Amnesty Hearings

ON RESUMPTION

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: (cont)

May it please the Committee, Mr Commissioner, yesterday at the close of proceedings, at the adjournment we had reached page 120 of my Heads where we attempt to address Mr Chairman, the last of the technical aspects, before we come to the facts.

That deals with the issue of the international competence of amnesty orders issued by this Committee. Mr Chairman, by way of summary, one has a situation either one of two situations, one where the whole of the act, omission or offence takes place outside the borders of the jurisdiction of our Courts, and the second is where part of the act, omission or offence takes place within the borders of our country and part of it takes place outside.

It has been excepted Mr Chairman, I think on a fairly wide basis that for that which was done inside the country, clearly the Amnesty Committee is empowered to give amnesty and to deal with it. The issue here really concerns the situation where part of it or the whole of the act, takes place outside the jurisdiction.

We in this paragraph, Mr Chairman, have attempted to give you some indications that would tend to point that the Amnesty Committee should deal with an amnesty application as if the whole of the application or rather the act, omission or offence took place within the Republic, without distinguishing that part which takes place outside.

Mr Chairman, we thought that this might be of some importance Mr Chairman, because of what you see in paragraph 251, that is the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, 15 of 1998, in which Section 9 speaks of an extraterritorial application of the Act and says any Court of law in the Republic may try a person for an offence referred to in Section 8, that is assistance, rendering of assistance, military assistance outside the borders of the country, Mr Chairman, notwithstanding the fact that the act or omission to which the charge relates, was committed outside the republic and then it has certain exceptions.

What strikes one Mr Chairman, is if Parliament saw fit on one occasion to regulate by way of statute the jurisdiction of our Courts to make the jurisdiction of our Courts applicable to an act or omission committed by a South African citizen outside the borders, then there seems to be no point in principle why parliament could not also say well, for all the acts, omissions or offences committed during the conflicts of the past as intended by the TRC Act, we now say that South African Courts, High Courts of South Africa would have jurisdiction.

That is not a situation that has arisen yet, it may arise in future Mr Chairman, and therefore, it is not a totally academic argument, which is the only point I am making.

There is also a little further removed from military activity, there is also Section 37 of the Marriage Act, Mr Chairman, which also deals on the same basis with jurisdiction in regard to offences committed outside the borders.

So there is precedents for the proposition that our Courts may in certain circumstances, if allowed by statute, have jurisdiction Mr Chairman, to try criminal matters outside, committed outside the borders of the country.

CHAIRPERSON: That will only effect the position inside the country, won't it, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Well, Mr Chairman ...

CHAIRPERSON: A decision by us cannot bind an English Court?

MR VISSER: That is exactly the next point, yes. What we are dealing with Mr Chairman, as you have quite correctly pointed out, is first of all the interest of the criminal if I may put it that way, in terms of these provisions or in our case, the position of the applicant who has committed an act, omission or offence in terms of the TRC Act, as opposed to Mr Chairman, the interest of other governments and quite clearly there is no argument that could ever be sustained to say that a decision made by you, would have legal binding effects on any foreign country.

Certainly there may be treaties etc, but that is a matter for diplomatic discussion and efforts, and certainly not by way of law. Mr Chairman, we have submitted to you, I have just summarised basically the whole of that paragraph dealing with that issue Mr Chairman, where we deal with the various permutations in order to - to intend to show Mr Chairman, that this Committee should deal with the matter in its - holistically Mr Chairman, and we rely for that submission, on Section 29(2) Mr Chairman, which very clearly has a reference which indicates that this Committee should not shrink away from acts, omissions or offences which relate to foreign countries, where it says ...

CHAIRPERSON: Which page are you on?

MR VISSER: I am at page 123 Mr Chairman, it starts at 122 at the bottom, paragraph 257. We deal with Section 20(1) and then over the page, I quoted the extract which we submit is relevant, but I will read the whole of the subsection to you Mr Chairman. In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates "act associated with a political objective", means any act or omission which constitutes an offence or delict which according to the criteria in subsection 3, is associated with a political objective and which was advised, planned, directed, commanded, ordered or committed within or outside the Republic during the period so and so and so, and the whole of the other subsections, sub-subsections Mr Chairman, you will notice in subsection 2, are subject to that qualification, namely planned, directed, commanded, ordered or committed within or outside the Republic and we say Mr Chairman, that if nothing more, and I put it no higher than that, it certainly is an indication that the legislature had intention that you should not stop at the borders of the Republic of South Africa, but you should go further than that.

Section 5 Mr Chairman, although not directly in point, is also mentioned on the previous page, paragraph 256. I say again it is not directly relevant, but it certainly does give an indication that parliament intended for the work of the Commission to extend beyond the borders of the Republic of South Africa.

I say all that subject to what you have already quite correctly indicated Mr Chairman, and that is that your orders will have no legal force in other countries, but by the same token because we don't know what is going to happen in future, what parliament might do, how parliament might extend the jurisdiction of our Courts and we say for that reason Mr Chairman, if we conclude at page 127, paragraph 271, it is therefore submitted that the Amnesty Committee needs not concern itself with the effectiveness of its order in foreign countries.

If an applicant complies with the provisions of the TRC Act, he should be entitled to amnesty. I add Mr Chairman, in this country.

CHAIRPERSON: What does 5(i) mean?

MR VISSER: 5(i) deals Mr Chairman, with the investigation capacity of the TRC's Investigation Unit Mr Chairman, it says powers of the Commission, in order to achieve its objectives and perform its functions, the Commission shall have the power to in consultation with the Minister and through diplomatic channels, obtain permission from the relevant authority of a foreign country, to receive evidence or gather information in or from that country.

CHAIRPERSON: So if we gather information from England, that is we have someone here, giving evidence about what happened in England, we should have consulted with the Minister and through diplomatic channels, obtained permission from the relevant authority? Is that mainly the meaning of this Section?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, those are the plain words. I am not going to comment on how practical it is Mr Chairman. I have no doubt that you could have called the Inspector if he was willing to come and give you evidence about something that he knew, could have been to your assistance.

CHAIRPERSON: That is a different matter, if you are getting an official from a foreign country, but if you are merely gathering information ...

MR VISSER: Well, one would imagine Mr Chairman, it would be the situation where the Committee as we have been attempting to do, go over to London and start digging around for evidence there.

CHAIRPERSON: Gather information by looking at a newspaper?

MR VISSER: No, no, that is so Mr Chairman, and clearly it would be ridiculous to expect for you to consult the Minister on that, obviously.

Be that as it may Mr Chairman, there are many other aspects of the Act which do present problems, but be that as it may, the only point here is that it is clear that in the mind of the legislature Mr Chairman, it wasn't a confined issue to the Republic of South Africa, they thought wider and there are indications in the Act which appear to support that contention.

Mr Chairman, I am told that I made a mistake at page 128 and 138 by referring to Pentonville Avenue instead of Penton Street, 28 Penton Street. Mr Chairman, if you will just bear that in mind, it is not really material. I just wanted to draw your attention to it.

Mr Chairman, as far as the evidence is concerned, I intend not to linger for too much time on the evidence. We have presented you Mr Chairman, with the evidence in the London bomb amnesty application of Gen Coetzee and Colonel James Taylor.

I start off at page 128, we give you a summary of what transpired during that evidence Mr Chairman, we refer to the amendments which were allowed. The evidence which was incorporated at page 129 in his evidence. He dealt with the police and we have already referred you at the top of page 130, to the decision of Jan Hattingh Cronje Mr Chairman, as to the approach of the Amnesty Committee, in regard to that kind of background evidence.

We went on Mr Chairman, we go on, at page 130 referring very briefly to the police career of Gen Coetzee, his experiences as a policeman. Over the page ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, you say that has been incorporated, paragraph 274 on page 129? Then you turn over, the evidence on Vlok and Van der Merwe has been accepted by the original Amnesty Committee.

MR VISSER: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: The original, who is the original Amnesty Committee?

CHAIRPERSON: The Cronje judgement.

ADV DE JAGER: Oh, in the Cronje judgement?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman. May I ask whether your copy says at the top of page 130, the evidence of Vlok and Van der Merwe has been accepted by the original Amnesty Committee - decision Jan Hattingh Cronje, application number 2773?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MR VISSER: Oh, well then Mr Chairman, that is what I refer to.

I have read it to you, if you choose to, I can do so again but it is quite clear over those pages, 226, which were dealt with when my learned friend, Mr Bizos, made an objection. That is quite clear that the Amnesty Committee accepted that and used that as the basis for allowing the amnesties of Jack Cronje and others as they applied for.

Mr Chairman, if I may come to page 132. In paragraph 280 we refer back Mr Chairman, to what we already addressed you on in the main, when we spoke about the political historical background and the strategy of the South African government to prevent where possible, assaults, acts of sabotage and terrorism perpetrated in the Republic of South Africa and to attempt to prevent that at its source and that was normally outside the borders of South Africa Mr Chairman, and this sentiment we submit is clear from the evidence of Gen Coetzee, played a notable role in the actions taken against targets in foreign countries such as the incidents presently on the table before this Committee.

Then Mr Chairman, you know the history now. There were overtures during 1982 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can we go back to this, it is not quite correct that, is it?

MR VISSER: Which is that?

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it the strategy of the South African government to prevent where possible assaults, etc anywhere, not at the source, outside the borders? We have had numerous cases of young men being killed when they were on their way out of the country to receive military training, because when they came back, they would have been dangerous terrorists?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The policy of the government was to prevent where possible, these, wherever they could be, not confined to outside the borders?

MR VISSER: No Mr Chairman, I am sorry if I gave the impression that - I was making a submission intending that it should be regarded as mutually exclusive, it is not mutually exclusive, clearly because we know of all actions ...

CHAIRPERSON: It should be rather at the source?

MR VISSER: At the source, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: If it was outside the borders of the Republic, it would be done there?

MR VISSER: Yes. Yes certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: Or if necessary outside the borders of the Republic?

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman, for correcting me. The idea behind the submission is simply that if you can prevent it at its source before it ripples out ...

CHAIRPERSON: Before they could attack?

MR VISSER: Then obviously you do so. You do so, and that was the consideration and this submission goes no further than what you have just put to me Mr Chairman.

And of course Mr Chairman, there were overtures as Gen Coetzee has told you. We refer to that at page 133. There was reference to the memorandum of Baker, Colonel Baker Mr Chairman, in volume 3 at page 10 to 13, I am not going to read it, you know what that says.

There was an allegation by Gen Coetzee, and I may hasten to add Mr Chairman, that allegation that there was an escalation of terrorist activities within South Africa from 1980, is independently corroborated with reference to other evidence Mr Chairman, some of which I have given you in the history which we spoke about yesterday. The ANC and the SACP offices in London were seen as the main source where attacks against the Republic were planned and generated.

CHAIRPERSON: There is no evidence to that effect is there?

MR VISSER: Well, Coetzee thought so.

CHAIRPERSON: The main source was Lusaka, that was the Headquarters? That was their Military Headquarters? If you look at the ANC, the second one, the submissions, they set out in detail where all the things were?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It was not London.

MR VISSER: Gen Coetzee gave that evidence Mr Chairman, you will recall. He may not be entirely correct, but that was obviously what he thought at the time, but you are absolutely correct. We have heard a lot of evidence from ANC people, we have certainly seen in the submissions and again we have heard evidence, I think it was from Mr Makgoti and Mr Tladi and or Mr Tladi in this hearing, that the main Operation Centre of the ANC where planning was done and military action was worked out and put into operation, was Lusaka.

I don't want to dispute that at all. What I am dealing with now Mr Chairman, is what Gen Coetzee gave evidence and he maybe factually incorrect, having told you that, but that is what he said to you and that is what he believed Mr Chairman. I take it no further than that.

Mr Chairman, he gave evidence also at a Section 29 hearing of the TRC Act, before the Human Rights Violations Committee, and Annexure D is what was tabled at that meeting and that is also part of what is before you now, and I refer you to Volume 3, page 182 to 188. You will recall Mr Chairman, that that was the part that was attached to Taylor's application because the Annexure D which was attached to Gen Coetzee's application, was not complete, and that is why we refer to page 182.

CHAIRPERSON: It is a little surprising that someone in Gen Coetzee's position, who must have known what the factual position was, should say that the main Headquarters was in London, isn't it? Doesn't that effect his credibility more than somewhat?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, it might effect his insight, but not necessarily his credibility.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, he couldn't have believed that? He was trying to explain why this operation was conducted, wasn't he?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, is he so wrong? You will recall that I put to Ms Marcus that pamphlets were published in London which were forwarded and circulated in South African.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he says the main sources where attacks against the Republic were planned. There was no evidence of any military presence in the London office?

MR VISSER: Not military presence Mr Chairman, but certainly the leadership frequented that building, why shouldn't they talk there about ...

CHAIRPERSON: Occasionally, they were in Lusaka, the Headquarters were there, we know them. We know the names of the people. As the Head of the Security Police, I find it very difficult to believe that he could have believed this.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, it was 1982, and he tells you that is what he thought, well 1980. That is what he thought the position to be Mr Chairman, and with respect ...

CHAIRPERSON: Were our Security Police that ill-informed?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, perhaps ...

CHAIRPERSON: When they were keeping tabs on what people were doing all around us, we have heard evidence of what they were doing elsewhere, observation they were keeping?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, they weren't omnipotent and they didn't have all the knowledge in their possession. We know for example Mr Chairman, it came out during this hearing, they didn't know what was going on in Angola really. They didn't know. They had some information, but they didn't really know what was going on there.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, those are (indistinct) that have been made here before you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I am talking about this particular point which you are making. You put it here, and I am saying that I find it hard to believe that someone in his position, could have believed this.

MR VISSER: Yes. Will you excuse me a moment Mr Chairman. My Attorney tells me Mr Chairman, there is evidence apparent upon which this is based, and he will try and find it and give it to you.

Mr Chairman, I make nothing more out of it than this was evidence by Gen Coetzee, we know certainly of the importance of the Lusaka office. Certainly there isn't evidence before you which went into detail as to what exactly was done at the London office. This is what he says Mr Chairman. I would respectfully submit that it is not necessarily a matter of credibility, but perhaps being ill-informed at the time. I don't want to take it any further.

I have referred you to Annexure D Mr Chairman, and at page 134, it was made clear in the evidence of Gen Coetzee that the overtures from the South African to the British government, had had little effect and we refer Mr Chairman, to the documentation in that regard, Williamson Volume 3, pages 33 to 37, 38, 82 to 85, Exhibit Q1 and Q2 and there is a lot of evidence there Mr Chairman, and then Coetzee's evidence is at the record, page 28 to 30.

Mr Chairman, it comes about that a decision was made "by the government", to strike at the offices of the ANC and the SACP in London and Coetzee made it quite clear, that the objective of the attack was not the British government but the ANC/SACP although there was a secondary bonus as it were Mr Chairman, and that was to show the South African government's disenchantment to the British government at allowing the ANC and the SACP to operate from their soil. That is at the record, page 30 to 31. Quite a bit of evidence was given about that.

Mr Chairman, the important aspect of the operation against the ANC as it turned out, only against the ANC because there wasn't proceeded with the SACP office building attack, was to show that the alliance could not regard themselves to be safe in the planning and execution of acts of terror against the Republic even from a distant, foreign country.

The attack itself, the facts around the attack Mr Chairman, you know very well. Coetzee told you how in the early part of 1982, the late Mr Louis le Grange spoke to Coetzee and Gen Mike Geldenhuys and told them that the government had resolved to demonstrate to the ANC and the SACP their vulnerability in the United Kingdom. I am at the bottom of page 134, going to 135 Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Botha sort of denied the government took a decision?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I heard him deny that. I can't be bound by his denial. I have a witness who came under oath and told you that he was told. Now Mr Chairman, that is what I am bound to. If you tell me, all right, well, it is hearsay evidence, we prefer to hear the evidence, to accept the evidence of Mr Pik Botha, well then fine Mr Chairman. I have no problem with that.

ADV DE JAGER: The only point is it seems as even though in government circles, the one Minister didn't know what the other one was doing?

MR VISSER: Oh yes, I don't believe, with respect, if I may believe anything Mr Chairman, that it was anything different because we have seen so many instances of, and heard evidence of bypassing people when it was thought that that person would not agree with the planning at that particular time.

We have seen that Mr Chairman, and we have heard about that in the Armed Forces hearing. Well, you haven't heard it, but it is on record in the Armed Forces hearing, and clearly Mr Commissioner you must be correct, it may very well be that Mr Pik Botha didn't know anything about this, as he said.

The only thing that I am putting forward to you at the moment is what Coetzee says Louis le Grange told him. He says and in fact Mr Chairman ...

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think you have to labour this, at the end they have even decorated the people and handed them medals.

MR VISSER: No but interestingly enough Mr Chairman, Jimmy Taylor came to the conclusion that they must have known about it, he told you about that in his evidence. He thought Mr P.W. Botha who was then the Prime Minister and Mr Pik Botha, must have known about it. Those were his inferences.

But anyway, we have heard what Mr Pik Botha said and I am not going to take him on on that, I am just telling you what Coetzee told you.

Anyway Mr Chairman, at page 135, in fact Mr Coetzee himself says to you and I refer to that in paragraph 292, that he himself doubted whether Mr Le Grange would have decided upon this operation on his own because he says that he knew him very well, you will remember the evidence, and he was not that kind of a person.

However that may be Mr Chairman, what happened going on to page 136, is Brigadier Piet Goosen was identified as the leader of the operation. Mr Craig Williamson, Major Craig Williamson at the time, was a natural choice because of his background and experience to be part of the team, and other members were coopted with specific reference to what they could, the assistance, the assistance which they could render.

In that regard, Mr Jimmy Taylor was brought up from Natal and he participated. That was at the request I believe, if I remember correctly, of Mr McPherson, who thought that Taylor would be a good choice.

Mr Chairman, we deal with allegations that there were instructions to kill people in Great Britain, and with respect, I am not going to labour that point or dwell on it for any time, but except to say that Gen Coetzee gave a very clear and logical answer as to why that shouldn't have been so, and that is that diplomatically it would not have been palatable and excusable had people been killed, particularly British citizens and had it come out that the South African government was responsible. It stands to reason Mr Chairman, we don't need to investigate that any further.

Mr Chairman, if I may go over to page 144, to keep up with the trend of the story Mr Chairman, at 144 we are now with Mr Taylor and he tells you that he was at that stage stationed at the Security Branch in Durban and he was told by his Commanding Officer, Brigadier Van der Hoven that he had to go up to Pretoria, come up to Pretoria for special duties, which he did. He linked up with the team Mr Chairman, after having seen Brigadier Goosen and he explained to you what happened here in South African until they left on the 1st of March for Great Britain.

That is at the bottom of page 145. Mr Chairman, you must tell me if I am going too quickly, but these are matters of fact which you have heard and which is on record. I don't want to belabour the points.

He explained to you at page 146 what McPherson ...

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, is paragraph 332 somewhat out of place? 332 refers to the final briefing in South Kensington?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then the next paragraph is time was spent on obtaining documentation including passports.

MR VISSER: Oh yes, the explanation for that Mr Chairman, was that ...

CHAIRPERSON: 332 should appear after 334, shouldn't it?

MR VISSER: Yes indeed Mr Chairman. Certainly, it refers to a time after they had left South Africa. The only reason why it slipped in here and I didn't realise it, was that that was the order in which the evidence was led, because at the time when the evidence was led in chief Mr Chairman, we stopped there and said hang on, did you know before you left, what was going to be done and he said no. He had a good idea, but he thought that it was going to be an intelligence gathering and it may involve breaking and entering, but it was only when he got to England that he found out and you will remember he came in for a lot of criticism from Mr De Kock and McPherson on that evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: No, just the order.

MR VISSER: The order, yes, I do apologise Mr Chairman, again, I must say that it was late at night and I was doing this myself and so I take full blame and responsibility.

Mr Chairman, he gave you a clear picture, according to his recollection, as to what happened in London. He told you how they in paragraph 335, how they did reconnaissance Mr Chairman, very intensely, virtually every day, or night.

I am referring to page 146, and he said that they were to proceed to the offices, do reconnaissance, make observations as to movements of people at various times of the day, various days of the week. This sort of activity continued from virtually the day that they arrived, which was the 1st of March, until the night of the 13th of March.

Mr Chairman, and then he couldn't remember where the final briefing was, whether it was at a pub or whether it was at their flat. I submit with great respect Mr Chairman, that it is a matter of detail which is really not important to the facta probanda in the matter.

He told you that there was a decision that there should not be proceeded with any attack on the SACP offices for fear that people might be hurt of killed. It was put to him that he had something to do with reconnaissance at the house or apartment where Mr Joe Slovo stayed. Later in cross-examination it turned out to be a home belonging to Mr Horpe, I am referring to paragraph 337, which he says he knew nothing about Mr Chairman.

Then at 339, final briefing that took place Mr Chairman, it was either the Wednesday or the Friday evening, and I deal with that, with his failure to be able to recollect clearly where it happened. As I say, that is not really important Mr Chairman, we deal with the issue of his inferences as to who had known about the operation in paragraph 342 Mr Chairman.

Then came the 13th of March, the Saturday, when this happened, when the bomb was planted at night and afterwards, they made arrangements, got onto a plane and flew out to Frankfort.

Mr Chairman, one of the important things from the evidence of Mr Taylor, and that was part of some discussion between the Committee and some of the members, some of the legal representatives here, and that was the question of whether they had done sufficient reconnaissance in regard to ascertaining whether or not Ms Gill Marcus would be there on that particular Sunday morning, yes or no.

Taylor's evidence Mr Chairman, is quite clear that in regard to the Sunday morning of the 14th, they did not expect anybody at that offices by virtue of the, as he recalls it, the Sharpville rally, which would take place at Trafalgar Square in front of South Africa House.

That Mr Chairman, in our submission, is a reasonable assumption to have been made and we submit that the proof is in the eating, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, nobody was injured that we know of, or seriously injured at least, and clearly it seems Mr Chairman, that the submission is fair to say that the members of the Operation Team, were entitled to assume as they did, that there would be nobody in that office.

CHAIRPERSON: The impression I got and I, it is an impression, I don't know if it is justified from the evidence, of Ms Marcus was that her conduct was somewhat unusual. She was the person who went in on Sundays, not that the office was open on Sundays or that it was a regular practise. It was that she went there and to have discovered that, they would have had to have watched the building for some weeks, on Sunday, to ascertain that somebody was going there on Sundays.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which quite clearly they didn't do.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, even taking that argument to its logical conclusion, even assuming against the applicants that this is something which really they ought to have done, then I would submit with respect Mr Chairman, that in the grand scheme of things, given the operation which they wanted to do, given where they placed the bomb and I heard the evidence of Ms Gill Marcus to say that there was a crater blown into the building and she would have been killed, had she been there, but given all of that Mr Chairman, with great respect, it was still an act, omission or offence which fell within the ambit of the requirements of the Act and with great respect, again, as you put it, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, nothing happened.

But as you say, yes, we certainly know Mr Chairman, that this was her evidence. She might have been killed she said, well obviously, other people might also have been killed, but they weren't.

At the end of the day, what you have before you, is an application for amnesty Mr Chairman, which does not concern gross violations of human rights.

They left, there are some doubt or contradiction as to who flew out on what aircraft Mr Chairman. With great respect, it takes the matter no further, it certainly does not reflect on anyone's credibility if they can't remember whether De Kock and Adam flew with Taylor and McPherson or on a separate flight, and whether they went to (indistinct) or Brussels or whatever the case may be. We submit that it is matters, those are matters which are not really of great importance for you to make a decision Mr Chairman.

They then returned to South Africa Mr Chairman, and oh yes, I have just found it, it is paragraph 354 of page 150, and again Mr Chairman, it seems to be out of order, that is why I couldn't find it earlier, where he deals with the demonstration at Trafalgar Square.

That also seems to be a paragraph not entirely in the correct order. Then Mr Chairman, Taylor says to you that there was a medal parade and he tells you who were there and he goes on to give basically the same political objectives as did Gen Coetzee, in the main boiling down to saying to the ANC, showing to the ANC that they cannot rest assured in a foreign country, that they could go ahead planning what they were planning, without fear of retaliation from the South African government.

Mr Chairman, coming back then to Coetzee and Taylor combined, we submit Mr Chairman, that there is no opposition before you, no valid opposition before you by any interested party or implicated person in the London bomb incident. We would ask you Mr Chairman, to deal with the matter on that basis.

You will recall that my learned friend, Mr Bizos, was cross-examining both Coetzee and Taylor in regard to the London bomb, in spite of our objections Mr Chairman, my learned friend suggested to you that he was entitled to cross-examine because of, on the basis of credibility and incidentally not even the credibility of Coetzee and Taylor as we understand it, but the credibility of Mr Williamson.

We have serious difficulty with that argument Mr Chairman, and we say that having been allowed to cross-examine as he did for very long periods of time, where my learned friend had no locus standi to do so with great respect, may have caused if this Committee is going to take into account, that cross-examination against the applicants for who we appear, will be a grave irregularity and certainly very unfair Mr Chairman.

We conclude that aspect Mr Chairman, we have dealt with it fully in the Heads, but we conclude that by saying that we ask you to ignore the evidence of Mr George Bizos in regard to the London bomb, as far as it refers to both Gen Coetzee and Colonel Taylor.

Mr Chairman, may I refer you to page ...

CHAIRPERSON: Should we perhaps, if everybody hasn't read it, you deal with that at length at page 156?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, I was just going to refer you to that, page 156, under the heading Cross-examination by Mr Bizos. I am not going to repeat all of that, but we stay with all the submissions that we made up to page 158.

Mr Chairman, just again a matter of typing, at page 154 you will see that paragraph 379 and 380 on the next page, are out of proper position Mr Chairman, they should come in after paragraph 385, those two paragraphs, and I do apologise Mr Chairman. So, 379 and 380 should just move down to below paragraph 385 Mr Chairman.

Then there was one other one, and that was in the evidence of Gen Coetzee. Oh yes, Mr Chairman, we are just coming to it. We will come to that Mr Chairman, we will deal with that as we come to it.

Mr Chairman, dealing then with the London bomb applications, that is basically what we submit, are relevant and germane to your enquiry and we submit Mr Chairman, that viewed in terms of the provisions of the Act and the requirements of the Act, these two applicants, in fact as did all the applicants with respect Mr Chairman, must have satisfied you on a balance of probabilities Mr Chairman, that this falls within the ambit of the Act and that you could, should and ought to give amnesty as prayed for.

The form of the amnesty we will deal with at the end.

Mr Chairman, we then come to the question of cross-implication of applicants because we are dealing with Coetzee at the moment, Mr Chairman, and with Mr Taylor. May I first of all deal with, perhaps I should deal with Mr Taylor first of all.

The question regarding Mr Taylor was the issue of his evidence that he had no knowledge, or nor did he participate in the doing of reconnaissance on either Mr Joe Slovo or Mr Horpe. My learned friend, Mr Cornelius, made certain submissions to you on paper, although quite properly in our submission Mr Chairman, when it came to his oral argument, he placed submissions before you which were in our submission, correct, and that was that we are dealing here with the evidence of people about issues that have taken place some 17 years ago, I think it is Mr Chairman, 16, 17 years ago and the apparent criticism of Mr Taylor that he was vague in recalling his evidence, is really not a substantial criticism. I am referring to page 38 of the blue Heads of argument of my learned friend, and page 39.

Mr Chairman, with respect ... (tape ends) ... and that you would have no hesitation in accepting what he told you. He went out of his way Mr Chairman, to give fair evidence, make fair concessions where he had to and where it was reasonable, but it was quite clear Mr Chairman, that he gave credible evidence.

At the end of the day, he played a very minor part Mr Chairman, he was ordered to go to Pretoria, he was ordered to go to Farm Daisy, he was given instructions, he wasn't even given all the instructions, he was ordered to do reconnaissance and he was ordered as to what he was to do on the evening when the bomb was placed and he was ordered to fly out back to South Africa and he received a medal and that was really, basically his evidence.

Mr Chairman, I deal with Taylor at page 163 and we refer to the, at this stage, Saturday evening. I only had the written argument of Mr Cornelius before me and I didn't know what he was going to say, so this goes much wider than what is necessary.

Then we come Mr Chairman, at page 164, there is a paragraph 422 and 423 Mr Chairman, which I really don't understand how that landed here. Those paragraphs Mr Chairman, should move down it seems to after paragraph 426.

I am sorry, my Attorney tells me I am wrong Mr Chairman. I am sorry, sorry, yes. I am sorry Mr Chairman, I am wrong. Paragraph 422 and 423 should move up to just behind, after paragraph 417. 422 up to 426 Mr Chairman, I am sorry, I am terribly sorry, 422 up to 426 should move up to behind 417. I am sorry Mr Chairman.

So the evidence of McPherson regarding Taylor, comes after 426. That is what it means.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, now 421 on page 164, on the third line shouldn't that be Taylor rather than McPherson?

MR VISSER: Taylor, thank you Mr Chairman. It is not McPherson, that should be Taylor, yes. I must say Mr Chairman, I am constantly amazed at how quickly you read these things and pick up the mistakes. I wish I had that ability.

Yes, McPherson is incorrect Mr Chairman, you are quite right, it should read Taylor.

CHAIRPERSON: You see that was last night, not this morning.

MR VISSER: I still missed it until now, but anyway Mr Chairman, that is as far as the evidence regarding the London bomb is concerned, as far as Taylor, we accept what my learned friend now says that he is not asking you to reject the evidence of Taylor.

The issue of whether or not McPherson did reconnaissance in regard to Mr Slovo or Horpe, is something which is totally extraneous to the interest of this Committee in the present hearing Mr Chairman. Nobody else gave any evidence about that.

It may well be that he might have had such instructions, individual instructions, we don't know Mr Chairman, but the fact of the matter is, it does not stand in the way of you granting amnesty to either Mr McPherson or in our submission, to Mr Taylor.

Mr Chairman, we then have to deal with the issue of the Lusaka bomb, because it seems logical to deal with it now because it reflects on Gen Coetzee.

Now, you will recall the evidence Mr Chairman ...

ADV DE JAGER: Where do you deal with that?

MR VISSER: Page 159, paragraph 401 and onwards. Mr Chairman, there is a short answer to this whole (indistinct), it is very short answer to that. My learned friend has actually quoted it.

It concerns Mr Derrick Brune. At page 40 of my learned friend, I don't know whether you have his Heads before you Mr Chairman, page 40, he refers to this issue and paragraph 19.1 if you look at the previous page, and he says in the second paragraph, the applicant and Captain Kobus Pretorius approached Gen Coetzee and discussed the possibility of the operation with him.

Gen Coetzee gave approval of the operation, although Gen Coetzee cannot recall the approval, he testified he would have. That is not entirely correct but be that as it may on a balance of probabilities, he did.

Mr Chairman, you will recall that at a certain point, you interjected Mr Chairman, and my learned friend has made reference to that passage, I hope I can find it, where I attempted to, I was at pains Mr Chairman, to explain to you that I was asking questions in regard to Brune, and it appeared to us in the cross-examination, that what McPherson was saying is that he and Pretorius went to Brune, who was acting in the place of Mr Craig Williamson during the latter's absence as their Head or their Commanding Officer and that he was actually the one that gave the permission, or gave them the go ahead.

What happened as far as Coetzee was concerned, was a matter of finances. If that interpretation of the evidence is correct Mr Chairman, it needs to go no further because then we are not speaking of a frolic of his own, as my learned friend is obviously concerned with.

Here we are Mr Chairman, it is page 58. My learned friend has referred you to page 1409, his page 58 of his Heads and he quotes the evidence. "Chairperson, didn't he tell us Mr Visser, that he went to the Commissioner to get permission to pay the R2 000-00 because it had to come from the Commissioner?" Well, what it means, the interpretation, I don't know Mr Chairman, but what it means, what you meant obviously was the Commissioner had to approve the R20 000-00, that is what you are saying. "He couldn't have put the proposal in writing. They told the Commissioner that they would prepare a motivation, that he would be paid for services rendered in the past. Mr Visser, yes, but the witness also told you Mr Chairman, that the reason why he reached the Commissioner directly and jumped the intermediate officers was because Brune, after he had heard what their motion or their plan was, sent them directly to the Commissioner."

CHAIRPERSON: There is no suggestion that Brune gave them permission. What you are putting is that Brune sent them to the Commissioner.

MR VISSER: I am talking about an interpretation Mr Chairman, and what I am submitting to you is Brune is not in the position of Williamson as their Commanding Officer. They come to him and they say, we've got this plan, we've got Allie, we've got a bomb and we've got the Lusaka office and so on.

In sending them to the Commissioner and as you put it, to get money, it is tantamount and the inference is inescapable that he is agreeing with this. If a Commanding Officer agrees Mr Chairman, that is tantamount ...

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it obvious that he wouldn't have sent them to the Commissioner if he didn't approve of the scheme?

MR VISSER: That is my point.

CHAIRPERSON: If he hadn't approved of the scheme, he would have said don't talk nonsense?

MR VISSER: That is exactly my point Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What he says is look, I can't authorise it, go to the Commissioner.

MR VISSER: Yes, I can't give you that money, yes. As you put to me, yes. And what I am saying Mr Chairman is on that evidence, then there is no question of a frolic of his own on the part of Mr McPherson, that is the only submission that I am making. That is the only submission that I am making.

But Mr Chairman, what has happened here was McPherson says Gen Coetzee ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but isn't the point that Mr Cornelius is making, that there is nothing to support this? Once again, it is, he is corroborating himself saying he went to Brune.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I can't really argue with him whether he did or whether he didn't. I know that Mr Kobus Pretorius wasn't called as a witness. It would have been very helpful if he had been.

But I am not sure that we have a basis of believing that Mr McPherson wasn't telling you the truth, that he went to Brune. I can't deny that Mr Chairman, surely. This maybe one of those situations where the only evidence that exists, I don't know what happened to Captain Pretorius, but where the only evidence that exists, is that of Mr McPherson.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, McPherson's is two steps. I went to Brune, I went to Coetzee.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And they now say Coetzee says, tries to play it down and say no, no, he didn't, I can't remember it. I don't think he would have come to me.

MR VISSER: Yes, he would have had to go says Coetzee. Coetzee's evidence is quite clear. He says look, I gave thousands of these orders or authorizations.

It is quite possible this one might have been one of them, but I have serious doubts. I look at the haphazardness of the operation and I say to myself, there is no motivation as to, there is no explanation as to how Allie was going to get to Lusaka, how he was going to carry the bomb. There is no memorandum in front of me, and what normally would have happened is, we work with the Police Secret Fund which was subject to checks and balances and we couldn't get money unless we put in some memorandum, I can't remember any memorandum ever given to me.

In fact, McPherson doesn't even say to you that they gave him a memorandum. He says they didn't. He says, Mr Chairman, although it is possible, it is highly unlikely that I would have given this permission. He also told you about the fact that he was in Cape Town. My learned friend again, we can't argue with that when he says, McPherson says that it was on the days that he was up from Cape Town when I spoke to him. That doesn't take us any further Mr Chairman.

At the end of the day with great respect, we would submit that it is logical as was put to Mr Williamson by Mr Cornelius, that McPherson would probably not have entered into this operation without authority from above. It appears as you have just put to me Mr Chairman, and as I submit that the probabilities are that Brune in agreeing with the operation, authorised it.

That really is all that McPherson needs and it is only as far as you have to go. Whether or not Coetzee did or did not, Mr Chairman, is going to make no difference to whether McPherson in your opinion, should be granted amnesty or not. That is my submission Mr Chairman.

What I am saying to you is that the whole argument about who is correct, Coetzee or McPherson may very well be totally unnecessary. That is my submission Mr Chairman.

In the meantime if you have a different view Mr Chairman, we stay with the submissions which we have made from page 159 onwards and we refer you to the evidence Mr Chairman, where we deal with it.

CHAIRPERSON: Up to page 163?

MR VISSER: Up to page 163 and then, sorry, and then you will recall those paragraphs 422 to 426 must also be added to that Mr Chairman, it is really up to page 165.

Mr Chairman, there were some, referring to page 165, in regard to the implication of Generals Geldenhuys and Dreyer, with great respect, I am not going to waste your time with that. It has nothing to do with your enquiry here today.

If they did something wrong, then Mr Chairman, the law will take its course.

ADV DE JAGER: The same with Coetzee, if he had in fact authorised it and didn't disclose it, and he was involved in the Lusaka thing, the law should take its course?

MR VISSER: Oh yes, absolutely.

ADV DE JAGER: We should decide whether McPherson had authority or whether he believed he had authority?

MR VISSER: That is exactly right Mr Chairman. That is exactly right. The only reason why I spent some time on it, is to look at the matter from the point of view from McPherson, but clearly you are absolutely correct. If Coetzee was involved and that is what is shown in the fullness of time, well then the law will take its course.

Mr Chairman, I then come to the application of Brigadier Willem Schoon. Sorry, I have dealt with Geldenhuys and Dreyer, I have dealt with it. Willem Schoon Mr Chairman, attempted murder of Mr Marius Schoon.

With great respect Mr Chairman, I have read the Heads and I have listened to the argument of my learned friend, Mr Jansen, and I agree fully with his views in the matter. He is absolutely correct without any doubt.

I expected Mr Chairman, to hear in his argument, which I didn't have at the time when I drew, what you find at page 166 onwards, I expected to hear something entirely different, and it is from that point of view that we have dealt with the matter as we did.

The fact of the matter is, my learned friend is quite correct and we actually attempted to leave the door open for Mr Coetzee to take, to concede to the fact Mr Chairman, that clearly Mr Marius Schoon was such a prominent person while he was in Botswana, that there wouldn't only have been one discussion about him. The probabilities would have it that there must have been quite a number of them.

This is the point which my learned friend, Mr Jansen, makes. It seems equally obvious Mr Chairman, and we are hoping that it will seem as obvious to you as well, that there were more than one attempt on his life.

If that is not the explanation, then I don't know what the explanation is, because the facts that we have here Mr Chairman, certainly indicate two separate events. They cannot possibly refer to the same.

We agree with my learned friend as far as that is concerned. Secondly Mr Chairman, even if you assume and that is the second point my learned friend, Mr Jansen, makes. Even if you assume that they refer to the same incident, which we say you can't assume, but even if you do, then we say that the issues upon which there is conflict between Mr Willem Schoon and Mr Dirk Coetzee, are incidental matters. They don't deal with the crux of the matter, namely the fact that Mr Marius Schoon was a target, the fact that Willem Schoon gave authorization or an order, call it what you like, the fact that there was an attempt on his life in Botswana.

Mr Chairman, we agree with my learned friend, Mr Jansen and that should really be the answer, the end of this argument. However Mr Chairman, we have a problem here because my learned friend, Mr Bizos is here. My learned friend, Mr Bizos ...

ADV DE JAGER: Is Mr Bizos creating a problem?

MR VISSER: He is creating a problem.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why he is here.

MR VISSER: My learned friend, Mr Bizos might say well, that is very well, Jansen can make all those concessions, but I am acting for Mr Marius Schoon and in fact for others of the Schoon family as well, Fritz. I am saying, I am asking you Mr Chairman, to reject the evidence of Mr Willem Schoon on the basis of the evidence of Mr Dirk Coetzee.

Mr Chairman, I don't want to get into that, because I don't believe that my learned friend, Mr Bizos, can take that option on behalf of the Committee. I think it is my learned friend, Mr Jansen's choice, because after all Dirk Coetzee, is his witness and he is an applicant before another Amnesty Committee, in regard to an attempt on the life of Mr Marius Schoon, be that the same one or be it a different one.

Why I am saying this Mr Chairman, is simply for the following reason. I have stated at page 167 onwards the evidence of Dirk Coetzee. We have placed some facts relating to the particular incident which we are dealing with here, on paper before you.

In the light of Mr Jansen's view, we find it unnecessary to deal with Mr Dirk Coetzee's credibility, because once both of us tell you and you accept that it probably refers to two incidents, that is the end of the dilemma, that is the end of the impasse and you don't have to deal with credibility.

I am not abandoning this argument Mr Chairman, in case my learned friend, Mr Bizos takes a different view. I would ask you to allow me in reply, then to deal with the credibility of Mr Dirk Coetzee, because this is not all that I want to deal with. There was an Appellate Division decision in this regard, as you know, in the Vrye Weekblad case.

It is going to take some time to deal with it and with respect, what I am saying to you Mr Chairman, we think it is unnecessary to deal with it now in view of what my learned friend, Mr Jansen, has said, but as long as you will bear in mind, that if my learned friend, Mr Bizos, says something different, I may well have to say well, now I want to address you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In any event, can you tell me what this Mauritius statement is?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I thought that was the document that is before you. We referred to it in cross-examination. I think it is a document which is part of the documentation of Mr Dirk Coetzee, which is before you. Where is Jansen? can you help?

MR JANSEN: Yes. Mr Chairman, it was introduced in cross-examination of Mr Coetzee in these proceedings. I think the document that was used, was in fact the Exhibit in Coetzee's matter. I can't remember the number, for some or other reason, the number Exhibit P comes into my head, or R, but I could be corrected.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it had to have been before you, otherwise I couldn't have cross-examined on it. Nobody seems to remember what the Exhibit number is.

CHAIRPERSON: I see your Attorney is shaking his head.

MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, I don't want to waste time.

ADV DE JAGER: It is referred to ...

MR VISSER: In the Kondile case? It is YY Mr Chairman. YY is an extract from the Mauritius statement Mr Chairman, and this is part of what I referred to. This was handed in Mr Chairman, for the specific purpose of cross-examination and it was marked in fact, from page 1 to 14 because it contained various pages which were extracts from a statement which was taken on tape recording by Mr Jacques Pauw of Mr Dirk Coetzee, while they were on the island of Mauritius Mr Chairman, that is why it is called the Mauritius statement.

CHAIRPERSON: YY starts "gegaan", page 104. It goes on to page 118. Page 12 is obviously a transcript from some court proceedings?

MR VISSER: Yes, that is the evidence which Mr Dirk Coetzee gave in London before the Harms Commission, Mr Chairman, that was explained in the evidence, and it is on record. Perhaps you can just, it says London record, Mr Chairman, it is before the Harms Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: The Harms Commission?

MR VISSER: Yes. The reason why it is only that part of the London record that is placed before you, is that that is the only part that is vaguely relevant Mr Chairman.

The London record is really a very voluminous document, and this is the only part that is really relevant. I must say Mr Chairman, there is another aspect to this and I say this, perhaps so that my learned friend, Mr Bizos, can take note of this, we also make a submission in our Heads Mr Chairman, that Mr Dirk Coetzee nowhere in his evidence before the Harms Commission in London, spoke about this attempt on Mr Marius Schoon.

I don't want to make a big thing of it, because frankly in order to check that submission of ours, you are going to have to go through the whole record Mr Chairman. It is either a matter of taking it at face value as prima facie correct or going through the whole record. That is an option which whoever has an interest in this matter, must elect himself to exercise.

Apart from that Mr Chairman, the only relevant pages in the London record, are from page 767 to 769 for this particular application.

Then lastly Mr Chairman, to make it absolutely clear, at page 167 of our Heads, paragraph 436, rightly or wrongly Mr Chairman, I was given the impression from the evidence of Mr Dirk Coetzee, there was opposition to Brigadier Willem Schoon's application for amnesty. I hear what my learned friend says and it seems that I was incorrect, so that has to be amended to say that there is not, Dirk Coetzee is not opposing Willem Schoon's application and you may as well add that Willem Schoon doesn't oppose Mr Dirk Coetzee's application before the other Amnesty Committee. Is that correct? My Attorney confirms that Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman, dealing very briefly with the issue of Mr Marius Schoon. We have stated for your benefit at page 171, a brief summary of the evidence as we understood it. We haven't got a record of this, you will recall because this was evidence which was presented by Mr George Bizos last week. We have attempted to give from our notes, a brief synopsis of what these people say.

Mr Chairman, we submit that it is quite clear that the attempts to play down the importance of the role of Mr Marius Schoon in the ANC, while he was in Botswana, was contradicted by his own witnesses, Mr George Bizos' own witnesses, time and time again.

It is clear from the evidence, I refer to paragraph 457, Mr Henry Makgoti that there were lots of students in Botswana who elected to come under the ANC as he expressed it, he were taught politics, ANC politics by Marius and Jeanette Schoon. He went on to explain it, you will recall Mr Chairman, they were there for military purposes, but they were taught politics while they were in the military and that was in reply to a question as to what the influence of the military and - the politics of the day, were on the military.

Mr Makgoti furthermore testified that Marius and Jeanette Schoon recruited people in the Republic of South Africa, although he hastened to add that they were not involved in military aspects. What is clear from the evidence in cross-examination of Mr Heinz Klug, Mr Leonard Tladi, Mr Henry Makgoti and I wish to add Mr Chairman, Mr Maharaj and Mr Marius Schoon himself at the bottom of page 171, are the aspects which we set out at page 172 and following.

Marius Schoon had a record Mr Chairman. He was convicted of sabotage in 1964, he was in prison for 12 years. Marius and Jeanette Schoon identified with the armed struggle. I give you the references from Marius Schoon himself Mr Chairman, and Mr Maharaj. Marius and Jeanette Schoon believed that the killing of people which were to the advantage of the ANC struggle, was justified. I give you the reference, for example the Church Street bomb was on a question of my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis, specifically mentioned, as one that Marius Schoon believed to have been justified.

They were involved in political mobilisation, the recruitment of people in the RSA and mass mobilisation. The references are there. They were building an underground structure for the ANC in Botswana Mr Chairman. That is Mr Maharaj who gave that evidence.

One of their tasks in Botswana was to establish infiltration routes to and from the Republic of South Africa, they had built up a very sophisticated and extensive network Mr Chairman. The references are there.

These routes are used for and by the ANC cadres, leaving and returning to South Africa. Maharaj gave that evidence, Mr Marius Schoon admitted in cross-examination that he and Jeanette were targets of the South African Security Forces while they were in Botswana, because of the work that they were doing and because of what they were doing. They posed a considerable danger and difficulties to the South African government. The reference is there.

He received training. There is some dispute about what training he received. You will recall that Brigadier Schoon told you that when he considered the position of Mr Marius Schoon, he drew a file or files of Mr Marius Schoon and he read it.

He told you that he read there that Mr Marius Schoon was involved in terrorist activities. In fairness in evidence before this Committee, he said words to the effect, or an explanation to the effect that it is probably referring to the conviction of sabotage Mr Chairman, in fairness to Mr Marius Schoon.

He went on to say that it was what he remembered from a reading of the files was that the infiltration routes were used Mr Chairman, to smuggle arms and ammunition. Whether that is true or not, whether it was in fact correct or not, that is what Brigadier Schoon believed at the time. There was no reason for him to disbelieve something which he read in the files.

Those files unfortunately Mr Chairman, don't exist any longer. It is a pity that so much of what was previously available has been destroyed, it has become unavailable. You made a remark about this previously I remember, Mr Chairman, it would certainly have assisted in the work of this Committee enormously if these documents had still been available, but they are not.

This is what Mr Willem Schoon remembers, that he read Mr Chairman, and there is no reason for you to believe that he was dishonest about that.

Now Mr Chairman, lastly in regard to the training. Mr Willem Schoon thought that it was training, military training, but be that as it may, we have heard the evidence of Mr Maharaj and we have heard the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon, we cannot say that they are lying to you merely based on the recollection of Mr Willem Schoon. I take the matter no further, regarding the training at Camp Funda, but that was more like a training in regard to pamphlet bombs used for the distribution of pamphlets and while he was there, he took the opportunity of doing a course in self defence.

We have no reason, no grounds at least, to dispute that evidence of Mr Marius Schoon. Mr Chairman, we say then in paragraph 461, it is submitted that it is probably not necessary for the Committee to choose between the evidence of Willem Schoon and Dirk Coetzee, in so far as it is reasonably obvious that Dirk Coetzee probably became involved in two operations to eliminate Marius Schoon, of which Willem Schoon was only involved in one of them and someone else might have been involved in the other.

That much is strongly corroborated with the references to the Mauritius statement, which I gave you earlier where Mr Dirk Coetzee is clearly confused between what Jan du Preez told him and what the role was that Mr Jan du Preez played, because you will recall that he actually started off by saying that his instructions came from Jan du Preez. It was later changed to Willem Schoon.

As I said, I don't want to get into that Mr Chairman, unless it becomes absolutely necessary for me to do so in reply, then I will. At this stage, our submission is in 461, you don't need to go into that Mr Chairman.

Just lastly on the issue of credibility, there were the two affidavits handed in, the one to McNally apparently and the other to the Harms Commission, that would appear to us to mean both were handed to the Harms Commission, in which certain denials were made regarding money in an envelope to be taken to Nick van Rensburg, by Dirk Coetzee and in the other instance, the death of Mr Griffiths Mxenge and Willem Schoon's knowledge about that.

We submit Mr Chairman, that the only sin that Willem Schoon committed, was to have forgotten about the fact that he made those false statements. The fact that those false statements were made Mr Chairman, is easily explained. At the time, there wasn't a process of amnesty and clearly, there were a lot, we know that, we hear that every time we have amnesty applications, we know that a lot of people in a number of situations, denied offences having been committed Mr Chairman, because that was the cover stories. There were the "dekstories" as my learned friend has been at pains to point out to you, and there were cover ups, of course, about the acts and offences which were committed during the past.

Mr Chairman, may we be allowed to wrap up and to say to you that we appear for three applicants, those you will see from page 1 onwards, the first two applicants relate to the damaging of the ANC offices and the planned damaging of the SACP offices. We heard the exchange between my learned friend, Mr Jansen and Commissioner De Jager, as well as yourself Mr Chairman, in regard to how the amnesty order should be worded if amnesty should be granted and we submit Mr Chairman, that it is, we have had discussions about this before and some arguments previously during other applications and it is our understanding rightly or wrongly, that the way we have it worded, in pages 1 and 2, will be the correct way of doing so Mr Chairman.

The simple truth of the matter is that on a previous occasion, I believe you Mr Chairman and Mr De Jager, as well as I can't remember who the other member of the Committee was, were ad idem that it is ill logical and unreasonable to expect, to find out every single possible offence which might have been committed during the course of a particular incident because somewhere in the wings, there might be something.

The idea would be that amnesty be granted in regard to a particular incident, as long as that incident is clearly identifiable and restricted as far as dates, so that it does not flow over to other incidents. That is what we have done here Mr Chairman, we have made it quite clear what the incident is that we spoke about, given a date, given a situation, situated at 28 Penton Street and we have done the same as far as Brigadier Willem Schoon is concerned, although that was a bit more difficult, but we simply say that he, if you allow him amnesty, it will be for one attempted murder, one case of attempted murder of Louis Marius Schoon in Botswana during or about 1981/1982. You will recall that he can't remember what the date was Mr Chairman.

If you want to amend that to say one attempted murder, then that would be fine Mr Chairman. It is clear that we couldn't make it more precise, as you will understand, on the evidence.

We are submitting, we are hoping that that would be sufficient for you to deal with the amnesty applications.

Mr Chairman, having said that, we make the general submission that having regard to the requirements of the Act, we submit that these three applicants have complied with all the requirements of the Act, they have made a full disclosure Mr Chairman. These were acts, omissions or offences committed during the struggle of the past, and they were clearly, clearly Mr Chairman, associated with political objectives and therefore they should be granted amnesty.

Could you excuse me one moment, Mr Chairman? Mr Chairman, it appears that I have made a mistake which is clearly not the first one, but it seems that I must have added from my own memory of the evidence of Gen Coetzee, the word "main" in paragraph 283. My learned Attorney has checked on the evidence and he says to me, I am wrong, the word "main" shouldn't be there, it should simply refer to a source of attacks.

Mr Chairman, my Attorney is quite correct. The evidence you will recall was this, this attack on the London office of the ANC came in the wake of the rocket attack on Voortrekkerhoogte and the persons who were implicated there, in regard to them, there had been indications that they had used either British passports or had British addresses and that the South African Police who wanted to go and investigate in Great Britain, were apparently not given that permission.

That was the reason, I am sorry Mr Chairman, as I say, this is clearly then my mistake. If it is not in the evidence, I take full blame for it, this is what I typed and if it is wrong, it is wrong. I am sorry about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 464, 465 and 466.

MR VISSER: Could you please just repeat Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: 464, 465, 466. Are you making these submissions on behalf of all three of your applicants or only two of them?

MR VISSER: All three of them Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, don't you want to remove the word both?

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I would like to, yes. All applicants, thank you Mr Chairman. That is all I have to say, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if you want to address us now, whether we should take the short adjournment?

MR BIZOS: Perhaps we can take the short adjournment, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am not talking to you Mr Bizos. We have somebody else before you. Ms Patel, do you have anything that you wish to say?

MS PATEL: No thank you Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Nothing. Very well, we will now take the adjournment Mr Bizos, to prepare ourselves.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Before you commence Mr Bizos, I have been told that Mr Fritz Schoon is with us here today.

MR BIZOS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Speaking on behalf of the Committee and I am sure on behalf of everyone participating in this hearing, we would like to express our condolences to him for the sad death of his father a short time ago.

As we all know, and I am sure he knows, his father very bravely gave evidence before us last year at a time when he was suffering from the illness which finally killed him. He will remain in our memory. I would also like to express our condolences for him to the tragic death of his mother Jeanette and his sister, Katryn, at a time when he was I believe, only two years old.

It must have been a very, very heartbreaking experience for a young boy to have to live on his own after that, I am sure he knows as we all do, from what we have heard today, that his family will always remain part of the new history of our land. We express our sorrows to him.

MR BIZOS IN ARGUMENT: May we place on record, that in view of the death of Mr Marius Schoon, we are now appearing for

Claire Shelly McLean, who formally adopted Herman Frederik Schoon, who is known to his friends as Fritz, Mr Chairman, so now we are appearing for both of them for the purposes of the record, we clearly have locus standi.

Ms McLean was in fact the wife of Mr Schoon before his death. Thank you Mr Chairman. I will ask my Attorney to hand in a portion of our Heads. I want to assure the Committee and our learned friends that we are not keeping the second part back, in order to gain any advantage, but it is because we are in fact answering their application.

We worked hard into the night in order to prepare the Heads. (... tape ends) ... we hope that tonight we will have at least a very substantial portion of the rest Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may just before my learned colleague proceeds, in respect, I just want to place on record in respect of the London bombing, that the only interested party in that matter at the time, was the ANC offices. We in fact sent a notice to them and they have elected not to oppose the application. Thank you.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, before Mr Bizos commences, you will recall that he tendered to us details of the extracts from the tape that he would use in an endeavour to try and resolve the issues.

We have responded and gave him a set of our responses this morning. I have three sets for you, nothing really turns on anything but the last two issues, one of which the contention is that the paragraph is incomplete and as such, unintelligible. We did not dispute the words that appear and the last item at page 52, which refers to an extract from the first Slovo quote up to the end of the page, is in fact really not a discussion between Gillian Slovo and Mr Williamson, but is part of a discussion between Mr McBride and Mr Williamson. If I could hand up those copies.

I think that disposes of any disputes.

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Chairman, I am sorry, Cornelius for McPherson, I promised yesterday and I undertook to supplement my Heads with the specific application for the two incidents which I have drawn. To finalise this issue, may I hand this up as well? Thank you.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, these Heads are directed at the opposing the granting of amnesty to Mr Williamson and Mr Raven, in respect of the murders of Ruth First, Jeanette Schoon and Katryn Schoon and opposing the amnesty application of Mr Willem Schoon, in respect of the attempted murder of Mr Marius Schoon.

There is a preliminary remark that I want to make Mr Chairman, and that is this, you will have noticed right at the outset that these Heads of argument have been drawn in accordance with an admonition to Counsel Mr Chairman, by Hookster, JA, the father when Counsel was arguing by way of analogy that he should really proceed with his argument on the facts of the case before the Court, and added in his way that similes are for the poets.

We have taken to heard that admonition Mr Chairman, and have tried as far as we possibly could, to stick to the facts of this case. We will have submissions to make in relation to some of the far reaching statements, judgements, evidence in other matters, in due course. You will also see on pages 2 and 3 Mr Chairman, 2, 3 and the top of 4, that there are no references given. That is because that is a sort of preamble or a headnote really of what we are going to argue.

We have summarised it for the benefit of the Committee, so that they will know from the outset what it is that our analysis of the facts, and if you have a look on page 4 onwards, you will see that there is a reference to the record Mr Chairman, for practically everything that we have to say.

We have done this because we believe that that is a matter which can be of assistance to the Committee, but also prompted Mr Chairman, with respect to one or two of our learned friends, who have really made submissions based upon facts which are not founded on the record.

We believe Mr Chairman, that the best way that any application can be decided, or indeed any matter in which findings of fact have to be made in order that the law should be applied, that the facts should be set out, argued which should be accepted and which should be rejected, then apply the law to those facts and not on the basis of wild and far reaching statements Mr Chairman, which are not supported by the evidence.

I must say Mr Chairman, that it doesn't apply to everyone that has argued here, we find with the greatest respect, the argument of our learned friend, Mr Jansen and the argument of my learned friend, Mr Cornelius, to have been drawn up as if they had been aware of the admonition of Hookster, JA, Mr Chairman, and we thank them for that.

Let me deal with what is really the headnote of what we have to say Mr Chairman. It is submitted that amnesty should not be granted to Williamson, nor to Raven on the following grounds and that is, Williamson failed to make full disclosure of Gen Coetzee's role in authorizing the murder of Ruth First.

His and Coetzee's assertions that Coetzee did not know of the planned murder and did not authorise it, ought to be rejected. The evidence of Williamson and Raven concerning their knowledge of the intended recipient of the packet bomb, is so contradictory and improbable, that it cannot be believed.

You might have noticed Mr Chairman, that we use the word package. This was the word used by a witness that saw it, and it is a word that is used by Mr Williamson in the recording that was made of the interview between Mr Williamson and Ms Slovo. But we will refer to that in due course, Mr Chairman.

Raven's evidence of the manner in which, I beg your pardon, the evidence of Williamson, I am sorry again, Williamson's claim that he saw everything but the name, and Raven's claim that he chose not to look, we submit, ought to be found to have been false.

Raven's evidence of the manner in which he went about the construction of the bomb, is highly improbable. His and Williamson's claim that Ruth First would have opened the second, unmarked envelope without becoming suspicious, is disingenuous. Furthermore, their evidence as to the description of the bomb, is contradicted by O'Laughlin's uncontested evidence, Mr Chairman.

We will show that it was not put to her that she was wrong about that. The evidence however indicates that the packet bomb was only addressed to Ruth First. Williamson claims that he always believed that the bomb was addressed to Joe Slovo. As a matter of law, we will therefore submit, he cannot now claim an ex post facto political objective in relation to Ruth First, a person whom he allegedly never intended to kill.

He does not claim that Ruth First was killed by mistake. We will refer you to the Act, to the requirements and submit that an applicant cannot seek amnesty for a person whom he says, he did not intend to kill.

Raven claims that he chose not to look or failed to look at the name of the addressee. His application is therefore also fatally flawed. First he cannot claim an ex post facto political objective in relation to Ruth First, and secondly he cannot be said to have acted reasonably or in good faith, and therefore as a matter of law, lacks a legitimate political objective.

We will in due course argue Mr Chairman in detail that you cannot speak of a motive or the achievement of a political objective, or that you acted proportionately or the gravity of the offence to be taken into consideration, about a person that you say you did not intend to kill.

I may also say Mr Chairman, and project what we will argue later, that this pile Mr Chairman, of argument, almost three quarters of a foot high, that deals with other matters, particularly those after 1982 and 1984, are not admissible in these proceedings.

What the leader of the PAC Mr Chairman, said in an amnesty or a Commission hearing in a hope of getting his comrades out of prison, in 1996, can hardly be relevant as to what the state of affairs and circumstances were in 1982 and 1984 when these murders were committed.

Both Williamson and Raven claim that First was a legitimate target for assassination. Coetzee however expressly disavows their claim and states that Ruth First should not have been killed. Now, I know that it is your decision Mr Chairman, and not that of Gen Coetzee, but we will develop the argument in due course, that if the Head of the Security Police and thereafter the Commissioner of the Security Police, who was the cog of the whole operation, says that Ruth First was not a legitimate target and contradicts his Chief of Intelligence, Mr Williamson, must weigh heavily on whether or not she was a legitimate target.

We will in due course speak as to what is and what is not a legitimate target Mr Chairman. We will clarify what we mean.

Williamson's evidence in relation to the nature and extent of the information concerning Ruth First, said to be available to him and to those who made the decision to murder her, is so far removed from the truth that it must be rejected.

Williamson knew or ought reasonably to have known the nature of the work being done by Ruth First in Mozambique. On those facts, which were readily ascertainable to him, Ruth First was not a legitimate target for murder, accordingly he had knowledge that the political objective for his initiating or participating in her killing.

Raven's claim that he knew practically nothing about the life and work of Ruth First in Mozambique, deprives him of any basis for concluding that she was a legitimate target for assassination.

The argument Mr Chairman, advanced by Mr Raven in evidence, that he was nothing more than a factory worker, making ammunitions who does not know where the bullet or the hand grenade is going to land, we will deal with in due course as a completely distinguishable situation, but again Mr Chairman, you are not called upon to decide this matter upon similes, but rather on the facts of this case.

We submit Mr Chairman, that Williamson is a vindictive human being. He hated Joe Slovo and wished him dead or captured, however, despite the best efforts of the South African Security Forces, he was not killed or captured.

To destroy or weaken Joe Slovo, Williamson dispatched a packet bomb to Ruth First and then planted a story in the press that the ruthless Slovo had killed his own wife.

We submit in 2.11 therefore Mr Chairman, it must concluded that Williamson's actions were malicious and completely out of proportion to any political objective. We will refer to the evidence in due course Mr Chairman.

Then we say the requirement of full disclosure. That is in relation to Williamson under paragraph A(1). Each of the relevant facts that Williamson has failed to disclosed, will be dealt with in turn and the first is the involvement of Gen Coetzee.

The close and special relationship between Williamson and Coetzee over many years, has been clearly established. Whether Coetzee was his mentor, Williamson states, I never thought of it at the time, Mr Chairman, but yes, I mean he was the senior officer from whom I took guidance and advice and who assisted me in achieving what I managed to achieve in my career Mr Chairman. According to him, he would not have acted if he had thought that Coetzee would not have approved.

May I pause here for a moment Mr Chairman. We are not here dealing Mr Chairman, either with a police officer at the border who has to make a decision as to whether he should commit a particular act or not, and have to decide whether he was expressly or impliedly authorised. We can understand the position of such a person, as we can understand the position of an MK soldier who has to make a decision when he is caught and has a hand grenade in his hand, whether he should really kill the police officers that have captured him, in order to escape and whether that was authorised or not. We can understand those situations.

In relation to authority Mr Chairman, how can the Head of the Security Police be believed when he says that he did not know what his Chief of Intelligence did and how can the Chief of Intelligence say that his mentor and the Head of the Security Police, were not consulted when they decided to murder a high profile person and we would appreciate it very much Mr Chairman, if some of our learned friends, do not refer to people as terrorists. We do not refer to their clients as murderers Mr Chairman.

We are dealing with the epicentre of the illegal activity that was going on at the time, Mr Chairman. Coetzee was the top of it, Williamson was his Chief of Intelligence. There are probabilities, a mountain of probabilities which come to the fore in order to show that the detailed evidence of Coetzee that he did not know and Williamson, that his mentor did not know, are false.

May I Mr Chairman, in self defence, that I cross-examined Coetzee for too long, may I submit that the submission is not well founded. I did not cross-examine Coetzee merely in order to test his credibility Mr Chairman. I cross-examined Coetzee with the leave of the Committee, properly directed with respect, in order to show that he was lying when he said that it never occurred to him who was killing the ANC Heads in the neighbouring countries or who killed Ruth First or who killed Jeanette and Katryn Schoon. That was the length of the cross-examination which was permissible.

The question of what was happening at that epicentre goes to the root of deciding on the probabilities, whether you are going to believe Williamson and whether you are going to believe Coetzee, when they both say that the other did not know what was happening.

Then we say Mr Chairman, at the bottom of page 4, subparagraph (b) ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, before you go on. You suffer as certain of the other people did, with the typing error. I take it the page 3117 is incorrect?

MR BIZOS: No that is Dirk Coetzee Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: What page, what record are you referring to?

MR BIZOS: I am told our record Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: 3000?

MR BIZOS: Yes, it is not Gen Coetzee, it is Dirk Coetzee who was one of the last witnesses Mr Chairman. This is the passage Mr Chairman ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it is right at the end of the record.

MR BIZOS: Well Gen Coetzee was like a father to him and Craig wouldn't have done anything to upset Gen Johan Coetzee at all or risk any operation without consulting Gen Johan Coetzee.

Perhaps, we can understand Mr Chairman, your surprise at 3000 and on.

ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on)

MR BIZOS: Yes, because the last witnesses, we can't give you page numbers on as it will appear later on Mr Chairman, because it has not yet been transcribed.

I take it, is the argument being recorded Mr Chairman, or is it going to be, I know that it is being recorded, is it going to be typed Mr Chairman? Anyway, I don't know, it is not my decision Mr Chairman, and I don't want to make any, I will leave it at that. If the argument is recorded, then 5000 or 6000 is more likely, yes.

Coetzee's professed ignorance about political killings, and that is what the cross-examination was about Mr Chairman, not about credibility. One of the ways in which we can ascertain whether Coetzee was lying or not, is to cross-examine him on the state of affairs during his stewardship of the Security Police and thereafter as Commissioner of Police.

If he can't be believed as to what the general situation was and he gives ridiculous answers to the questions, it can weigh heavily with the Committee as to whether they are going to believe him when he says that he did not know that Williamson had done anything wrong.

We will give you a list of improbabilities so high that we submit, that Coetzee, Gen Johan Coetzee, is not worthy of belief. We start with the second reason.

Coetzee states that he never suspected that the Security Policemen under his command, or any other Security Force members, were responsible for the assassination of ANC activists inside and outside the country. We will give you the references Mr Chairman.

There is simply no basis upon which such an incredible statement can be believed, and I am sorry that it required lengthy cross-examination in order to establish it, or rather I should say, I am sorry that it took such a long time, but I am pleased that it established the facts, that we submit, are almost beyond reasonable doubt and most certainly in accordance with probabilities.

Coetzee's innocent explanation in relation to his role in the 1986 Swaziland raid is unconvincing. He is unable to deny when Colonel Tickey de Jager and Brigadier Coetzee entered his home at half past five in the morning, he did not ask them for an explanation, nor did he express any surprise at the early hour of their arrival, but asked instead did you get what you wanted to?

Furthermore Coetzee's evidence is contradicted by the evidence of Eugene de Kock. We submit Mr Chairman, that whatever Mr De Kock may or may not have done, there can be no doubt that he is an impressive witness. We ask the Committee to accept him evidence on the point, to reject the evidence of Gen Coetzee who was hein and hoin(?) and who didn't remember and who didn't really identify the incident, and all sorts of excuses.

The evidence of De Kock is clear in every respect. If that evidence is accepted, then Gen Coetzee deliberately lied about illegal actions committed by his Security Policemen when he was Head of the Security Police and when he was Commissioner.

When asked whether he knew about the 1981 assassination in Zimbabwe of Joe Gabe, the ANC Chief Representative to that country, Coetzee states no sir, I know Joe Gabe, but I don't know that he was assassinated. In an attempt to explain how he could have been ignorant of this assassination, Coetzee argues that there was a war raging in that country at that stage, and as far as I was concerned, it could have been the Rhodesian Security Forces or it could have been anyone else.

The lie in this answer is patent. Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, but it isn't just not remembering the date, Rhodesia Security Forces no longer existed. There never was a Chief Representative of the ANC in the former Rhodesia, and when the Head of the Security Police and the Commissioner of the Police, is capable of making such a statement seriously before the Committee, how much of his credibility can there really be left?

In 1982, Coetzee was the Head of the Security Police. his claim that he did not suspect South African involvement in the 1982 death of the ANC representative to Swaziland or the 1982 death of the ANC's representative to Lesotho, is so improbable that it cannot be believed.

A list of political activists who were killed during Coetzee's period as Head of the Security Police and later as the Commissioner of the SAP, was read to Coetzee. His claim that he had no knowledge of any of these deaths and that he never suspected that the Security Police might be killing political opponents of the State, cannot reasonably possibly be true.

May I pause here for a moment Mr Chairman. We have self serving statements from Min Vlok, from Commissioner of Police Van der Merwe, where we were not there to cross-examine them, where they were really making statements in order to either get amnesty for themselves, we are asked or the Committee is being asked to take that self serving evidence into evidence here.

I would dare say Mr Chairman, that if Gen Van der Merwe was there, and Mr Vlok was there for us to cross-examine, it may well be to say the least, that some of the self serving statements, may have been shown to be as (indistinct) as the evidence of Gen Coetzee that he didn't know who was killing his enemies in Southern Africa.

In paragraph (c) on page 6, Coetzee was unable to point to a planned assassination in South African during his period as Commissioner of the SAP, that was investigated and prosecuted. He chose to attribute this to incompetence.

He couldn't say that he knew, he couldn't say that he didn't do anything about it, knowing it, he chose the least helpable that he was an incompetent Head of the Security Police and an incompetent Commissioner.

Well, it is the last refuge, but it doesn't do his credibility any good Mr Chairman. It is submitted that it was not incompetence that resulted in the failure of justice, but rather that Coetzee was either involved in the planning of political assassinations or deliberately turned a blind eye to them.

It is therefore submitted that Coetzee lied to the Committee when he stated that had he known that Williamson and Goosen had been involved in the assassination of Ruth First, he would have disciplined them, and if necessary, he would have charged them.

What is also highly improbable that he is telling the truth Mr Chairman, is Gen Coetzee's response to the death of Ruth First and that was not just about credibility. It is directly connected with the main point in issue Mr Chairman, and not just credibility that I am accused of.

Williamson states that the death of Ruth First was announced at one of the daily Sanhedrin meetings. Those meetings were regularly chaired by Coetzee, Mr Williamson tells you that. According to Williamson, the only reaction to the announcement was a surreptitious nod by Goosen for Williamson's benefit. He claims that there was no further discussion at the meeting concerning the death of Ruth First.

If she was Mr Chairman, the dangerous terrorist that she has been called by some in these proceedings, one would have thought that there would have been rejoicing at this meeting, even if the need to know principle was observed and nobody would openly ask at a meeting which one of our lads did this wonderful act.

Unless Coetzee we are saying, if was involved in the planning of Ruth First's murder, it is inconceivable that he did not ask Williamson either during or after the meeting, whether he had any intelligence as to who was responsible for her death.

Mr Chairman, this is not a case about unknown people. Gen Coetzee says that he knew Ruth First well. He states that he would never have authorised her death and that for personal reasons, he would never have acquiesced in her killing. Her death should never have happened. That is his evidence.

There can be no doubt that if her death had taken him by surprise, Coetzee would have investigated whether any of his senior officers had any relevant information. Williamson, his Head of Intelligence, would have been the obvious starting point.

Coetzee's failure to ask any questions concerning the death of Ruth First, can only be explained by accepting that he knew in advance of the plan to murder her. He only had to go, if my memory serves me correctly, not more than three doors away and ask his Chief of Intelligence who killed Ruth First, it is important for us to know?

Williamson's response to the death of Ruth First, Mr Chairman, are also factors which make his version highly improbable and therefore untruthful.

On the day that Ruth First's death was announced at the Sanhedrin meeting, Williamson indicated his involvement in the murder to Dirk Coetzee. Williamson said so. Williamson states I think we had both probably been at the Sanhedrin and probably walking back to our offices or met in the corridor after the Sanhedrin meeting. At that time however, Dirk Coetzee was no longer in the Security Police, having left at the end of 1981.

Williamson's explanation for this breach is not convincing. If he was prepared to break the need to know, by indulging in passage talk, in passage talk with Dirk Coetzee who were at the very least, he, Williamson must have known, at least that he was under a cloud at the time and that he had left the Security Police, or he was forced out, and he knew that, how could he have breached that confidence, but have not told his mentor unless of course his mentor knew, and he had authorised it.

And for the reasons that we will advance shortly, he did not want to implicate his mentor in this. But of course the question of the Nkomati Accord meeting, here are two high ranking officers in the police and Security Police, who are the Chief Representative of the Republic of South Africa at a binational meeting in order to restore peace or so they said, in Southern Africa and his assistant is Mr Williamson.

One can assume without having lengthened the cross-examination, that they lived in the same hotel, that they drove down together, that they discussed the issues that may have been dealt with or were likely to be dealt with by their fellow Accord signatories, the Mozambicans, and an issue that was concerning the Mozambicans was, who killed Ruth First?

And let us go to the words and not in generalities. According to Gen Coetzee, during one of the meetings in Mozambique of the Security Committee, my co-Chairman, whilst we were having our tea break said to me, why did South Africa kill Mrs Slovo and I said, he never presented evidence. If that is so, it was a mistake. It is still my view.

Coetzee states that the meeting took place, one or two months after the signing of the Accord in 1984. Coetzee denies that he admitted at the meeting that South African agents had killed Ruth First, however Coetzee's conversation with a journalist from the New York Times, makes it clear that others at the meeting had understood Coetzee to have said that it was a mistake for South African to have killed Ruth First and that is Coetzee himself speaking.

At page 289 we read the following, in the middle of the page, I am asking the questions. Let me start earlier on so that it can be in completeness. I was told I can't remember, page 289 at the top. I was told I can't remember that particular incident, I remember that and I have said so sir, that during one of the meetings in Mozambique of the Security Committee, my co-Chairman whilst we were having our tea break, said to me, why did South Africa kill Mrs Slovo and I said he never presented evidence. If that was so, it was a mistake. It is still my view.

Yes, but it is also an admission that the South Africans did it, because that will be his evidence? No, it is subjective mood sir, I said if. If? No, no, you didn't say, you say you admitted it by clear implication that the South Africans had done it and that you said it was a mistake? No, I didn't say that sir. I said if it was done by South Africans, as a matter of fact, they never ever presented me whilst we discussed the issue, with any evidence to indicate that they are accusing us.

That was just a casual remark while we were having tea together. Afterwards, as I have said sir, a journalist, I think from the New York Times approached me and he said that I have said that we have committed a mistake. Is that true, and I said I didn't say that and that the first meeting thereafter of the committee, I went on record to say that listen, if what I have said is construed in this way, you must remedy it. I have never said that we had done it, I don't know anything about it.

Then, so the suggestion that you admitted, came how long after your notice in this journal, how long after the entry into the Nkomati Accord? It must have been well, at least a month or two months after that. After a few meetings of the accord and may I say that every word said in the Accord, was minuted sir, and countersigned at the next meeting.

Williamson concedes that Coetzee had a right to be informed. He concedes further that good practice requires Coetzee to be given the information. I am sorry, I didn't read out (m), I turned over the page. Coetzee was so concerned with his apparent misunderstanding that he told the journalist not to print an accusation or allegation like that, because I have never said that, and with the first subsequent meeting of the Committee, I told the whole Committee please don't, this is rumour mongery, I don't go along with this story because I have never said that and I don't mean it, and I have no information about it.

Williamson concedes that Coetzee had a right to be informed. He concedes further that practice required Coetzee to be given the information without having specifically to ask for it.

Williamson concedes that the Mozambicans had raised the serious query and that Coetzee could easily have asked him whether there was any basis for the allegation that South Africa was responsible, the him there of course refers to Williamson Mr Chairman.

He further concedes that he would have expected Coetzee to have discussed the allegation with him, if it had been one of the series of questions that we had to answer. Obviously Mr Chairman, although it may have started off in tea time discussion, when Gen Coetzee took it back and said let there be no misunderstanding, the matter was on the table at the Nkomati Accord meeting. Williamson was the most senior Intelligence Officer from the Security Police present at meetings related to the Nkomati Accord. He says so.

Given the very special relationship between Williamson and Coetzee, Williamson was the obvious person for Coetzee to have gone to and have asked whether he could give him any more information about the death of Ruth First.

In paragraph 2 on the bottom of page 9, Williamson states that Coetzee never asked him what are these Mozambicans talking about that we killed Ruth First? He persists that the version that the first time that the General ever discussed the death of Ruth First with me, was after the Observer article in 1995.

Paragraph 5 on page 10, Williamson further states that Coetzee never asked him at the Nkomati meeting whether he had any information about the death of Ruth First and the matter was never raised to my knowledge at the Security Commission and it was never raised in my presence at all.

On the contrary and to Williamson's knowledge, the matter was indeed raised at the Commission by Coetzee and understood Mr Chairman, at that time, that the matter was closed and that that was South Africa's final statement on the matter and I did not raise it any further, and I was not asked any questions, and I was not asked to contribute Mr Chairman. This is Williamson talking Mr Chairman.

Furthermore on Williamson's own evidence, the matter was raised in his presence. He did hear about the Mozambican allegation that South Africa had murdered Ruth First and in fact, I was given photographs of the scene. Again on Williamson's own evidence, he showed the photographs to Coetzee.

Now Mr Chairman, how can either of them be believed that when they are at a conference, they are given photographs of the damage done and presumably the deceased persons there, and they don't say well, you know, the Mozambicans say, Coetzee knows that the Mozambicans are saying you did it, or asking leading questions, suggesting that they did it.

They do not ask one another, hi, Mr Head of Intelligence, what do you know about this? If they expect anybody to believe that Mr Chairman, then we believe, we will submit, that they are presumptuous in believing that any falsehoods that they may proffer, may be accepted in an unquestioning manner by the Committee.

In that context Mr Chairman, in paragraph (u) at the bottom of page 10, it is inconceivable that Coetzee and Williamson did not have any discussion as to who was responsible for the death and destruction shown in the photographs.

If Coetzee genuinely did not know, he would have asked Williamson. If he did know, he would have indicated to Williamson and they would have discussed how they were going to deal with the Mozambican allegation.

If Williamson believed that Coetzee would have approved of the plan to murder Ruth First, there can be no innocent explanation for Williamson not having properly briefed Coetzee as to the identity of those responsible.

Williamson knew that Coetzee had to be in possession of all the facts before deciding on a response that would not subsequently prove embarrassing. The only explanation is that Williamson knew that Coetzee was a party to this decision to send the bomb to Ruth First and therefore was aware of the identity of those responsible.

May I pause here for a moment Mr Chair. Mr Williamson and Mr Coetzee are admitted fabricators of fact and allegations against their enemy ... (tape ends) ... it does not mean of course that because Mr Williamson was a Master Spy or a Master Deceiver or a Master of "Dekstories" and STRATCOM's, it doesn't per se mean that he is not capable of telling the truth and that he may be telling the truth here, but then he needs to have some probability in his version, some corroboration by some credible witness.

If the probabilities are so overwhelmingly against this version that he is giving, then the fact that he is a Master of Deception, is a relevant factor. It may well Mr Chairman, that the musket bearer who killed someone, denied it at the time, may have even given evidence in court that he was innocent, that he was a member of - that he had taken part in this conspiracy of silence of admit nothing and deny everything.

But his job was to really patrol the border. His job was not to make up lies, or "dekstories", or plant false information. Then, it may well be that the person from the border may be more readily be believed than one of the talents of Mr Williamson, Mr Chairman.

Then Mr Chairman, the "confrontation" between Coetzee and Williamson in 1995. Coetzee claims that he first became aware of Security Force involvement in the death of Ruth First, after the publication of the article in the Observer newspaper in 1995.

He did not immediately telephone Williamson to demand an explanation. When I first heard of this, and the first time I saw Mr Williamson, which may have been two, or three, or four or five or six months after that, because I live in the Karoo town, and when I saw him, I said to him but you know, why was this done? I am completely unaware of this and he said yes General, you were not informed.

Mr Chairman, even Karoo towns have telephones Mr Chairman. Here is the Commissioner of the Police and the Head of the Security Police now somewhere in the Karoo and he hears for the first time that his favourite Chief of Intelligence was responsible for the death of a person whom he knew and who he says should not have been killed. Can any reasonable person believe that he would not have immediately wanted to know, hi Craig, what did you do?

Why? You knew that I knew this person. You yourself knew her, we both had intellectual pursuits and here was an intellectual. Did you go and kill her without telling me? None of that? We blame the telephone service in the Karoo.

A natural thing to do is to pick up the phone and say why didn't you tell me? How are you going to extricate yourself from these admissions that you make? Why did you do it? None of that.

In paragraph (x) on page 11, if Coetzee is to be believed that he waited anything up to six months before asking Williamson about the allegation in the Observer, then it follows that the article could not have been news to Coetzee. However, because Coetzee's version that he did not know about Williamson's involvement until 1995 is so improbable, it is unlikely that this conversation took place in the terms alleged, or at all Mr Chairman.

Williamson relates the 1995 conversation differently. When Coetzee told him that he did not know about Security Police's involvement in the death of Ruth First, Williamson states that he told Coetzee with a tinge of scepticism, his words, if you say so sir.

According to Williamson, he told Coetzee, you were never consulted by me. We have no explanation as to why this cryptic telegraphic style was used. Was it perhaps because they suspected that their telephone may be bugged? One doesn't know.

But Mr Chairman, it is a different version. Once one has different versions, whom does one believe? We submit that the only answer is that neither can be believed.

Both Coetzee and Williamson attempted to exonerate the former from involvement in the murder of Ruth First, however, Williamson could not go as far as Coetzee to assert, yes General, you were not informed, because that could have meant that Williamson knew at the time that Coetzee had not sanctioned the murder.

Significantly Williamson's Attorney did not put his client's version to Coetzee for his comment.

Both Coetzee and Williamson have a motive for giving false evidence. Coetzee has not applied for amnesty for any of the assassinations committed under his command, including the murder of Ruth First.

Williamson owes his former mentor for years of protection and patronage. May I pause here for a moment Mr Chairman?

Passages from Gen Van der Merwe and Min Vlok have been put there and they are supposed to serve the purposes of the applicants. It would be manifestly unfair to us, the objectors, Mr Chairman, to use that self serving evidence without it having been tested, but in addition, if they had given evidence in these proceedings, we would have been entitled, as we were entitled to ask Gen Coetzee how the system worked, whether death was decided by a single person telling another down the passage or what was the function of the Security Council, what was the function of the Sanhedrin and what was the practice about avoiding, the Minister avoiding his Commissioner of Police and giving orders to people below?

All those relevant factors, so that Mr Chairman, all these extraneous matters to this that had been placed before you on the basis of proving the conflicts of the past, yes, we agree that there were conflicts of the past. The Constitution says so, the Act says so, evidence that there was this conflict, is there.

We do not need Mr Chairman, the evidence of Mr Mlambo as to what the PAC thought in 1996 when he was trying to get his comrades out of convictions for killing people on farms, nor do we need Mr Chairman, the host of quotations from those applying for amnesty for the Church Street bomb. Yes, there was a conflict, but we will submit that you must have regard to what the conflict was, and what steps were taken by both sides, to implement their objectives in 1982, not in 1985 - because we are told that there was a change of policy, that there was a reaction to it, and when the subsection (3) of Section 20 speaks about the requirements, the state of mind of the people concerned, must be determined at that time, not what the PAC representative at the Commission said in 1997, Mr Chairman, nor what happened at the Kwethi meeting in 1985 when these killings had already taken place.

We will argue it more fully Mr Chairman, later on, that on questions of proportionality and questions of gravity, in questions of the other requirements in detail, it must be in the milieu, in the circumstances then existing. We will pose the question Mr Chairman, that in 1982, neither in 1982, neither in 1984, did any member of the African National Congress or MK ever send a bomb to the wife of a General because she was involved in the Comforts Programme for the Forces?

No ANC member, Mr Chairman, sent a bomb to the principal or the vice-principal of a school that registered all the matriculants for the purposes of being drafted into the Forces.

No ANC person in 1982 or 1984, Mr Chairman, targeted the wives of Generals, Commissioners or indeed members of the politicians. You have the evidence of Mr Maharaj and others, but that is the time and on the question of proportionality, what the one side was doing, must be weighed with the side of the other.

We will submit that killing Ruth First, whatever they may have thought of her or however Mr Williamson and others, may have hated her, she was not a legitimate target. What do we mean by legitimate Mr Chairman, it really means a proportionate target.

Having the circumstances of that time, not of what Mr Mlambo was speaking, trying to justify the killing of farmers in order to collect money for what he says. Where was Mr Mlambo in 1982 and 1984? Was there an APLA presence in South Africa at all at the time, Mr Chairman?

All those questions are not answered, and by incorporating them by reference, doesn't really help the enquiry in this case, it merely may serve, it may serve as an attempt at moral justification for the killing of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon.

But Mr Chairman, that sort of reasoning out of context, at a time when these things were not happening, is of no assistance.

Then Williamson's attempt to manipulate the evidence Mr Chairman. In this proceedings, STRATKOM, right here, neither Williamson, nor Coetzee are credible witnesses. We say that he is skilled deceiver and a calculated liar. He even attempted to manipulate the evidence in this hearing when he sought to rely on video 1 without revealing that he knew about allegations of fake arm caches. His word, we submit, has no value Mr Chairman.

We quote Mr Hugo acting for Mr De Kock, "but you did however hear what I am stating that you now, before this video was shown to us yesterday. Mr Williamson, I heard that there was a possibility that, in fact I think that in one of or some evidence, Mr De Kock has given previously, he made this statement. In fact I heard that there was some that the former Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, had also alluded to the same thing."

In paragraph (cc) during the further cross-examination, Williamson attempted to suggest that the fake arms cache shown on video 1 related to the so-called EPG raid on

Gaberone and not to the earlier raid of the 14th of June 1985, which Williamson admits been involved in. However, the TRC report, volume 2, 150, paragraph 447, published after Williamson gave his evidence, the following stated in relation to the aftermath of the raid on Gaberone on the 14th of June 1985 - so negative was the general reaction to the raid, that an elaborate propaganda exercise had to be mounted to justify the operation. This was orchestrated by Mr Craig Williamson and included the planting of stories in newspapers like the Citizen and the Sunday Times, under such headlines as "The Guns of Gaberone". In a discussion with the Commission, Eugene de Kock stated that some of the weapons displayed as captured in the raid, were in fact borrowed from him by Williamson.

Then we deal with the probabilities.

ADV DE JAGER: What was De Kock's evidence here, did he also say he borrowed it from Williamson?

MR BIZOS: Similar. Similar as far as I remember, but we will look for the evidence. I don't know that he went as far as he did before the Commission Mr Chairman, but we will check it.

Mr Chairman, I don't want to take this - we will check it and see what Mr Williamson said about this, and perhaps even check what his evidence was before the Commission. But one thing is clear Mr Chairman, that he was in the Security Police at the time, he was the Head of Intelligence and that these "dekstories" were actually put out at the time.

Given Williamson's position, on page 14 Mr Chairman, given Williamson's position as Head of Intelligence, the role that he describes for himself in the murder of Ruth First, that of a messenger, is highly improbable.

He concedes that Goosen did not need him to communicate with Raven and that on a need to know basis, Goosen and Raven could have excluded him without any problems.

It is submitted that Williamson has deliberately down-played his role in the murder of Ruth First. If he was not a messenger, then he must have been involved in a planning in his capacity as the Head of the Security Police Intelligence. He denies that he was involved in planning, because that would inevitably expose the identity of those with whom he conspired to kill Ruth First, including Coetzee.

Goosen would not have embarked on such a project without the express authority of Coetzee, his immediate superior and another person who knew how the system works, has said so Mr Chairman.

It is accordingly submitted that the probabilities are overwhelming that both Williamson and Coetzee were involved in the decision to murder Ruth First.

Then we deal in 3.2 at the bottom of page 14, the intended target of the packet bomb. Williamson's knowledge of the identity of the target was important to him at the time. He states that he might have questioned his orders if it had been intimated to him that the target of the bomb was somebody that he did not regard as a legitimate target, for example if somebody - these are his words - for example if somebody has said to me, get this IED made, it is going to Bishop Tutu, then I think my attitude may have been different.

He realised the importance of who the intended victim was. We submit that Williamson knows to whom the bomb was addressed. On Williamson's version, he must have seen the name of the addressee on the intercepted envelope.

If he saw the stamp, the logo, the name of the University and the name of the city, he could not possibly have failed to see the name of the addressee. This is a passage that we want to read to you Mr Chairman, because it shows how ridiculous his evidence really was.

We are just looking for the relevant file Mr Chairman, page 997 to 998. Let us start at page 996 Mr Chairman instead of 997 for the sake of completeness and that you may have it.

Let us ask you this about this envelope. About? This envelope. This intercepted postal item. Was it addressed in the ordinary way with the address in the middle? Yes, I remember Mr Chairman, it was standing. It (intervention) - yes, you are thinking about the difficulties you are going to get in. No, I am thinking. There is nothing there, there is nothing so difficult as to whether it was addressed in the middle of the envelope like everybody addresses envelopes, what is so difficult about that? No, I was trying to remember which way it was actually, upwards or in the envelope actually Mr Chairman. Yes, yes. Mr Williamson, it was either standing up or on its side Mr Chairman, and it was probably addressed in the middle, yes. Yes, and you looked at the middle and if it was, if you looked at it in a way which it was easy to read and not sideways, do you remember whether you had to strain your neck to read it or whether you just read it? Do you remember that? I remember I was holding the big envelope in one hand and I looked in and the main thing that I remember Mr Chairman, was the logo and the Lesotho stamp. Yes, in order to look at the logo which is usually on the left hand side, and in order to look at the stamp, which is usually on the right hand side, you had to look passed the full name and address? No, Mr Chairman, because the contents were being blocked. The contents were blocking, the envelope had been opened. It had been taken to pieces, everything was apart inside the big envelope Mr Chairman. But you see the stamp which is normally on the top right hand corner? Yes, but that is why I could see the stamp Mr Chairman. And you could read the rest of the address, the university and Maputo which would be under the names? Yes, but that is ... Why couldn't you see the names? Mr Chairman, I couldn't see the name, and that is when I moved the paper, I saw the address Maputo and Eduardo Modlani, Mr Chairman. Chairperson, and that would be below the names? Yes, and that is how I moved the piece of paper. Chairperson, you could see the names, you could see the address, you could see the stamp, but somehow you never saw the names? No Mr Chairman, I have absolutely no recollection what was the name on the envelope. My interest at the time was where it was going, I mean the city it was going to, and where it had come from. Chairperson, you say it was more interesting than who it was going to? Please Mr Williamson. Mr Williamson, no Mr Chairman, I already, I assumed it was going to Slovo. So you had seen the name Slovo? No, I had been told the name Slovo Mr Chairman. So I wasn't looking for the name Slovo, I was looking where it was going from and where it was going to. I knew it was going to Slovo, I made this assumption. Chairperson, well how did you know it was going, who told you? The Brigadier, Mr Chairman. Before you went to the Brigadier, you didn't know it was going to Slovo? Mr Williamson, no. And then Mr Sibanyoni, Mr Williamson, the fact that the Brigadier wrote a note that he wants to discuss the matter with you, will that not make you to be more thorough, in other words prepare yourself for the pending discussion with the Brigadier, so as not only to know where it came from, but also to know everything about the envelope which the Brigadier wants to have a meeting wit you? Mr Williamson, no Mr Chairman, the fact that the Brigadier wanted to discuss something like that, which was unusual and which was in an enclosed envelope, made me know that if there was something that he wanted to tell me, that I had to go and discuss that, but not that there was anything that I had to prepare. Mr Sibanyoni, did it ever come to you that maybe he was going to ask you some questions about it, therefore you need to know? Mr Williamson, no Mr Chairman, if he had wanted to ask me about the contents, they would have sent a formal photocopy of the contents which was normal, standard procedure. So the fact that I had been sent the original, meant something different to me Mr Chairman.

Now Mr Chairman, how can that possibly be true? Of course we will deal with the contradiction with Mr Raven who actually says that there was a sticker on top of it, to cover everything, so that he couldn't see anything, he couldn't even see the address.

But of course, in paragraph (c) on page 15 Mr Chairman, his elaborate version as to how he came to see everything on the envelope, except for the name of the addressee, is highly improbable and contradicts the contents of his written application.

In oral evidence, he first states that he did look at the contents of the official envelope when he received the written instruction from Goosen. When I went to the Brigadier, I went with it and then we, he said this is a "posstuk", I had opened it by then.

Later he states that he only opened the official envelope in the presence of Goosen. Paragraph (d), in his written application for amnesty, Williamson states to the best of my recollection, the mail item in the large envelope was an A4 or larger sized envelope, with a logo of an international organisation thereon, possibly UN related, and was addressed to Joe Slovo, C/o Ruth First, or to Joe Slovo and Ruth First at Eduardo Modlani University in Maputo, Mozambique. This postal item had a cancel Lesotho stamp on it.

There is no suggestion in his written application, that Williamson had any difficulty in reading the name of the person to whom the letter was addressed. It is therefore submitted there can be no doubt that Williamson saw the name of the addressee on the bomb, his denial in this regard, ought to be rejected.

We submit Mr Chairman, on page 16, that Williamson knows that the bomb was addressed to Ruth First. The evidence however indicates that Ruth First would never have opened and did not open a packet addressed to Joe Slovo, to Joe Slovo C/o Ruth First, or Joe Slovo and Ruth First. We rely on the evidence of Slovo, Gillian Slovo and we rely on the evidence of Ms O'Laughlin and also Mr Chairman, if my memory serves me correctly and I think it does, on the evidence of Mr Mac Maharaj that he actually used some pretty strong words that you just couldn't get to Joe Slovo, who didn't receive any mail, who didn't post anything to him. We will try and find that passage Mr Chairman and ask you to add it.

But the evidence is overwhelming that Joe Slovo would not receive a package from the post, Joe Slovo would not. We want to bring back to your memory Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, the conviction with which Ms O'Laughlin spoke of the separate lives that Mr Joe Slovo and Ruth First led.

They would not open each other's mail. You will also remember how the receipt of anything addressed to Joe Slovo at the university, would have been considered as contrary to the bargain struck between the institute at which Ruth First taught and it was headed by Prof De Braganza. They would never have allowed that sort of item to come there, or would have touched it. What we say ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos on that score, suppose an item was addressed to the university, how could they prevent it reaching the university?

MR BIZOS: No, they couldn't prevent it reaching the university. She would never have opened it. If one knows that one's husband is the number one target of the Security Forces in South Africa ...

ADV DE JAGER: I appreciate the other leg, she wouldn't have opened it, but I ...

MR BIZOS: (Microphone not on) ... of course Mr Chairman, that the UN sending post to Joe Slovo at the university, does raise an eyebrow.

What we say in paragraph (h) on page 16 Mr Chairman is, that O'Laughlin describes how passionate Ruth First was that the Centre of African Studies at the university not to be seen as an ANC/MK front, she wanted the Centre to be seen as a Mozambican institution. O'Laughlin states that the Mozambicans felt that they were economically and militarily vulnerable, they wanted to be sure that the Centre was not involved in military or strategic planning.

Ruth First guaranteed this to (indistinct) De Braganza and the Director of the Centre. O'Laughlin explains under cross-examination that both Ruth First and Joe Slovo told her that none of Slovo's parcels were ever to be opened.

This was not limited to them. It was generally known in Maputo that parcels addressed to Joe Slovo were not to be opened.

Now again, we are not dealing with a low rank Security Policeman who took a chance and wanted to make himself a hero, without having any knowledge of Joe Slovo or the habits of Ruth First, or what the circumstances were in Maputo. We are dealing with the state of mind of a self proclaimed super Intelligence Senior Officer, who would have known what the position was in Maputo.

CHAIRPERSON: Would this be a convenient stage Mr Bizos, seeing that you are going on to a somewhat different point?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I have just had a note passed to me, and I don't know whether you gentlemen or any of you, can claim credit for it, but I have been told that the cafe will be closed for the rest of the week.

MR BIZOS: It is not news Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: The suggestion is that in those circumstances, the half hour we have been taking for lunch, will be a little bit short if you have to go elsewhere to get food. Do you gentlemen, ladies agree, should we make it an hour?

MR BIZOS: An hour Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until two o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

MR BIZOS IN ARGUMENT: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman, we were on top of page 17, paragraph (j). If the Security Police had intercepted an envelope containing ANC or SACP communications for the attention of Joe Slovo, Williamson would not have passed up the opportunity of closely examining and copying the contents for his own intelligence purposes.

Yet, he did not bother to find out what was in the intercepted item. I want to pause there for a moment Mr Chairman.

Here we have the Head of Intelligence of the Security Police to whose attention postal item comes, addressed to the Commander in Chief of MK. On the general and specific probabilities, is that believable? Isn't it really an attempt to make himself a second grade clerk, who is merely handed something? On his own version, he knows that it is addressed to Slovo, the Commander in Chief from MK, for whom, whom he considers enemy number one, he is the Chief Intelligence Officer, doesn't look into to see what is in it? It may have been plans for the furtherance of the acts of sabotage that were to be committed? It may have been the specific plans for the blowing up of installations such as SASOL. The Head of Intelligence wants the Committee to believe that he believed like a second grade clerk, failed to ask has this been examined, has it been classified, has it been studied? Who is sending what to Joe Slovo? He does none of that.

So that on his mere say so, the thing is so improbable that I would submit with respect, that the Committee will reject it out of hand. But it does not stand alone.

We say in subparagraph (k) there is doubt whether Williamson's intercepted mail item, existed at all Mr Chairman. The fact that Raven's written amnesty application makes no mention of such an item, is significant in this regard.

O'Laughlin's evidence that the packet had no official logo or printed matter on the front, strengthens that doubt Mr Chairman.

If indeed, there was an intercepted item as described by Williamson, the only possibly explanation for Williamson's not bothering to find out what it contained, must be that the item was addressed to Ruth First and did not contain anything of value for the Intelligence purposes of the Security Police.

CHAIRPERSON: He wouldn't have known that without finding out, would he Mr Bizos?

MR BIZOS: Absolutely. Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: You are saying that the only possible explanation for Williamson's not bothering to find out, is it must have contained ...

MR BIZOS: Well, even that is being generous to Mr Williamson Mr Chairman. What we actually submit, it doesn't come clear out of this subparagraphs, that Williamson's department was not unknown for making things up. The probabilities are having regard to the contradictions between him and Raven and the improbabilities, that they decided to make a bomb and address it in handwriting, in the middle of the page, and they would have known who Ruth First's friends were, and they wrote the name and address of a sender on the top left hand corner and they sent it off.

That is the basis Mr Chairman, and we must not with respect, when we have blatant untruths told by both of them, contradicting their applications, contradicting one another, giving improbable versions, we don't have to fall into their sphere of the relation of the whole thing.

The probabilities are that if we look at these unsatisfactory features, they said let's get rid of Ruth First and the best way to do it is to send her an item that looks as if it has been sent from elsewhere.

It was not necessary for him to study what they themselves put in. They hoped that it would be blown up, which it was, and the contents would have been destroyed for ever, anyway.

ADV DE JAGER: Wouldn't it be probable too that they would get hold of a UN envelope, that kind of thing?

MR BIZOS: That is probable, but then we have uncontradicted evidence that it wasn't.

CHAIRPERSON: You say he says it was?

MR BIZOS: No, no. The question is whom do you believe?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I mean you can't say uncontradicted, can you?

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, uncontested Mr Chairman. Ms O'Laughlin was not, it was not put to her that the version he was deposing to, was false.

In fact Mr Chairman, we are going to, I might as well say it now, there had been many questions by Mr Levine to our witnesses, no contrary version was put as a matter of practise. There was probing, there were questions, but not that Mr Williamson says or that Mr Williamson contends or even the witnesses that gave evidence before Mr Williamson gave evidence, or rather, to the witnesses that gave evidence after his, it was never put to - Mr Williamson's version was never put Mr Chairman, which is an additional important factor.

The evidence of Mr Maharaj Mr Chairman, was not contradicted. It wasn't put that this did not happen. The telephone call and the stopping of the money, it wasn't put that that did not happen.

Then we go on to the next sub-heading. Williamson's description of the intercepted item is false, we submit. In his first interview with Gillian Slovo, Williamson described the bomb as more than an envelope, a small package, and we give you the reference to that Mr Chairman.

We do not understand that to be contradicted. If it is contradicted, we can just listen to two lines of the tape, Mr Chairman. On O'Laughlin's evidence it is clear that the bomb could not have been contained in either of the two USIS envelopes.

The size of those envelopes were approximately one third of an A4 envelope. It is submitted that the bomb could only have been contained in the packet, described by O'Laughlin.

The packet described by O'Laughlin had two addresses on the front. The one in the middle was the address of the receiver and the one on the top left hand corner, was the address of the sender. There was no official logo or printed matter on the packet.

She was not challenged on that Mr Chairman. The packet was approximately two and a half centimetres thick and looked interesting as if it contained the proofs of a book. O'Laughlin's evidence was clear, honest and we submit, convincing.

Furthermore her evidence in relation to the size of the USIS envelopes and the absence of the logo on the packet, was not contested during cross-examination. It is submitted that O'Laughlin's evidence in this regard directly contradicts Williamson's evidence and proves once again that he has failed to make a full disclosure.

The format he has described is substantially different to that described in the uncontested evidence of O'Laughlin. We submit that there was a deal between Williamson and Raven Mr Chairman. And we give details why we say so by reference to the fact ... (tape ends) ... revise that submission if they have regards to the fact.

It is clear that at the time they submitted their written applications, Williamson and Raven were to say the least, not cooperating with one another. Raven made some very damaging statements against Williamson in his written application. By the time the hearings began however, Raven had seen Williamson's application and he changed his version in order to accommodate Williamson's version.

In his written applications Raven mention neither the large official envelopes, nor the intercepted mail items. On top of page 19, Raven stated that Williamson instructed me to construct two explosive devices in the form of letters.

They were to be constructed in an envelope, A4 size, and approximately 30 to 40 pages thick. In Williamson's written application he states after Raven had completed his task and brought the official envelope and the postal item back to him, he looked into the official envelope at the postal item, which looked no different to me from how it had looked before.

In his oral evidence and in an attempt to reconcile their mutually destructive versions, Williamson states that after Raven returned the official envelope to him, I looked in. I saw everything look the same. There was then an extra envelope in the big envelope and I gave it back to the Brigadier and I assumed that ... Chairperson, so there was an extra envelope you now say? He hadn't fitted anything into the original? Mr Williamson, no, it was not in the original. Everything was separate, even the contents.

It is clear from his evidence, pages 760 to 769 that Williamson was struggling to remember the agreed version. His versions changes as he testifies. Even if Williamson had remembered that, according to the agreed version, the extra envelope had to have been put into the original, before he received the big envelope from Raven, Williamson could not have been able to explain how he had known that there was an extra envelope in the original, if he had just peeked into the original envelope and everything looked no different to me from how it had looked before.

In order for Williamson to have seen the extra envelope, he would have had to look into the original as well. That was something he did not do. He got rid of the bomb without delay. When Williamson congratulated Raven after hearing about the death of Ruth First, there was no suggestion by Williamson that the bomb had been intended for Joe Slovo, but that it had served Ruth First right because of her activities in Mozambique.

Now Mr Chairman, this is the evidence of Mr Raven - sorry, I withdraw that. Let me read it again, when Williamson congratulated after hearing about the death of Ruth First, there was no suggestion by Williamson that the bomb had been intended for Joe Slovo, but it had served Ruth First right because of her activities in Mozambique.

Compared to the bundle Raven, page 2, is what Williamson said to Raven about the death of Jeanette and Katryn Mr Chairman.

But let us take the first part of it and deal with the probabilities. If the bomb was not intended for Ruth First, which Williamson denies, it is reported that Ruth First was killed with a bomb. Williamson goes and congratulates Raven. If either or both had spoken any bit of the truth, what the discussion should have been about immediately after the event and I am asking you to add this to this paragraph, the discussion would have been oh, my God, we killed the wrong person. We sent the bomb to Joe Slovo and look what happened. How did this come about?

None of that, but what appears in paragraph (w). How can either of them be believed and particularly Williamson? What we submit in paragraph (x), it is therefore submitted that an inescapable conclusion is that Williamson knew at the time the bomb was dispatched, that the intended victim was Ruth First.

The reason he denies that he knew this at the time, is because he knows that the bomb was intended to kill Ruth First in the hope that her death would destroy Joe Slovo. This he cannot admit, because it would prejudice the legitimacy of his political objective.

Those are the main facts upon which we submit this Committee is going to make a decision. The arguments of some of our learned colleagues, Mr Chairman, reminds one of the often repeated (indistinct), don't let the facts get into the way of a clever legal argument, but matters are decided on the facts Mr Chairman.

On the facts of this case, as we have outlined, on the facts which will have to be found proved in the manner in which we have suggested in our argument. Not the fanciful facts, not dismissing our contention. Mr Chairman, one of the reasons why it has taken us so long Mr Chairman, in order to draw up these Heads and we can only put half of them in, is that we look in vain for references to this record for an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and or their versions.

We got a ton of references Mr Chairman, to the Cronje record, but none to this, our record, in order to respond to it. Look at that argument Mr Chairman, and see how many references to Williamson's or Raven's evidence you will be able to find.

It isn't, we have done these Heads Mr Chairman, in the hope of being of assistance to the Committee in order to make proper findings of fact, because it is only on well defined disputes of fact, upon which decisions have to be made, upon which the law has to be applied, not in what happened in other cases or quotations of what one or other said as to whether Jan Petersen would have been a cripple if he had not died, and other propagandistic matters which regurgitated before this Committee. They serve no purpose for a just decision Mr Chairman.

Then we deal with Mr Williamson's political objectives. Williamson attempts ex post facto to justify Ruth First as a legitimate target for assassination. He does not claim that her death was an accident or a mistake. It follows, we submit, that as a matter of law, he is not entitled to amnesty for her murder.

Then we deal with the legal consequences of Williamson's dated case, on the facts as they appear before you Mr Chairman.

Williamson states that until he had his first interview with Gillian Slovo he had been convinced that the bomb had been addressed and sent to Joe Slovo. This interview was conducted during early 1995 so that for all those years and all through the Nkomati negotiations and meetings, he thought that the bomb was addressed to Joe Slovo, so he would have us believe.

On page 976 Mr Chairman, because this is a vital fact which comes out of his own mouth and upon which we base our legal submissions, that is why we want to read it to you. Page 976. I am asking the questions.

Now I want to refer you to page 3 of your application and to which you say that with the best of my recollection, the mail item in the large envelope, was an A4 or larger sized envelope with the logo of an international organisation thereon, possibly UN related, and was addressed to Joe Slovo, C/o Ruth First or Joe Slovo and Ruth First at Eduardo Modlani, Maputo, Mozambique.

Do you say that this is true or false? Mr Williamson, yes, Mr Chairman, that is. I am not saying that I saw the address Mr Chairman, I am trying to explain that I knew this was addressed to Joe Slovo. Knew, we would ask that you underline that. I knew that this was addressed to Joe Slovo.

I didn't go into the narrative here Mr Chairman, in the detail that we have now of exactly the words that the Brigadier said to me and the assumptions that I made Mr Chairman. The fact is that I have also discussed this with the, I think it was Gillian Slovo and in fact I believe Mr Chairman, that she was the person that first, first started me really thinking about was it possible that this had in fact been addressed to Ruth First and not Joe Slovo. That is from 1982 to 1995, that is 13 years the Chief of the Intelligence of the Security Police was under a mistaken state of mind that this was addressed to Joe Slovo and then when Ruth First's daughter, Gillian Slovo comes along and says who killed my mother and why, then a seed of doubt somehow gets into his complicated mind, well, it may be that for 13 years I have been living in an abberation. For 13 years I have been living in a fool's paradise, in an abberation, but I thought that I sent it to Joe Slovo and this young woman here comes and tells me, well, I thought to myself, maybe I was wrong for 13 years.

Now, he goes on. I believe up until that moment, I was convinced that it was being sent to Joe Slovo and I think it was her that started me thinking that perhaps I had made a mistake, and that it wasn't addressed to Joe Slovo.

For a person of your intelligence and ability, it must be obvious that what the evidence that you gave here and what stands there, is contradictory, Major Williamson, do you agree? No, I don't agree Mr Chairman. Well, do you say then I didn't see any name, but only saw the university is not contradictory to? To the best of my recollection, the mail item in the large envelope was addressed to Joe Slovo, C/o Ruth First or Joe Slovo and Ruth First.

You say there is no contradiction? No, I don't Mr Chairman. Well, he may not see the contradiction Mr Chairman, I submit that the Committee will have no difficulty in finding that there is a contradiction and the only explanation for the contradiction is that he was not giving a truthful version.

In paragraph 6 on page 21 Mr Chairman, we say on his current version therefore, at no time prior to the dispatching of the bomb, did Williamson apply his mind as to whether Ruth First was a legitimate target or not.

Then we submit in paragraph 7 that Williamson ex post facto attempt to legitimise the killing of a person who on his version, he did not intend to kill, is not permissible in law, Mr Chairman.

He is not permissible in terms of the Section of the Act that you are administering and presiding over proceedings. He does not claim that it was a mistake. He says it was not intended for her, were never addressed to her.

In 7.1, both Williamson and Raven were at all materials, employees of the State. They were employed as members of the Security Police. The acts for which they seek amnesty were performed while they were physically stationed at the Headquarters of the Security Police in Pretoria.

Their application for amnesty must therefore be dealt with in terms of Section 22(b) and (f) read with Section 21(3) of the Act.

May I say Mr Chairman, that the attempt to introduce the National Party in order to incorporate, in order to avoid Mr Chairman, and it is an obvious stratagem, in order to avoid the provisions of subsection (f) of the Act, Mr Chairman, any person referred to in (b), (c) and (d) who on reasonable grounds believe that he or she was acting in the scope of her duties and within the scope of his expressed or implied authority.

Counsel for Mr Raven, Mr Chairman, was not prepared to assume or to argue that his conduct, it was necessary for him to argue that Raven's conduct was reasonable which (f) requires.

If, as he was a Security Policeman, and not a member of a political organisation as provided for in 2(a), reasonableness would not enter into the picture. We submit with respect again that one must have regard to the facts.

One should not expect a legal argument to be accepted Mr Chairman, whatever its merit may be in the abstract, if the facts do not support it.

We submit that Adv De Jager correctly put when this issue was first broached by Counsel for Mr Raven, to whom did they submit their travelling expense slips, the Security Police or the National Party? The answer is obvious Mr Chairman.

Not one of them Mr Chairman, came along and said that I went to the meeting of a National Party and I was told by the "Hoofleier" or the "Provinsiale Leier" or whatever go and do this.

On the contrary, in their applications, they specifically say who told them to do what and I submit that it is an irrelevancy that is introduced Mr Chairman, on which no basis of fact can be found.

In paragraph 7.2, Section 22(b) provides that any act associated with a political objective that have been committed bona fide with the objective of countering or otherwise resist the struggle, it is submitted Mr Chairman, that the only manner in which it can be determined whether the perpetrators' objective was bona fide, is to have regard to the perpetrator's state of mind at the time when the act was committed.

We emphasise that Mr Chairman because of the irrelevancies of the ex post facto "facts" that were attempted to be introduced into this hearing.

The perpetrator's state of mind at any time after the commission of the act, can have no bearing whatsoever on the requisite bona fides - requisite of bona fides, I think it should be more properly expressed Mr Chairman.

It is clear from the criteria listed in 20(3) that the decision whether a particular act is an act associated with a political objective, can only be made with reference to the facts pertaining to the time of the commission of the act.

The relevant criteria will be dealt with in turn. In relation to 3(a) Mr Chairman, the motive of the person who committed the act or offence. Now motive is the reason, the kinetic force that pushed him to commit this act of killing and torture, or whatever it may be. Motive.

Motive can only be enquired into, having regard to what the state of affairs was then. Not what Mr Vlok told them afterwards, not what Mr Van der Merwe told them afterwards, not what the people that applied for amnesty for the Church Street bomb, said, not what Mr Mlambo said at the enquiries, nor what Mr Cronje said in his application for amnesty, nor indeed what Brigadier Victor might have told Mr Cronje some time later. We are talking about 1982. What were the facts then and what was the state of mind of the applicant at the time of the commission of that act?

We submit that this is an elementary consequence because of the plain words of the statute Mr Chairman. You can't say Mr Chairman, that I beat up my wife in 1982 because what I found out in 1988. It just doesn't bear logical examination Mr Chairman.

Context, the section says the context of which the act or omission or offence takes place and particular whether the act or omission or offence was committed in the course of or part of a political uprising, disturbance, event or in reaction thereto. The applicants can't say that we reacted to the Church Street bombing Mr Chairman, when we killed Ruth First in 1982, when the Church Street bombing was in 1983.

Also Mr Chairman, that what was the state of targets chosen at the time? It may be that after 1985, there may have been a change according to the numerous statements that were put it, but that can hardly give an answer Mr Chairman, favourable to the applicants that have to actually justify in 1982.

The gravity, the Section says the legal and factual nature of the act, omission or offence including the gravity of the act, omission or offence. Gravity of the offence Mr Chairman, is something that has to be balanced out.

Killing the Commander in Chief of MK, I would submit may have been viewed by the Committee as a less grave offence than killing his wife who was teaching at a university in Maputo. So gravity has got to be balanced as to who was being killed at the time.

Who were the enemy in the words of the Security Police, killing at the time? Not a single instance of the wife of a General or a high ranking politician or anyone else. We submit that the gravity of the act depends upon the identity of the victim and his or her role in the conflict which may extenuate or aggravate the nature of the act. Killing is killing, but whom you kill and the reason why you kill, may extenuate or aggravate the nature of your offence and a factor to be taken into consideration.

ADV DE JAGER: Suppose I would have the objective to kill A, a so called legitimate target, I hate the word legitimate target, and instead of killing A, I am killing B also a legitimate target, but I didn't intend to kill B - would I be entitled to amnesty then for B?

MR BIZOS: (Microphone not on). Not on an ex post facto reason we would suspect, because you had to have a particular motive, a particular motive which you had to be bona fide about at that time. That is the whole crux of the argument.

ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on) as whether it was a legitimate or non-legitimate target, wouldn't enter the picture in the circumstances that I have put to you?

MR BIZOS: (Microphone not on) You have to assess, you would have to assess the position at the time. What you may be thinking of Adv De Jager, it may be a different situation if they truly said we addressed this to Joe Slovo, to his hideout in the protected village that he was in.

Unfortunately he opened the bomb in the bedroom and Ruth First was there and they plead that case, and they are honest about that, and they make full disclosure about that, it may have been a different case altogether. But here they say it was intended for Joe Slovo and they are lying.

They cannot come ex post facto and say oh, by the way, if we had thought about it and if we care to tell the truth, she would also have been a legitimate target. The Act does not allow it, Mr Chairman because it says, they nowhere say that Ruth was killed by mistake. They don't say, he doesn't say that.

They don't say that. There may be an argument on behalf of Mr Raven, which we will deal with on the facts, but it doesn't avail him either at all, because he can't come along and say that Ruth First was a legitimate target, he didn't apply his mind to it at the time. He can't come now and say she was a legitimate target.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand from what you have just said that had the position been that the bomb had been addressed to Joe Slovo, in the circumstances that we have heard of, but by chance his wife picked it up and opened it, they could then have then said it was accidental, we were aiming at that target?

MR BIZOS: Yes, if that was their case.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you would have accepted that?

MR BIZOS: If that was their case, but that is not their case. And then of course there would have been the argument well, if you sent it to him c/o his home, didn't you possibly, there would have been an argument, but ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I said in the circumstances because the evidence we have heard is that nobody else opened his post.

MR BIZOS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So therefore you would have felt reasonably safe addressing it to him, that he would be the person who opened it?

MR BIZOS: Yes, but that is not the case that has been pleaded, that is not the evidence. There has been no full disclosure in relation to it and on any basis, or on any of this criteria, does Mr Williamson touch first base, we submit.

(d) The objective of the act can only be assessed at the time of the commission of the act. This criteria is also concerned with the identity of the target in the eye of the perpetrator at the time of the commission of the act.

The question asked by subsection 3(d) is whom or what did the perpetrator intend to target? Let us look at the wording, the object or objective of the act, omission or offence and in particular whether the act, omission or offence was primarily directed at a political opponent. We are told that it was directed at Joe Slovo, not at Ruth First, or State property or personal against private property and individuals. But it must be a political opponent, it obviously must be something at the time.

I think that we ask you to accept that the identity of their target in the eye of the perpetrator at the time of the commission of the act, that is, we submit, a straight forward interpretation and application of the subsection.

We then go to (e). A perpetrator who acts in the execution of an order, will act in accordance with his understanding of the order. That understanding is totally dependent on the perpetrator's state of mind, up to the time of the commission of the act, and that is clear, we submit, in subparagraph 3(e), whether the act or omission or offence was committed in execution of an order of - now the order must be kill Joe Slovo. If you have an order to go and kill Joe Slovo, you are not acting bona fide or in terms of the Section, if you go and kill Ruth First?

3(f), the relationship between the act, omission or offence, the political objective pursued and in particular the directness of proximity of the relationship and the proportionality of the act, omission or offence to the objective pursued.

The objective that was to be pursued, was to kill Joe Slovo, not Ruth First. What was pursued, we submit, in 7.56 can only be determined with the reference of the state of mind of the perpetrator at the time the act was committed, not digging up facts, ex post facto to say well, it served her right anyway.

It may be good parlance at KOMPOL or wherever they were, but not for the purposes of the Committee. In paragraph 8 it is submitted that Section 22 and 3 of the Act do not contemplate the existence of an ex post facto political objective.

On this ground too, and taken alone, Williamson's application for amnesty for the murder of Ruth First, ought to be refused.

Then Ruth First, we submit was not a legitimate target for assassination. The roles played by Joe Slovo, the intended victim, and Ruth First, the actual victim, were fundamentally different. Williamson cannot be heard to say that he was unaware of this fundamental difference.

It is submitted that Williamson knew or ought reasonably to have known at the time that the letter bomb was dispatched, exactly what activities Ruth First was involved in and that such activities, even from Williamson's point of view, did not make her a legitimate target for murder.

In 10.1 we say that Williamson was the Head of the Intelligence Section of the Security Police. He states that I had at my disposal probably one of the most sophisticated surveillance organisations in the country, if not the most sophisticated Mr Chairman, and I would have used that Mr Chairman, so that if for some way or other principle, it is to be considered whether or not Ruth First was a legitimate target. We submit that he on his own assessment of the efficiency of his organisation, should and did know what she was doing.

I am reminded and I should draw to the Committee's attention, that this what he said was in relation to his saying not sending Van Jaarsveld down to Port Elizabeth, to reconnoitre the killing of Goniwe.

Williamson claims that he had no specific information on Ruth First and that he was gathering information on her. At one point Williamson says I said that she was a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, I want to read this, because he is a tricky guy.

I said that she was a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party. Approximately one minute later, Williamson denies that he has just said and states, I said I believed so Mr Chairman. At one stage, I am sure, she was.

At page 1003, and that was all she was, she was not involved in MK. Are you able to deny that? Mr Williamson, Mr Chairman, I have no specific information. I said that I was not gathering information on her.

Mr Bizos, so you can't deny the proposition that she was not an MK? Mr Williamson, no Mr Chairman, I can't. I said that she was a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party. Up to when, and then she goes on.

Then on the next page, you said that she was, did you say that she was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party? I said I believed so Mr Chairman, at one stage, I am sure she was. He says I believe, and wants to change the was and what is drawn to his attention, he says no, no, he never said that.

ADV DE JAGER: ... at one stage I was sure she was. At a certain stage, she was a member. Now, at some other stage, I believed she was, but I was sure at a certain stage, she was, but later I believed, she was.

If you would divide it in factual, that at a certain stage, she was a member, and then resigned and he still believed at the later stage, that she was.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but the categorical that she was, referred to the time that she was in Mozambique in context, the first quotation.

I said I believed, he would not accept that he had said she was. That is really the - and also, we were dealing what what she was in Maputo at that time, that was the issue on what we were.

Then on 10.3, there can be no doubt that the Head of the Intelligence Sections of the Security Police, knew what Ruth First was doing in Mozambique. In this regard, Williamson has not made full disclosure. He knew that she was not one to blindly tow the official ANC line, that is what he says himself.

If Williamson was aware what Ruth First was saying about the ANC or SACP policy, he would also have been aware of what else she was saying.

The work that Ruth First had done in England and was doing in Mozambique, was no secret. Her writings had been published in numerous newspapers and books. She had been employed as a lecturer in Sociology at Durham University and had left Durham five months before her death to take up a position as a lecturer in the Centre of African Studies at the Eduardo Modlani University in Maputo.

By that time, she had long since become a well known and respected speaker, much in demand at anti-apartheid meetings. She was an authority on Africa and had been invited to numerous international conferences.

We refer to the evidence of both Mac Maharaj and O'Laughlin and Gillian Slovo of course.

None of this could have been unknown to Williamson. Neither Williamson, nor Raven has challenged the evidence that has been placed before the Committee as to the true nature of Ruth First activities in England and Mozambique.

Williamson concedes that he cannot deny that Ruth First was not involved in MK activities. Yet, in his written amnesty application, Williamson describes the political objective sought to be achieved by the killing of Ruth First, as follows: to weaken the ANC/SACP revolutionary alliance through killing or injuring key personnel involved in planning strategy against the South African State and in particular to disrupt SACP/Frelimo links in Mozambique, to psychologically destabilise and so to politically weaken the ANC/SACP by causing fear and confusion within their ranks, especially through killing or injuring high ranking officials.

It is the adjectives here, that are used in relation to Ruth First. The high ranking official and personnel involved in planning and strategy - she was neither involved in planning and the strategy, nor a high ranking official.

We say 10.6, Ruth First was not involved in planning and strategy against the South African State. She was not a high ranking official of either the ANC or the SACP. She was not even an official of those organisations. She had drifted away from the Communist Party.

When the Communist Party regrouped in exile, she volunteered to stand down and were not elected to the Central Committee. She was an ordinary member of the ANC, according to Gillian Slovo, to Maharaj and O'Laughlin.

Williamson would have known this, but then of course Mr Chairman, his difficulty is that if he didn't intend to kill Ruth First, he would never have bothered to find this out. In so far as he may say that he did, that contradicts his main thesis, that he didn't intend to kill Ruth First.

Page 26, paragraph 10.7, if Williamson had use the sophisticated surveillance organisation at his disposal, he would have known that Ruth First led a very public life in Maputo. He would have known that she lectured students, did fieldwork in rural areas and learnt to speak Portuguese, wrote books, went to the cinema and liked to go out for dinner with her friend and colleague, Bridget O'Laughlin.

Without the benefit of any sophisticated surveillance organisation at his disposal, Williamson would have known that Ruth First was a fierce anti-apartheid critic, like Archbishop Tutu and many others. Williamson claims that he did not regard Archbishop Tutu as a legitimate target for murder - neither was Ruth First, but then of course, Ruth First was Joe Slovo's wife. That is where the difference lay.

Having tried very hard to get at Joe Slovo, what better way of killing his wife, and then planting the story that no responsible ... (tape ends) ... the same as the murder of Schoon was because of divisions within the ANC.

We submit Mr Chairman, that Williamson is a vindictive human being, and that he acted out of personal malice, ill will and spite when he dispatched the bomb to Ruth First.

It is clear that Williamson hated Joe Slovo. He admits that there was a store room, Joe Slovo's basement room at Daisy Farm, which he says we used to joke about and say one day we would keep Joe Slovo in there. We often used to joke that that particular store room was waiting, we had prepared it specially for Joe Slovo.

That is his own evidence Mr Chairman. He concedes that he could have said that the iron ring in the concrete floor of the store room was there for the purpose of chaining Joe Slovo to it, on a short enough chain so that he could not kill himself as Biko had done. He concedes further that whoever captured Joe Slovo, we could possibly have used that room to keep him in, Mr Chairman.

Counsel for, Attorney for Mr Williamson said we didn't call a witness. Yes Mr Chairman, this information was given to us by Mr Jaap van Jaarsveld, who we placed on record, but we are content to let it be on Mr Williamson's own admissions. Mr Van Jaarsveld opted out from giving evidence and in so far as there are any differences, we are happy to let it rest on Mr Williamson's admissions.

What better evidence of malice than the next subparagraph - after the death of Joe Slovo in 1996, and at the time when Williamson had allegedly decided to put the conflicts of the past, behind him, Williamson told a reporter that it was particularly hot that day, because someone forgot to close the gate when they let Slovo in. This evidence was given by Gillian Slovo, it was not challenged.

Mr Williamson is not going to be the final arbiter that will judge Mr Slovo, but that he could not conceal his hatred in the words of Gillian Slovo after a painful and tragic death of Mr Slovo, indicates how false his pretensions were that he broke silence in the Observer article, because he wanted to put the conflicts of the past to an end and contribute to reconciliation.

On the contrary, that statement shows the ongoing hatred. Williamson states that after the death of Ruth First - sorry, not satisfied with the murder at 10.9.4, Williamson continued his attack on Joe Slovo by planting a cover story that he killed his own wife.

Although the story was fed to selected journalists, immediately after the death of Ruth First, it only appeared in print almost two years later, shortly after the deaths of Jeanette Schoon and Katryn Schoon.

Williamson states that after the death of Ruth First, he predicted that the ANC "moontlik sal poog om die RSA in gelyke munt te vergeld. Attacks on prominent South Africans, could not be excluded." This, taken on its face value, really indicates what was Mr Williamson's view of Ruth First, that she was the counterpart of prominent South Africans, particularly those no doubt, which supported the National Party or their families.

He doesn't say that the death of Ruth First may lead to attacks on people involved in countering the effect of the struggle, he foresaw it as a husband and wife, or family relationship elimination - because of that prominence, was permissible. It is submitted that the quoted words, provide a glimpse of Williamson's true motives at the time, that is, he considered Ruth First to be a member of a family of a prominent ANC official, and as such a target for attack.

In essence, Williamson were pursuing his approach which he put in a picramatic form that in the struggle, you must terrorise the terrorists by killing their wives.

Mr Chairman, because Mr Williamson's Attorney said that I had used words about the morality of Mr Williamson, we want to refer to his own words in a speech that he made to a conference at which a number of prominent office bearers were present.

The fact that he was chosen to address such an august gathering of securocrats, is in itself evidence of this man's morality, honesty. At page 663 led by his own Attorney Mr Chairman, he is referred to paragraph 30 of the document, it is read into the record, so it is not necessary to note the Exhibit number, Mr Chairman, I attended this conference, I was in fact one of the police delegates to the conference.

This conference was to discuss various problems in the Intelligence community, and I made a presentation about what is called "dekking". "Dekking" is cover, and we were discussing what is known as human intelligence, as opposed to electronic intelligence or openly accessible intelligence.

Human intelligence relates to the use of individual agents and I am quoted in paragraph 6.2.3 as saying in the second half of that, in this regard, Major Williamson remarked in the Intelligence game, there is only one rule and that is that there are no rules.

Then I go on to say when survival is at stake, it is often necessary for a service to go over to confidential action, which does not agree with the Acts of morality, norms or values, controlled by the public action of the State or Service.

Confidentiality both in defensive and offensive, is the guide word here. Cover is used to enable the operatives to execute secret orders without having to accept public responsibility.

On page 1176, thirdly - I am reading a passage to him, thirdly the psychological effect of what we call terrorising the terrorists, was important, both in the negative sense for them and in the positive sense, for the Security Forces and the target civilian population of the Republic.

The question in relation to that is, would killing Ruth First be an act of terror in the mind of the person you would call the Arch Terrorist, Joe Slovo? Yes, Mr Chairman.

I am going to put to you that there is a high degree of probability that you and your colleagues decided to kill Ruth First in order to get at Joe Slovo in pursuance of this philosophy of yours. Mr Williamson, Mr Chairman, it is entirely possible that whoever decided to target and do that, had decided and if I had seen and been told that this was specifically going to Ruth First, then I would have been in accord with that.

I would ask Mr Chairman, I don't know if you made a note of the page numbers, because those two page numbers were not in the Heads Mr Chairman. Yes, they are there, sorry, they are there, yes, thank you. The first one is not there, page 663 was not there, it is the additional reference.

CHAIRPERSON: 663?

MR BIZOS: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: 10.10?

MR BIZOS: Yes. However, Williamson could not point to a single instance where the wife of a South African cabinet Minister, high ranking politician or General was targeted and killed by the ANC, nor could he deny the evidence of Maharaj that he never saw the President or Prime Minister of South Africa as a legitimate target.

I didn't see membership or prominence in the National Party or the government, making the person a target.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, that I can't understand. I can't understand why you shouldn't target the person making the policy, but you could target a policeman standing watch in the street, or a passer by in the Church Street bomb. Why wouldn't the Cabinet Minister be a legitimate target?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the answer was given by President Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress, I believe it is in the papers, somewhere in the submission, and that is despite all this propositions of total war that are claimed by some of the gentlemen that have been quoted here, the African National Congress was on record at all times, in not escalating the struggle to a degree in which we were to finish up in a race war in South Africa.

ADV DE JAGER: That is my point, why then kill almost an innocent bystander and that could be sort of said, well, it is crossfire, and that kind of thing, instead of targeting the persons responsible for the situation in South Africa?

MR BIZOS: The person on the ANC side, accept for a short period after, and it is in the documents, short period after the Lesotho funeral, where Mr Tambo said that sooner or later, more white people may die that black people, and that was interpreted by some cadres and the Wimpy Bar and the Mongoose Bar and other acts were committed, but that was put to an end Mr Chairman, because clearly the ANC did not want the struggle to escalate to full out civil war.

This is why there was this limitation. I am quoting Mr Maharaj, Mr Chairman, there was this limitation and on the proportionality test, on the proportionality test, that is an important factor and that is why we speak of legitimate or illegitimate targets.

The innocent person standing by, if a person is believed that they attacked a military target or a Security Force target, and innocent people killed, it is in the submissions, but it was never the policy Mr Chairman, to escalate the war to a point where obviously civilian people even though they supported the National Party's policies to the hilt, and some of them even said that you are not doing enough in order to, don't try them, shoot them on sight and matters like that.

ADV DE JAGER: (Microphone not on)

MR BIZOS: Yes, but what I am saying Mr Chairman, in 1982, this is why it is important, in 1982, targeting the wife who was the Head of the Army, it may have been Gen Viljoen, targeting Mrs Viljoen Mr Chairman, would not have been a legitimate target.

Even though she may have been the Chairperson of what do they call it, a Comforts' Committee for the Army, even if she attended National Party meetings and supported the policy and shouted "hoor hoor" every time they said something in furtherance of that policy. Nobody would have regarded Mrs Viljoen, Mr Chairman, a legitimate target.

There would have been no extenuation with the struggle as it stood in 1982, and that is the test that you have to apply with respect. Would you have found as a Judge as extenuating circumstances, killing Mrs Viljoen in 1982 because she was the wife of the General who was conducting the struggle in Namibia and in Angola? It would have been outrageous.

I don't want to talk about, I don't want to become involved in this debate about moral high ground and lower ...

ADV DE JAGER: That is not what I have been putting to you, you are now sort of expanding on it. I said why didn't, why shouldn't, I asked why shouldn't for instance the President of the country or the leader of the party who is creating this policy, why shouldn't he be a legitimate target, but somebody else like a policeman guarding some station or whatever, could have been a legitimate target?

The only thing that I wanted to say is - and I don't think it is very relevant for this argument, I must really say, but I would have thought that if really you are fighting a policy, you would, your first target would be the man creating the policy?

MR BIZOS: The logical correctness of your statement Adv De Jager, one can accept but where ...

ADV DE JAGER: I understand why they didn't do it.

MR BIZOS: (Microphone not on), not want to escalate it, after all they were hoping to bring that person to the negotiating table. That was the purpose and unbridled terrorism was not the policy of the African National Congress.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, where does this evidence appear from? My learned friend has spent a lot of time this morning, criticising other people for introducing evidence which is already official record before this Committee, and before the TRC. He is now giving evidence from where he is sitting, from the bar Mr Chairman, and I object to that.

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps he is being asked.

MR BIZOS: No, I have a better answer than that and the question is both legitimate and I gave a legitimate, and I would suggest to my learned friend, that he goes and reads the evidence of Mr Maharaj and he will find everything that I said, in his evidence Mr Chairman.

I remember the graphic way in which Mr Maharaj gave that evidence. Maybe my learned friend ...

ADV DE JAGER: Okay, Mr Bizos, could we kindly continue with the next ...

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I just want to say my learned friend is wrong, he is misleading you because there is nowhere on the evidence, and I challenge him to show you where Mr Maharaj said that they wanted to keep these people alive to bring them to the negotiation table and if he shows me that, I will withdraw my objection.

ADV DE JAGER: He is quoting ...

CHAIRPERSON: That was a reply to the question asked by my colleague as to why they did not attack State Presidents and other politicians. It may have been inspired by the fact that my colleague is an erstwhile politician who thinks that that should be open to attack.

MR BIZOS: Well, yes I don't know who they would have negotiated then Mr Chairman. Then we say Mr Chairman, it is submitted that Williamson's acts epitomise an individual completely lacking in morality. By his own account, he abandoned the norms and values of the contemporary morality and the references there was pointed out by Adv ...

The postcard sent by him to Gill Marcus, shortly after the London bomb, is evidence of his callousness Mr Chairman. We submit that the evidence of Gill Marcus was both credible and fair, she did not suggest that it was against her, but that it shows Mr Chairman - and I have been thinking about it and I will say it, isn't it strange Mr Chairman, that Mr Williamson has sometimes managed, has somehow managed to kill two women and a young child and his attempt to terrorise another woman working for the ANC.

There is also another important aspect with respect and that is the choice of weapon, on the proportionality. I would ask you to, it is not something that we have dealt with, the choice of weapon, on the proportionality test.

A parcel or letter bomb, is an open ended victim maker. I know that during the course of the evidence, a point was made, well it is no different to a landmine. Yes, that argument can be made, and landmines were used during a certain period and the evidence of Mr Maharaj was in 1985, so that part of the equation was not there in 1982 or for that matter, in 1984.

When in the Section where it speaks, the legal and factual nature of the act in (c) and a political opponent in (d), it presupposes that there should be a form of containment. You can't go with a machine gun where your victim is only a person, knowing that he will be surrounded by other people and in shooting him, you achieve your political objective, but at the same time, you kill a number of people.

A letter or parcel bomb that may be opened in a home, in an office, in a tutorial room, is a sort of weapon that of necessity will produce results that could not be controlled, and that must have been clearly foreseen.

It is significant Mr Chairman, that Mr Williamson chose the only acts that he has admitted to, chose this method against two women and a child and admits to no other acts. An inference may be drawn Mr Chairman, as to why he may have done it for reasons other than achieving primarily a political objective.

We submit at 10.11 that Mr Williamson's actions were malicious, completely out of proportion to any political objective and his application for amnesty for the murder of Ruth First, ought to be refused.

Mr Chairman, the next section will be done by my learned colleague, Mr Berger, and I then will come back Mr Chairman, you will see that I am going to deal with some of the law that has been dealt with. That is on page 42, at the bottom of page 42 Mr Chairman, but probably we won't get to it today.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is certain Mr Bizos. Now matter how quickly Mr Berger may deal with the passages he have, we only have half an hour left.

MR BIZOS: Yes and Mr Chairman, we will continue tomorrow with the Schoon application, Schoon as victims, application Mr Chairman. May Mr Berger take over Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, in this part of the Heads, we follow exactly the same format as we followed before. We deal with Mr Raven and we break down the Heads into two major categories, first the requirement of full disclosure and secondly, the political objective.

At page 28 of the Heads, paragraph 11. Chairperson, you will see, and members of the Committee, as we develop the Heads, there is always a contradiction between what Mr Raven says in his application, his written application and what he said in evidence before you. That applies not only to the killing of Ruth First, but also to the killing of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon.

We submit, when we refer to his current version, we refer to his version before you in evidence. On that version, we submit it is clear that he is not telling the truth when he says that he did not know for whom the bomb was intended.

But as we have said before and as we have argued before, there is considerable doubt as to whether the intercepted envelope existed at all. The reasons for that were that Mr Raven in his application makes no mention of the intercepted envelope and also the description given by Ms Bridget O'Laughlin that there was no logo on the envelope that Mr Williamson says was in fact the intercepted envelope.

Dealing with the written application of Mr Raven, we say in paragraph 12, that in his application, he describes the construction by him of two explosive devises in a very specific manner, according to instructions given from Williamson.

He says at page 44, bundle 1, at a given date I cannot remember if it was 1982 or 1983, Williamson instructed me to construct two explosive devices in the form of letters. They were to be constructed in an envelope of A4 size and approximately 30 to 40 pages thick. Then he describes in considerable detail, how he went about manufacturing that bomb at the bottom of 44, top of 45.

We set out in paragraphs 12.1, 2 and 3, the elements of the instruction from Williamson. We say in 13, Chairperson, that it is clear from Raven's description in his written application, that he could not have known for whom the bombs were intended because on that description, he has constructed the envelopes from scratch and as he says, on completion, I handed the envelopes, the two that he is talking to, back to Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Does he say he constructed the envelopes from scratch?

MR BERGER: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: they were to be constructed in an envelope of A4 size?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't indicate he is constructing the envelope?

MR BERGER: No, perhaps, what I am saying Chairperson is that it indicates that he had to go and get an envelope and construct a bomb and put it into the envelope. I am not suggesting that he actually put the envelope together.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what you say in your Heads?

MR BERGER: I have overshot the mark then Chairperson. What I am intended to say was that he was to get envelopes, he says they were to be constructed in an envelope of A4 size.

CHAIRPERSON: It may have been given to him by Williamson?

MR BERGER: That was specifically asked of Raven Chairperson, and that wasn't the answer that he gave. I deal with that in subsequent paragraphs. Perhaps I should, in paragraph 14 we make the submission that the version put forward by Raven during his oral evidence, and I will develop it in due course, the revised version, we say is so far removed from the version in his written application, that it cannot be true.

One thing Chairperson, which cannot be gainsaid, is that there is no mention of the large official envelope in his written application, it is not there. There is no mention, specific mention of an intercepted mail item. If one has to read that in an envelope of A4 size, Chairperson, if one has to read that that is a reference to an intercepted envelope, I would submit that that is stretching it too far, and the reason why I say that is because in his written application, the reference is to a single incident at a specific date. He says at a given date, he was instructed to construct two explosive devices.

They were to be constructed in an envelope of A4 size. It is never been Raven's version that there was one intercepted envelope and he had to put the two devices into that single envelope. The submission I make Chairperson, is that the envelope of A4 size, that is referred to on page 44, is definitely not the intercepted envelope.

The reference to 1813 and 1816, is reference to Mr Raven's evidence in chief where he talks about, he says at 1813, I was summonsed to Major Williamson's office. He had on his desk a large official envelope and he stated that Brigadier Goosen had requested that I endeavour to see if it is possible to replace the contents of an intercepted postal piece, with an IED. Those are his words that he uses in his evidence in chief.

It is a far cry from what he says at page 44, I would submit. At page 30, 14.2 we say that the care taken by Raven to avoid seeing the name of the addressee, and the Committee will remember his evidence about the care that he took, that is the revised version, is not mentioned at all in the original version.

I submit that the plain implication from his original application, 44 and 45, is that he did not see the names because he could not see the names, because there were no names. If one reads over the page at 45, he says if the envelope was opened from either end and the contents removed, the circuit would be closed and the detonation would take place.

On completion, I handed the envelopes over to Williamson. I did not know who the letters were intended for, plural. It was only after the death of Ruth First and the congratulations from williamson that I realised that she had been the target for the device I had manufactured. Then in the revised version, 19.22, paragraph 14.3, this is now during his evidence in chief, the bottom of 19.21 Chairperson, you ask the question, well in the middle of 19.21, he gave you a specific envelope and he wanted a bomb to fit into that envelope. Surely that indicates that he was telling you to construct a bomb to go to those people or that person? Mr Raven, no he said construct a bomb to go into that envelope. Chairperson, yes. It was not my place, Chairperson, no effort to conceal it from you? Mr Raven, and there was no effort on my part, Mr Chairman, to find out to who it went.

And then the question that is quoted, this is at 19.22, so you were prepared to make a bomb to kill somebody and make no effort to make out who they were, although all you had to do was to look at the piece of paper in front of you, is that what you are telling us? Mr Raven, that is correct Mr Chairman. Chairperson, you chose not to find out? Mr Raven, that is correct.

Then my learned friend, Mr Du Plessis comes in and then subsequent to that, Mr Raven says in both, well, perhaps I should read it and not paraphrase it, Mr Du Plessis, at 19.22, Mr Chairman, with respect - Chairperson before that, so you were prepared to kill people where you might have thought their death was a complete mistake? Mr Du Plessis, with respect, the testimony was that the address was covered. The testimony was that the address was covered on the envelope.

Chairperson, there was some form of covering in the one case? There was no such evidence in the Schoon case. Mr Du Plessis, in both Mr Chairman, he testified that the incident happened exactly the same and that means that it happened in both incidents Mr Chairman.

Chairperson, I ask the Committee to bear that passage in mind when we have regard to the application in respect of the deaths of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon.

Mr Raven's case now presently before the Committee is that in both instances, the envelopes were identically constructed, in both instances the envelopes were covered with a - and he comes a bit later on to say a 3M sticking paper.

He says a 3M sticking paper was covering the address on both the envelopes. Chairperson, are you telling us now that this covering of the envelope was such you couldn't have looked at the address? Mr Raven, no, I couldn't have looked without taking and actually damaging perhaps the envelope.

The point we make is could not have seen the name, revised version on his own evidence, chose not to see the name.

14.4 the revised version places the construction of the two devices approximately two years apart while the original version maintains that the two devices were constructed at the same time.

Raven recognised this problem when he gave his evidence in chief, and so he attempted to explain this discrepancy and he ascribes the discrepancy between saying one incident as opposed to two to the passage of time, he says, and the similarity between the two incidents.

Then he says that it was Mr Williamson's application, he read it and that is what revived his memory. We make the point in 14.6 Chairperson, that it is clear from his other applications, if one has a look at bundle 1.28 to 32, his general information and background, 44 to 45, Ruth First, that there are no problems with Raven's memory.

If one looks at the information that he furnished in relation to the death of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon, bundle 2, 108 to 109, London bomb, bundle 3, 154 to 162, no problems with his memory.

In 14.7 Chairperson, we say that the London bomb exploded on the 13th of March 1992, Ruth First was killed 5 months later on the 17th of August 1992.

CHAIRPERSON: 1982 surely?

MR BERGER: That is a mistake, I am sorry, both of them should be 1982. It is highly improbable we submit, that Raven remembered such detailed information of the events before, during and after the London bomb, but he forgot that he had manufactured the packet bombs two years apart.

We say so Chairperson and members of the Committee, because Raven knew that he killed two women, two adult women by his bombs and he knows that that did not happen at the same time.

He remembers the death of a little girl and williamson's response to that death as a discreet event. The reference is there. We submit that it is inconceivable that he could have conflated the two incidents. He only made two bombs we are told, which killed two adult women in his entire career, and when he has to think about it, for some reason, he thinks that he made the two bombs at the same time.

In 8, his explanation for not having mentioned the large official envelope and the intercepted item in his original version, is that he did not think the detail thereof, I did not realise would be of such importance.

He is asked, why didn't you put it in and he says, I didn't think detail was that important. Asked, well, why did you give that detail in respect of the London bomb and the answer there is interesting, because he reverts to his memory. He says I gave the detail about the London bomb, because of political implications, it was more clear in my mind.

As we said here earlier, this case I've got in my mind then as one occurrence, which was actually two over a period of two years.

That is, we make the point at the top of 32 that he goes back to his problems with his memory. At page 32 of his written application, this is still part of bundle 1 and it relates to the death of Ruth First ... (tape ends) ... in 1982, 1983, I can't remember the date, Craig Williamson instructed me to assemble two IED's in the form of letter bombs, A4 size.

Chairperson, I would suggest that this paragraph is an even clearer indication that he is not talking about an intercepted postal item in his application. This is the second paragraph on page 42. He gave me no indication as to who the targets were. This was the standard operational procedure, need to know. After the media reports of the death of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon and her daughter and the congratulations of Craig Williamson, did I suspect that the two IED's I had constructed, were responsible for their deaths.

We submit that that statement that there was no indication as to who the targets were, is utterly inconsistent with the version of his being handed an envelope within another envelope and the name and address of the target is on that envelope. You can hardly say that he was given no indication?

Chairperson 14.11 is - I am not going to read through it, but what we do in that paragraph is we say if the revised version, if the version that Raven placed before you, is the truth, he would not have forgotten the details that he now claims to have remembered, the dipping of the hand, the loose contents, something blocking the name, locking it away, the awkward way in which he put the letter into the intercepted item and handing it back to Williamson. He would not have forgotten it and so his previous answer to say that the London bomb was more clear in my mind, that is why he didn't remember the details of the two bombs that he constructed, is a little far fetched.

In fact, the interesting thing is that he could remember the details about how he went about constructing those two bombs, that he could remember, but he couldn't remember the intercepted item, he couldn't remember the large official envelope. He couldn't remember locking it away and all of those details.

The awkward way in which he went about, this is a man who has rubber gloves, Chairperson, you will remember that you asked him the question didn't you have your rubber gloves with you and he said no, I left them at the place where I constructed the bomb. I couldn't take them back to my office, it would have been too conspicuous. This is a man who has these rubber gloves and he goes about that awkward way of trying to insert a letter bomb into another envelope by holding it with his knuckles, lifting it partially up so that the name doesn't come out of the envelope, for some reason not taking it completely out of the official envelope, even between his knuckles, and in that elaborate scheme Chairperson, you will remember that both in his evidence in chief and under cross-examination, you in fact pointed it out Chairperson, that he would have left his fingerprints all over the various envelopes.

His claim that Williamson's application refreshed his memory, we submit is untenable. What really happened, we submit, is that Raven submitted his written application at a time when he was angry with Williamson for having publicly disclosed his covert activities. He says he was angry with him, he admits he was angry, but he says he was angry with him, because he let slip or he told the press that he had been involved in the London bomb.

The fact of the matter is on whatever version, Raven admits that he was angry with Williamson and so he decides we submit, I am going to make application for amnesty and I don't care about Williamson, he has dumped me, I am now going to save myself.

He reveals facts which are highly prejudicial to Mr Williamson, and then by the time that these hearings start, they have buried their differences and now they have to come up with a way of marrying Mr Raven's blank envelopes with Mr Williamson's intercepted envelope. We suggest that if Mr Raven had not decided to strike the deal with Mr Williamson, and had stuck to his original application, he might well have been entitled to get amnesty because then he could have said, if that was the truth, here it was, Williamson gave me an instruction, construct a bomb, these are the specifications, put it in an envelope and return it to me.

He gets the envelopes and they go off to Williamson and at that point in time, Raven hasn't the foggiest idea where it is going to, because there are no names on those envelopes. He can then simply say I was following orders and I was acting reasonably.

Williamson gave me an order construct a bomb, I constructed the bombs, I gave it back to Williamson, and I don't know anything about anything else. I am entitled to amnesty and on that basis, he might very well be entitled to amnesty. Where his application falls down, we submit Chairperson and members of the Committee, is that he aligns himself with Williamson, he then fabricates a version before you and then runs into all sorts of problems with full disclosure and all sorts of problems with political objective.

Page 33, we deal with this compromise version. Raven is now, he is now abandoned his version that he just created the envelope or he created the bomb in an envelope and handed it to Williamson and couldn't have known and he now has to deal with this version that in fact, he knew who the envelope, or he was given an envelope with the address and he now has to explain why he doesn't know for whom it was intended.

He says it is a need to know, and he describes the principle of need to know and he says you get the minimum information, and then he gives an example of a mother not knowing that her son has gone off into battle and says, well you see, that is a beautiful example of need to know. Well, that is correct, but it is not applicable to the present applications at all. We know that need to know wasn't strictly applied, we know what Craig Williamson did about need to know when he told Dirk Coetzee on two occasions and we know that Raven knew that Goosen was involved. Raven didn't need to know that Goosen was involved on the version that is presently before the Committee.

Why wasn't need to know applied there? Raven concedes that Williamson didn't tell him definitely you mustn't look at the name on the envelope, he wasn't told to lock the envelope away and he says he locked the envelope, the official envelope and its contents away because and this is a quote from him, it is obvious that if I wasn't to know who the documents were for, and nobody said that to him, and I wasn't going to be told, it would be silly leaving them laying around on the table for anybody to walk into the office and start scratching around, leaving it firstly with fingerprints and secondly knowing that I am in possession of an envelope addressed to X, Y, Z.

16.1 we say it is clear from this passage that anyone could have walked into Raven's office, see the official envelope on the desk and determine the identity of the addressee. Apparently it wasn't as easy for Raven.

On Williamson's version, there was nothing preventing Raven from seeing the name of the addressee, because Williamson saw the name of the addressee. Williamson moved those pages away and saw the address, everything but the name, yes.

Raven says in some or other way, that address had been covered. Well, not according to Williamson and then the cross-examination we submit, exposes the absurdities in Raven's evidence. It is at 19.22 to 19.23. Are you telling us now that this covering of the envelope was such that you couldn't have looked at the address? No, I couldn't have looked without taking and actually damaging perhaps, the envelope. 3M stickers are these Chairperson, that are stuck on my, on my - as flags. These are 3M stickers, they don't damage anything but Raven says, or you say Chairperson, how, tell me about this cover now that you have to damage the envelope to look at it, but you were going to put a bomb into it.

Mr Raven, if some type of 3M sticking tape that was covering the address. Then I asked him, well, how did you know that the name and address had been totally covered if you didn't remove the envelope completely and Raven says and this is when it really becomes absurd, he says but the thing is I can't remember when I removed the envelope to look at it, whether it was looking backwards towards me or with the address side towards me. That I cannot remember. This is at 19.24.

At 19.23 he said he also hadn't sealed the envelope. And then I say to him, this is still at 19.24, if you can't remember if the back was facing you or if the front was facing you, then how can you remember that there was something stuck over the name and the address? You might have been looking at the back, and it might have been stuck over the front and you wouldn't have seen it because Chairperson, you will recall that he has already confirmed, he didn't look at both sides of the envelope. His answer is, which makes no sense and vice versa is also the fact that could have been.

I then ask him, well, if you were looking at the back, why are you making up the story about the sticky tape on the name and address, you would never have seen it in the first place? Answer, I said I never knew who it was going to. No, no Mr Raven, please listen to what I am saying, you are saying you could quite easily have been looking at the back of the envelope or the front. That is correct. You didn't look at both sides of the envelope? Well, I didn't take it out. Exactly, so you didn't look at both sides of the envelope? Correct. So you could have been looking at the back? Correct, I could have. And the name and the address wouldn't have been on the back? No. So then you wouldn't have seen any sticky paper covering the name and the address? No.

So why are you talking about sticky paper covering the name and the address? He says because it could just as well have been on the front of one of the two cases, where I didn't see the address, because it came out the other way and there was sticky tape. I couldn't see the address therefore it was really a need to know, whatever that might mean.

The point that I ask the Committee to bear in mind in relation to the second application, Jeanette and Marius Schoon, is that in that application as we will point out in tomorrow's Heads, but in that application, Mr Williamson did see the name so he says, the name and the address. He says I read it, it was going to Marius and Jeanette Schoon, Lubango, Angola.

On Mr Williamson's version, he could see everything, nothing was covering the name and the address and if Mr Raven is correct that everything happened in exactly the same way, in the two applications, and that the sticky paper as Mr Du Plessis said in the earlier quote that I read out, was covering the address in both applications, even if one takes Raven on his present answer where he says that in one of the two cases, it was being covered. If it wasn't being covered in the Ruth First case, then it must have been covered in the Jeanette Schoon case, and vice versa, but in the Jeanette Schoon case, Williamson saw the name and the address and in the Ruth First case, Williamson saw the address.

Whichever way Mr Raven wants to have it, we submit that his version about sticking paper stuck over the address or the name and the address, is a fabrication. The question that must be asked is why is Raven fabricating about the name and the address being covered in this way? The answer we submit can only be because now that he is in an alliance with Mr Williamson, he is forced into absurdities to explain what is not the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I don't want to stop you because I can see there is not a great deal more, but we have had indications from other persons appearing, that they have conferences arranged in the afternoons. I did indicate that we would adjourn at four o'clock.

I don't know if that is still the position, I gather it is.

MR BIZOS: No, Mr Chairman, I was merely going to ask that if we do adjourn now or a little later, could we adjourn until nine o'clock tomorrow. It is important Mr Chairman, as I have indicated to you, that I am in difficulty about tomorrow afternoon and I should leave here at about, after tea time, at tea time and I still have to do the Williamson application on which the Heads are in preparation and also a portion of the law.

I will manage that if I am given two hours Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I had arranged to meet another Attorney who is engaged in another matter here at nine o'clock. They say that they will be five minutes.

MR BIZOS: Or so soon thereafter Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Or so soon thereafter.

MR BERGER: Mr Chairman, I will appreciate that too, because my problem of today went over to tomorrow Mr Chairman, so if we start early and the argument pertaining to Mr Raven is finished at half past nine, quarter to ten, that would place me in a much easier position.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we will start as soon after nine o'clock as possible.

MR VISSER: May I just ask, sorry Mr Chairman, to be informed, I am not quite sure what it means when my learned friend, Mr Bizos says he is not going to be available. Is it going to mean that we are going to adjourn or does it mean that we are going on with Mr Berger or somebody else?

CHAIRPERSON: No. Mr Berger.

MR BIZOS: With Mr Berger, who is going to do the ...

MR BERGER: On Mr Raven, in relation to Marius and Jeanette Schoon, yes.

MR VISSER: So only my learned friend Mr Bizos, is going away, we will carry on, is that the picture?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there is no suggestion that we are going to adjourn the hearing, we are going to finish the hearing.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS