Amnesty Hearings

MR LEVINE IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I believe that I should ask for a short adjournment to have my Heads bound in blue?

CHAIRPERSON: We'll allow you to do that afterwards.

MR LEVINE: Thank you. Mr Chairman, I have prepared the Heads in two volumes simply because I filed the Heads in regard to the London bomb, with the exception of the one witness who gave evidence this week, in November of last year and it was necessary at that stage to deal with them separately because the majority of the witnesses in regard to the Schoon and Slovo matters only dealt with subsequently, so if you would bear with me in the fact that there is a substantial amount of repetition on the law and the legal argument and what I propose to do, Mr Chairman, we are mindful all of us in regard to the restraints, the time constraints under which this proceeding takes place and the law in my respectful view has been admirably argued and set out by Advocate du Plessis in his Heads and I do not propose to deal in the hope of saving time with the law as it was set out. It does appear in both sets of my Heads and I propose to limit myself in the main to dealing with the matters relevant to my client and to the evidence given insofar as it impacts upon my client.

CHAIRPERSON: We think that that would be very helpful, Mr Levine, thank you but could we also mark the Heads of Argument relating to the London Bomb as 1 and Jeanette and Katryn Schoon as 2?

MR LEVINE: Certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if anyone else other than myself has two copies of the London Bomb. I'm marking mine 1 and 1 Revised, that is the original one which was even better than you said, it wasn't November, Mr Levine, you filed them with the TRC on the 30th October.

MR LEVINE: Well I made it by one day. Mr Chairman, I would add that all of the authorities mentioned in the Heads are contained in three volumes of hard covered files which were not with you or with the TRC on the same date and obviously those are so voluminous copies haven't been made for my colleagues but I do have a set here which they are able to look at if they require and will be available throughout the argument.

CHAIRPERSON: But one would have expected your colleagues to have read all the authorities and be completely conversant with them?

MR LEVINE: I'm sure they have and they may want to criticise me for having left something out. Mr Chairman, so I will not deal with the law save, Mr Chairman, to stress one or two aspects. The legal requirements, the subjective and objective elements, guiding principles, the Norgaard Principles and political or private issues have all been dealt with fully both in these Heads and by Advocate du Plessis in his very, very able address yesterday.

I would like to deal with the superior order test which you will find on page 8, that was referred to in Rapollo's case which referred to the superior order test, namely that a private soldier is protected from liability for acts done in obedience to the orders of a superior officer, if the orders are not so manifestly illegal, that the soldier must or should have known them to be so and if a soldier must or should have known them to be so, that if a soldier honestly believes that he is doing his duty and obeying them. I deal with the findings of the court in the Rapollo case, I deal with the requirements that the superior order test is interpreted widely and it goes further in the normal course that the test in criminal law regarding obeyance of superior orders goes further than the normal test in criminal law. The only question to be asked is if the acts were committed in the execution of an order or with the approval of a person or organisation acted for. I deal ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is the test really not the question of illegal, because these acts were manifestly illegal, but whether these acts were in accordance with the policy - I'm not sure policy is the right word, with the practice of the Government and the Party at the time?

MR LEVINE: Yes, the status existing at the time and what was generally perceived to be, as I will argue and as appears from the Heads, a state of war whether it was a low density war or a high density war, there was a state of war existing and perceived at the time. The analysis by the courts of the Act was discussed in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission versus Du Preez and another and you will find that at paragraph 31 of the Heads.

Section 20 of the Act was also referred to in Azapo and others versus The President of the Republic of South Africa and the rationale of the Act as a whole was discussed on pages 683 and 684 of that particular authority, AZAPO and others and the court also held that to deal with arguments raised in respect of international law and the court had to deal with those arguments in respect of international law and the Geneva Convention and the applicability of the Geneva Convention was discussed at pages 687 to 691. As you correctly said yesterday it would be very surprising if certain of the people charged with seeking amnesty had the Geneva Convention specifically in mind when these acts were committed.

Then, Mr Chairman, we go on to the manner that the Act should be interpreted and it is respectfully submitted and that appears at paragraph 39 that the Act should not be restrictively interpreted but rather liberally interpreted and there follows a list of cases that I gathered and I set out in the volumes.

There are guidelines, certain guidelines attached to the grant of amnesty and at paragraph 42 on page 12 of the Heads it is provided as follows that there is no generally accepted definition of political offence or political prisoner in international law. What is generally accepted, however, is that principles developed in the field of extradition law are relevant in distinguishing between political offences and common crimes. The law and practice of States show that there is now a considerable degree of consensus, but as to the types of offence which may in principle be classified as political as well as the sort of factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether an offence is political or not.

At paragraph 46 I respectfully submit that the test is a very wide test and should be an indication that in respect of the interpretation of Section 20 of the Act, a wider than a narrower interpretation should prevail. The test is more of a subjective test rather than an objective test. Section 1(a), (b) and (c) are all subjective in nature and subjective factors are therefore regarded as more important than objective factors.

The Heads then go on to deal with certain notices in Government Gazettes and then goes on to deal with the work of Du Plessis, Olivier and Pienaar "Geweld deur voort na eerste demokratiese verkiesing" from South African Public Law. Various references are then made in the following paragraphs right through 53, 54, 55 to various articles and the application of the Norgaard Principles.

I then deal at page 19 of the Heads with, from paragraph 61 onwards, the amnesty procedures in other countries and those are all set out with references, two articles which are in the Heads and I'm not going to repeat them because they are before you, Mr Chairman and Committee Members.

At page 23 of the Heads I deal with the definition of satisfied. In Section 20 sub-section 1 and I draw attention to the fact that the Afrikaans word for satisfied is "oortuig" but that it should be remembered that the English text of the Act was signed by the President. There are then Oxford Dictionary definitions of satisfied and what satisfied means in terms of these definitions and a reference to the Handboek vir die Afrikaanse Taal at page 792 which deals with "oortuig".

Thereafter, Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee, follows comments on the discretion of the Committee and the manner it is to be exercised. I state that it is not an unfettered discretion but it is a bound discretion which is bound by jurisdictional facts and I refer to the Kudu case in the Appellate Division. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted the Committee should apply it's mind according to the requirements of the Act and to the tenets of natural justice and there I refer inter alia to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange case.

In paragraph 74 it is stated that it is respectfully submitted that the Committee should have regard to all relevant information and evidence before it including exhibits and arguments but I submit that the Committee should not have regard to sketch plans, there are several of them of the ANC offices in London since each of these plans vary and because of the valid criticism of the tape recordings and transcripts introduced by Advocate Bizos without notice. It is respectfully submitted that the same considerations should apply. We've got beyond that because Advocate Bizos has undertaken only to deal with four or five issues and he has promised to give us notice of those issues and I'm certain that that undertaking will be honoured to the full. As yet, we don't have notice of them but I'm sure that will be done in the fullness of time.

Then, Mr Chairman, I deal with the Committee and the Commission as having been created by the Act being a statutory tribunal which should conduct proceedings according to certain elementary principles and discretion should be exercised according to the rules of natural justice.

I then deal with the Sections in the Act dealing with the application complying with requirements of the Act. The various sections on which ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could we perhaps enquire, is anybody going to argue that the applications do not meet the requirements of the Act, the application, the form of the applications? Is it necessary to argue about it or is it common cause ...(inaudible)

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we are going to argue that the - we are not going to argue in a formal basis, the formality of it, but we say that they are inherent - we will say that they are particularly in relation to the first application. We are going to argue that an application, not in the formal manner, but an application for amnesty for Ruth First on the submission, what is contained in the application and the evidence is not in compliance with the Act. What we are really saying, that's why I make it clear, that it isn't a formal but a substantive argument that we are going to put, that you cannot say that "I sent a bomb to Joe Slovo" and come and try and justify the sending of the bomb ex post facto as to what Ms Ruth First was doing. That will be the substantial portion of our argument. Not the filling in of the form and such other matters. This is why I cannot give an unequivocal answer to Advocate de Jager's question, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think your answer indicates that Mr Levine does not have to bother with Section 21 (a), that where he makes the submission that the application is being submitted in the prescribed form and within the requisite time period?

MR BIZOS: I don't think he has to worry about that aspect, Mr Chairman. More substantial ...(inaudible)

MR LEVINE: Well perhaps I can then be permitted to argue more fully on those aspects as and when it is required and perhaps better in reply to Mr Bizos' various points.

Now in dealing with Section 21 (b) at page 29 of the Heads, paragraph 82, I state that extensive evidence was led, video tapes and photographs handed in as exhibits pertaining to the conflicts of the past, the context in which these conflicts took place, the political uprisings, the disturbances or events which happened and the general background against which the different political parties acted and the ideologies to which they ascribed. It is respectfully submitted that such evidence and material are important for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Act and that delicts and offences must have been committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.

I record in paragraph 83 and acknowledgement and my gratitude to Advocate du Plessis for the material contained in two earlier unrelated amnesty applications and my thanks to Advocate du Plessis for readily and kindly agreeing to my utilising such Heads for the purposes of placing the legal argument before the Committee and I'm most grateful to Advocate du Plessis for his assistance in this particular regard.

The evidence of the terrorist war, Mr Chairman, recurred throughout the hearing. It is in my view, with respect, abundantly clear that the South African Security Forces were engaged with organisations in a war inside and outside the country which had to be countered both militarily, politically and psychologically with acts of violence involved inter alia in counter-insurgency operations, pre-emptive strikes and reference is made here once again to the video exhibits which were shown in the photographs which became exhibits.

I say in paragraph 85 that during a lengthy often irrelevant, emotive cross-examination inter alia of Mr Craig Williamson, Advocate Bizos S.C. sought to illustrate that both Ruth Slovo and Jeanette and Marius Schoon were innocent civilians who should not have been targeted at all whilst in respect of the London bomb that innocent parties could have been injured or killed. I'd like to just make it clear, Mr Chairman, that here I refer to Advocate Bizos S.C. and when I refer to him later in the Heads or in argument purely as Advocate Bizos, I don't mean to denigrate him in any way, it is just a short term of reference and obviously I refer to him in depth as Advocate Bizos S.C.

MR BIZOS: He could call me Bizos if he wants to, I'm not conscious of my ...(inaudible)

MR LEVINE: Bizos by any other name is just as sweet.

Dealing, Mr Chairman, with the London bomb, the evidence will illustrate that despite the potential and actual prejudice which Advocate Bizos sought to create, the only injury was very slight, namely to one Vernon Mbaza who was living in the offices and I think as you so aptly put, Mr Chairman, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, nobody was seriously injured.

The suggestion of Advocate Bizos that Williamson as a spy practised deceit on many during his spying operations and because of this deceit cannot now be believed in his amnesty application is without foundation. Indeed I say in paragraph 87 that Williamson's evidence throughout an inordinately lengthy cross-examination was virtually faultless, notwithstanding that he was giving evidence on events which occurred some 16, 15 and 14 years ago and it is respectfully submitted that his evidence, however unpalatable, certain of his acts may have been - must be accepted by the Committee as true, notwithstanding any adverse views of issues of his morality.

I state, Mr Chairman, in paragraph 88 that a careful consideration of Mr Williamson's evidence in it's entirety will illustrate that he was patient, polite, respectful and dignified and that he gave his evidence in a calm and in a forthright manner, unruffled by certain snide comments, over a period of some seven days during which time Advocate Bizos was afforded the widest possible leeway in putting many irrelevant and of repeated questions to Mr Williamson. The immediately aforegoing observations related not only to Mr Williamson but also to other witnesses who should, with the greatest respect, not have been submitted to lengthy, irrelevant, emotive, sarcastic and often repetitive cross-examination which was in many instances unsubstantiated such as the Charles Newton wedding incident and the second Gabarone Raids which I'll deal with presently.

The evidence of General Coetzee as well as documents and certain exhibits indicate that the ANC in particular and the revolutionary alliance including the South African Communist Party were involved in revolutionary warfare which incorporated political uprising, guerilla and terrorist warfare and which culminated in a full scale, low intensity war and anti-terrorist pre-emptive strikes, attacks and incursions.

In paragraph 90 I say that the evidence clearly illustrated that the security forces resorted, were forced to counter-revolutionary and counter-insurgency tactics and strategies to combat the tide of violence and to combat the people's war conducted by the ANC and it's sister organisations. These tactics and strategies were developed in regard to cross-border strikes and counter-revolutionary measures within the country. The thinking behind such tactics and strategy was that the enemy had to be dealt with in the same way as they had acted which would entail that bombs should be thrown if the enemy threw bombs, killings should be carried out if the enemy killed people and the enemy should be intimidated if the enemy intimidated people. Sometimes, in order to psychologically destabilise the terrorist forces, pre-emptive strikes were carried out to illustrate the commitment and efficacy of the security forces and this appeared from the evidence inter alia of Mr Williamson.

And I then deal with the strategy, tactical approaches, all being confirmed as part of the South African Defence strategy in the White Paper on Defence in 1982 and the statement at page 28 where it was said and I quote:

"If necessary, the South African Defence Force would engage in defensive proactive action."

Thereafter follows, Mr Chairman, reference to the author Grundy, the reference to the apartheid rebels in South Africa's hidden war by the learned author Davis and I state in paragraph 98 that it was further stated in evidence by Mr Williamson and General Coetzee that actions outside the normal scope of the legal process were necessary and were inevitable as leaders and perpetrators outside South Africa could not be detained or prosecuted.

I then deal with the question of the decorations and I state that Major Williamson, his immediate superior office Brigadier Goosen and the remaining members of their team which took part in the bomb blast at the London offices of the ANC, all received decorations for the role which each of them played in the operation.

Although the names of the participants were not mentioned till a much later stage the operation was openly approved of by the Government at the highest level and recognised as a procedure where the enemy was psychologically and politically destabilised and the British authorities were given a warning not to afford sanctuary to South African enemies at a time when a war against South Africa was escalating both within and outside the borders.

Whilst Advocate Bizos expressed a view that Major Williamson and General Coetzee were very close and that Major Williamson would not do anything without his mentor, both Major Williamson and General Coetzee denied the unsupported view in their evidence and accordingly I would submit that Advocate Bizos' allegation of a conspiracy of silence fell flat in the face of the need to know or "moet weet" principle deposed to by both Major Williamson and General Coetzee. I would however concede that in one instance there were certain corridor talk with Dirk Coetzee where Major Williamson reached the issue of the "moet weet" principle in regard to the death of Ruth First.

Advocate Bizos alleged that Major Williamson had been the best man at the wedding of Charles Newpen but during the long cross-examination of Williamson, Mr Bizos was obliged to withdraw this positive assertion made on a number of occasions to depict Williamson as a sneak whose evidence could not, by virtue, of his duplicitous past possibly be accepted by the Committee as being the truth.

I would now like to deal Mr Chairman with certain comments in regard to Major Williamson's evidence. At paragraph 102 of the Heads of Argument I say contrary to what ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It is almost identical with what you've already read us?

MR LEVINE: Not at all, Mr Chairman, they deal with certain elements of his evidence but I'm quite happy to leave paragraphs 102 and 103 as having been included in the Heads and not deal with anything that you may believe is a duplication or identical to what has been said. May I read in the Heads and I'd content myself with that?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I think it's almost a - well you've dealt with it in paragraph 13 on page 32, paragraph 88 ...(inaudible)

MR LEVINE: Yes, not as extensively but absolutely correct to have put that in that way, Advocate de Jager, so it's in the Heads, they are accessible to everyone and I'll content myself with that. I'd like to make an amendment to paragraph 104 of the Heads and I would ask you to delete paragraphs 104.1, 104.3 and 104.8. I say in ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we seem to have a different numbered Heads of Argument - different numbered paragraphs, Mr Chairman. Paragraphs, yes. Fine, paragraph 104 is on 36 on my copy, the evidence clearly illustrated has no sub-paragraphs, 105 says: "......(indistinct) and strategists were developed" etc. The paragraph numbers are wrong but I don't want to make a fuss about it, we want to get on if Mr ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: May I make the suggestion that my candidate attorney looks at these papers during the break and can then substitute it because it appears that my paragraphs are the same as those before everybody else. Mr Bizos, I want to assure you, you haven't been singled out for any disparitary treatment, it's purely an error and we will rectify it.

MR BIZOS: I accept that unreservedly, the mystery has been solved, Mr Chairman. The same appears in two volumes, one relating to Jeanette Schoon and the other - anyway they are the same content but differently numbered in the two different volumes, Mr Chairman and because we only have one ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: No, Mr Chairman, I think - sorry? Mr Chairman I think it may be that Mr Bizos was inadvertently looking at the volume dealing with Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and Ruth Slovo, that the numbering differs. He was given two sets of Heads and this is the one dealing with the London bomb and I think that is the reason.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that appears to be the reason, Mr Chairman. My attorney has the other and we will liaise in order to try and follow. Thank you.

MR LEVINE: So paragraph 104 would now read

"Advocate Bizos kept on telling witnesses that there will be evidence of x,y and z but in certain instances no such evidence as Advocate Bizos spoke of was forthcoming inter alia from any of the following persons: Robert McBride, the instructing attorney to Advocate Bizos' secretary, the transcriber of Gillian Slovo's tape recordings, Minister Pallo Jordan, some person unnamed but relating to the Slovo cell at Daisy Farm to Advocate Bizos alluded."

There was reference to this unnamed person.

Then, Mr Chairman, I deal with the meaning of certain words and that is set out in the paragraphs 105, 106 I deal with the Trevit - with Trevits, I deal with the ANC statements, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission date August 1996 and the reference to the people's war and the page references are set out in paragraph 106.1, I deal with the top secret security document and at page 40 I go on to deal with various articles and they are all set out in the Heads and in the volumes of authorities which you have before you.

The evidence I say at paragraph 107 is that the applicant, Mr Williamson, believed at all times that his acts were justified as part of a war. He believed that he was justified in the manner in which he acted and in a way in which orders were given contributed to the acceptance that orders were illegal but acceptable. Illegal in normal peace time situation that is and Advocate du Plessis dealt in far greater detail and by reference to many more Heads, many more references in his Heads of Argument and I associated myself with all his submissions. Advocate du Plessis did not place volumes of the authorities before you because these were placed before you as I understand from him on a previous occasion and they are before the Committee somewhere or in some shape or form.

It is clear, it is respectfully submitted from the evidence of inter alia General Coetzee that the security forces regarded the conflict in which they were involved as a war which called for counter-revolutionary strategy outside the normal criminal justice system and the legal system and as Advocate de Jager has correctly pointed out this has been dealt with before and I will not labour it.

Page 42, the second part of paragraph 109 speaks for itself but I would stress that the conduct of Williamson, amongst others, should therefore be seen in the light of the fact that if normal circumstances existed, that the people involved in the struggle on both sides were engaged in a war and their actions should be understood and regarded in the light of a war situation. It is respectfully submitted that the actions of the applicant can it now with hindsight be regarded in the same category as normal in a peaceful situation and that the acts for which amnesty is sought should be viewed according to the circumstances which prevailed at all times material.

And I go on in paragraph 110 to state that all times material Major Williamson acted on an instruction from a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen, which he was obliged to obey.

I then go on in the Heads to deal with the meaning of a political offence and I set out various authorities and articles in regard thereto and this goes on through paragraphs 115 through paragraph 116, 117 and onwards and the authorities and the articles referred to are clearly set out and are before the Committee and are available here should they be required, that is of course, Mr Chairman, if all of my colleagues haven't already read them.

We then deal with the political incidents test and the proportionality, theory, the subjective versus the objective motive within the meaning of Section 20, sub-section 3 of the Act and the Norgaard Principles and page 50 deals with more authority. Section 20, sub-section 2 deals with the issue of an offence or a delict and I'm not labouring these because as I say they've been dealt with fully in the Heads and were dealt with admirably I would submit by Advocate du Plessis yesterday.

Pages 52 and 53 are similarly in the Heads and set out the law and the requirements. The Geneva Convention as I say certainly wasn't as you correctly remarked yesterday in the minds of the applicants squarely when these acts or omissions were committed but the references to the relevant portions of the Geneva Convention are set out in the Heads as well as references to learned author Van Dongen and Dugard at pages 56 and 57 and I deal with the article 8 (c) dealing with crimes against humanity. At paragraph 161 namely murdered, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population and the key words being against any civilian population.

I state in paragraph 163 that it is clear from the evidence on Mr Williamson that he did not direct actions for which he seeks amnesty against civilians knowingly, the word knowingly should be added in, his actions were directly and solely against activists involved in the internal war, trained terrorist and persons who acted in the course of the people's war, of liberation and liberation movements. Major Williamson could therefore never have thought that he was committing any crimes ...(inaudible) which could have been given in a conventional war in a battle situation.

I then go on to deal with the United Nations Charter and there it is contained in paragraphs 166 to 170 of the Heads.

Anticipatory self defence is dealt with in paragraphs 171

to 173 and I then deal with pre-emptive action and I state that, in paragraph 174, that pre-emptive action was therefore part of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the Government at the time and that it is important to determine the applicant's scope of his duties and their authority and to determine if the applicant believed on reasonable grounds that he was acting within the scope of his duties and in my submission he clearly was and he perceived his duties to be what he carried out.

I deal with the principle of proportionality in paragraph 175 and in paragraph 177 I submit with respect that the then South African Government regarded itself as acting lawfully in authorising cross-border raids and in this regard influenced members of the security forces including Major Williamson that he was acting lawfully in terms of international law. Major Williamson was led to believe on reasonable grounds that he was acting lawfully and this was confirmed by statements of politicians and leaders of the time. Major Williamson was convinced that with what he was doing had the blessings of his superior officer and indeed it was on the orders of his superior officer and the Government which was in fact the case.

I say at paragraph 178 that in the light of the aforementioned it is therefore respectfully submitted that Major Williamson could not have questioned the orders given to him together with the tacit ratification of his actions as having been lawful in the international context. The evidence was that he regarded his actions as part of a war and as part of the armed conflict in South Africa which was nothing more than an internal war and the same is applicable to the external war that was waging. Orders therefore to act as he did and to eliminate and kill opponents would therefore not have been regarded by him as anything more than a legal order or orders in a war situation and it was justified by the South African Government's reliance on article 51 of the Union Charter and the right of the South African Government to self-defence and to the inclusion of the right of anticipatory self-defence which distilled in Major Williamson a belief that pre-emptive counter-revolutionary acts were all part of the anticipatory self-defence strategy of the South African Government and in this regard he could never have thought that any orders to act accordingly could have been unlawful.

Elimination, I say in paragraph 179 at page 62, was sometimes necessary as there were no other ways to act against activists, terrorists, especially their revolutionary terrorist actions directed from outside of the Republic. Cross-border raids and attacks were authorised and recognised as part of the State counter-revolutionary strategy.

At paragraph 181, I state that it is also clear from the above mentioned that Major Williamson could not have thought that he was contravening the Geneva Convention of 1949 of the protocols thereto because of the non-applicability of the conventions.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he aware of the conventions?

MR LEVINE: ...(inaudible) broad, broad basis but certainly not in detail as I've said and I don't want there to be suggested that there's a conflict between what I've argued earlier, what you have said Mr Chairman and what is said in paragraph 181. So I believe that whilst he may have been aware in general terms he wasn't aware of it in it's very fine points and niceties but it does not in submission matter for the purposes of my argument.

At paragraph 182 on page 63 of the Heads I deal in fair detail with orders of the superior officer and the question to be asked is whether any reasonable security force member in a position of Major Williamson would have accepted that the orders referred to in the evidence were legitimate orders. I say this can therefore be accepted that Major Williamson was always brought under the impression that orders given to him by his superior officer, Brigadier Goosen, formed part of the Government's counter-revolutionary strategies and the evidence also indicates that he believed that it was so.

I then refer to certain authorities and articles dealing with this point and these are before you in the volumes that have been handed up.

I then deal with references on the learned authors P J Visser and M C Marais and I say that insofar as Major Williamson is concerned, he accepted that to act as he did and was ordered from a high political level and from a superior officer during a time of war was correct. He believed that he had to follow orders, he could not dispute or refuse to follow orders. He did not believe that he had committed crimes. He acted as part of war and his actions were in the pursuance of his duties during a war. Cross border operations were authorised ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why are you arguing in paragraph 182, 3 in my other one, that he hasn't committed an offence?

MR LEVINE: Yes. An offence at the time of war. It was certainly an offence in times of peace but certainly not, as we understand the status to have been, in a time of war.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say that if the accused bona fide believed the order to be lawful, culpability in the form of intention is absent because the accused lacks knowledge of unlawfulness and the accused cannot be convicted of any offence for which intention is required?

MR LEVINE: That is from the learned authors Visser and Marais at page 261.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it's in your Heads of Argument. Are you asking us to accept that, that he has not committed any offence for which intention is required therefore we cannot have amnesty?

MR LEVINE: No, Mr Chairman, that's perhaps putting it ...(inaudible). Obviously there's an offence but the status of a situation and the state of war that existed would justify not constat the offences he's being granted the amnesty, either it clarifies that aspect, Mr Chairman and I think it's clarified in paragraph 187 on pages 64 when I say that it is in any event clear in terms of Section 20, sub-section 2, sub-section (f) of the Act that Major Williamson believed on reasonable grounds that he was acting in the course and scope of his duties and within the course and scope of his express or implied authority. The fact that he believed this on reasonable grounds has been indicated above with reference to international law on armed conflicts and a right of States to use force.

Further grounds are the actions sanctioned by the Government itself which went outside the scope of legal process and cover up of incidents, tacit or express ratification of the actions of the applicant and the statements of his superiors, leaders and politicians.

I then deal with the work on covert policing in an article by Schaff and I then deal with articles appearing in the authorities handed up to you and these are further set out at pages 65 and 66. Again reference is had to the Geneva Convention. At pages 67 onwards I deal with the fact that - it appears at page 197, that Major Williamson as was indicated and as was made clear in his evidence and the evidence of certain of the other applicants believed on reasonable grounds that he was acting in the course and scope of his duties and in the course and scope of his express or implied authority, he believed he was acting as a soldier in a war, his actions were there for the actions of a soldier in a war and his actions should be regarded in the light thereof.

In the First and Schoon matters which I'll come to in the next volume, Volume 2, I just say here that the orders were on evidence pertaining to Major Williamson, direct orders of a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen which fall under Section 20, sub-section 2, sub-section (b) of the Act and the same would apply to the attempted murder of Joe Slovo and to the extent that it is contended any attempted murder insofar as Marius Schoon was concerned.

I then deal with Section 22 (d) and 23 (a) of the Act. Mr Chairman, again this law was being fully canvassed in yesterday's argument and is set out in the Heads and I don't propose to deal in detail with this, I would ask you to correct at page 71 the reference at 199.3. It should read 20, sub-section 3, sub-section (d). At page 73 ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: It's seems the typist has made the same error here?

MR LEVINE: No, the typist, Advocate de Jager, as I've acknowledged much earlier in these Heads made use, as I made use, of certain prior Heads where the error was made. I don't accept total responsibility for the error. The same would apply to paragraph 199.5, the reference should be 20, sub-3, sub-(f).

The issue of proportionality is dealt with at page 75 of the Heads together with the authors and their references. Thereafter, I deal at paragraph 210 with Sections 20, sub-section 3, sub-section (i) and sub-section (ii). That is at page 77 of these Heads and at paragraph 210 I submit that it is clear from the evidence that Major Williamson did not receive any personal gain from any of his actions and he was not challenged on this. I deal with the previous application of the Norgaard Principles in Namibia by the Amnesty Committee there and that covers or is covered by paragraphs 211, 212 of the Heads and in paragraph 213 I deal with the amnesty application of Brian Mitchell and it is not in pari materia with this amnesty application as I think was drawn to Mr du Plessis' attention yesterday by the learned Chairman or perhaps it may have been by Advocate de Jager but certainly by a member of the Committee.

Paragraph 214 deals with the issue of the elimination of activists who stored petrol bombs and other weapons in a house which was the intended strike area in Captain Mitchell's issue and there's reference to the application of Hendrik Jacobus Steyn which is another application before the Committee and the judgement of the Committee therein.

At paragraph 220 deals with Norgaard's advice to the......(indistinct) and special representative and that's there and then at page 225 is the disclosure of all relevant facts "alle tersaklike feite" and it is respectfully submitted that Major Williamson has disclosed all relevant facts, that these requirements have been complied with in the evidence pertaining to each and every incident and in his affidavit in support of his application in each of the instances where the affidavits have been placed before the Committee.

I say at paragraph 226 that care should be taken not to be harsh on Williamson in respect of his memory. If one has due regard to the fact that the actions took place 14 or 16 or 18 years ago and that his memory may have been effected by the passage of time, also by post-traumatic stress and as a tragic death of Katryn Schoon which Williamson stated in evidence lives with him day in and day out.

It is further respectfully submitted that Williamson had no reason to lie whatsoever. It should be taken into account that he came forward of his own free will to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation process and to apply for amnesty and to place before the Committee the full version of the facts. He did so without having been forced to do so and there should be no reason whatsoever for him to have lied. The only effect of a lie would have been a refusal or would be the refusal of amnesty which would clearly not be in his interests. The fact that Major Williamson has at all times cooperated with all aspects of the TRC process was not in any way challenged.

I would then have further comments to make at paragraph 228, page 83, in regard to the evidence of Major Williamson and these are as follows. 228:

"Whilst Major Williamson's evidence was clear and concise and speaks for itself, it is considered necessary, with apologies to Advocate de Jager, to draw the following additional matters to the attention of the Committee, that Mr Williamson fully investigated and became familiar with the ANC offices in London before or when formulating preparations for the bombing, that he made absolutely ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us for how long he investigated the offices?

MR LEVINE: I think it is somewhere in the evidence but may I just clarify that, if you could give me one moment, Mr Chairman? If you give me one moment I'd like to clarify it hopefully by reference to the record itself.

Mr Chairman, I would try reference but Mr Williamson's evidence I believe was to the effect that he knew the ANC offices because he had been there when he was undercover and was familiar with the premises and the surroundings and that two weeks preparation was - taken place prior to the day of the bomb having been exploded at the ANC offices in London.

CHAIRPERSON: So they observed it for two weeks?

MR LEVINE: Two weeks but prior to that he had been familiar ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why I am interested is we've heard the evidence that Mr Marcus was there every Sunday except this particular Sunday and that if anybody had observed the offices they would have been aware of the fact that she was sitting in them working on every Sunday.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, my attention is drawn to the fact that somewhere in the record in which we will try and find shortly is that it appears that Mr Williamson's attention was drawn to the fact that nobody would be in the offices on that particular Sunday when the bomb was planned to go off.

CHAIRPERSON: You can refer me to that later.

MR LEVINE: Yes, we shall Mr Chairman. I go on at the bottom of page 83 that Mr Williamson made absolutely sure that where the explosions were to be placed so as to avoid death or serious injury.

Then I state that whilst he was based in Cape Town his handler was not General Coetzee as was put to him and whilst Advocate Bizos depicted him as being duplicitous, deceitful, everything pointed to how well Williamson did his difficult and dangerous undercover job in South Africa and outside. Williamson had nothing to do with the second Gabarone raid. I think it was suggested and put to him in cross-examination that he was involved in that raid, he'd already left the service at that stage that it was also strongly suggested and argued that the Sanhedrin meetings were those where death sentences were pronounced upon. I think Advocate Bizos used those words and this never took place. At a Sanhedrin meeting Mr Williamson never even had an idea of what the Sanhedrin meeting meant. Mr Williamson conceded clearly that insofar as Dirk Coetzee was concerned, he once again obliquely breached - he once, not again, he once obliquely breached the "moet weet" rule. Williamson was not on the 7th floor with General Coetzee, he had his office on the 6th floor. It was Williamson himself who approached the ANC government to further the amnesty process and there was some suggestion that Mr Williamson had benefited in regard to a yacht and in direct response to a question by you, Mr Chairman, Major Williamson stated that he had to sell the yacht purchased with funds that he had borrowed and that his sole contribution was 5000 pounds sterling.

I then go on at page 85 of the Heads to deal with issues of relevance and false premises and I say in paragraph 229 that a goodly portion of Advocate Bizos' cross-examination of Mr Williamson which was unduly lengthy, emotive and hostile, was also brought on incorrect information. I've dealt with the Newpen incident and I don't want to repeat that but I say that it was raised to show, to illustrate to what lengths those opposing Mr Williamson's amnesty applications were prepared to go to seek to impeach his credibility even to the extent of placing false statements of fact which were also irrelevant before Williamson in order to try and influence the Committee and upholster their case of opposition. A further useful example was the cross-examination of Williamson by Advocate Bizos on the second Gabarone raid which took place after Williamson had left the service.

Another line of cross-examination of Mr Williamson of the same ilk was above set forth was the reference to the Sanhedrin meetings which I've dealt with before and a reading of the text of the Sanhedrin exhibit which is an exhibit before the hearing will illustrate that no such suggestion as mentioned of death sentences or anything like that appears. Sanhedrin was the meetings of ancient Rabbis and not the giving of death sentences or setting out who was going to die.

As was the case with Mr Williamson ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I think, perhaps I don't think anything would turn around it but the term Sanhedrin is used in Afrikaans to indicate a "groot raad" meeting like for instance in church circles it would reflect to a synod, a greater council sort of meeting. That's as I've known the term to be used usually in the normal speaking terms but I don't think anything turns on it.

MR BIZOS: May I just say, Mr Chairman, that before Mr Levine pursues this line of argument I would suggest that he looks at the Encyclopedia Britannica where I got what the Sanhedrin was and I used in the historical sense, that it is set out in encyclopedia Britannica but he can make whatever he wants to do with it.

MR LEVINE: I did look at it and the reference is before you from an encyclopedia in the same way that I looked at the reference and description of ......(indistinct) ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps we can get on with it.

MR LEVINE: I'm indebted to Advocate de Jager and I would agree with him that nothing would turn on the meaning of the word Sanhedrin as such.

I say in paragraph 230 as was the case with Mr Williamson, Gillian Slovo undoubtedly received guidance on the questions to put to Mr Raven as well as to Williamson in an endeavour to compromise Raven and Williamson for purposes of their amnesty applications. No valid criticisms can be levelled at Raven at delaying his amnesty application until a late stage as this was his unamiable right and the suggestion that 25 applicants got together to plan their versions and the suggestion made is without any basis and it is a regrettable indictment of Raven's attorney to which the least Mr Berger should have apologised for but saw fit not to do so. You will remember that there was this criticism, Mr Chairman and Committee Members, that Mr Raven's application was made at the eleventh hour.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, can we come back to the facts of the case and let's not continue to - really, the Chairman yesterday made a request and an appeal to you people not to sort of attack each other, but let's leave that out and let's get down to the facts please.

MR LEVINE: There's not an attack as such Advocate de Jager but it must be seen in it's perspective and that is what I am trying to do.

CHAIRPERSON: Raven is properly represented before us. If there has been any criticism his counsel can deal with it. Why is it necessary for you, Mr Levine, to make this attack on Mr Berger arising out of something put to Mr Raven?

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, I take your point. I believe it had no place in the cross-examination but I'm not going to pursue it.

I now deal at paragraph 232 with the plans of the ANC offices in London. I've dealt with the varying plans, the handing in of the sketch plan by Gill Marcus. I then deal with certain of the witnesses. I deal with Mr Taylor at paragraph 235. I say that at page 98 - sorry at page 88:

"An affidavit in support of Mr Taylor's amnesty application was deposed to on 11 December 1996 and dealt with matters some fourteen years earlier. Clearly in certain respects Taylor's evidence was hazy. Surprisingly he said that until he got to London he was unaware of the intention to bomb the ANC offices but he concedes that he didn't know that ANC offices were the target of some sort of operation. In regard to the South African Communist Party offices it is clear from his affidavit and from his evidence that the plan to bomb this office was rejected out of hand and almost immediately for the reasons set out at page 17 of his affidavit and in this regard the parties involved made no attempt at all to carry on with what had been mooted and the stage of preparations were never even reached. Mr Taylor stated that insofar as his recollection that he was advised that instructions came from the top. He cannot recollect whether he was told of this by Brigadier Goosen or by Major Williamson. He does however confirm that Brigadier Goosen was the senior officer who was in control. Mr Taylor conceded that it was quite possible that no names were mentioned to him but because he had heard that the instructions had come from the top, he reached his own conclusions as the persons from whom the instructions may have come and inserted those names in his affidavit. In submission Mr Taylors evidence was favourable to Mr Williamson."

Now Mr Chairman, I'm mindful of the proximity to the tea adjournment but I only have several pages left and perhaps I could conclude with this sector of the argument before the adjournment but I'm in your hands.

CHAIRPERSON: I was proposing to adjourn a little later as after tea we're going to continue at 2 o'clock.

MR LEVINE: Till 2 o'clock, yes.

MR LEVINE: I then deal with the evidence of Eugene de Kok. Mr Chairman, I believe that the answers to your query appears at page 839 of the record in the cross-examination of Mr Williamson by Advocate Bizos. Mr Williamson says on the third line of that page

"I had no information that there was a group of people going to come to the ANC office at 9 o'clock on that Sunday morning. My information was that if the explosion took place within the window, that's the time that it had been decided, that nobody would be in the ANC office at that time besides possibly the security guard cum caretaker on the top floor."

Mr Bizos then says to Mr Williamson:

"Incidently, the evidence will be that there was neither a security guard nor a caretaker but a homeless person that had taken refuge at that place. Are you able to deny that?

Mr Williamson's answer:

"I will not deny it, Mr Chairman, but from our perspective knowing that an individual was allowed to live in and sleep in the ANC headquarters in London I certainly would not have regarded this as some unfortunate homeless person that the ANC had given refuge to, I would merely regarded him as obviously of high enough rank and being trusted enough to be allowed to stay in what was regarded as a sensitive installation."

ADV DE JAGER: The real gist of the question was how long did they keep this building under surveillance?

MR LEVINE: The one in question it was a twofold question, Advocate de Jager, the one was how long did he keep it under surveillance and did he have any information and information he had was as I've now related from page 839 of the record.

CHAIRPERSON: You see this is something that we have to consider in the light of your argument that they took every step to avoid injury or damage to anyone. Did they see, did they keep the place under observation for a few weeks before to see whether children were in the playground of the school and matters of that nature and that's what I'm asking you, is there any evidence to indicate that they had kept the premises under observation for a reasonable length of time to satisfy themselves that this was a safe time?

MR LEVINE: Yes, Mr Chairman, I would refer you to page 1778 of the record at - unfortunately the lines are not numbered but six lines from the bottom of that page Mr Williamson's evidence is as follows

"The purpose of nearly two weeks of surveillance, Mr Chairman, was to make sure that the people involved acquainted themselves in particular with the back of the building which I wasn't particularly well acquainted with personally."

That sets out the time period spent in the surveillance prior to the bombing on the Sunday.

ADV DE JAGER: If it was nearly for two weeks it would have included one weekend.

MR LEVINE: It certainly would have included one Sunday.

CHAIRPERSON: Because we know they only went over there, don't we, at the beginning of March, wasn't it?

MR LEVINE: Yes in addition to the surveillance, Mr Chairman and you're quite correct. It was only one Sunday, it was in fact thirteen days that the took took and the surveillance started but as Mr Williamson said at page 839 he had knowledge and information that there would be nobody in the ANC office at the time on the Sunday besides possibly a security guard cum caretaker which was in fact correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You see I have some problem that in his application he says during the second week of March 1982 the team members travelled to London. That's the second week of March?

MR LEVINE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The explosion took place on Sunday the 14th March.

MR LEVINE: Correct. The second week would have commenced on the 7th March which was a Sunday.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, one week, it gave you one week to observe, not two weeks.

MR LEVINE: I think the evidence was and we will endeavour to look for it, Mr Chairman, that the surveillance was over a period of some thirteen days.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm just relying on Mr Williamson's application which was attested to by him?

MR LEVINE: Yes, I take your point.

CHAIRPERSON: At page 4 of his application.

MR LEVINE: I take your point, Mr Chairman, but let us try and find that?

MR VISSER: If I can be of assistance here, Mr Chairman? I have various references here. The first one is in bundle 3, I haven't looked at the evidence, I remember it was also the evidence of Mr Taylor, bundle 3, page 173. He said that they arrived in London on the first of March, at the bottom of that page. Page 173 of bundle 3 and I seem to recall, it's not very clear, but he seems to recall that they arrived in London on the 1st March.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes, no, no I hear what you're saying, Mr Chairman, and then the other references, page 440, are not so, I think that was General Coetzee and the other is McPherson at page 1448.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: But page 440 must have been Coetzee, that's in part of his evidence. I'm not ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: 440 and 1448?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, I can't be of more assistance because I've just been trying to find some references for you. Yes, I should have referred you also to page 2390, Mr Chairman. 2390 of the record is the evidence of J B Taylor in evidence in chief where I say

"MR VISSER: And that car broke down and you had to change it. You don't have to go into that detail but did you also do reconnaissance at the ANC building?

And Mr Taylor says:

"Very intensely, Mr Chairman, virtually every day or night, either by car or on foot

2390. And he goes on to say, Mr Chairman, that - the last sentence on that page if you have it before you:

"And this sort of activity continued from virtually the day of our arrival until the night of the 13th March."

I'm just looking for whether he gave evidence to say in his evidence itself what day they arrived. Oh I see, yes Mr Chairman, at 2388 indeed. At 2388 I'm leading him from his affidavit and I say:

"MR VISSER: Alright and you say all of this took up the time from 20 February to 1st March when you left for London and what were your tasks allocated to you in London?"

So it was rather excepted that it was the 1st March and then it follows at the page reference which I've just given you at 2390. But again, that's not Mr Williamson, I haven't reached him, I'm just going to look for Mr Williamson's evidence as well.

MR LEVINE: I'm indebted to my learned friend and perhaps if he comes across that then the evidence of Mr Williamson in browsing through you give us the same benefits?

Then - can I carry on Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: You've quoted to me Taylor's application and have you been quoting Taylor's evidence now? Taylor's application is you go on, page 174, starting at the top of the page

"The only person having contacted the individual persons were Major Williamson and another task allocated different appears was to conduct independent reconnaissance for those of the ANC office, it's not the office of the South African Communist Party. At this stage we had not been briefed or we're still not being briefed on the exact nature of our mission."

The next paragraph:

"On the last Wednesday of our stay, probably the 11th March, the team got together for the first time and then they were told what they were going to do."

So none of his previous - if he did observe the thing, it was with a view to ensuring safety for an explosion, he was just looking at the building.

MR VISSER: Yes, but he gave evidence, Mr Chairman, that he thought that there was going to be some kind of penetration ......(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And he was looking ......(indistinct) Yes, I've just found it, Mr Chairman, it's page 2390. ......(indistinct). I am sorry, Mr Chairman, it was the paragraph I started reading, I unfortunately read the first and the last sentence, I should have read the inbetween one as well.

It goes on at page 2390, we would proceed to the offices, to reconnaissance, make observations as to the movement of people at various times of the day, various days of the week, and this sort of activity continued from virtually the day of our arrival until the night of the 13th of March.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairman. I deal with Eugene de Kock at page 90. I submit that De Kock was a forthright witness, his memory was good and he have his evidence honestly, unreservedly and to the best of his ability.

I submit further that De Kock described Williamson as a perfectionist whose instructions and motives, he had no doubt in his mind, in accepting and following.

He gave Williamson a clean bill of health, which is more than he stated in regard to Gen Coetzee. There was no evidence from Mr De Kock, or anyone else for that matter, to illustrate that at any time was the conduct or demeanour of Williamson anything but exemplary and this was observed by the Committee at the hearing in the manner in which, the exemplary manner in which Mr Williamson ...(indistinct) himself over some seven, eight days of cross-examination.

I would deal with the issue of the attempted bombing of the South African Communist Party offices in London and I would say that ...

CHAIRPERSON: What is the relevance of that?

MR LEVINE: Any suggestion that there might be that there was an attempt ...

CHAIRPERSON: He hasn't asked for amnesty for it, it is not before us?

MR LEVINE: No. No, he hasn't. It is quite correct Mr Chairman. Then I would go on, I would ask you to skip paragraph 238 at this stage and go on to a document annexed, which is marked Addendum to Heads of Argument. That will be the last three pages of this particular sector where I say that the Heads prepared on behalf of Craig Williamson, was signed on the 20th of October 1998 and provided by me to Ms Ramula Patel during November 1998. I take your point that it was the 30th of October 1998.

Since the presentation of these Heads, there is only one witness with whose evidence it is necessary to deal, namely that of the current Deputy Minister of Finance, Ms Gill Marcus. In dealing with Marcus' evidence, it is not conceded that she was a relevant witness or that Adv Bizos and his legal team, had locus standi to call Marcus, more particularly as his team was not representing the interests of anyone opposed to this particular application for amnesty by Mr Williamson.

The evidence by Marcus is dealt with only to the extent that it is sought by inference to involve Mr Williamson in so far as the receipt by Marcus of a certain postcard emanating from Botswana, is concerned.

In so far as this postcard is concerned, it is necessary to record the following: (1) Marcus never received any note from Mr Williamson in the past, other than the postcard in question, from Botswana, and which she concluded emanated from Mr Williamson.

Marcus could not say whether the manuscript, it was a handwritten postcard according to her, was that of Mr Williamson.

Marcus said that the signature to the postcard, was merely in printed manuscript which she could not identify as being in the handwriting of Williamson. From the bombing of the ANC Headquarters in London, Marcus drew a conclusion that the postcard, she did not keep in its original form or in the form of a copy, and which she received from a Craig in Botswana, emanated from the applicant, Mr Williamson.

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence of Marcus is clearly speculative on her part, in this regard and that the Committee can reach no conclusion on this.

It is to be remembered that when Mr Williamson was asked in cross-examination as to whether he had sent a postcard to Marcus, he answered that he could not remember, but that the postcard might have been sent to Marcus, as this would have been consistent with his stated purpose of the bombing, which was to destabilise the opposition at a time of war.

Mr Chairman, that is all I have to deal with in so far the witness, Ms Marcus is concerned, and I would respectfully submit to you that Williamson has made out a proper case for amnesty in terms of Section 20 and the other provisions applicable, of the Act and the Committee is requested to grant amnesty to him, in regard to the issue of the London bombing of the ANC offices.

CHAIRPERSON: You now are going to go on to the next bit?

MR LEVINE: I am now going on to ...

CHAIRPERSON: This will perhaps be a convenient stage to take the short adjournment then.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE IN ARGUMENT: (continued) With your permission, I will go on to the Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and Ruth Slovo issues.

I repeat Mr Chairman, what I said in opening in regard to the law and the certain articles and authorities and the analysis of the Sections involved which, because of time constraints and the fact that they have been fully dealt with in the Heads and in argument, by Adv Du Plessis, not going to be repeated here.

In regard to this particular set, I would commence at page 30, paragraph 86. Do you have it, it is at the bottom of the page, Mr Chairman. I say that in regard to Ruth First, Ruth Slovo, it is contended that she was a legitimate target and in this regard reference is made inter alia to (1) the Security Police terrorist album, Exhibit M where reference is made to Ruth Slovo under the name Slovo, as being a terrorist.

Secondly to the tribute to Ruth Slovo by comrade Nzala, which appears as Exhibit L and thirdly, to passages from Gillian Slovo's book, styled Every secret thing and referred to in evidence as Exhibit 8, Gillian's video tape and lastly ...

ADV DE JAGER: Is that before us?

MR LEVINE: I believe that the book was handed, the video tapes certainly are.

ADV DE JAGER: I thought they contested it?

MR LEVINE: No, they showed it.

ADV DE JAGER: Oh, the video tapes, not the transcripts.

MR LEVINE: The video tapes and lastly, Gillian Slovo's evidence. In regard to the Schoon's, Adv Bizos would have the Committee believe that they had as it were, retired to Lubango, a heavily defended military town including a Cuban military base.

This is contradicted inter alia by Craig Williamson's evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you remind me what he said about it?

MR LEVINE: Yes, I will try and get the precise passage for you Mr Chairman, and then I will give it to you with absolute certainty.

While that is being sought, may I say that another contradictory factor was Willem Schoon's evidence, pages 40 and 43 of Exhibit N. Mr Nzo's release to the press after Jeanette Schoon's death, who refer to her as a comrade in arms and that would appear in Exhibit AA.

The tragedy of the death of Katryn Schoon, is something which Mr Williamson will have to live with for his entire life and he is genuinely contrite about this horrible incident in so far as the child was concerned. As we heard in his evidence, that in harsh reality this was a byproduct of an ugly terrorist war that was being fought.

Reading of Mr Williamson's evidence of a whole, will illustrate his inner turmoil and dire regret which lives with him day by day as a result of the sad and unfortunate occurrence.

In paragraph 89 I say that the suggestion by Adv Bizos that in the case of the Schoon's, Mr Williamson was motivated by ill-will, spite and malice, because the Schoon's exposed him as a police spy, was effectively dealt with by Mr Williamson in his evidence, who stated under oath that he knew nothing of the role which the Schoon's allegedly played in his exposure and Williamson stated that his exposure was caused by the revelations of a former member of National Intelligence, Mr Arthur McGiven, who fled from South Africa and gave an interview to an English newspaper.

That article, a copy of that article, is before the Committee. The suggestion by Mr Bizos, that Williamson as a spy practised deceit on many during serving operations, during his spying operations, and because of this deceit, cannot now be believed, his amnesty application is without foundation.

Indeed Mr Williamson's evidence throughout an ...(indistinct) lengthy and pertinent hostile cross-examination, was virtually faultless, notwithstanding that he was giving evidence on events which occurred some 16, 15, 14 years ago and it is respectfully submitted that his evidence however unpalatable certain of the acts may have been, must be accepted by the Committee as true, notwithstanding any adverse views on his morality.

I have dealt with his patience, his politeness, his respectful and dignified attitude. The fact that he gave his evidence in a calm, in a forthright manner, unruffled by certain snipe comments over a period of some seven or eight days and I also wish to record and remark that Adv Bizos was afforded the widest possible leeway in putting many irrelevant and often repeated, questions to Mr Williamson.

I deal with the transcripts and the tape recordings in Exhibits X1A and X2A respectively. They were handed in by Mr Bizos. It is transcripts of tape recordings by Gillian of two interviews with Mr Williamson. No mention was made by Adv Bizos of the fact that he was not relying on the accuracy of the transcripts or that he was only using the same for the putting of certain questions. This of course has come about at a much later stage. After audition of the tapes, as appears from Exhibit X1B and X2B respectively, the transcripts are inaccurate.

Regrettably it has not been possible to involve ...

ADV DE JAGER: As far as the tapes are concerned, we have an agreement now that certain excerpts will be given to you and you would be able to study them and reply on it. As far as that is concerned, I think there has been an agreement that the whole of the tapes, wouldn't be considered. We shouldn't consider as evidence, the whole of the transcripts. Is it then necessary at this stage, to deal further with the tapes or the admissibility of the tapes, if that was the agreement you have come to?

MR LEVINE: No Mr De Jager, it is not necessary as such. I deal with it, I dealt with it prior to this agreement having been reached and as yet, I haven't got the four or five specific incidents, or instances but as I said earlier, I am sure that Mr Bizos will make these known to me as soon as he possibly is able to, so that I might prepare in so far as necessary.

What is important, is that the McBride portion of the Gillian Slovo transcripts, is destructive of Adv Bizos' attempts to discredit Mr Williamson's assertions that he was discussing the process with the government at an early stage, and it is supportive of Mr Williamson's credibility. Thereafter in paragraph 102, follows the certain authorities to which I have referred, again prior to the agreement having been reached.

If you will give me one minute. The rest of paragraph 103, 104, 105, right through to 106, have been dealt with in the previous argument in regard to the London bombing. I then deal with Brumdi and various other authors, documents of which are before you.

The issue of the closeness between Mr Williamson and Gen Coetzee is dealt with in paragraph 113. The comments on Mr Williamson's evidence have already been raised and I am not going to run the risk of incurring any wrath by repeating those.

I draw attention to the fact in paragraph 117, that certain witnesses promised to have been called, have not been called, and I would add to those the names of the promised witness Sue Rapkin and the names of the witness Van Jaarsveld, the latter of whom was explained by Mr Bizos but with respect, it is my submission that if Mr Van Jaarsveld was going to have been called, a subpoena would have been served on him, well in advance of the proceedings.

What has not been explained by Mr Bizos is the failure to have called Sue Rapkin and Robert McBride inter alia. The question of the meanings of certain words, take out, eliminate, kill, has already been dealt with.

Then follows page 43, 44, various articles are referred to. At page 120, the evidence is that the applicant, Mr Williamson believed at all times material, that his acts were justified as part of the war. He believed that he was justified in the manner in which he acted and the way in which orders were given, contributed to the acceptance that orders were illegal but acceptable, in other words in normal times, he would have regarded these orders as having been illegal but under the circumstances, they were accepted by him.

The paragraphs 121, 122 on page 145 are repetitions of the previous argument and I say at paragraph 123, that at all times material, Major Williamson acted on instructions from his superior officer, Brigadier Goosen, which he was obliged to obey.

I deal with further articles at page 46. I deal with the meaning of political offences, pages 47, 48 - these have all been dealt with in the previous Heads of argument, dealing with the London bomb and shall not be repeated, as is the case with the political incidents test, the proportionality theory, subjective and emotive issues dealt with at pages 53 and 54, all the sections of the Act relating to the various requirements, time periods and the like.

At page 59, paragraph 153, I state that Mr Williamson has stated in his evidence that he has been a supporter of the National Party government, which was a publicly known political organisation. The evidence of Mr Williamson has been that he was involved bona fide in the furtherance of a political struggle waged by the National Party government, which was the then government, against the revolutionary movements.

The actions of Mr Williamson, all part of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the previous government, against such movements, and he at all times material, acted in support of the previous government.

It is respectfully submitted that all of the actions therefore, fall under the application of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. I also state that the revolutionary movements were all publicly known.

Actions were always taken against members and supporters of the liberation movements and all the well known ones, namely ANC, PAC, SA Communist Party.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you in this regard, kindly address us on the foreseeability of killing a child in such circumstances and what is your submissions about that?

MR LEVINE: My submissions in regard to that Mr Chairman, members of the Committee, are that firstly, it was unlikely to perceive, to conceive that children would be taken to a military base such as Lubango was, with its significant military personnel and the involvement of the Cuban Forces in the area. An area where we have heard evidence, there was ongoing warfare, there were helicopters flying at building height around the area and factors which would militate strongly against children being taken to that particular area.

Perhaps I might refer you to certain issues on the evidence. I would start at the evidence of Mr Williamson at pages 607 to 610. It deals from 607 to 610 of Mr Williamson's evidence, to his description amongst others, of Lubango as it was, but I think Adv De Jager put the question to Mr Williamson, referring to whose initials were at the bottom of page 58 of, perhaps I will continue where it is relevant - Mr Williamson goes on to deal with page 58 of the document and refers to the map, addended to the document. A map of Angola air defences at the time, giving some information on the air defences and anti-missile defence systems, Soviet manufactured systems and the so-called SAM systems which attention was drawn to the town of Lubango where the attack on the Schoon's took place.

It is possibly aside Gahama, which was slightly to the south, was an Angolan Air Force base, but Lubango as a town was probably the most defended town in Angola at that time and it goes to illustrate says Mr Williamson that my belief and the belief of others in the Intelligence community, that the Schoon's were escalating their involvement against the struggle, was giving impetus by the fact that they had gone specifically to Lubango, because of the role of Lubango at the time of war.

In answer to Adv De Jager, it would appear that it was highly unlikely to believe that any children would be taken to a place which was where there was so much military involvement at a time of war.

CHAIRPERSON: There was a university there, that was known was it not or could have been ascertained with no problem?

MR LEVINE: There was a university, but there is nothing to have disabused the minds of any of the people involved, that the Schoon's were not carrying out the same functions as they were carrying out in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: I am talking about the type of town it is, you keep on stressing the military. I am saying there was also, it was known to have a university there? Is there any evidence that there was the slightest attempt made to enquire or ascertain if the children were there?

MR LEVINE: In fact Mr Williamson said the opposite, that there wasn't an attempt made to ascertain if children were there. It was extremely unlikely in his understanding, and in his investigations, that any children would be brought to that particular town.

In fact, Mr Chairman, at page 1214 in the cross-examination of Mr Williamson ...

ADV DE JAGER: Just a moment.

MR LEVINE: Page 1214, Mr Bizos says in the middle of the page so that, and at that time, according to one of the Exhibits before us, that is Exhibit N, sorry N, the last page we are told that between 1983 and 1985, Angola was a military zone under a Regional Command.

At the bottom of the page, Mr Bizos reiterates Angola was a military zone under Regional Command, and we are told who the Commander is, and we know who the Commissar was, and what does NAT stand for.

There was nothing that could have led anyone to believe that any children would be taken to that particular area.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, there was a reference to a page 58. Can we please be told of what document.

Sorry, there was a reference to a page 58, could we please be told on what document he is referring to? It will help for us to deal with the submissions, if we had page numbers, or the document from which that came.

MR LEVINE: Perhaps it could be found, and I will mention it shortly. At page 1736 to 1739, Mr Du Plessis is cross-examining Mr Williamson and at the top of page 1736, Mr Du Plessis says, then Mr Williamson, certain aspects have been put about the Schoon's involvement in Angola and especially Lubango. Can I Mr Chairman, may I hand out certain documentation in this regard just to make it helpful, for the Committee.

I just want to know Mr Williamson from you, in respect of the research that I did pertaining to Lubango, and the situation of Lubango, if you, maybe your memory is spoilt by the reference that I am going to refer you to. I just want to know if you agree with this.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, has an application been made to recall Mr Williamson, to give evidence or am I misunderstanding what Mr Levine is saying?

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, there is no application made to call or recall Mr Williamson. I am referring to the evidence which Mr Williamson gave when cross-examined by Mr Du Plessis.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, I thought he was asking Mr Williamson a question now.

CHAIRPERSON: He was reading from the record, he had given us the page reference.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I misunderstood.

CHAIRPERSON: He said it was the top of page 1736.

MR BIZOS: I am sorry, I misunderstood.

MR LEVINE: I find this type of interruption to be disconcerting, but save for making mention of that, I will not give into debate on why it was introduced.

I am dealing as you correctly say, with evidence previously given. Mr Du Plessis makes reference to HH or rather JJ as he then corrects himself. He says the first book is a book by Mr John Turner, about Continent Ablaze and all that happened during the last 15 years.

If you turn to page 113 of the book, the third dark dot there, the paragraph starts with FAPLA and then you will see about four lines down, it says defences in South West Africa sought to ...(indistinct) South African incursions with major bases at Gahama, Lubango and Kuyundu. Mr Williamson agrees.

Does that accord with your perception says Adv Du Plessis? Yes, Mr Chairman. And then he goes on, Mr Williamson, to explain why. Mr Chairman, this is just further evidence given that it would have been unlikely to have believed that any children would have been brought into that area.

Page 58 is in Mr Williamson's amnesty application, which is a map attached, it forms 26 of the typed annexures, and 58 of the manuscript, numerical annexures. I am sorry, volume 2. Sorry, I omitted that particular reference Mr Chairman.

That I think is in answer to Mr Bizos' query as to where page 58 has its origins.

MR VISSER: I must say Mr Chairman, I was also a bit confused, together with my learned friend, I thought my learned friend Mr Levine, was going to refer you to Exhibit XX which would have been the obvious one, but I don't want him to fear.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I then go on to deal with the various subsections of Section 20 of the Act, which is dealt with fully and has been previously dealt with in argument by Adv Du Plessis yesterday. I am certainly not going to repeat them.

The same would apply to anticipatory self defence and the issues regarding orders of a superior officer. That goes right on through to page 77 and onwards with the Sections, subsections of Section 20.

We then reach page 82 where in paragraph 212.2.7 I stated the offences for which Mr Williamson is seeking amnesty, have been extensively dealt with by him on affidavit and in his evidence. Amnesty is also sought in respect of any delicts appearing from the facts and for any other criminal offences which may appear from the facts which were not listed.

It is respectfully submitted that the Committee can grant amnesty in respect of all criminal offences, appearing from the facts, as well as all delicts appearing from the facts.

Such an order would preclude any dispute later regarding amnesty. There follows reference to Section 20(3)(d) and Section 20(3)(e) and (f). I say at 212.5.3 at page 88, it is submitted that a war situation prevailed in South Africa and I would add, and outside its borders and there was a guerilla internal war. The actions of Security Forces should be regarded in that light, the killing of a political opponent in a war situation, would then become accepted and justified.

I refer to the Diali and Mahali cases in paragraph 212.5.7 on pages 89, the proportionality principles are dealt with at pages 90 onwards, and at page 215 it is stated that proportionality is a flexible principle which takes into account, a balance between the military objective on the one hand, and the loss of civilian lives on the other hand.

Proportionality is to be regarded as an aspect of self defence which can justify actions taken in self defence, against an armed attack. In this respect, it is clear that the overriding motive and the targets were the buildings and the facilities in the buildings, as well as liberation movements and members and that it is always the case, regrettably I would add, that certain innocent lives, certain innocent people ...

CHAIRPERSON: This is a submission for the London bomb, it is not a submission for here is it? It was planned in such a way that civilians would not be killed, and nobody was seriously injured?

MR LEVINE: Yes, I was coming to add to that Mr Chairman, that it is regrettable that in a case of the Schoon incident, Katryn Schoon, an innocent child, was killed, but for reasons which I have given in answer to Adv De Jager, I believe that there could be no way of having anticipated that children would be taken into that type of environment.

At page 222, paragraph 222, I state that in Major Williamson's applications, the political motivation has been clearly set out, both in affidavits and by way of his viva voce evidence.

Issues of the Norgard principles in Namibia, at page 93, I deal with Sections 20(3)(1) and (2) respectively. It is clear from the evidence that Williamson did not receive personal gain from any of these actions and he was not challenged on this.

It was suggested by Adv Bizos in cross-examination of Mr Williamson, that he showed malice, ill-will and spite towards the Schoon's, since said Adv Bizos, it was the Schoon's who exposed Williamson as a police spy.

As I have mentioned previously, Williamson denied this and stated that he knew nothing of any alleged exposure by the Schoon's, but stated that his cover was blown by a former member of the Intelligence Service, who had fled South Africa, and who had given an interview to a London newspaper, namely Arthur McGiven.

Previous application of the Norgard principles by the Amnesty Committee in Namibia is then dealt with. Also dealt with again, is the Brian Mitchell, Captain Brian Mitchell incident and the Norgard's advice to the UN.

ADV DE JAGER: Are you now at page ...

MR LEVINE: 98. At 99 and 100, I deal with the disclosure of all relevant facts. I deal with comments at pages 100 and 101 on Mr Williamson's evidence, which I have already made in regard to the London bomb incident.

I deal at page 102 ...

GAP BETWEEN TAPES

... government to further the amnesty process, hasn't been placed in issue. The evidence is that Gen Coetzee first discussed the Ruth First killing with Mr Williamson in 1995. According to what Brigadier Goosen had told him, he had assumed that Joe Slovo was the target and not Ruth Slovo.

When criticised by Adv Bizos that he did not apply his mind as whom the envelope was addressed, Williamson's answer was Slovo. It must be remembered that this event took place some 16 years ago and I deal later with the aspect of the envelope, the address on the envelope, the name, the fact that the envelope was part of and was inside a larger envelope and was obscured by some paper, which Mr Williamson moved away and saw the reference to the university, but not reference to the name of the specific addressee.

Mr Williamson disagreed with Adv Bizos' proposition, that because of the threats on their lives, the Schoon's had left Botswana and so-called as it were, retired to Lubango. The evidence is that South African Intelligence had been monitoring the Schoon's for a considerable time, that Lubango in 1983 was a hive of Cuban and SWAPO military activity, that in Botswana there was a spy vs spy type of situation, that the Schoon's were according to Exhibit M according tot he evidence of Mr Maharaj, and the evidence of Mr Makgoti, it was also the evidence of Mr Williamson, were part of the ANC front line in Botswana and I would refer you to Exhibit N again.

It matters not whether the Schoon's were part of the Senior Organ or not. Williamson say in paragraph 243.19 he thought he was exposed and believed he was exposed as a police spy, by one McGiven and not by the Schoon's. The first time that his exposure was attributed to the Schoon's, was when it was put to him by Adv Bizos in his cross-examination.

I state that Williamson did not give permission to McBride to distribute the conversation outside of high government circles, but this is in the event of supervening factors, by the way at this stage.

In answer to a question by Mr Chairman, Mr Williamson stated that he had to sell the yacht, purchased by funds borrowed and that his sole contribution was the sum of five thousand pounds sterling. The issue of relevance, irrelevance and false premises, has already been dealt with in argument. It appears from the Heads, the issue of the transcripts and the tapes, has been already dealt with.

The baseless and unsupported suggestions at paragraph 246 at page 106, Adv Du Plessis, clarified with Mr Williamson in cross-examination the disparities between Raven and Williamson's affidavits in support of amnesty and I stress this test should be misconstrued, that I am dealing with Adv Du Plessis' cross-examination of Mr Williamson and not any application by myself can Mr Williamson be recalled.

Adv Berger never substantiated the allegations that Raven and Williamson had as he said, done a deal to rectify a divergence in their affidavits. Adv Bizos cross-examined Mr Raven extensively on the alleged deal with Mr Williamson, which Mr Raven denied.

Adv Berger put the following to Mr Raven, namely that he, Raven, had done a deal with Mr Williamson, not to remember in his evidence that the amnesty hearing (1) that Williamson had given him instructions at one time to build two IED's, but rather one and about one year later, another. That the words that he, Mr Raven had ascribed to Williamson in his affidavit, namely that the Schoon's used their children as "bomb disposal units", were not necessarily Mr Williamson's words, but that he could not remember clearly the source from which these words had come, that it is all very well I submit, and good, that Adv Berger did not put to Raven, the normal and logical proposition as to the ...(indistinct) for this alleged deal by stating to Raven that he, Raven, would be getting in regard to this, and this was not done on the evidence. There was, in my submission, no deal.

This is just another baseless allegation by the parties opposing amnesty to show some sort of underhanded conspiracy. It must also be remembered and I don't want to be accused of taking up the ...(indistinct) for Mr Raven, but he did tell the Committee that he had suffered a mild stroke, which evidence was not in any way challenged by Adv Berger or by Adv Bizos and this as well as the lapse of some 14 to 18 years, could easily account for certain of his minor memory difficulties.

Raven was however, quite positive that whomsoever was desired or was destined to receive the letter bomb, he would have prepared the same, pursuant to orders from a superior officer in times of war.

To the extent that there might be a suggestion that Raven's evidence before the Committee, cannot be accepted or must be treated with caution, as he did not tell the truth to Gillian Slovo when she arrived at his shop, without notice in the company of a camera crew and started asking him questions about her mother's death, this suggestion would be without foundation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, did both Mr Bizos and Mr Berger question Raven?

MR LEVINE: No Mr Raven was questioned by Mr Berger, but at certain times, Mr Chairman, particularly in regard to certain of the issues raised, Mr Bizos did in fact answer when it was the witness with whom Mr Berger was busy with. I did raise that and to that extent, I think it is relevant.

CHAIRPERSON: But you say Mr Bizos, did you say he also put questions to the witness?

MR LEVINE: No, I did not Mr Chairman. I said that in certain instances, Mr Bizos addressed the Committee when correctly, in my submission, Mr Berger was seized of the witness and that Mr Bizos should not have been permitted to address the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: I am asking you this because in your Heads of Argument you say Adv Bizos cross-examined Raven extensively on the alleged deal with Williamson. I am reading from paragraph 246, page 106.

MR LEVINE: Adv Berger, 246?

CHAIRPERSON: Line 5.

MR LEVINE: It should read Berger.

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't, it reads Bizos.

MR LEVINE: Well, Mr ...

CHAIRPERSON: And that is what you read to us.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, in perhaps 250 odd pages of argument, one is dictating, one refers to an incorrect name, I would apologise. I would submit that it is clear from the rest of the argument that it doesn't relate to Adv Bizos and may I re-read the third sentence.

CHAIRPERSON: You can only correct it, that it should substitute Berger for Bizos.

MR LEVINE: Well, I have done so. Possibly the same might be said of Lubango and Lusaka, Luanda. It is something that does occur in a lengthy dictation, but thank you for bringing this to my attention and the necessary correction has now been made.

I say at page 254 that Adv Berger, paragraph 254, was sharply criticised by you, Mr Chairman, with respect rightly so, for not being forthright in his questions, which he directed at Raven, in regard to the video Exhibit 6, without exhibiting to Mr Raven in advance the video tape in question. This is merely again supportive of the epithet, trial by ambush adopted in these proceedings.

I am now going to deal with the status of Ruth Slovo at page 109, paragraph 255.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I am beginning to tire of referring to a person who on the evidence, was categorically stated that she wanted to be known as Ruth First, that Mr Levine puts a heading on, Mrs Slovo also known as Ruth First and persists in calling her Ruth Slovo.

I may make a submission in regard as to what that was intended to convey, and I may not, but may I appeal that persons be referred to in the manner in which they wanted to be known and they were known, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, if Mr Bizos wants to make submissions in that regard, he must feel free to make them, not to give smoke screens or ...

CHAIRPERSON: He has made a request to you, Mr Levine, that you address this person in future, as Ruth First because that is what she wishes to be known as.

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, in certain of the Exhibits to which I refer, she was described as Ruth Slovo.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to grant his request Mr Levine, it is merely a matter of courtesy, from now on? We are not talking about the past, we are talking about from this moment on?

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, there is nothing discourteous intended.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, will you answer my question? Will you grant Mr Bizos' request from now on?

MR LEVINE: The answer is yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well let's carry on.

MR LEVINE: And if, and if Mr Chairman, I do not abide by that, and if I happen to transgress, then it is purely a transgression. But I will do my utmost.

CHAIRPERSON: Get on with it then.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I will get on with it. The articles and references, descriptive of Ruth First, are as follows: comrade Nzala's tribute to her, Exhibit L, her listing as a terrorist, Exhibit M, where she is not referred to as First, and her descriptions, descriptions of her in Gillian's book, Gillian's video tape and President Mandela's address to the 50th National Congress of the ANC, Exhibit KK, at best for the opponents to the amnesty applications, Ruth First, was a member and a supporter of the ANC and was thus, a justifiable target.

There was a hypothetical question put by Adv Bizos to Mr Williamson in cross-examination, what would happen if Joe Slovo went to meet his wife in Mozambique and had a discussion? I would submit to you that this was not really a hypothetical question, because there were references that appeared, that had been read, in Gillian Slovo's book or had been on her video tape about the meetings on the beach.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the last witness also testified that they met and that they lived together and that they moved together to another house.

MR LEVINE: Precisely, it was Ms O'Laughlin, Adv De Jager. I said that the golden thread running through Adv Bizos' cross-examination of Mr Williamson, seems to be that both in regard to First and the Schoon's, peace loving, non-militants had been targeted, but surely the real test is Brigadier Goosen's and Mr Williamson's perceptions of these victims, and in the case of the Schoon's, it is indeed unlikely that they left Botswana to get out of the terrorist fold and went to Lubango, merely to teach English, which coincidentally was the same cover, occupation that the Schoon's had while serving as senior ANC Executives in Botswana.

If there is every any evidence that is needed to show that it is not any act of malice that Ruth First was referred to as Slovo, I would refer you to the third sentence of paragraph 258 where I deal with the lady as First, as she wanted to be named.

In regard to the Schoon's, they were perceived as terrorists, and attention is drawn to page 40 and 43 of the Further submissions of the ANC, dated 12 may 1997, Exhibit N. Adv Bizos stated, I would delete paragraph 260 because evidence was led in support from Mr Makgoti. The recording of Mr Nzo's press statement, Exhibit AA, refers to Jeanette Schoon as a comrade in arms, which is a strange way of referring to a peace loving academic and English lecturer.

Marius Schoon did not explain why he as a alleged retiree from the freedom struggle, went to Lubango for this purpose, allegedly to teach English, was in Luanda on the day of the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and the tragic death of Katryn Schoon.

As we have heard from Mr Williamson himself, it haunted him every day of his life for more than 14 years, but that such death was regrettably a tragedy associated with a war of this kind.

I deal with evidence of Gillian Slovo at the bottom of page 11, starting with paragraph 264.1. It is clear that Gillian Slovo was placed in an unfortunate position, in having to give evidence of and concerning her late mother, who died a violent death. It is respectfully submitted however, that there was no real need for her to give evidence, other than to seek to ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, I really don't think that it is, the submission that you are making in paragraph 264.3, is a worthy submission.

MR LEVINE: I will not raise 264.3. You did say 264.3, I hadn't yet got to it, but I certainly in view of your attitude ...

ADV DE JAGER: No, I don't think it ...(indistinct) an Attorney, an officer of court to make such submissions.

MR LEVINE: I am certainly mindful of that and I don't then persist purely because I don't want to appear in any way confrontation, with that particular submission.

264.4, during cross-examination of Gillian Slovo by me ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is this really relevant? Mr Levine, this constant stirring up ill-feeling between practitioners ...

MR LEVINE: I am not stirring up ill-feeling Mr Chairman. You recall ...

CHAIRPERSON: I don't see what the relevance of this to our coming to a decision on amnesty, where this effects us.

MR LEVINE: It is part of what took place and you will recall Mr Chairman, that everyone was inconvenienced, but it is there.

CHAIRPERSON: I can recall many instances during this hearing where everyone has been inconvenienced. I can see no reason for them all to be brought up again, unless they are directly relevant to the issues we have to decide.

If you want to bring it up Mr Levine, by all means, and we can judge what your attitude is and why you are conducting yourself as you are.

MR LEVINE: Are you suggesting Mr Chairman, that my conduct deserves judgement because I put facts before you?

CHAIRPERSON: I am suggesting that anybody reading your Heads of Argument, will get the impression that you have very strong feelings against certain other practitioners appearing here.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, the Heads of Argument deal with it, and I won't seek to incur your displeasure by reading what appears on pages 113 and 114.

I go on to paragraph 264.8, at the bottom of page 114, a further cogent example of Ms Slovo's subjective and self serving evidence, was her alleged inability to recall that Mr Williamson in his evidence, had apologised on several occasions, of the fact that Ruth First had been killed.

Ms Slovo conceded that the two men shown in the video after the SASOL attack, could have been members of an ANC cadre in Mozambique, where Ruth First was said by comrade Nzala to have served in one of the ANC units.

Ms Slovo could not dispute that even on her own version, that she has denied, and would sought to hold out that Ruth First was an academic and merely a supporter and member of the ANC, that her mother fell within that class of persons described in Section 29(2)(d) of the Act.

Ms Slovo responded to a question about her and her sister's air fares by stating that the TRC had paid for one air fare, presumably hers as a witness. The ret of that, I don't want to deal with for fear of having it suggested of me that I have some strong feelings in the matter.

It will be remembered that Adv Bizos made it clear that the hearing of Ms Slovo, at the hearing that Ms Slovo had to leave South Africa by Friday the 25th of September, as she had to be back in England by the 26th and I set out what happened when she was questioned.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, in all fairness, what happened on the 26th of September 1999 in respect of whether she is going back or not ...

MR LEVINE: 1998?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, 1998 or whenever, that can't be of any importance to us coming to a decision about your client's amnesty?

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I have always been of the view that for completeness of a record, matters should be placed before the Presiding Judge for Presiding Committee, but I am not going to deal also in the interest of conserving time, with those issues.

ADV DE JAGER: Can that be of any relevance for us to come to a conclusion about your client's political motive, about any of the requirements of the Act?

MR LEVINE: It relates to certain of the atmosphere with which these proceedings ...

ADV DE JAGER: We are not going to be influenced by the atmosphere, because the atmosphere wasn't created by the clients, it was created by their representatives here.

MR LEVINE: I don't dispute that, and perhaps the best way of dealing with your objection, would be to get to paragraph 264.16 of the argument. Before I get there, perhaps it would be just as well, if I dealt with paragraph 264.14 at the bottom of page 160, I say that Ms Slovo was surprisingly vague about her mother, inter alia in regard to comrade Nzala's description of Ruth First, page 21 of her book, about the beach meetings at Ponte D'Ore, page 25 of her book, wherein she described her mother as a woman who had given her life for the struggle and also President Mandela's inclusion of Ruth First as being amongst a number of activists as set out in Exhibit KK.

Ms Slovo conceded that her mother was at all times supportive of her father's work as a Head Military Strategist of the ANC. I say at 246.14 in the submission, that Ms Slovo's evidence read as a whole, will illustrate that she knew precious little of her late mother, what she was engaged in at the time of her death.

This notwithstanding even on Ms Slovo's own evidence, that Ruth First was a legitimate target in terms of Section 20(2)(d) of the Act. It is necessary in my submission, to deal with the evidence of certain witnesses who testified before the Commission.

Willem Frederick Schoon made it plain that five foremost white persons, if you would add that word, in the ANC and SA Communist Party at the relevant time, were Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Marius Schoon, Jeanette Schoon and Ronnie Kasrils and that at all material times, Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon, were important and heavily involved members, prominent, the word permanent should read prominent, if you would be good enough to amend the last line of paragraph 266.2.

In the 1970's and 1980's, there was a war taking place both inside and outside South Africa and the video shown, illustrate accurately the violence and damage caused by such a war. The perception of the Security Forces regarding the Schoon's, Joe Slovo and Ruth First inter alia were as being enemies of South Africa.

Marius Schoon stated under oath as to the number of occasions he believed that his enemies had tried to assassinate him, he denied that while in Lubango he was not doing precisely what he and Jeanette had been doing in Botswana before their deployment to Angola, but he agreed with pages 270, 278, 279 and 280 of Exhibit Q2 of being a very astute analysis of the position as written by Mr Williamson, reflecting Mr Williamson's subjective views.

I am not going to go through those pages, they are before you in an Exhibit.

Mr Mac maharaj sought to portray the ANC as being exemplary in every respect as opposed to the so-called ...(indistinct) regime and its behaviour. In his evidence in chief, Mr Maharaj said he had collected a dossier of what he described as circumstantial evidence on Mr Williamson, but under cross-examination, he changed his description of such dossier to a file containing information about Mr Williamson.

Mr Maharaj could not however, point to any hard facts upon which his suspicions were based. They were merely suspicions. Mr Maharaj did state that at all times material, Marius and Jeanette Schoon were important members of the ANC.

Surprisingly Mr Maharaj was not prepared to concede that Mr Williamson in seeking to further his political cause, the word cause should be inserted for the word case, took the same risks as Mr Maharaj took in the struggle which he was fighting on behalf of the ANC.

Mr Chairman, with respect, correctly remarked that it was clear that Mr Maharaj did not like Mr Williamson and he would not concede anything in favour of Mr Williamson. Mr Maharaj however did concede that Ruth First, Marius Schoon and Jeanette Schoon, were all dedicated members of the ANC, just as he was, namely himself, Mr Maharaj.

At face value, Mr Maharaj was an impressive witness because of his confidence, perhaps arrogance. Given further Mr Maharaj's evidence, was devoid of any factual basis and consisted just as that of Mr Klug, of sheer speculation.

Bridget O'Laughlin did not know whether Ruth First was working to further the aims of the South African Communist Party and she could not exclude this as a fact. Ms O'Laughlin could not exclude that Ruth First was involved in furthering the aims of the South African Communist Party.

Ms O'Laughlin had never been present when Ruth First received any communication from Joe Slovo and clearly could not have known what Ruth First, how Ruth First would have reacted under circumstances other than speculate, which cannot be accepted by the Committee.

That communication from Joe Slovo should read communication for Joe Slovo, and I would ask you to amend from, the second line of paragraph 270.4 to read for.

I remember and it is not clear because there seems to be some typing omission on page 21, but it would appear to me that it should correctly read at the bottom of paragraph 270.4 that it was submitted by Mr Bizos that there would be evidence from Palo Jordan and O'Laughlin that the envelope was addressed to Ruth First and one wonders why O'Laughlin could not have mentioned this in her statement, as to the information on the incident which she so vividly described.

O'Laughlin stated that Sue Rapkin was an MK representative, visiting Ruth First at the university and that Rapkin would have regarded Ruth First as being a leader in a liberation struggle.

Mr Chairman, at paragraph 270.7 I deal with Mr Heinz Klug's evidence. I state that he admitted that he had never met Mr Williamson and that he had only spoken to Mr Williamson on one occasion on the telephone. Mr Klug conceded that his evidence was based purely on assumptions, and he was driven to concede that his work for SANA SNS could have been regarded as intelligence gathering work.

Mr Klug assumed that the bombing of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon arose partly, underline partly, from Mr Williamson's animosity. That was only an assumption, and Mr Klug only assumed that Mr Williamson was responsible for the printing of the newsletter of SANA.

So vague was Mr Klug in his evidence about his calls to Mr Williamson, that this aspect is difficult to accept. Mr Klug made calls from a callbox at the Holiday Inn and stated when he called collect to Mr Williamson in Geneva, the office would not accept his call and Mr Klug had to concede that Mr Williamson could merely have been out of the office.

It is difficult to understand why Mr Klug was called as a witness at all, other than for some political matter.

CHAIRPERSON: He did not say that he, did he say that he had only spoken to Williamson on one occasion?

MR LEVINE: Yes, yes Mr Chairman. He said definitely only one occasion, but maybe there might have been another occasion, but his evidence was definitely one occasion.

CHAIRPERSON: My recollection was that it was not definitely only on one occasion.

MR LEVINE: I think he said definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was uncertain, wasn't he?

MR LEVINE: I think he said definitely on one occasion, but again, the evidence will speak for itself.

I don't wish to deal with remarks that were made during Adv Du Plessis' cross-examination. I deal with Mr Tladi and I say that he was evasive. Perhaps evasive might not be the correct word, the most applicable, perhaps the word might be unsuitable or unacceptable.

Mr Tladi would not concede any overlapping in the ANC of the political and military, although the ANC referred itself to political military organs. Mr Tladi stated categorically that there was no MK presence in Lubango, but could not put forward any facts on which he based his statements.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that true Mr Levine, I understood him to say that they were the political body, controlling Angola and they would have known if there were MK presence there and they did not know of any such presence?

MR LEVINE: Well, there is other evidence of MK presence there.

CHAIRPERSON: Whose evidence was that?

MR LEVINE: I think the evidence of Mr Williamson. I am corrected in that. I am told there was no MK presence in Lubango as such.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have just said there was evidence to that effect, is that wrong, there was no such presence?

MR LEVINE: Yes, I am corrected Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So there is no reason to disbelief Mr Tladi when he said there was no MK presence there and if there had been, he would have known about it?

MR LEVINE: On that basis, yes. But Mr Tladi could not say whether Marius or Jeanette Schoon, what they did was, they were in Lubango since in his own words, he did not see them other than when they came to Luanda on a monthly basis, alternating the one with the other.

If you could add in in 271.3, alternating the one with the other after monthly basis.

CHAIRPERSON: And adding the words other than, after see them?

MR LEVINE: Other than, yes.

MR VISSER: That is not quite correct Mr Chairman, if I may remind my learned friend, Tladi said that he did go down to Lubango to visit them.

CHAIRPERSON: He visited them in Lubango. He was there, as my recollection, he was the person who bought the flowers for Katryn, isn't he?

MR VISSER: Something like that.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was in a state of extreme distress when he told us about how they left there. You cannot say he did not see them, he visited them in Lubango on his evidence, so that is also incorrect Mr Levine? That is not what you are saying in your Heads of Argument, please Mr Levine, try to be accurate if you want us to accept what you are saying.

MR LEVINE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: I said please try to be accurate if you want us to accept what is contained.

MR LEVINE: I am rephrasing it Mr Chairman and I would ask you to make a note that the import is that he was not in daily contact with them, by virtue of having visited Lubango. He could not dispute Mr Maharaj's statement that Marius Schoon and if you would add in, Jeanette Schoon, was an important cog in the ANC network, both politically and militarily in view of the overlapping between political and military.

In paragraph 272, I state that there was no reason for the Security Forces to believe that the functions of Marius and Jeanette Schoon, had changed in any way since their deployment to Lubango. Mr Henry Makgoti stated that Marius and Jeanette Schoon played an important role in the ANC. I don't know if it has an impact on you Mr Chairman, but I hear a lady talking.

ADV DE JAGER: Is it perhaps the Interpreter?

MR LEVINE: No, Mr Makgoti stated - no, it is not, it came from the left side. I am unfortunately ...

MR BIZOS: Sir, our Attorney was saying something to me, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: That Marius and Jeanette Schoon played an important role in the ANC in Botswana, whether they were members of the Senior Organ or not.

Mr Makgoti could not point to any indication to anyone, that when the Schoon's went to Lubango via Lusaka, they were not continued in the same work, for the ANC as they had been doing in Botswana.

Mr Makgoti conceded that there was a large military presence in Lubango and that the Schoon's visited Luanda on an alternate monthly basis. These factors, it is respectfully submitted, would only have fortified the views of the Security Forces that the Schoon's functions have not changed from Botswana days.

Mr Makgoti in my submission, was a dignified and a fair witness, who made concessions when they were justified. At 273.5, I deal with cross-examination by Adv Bizos, of Mr Makgoti. Adv Bizos there attempted ...

ADV DE JAGER: That maybe re-examination, I suppose?

MR BIZOS: Re-examination, yes.

MR LEVINE: Re-examination, Adv Bizos attempted to elicit from Mr Makgoti, using Exhibit N the differences between the ANC structures in Botswana and the ANC structures in Angola as described in Exhibit N and Mr Makgoti merely said that the Angolan structures were running in a different way.

It is clear from page 49 of Exhibit N where it is stated that Angola was a military zone under a Regional Command.

It must be remembered that in his evidence under cross-examination by Adv Du Plessis, Mr Schoon stated that both the Schoon's identified themselves with the armed struggle that was taking place.

I am not going to deal with the television interview, it appears both from my argument previously and what appears in the Heads, and I have marked as X that portion of the interview, the oral portion of the interview, that is of relevance, and I will not deal with it any further.

I would like to now deal with the attempted murder or the allegation that there might have been an attempted murder in so far as Joe Slovo is concerned, and I don't think this is part of the amnesty application by Mr Williamson, but just to deal with it very, very briefly.

I say that under normal circumstances the sending of a letter bomb to reach Mr Slovo, would have qualified as an attempt to commit a crime. If there was unlawfulness, intention and act for putting such into effect, the circumstances surrounding what took place in these instances, was hardly normal circumstances since on any version, and particularly on the perception of Mr Williamson, the Security Forces were engaged in a war against members of a terrorist organisation, opposed to the Republic of South Africa and under the circumstances the ...(indistinct) which might have constituted an attempted murder in times of peace, is not to be regarded as a criminal offence at the time of war, which was clearly in the minds of both the freedom fighters in support of the South African Communist Party and the ANC, the idealists on the one side, and those fighting a war on the side of the Security Forces.

Joe Slovo was undeniably a terrorist, he was the leader of the military wing of the ANC and together with Ruth First, Marius Schoon and Jeanette Schoon, a legitimate target of the Security Forces. The same would be applicable to any argument resisting an allegation of any attempted murder in so far as Marius Schoon is concerned.

If you would bear with me a moment. Mr Chairman, I would like to deal with ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, do I understand from this that your argument is attempted murder of Joe Slovo or of Marius Schoon would not be a criminal offence?

MR LEVINE: Under the prevailing circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: So they cannot ask for amnesty in regard to them?

MR LEVINE: Because there were prevailing circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: So we just can't consider it as an amnesty application, they are saying it is not an offence.

You go on to say that Ruth First, Marius Schoon and Jeanette Schoon were legitimate targets of the Security Force, does the same apply to them?

MR LEVINE: But ...

CHAIRPERSON: Because a time of war, as you say, existed, it was not an offence?

MR LEVINE: At the time of war, in the circumstances of the war prevailing, it was not an offence and ...

CHAIRPERSON: Therefore the murder was not an offence, so what are we wasting our time for?

MR LEVINE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Your colleagues all look a little shocked at your submission.

MR VISSER: I heartily disagree Mr Chairman, I must place myself on record, Visser, I don't agree with this.

CHAIRPERSON: I find it difficult, you are now arguing that in the circumstances that existed at the time, the killing of these two women and the attempted murder of the two men, was not an offence?

MR LEVINE: I am saying it is not an offence because of the war situation that was prevailing, but the names of Joe Slovo is included in the application of Mr Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you go on to include together with Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon?

MR LEVINE: They are included.

CHAIRPERSON: They are legitimate targets, therefore it was not an offence? You say in your Heads of Argument, they were legitimate targets of the Security Forces, the same principle, and that is that in time of war, it is not an offence and you are submitting this was time of war? So your submission is no offence was committed by Mr Williamson?

MR LEVINE: No, there was an offence committed, but that offence or those offences were such that they would qualify for amnesty, given the full compliance by Mr Williamson of the terms of the Act and ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, they have to be a criminal offence.

MR LEVINE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You are saying they were not, in a time of war, these were not criminal offences?

MR LEVINE: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the argument you sent out.

MR LEVINE: No Mr Chairman, what I am saying, but for the times of war, these were criminal offences.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LEVINE: And they remain criminal offences, but ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is not to be regarded as a criminal offence at a time of war, which it remains? You say categorically that it is not to be regarded as a criminal offence at a time of war?

MR LEVINE: Well, let us strike out, is not to be regarded as a criminal offence.

CHAIRPERSON: I just don't understand this argument.

MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, I think it is clear.

CHAIRPERSON: If it is clear, if then your client cannot apply for amnesty.

MR LEVINE: No, my client has applied for amnesty in respect of the offences and the commissions and omissions. Perhaps the words criminal offences, should be taken out and I would urge that they be taken out at that place.

That is dealing with the reference to the attempted, any reference to attempted murder that may be applicable.

Mr Chairman, I would like to deal with certain matters not in the Heads. They are matters that I will have typed and handed up on Monday or as soon thereafter. I would like to refer to the evidence firstly, dealing with Katryn Schoon at pages 1200 to 1205, especially at page 1204 and 1205 and page 994.

It never crossed Mr Williamson's mind that the Schoon's would have taken their children to Lubango which was an area of military conflict. I also refer to page 1214 which refers to Lubango as being a military zone.

To his everlasting regret, Mr Williamson omitted to ascertain whether or not the Schoon's took their children with them to Lubango. His impression at the time, and this was conceded by Mr Makgoti was that the Schoon's had gone to Lubango to continue with their ANC work and indeed, Mr Williamson and other members of the Security Forces became even more convinced of the Schoon's importance to the ANC due to the fact that they went to Angola which was ANC's military zone and to Lubango, which was a Cuban garrison town.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, there is something that I would like to - I see you have got Annexure X to these papers. I have refrained to read it, because fortunately I have been made aware of what it is about.

But you now, have deliberately waived any privilege that your client might have had by putting something before us which we asked you and which we have ordered, not to be put before us.

MR LEVINE: I did not Mr De Jager, understand it to be an order. I understood that the Chairman did not want to see the, audition the video tape. I do not see how any privilege can attach to something which is broadcast ...

ADV DE JAGER: You argued that that would prejudice your client.

MR LEVINE: No I did not argue that it would prejudice.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you argued that your client had been prejudiced and that we should see it.

MR LEVINE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: We after further consideration said, we did not want to see it in that it could prejudice us against your client, it was not something that had been led before us and we accordingly said we would not, we were not prepared to see it because it could prejudice against your client.

I now understand, I had not seen it, I now understand that you have stuck a transcript of that tape, unto your Heads of Argument?

MR LEVINE: I have Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And you had not told us about that?

MR LEVINE: I did tell you about it.

CHAIRPERSON: When?

MR LEVINE: I told you in my argument that attached was X and it was the Heads, it was a transcript of the oral discussion that took place in the TV programme.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, I don't think, but I will give you the benefit, that you have put it before us and we've got to read the whole thing, but you didn't mention now Annexure X, but while you were reading it, I looked at your, while reading the Heads, I saw that you referred to X and I was aware what X was about, although I didn't turn over the pages to read X.

MR LEVINE: Then it is clear that I can't be accused of not having told you anything, because I referred to X in the argument and I have the distinct impression of having referred to it now when addressing you, but it is clear that it wasn't attached as some form of surreptitious annexure. It is referred to in the Heads.

CHAIRPERSON: Where in the Heads?

MR LEVINE: It is referred to 275.3, at page 127.

CHAIRPERSON: And you did not read paragraph 275 to us?

MR LEVINE: Oh yes, I did Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you didn't.

ADV DE JAGER: No, you did not Mr Levine.

MR LEVINE: Oh, I didn't, in fact I said that I shall not deal with that particular paragraph, but it is not something that was not disclosed, or withheld anyway whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: I propose to adjourn for a few minutes now, (microphone not on)

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Anything further Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE IN ARGUMENT: (continued) Not a whole lot Mr Chairman, you will be relieved to hear.

I want to deal with the issue of the envelope address. It was dealt with in some length in these proceedings and I would refer for convenience sake, to the record at pages 576 to 577, page 767 onwards, it runs for a few pages, and pages 994 and 995.

That is not intended to be exhaustive, that is where I believe the main discussion took place. I am not going to read these pages out and as I say, I will let you have a typed version of this, early next week.

Mr Williamson says, his evidence was that he firmly believed that the item was intended for Joe Slovo. He has no recollection of seeing a name on the envelope. He did not take a good look at the envelope and he says that the name and address was covered in some way, which accords with Mr Raven's evidence.

You will remember Mr Chairman, that I think you too, were under the impression in the early hours or the early times, that there was an envelope, a large envelope and nothing else, there was no other envelope in the large envelope. The evidence is that there was an envelope in a larger envelope and that Mr Williamson was able by use of a pencil or a pen, to see the address in the small envelope that was housed in the larger envelope, by the movement of some papers which were together with the small envelope, in the large envelope.

If Mr Williamson saw and heard and knew that the IED was aimed at Slovo/First, why would he lie about it? Mr Bizos can only suggest that Mr Williamson is embarrassed because he was involved in killing a woman and that he was seeking noble justification by saying that the IED was aimed at Joe Slovo.

I would submit that this would be absurd and that the one thing that Mr Williamson has not tried to do in these circumstances and at these hearings, is to morally justify his actions.

The fact is that the Secret Service Units or the Security Forces operated just as Mr Williamson said they did, secretly, clandestinely, deviously and with so-called smoke in mirrors, with the exact purpose of causing confusion and doubt about who exactly was responsible for what.

CHAIRPERSON: But now in his application he says that the letter was addressed to Joe Slovo C/o Ruth First or to Joe Slovo and Ruth First?

MR LEVINE: In his evidence he said that it was addressed or intended for Joe Slovo. It must be remembered Mr Chairman, that we are talking of 14 or 16 years ago.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he made an affidavit, he attested his application, he swore to the correctness of it, and that was earlier than when he gave evidence?

MR LEVINE: That is correct, that was about one year earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and in it he said to the best of my recollection, the mail item in the large envelope was an A4 or larger size envelope, with a logo of an international organisation there on, possibly UN related and was addressed to Joe Slovo C/o Ruth First or to Joe Slovo and Ruth First at the Eduard Modlani University in Maputo, Mozambique.

MR LEVINE: And then his evidence was that the addressee, the name of the addressee could not be discerned by him in the papers that were in the larger envelope and of course, Mr Chairman, when we remember that he knew at that later stage, who had been effected by the envelope, or the parcel or whatever it would be termed.

It is not surprising in my submission ...

CHAIRPERSON: But he only knew that that person had been effected because he had seen on the envelope, otherwise if he had had an envelope that he knew nothing about who it was going to, when he saw a report months later that Ruth First had been killed, he wouldn't connect it with himself at all, would he?

MR LEVINE: No but his evidence is that he was told by the Brigadier, Brigadier Goosen. That is his evidence. He couldn't himself discern ...

CHAIRPERSON: The Brigadier looked up at me directly and nodded slightly.

MR LEVINE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: He said when the death or Ruth First was reported, Brigadier Goosen looked directly at me, and nodded slightly.

MR LEVINE: I think there is some other evidence which is more explicit.

CHAIRPERSON: I am just reading his application.

MR LEVINE: Yes, but I think there is evidence which is more explicit than that.

If you bear with me for one moment Mr Chairman, I would like to just get an instruction of the application itself.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, you have promised that you will give it to us on Monday. Perhaps you could over the weekend have a look at it and, seeing that you are going to give it to us on Monday, give us the references too.

MR LEVINE: Yes, that would seem quite proper. It is therefore not surprising that Mr Williamson cannot give clearly, chapter and verse on an operation which was not his own. By that I mean it was an operation in which he played a part on a need to know basis, and his vagueness about Ruth or Joe Slovo's evidence is a result of the fact that he did not specifically apply his mind to the matter at the time and that he was satisfied at the time, that he knew who the IED was going to. To the fact that these events occurred in 1982 or 1983, we must also draw a distinction between the type of detail Mr Williamson knew about the London bomb which was really his operation in much greater detail and which according to the evidence, was cautiously and meticulously planned and executed and the Maputo and Lubango bombs which were not operations, save that he was - not operations in the sense that he was not in charge of the planning and execution of those operations, is distinct from the situation with the London bomb.

I draw attention again Mr Chairman, to the fact that Mr Williamson voluntarily came to give evidence, has cooperated in each and every respect and that being the case, would not have lied in his evidence. In my submission Mr Chairman, Mr Williamson has made out a proper case in regard to this particular aspect for an amnesty and the Committee is requested to grant amnesty to him.

Thank you, I am indebted to the Committee for the time and for the indulgences that have been afforded to me. I would be happy to deal with any other aspects that are required to be dealt with at any stage in the future.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I am not looking at you. Do either of you gentlemen think you can finish in 15 minutes?

MR CORNELIUS: No, I don't think so Mr Chairman. I will probably need about 45 minutes I would say.

MR JANSEN: And myself, roundabout 30 minutes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In those circumstances I don't think it is fair to ask any of you to start now. You can go away and in the weekend, preparing and we will start what time on Monday?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, could we start earlier than ten o'clock, I have problems on Wednesday afternoon and I would like to finish before that Mr Chairman. I am hoping that I would get an opportunity at least by Tuesday morning to start.

My learned friend says that he would be about a day, so if we could make sure that we could start late on Monday or early on Tuesday Mr Chairman, I will appreciate it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I am looking to my left, because you come from Johannesburg, the two of you, don't you?

MR LEVINE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Nine o'clock, would that be a practical time?

MR BIZOS: Yes Mr Chairman, subject to all the other people's convenience, or half past nine.

CHAIRPERSON: Half past nine.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I will certainly be here.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I know that at nine o'clock, the traffic can be pretty appalling and if you have to come all the way from Johannesburg in that traffic, I think half past nine might be a more realistic time.

MR LEVINE: Perhaps we can aim at being as close to nine o'clock as we can.

MR BIZOS: Half past nine, let's make it firm for half past nine.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, we will start by half past nine on Monday, but if we are all here before then, we will start as soon as we are ready. We might sit later in the afternoon to make up time for the new problem that we have.

MR BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I have difficulty later in the afternoon and with the best will in the world, I can't change all the appointments I have made.

CHAIRPERSON: You, every afternoon, are you?

MR LEVINE: I have made appointments for most of the afternoons.

CHAIRPERSON: Well then we can't, we will take half an hour off lunch time as we did the other day, that seemed to work very well.

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Today we haven't had lunch yet. I am told by my secretary that this hall is not going to be used for any other function over the weekend and it is going to be kept locked, if you want to leave some of your papers here.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS