Lubango, because everything we were doing, was completely open.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but do you have any knowledge of that, do you know if there were any SWAPO agents there, do you know if any information was obtained by the Security Forces about what you did there, do you know?

MR SCHOON: I cannot say that I know, but I have heard a large number of people saying that SWAPO as a whole and particularly in Lubango, had been thoroughly infiltrated by the South African Security Forces, but I have no personal knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: From whom did you hear it, at what time?

MR SCHOON: I have heard it both before and after Namibia's independence. I started hearing it in the month we spent in Luanda before we went to Lubango.

After independence I have heard a large number of Namibians say that.

ADV DE JAGER: And in Lubango itself, did you hear any rumours there or ...

MR SCHOON: We had virtually no contact with SWAPO, SWAPO had a small office in Lubango itself. We had some social contact with a young man who was working in the information department. I never met the SWAPO representative, I don't think I heard it in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, now Mr Schoon, at that time Lubango was a base for the MPLA and the Cubans and SWAPO bases were outside.

MR SCHOON: For FAPLA, not the MPLA.

MR DU PLESSIS: For FAPLA yes sorry, for FAPLA, the military forces.

UNITA, you say there was a UNITA presence, but I presume that the people involved at the University would have been aligned to FAPLA and to SWAPO and not to UNITA or the South Africans?

MR SCHOON: No, nobody at the University was aligned to SWAPO.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but then against UNITA?

MR SCHOON: The people at the University were Angolans, they would have been aligned to the MPLA. They might well have served actively with FAPLA as virtually everybody in Angola.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, they were I take it as a given, most certainly not supporters of UNITA?

MR SCHOON: They never gave me any indication that they were.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see, what I find strange Mr Schoon is that the other teachers that were there, that you mentioned, were Vietnamese and East Germans?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. And South Africans.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that sounds to me like quite a communist kind of University? Vietnamese, East Germans and South African SACP members?

MR SCHOON: Well, you know Angola was a very beleaguered country with very meagre resources. One accesses resources from those people that are prepared to give them.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but what I am trying to establish is that the whole town Lubango, including the University, yourself and the people you worked with, were all aligned to the one side of the fight that was going on in Angola?

MR SCHOON: I would say that is correct Sir, except for the people that were shooting with automatic weapons in the streets at night?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, there were some renegades at night, but they weren't in control of Lubango?

MR SCHOON: They were not in control of Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: They were not going to the University?

MR SCHOON: Perhaps they were, I don't know.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now, Mr Schoon, you were aware of the ANC's involvement in a military way with FAPLA, were you?

MR SCHOON: I am not certain if I was aware at the time, or if I became aware subsequently. I know now, but I am not certain that I knew at the time. But there were occasions where MK units went into action with FAPLA units.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you don't dispute that?

MR SCHOON: I don't dispute that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because that is clear from the ANC's first presentation to the Truth Commission and I will refer to page 94 - 95 where names of ANC members are listed exactly 99 of them, who were killed in UNITA ambushes.

MR SCHOON: I have not seen that document, but I don't dispute what they are saying.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is page 94 - 95 of the first submission Mr Chairman.

Mr Schoon, so you would also then not disagree with me that the ANC completely aligned themselves with the fight of FAPLA against UNITA?

MR SCHOON: The people, the government of Angola were possibly our closest allies in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And in that regard, it was important for the ANC to have a presence in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: It was important to make a very real response to the request that had come to the ANC from the Angolan government to supply teachers of English.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see, you keep on referring to that Mr Schoon, and I am giving you the chance now every time to agree with me that your presence as members of the ANC did not just have to do with your teaching there, it had to do with more than that.

It had to do with the ANC structures, it had to do with a representation of the ANC in Lubango?

MR SCHOON: That is not true Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then we will have to ask Mr Maharaj if what he testified the other day, was not right. Because Mr Maharaj, let me just put to you what he testified, Mr Maharaj testified that in an act of solidarity with the Angolan government, the ANC and that is how I understood him, we can ask him again on Friday, sent representatives of the ANC there and they sent you to go and teach there.

I didn't understand him to say that they simply sent you to go and teach there, just for the sake of teaching.

MR SCHOON: My understanding of what Mr Maharaj said and I think this will be borne out by Mr Mahoti when he gives evidence, was that the act of solidarity was in fact sending teachers. We had no other functions in Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, but the act of solidarity would then have been to act as teachers on your version, to act as teachers for people who were aligned to the struggle of FAPLA against UNITA?

MR SCHOON: No, we were teaching people at an Angolan University?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Schoon ...

MR SCHOON: No wait a minute, we were not teaching at a FAPLA staff college, we were not teaching at a political school, we were teaching at a University which was open to Angolan people living in the area.

The bulk of whom would have supported the MPLA, some of which perhaps had reservations about the MPLA.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Schoon, explain to me, here you are, a highly successful person involved in Intelligence, who set up an extensive network in Botswana, who is removed there because of safety reasons, and you get sent to Lubango just to teach English. Explain to me where did the change in your whole situation and function in the organisation come about?

MR SCHOON: That is how we had been redeployed, the organisation had decided that that is how we could at that stage, be most useful.

ADV DE JAGER: So it wasn't that anything as far as your convictions, nothing changed? The organisation decided that they could use your there and that is why you went there?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Mr Commissioner.

ADV DE JAGER: In service of the - you went there because you wanted to serve the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And because the ANC wanted to align themselves and chose solidarity with the fight of FAPLA against UNITA and the fight of the whole struggle in Angola and the ideological struggle there, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: There was an act of solidarity Sir, but the act of solidarity was not to represent the ANC in Lubango. We went to Lubango to teach.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but it was part of the ANC's structure and it was an order of the ANC that you had to go there.

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, as a loyal member of the ANC, they could have sent you to Sweden or wherever and you would have obeyed and went wherever they wanted to send you?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The note I have of Mr Maharaj's evidence is that the Schoon's were sent to Lubango to teach at the University at South Angola, it was outside out command structure, and there was no ANC people there and no ANC structures there.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, and I remember I made a note specifically of the word as an act of solidarity. He said as an act of solidarity.

The part you read now made me believe that he was sent there to represent the ANC and then that it was an act of solidarity and that is why I am asking Mr Schoon, but we can ask Mr Maharaj on Friday.

May I proceed Mr Chairman, thank you. Mr Schoon, and the language there was Portuguese wasn't it?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, and the ANC in its wisdom sent us to Lubango without a word of Portuguese between us.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you knew I was going to ask that. Explain to me, how did you teach people at the University of what is it, of Angola, the satellite campus in Lubango, how did you teach them English without being able to speak a word of Portuguese?

MR SCHOON: My language training Sir, has always indicated to me that you teach people through the medium of the language that they are learning.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Schoon, I put it to you that I find that very strange. The ANC sent people to Angola to teach Angolans English, whose language, whose first language or first or second language is Portuguese and you cannot speak as a teacher, you cannot speak the language of the people you are teaching?

MR SCHOON: I wouldn't have used any Portuguese even if my Portuguese was fluent Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, well I put it to you Mr Schoon, that I find that very strange and I put it to you further that the reason why you were sent to Lubango, was not just to teach. It was not just to teach. It was to represent the ANC and to set up new Intelligence channels in Angola.

MR SCHOON: I dispute that and I would suggest as well Chairperson, that if I had in fact been sent there for that purpose, it would have been insured that I could communicate with the people and have some Portuguese.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I hand up to you, to the Committee and to the other members, some newspaper articles from which I want to ask a few questions.

I have numbered them, the pages, I think that would be Exhibit WW. I think VV was the last one, that would be WW.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, excuse me, would you perhaps allow us a break for five or ten minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

MARIUS SCHOON: (affirmed)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (continued) Would you turn in this document WW, to page 13 thereof please. You will see that is a report of the Sunday Times of 1 July 1984 and it starts with South African Security Branch Forces yesterday blamed the Communist Party Assassination Squad and then there is a second paragraph, the third paragraph says, the bomb killed Mrs Schoon and her daughter on Thursday afternoon, destroying their flat in Lubango 400 kilometres south of the Angolan capital, Luanda.

Her husband Mr Marius Schoon, who was Head of the ANC Intelligence network in Southern Africa, was in Luanda on business at the time.

MR SCHOON: It is not true Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: So you deny that?

MR SCHOON: I was never Head of the ANC's Intelligence section, either for Botswana individually or for Southern Africa as a whole.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Schoon, I find that strange. You know the most obvious and most probable situation that should have arisen here, I accept that you were sent as teachers to Lubango, but I don't accept Mr Schoon for one minute that you were sent there innocently as teachers, and that you were not involved in any Intelligence work for the ANC whatsoever. I put that to you.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, may I ask that the first paragraph is read because the - my learned friend finds it strange that there should be an untruth in this report. Could he read the first paragraph please.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have read the first paragraph which refers to the Security Branch sources Mr Chairman, I am coming to that.

MR BIZOS: No, please read the witness the first paragraph before you ask him about your surprise of the truthfulness or otherwise of the second paragraph. I submit that it is fair Mr Chairman, I am sorry that I addressed my learned friend directly, that it is fair when it is put to him that a reputable newspaper has made a statement, and my learned friend finds it surprising, he should read to him South African Security Branch sources yesterday blamed the Communist Party Assassination Squad for the parcel bomb deaths of South African exile Jeanette Schoon (35) and her six year old daughter Katryn.

Then there is a second paragraph and then a third paragraph.

CHAIRPERSON: And the second paragraph makes it clear that people say the first paragraph is not true?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not printing the first paragraph as an averment that South African Security Branch were correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I know that.

CHAIRPERSON: The second paragraph says friends of the dead woman believe the bomb was the work of the South African Security Branch.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I know that Mr Chairman, but we express this great surprise that such an untruth should find itself in the passage, is taking cross-examination a bit far.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, I don't know if Mr Bizos wants to come and testify about the fact that this is an untruth. All I am saying is I am putting what is in this newspaper article, to Mr Schoon and I am asking his comment on that, and my question was actually flowing from that.

My question was simply that I find it improbable that in the light of this allegation that is made inter alia, and the position that Mr Schoon had in Botswana, that the ANC would simply utilise Mr Schoon and Jeanette Schoon in Lubango for purposes of teaching English. I find that totally improbable. That is what I am putting to you Mr Schoon.

This averment in this newspaper article confirms my suspicion about the situation that you had in Angola and the position you had in Angola.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I would like to start as well with the first paragraph in replying to this question if I may.

The first paragraph is clearly a Stratcom, it is the type of misinformation which the public was fed deliberately by the Security Police, by other State Security organs.

I would say that the paragraph that is being referred to, was possibly also deliberately planted in that way. I deny completely that I was ever the Head of Southern African Intelligence for the ANC and I would like to add Chairperson, that whoever was the Head of Southern African Intelligence for the ANC, would have been learning very little to the benefit of the ANC in Lubango.

The ANC had no presence there, we had no military presence there, we had no political presence there.

ADV DE JAGER: Flowing from that, that is what is puzzling because you have done such a wonderful job for the ANC in Botswana and now they are transferring, redeploying you where you are of no use to them?

MR SCHOON: Mr Commissioner, that is a question that I suggest you ask to Min Maharaj and Mr Mahoti. I followed instructions and I had to go.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I put that before, you followed instructions, they decided and you went.

MR SCHOON: I often did not understand the workings of the ANC, but in this as in other instances, I did what I was requested to.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see Mr Schoon, and the suggestion was made during cross-examination of applicants, and in particular Mr Williamson, the suggestion was made that you were sent to Angola because it became too dangerous or that you went to Angola because it became too dangerous in Botswana.

That was clearly the perception that was created. In fact, may I put to you Mr Schoon, that it was never put to any of the witnesses including Mr Williamson, that you first went to Zambia and then to Angola. Do you have any explanation for that?

MR SCHOON: I speak without having made notes. My recollection is that one of my legal representatives in fact put to Mr Williamson that we had spent some time in Zambia.

That recollection might be incorrect.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, I've gone through the record, but it is a long record, and it may be that that is so. I am not saying that I am one hundred percent correct, but I went through the record, and I couldn't find that.

Mr Schoon, you see the perception that was created is that you went to Angola to be away from the danger. What do you say about that, is that the truth or isn't that the truth?

MR SCHOON: I think we were possibly sent to Angola to take us away from immediate danger which there was in Botswana, which there was in Lusaka. I would assume I have had no discussion with my leaders, about this, but their feeling was that we would be safer in Lubango than we were either in Lusaka or anywhere in Botswana.

I do not know why I was sent there Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Goodness gracious Mr Schoon, are you serious in trying to say to us that Lubango was a safer place?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I do not think any of my leaders had been to Lubango, they did not realise what a dangerous place it was.

MR DU PLESSIS: You have heard of Operation Askari, haven't you?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: You haven't heard of Operation Askari? You see the situation there in Angola at that time, in 1983, was as you have stated, it was very unstable.

MR BIZOS: Do we have the title of this so that we might also be advised, whose book is this Mr Chairman, we don't know. I don't know whether the Committee knows, or whether it is so well known a book that we are expected to know about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, the book was handed in as a previous Exhibit, if you would bear with me, or parts of the book.

I am not sure, it was Exhibit JJ, Continent Ablaze of John Turner, the insurgence in wars in Africa 1960 to the present. There was one page handed in. I don't intend to hand in the page that I am going to read to Mr Schoon.

I am just going to put that to him as facts, those facts are well known facts which cannot really be disputed.

You will see there were two books, excerpts of two books handed in. The one was by Turner and the one was by Bridgeland, the War for Africa. The War for Africa was handed in because it gives a map of Angola and it shows where Lubango was close to the Namibian border.

CHAIRPERSON: Somebody asked yesterday. They can see that in Exhibit JJ.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman. Now you see, Mr Schoon, let us just refresh our memories in respect of Exhibit JJ, it was handed in because it states on page, that is the second page of JJ, page 113 of the book of Turner, it refers to major bases of FAPLA in Angola, referring to bases at Kahama, Lubango and Kayundo?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I do not have this document in front of me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, do you agree with me that that was a major base in Angola?

MR SCHOON: Could you just read the paragraph again?

MR DU PLESSIS: I will read it to you. FAPLA deployment address security needs better. This entailed placing at least four motorised infantry brigades in eastern and south eastern Angola as well as assigning more light infantry brigades into the interior of Angola. Defences in south west Angola, sought to counter South African incursions with major bases at Kahama, Lubango and Kayundo.

And then in the War for Africa it states, but that was later on, later in the 1980's, on the last page, on the second last page of JJ, it states that at Kahama gave the most cause for alarm, MIK 23's could now operate from there instead of from Lubango, the main southern Angolan war plane base, 300 kilometres north of the border. Do you agree with that, that that was the position of Lubango at that stage?

MR SCHOON: I am not aware that Lubango was the main MIK base for some time. I flew through Lubango airport I suppose on four or five occasions. I never actually saw a MIK on the ground, but I don't dispute that.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't dispute that?

MR SCHOON: I don't dispute that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. You see Operation Askari took place in 1983, it is a well known operation. If I refer to the well known name Mr Bizos will know about it, the biggest battle of the Operation Askari was the Battle of Kuvuli which is one of the most well known battles of the Angolan War.

MR BIZOS: Never heard of it Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, I will provide Mr Bizos with quite a lot of books that has been written on the Angolan conflict.

MR BIZOS: Don't need them Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: It is the Battle of Kuvuli Mr Schoon.

MR SCHOON: I have also heard of Queto Carnavale, Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Schoon, you speak of Queto Carnavale, I will give you an Internet site where ...

ADV DE JAGER: Could we perhaps get back to the ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. In respect of Operation Askari, we will speak about that afterwards Mr Schoon, in respect of Operation Askari, what happened there was it was an attack on Kuvuli and may I hand up to you Mr Chairman, copies of the map indicating Operation Askari and its situation in relation to Lubango.

This operation started in December 1983. That would be Exhibit XX, I think Mr Chairman. You will see from that Mr Chairman, that just indicates the attack on Kuvuli and the deployment of South African Forces. Mr Schoon, I am not going to go into Operation Askari, the point I am trying to make is that very close in the vicinity of Lubango, there were major conventional battles being fought at that time when you arrived in Lubango.

MR SCHOON: I am aware of that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And surely you would agree with me that Lubango wasn't a safer place than Gaberone?

MR SCHOON: I have never said Lubango was a safe place.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. So if the reason was to send you to a safer place, it can't be correct because that wouldn't have been the case, that couldn't have been the reason why you were sent to Lubango?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I don't know why I was sent to Lubango, except to teach English. I am aware the forces of the previous regime, invaded Angola yet again in December of 1983. It was either the day before we arrived in Luanda or the day after.

Judging from the troop activity that there was in Lubango when we arrived there, in mid January of 1984, there was clearly considerable activity amongst FAPLA and Cuban troops. I would suggest to you Sir, that the people who sent me to Lubango, I don't think either of them had ever been there, they had no idea of the reality on the ground in Lubango.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, could I just post one question, I am looking here at Exhibit JJ, the last one. On page 379 it was stated that the MK soldiers were disillusioned, because they were ordered to fight with FAPLA and Cuban soldiers against UNITA, and that caused a mutiny in 1984.

MR SCHOON: Sir, this is something that I am aware of now, I was not aware of it in 1984.

ADV DE JAGER: You didn't hear of any mutiny in 1984?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Amongst the ANC soldiers?

MR SCHOON: We were isolated in Lubango, we basically heard nothing. I am aware of this now Sir, I was not aware of it at the time.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Schoon, and I see one of the newspaper reports which I didn't include in Exhibit WW and I beg your pardon Mr Chairman, I will have copies made and present you with it, is a newspaper article of Die Beeld of 30 June 1984 and it is not necessary for you to read it, I can read it to you.

It only says according to informed sources, this campus is a satellite campus of the University of Luanda. Terrorists are among others, educated in English there before they are sent to infiltrate South West as told to Beeld.

MR SCHOON: That is not true. That is not true, I think there was a lady from Namibia who lectured at the University. There were no Namibian students, it was definitely not a terrorist training centre.

MR BIZOS: Can I have a look at that in order to see what the source of the information is, whether it may be a Stratcom Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Mr Bizos, you are going to say that it is a Stratcom, I know that.

MR BIZOS: Well, what do you say? My learned friend can proceed, I merely want it for re-examination purposes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. I will make copies this afternoon Mr Chairman.

You see Mr Schoon, these are now two newspaper reports from different sources indicating that you were involved in more than just simply teaching English to innocent people, and I put it to you that I am going to argue that that makes it more probable at the end of the day, that you were involved in more than just teaching English.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, just because there are two sources, does not of necessity make them correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: I think the information in those two sources is completely inaccurate.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, the alternative Mr Schoon, and I am going to put that to you, is that was the perception that the Security Forces had. What would you say about that?

MR SCHOON: You know Chairperson, if I may make a comment on this. One of the things that has surprised me in these proceedings is that I have heard the applicants saying these were our perceptions, when in fact these were Stratcom's that they were putting out themselves.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but Mr Schoon, we don't know if these were Stratcom's, these two reports. We don't know that. We can speculate and we can surmise, we don't know.

MR SCHOON: It is possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: The question I am putting to you, don't you think it is possible that this was really the perception?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I can not sit and allow my learned friend to put wrong the evidence which - put matters in respect of which there is direct evidence from their side, as to who was responsible for putting a Stratcom out in relation to the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon.

They admitted that they did it Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It is quite clear from the report that Mr Du Plessis put in that it was the South African Security Forces saying this, and it is quite clear that that is not his applicant's case, that it was a false statement put out by the South African Security Forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, my client, Mr Raven, never testified about the Stratcom in these issues, because he never knew about it.

The simple question I am asking, and I am not disputing that this was put out by the Security Forces Mr Chairman, and it may be even probable that this was a Stratcom, all I am asking is isn't it possible that this information was the perception the Security Police laboured under?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Du Plessis, I think you could argue that, but really to ask a person what would the perception of another person be, I don't think he could give you an answer.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, I will leave it there, I will argue that Mr Chairman.

MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, may I make a comment on these documents that had been handed to me. Sir, I have not had time even to scan these documents, but just flipping through them, I can draw the Commission's attention to three, four inaccuracies.

I am sure that if I were to read these documents properly, I would find a number of other inaccuracies in these documents. Chairperson, would you like me to point out the few that I have been able to see in the few minutes I have had this document?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, we are going to waste time, I am not putting this before the Committee as necessarily being correct. These are newspaper reports, and I am asking Mr Schoon about these reports. If he says he disputes it, I am not going to call the reporter and prove this. I am merely using this in cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: He has disputed that.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, my learned friend can't get away with what he has just said.

What he put to Mr Schoon was how can two reports, how can you call both reports wrong when the one supports the other? That is a clear suggestion Mr Chairman, that he relies on the truth of the contents and that he is going to argue on the probabilities that the content is true.

This is what he put, when it is drawn to his attention that this was admittedly a Stratcom communication, he now tells us other things. That is the basis upon which I objected and I submit that it was a valid objection and the ...(indistinct) by him, is a very poor excuse for putting to the witness what he was not entitled to put Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: The witness denied it and it is clear from the contents ...

MR BIZOS: But Mr Chairman, I am speaking about a member of my profession who puts one thing and when that is shown to be wrong, he hasn't got the courtesy to say I am sorry, but he changes, makes a complete ...(indistinct) as to why he put the question Mr Chairman.

We in the profession Mr Chairman, have certain duties to witnesses when we know or we could reasonably have ascertained that these were Stratcom reports, we had no right Mr Chairman, to put that as a true fact and challenge the witness with a probability that it is probably true.

That is what the objection was. The nett result shows that it was a wrong statement to put to the witness and I do not accept and I don't think with the greatest respect, the Commission should allow my learned friend to advance a contradictory version without comment Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we have now had comment, can we go on to something?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, I just want to say that I am not interested in any personal dispute with Mr Bizos, he can say about me what he wants to befitting a senior colleague of the Bar, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We unfortunately have had this on other occasions, of counsel on both sides, all sides, letting fly with what they feel, and I would ask them please to control themselves more.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. May we go through the questions again Mr Schoon, so that there is no misunderstanding about this.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have asked you and that is how I asked the question and I believe I was clear in that, I put to you what the newspaper report said and I asked your comment on that. You denied both reports and said you don't agree with it, is that right?

MR SCHOON: No, it is more than I don't agree, Sir, they are incorrect.

MR DU PLESSIS: They are incorrect. We have also drawn the attention of the Committee to the one report that seemingly relies on information that was obtained from the Security Forces.

MR SCHOON: Which document are you referring to?

MR DU PLESSIS: The one that I referred you to first on page 13.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Then I asked you a question Mr Schoon about what I am going to argue, and I put to you that I am going to argue that two newspaper reports such as this, and I am not necessarily going to argue that they are correct, I am not going to call a witness to come and testify about the correctness, creates a probability and I may be wrong in my argument, creates a probability that you were involved in more than simply teaching English in Lubango. I do not think that that is improper to put that to you, and I put it to you. Do you have any comment?

MR SCHOON: My reply to you Sir, is however you might judge probability, what we were doing in Lubango is teach English to Angolan students at the University in Southern Angola.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. You said there were inaccuracies in these newspaper reports.

CHAIRPERSON: Not inaccuracies, blatant untruths Mr Du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, I don't know if you accept that that is a blatant untruth.

CHAIRPERSON: Am I not to accept the applicant's version, the applicants are asking for amnesty in respect of the killing, are they not?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, there are untruths in that report.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, there are untruths.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not an inaccuracy.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Chairman, I am not talking about that part, that part ...

CHAIRPERSON: You are choosing little bits, I am telling you that report, if you look at the report as a whole, it is based on the allegation that the killings were done by the Communist Party.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if you look later in the report on page 13, on the second column, there were it says from page 1, you will see it refers there, it says a source close to the ANC in Lusaka said ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Du Plessis, isn't the fact that we can't rely on this report as evidence, you are not going to prove it as evidence. You said yourself, you are not going to call witnesses, so why should we waste another 10 minutes or 20 minutes on a report that is based on facts or information that we all know at this stage, isn't correct. Now we should choose a bit here and another sentence there that may be correct. I don't think that would serve the purpose of this Committee at all. Let's get down to the facts and see whether we could ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Chairman, I was really finished with this line of questioning.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let's get on with something then.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, Mr Schoon, there is one other aspect in these documents that I want to deal with you and that is something that appears in three or four of these reports. If you can turn to page 5 please of Exhibit WW.

Alright, the second column. It states there, the last paragraph:

"The bomb exploded at a time when both Mr and Mrs Schoon would normally had been out lecturing, Mr Curtis said."

Do you have any comment on that?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. That is comment made by Jack Curtis without having spoken to us, it is an assumption on his part.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you ever read these newspaper reports, did you speak to him about that?

MR SCHOON: I can't remember if I read this report or not. It wouldn't have been necessary to speak to him about that, because by then he had been briefed by me on what had actually happened.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is this not true, that is stated there?

MR SCHOON: When he says the bomb exploded at a time when both Mr and Mrs Schoon would normally have been our lecturing, Mr Curtis said, I am not even certain that he said that. I think that is something that the reporter might have written, but it is incorrect.

We seldom were both out lecturing at the same time, because of the children. We would sometimes be lecturing in the morning at the same time, never in the afternoon.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.

MR SCHOON: When he goes on to say Mr Schoon had already left for Lubango, he said, that is also incorrect.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, he probably means Luanda?

MR SCHOON: Or the reporter does not understand the difference between Luanda and Lubango.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Now Mr Schoon, the two attempts on your life, can you perhaps just deal not with the first one, but with the second one, where you testified about the paper bag against the car's wheel?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. What would you like me to explain, what would you like me to expand on?

MR DU PLESSIS: Explain it to us again please.

MR SCHOON: Where we lived in Gaberone was a townhouse complex. There was no secure parking for the vehicle, the vehicle had to be parked outside in a public area. I came out of the townhouse one morning, I recollect it was to go to the office and saw placed against one of the inner left hand wheels, one of the inner passenger side wheels of the vehicle, what looked like something that had been gift wrapped and which had a curly tail coming out of it.

I immediately walked around the corner to where Mr Patrick Fitzgerald was staying. We came back to where we stayed, the object was still against the wall of the vehicle. We then went to collect Mr Billy Masetla and when we came back with Mr Masetla, the object had been removed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, and you are saying to us what about that?

MR SCHOON: I am saying to you that I have no doubt that in fact it was a bomb that had been placed against the vehicle. I am also suggesting that the fact that it was gift wrapped, there was a hairy, curly tail coming out of it, would have been something that would have interested children if they had come out.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now, Mr Schoon, do you have any evidence whatsoever of who was responsible for placing that against the wheel?

MR SCHOON: None whatsoever Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: You don't have any evidence that it may have been a bomb, you don't know?

MR SCHOON: I suspect very strongly that it was a bomb.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you also don't know that it was the Security Forces?

MR SCHOON: I do not.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the same goes for the first incident? You don't know if the two coloured men were part of the Security Forces, or do you?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I have a recollection but I am not absolutely certain of it, that I was subsequently informed possibly by Mr Billy Masetla, perhaps by somebody else, that information had been obtained that these people had been sent from Johannesburg to kill me. I cannot remember if the Security Forces were specifically implicated.

MR DU PLESSIS: Both of them?

MR SCHOON: Both of them Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, were you ever told if they were prosecuted in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. You see because what I find strange is the only thing that was put in cross-examination about this appears on page 1209 of the record, where it was stated, where Mr Williamson was asked about two previous attempts and where it was stated you didn't hear about the botched attempt where the man was actually caught and exposed and thereafter an attempt that was countermanded. That was what was put in cross-examination?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir. At that time, my recollection was that in fact the person who had been apprehended, had been the person who originally came up from Newclare. After discussions with Mr Fitzgerald, we both agreed that in fact it was not that man, but he had sent two young people up the same time.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Schoon, that was never put to Mr Raven, my client. Do you accept that Mr Raven would not have known about anything like this?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I cannot accept what Mr Raven knew or what he didn't know. I accept that it was not put to him in cross-examination.

MR DU PLESSIS: In fact, Mr Schoon, and I will argue this, very little of what you have testified today, was put to my client, Mr Raven.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon, do you know what happened to the weapon, the revolver, or whatever, they found in the possession?

MR SCHOON: It was a pistol Sir, not a revolver.

ADV DE JAGER: A pistol.

MR SCHOON: I do not know what happened.

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps Mr Koekemoer is still looking for it.

MR SCHOON: It might be Mr Koekemoer's gun Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, Mr Schoon, in respect of Mr Raven, do you accept that Mr Raven acted under orders of Mr Williamson?

MR SCHOON: I do Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you also accept that Mr Raven was not aware of who the targets were in this instance?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I found Mr Raven's explanation of not looking at the addresses, very difficult to accept.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but do you have any facts that you can place before this Committee in terms of which you can dispute it?

MR SCHOON: I have no facts Sir, you did not ask me if I had facts, you said do I accept.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, do you have any facts?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is what I am asking you now, you don't? Alright, we will argue before the Committee if they accept it or not.

Do you agree Mr Schoon, that at the time 1984, the situation inside South Africa, reflected something akin to a full scale guerrilla war?

MR SCHOON: No, I think it only developed into that possibly two or three years later.

MR DU PLESSIS: Because you see there were lots of evidence before this Committee from all sides, indicating that this was the position.

MR SCHOON: Okay, that would not be my perception Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR SCHOON: My perception was that there were actions taking place inside the country, but that it had not yet developed into the extremely serious situation that there was a few years later.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you agree that it was already in the first stages of a guerrilla war?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, perhaps the country had been in the first stages of a guerrilla war, since the 16th of December 1961 when Umkhonto weSizwe first went into action.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but Mr Schoon, do you accept the background against which everything took place, the struggle, the fact that the ANC waged an armed struggle against the South African government at that time?

MR SCHOON: That is a historical fact Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that there were lots of violence?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: From both sides.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that it resembled a very peculiar war, but a modern day war, isn't that so?

MR SCHOON: Yes, it did.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, such as you get in other places all over the world currently, in Afghanistan for instance. Between Pakistan and India, in South America, it is the same kind of situation.

MR SCHOON: Yes, and no Sir. The situation between Pakistan and India is in fact two sovereign powers confronting each other from a position of Statehood. What is happening in Afghanistan, is possibly closer to what was happening in South Africa.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Schoon, you have never met Mr Raven, have you?

MR SCHOON: No Sir. Not to my knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you would accept Mr Raven's evidence that he didn't act out of any personal malice or anything personal against you or Jeanette Schoon, even though he didn't know that he was specifically acting against you?

MR SCHOON: I heard Mr Raven say that Sir. I have no evidence which makes me say okay, I must accept that. I heard it said.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I wonder if I could ask Mr Schoon, if we could indulge in some musical chairs, it is a little bit difficult to examine him from there, with my back to the Committee?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, where should I move to?

MR LEVINE: Perhaps where you were, if that would suit you. Are you comfortable Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I am fine, thank you.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, before I ask you any questions, I want to make it clear to you that on my own behalf and on behalf of my client, we associate ourselves with the remarks of sympathy expressed by my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis and similarly to Mr Du Plessis, I do have a job to do.

MR SCHOON: I understand that Sir.

MR LEVINE: Let us deal at the outset with some of your closing remarks to your evidence in chief.

I have the precise words which you uttered in regard to Mr Williamson's apology, given several weeks ago. Your words were, I listened to Williamson, it sounded like the dropping of crocodile tears.

MR SCHOON: That is what I said Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you have any basis to dispute that for 14 years, a little more than 14 years, Mr Williamson has lived with the dreadful sadness of the death of an innocent six year old child?

MR SCHOON: I have no reason to dispute it, that I can put on the table Sir.

MR LEVINE: Do you have any basis to suggest that Mr Williamson's apology was in any way disingenuous or a matter of crocodile tears?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I thought it was ingenious in the extreme, rather than disingenuous. It did not have a ring of sincerity to my ears.

MR LEVINE: Do you have any basis for that or is that your own perception?

MR SCHOON: That is my perception Sir.

MR LEVINE: And a highly subjective perception without any criticism to you whatsoever?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, perceptions tend to be very personal.

MR LEVINE: Very well. Now, it is one of the great tragedies of the conflict that took place, that there are many sadly, Katryn's involved and victims of that conflict?

MR SCHOON: I agree Sir, but it is one of the tragedies of our history.

MR LEVINE: And it is not only localised to Katryn, but it spreads over a number of families, a number of lives, and over various areas on both sides of the battle?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, let us go back to 1964.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR LEVINE: You were convicted in 1964 of either sabotage or an attempt at sabotage?

MR SCHOON: September of 1964 Sir, I was convicted of attempting to blow up the radio installations at the Hospital Hill Police Station.

MR LEVINE: And what prompted you some 34 years ago, to embark upon that course of conduct?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I accepted the position of the ANC, my organisation, that it was necessary to start moving over to armed struggle in order to bring more pressure on the South African government.

MR LEVINE: Were you at that stage a member of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Sir, I think the South African Congress of Democrats had just been banned. I was working very closely with the ANC, but at that time, the new structures had not yet been established.

MR LEVINE: So you were not yet technically a member although ...

MR SCHOON: Technically I think I was not a member.

MR LEVINE: In your mind you were associated with the cause of the ANC or its predecessors in title, and therefore you considered this to be part of the ANC goal which you were in fact seeking to espouse?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, naturally even at that stage, you were strongly anti the South African government and the regime for which it stood in 1964?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And you were convicted as you said, I think in September of 1964. Were you defended or did you merely tender a plea of guilty?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we pleaded not guilty. Our defence was that in fact the whole operation had been a police trap and our defence was that it was not possible to use a police trap on a capital offence.

MR LEVINE: And hence, your conviction?

MR SCHOON: And we had no real expectations that there would not be a conviction Sir.

MR LEVINE: And of course, I assume you did not appeal?

MR SCHOON: We appealed against the sentence Sir.

MR LEVINE: Only sentence?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR LEVINE: And was that appeal successful to a greater or lesser degree?

MR SCHOON: It was turned down.

MR LEVINE: So you went to prison, I would think bitter, yes or no?

MR SCHOON: I don't think I went to prison bitter, I think I went to prison thinking that I had done my duty.

MR LEVINE: And certainly whilst you were in prison, your feelings for the regime and what it stood for, increased in intensity?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, especially given the treatment that we received for the first four or five years in prison.

MR LEVINE: And you came out with the strong resolve to do whatever you did, prior to your prison sentence, if not stronger with a view to the overthrow of the then regime?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, I in fact came out of prison with instructions from the comrades in prison to be doing what I could for the mobilisation of the white left in support of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: And throughout the ensuing period from the date of your departure from prison, right through until 1994, your feelings and your perception never change?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: In fact you were of the view that whatever you could do on the part of the left wing governing powers, you would do in order to overthrow the regime and those who stood for the regime? Sorry Mr Schoon, the microphone is not going to pick up nods. I realise you are tired.

MR SCHOON: I am not nodding Sir, I was going to reply.

MR LEVINE: Please do, I am sorry.

MR SCHOON: In general what you are saying Sir, is correct, but there have been periods when I have done more to achieve those goals than others.

MR LEVINE: Well, you were firmly of the resolve to achieving those goals and indeed to the extent that you contributed and I would venture to say, it was a meaningful contribution. You succeeded in what your resolve was?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, to a large extent.

MR LEVINE: There may be certain areas where you would feel that with hindsight you are able to rewrite a little bit of history, given the opportunity, but to a large extent you succeeded in what you put your mind to achieve?

MR SCHOON: I would accept that Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, you told the Committee that you and Jeanette and I will refer to her as Jeanette, not disrespectfully, for purposes of shortening these arduous proceedings somewhat, that you and Jeanette illegally left the Republic for Botswana in or about June of 1977?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And this departure was on the instructions of the chain of command in the ANC?

MR SCHOON: I think the instructions came from internal command structures, not from external command structures.

MR LEVINE: Within the ANC?

MR SCHOON: Within the ANC.

MR LEVINE: Within in South Africa?

MR SCHOON: And specifically on the Witwatersrand.

MR LEVINE: Alright, and the purpose of your departure was inter alia in order for both your and Jeanette to join the external mission of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: So, at that stage of your departure from South Africa, whilst I think you were still under a form of house arrest.

MR SCHOON: And banning orders Sir.

MR LEVINE: And banning orders.

MR SCHOON: And Jeanette was also under banning orders.

MR LEVINE: Yes, you were by that time already active and willing members and participants in the ANC?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And you left South Africa and went to Botswana under discipline of the ANC, I think you used those words?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: And was the political objective of a revolutionary alliance of the ANC and SACP, the overthrowing of the then South African government by whatever means were possible?

MR SCHOON: By the means set out and what we regarded as the four pillars, which were the basis of the South African revolution.

MR LEVINE: Political, military?

MR SCHOON: Political, mass mobilisation, the formation of underground ANC units, military and the international arena.

MR LEVINE: Was one of the means to the establishment of this goal, to be achieved by building the ANC/SACP alliance to defeat the regime?

MR SCHOON: It was Sir.

MR LEVINE: And was another means that of adding to and building a political organisation to complement the military action?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR LEVINE: And which structure in the ANC/SACP alliance, was supreme when it came to military decisions and strategies and tactics?

MR SCHOON: Sir, if you look at the ...(indistinct) which I think Mr Maharaj produced, it was quite clear that the final authority for decision making, came from the ANC's most senior political organs, and the military were in fact subservient to control by the military organ. Sorry, let me say that again, the military were in fact subservient to control by the senior political organ.

MR LEVINE: So the predominant portion of the objective, was the political external and internal pursuits which the military were obliged having regard to the subservience of which you speak to follow?

MR SCHOON: I would say that is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: You would agree with me?

MR SCHOON: I would agree with you.

MR LEVINE: So, all decisions were made, decisions of importance were made by the politicians and followed by the military?

MR SCHOON: That is not quite what I said Sir. I said by the most senior political organs. At the level at which I was working in Botswana, I was not aware of any political control at that level. Over the military organs, there was co-ordination of political, military and intelligence things, through the Senior Organ, but each of those three areas of activity, in fact reported to their superiors in Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: Would you agree with me that as was the case with the South African Security Forces, the ANC military forces, followed political orders, certainly those of the Senior Organ?

MR SCHOON: Not from the Senior Organ, no Sir. They would get political direction and political orders from the NEC or the NEC's working committee. The Senior Organ was a co-ordinating structure which in fact did not give orders directly itself, to any of the three areas of responsibility that fell under that Senior Organ.

MR LEVINE: If the Senior Organ was in disagreement, it would make its recommendations and anything that was not within the parameters that were approved of by the Senior Organ, would be stopped?

MR SCHOON: No Sir, the Senior Organ was in disagreement, the matter would be referred to senior structures in Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: If those senior structures were in disagreement with what was being done, so too would they have the power to stop what was being done?

MR SCHOON: Sorry, are you talking about disagreement with what was being done, or disagreement within the various structures of the movement?

MR LEVINE: Disagreement with what was being done, due regard being had to the various structures in the movement?

MR SCHOON: I would agree with what you are saying on that basis.

MR LEVINE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: We are talking about Senior Organs here. That is the Regional Senior Organ like we had in Botswana, you are referring to?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: And Mr Levine, you are referring to the same Organ? You are not referring to the NEC,, the top structure?

MR LEVINE: I am referring to both Mr De Jager, on the basis that it would ultimately filter through as I understand the witness, through to Lusaka.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, from Lusaka to London or to where?

MR LEVINE: I understood Lusaka.

MR SCHOON: Sir, Lusaka was the external Headquarters of the ANC. Our head office was in Lusaka.

MR LEVINE: That is precisely to what I was referring. So, ultimate responsibility for any action would in the end result, lie with the political leadership at senior level of the ANC?

MR SCHOON: At most senior levels.

MR LEVINE: Yes. So Mr Schoon, having regard to your evidence about your own and Jeanette's activities on behalf of the ANC, and in the light of the ANC's own views of you and Jeanette's role in the struggle, are you surprised that the South African Security Forces would have targeted you?

MR SCHOON: Not in Botswana Sir, I am not surprised at all. I am surprised about it in Angola.

MR LEVINE: Well, we will come to that shortly and you cannot or do you dispute, and I am going to ask you for factual basis if you do dispute it, that it is possible that the South African Security Forces perceived you and Jeanette in the same light in Angola as you were perceived in Botswana?

MR SCHOON: I cannot speak about perceptions that I am unaware of, I do not know what their perceptions were.

MR LEVINE: Those perceptions could very well have existed to a greater or lesser degree in so far as your relocation and deployment to Angola might have been?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if those perceptions existed, they were unfounded.

MR LEVINE: You cannot point to any facts to show why you have given that particular answer at this stage?

MR SCHOON: The facts that I have given Chairperson, I will repeat them, are that Jenny and I were teaching English at the University in Southern Angola. We were not involved in Intelligence work, and if those were the perceptions of the South African Security Forces, they were both incorrect and I would suggest that those Security Forces were extremely badly informed.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the problem here Mr Schoon, that on your, what you have told us on several occasions, is that you don't know why you were sent to Angola.

MR SCHOON: I don't Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And the South African Security Forces wouldn't have known why an important ANC activist had been sent to Angola?

MR SCHOON: Sir, our consideration of this was purely that it was politically important for the ANC to be supplying English teachers to the Angolan government.

CHAIRPERSON: That would not have been as obvious to the South African Security Authorities, would it?

MR SCHOON: You may be right Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman has put the question far more eloquently than I was about to do.

Mr Schoon, just to deal for a moment with casualties. Do you support the position of the ANC leadership vis-a-vis the inevitability and therefore legitimacy of civilian casualties during the liberation war?

MR SCHOON: Unfortunate as it is, I do Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, if these type of casualties meet with your support, can you not likewise have the same views such as the casualties occasioned by the Wimpy Bar, the Church Street bomb, magoo’s Bar and why should there be any type of disparate views between the one section and the other?

MR SCHOON: I would suggest Sir, that is a question of how one defines militarily legitimate targets.

MR LEVINE: Well, would the Wimpy Bar be a military legitimate target?

MR SCHOON: I do not have the details of the Wimpy Bar, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Would I think you were here when photo's were handed out.

MR SCHOON: I walked out of it Sir.

MR LEVINE: You walked out?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR LEVINE: I can well understand the cause of that and I am sorry to raise that point with you. I think if you remember, I prefaced my remarks on that by saying that it may be harmful to certain people. Do you remember that?

MR SCHOON: I thank you for that warning Sir, and it was at that point that I left the room.

MR LEVINE: Yes. But you remember my prefacing of my remarks?

MR SCHOON: I do Sir.

MR LEVINE: And I made those remarks on the instructions and at the instance of my client, Mr Williamson. Do you accept that?

MR SCHOON: I accept that and as I said, I will say again, I thank you for the warning.

MR LEVINE: It is indeed Mr Williamson to whom you should be thankful, but be that as it may.

You mentioned the name of Barbara Hogan.

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir.

MR LEVINE: Was she functioning under your direction or control?

MR SCHOON: She was eventually functioning under our sole direction and control. There was a period shortly after we went to Botswana, where she was reporting and discussing her work both with us in Botswana and with Mr Judgson Kuzwayo in Swaziland.

MR LEVINE: Sorry, carry on.

MR SCHOON: It was clear that this was a situation that was going to lead to confusion. We discussed it with the leadership. I can't remember who we discussed it with, and Barbara was then given instructions that she was to break off contact with Swaziland and just work through Botswana.

MR LEVINE: It is the old attitude, one cannot serve two masters?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Mr Schoon, you mention we and us and our, what do you mean by those?

MR SCHOON: Sir, we were working in an ANC unit, involved with political mobilisation, reporting to the Senior Organ, the unit consisted of four people Sir.

MR LEVINE: Who were?

MR SCHOON: Myself and Jenny, Mr Patrick Fitzgerald and Ms Jenny, her surname will come to me in a moment.

MR LEVINE: A very important unit, was it not?

MR SCHOON: You know Sir, (no translation) is it true that an extensive network inside the country, and he referred to the Security Police report and he said I have counted 37 names in that report of people that they were in contact with, and I do not regard that as extensive.

I think it was important, but I do not think it was of prime importance.

MR LEVINE: But it was important because it was an essential cog in the wheel that was gathering momentum at the time in getting the whole show on the road if I might use a colloquialism.

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: But didn't you tell us that in fact, the network consisted of more than the 37 that is being mentioned in this report?

MR SCHOON: Eventually it did Sir. Eventually there was something like 70 people who were being run by the unit in Botswana.

Not all of whom I had contact with.

MR LEVINE: Now you have mentioned the name of Barbara Hogan. Can I pass another name through you.

MR SCHOON: Sure.

MR LEVINE: Guy Burger?

MR SCHOON: Yes Sir, he was really working with Jenny, I had very peripheral contact with Guy.

MR LEVINE: The contact you had with him, could you explain that?

MR SCHOON: Guy was very nervous about coming to Botswana. He did not want to spend time in our house. Jenny normally saw him outside the house. I remember having a Trade Union discussion with Guy.

I remember having a discussion about ANC policy with him. I cannot remember much else about it.

MR LEVINE: Was he in fact taking instructions from Jeanette?

MR SCHOON: Jeanette was running him, yes.

MR LEVINE: She was running him. Explain what you mean by running him?

MR SCHOON: That there would be communication between them, where information would pass backwards and forwards. There would be discussion about ways forward. There would be passing on of instructions from higher authority within the ANC.

MR LEVINE: So Jenny was to that extent a necessary conduit to give instructions to Guy Burger?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: What work was Guy Burger carrying out?

MR SCHOON: Guy Burger, my recollection Sir, and I am not too clear about it, was basically doing SACTU work in Grahamstown and was also working with a group of young black people in Grahamstown to establish ANC units.

MR LEVINE: So it was the fostering of ANC associated work?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now, we have heard that Barbara Hogan was arrested and I think convicted?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct Sir.

MR LEVINE: What about Guy Burger?

MR SCHOON: Guy was arrested and convicted.

MR LEVINE: For what?

MR SCHOON: Both of them were convicted for furthering the aims of the ANC.

MR LEVINE: Were they tried together?

MR SCHOON: No Sir.

MR LEVINE: Separately?

MR SCHOON: Is my recollection.

MR LEVINE: And of course, we are talking about close on 20 years ago or more. Nobody's recollection is perfect, but do you remember what sentences each of them received?

MR SCHOON: I think Barbara was sentenced to ten years, but this is from as you say a recollection of 20 years ago.

Guy got a relatively short sentence, again from recollection, I think Guy was sentenced to four or five years.

MR LEVINE: Long enough?

MR SCHOON: Long enough.

MR LEVINE: And I would like to refer you to Exhibit Q.

MR SCHOON: Could I have a copy please Sir.

MR LEVINE: Q2. Do you have a copy of it before you, it is Q2.

MR SCHOON: I don't have a copy of Q2.

MR LEVINE: Do you have it before you?

MR SCHOON: I do not have it Sir.

MR LEVINE: I wonder if your legal advisors could assist. I think their assistance is on its way.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Wagener, can you kindly, or somebody see that it is returned to me please.

MR LEVINE: It is headed: "Operational Highlights".

MR BIZOS: It is 5 o'clock ...(indistinct), may I suggest that this may be a convenient stage Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: I am only dealing with one, maybe two pages, Mr Chairman.

MR BIZOS: Could Mr Levine identify the pages so that during the adjournment, the witness can have a look at the pages Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Page 287, 288, 279, 280.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, I thought the element of surprise would enter here.

MR LEVINE: Unlike other people Sir, I am not given to trials by ambush.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you happy to take the adjournment now?

MR LEVINE: I can carry on.

CHAIRPERSON: It is 5 o'clock now.

MR LEVINE: Or I can take the adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: I am thinking of the other people in the building apart from us, when we are sitting late, we are not only effecting ourselves, we are effecting other people here and I think as it is 5 o'clock, we should take the adjournment now until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, excuse me, I just want to be certain that I am looking at the right page. Chairperson, is it the page which is headed: "Operational Highlights 1980 - 1984"?

MR LEVINE: 278, 279, 280.

MR SCHOON: Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS