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Amnesty HearingsType AMNESTY HEARING Starting Date 04 March 1999 Location IDASA DEMOCRACY CENTRE PRETORIA Day 9 Names HEARING : MR DU PLESSIS IN REPLY ARGUMENT Back To Top Click on the links below to view results for: +coetzee +jh Line 272Line 314Line 318Line 319Line 321Line 322Line 336Line 338Line 339Line 340Line 341Line 342Line 343Line 348Line 354Line 357Line 358Line 360Line 361Line 362Line 366Line 367Line 368Line 369Line 381Line 413Line 431Line 432Line 434Line 436Line 437Line 439Line 441Line 450Line 453Line 456Line 458Line 460Line 464Line 465Line 467Line 481Line 483Line 485Line 487Line 496Line 498Line 506Line 508Line 524Line 618 MR DU PLESSIS: ... agreement between the parties. I will start if it ... Yes, Mr Chairman, you will see my Heads of Argument are not entitled Heads, but Head. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I did that because it's going to be so short. I'm reluctant to blame it on my secretary again, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I am going to try and be very short. I tried to deal with the arguments very shortly in reply, and I have referred to certain paragraphs of the Heads of Argument of my learned friends. May I just before I start, Mr Chairman, I have gone through my Heads of Argument and I have designated specifically which paragraphs, in which paragraphs I have referred to the current record with page references. I've just made one page for purposes of that. I will hand it up to Your Lordship, Judge Wilson. That is just an indication of all the places in my Heads of Argument where I refer to this specific record. I'm not going to say anything further about that, that is just in answer to the criticism that I didn't refer to any places in my Heads of Argument to this specific record. MR DU PLESSIS: Those are pages of my Heads of Argument. CHAIRPERSON: Your original Heads? MR DU PLESSIS ARGUES IN REPLY: My original Heads of Argument. Each and every paragraph and each and every page where I refer to this specific record with record page reference. Mr Chairman, may I start with my Heads of Argument and may I at the beginning deal with what I believe is the essence of this matter and the essence of the argument. Mr Chairman, my learned friend, Mr Bizos said somewhere in his argument that he relies on the facts and then he applies the law, and I have a lot of sympathy with that. But with respect to Mr Bizos, Mr Chairman, one perhaps should also have regard to the Act and the requirements of the Act. And that is where the gist of the argument comes in. And in my submission, Mr Chairman, the point I'm going to make now is going to take care of approximately three-quarters of the Heads of Argument of my learned friends. That relates to Section 20(2)(b). May I just start in paragraph 3 by saying that the term "legitimate target" is a totally misplaced term. It is a term derived from struggle language, Mr Chairman. It has got nothing to do with this Act, it has got nothing to do with the legal requirements, and no applicant has to show that what he did was directed against a legitimate target. Paragraph 4 of my Heads of Argument, on page 2, sets out the important aspect that I want to draw to your attention. In terms of Section 20.2.B the applicants have to prove, apart from other requirements, that their actions were directed against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle against a State or a former State - and then I've taken the liberty, Mr Chairman, to emphasis the or in capital letters, OR against any members, supporters of such organisations. That is clear in the Act, Mr Chairman, in Section 20(2)(b). It must have been directed either against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement OR against members or supporters of such organisation. So an act taking place ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Is there significance against any members? MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, the only significance, in my submission, is the fact that it makes it very wide, any members or supporters of such organisation or movement. It is a very wide terminology to indicate, and it's not just a member, it's a supporter, so any supporter, any person who walked around in South Africa supporting the liberation movements would fall under this category. CHAIRPERSON: But you have to read it with the and, don't you, Mr du Plessis? - And which was committed bona fide with the object of countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's a separate requirement. CHAIRPERSON: So you cannot just justify it by saying well he was a member of the ANC. MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, it's got to be, it had to be, Mr Chairman, as part of your actions countering or resisting the struggle. So if a security policeman in the execution of his duties acted against the liberation movements and that was how he believed he did it, he would qualify with the next requirement bone fide with the object of countering or resisting the struggle. But Mr Chairman, I want to draw a line before the word "and", because that's a next requirement. In respect of the requirement before the last requirement, before we reach the bona fide stage in this section, you can either prove that you acted against an organisation or liberation movement, or against a member or supporter. Now in certain instances one will be able to prove both. That would be easy. But in the situation of Mr Raven, Mr Chairman, if his evidence is that he manufactured the bombs as part of what he did as part of the Security Forces in actions directed against the liberation movements, that's enough. And he asks for amnesty, Mr Chairman, because he manufactured bombs, and his testimony is that he had at least dolus eventualis pertaining to this act. He knew that this act culminate in the death of people. And that is the problem, Mr Chairman, and that is where the whole misconception, with respect to my learned friends, comes in. That is what Mr Raven is asking amnesty for. That is what Mr Williamson is asking amnesty for. For their participation in the manufacture of the bomb until the time that envelope was handed to Brigadier Goosen. And one has to look at that, coupled with their intention, to determine if they had dolus eventualis and if they could be prosecuted for murder because they did that. And that they did as part of their actions, bona fide, against a publicly known political organisation. The use of the word "or" above is important, it indicates that an applicant has to show either that he acted against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement or a member or supporter. The word "and" is not used, and therefore if an applicant proves that he acted against a liberation movement he need not prove that the action was eventually directed against a member or supporter. And then I make the all important point in paragraph 6, Mr Chairman, where I say: It is this distinction which led to amnesty applications being granted in the applications of Brian Mitchell, Amy Biehl, the St James Church, the Heidelberg Tavern incident Because in those incidents, Mr Chairman, in Brian Mitchell's case, eventually what he did was, the victims were innocent people but what did he do, his actions were directed against the liberation movements. Now on the arguments of my learned friends, Mr Chairman, Brian Mitchell wouldn't have received amnesty, the killers of Amy Biehl wouldn't have received amnesty and the killers in the St James Church incident wouldn't have received amnesty. In fact in that incident a Russian sailor was killed, who could have had nothing to do with the struggle in South Africa at the time. He was an innocent person, an innocent bystander. On my learned friend's argument further, Mr Chairman, the applicants in the Church Street Bomb attack won't get amnesty. Any person who planted a landmine won't get amnesty. If these actions all had to be directed against a specific victim or a specific target which according to them is a legitimate target, none of these people would get amnesty, especially nobody who planted a landmine. ADV DE JAGER: But isn't there a difference? If you've chosen a target and - well let's get down to the facts in this case, you've chosen Joe Slovo as a target but now you're killing Ruth First, or for instance, let's take it a bit further, you've killed Mr Pallo Jordan who was in the room there, but you've never had in your mind that you wanted to kill Mr Jordan for instance. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, then you would still qualify if your evidence is that what you did was directed against the liberation movements, even though you targeted a specific person, even though you targeted Joe Slovo. If your actions were part of the Security Force's actions against the liberation movements and you knew that you targeted Joe Slovo because he was part of the liberation movements, you would still succeed because you would still qualify for that one requirement, that you acted against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement. ADV DE JAGER: Let me go on from there. Suppose you're targeting First and she had nothing to do with the political movement, or suppose you've targeted, let's make it Mr X who had nothing to do with the opposition, but you carelessly thought that he had something to do with the political movement. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, sorry? ADV DE JAGER: Would that be ...(inaudible) MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, one has to keep in mind - and that comes back to the argument that I raised in my Heads of Argument about the test in Section 20(3), because one deals with this test but you also have to deal with Section 20(3). Now the question is then, what should the test be, should it be subjective or should it be objective? If on your facts it is objective, one's not supposed to get amnesty. However, if the main purpose of your actions subjectively were still bona fide, then you should get amnesty. And your example, Mr Chairman, is the converse of the Brain Mitchell situation. But at the end of the day that is why I tried to emphasise the fact that the test is mainly a subjective test. So ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: But even assuming it's subjective, if you're careless, would you be bona fide? MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, the question of bona fides, if we just look at that, the requirement is bona fide with the object of countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle. So one shouldn't read bona fides in isolation in Section 20(2)(b), as my learned friends argue, otherwise there would have been a comma after bona fide. Bona fide relates to the object of countering or otherwise resisting the struggle. So if you acted in such an instance, Mr Chairman, believing that you acted against a person who was a member or otherwise believing that you acted against a publicly known political organisation, you should receive amnesty, because bona fide is coupled with the object of countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle. It doesn't stand alone in the Act. So if you target somebody mistakenly, Mr Chairman, and you are bona fide that the act that you are embarking upon is part of the struggle against the liberation movements, but you were wrong and that you were wrong in your view of the victim or the target, Mr Chairman, you should get amnesty. One could perhaps say the following, Mr Chairman - let's get back to the Church Street Bomb, I don't know what the evidence was, but let's suppose the evidence was that I who was responsible for the bomb, thought that there would only be military personnel on the sidewall before the building, that was my information, I thought that. So I didn't have a specific target, but I thought that that would be the situation and now civilians are killed. I never directed my mind towards that, towards the killing of a civilian, but my act was against the State and it was bona fide with the object of countering or resisting a struggle. I know I'm applying the test now to the wrong set of facts, but that is the case, Mr Chairman. So if a person acts, he has a subjective view that he acts as part of the struggle against the liberation movements, and he acts against an innocent person but bona fide subjectively he believes that he's acting in resisting the struggle, he should get amnesty. The only stage where amnesty should be denied is if a person acts against a victim whom he knows has got nothing to do with the struggle. In such a case, Mr Chairman, clearly he shouldn't get amnesty because he's not going to comply with these requirements. CHAIRPERSON: Or if he acts against someone who is taking part in the struggle, but his motive is personal. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, ill-will, spite or malice, yes Mr Chairman, obviously, obviously. But in the instance of Mr Raven that is not a question, so I don't want to address you about the question how far if one has a dual purpose. Let's say for instance you have a purpose of ill-will, spite or malice but that person was also part of the struggle, should you be excluded from amnesty or not. That question may arise in the Bellingan matter and I will have to deal with it there, but Mr Chairman, I don't want to get into that argument now. The point is simply, the point is simply, Mr Chairman, that in respect of - and can I get back to paragraph 7 of my Heads of Argument. In Jerry Raven's case his evidence was clear. He expected the bombs to go to high-profile people involved with the liberation movements. It could have been anyone. He acted as part of the Security Forces in their actions against the liberation movements. He qualifies for amnesty, notwithstanding and irrespective of the standing Ruth First had with the ANC or the standing the Schoons had within the ANC. The only reason why these issues were raised in cross-examination by myself, Mr Chairman, was for purposes of the proportionality argument. It was important to show that the person, that the political objective to be obtained was, or the act was related to the political objective so that one qualifies for the proportionality argument. If one targeted a person who was appointed to do some menial task in some godforsaken place somewhere, like doing the garden of Mr Thabo Mbeki somewhere in Lusaka, and you targeted that person, you may have a problem with proportionality. And that was the reason why I concentrated in my cross-examination on the standing of Ruth First and Marius Schoon, and that's the only reason, simply for purposes of the proportionality argument. And that is only Section 20.3.F. In fact if the argument of the opponent should upheld it would lead to a situation where nobody who was involved in the planting of a limpet-mine, a landmine or the use of any bomb whatsoever would receive amnesty. No such applicant would be able to link the bomb attack to a specific victim, it would have the most startling consequences. And then I make the point I've already made, Mr Chairman. The only importance is with reference to Section 20(3)(f) and 20(3)(d). And Mr Chairman, I say in paragraph 10: "Jerry Raven did not know who the bombs were meant for, and he simply acted in an execution of an order as a security policeman in the struggle against the liberation movements. He acted with a political motive against the context and background of the struggle, with the object of building a bomb directed at the liberation movements, with the approval of the Security Police accepting that the bomb could kill somebody. And killing has already been found not necessarily to be out of proportion to a political objective in terms of Section 20.3.F. Furthermore, all the requirements of Section 20.2.B have been complied with. There is no reason why it can be said that Jerry Raven did not act bona fide with the object of countering or resisting the struggle. It is important to note that bona fides relates to the object of countering or resisting the struggle and does not stand as a separate requirement. I've already dealt with that point. The essence of the matter is that Jerry Raven did not act in any other way than with a political motive. He made the bomb, he disclosed that he made the bomb, the bomb caused the death of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon, and that is the end of the argument. And Mr Chairman, Mr Berger conceded in his argument that if Raven had said that he had received an order from Williamson and that he executed the order, he would have had a political objective. And that concession clearly accords with Mr Raven's evidence. Mr Berger argued (paragraph 14), that the assumption by Raven that he acted against the liberation movements would then be reasonable. The evidence of Raven was that he assumed that the bombs would have been used against the liberation movements. It is submitted that Mr Berger in these arguments advanced by him actually agrees with the case of Mr Raven. It accords with Raven's evidence. And the position of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon in the ANC is totally irrelevant. Apart obviously from the proportionality test. Therefore the argument that there is an attempt to ex post facto prove a political objective is totally misplaced. Furthermore, Raven's evidence was clear that he did not know for whom the bomb was intended. Even if he did know it would not be relevant for purposes of his application, as his case is clearly that he acted against the liberation movements. Furthermore, Raven did not ... ADV DE JAGER: ... relevant as far as credibility is concerned, that sort of thing? MR DU PLESSIS: Correct. Obviously, Mr Chairman. Furthermore, Raven did not have to prove that Ruth First was (dare I use legitimate target, I've fallen into that trap) was a target for assassination. He did not know anything about Ruth First and the Schoons, and therefore his evidence should be accepted that he assumed that the people targeted would have been high-profile members. And then, Mr Chairman, paragraph 18, Mr Berger addressed argument to you about the reasonable requirement in Section 20(2)(f) of the Act. Mr Berger argues that the unreasonableness lies in the fact that Raven deliberately refrained from looking at the addresses. He accepts therefore the evidence of Mr Raven that he did not look at the addresses. And that is a further concession he made in his argument. However, that is not how ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Did he in fact accept this or was he arguing "even if he did do this". MR DU PLESSIS: Well let me accept that he argued it on that basis, Mr Chairman. However, ...(intervention) MR BERGER: Mr Chairman, I'm sorry to interrupt, but my learned friend has not put my argument correctly. I did not accept that Jerry Raven would be entitled to amnesty on his application, I said if he had persisted with the application as set out in his written application, he might well have been entitled to amnesty. He would still have to come and provide further details. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I didn't interrupt when my learned friend was arguing. If I can carry on in paragraph 18: However, that is not how reasonableness is relevant in Section 20(2)(f). Section 20(2)(f) deals with the question if an applicant on reasonable grounds believed that he or she was acting in the course of the scope of his duty. So the argument pertaining to reasonableness raised by Mr Berger is untenable. Raven's job was not to decide if the target was reasonable or not. If he did not know who the targets were he could have left it to his superiors and that would have been reasonable. Then I refer to the Rhodesian case. And I just make the point, Mr Chairman, that bona fides there was dealt with in a totally different context. The argument that Raven had to know for whom the bomb was intended, in paragraph 29.7, is not well founded. He knew that it was going to high-profile persons of the liberation movements, and that would have been enough. And then I repeat the argument about the other applicants in the other applications. In paragraph 29.8 reference is made to personal enemies of Mr Williamson. Raven testified that this was a possibility but highly unlikely, and that he accepted that his superiors would have decided to whom it had to go. He testified that he had not reason to doubt Williamson and that he accepted that it would have been sent to a high-profile person. Even if Raven had looked to see for whom the bomb was intended, Mr Chairman, would not have made any difference whatsoever. He didn't know about Ruth First, he did not know anything about the Schoons, he did know much about Ruth First and did not know anything about the Schoons, and that wouldn't have effected his political motive at all. It would not have affected his actions in terms of his evidence. Paragraph 29.11 is also not well founded, Raven need not have considered the consequences of the bomb, or if he was likely to achieve his objective he only had to accept that it was part of his duties in combating the liberation movements. There are furthermore no facts which were placed were placed before the Committee indicating that Raven acted in any other way but with a political motive Bona fide as a security policeman as part of the fight against the liberation movements. The question who was killed eventually does not come into the argument at all. And then I just come back to the essence of the matter. Mr Raven is asking for amnesty for making the bombs and for the fact that he had dolus eventualis pertaining to the use of the bombs. His actions by making the bombs were associated with a political objective. And that is the crux of the matter in respect of the political objective, Mr Chairman. Then in respect of full disclosure, I make the point, Mr Chairman, that one has to have regard to the fact that it should be disclosure of relevant facts. So Mr Chairman, I know it's always an argument, how far does one have to go, but surely Mr Raven does not have to disclose to you with what colour toothbrush he ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Coming back to 26, the first part. He's asking for amnesty for the death too because of dolus eventualis. If you're asking for amnesty for an offence, in respect of that offence shouldn't you have a political motive too? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, in respect of each and every offence. Now the offence would be murder, he would be liable to be prosecuted for murder. Because I say, Mr Chairman, ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) instructions ...(indistinct) making the bomb were associated with a political object. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, the offence. ADV DE JAGER: Ja, and do you also say that, in the first sentence, ...(indistinct) associated with a political objective? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes. Yes, Mr Chairman, sorry, maybe I wasn't careful enough to formulate it, but obviously that is the case. Mr Chairman, in paragraph 28 I say: It is submitted that the question, if two or three envelopes were used, what colour the envelopes were, in which filing cabinet they were locked, if gloves were used or not, or other irrelevant details should not be important when full disclosure is considered. It is important, Mr Chairman, to determine what was done. And Mr Raven explained to you what was done. It would surely be a totally untenable situation if you would find on the probabilities that there were two envelopes involved and not three, on probabilities perhaps, that Mr Raven should be refused amnesty because of that. And that is the point I'm trying to make, Mr Chairman. One has to have regard to what full disclosure means and what relevant facts mean. It is submitted that full disclosure does not mean a consideration of the credibility of an applicant as in a criminal case. Credibility is an important factor, but care should be taken that a credibility finding on an irrelevant fact is not blown up to such an extent that an applicant does not get amnesty for an act which he has disclosed, for which he should get amnesty, but for some trivial issue." And then the all-important point, Mr Chairman. There are no facts which contradict the version of Mr Raven about the order he received and the construction of the bomb. There is no evidence that he must have known who the bombs were intended for. Mr Raven testified about his versions in his written application and explained the fact that he explains the incidents as if they happened at the same time. He was forthright with his explanation and the fact that he did not give this detail in his written applications can never be held against him. It has been the practice of the amnesty committee to allow an applicant to elaborate on his application at a hearing. It should not be held against an applicant if he did not disclose a specific fact in his written application. And that is borne out by lots of judgments which the Amnesty Committee has already made. In fact in the Cronje matters lots was presented, apart from what was in the written applications, Mr Chairman. It is clear that it is totally improbable that he would have manufactured a letter bomb in 1982 which would have been used in 1984. Mr Chairman so, I know the two versions are approximately the same and Mr Raven explained the reason therefore. But on the argument of Mr Berger, if that is true then one should accept, if he made the bombs at the same time, one should accept that the one bomb was floating around for two years before it was used, and that is totally improbable. It's therefore clear that his oral evidence is correct pertaining to this issue. It was not an amendment or a change to his evidence ... That's paragraph 33, Mr Chairman. ... in the written application, but simply an elaboration thereof. There is no question about any so-called (it should be "revised", Mr Chairman) revised version or a compromise version. The fact of the matter is that Raven elaborated on the evidence in his application, he didn't contradict it. The reference to the large official envelope and to more than one envelope is in fact supported by what Mr Williamson told Gillian Slovo in the interview held with Williamson by Gillian Slovo. That is clear from the exhibit, Mr Chairman. I couldn't remember, I didn't have it with me last night, exactly which exhibit it is. Perhaps Mr Williamson can be of assistance, or Mr Levine. It is one of those transcripts of one of those ...(indistinct). MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, my recollection is it's X2. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to Mr Levine. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Levine. CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) - 41 you say? MR LEVINE: I believe so, that is correct, Mr Chairman. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, there Mr Williamson refers to ... MR DU PLESSIS: May I enquire if you've found the place, Mr Chairman? You will see the discussion is a strange discussion and it's not all that clear, and it consists of a lot of suppositions, but there is mention there of more than one envelope. Raven should not be criticised for explaining the evidence in more detail in his oral evidence. The application ... CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) paragarph? ... the application does not state that the envelope the bomb was to be constructed in was a blank envelope. My learned friend kept on arguing about that. It doesn't say, in the written application, it was a blank envelope, it refers to an envelope. The argument that he could not have seen the name because it did not exist in the written version in the application, is therefore simply not correct. The argument in paragraphs 14.2 and 14.3 of the Heads of Argument of my learned friend, my learned friends, is not correct. Raven's evidence was that he looked at the intercepted mail item to see how thick it was. And then important, Mr Chairman, and that's something that wasn't alluded to by my learned friends in a lot of detail in their Heads, although I think they referred to it once, is the fact that he testified that he only partly removed the intercepted mail item. It was in a large envelope and he only partly removed it. I'll give you the page reference there, Mr Chairman. And then I say, his evidence was clear that he did not see the address. Now one can argue about probabilities and say: "Well, maybe it was probable that he could have seen the address, or shouldn't he have looked at the address?", Mr Chairman, but let's say for instance you make a finding that it would have been more probable for him to have looked at the address, there's no evidence to contradict his evidence, where you have to make a probability finding on two different versions. And if ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: But if you find his version is so grossly improbable, you don't need evidence to contradict it, do you, Mr du Plessis? MR DU PLESSIS: Well even that is so and even if you make such a finding, Mr Chairman, it does not, it cannot lead to a finding that he hasn't made a full disclosure. He has made a full disclosure of all the relevant facts, Mr Chairman. And if the envelope was yellow or pink or brown, those small little details after 16 years ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: But who it is addressed to is a relevant fact, Mr du Plessis. MR DU PLESSIS: Not in terms of my argument pertaining to Section 20.2.B, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Because you say that he didn't know who the Schoons were, it wouldn't have told him anything? CHAIRPERSON: But had the address been - had the bomb been addressed to the CNA ... MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes, that could have been. CHAIRPERSON: ... then it would have been he did not disclose it, because it disposes of his argument that it was aimed at a political organisation. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but that is not the facts in this matter, Mr Chairman. And he accepted ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: But if one finds he's lying on the point and concealing the information, aren't we driven to find he's not made a full disclosure? MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, because at the end of the day the evidence is accepted by everybody here, that the bomb that was manufactured, the bombs that were manufactured there reached Ruth First and it reached Jeanette Schoon, and he knew and accepted that Mr Williamson would have given him an order to act against a high-profile activist. So that possibility could be relevant if the facts were different. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the Act says where there's not full disclosure, it doesn't say but you can nevertheless grant it for other reasons. If we find there is not full disclosure, he's not entitled to amnesty is he? MR DU PLESSIS: Of relevant facts, Mr Chairman. MR DU PLESSIS: And that's the point I'm trying to make, that's the point I'm trying to make. But in any event, Mr Chairman, he testified that he had to act on a need-to-know basis, that he didn't see the addresses, and his testimony was that even if he had seen the addresses, Mr Chairman, it wouldn't have made a difference. That was his evidence. Even if he had seen the addresses it wouldn't have made a difference. Raven's explanation about the fact that the two bombs were manufactured at different stages is probable, taking into account a two-year period between the two incidents. He cannot be criticised for that. There is no reason why Raven would have wanted to say that the two bombs were manufactured at the same time, and it's highly improbable that a bomb would have floated around for two years before it was used. In any event, this aspect was not dealt with or challenged seriously in cross-examination. I don't think it was dealt with at all. MR SIBANYONI: Excuse me, Mr du Plessis, talking about the two bombs. There is an application by Bosch which was withdrawn. Bosch talks about making a parcel which was converted into a bomb and which eventually was used to kill Jeanette Schoon, and Mr Raven never said anything, if I remember well, about that. What is your argument, has he made full disclosure? MR DU PLESSIS: Well, Mr Chairman, I think it was accepted by everybody that Bosch wasn't involved in this matter and the evidence was placed before the Committee. I cannot even remember that Mr Raven was challenged about the question. I think he was asked. I cannot a hundred percent recall about Bosch. But if he wasn't asked about Bosch, Mr Chairman, and he wasn't challenged by the possibility that Bosch may have been involved or not, surely it cannot be held against him with a finding now, that Bosch may have been involved or not. I don't know if that deals with the answer. CHAIRPERSON: Mustn't one also have regard to Mr Bosch's application? I have the same view as my colleague, that I looked at Bosch's application again and what he says he was asked to do, at page 123, that he was asked to stick documents together. He at a later stage accepted that it had been changed to a bomb which was used for Jeanette Schoon. So to his knowledge at the time he was not making a bomb, he was preparing, sticking 30 pages of letters together which might have been used for some other purpose. The inside hadn't been cut out. He had no part in that making of the bomb. He says the same thing later at his other affidavit. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, the answer to that can be found in Mr Raven's evidence, that they manufactured bombs like this for training purposes lots of times. He testified that. And I think that was the basis upon which Mr Roussouw withdrew this application. Because Mr Bosch could not link what he did, with the, where he says he took the pages and he put them together, that he couldn't link that with the Jeanette Schoon incident, and that's why he withdrew his application, Mr Chairman. Now the answer to that question is simple, and that is that Mr Raven testified that for training purposes they manufactured letter-bombs, to show people how it worked. In fact he testified that to show somebody to disassemble such a bomb, they should know how such a bomb is assembled and do you open it. In fact I think he explained to you, Mr Chairman, that one has to open a bomb by cutting the envelope in the middle with a cross and not along the sides and so on. So I think that disposes of that question, Mr Chairman. Mr Bosch wasn't involved in this specific incident. And on the evidence of Mr Raven, one has to accept that because in all probability Mr Bosch could just as well have been involved in some manufacturing of a bomb for training purposes. That's why Mr Bosch withdrew his application, because he couldn't link what he did to the, specifically to the Schoon incident. Paragraph 41 of my Heads of Argument, Mr Chairman, I say: It should be remembered that the envelope with the address on in the First incident was only partly removed from the large envelope, and therefore Raven could not have seen the name. There are no facts to contradict Raven's evidence. The criticism in paragraph 14.11 is unwarranted. This provides the detail of what Raven did. Mr Chairman, that's where Mr Berger argued that all the evidence about Raven dipping his hand into the envelope, the loose contents, etc., etc. There is no suggestion that it could have happened any other way. The question is if Mr Berger is arguing that all of this was made up by Raven and did not happen. If not, what is Mr Berger's version about what happened? Is he saying there were no envelopes, is he saying there was only one envelope? What are the facts upon which he could base such averments? No evidence was presented to you that to manufacture a letter-bomb you have to go about it differently, Mr Chairman, and that Mr Raven's evidence is ridiculous because this is not the way you manufacture a letter-bomb. He had no facts to rely on, no evidence was presented, that the method of manufacturing of the bomb does not accord with normal principles or standards of manufacturing a letter-bomb. Therefore Raven's evidence about this cannot be disputed. And then the question of the fingerprints, Mr Chairman. Mr Raven explained that in his evidence, that he used his knuckles when he manufactured the bomb and that he used his fingers to show the Committee how the bomb was ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Did he use his knuckles when he, or did he use a, didn't he use a rubber ...(indistinct) MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, he used rubber gloves when he manufactured the bomb. And he testified that he used his knuckles when he held - I think he showed you that when he held the envelope up, he used his knuckles to hold the envelope up when he slipped the bomb in, Mr Chairman. ADV DE JAGER: Is your statement correct there, that he used his knuckles when he manufactured the bomb? MR DU PLESSIS: I'm sorry, it's not correct. It should be, he used his knuckles when he put the bomb inside the envelope, I'm sorry. When he manufactured the bomb he used rubber gloves. Then paragraph 14.13, paragraph 45 of my Heads. That is where Mr Berger criticised the question of Raven's evidence that Williamson's application refreshed his memory. I make the point, Mr Chairman: There are no facts to substantiate that Raven and Williamson decided to work together, that they had reconciled and that they therefore fabricated the version. That argument really implicates that I would have been party to that, Mr Chairman, and I reject that. In fact Williamson's version was disclosed to Gillian Slovo long before this application, and at a time when Raven and Williamson supposedly were angry with each other. Raven's evidence does not contradict Williamson's evidence, Raven simply elaborated on the written application. It is furthermore important to take into account that there is no reason why Raven would have lied at all. He could not achieve anything by it. Furthermore, the only place where his evidence ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Sorry before you go on ....(intervention) MR DU PLESSIS: This is important, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't Mr Berger's case that Raven changed his evidence? He didn't say that his evidence contradicted Williamson's evidence. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't his case that the application contradicted Williamson's evidence? MR DU PLESSIS: But it doesn't, Mr Chairman, it doesn't because ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Oh, it's not the evidence? He didn't make - you here say "Raven's evidence did not contradict" That was not Mr Berger's case of the evidence. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes, yes. I don't think it was meant to convey that that was Mr Berger's argument, I simply make the point that Raven's evidence does not contradict Williamson's evidence, Raven elaborated on the written application. The only criticism of Mr Berger as I understand it, Mr Chairman, is that Mr Raven now came before the Committee and explained things in a bit more detail. And the only point to consider here is ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: But he also tried to sort of soften at least, some of the allegations he put forward in his written application. MR DU PLESSIS: Soften in what extent, Mr Chairman? Yes, the fact that ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) involvement of the child and the child's playing. The child being used to play with dangerous things in order to see whether it was a bomb or not. MR DU PLESSIS: Well he gave evidence about that, Mr Chairman, and he testified that he can't remember where exactly he heard or how he heard it, Mr Chairman, and that's as far as it goes. And in any event, Mr Chairman, the point I'm trying to make at the end of the day, Mr Chairman, is surely facts condensed as they were in the application, Mr Chairman, can never, if you relate it in evidence and you tell the Committee the story and you explain certain things, Mr Chairman, clearly the implication will be different. It may be that the impression is created that it was, something was a bit more of a serious action, or something was a bit less serious than it sounds in the application, Mr Chairman. And even if you say that he tried to soften it, Mr Chairman, that's part of his explanation and it's not a question that he needed to soften that evidence for purposes, for any other purposes, he tried to ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps I've also softened it. MR DU PLESSIS: It may be, Mr Chairman. The point is, what could Raven achieve by lying to the Committee, Mr Chairman, what would he achieve? - nothing. And if there was a contradiction between his version and Mr Williamson's version, which he now tried to bring in line with Mr Williamson's version, perhaps that would be something to speak about. but there are no contradictions. In fact they were involved in different stages in this operation. Williamson gave him the envelope, he manufactured the bomb and he gave the envelope back to Mr Williamson. There is no overlapping between their evidence. So there is no reason why Mr Raven would have lied about anything in his application, Mr Chairman. The only place where his evidence and Williamson's evidence overlaps is about the address on the envelopes, and if the addresses were covered or not. Apart from that, Raven's evidence about he manufactured and everything else pertaining to the bomb has no bearing upon Williamson's evidence. There could therefore have been no reason whatsoever to try and fabricate a version, as Williamson and Raven were involved in the matters in different capacities and at different times. It is in any event not relevant to determine how many envelopes there were, or if Raven did or did not look at the address. The fact of the matter is that Raven testified that he acted against the liberation movements, that he acted on orders. He testified that he accepted that the targets would have been high-profile people. The criticism against Raven for not looking at the addresses is not well-founded. Raven worked on a need-to-know basis and he did not regard it as necessary. It is important to note, and I emphasise that again Mr Chairman, that Raven testified that he did not take the envelope fully from the large envelope. So Mr Chairman, at the end of the day my submission is that Raven's evidence pertaining to the address on the envelope should stand, and if he saw the address or not. His evidence was that he didn't see it and that he didn't look for it, and if Williamson didn't tell him about it, he didn't want to look for it. And then I refer you to my cross-examination of Mr Williamson about the envelopes, Mr Chairman, and ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, I'm just lost. Can we go back to paragraph 37? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Reference to paragraph 14.2 and 14.3. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, that argument ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: No, paragraph 14.2 and 14.3 of what? MR DU PLESSIS: Of Mr Berger's Heads of Argument. That's what I refer to every time. CHAIRPERSON: Of Mr Berger's Heads? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Page 30 of the Heads of Argument, Mr Chairman. I'm sorry, I should have pointed that out to you. CHAIRPERSON: I've got it as Levine's and I'm getting totally confused. MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, it's Mr Berger's argument. Mr Chairman, and Mr Berger ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: But where is - oh. MR DU PLESSIS: Page 30, page 30, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: Fine, I'm alright now, thank you. MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if I could just deal with that. In paragraph 14.2, Mr Berger says: "The care taken by Raven to avoid seeing the name of the address he referred to the revised version, so-called revised version, is not mentioned at all in the original version." Yes, he elaborated on that in his evidence. "In the original version, Raven could not have seen the name because it did not exist." On what does he base that, Mr Chairman? The only reason why he says that is that he accepts that Mr Raven refers in the written application, to a blank envelope in which he manufactured the bomb. And the point I'm trying to make, Mr Chairman, there in paragraph 37, is that: Raven's evidence was in any event that he looked at the intercepted mail item to see how thick it was and he only partly removed it. His evidence was clear that he did not see the address. Mr Berger argues that in the revised version, Raven could have seen the name but chose not to look. And that accords with Raven's evidence. It's not a question of a revised version, it's an elaboration of what was stated in the original application. In the original application no reference is made of the large official envelope, the intercepted mail item and the envelope in which the bomb was manufactured. But that doesn't mean that there's a contradiction, Mr Chairman, it only means that he has now testified in detail about this. In the written application he testified about the envelope in which the bomb was made, and in general he said that that was handed to Mr Williamson. Now he comes and says okay, the way it worked was there was a large envelope, there was an intercepted mail item, and he simply elaborates on his evidence. MR DU PLESSIS: I think I've lost my place, Mr Chairman. Paragraph 49, page 19, thank you. Paragraph 49, I make the point, Mr Chairman, that it is important for you for purposes of evaluating this, the evidence about the envelopes, to read my cross-examination of Mr Williamson, because if you read it in toto, and not just selective excerpts which appear in the Heads of Argument of my learned friends, then you will see, Mr Chairman, that Williamson's version about the envelopes accords with Mr Raven's evidence. And I give you the page references there. And you will see that I ask the questions of Mr Williamson in detail, so as to test the fact if they accorded or not. The fact that Raven testified that the two matters happened the same time, does not necessarily mean that everything was one hundred percent the same. He testified that the Schoon and First incidents happened exactly the same time, but surely one can expect certain minor deviations. The fact that Williamson said that he saw the address of the Schoons on their envelope, does not mean that Raven could have or should have seen it. Raven says he didn't see it. If Williamson said he saw it, it doesn't mean Raven saw it, because Raven's evidence is that he only partly removed the intercepted mail item simply to see how thick it was, for purposes of manufacturing the bomb. Then paragraph 53, Mr Chairman, refers to paragraph 18 of the Heads of Argument of my learned friends. I say there: It is argued that Raven's version is improbable that he did not see the names and addresses on the envelopes. However, the question arises why Raven should lie about this. Raven's case is that he acted against the liberations movements. If he had seen the address or not, it would not make any difference to his case in terms of the Act. There is no motive or reason for Raven to lie. To lie about this, Mr Chairman, is not going to take him further in his amnesty application. It wouldn't have made any difference, and therefore, Mr Chairman, even if one should say, well shouldn't human nature have caused him to look or shouldn't he have been more inquisitive about it or whatever, the point is, Mr Chairman, under those circumstances he testified that he worked on a need-to-know basis, he didn't look, Williamson didn't tell him, he didn't regard it as important. And that's his evidence. And that, Mr Chairman with respect, should stand. And even if you find that there may be a degree of improbability in that, Mr Chairman, his evidence cannot be rejected offhand on that specific point and he should not be denied amnesty because you may perhaps have some doubt about the probability about this, Mr Chairman. So I say: He testified that he did not see the addresses, and the fact that he could have seen the addresses, should not detract from the fact he testified that he did not. He testified he acted on a need-to-know basis and did not regard it as appropriate to enquire who the targets were if he was not told by Williamson. He acted on orders and executed those orders. It is submitted that ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Can one except - perhaps except is putting it a little high, that there may have been a reverse of the need-to-know basis, that persons working in various sections of the Security Police at that time may have operated on a basis "don't-want-to-know"? MR DU PLESSIS: Well I think that was Mr Raven's evidence. He actually testified that, he said well, if they don't want me to know about it, I don't want to know anything, I'll make the bomb and that's it. CHAIRPERSON: And I would rather not know what it's all about. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And Mr Chairman, I know I've been criticised for referring to other matters, but you have heard lots of evidence about this. And how the need-to-know principle function, Mr Chairman, is that I will be involved to the limited extent I'm required. I don't want to know anything about it because I don't want to be forced into some sort of situation that I have to lie under oath later, or I have to say something about it later. The less I know the better. That's how need-to-know works. And Mr Raven's evidence was in fact, in this incident, Mr Chairman, that he didn't want to know. If Williamson didn't want to tell him, it was not his job to find out. And that is a factor of probability in his favour on this evidence, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I deal again with the envelopes, and it's just a repetition of the argument in paragraph 55 and 56. The argument in paragraphs 19 and 20 of my learned friends' Heads of Argument about the construction of the bomb is strange. No evidence was tendered how a letter-bomb should have been made. The question of the thickness of the intercepted item was not dealt with in cross-examination, he was not asked if it was usual to rely on an estimate. It's also not clear why Raven would have sealed the envelope before returning it to Williamson. There exists no other version about the construction of the bomb and the criticism cannot stand. And then paragraph 21, 22 and 23 of my learned friends' arguments, Mr Chairman, it is ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: The one point here in 57, you say it's not clear why Raven would have sealed the envelope before returning it to Williamson. But if the thing slid out of the envelope it would have blown up, wouldn't it? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman. But if you read his - I did that yesterday, if you read his evidence about how he manufactured the bomb and how he fastened it to the envelope, Mr Chairman, you will see that that would have been highly improbable. That would have been ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, which envelope wasn't sealed? MR DU PLESSIS: I looked at the evidence, Mr Chairman ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Was it the bomb envelope or was it the cover envelope which covered the bomb? MR DU PLESSIS: His evidence is not clear about that, Mr Chairman. I looked at it yesterday and there are various passages. The one passage refers to what he would do in general. That is what Mr Visser referred to. And that passage refers tot the fact that he glued the envelope together. And I actually asked him a question about the manufacture of the bomb and in my question I said to him: "when you closed the envelope", and I suggested the answer really, it was a leading question, but thereafter his evidence was that the envelope where the bomb was not in was not closed. I checked the evidence yesterday, Mr Chairman. But even if that is so, it makes no difference because, Judge Wilson, if you read the evidence pertaining to the way he manufactured the bomb and fastened it to the envelope, there is no way that it could have just slipped out and gone off. CHAIRPERSON: But isn't that what causes it to go off, that if it is pulled out, moved out of the envelope? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but it must be pulled out of the envelope. You will read his - if you read his evidence you will see it breaks the circuit if it is pulled out, so there must be some force in it to pull it out, Mr Chairman. ADV DE JAGER: Maybe then I've been under the wrong impression in putting it to Mr Berger, I thought it was the outside envelope, the second one, that wasn't sealed. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I checked it when that altercation was going here yesterday, and that is why I'm dealing with it now. CHAIRPERSON: I was under the impression that if you shook the envelope then it fell out, it could fall out and blow up. Do you say there is evidence that it had to be pulled out? MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes. His evidence was specifically that you had to pull it out for the circuit to break, Mr Chairman. No evidence was tendered that such an envelope as the one in which the bomb was constructed would not have been opened by any person in the position of Ruth First and Jeanette Schoon. The facts contradict the arguments of Mr Berger because First did open the envelope and Jeanette Schoon did open the envelope inside the intercepted mail item. He argued that it's improbable that they would have opened it, but the facts really contradict that argument. In all probability the inner envelope would have been opened together with the main envelope, or the circuit would have been broken by the act of opening the main envelope. And this issue was in any event not seriously canvassed in cross-examination. It's not clear what Mr Berger argues was the case, does he argue that there was only one envelope, does he argue that there was never a letter-bomb, no facts ... ... that there will be such evidence. In any event, in respect of full disclosure Mr Berger argued and conceded ... And I submit that this is very important, Mr Chairman. ... that Raven would have received amnesty with reference to full disclosure, in respect of the written application, and that the written version was the truth. He argued and conceded that Raven made a full disclosure of all relevant facts in the written application. All Raven did in his oral evidence is he testified in more detail. So in fact Mr Berger made a concession about that, Mr Chairman. And with respect, my argument is that he should be held to it, Mr Chairman. ...(intervention) MR BERGER: Chairperson, I ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Well his submission wasn't that it was just he testified in more detail, his submission was that he came with a different version and that it was a different version he was now asking for amnesty on. MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but Mr Chairman, he ....(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Even if Mr Berger has conceded it, we're not bound by any ...(indistinct) MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. I just make the submission that it is important that his concession was that the facts in the written application would have justified a finding that there was a full disclosure. MR BERGER: Chairperson, I did not make that concession. I thought I made it clear that I said if he had persisted in that application he might well have been granted amnesty on those facts. That is what I said. MR DU PLESSIS: Well that's a concession, Mr Chairman, that if he had testified only what was in the written application he would have made a full disclosure. He made this concession again now, Mr Chairman, but I'll leave it at that. CHAIRPERSON: Leave it at that. MR DU PLESSIS: I will leave it at that. Raven only elaborated on the written version in the written applications. And there I make the point. I will not make that point further. There are no contradictions between the written version and the further evidence, and therefore in the light of the admission and concession it should be clear that Raven has made a full disclosure. Mr Chairman, at the end of the day if you sit back in this matter and you ask yourself what the position is, the answer is simple, Mr Raven acted with a political motive, he manufactured the bombs, he accepted that it would have been used against the liberations movements, and he came and told you everything about it, Mr Chairman. There are no facts indicating anything otherwise. And in that respect, Mr Chairman, I request you to grant amnesty to Mr Raven. I don't know if there's anything else that you want me to address you on. MR SIBANYONI: Mr du Plessis, just one question. What is your argument, is the success or otherwise of Mr Raven's application dependant on Mr Craig Williamson's case? I'm asking you on specifically the fact that assume, I'm not saying that is the case, assume it is found that Craig Williamson had a different motive, namely personal interest to score points and the like, and Craig Williamson's application fails along those basis, would you argue that your client's application should, as a consequence, also fail or what is your ...(intervention) MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman. That is why I drew a distinction between the fact that Mr Raven's evidence about this matter does not overlap Mr Williamson's evidence. He manufactured the bomb, and that's what he testified about. If Mr Williamson had a different motive, if you find that he had some other motive, a personal motive apart from anything else, Mr Chairman, Mr Raven testified he didn't know anything about it. He didn't know anything about the Schoons, he didn't know anything about Ruth First, and he didn't know anything about any personal motive Mr Williamson had. So Mr Raven's evidence, application is absolutely divorced from Mr Williamson's application. To a large extent obviously, Mr Williamson's evidence could assist Mr Raven's application, but even if you reject Mr Williamson's application, obviously at the end of the day, Mr Raven's application does not depend on Mr Williamson's application. I want to make one submission, Mr Chairman, and that is that on my argument which I presented to you, if there is no finding of ill-will, malice or spite, my submission is that on the evidence, Mr Williamson should also receive amnesty, but I won't go further than that. And I am not going to argue his case, Mr Chairman. But the point is that Mr Raven's application is not dependant on Mr Williamson's application, it's divorced. And the allegation that they worked together is totally devoid of truth and if that was so I would have had a duty to tell you that, when that argument was raised. And that is ...(indistinct) of truth. I don't know if there's anything else, Mr Chairman. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) you have kept one of my brothers waiting for nine minutes by now, Mr du Plessis, you better leave us. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I appreciate it. CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to return? MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I will return if I'm finished there, but I doubt that that will ...(indistinct). CHAIRPERSON: Well thank you for your assistance during the course of this hearing. MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, and thank you for excusing me. CHAIRPERSON: Who is to follow? MR VISSER ARGUES IN REPLY: I see Mr Levine is nodding in my direction, Mr Chairman. I have no problem. Mr Chairman, I'm going to also be as brief as I can, and I will deal only with those issues, as far as I possibly can confine myself thereto, which arise from the arguments of our learned friends. And they fall basically into three categories, Mr Chairman. First, there are certain submission which were made in regard to the technical aspects, to the legal aspects. Secondly, Mr Chairman, there are the statements and allegations and arguments regarding General Coetzee. And lastly, those regarding Willem Schoon. My learned friend commenced his argument, Mr Bizos commenced his argument by saying, there's really no argument about the interpretation, the meaning of Section 20, you've heard arguments and it's not necessary for my learned friend to go into that any further. And then my learned friend in his argument pitches with an amazing brand new argument as if it is the most natural thing. And that is the argument you find at page 21 in paragraph 7, and at page 46 ...(intervention) MR VISSER: Paragraph 7 and page 45 to 46, paragraph 36.4. And as we understand what my learned friend is saying is, he says that the political objective subjectively in the mind of the perpetrator must exist at the time when the act, omission or offence is committed. CHAIRPERSON: At page 45, 46, paragraph? MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman. Page 45 to 46, paragraph 35, 36 sorry, .4 deals with the ex post facto political objective. Now let me immediately say, Mr Chairman, that I can probably be told this has got nothing to do with me in the present application, which will be true. But Mr Chairman, we would not be doing our duty unless we drew your attention to the fact that this issue in principle was also relevant to other amnesty applications. Now Mr Chairman, how does my learned friend come by the argument that the motive has to exist at the time and the later, if there appears to be a mistake in the target later, you can't then change and say, but oh that target was in any event a target to which one can relate a political objective. You can only find that in Section 20, because that's the only Section that deals with the requirements for amnesty. And what my learned friend is doing, Mr Chairman, is he's reading, he must read Section 20.1.B as follows: he must read it that it was an act, omission or offence to which the application relates, was committed with a political object. You've got to read it that way to support the argument. But of course that's not ...(intervention) MR VISSER: 20.1.B. I'll read it to you, Mr Chairman. The words of the statute as they stand and as you are bound to, are the following "If the Committee after considering an application for amnesty is satisfied that, B, the act, omission or offence to which the application relates is an act associated with a political objective." Now Mr Chairman, there's nothing subjective in that test, it's an objective inquiry into the facts and that inquiry can place as to whether those facts existed at the time, whether at the time or thereafter. Mr Chairman, the whole point - and Commissioner de Jager has pointed this out, the whole difference between the test as expounded in the further Indemnity Act of 1992 and the present TRC Act, lies precisely in the difference in wording. I've mentioned this to you, Mr Chairman, in my main argument. The further Indemnity Act provides in its preamble: "... whereas certain person also advised, directed, commanded, ordered or performed acts with a political objective." And Mr de Jager pointed it out to one of my colleagues during argument, that that is actually a more stringent test, which of course it is. It would restrict you to that moment when the act is committed, to when the command is given or ordered. It is not the same situation with the TRC Act, Mr Chairman. And let us give you some examples. CHAIRPERSON: Well you were going to tell us, or you did tell us and I didn't have a change to note it, that on Mr Bizos' argument, Section 20.1.B must be read as if it says ... MR VISSER: As if it says "was committed with a political object"(sic). Which of course it doesn't. It says "... the act, omission or offence must be associated with a political objective" Of course, if my learned friend, Mr Bizos told you, I am only directing my argument to you, Mr Chairman, on the basis of (3) of Section 20 and I'm saying that is a subjective test, of course then, Mr Chairman, we would agree, then we would agree ,because that's exactly what Justice van Dykhof tells us in the Rapollo case, because those were the criteria which he was considering in the Rapollo case. But you yourself, Mr Chairman, has pointed out during the argument here, your words were to the effect, if one or two or even more of the requirements, the criteria in Section 20(3) are absent, it still doesn't mean that amnesty should necessarily be denied, it depends on the facts of the matter. And of course, Mr Chairman, (a) of (3) of Section 20 and D are clearly, clearly subjective elements, clearly. But one must not put the cart before the horse, Mr Chairman. The requirement of the Act is that it must be an act associated with a political objective. And it has given you certain criteria in order to determine whether such an act, omission or offence was indeed associated with a political objective. And clearly the motive of the person at the time is relevant, but it's not the beginning and end all of the inquiry. And certainly in D the objective of the act, omission or offence, the question of proportionality, is of course relevant. I'm not saying it isn't. But that's not the sole test, Mr Chairman. And that is our criticism of the argument of our learned friends. May we mention to you why this is so important? We submit, Mr Chairman, that at the time of the commission of an offence, a person might for example act on orders from a superior, not knowing (a) that there is a political objective associated with the act he's required to do, or ordered to do, not knowing that when he acts it's not a purely criminal offence, but simply obeying an order. Now he may think that it is a legal order and he may even think it's an illegal order because His Lordship, Mr Justice van Dykhof told us that that's not the issue, the issue is not legality. Now we want to present you, Mr Chairman, with the example of Brigadier Visser and Lieutenant van Loggerenberg, that Commissioner de Jager knows very well about, in the Bopape incident. What happened there, Mr Chairman was, Mr Bopape was interrogated in Johannesburg and he died while being interrogated, and it was a day or four prior to the commemorations of an important, the Soweto Day. And what happened there, Mr Chairman, is Visser was phoned in the Eastern Transvaal and he was asked whether he could take care of a package. It turned out that was the body of Mr Bopape ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Was there a decision given in that case of ...(indistinct) MR VISSER: No, there wasn't, Mr Chairman, there hasn't been. And the fact ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: In that case, Mr Visser, would it be appropriate to - if you would have been referring to a decision and say this would a precedent, but would it be appropriate to point to certain facts, and now you're going to a factual basis, you're not putting a proposition as such, Mr X or Y, you're referring to a specific application. MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we don't have precedents because judgments and decisions haven't been handed down. I'm leading up to this submission to you, and that is, here was a man who got an order, who gave that order to one of his subordinates, they took care of disposing of the body. And my submission to you is simply this. It is unthinkable that the Amnesty Committee can in an appropriate case such as perhaps Bopape is, give amnesty to the people who interrogated Mr Bopape, during which he died, but refuse amnesty to the persons who didn't know anything about who it was, whether there was a political objective at the time, who disposed of the body. A far lesser degree of guilt, a far lesser offence than having, let's say, killed Mr Bopape, if that's the situation. And what we're saying, Mr Chairman, is we are going to see that kind of thing. We saw it in the London Bomb, we saw Wal du Toit. Wal du Toit told you that he doesn't know what this bomb was for, he just made it. He just made the London bomb. He was told to do it, he wasn't told what it was for and that was it. Now can Wal du Toit then even, on this argument of my learned friend, ever come to you and be heard to say: "I am asking you for amnesty", because you would then turn around and say: "But hang on we agree with Mr Bizos, that you should have known all the facts relating to the political association of your act, omission or offence, at the time of that act, omission or offence". We submit, Mr Chairman, it doesn't hold water, the Act does not say so, and you should reject that argument. Mr Chairman, the last aspect ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: He does, as far as he concerned, does know all the aspects. That is that a superior officer who I rely on has asked me to do something. MR VISSER: No, but he doesn't know that it's an act which is going to be associated with any political objective, he's just told to make a bomb. CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it implicit in his doing it that he does not think that his superior officer would ask him to make a bomb that is not to be used in the course of the struggle? MR VISSER: Maybe so, Mr Chairman, but we come back to the argument. The argument is, he doesn't know at the time of his act, he can assume, he can think, he can trust, he can bona fide believe, but he doesn't know. And my learned friend says, if this is the case then sorry for you, then you don't have that subjective objective of a political objective and therefore you can't obtain amnesty. And that's the only point that we are arguing against, Mr Chairman. And then, Mr Chairman, my learned friend, Mr Berger submitted to you that in regard to Section 20.2.F you should accept that there ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Where in his argument ...(indistinct) MR VISSER: I wrote this down, Mr Chairman. I'm sure whether it's in the written argument, I wrote it down. My learned friend could perhaps assist me if I tell you what the argument's about. The point is that he submitted that Section 20.2.F requires reasonable conduct on the part of a member of the Security Forces. Now I'm not sure whether that is stated precisely like that in the typed document, but that was what I wrote down in his oral argument. Mr Chairman, well ...(intervention) MR BERGER: Chairperson, if I could assist Mr Visser, it's paragraph 29.2 on page 40, and it's not reasonable conduct, it's a reasonable belief that his conduct was within the course and scope of his duties. MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if my learned friend restricts his argument to that, we've got no problem with it. We heard him say something different, both my attorney and myself, and the result is then we can step off that issues. Perhaps to make our submission absolutely clear, (f), Mr Chairman, presumes that a man acted outside his authority and it deems him to have acted inside his authority, in certain circumstances, Mr Chairman, and that requires that he had to bona fide believe that he was in fact authorised to do so and acting within his authority, within in his service as a policeman. And if we don't have an argument about that, Mr Chairman, then we can continue. Now Mr Chairman, my learned friend, Mr Bizos has in his argument presented you with two scenarios. The one is that, it seems that if he doesn't like something which has been argued here on behalf of the applicants, or perhaps if he hasn't got a counter to it, then his attitude was that it is inadmissible and it shouldn't be applied "against the victims". And secondly, Mr Chairman, in order to build up a case, my learned friend in spite of the evidence that had been given in clear terms, was prone to make the submissions which he made or the statements which he put to witnesses, to elevate that as if it was evidence. And Mr Chairman, I can spend a lot of time now going through each and every one of the points which our learned friends made. The points - I'm not going to do that however, Mr Chairman. Those points ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: You're now dealing with - if I've been, with Coetzee. Coetzee is not applying for amnesty. MR VISSER: Well he's applying for amnesty for the London bomb. ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) except the London bomb. ADV DE JAGER: As far as the London bomb is concerned, I believe there's no opposition. As far as the criticism of Coetzee is concerned, I could imagine, no not imagine, I agree that it could reflect on the London bomb, but I think it was directed more as to the credibility of Mr Williamson in not asking sort of permission from the relationship between Coetzee - and we're not going to make a finding in the Schoon or about Coetzee as such. He's not asking for amnesty there, so we're not concerned about where he could only be a witness as far as that is concerned. MR VISSER: Commissioner de Jager is of course quite correct. We have been attempting to make that point throughout the hearing, absolutely. We agree with that. But our problem is that the argument of our learned friend isn't as innocuous as just that. There would be statements, for example in his argument, Mr Bizos' argument, that Williamson wasn't tell the truth because he was not telling the truth about the fact that Coetzee authorised the Ruth First bomb, as if it was evidence. It's in his Heads. And Mr Chairman, he goes from paragraph A to paragraph a, through v, w, x, y, z to a, lifting out aspects which in his submission are improbable, whatever, on the most incredible grounds. Joe Kwabe, why didn't you know about Joe Kwabe? Can we really believe you when you tell us that you didn't suspect the Security Forces killed Joe Kwabe. Two people in Swaziland, did you know about their deaths? - No. Why not, you were the Chief of Security. That kind of thing, Mr Chairman, with great respect. Commissioner de Jager is correct, but it is a pity that senior counsel should be allowed the opportunity of character assassination of a witness, Mr Chairman, who has come here to assist and who has shown that he wanted to assist, who my learned friend just wouldn't believe may have been not guilty of some things. And with great respect, Mr Chairman, I will step off the discussion of the credibility of General Coetzee by saying that he's been treated abominably unfairly by my learned friend. My learned friend knows it, he knows it. The inferences which are sought to be drawn against his credibility are flimsy and nonexistent, and they are really a matter of thumb-sucking, Mr Chairman, and my learned friend knows that too. And I will take the matter no further. The only last point which I wish to make, Mr Chairman, is if my learned friend had destroyed the credibility of General Coetzee to such an extent that he could say he could never obtain amnesty for anything because you can never believe another word he says, it might have been a different matter. But then I would say, Mr Chairman, that in the London bomb all the evidence is mutually corroborative and it's also supported by the objective fact, so you don't even need General Coetzee's credibility in order to find that he made a full disclosure in the London bomb incident yeah or neigh. Mr Chairman, going over ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something new? MR VISSER: Yes. The last, you will be pleased to hear, the last aspect, Mr Chairman, which we wish to raise, and that is, my learned friend ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: How long will you be? MR VISSER: I'm sorry, did you want to take an adjournment now? MR VISSER: Yes, that's fine, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER ARGUES IN REPLY: (Cont) May it please the Committee, Mr Chairman. I come to the last part of my reply to the argument of our learned friends, and that concerns the amnesty application of Brigadier Willem Schoon, and let me hasten immediately to say that I find myself somewhat on the horns of a dilemma here, Mr Chairman, because I believe both my learned ...(no sound) were at pains to point out to you ... MR VISSER: ... to two different incidents. It appears to us, Mr Chairman, and we've both stated so - my learned friend must please stop me if I misstate what he told you, that it doesn't seem as if the two incidents which you have on the table before you could be reconciled with each other. The one deals with Mr Dirk Coetzee having been stopped before he ever left, on his version, by Jan du Preez on instructions as he says was obvious, from General Coetzee, and the other one deals with Dirk Coetzee having left and having apparently given instructions to a person, according to what Willem Schoon told you, who was accosted in Botswana and robbed of the firearm. Now it is interesting, Mr Chairman, that Mr Marius Schoon gave evidence about two gentlemen who came to Botswana, I think he said by motorcar, and they came and they stayed in Botswana and a firearm was discovered in the suitcase of one of them. I believe, if I remember correctly, Mr Chairman, that Mr Schoon said that he didn't see the firearm but he was told it was a pistol, if I'm not mistaken, which is different from what Willem Schoon said, because Willem Schoon said, he referred to a .38 revolver. So on that evidence, Mr Chairman, you have two differences of fact. The one is that it's not one person that went with the firearm, it's two, and they went apparently, if Mr Marius Schoon is to be believed, with a pistol and not a .38 revolver. But Mr Chairman, with respect, it is easy to understand that there could be mistakes as far as what precisely the firearm was, in the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon. I am sure, with great respect, and I submit to you that he wouldn't have been so interested to know exactly what the firearm was as long as he knew there was a firearm and as long as he knew that they were getting rid of these two people who came to visit there. So it is clear, Mr Chairman, that there's no way in which you can say Willem Schoon has been lying to you. My learned friend has pulled out two considerations, the one says he, is that it's amazing that he could have said that it's not his style to kill people, considering the number of occasions or the number of incidents in regard to which Willem Schoon has applied for amnesty. But Mr Chairman, my learned friends, both Mr Bizos as well as Mr Berger says that makes him an unimpressive witness. Well Mr Chairman, with respect, I don't know whether my learned friends have taken the trouble or whether they even have access to the other applications, Mr Chairman, to determine in how many other matters Brigadier Willem Schoon on his own, off his own bat gave instructions for people to be killed. We don't believe that there could be more than two others, Mr Chairman. And frankly, I don't want to bind him at this stage because I didn't go through that evidence, I haven't got it available, but that may be what he referred to. But be that as it may, the only other thing, Mr Chairman, is - and that really is the dilemma which I have, with respect, and that the only other basis upon which my learned friend, Mr Berger, suggested to you that you that you should perhaps not accept Willem Schoon's evidence in regard to this attempted murder of Marius Schoon, was the evidence of Dirk Coetzee. And he places his entire reliance to show how reliable the evidence of Mr Dirk Coetzee is, on the point that there was a breach by Mr Williamson of the need-to-know basis at page 68, paragraph 80, Mr Chairman. The other page references, Mr Chairman, are page 48, paragraphs D, up to and including H. This is what we've just been talking about a moment ago. Now Mr Chairman, the dilemma is this. I submit it is not necessary for you to choose between the evidence of Mr Dirk Coetzee and Mr Willem Schoon as far as Willem Schoon's amnesty application before here is concerned, or as far as Dirk Coetzee's amnesty application before some other Amnesty Committee is concerned, because it is clear that they're talking about two different incidents, Mr Chairman. Now if I'm wrong with that submission, Mr Chairman, then I must make a few submissions to you about the credibility of Mr Dirk Coetzee. Mr Chairman, Mr Coetzee has given evidence, or his versions have been placed on record on many occasions. The first was in 1989 by way of what became known ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I've always had this difficulty. Suppose Mr Coetzee has been lying on 20 other occasions, should I because of that come to the conclusion that he lied before us here? And I know it could be, it's a factor, but shouldn't we judge on what we've heard about a witness before us? Well if I would say well he's a compulsive liar, then I should find that and then I could perhaps use that against him here? But in my mind I've got problems about other people's findings, judging a person who appeared before them on an occasion and then I've got to rely on what they found to sort of come to a conclusion, to come to my own conclusion. MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, of course. Commissioner de Jager has just restated what the law is, we know that. The law prescribes, the law of evidence, that a tribunal should not necessarily hold that a person is not to be believed merely because another forum made a credibility finding against that person, because the other facts, the other considerations etc., Mr Chairman. But, in the case of Mr Dirk Coetzee it's substantially different. If one looks at what Justice Hookster says in the Highest Court of Appeal in NEETHLING vs DU PREEZ, and may I just read to you, you will see that it is a general statement about the person of Mr Dirk Coetzee. He says "A perusal of Mr Coetzee's own evidence sufficiently demonstrates I consider, not only that Coetzee is an entirely amoral person, but also that in the past he lied as often as a lie served his convenience." That's something that you've got to take cognisance of, that's not something that you can say is localised to a particular hearing, Mr Chairman. He goes on to say, Mr Chairman, and perhaps I should refer you to it, it's NEETHLING vs DU PREEZ & OTHERS and NEETHLING vs THE WEEKLY MAIL & OTHER 1994 (1) SALR 708. His Lordship, Justice Hookster, Judge of Appeal delivering the judgment, and I've just read to you a portion from page 756 ...(intervention) MR VISSER: 756, Mr Chairman. It goes on to 757E, where inter alia in those pages His Lordship says "I agree furthermore with the submission by counsel for the Appellant, that in weighing the evidence bearing on the crucial issue in the case, there should be steadily borne in mind, not only Coetzee's proclivity for perverting the truth, but in addition his cunning and ingenuity in fabricating evidence in order to lay a false trail." Now we've seen that often, Mr Chairman, often. And more importantly at ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Wasn't that in fact applicable to all the people working in the, laying a false trail, using a Stratcom, not accepting responsibility, issuing false statements? ADV DE JAGER: If that's the case, we've got that evidence, then we shouldn't believe a single one. MR VISSER: ...(indistinct) let's take it a step further at 757E "In regard to what was the crucial issue in the case, Coetzee was a single witness with a grudge against the SAP, and motive to misrepresent. He was a criminal whose misdeeds included crimes of dishonesty." Now that doesn't apply to every single witness from the Security Police who is going to give evidence or who have given evidence before you, Mr Chairman, with respect. And again I say, Mr Chairman, that this may be an exercise in futility if you're in agreement with what my learned friend, Mr Jansen and I held out to you but of course we can't bind you with our agreement about the facts, and that is why i'm offering this to you as an alternative. Allow me just to make, on this last issue of dragging other people into criminal conduct, Mr Chairman, remind you of what happened in Kondile's case. In Kondile's case the very same thing happened. Dirk Coetzee implicated Willem Schoon as the person who sent him to the Eastern Transvaal to eliminate Mr Kondile, and we know that in the Mauritius statement he said it was Fikter, it was Brigadier Fikter. What happened in this case? Here he said it was Jan: "upon the instructions of Jan Coetzee, according to the instruction of Jan du Preez" ... YY1, page 3. Sorry, YY, page 3. "Remember Marius Schoon's wife was also involved. Craig brought my attention to the one that morning of the event, or after the incident. I was supposed to go and beat up Schoon and his wife in Botswana, under the instruction of Jan du Preez, and then Coetzee prevented it." If my learned friend's request to you is when everything is in balance, rather choose Dirk Coetzee's evidence in preference to that of Willem Schoon. We submit, Mr Chairman, that on the track record of Mr Dirk Coetzee you'll choose Mr Willem Schoon's evidence. He has given evidence on many occasions, and we told you when he gave his evidence, where he had given evidence before. Nowhere had we seen any criticism of Willem Schoon's integrity, in the truthfulness of his evidence. And we submit, Mr Chairman, that if you will recall the way in which he gave evidence here again, that he was a credible witness and Mr Chairman, you would have no hesitation in accepting that he is giving the facts as he remembers then as truthfully as he knows how. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Schoon himself admits that he gave an affidavit to the Harms Commission that wasn't true. MR VISSER: Yes, that was in the past, Mr Chairman. What could he have done then? If he had said well look I was involved, I knew about this envelope, he might have gone to jail. That was a different situation. We now have an amnesty process, Mr Chairman. That is the situation which we have with most applicants on all sides, well particularly on the side of Security Forces. They had to lay a false trail at the end of the day, as you just pointed out to me, and they had to cover up because otherwise they would have gone to jail, obviously. It doesn't make them dishonest in that sense, Mr Chairman. It was a matter of expediency. We're not saying that it is justifiable, but certainly Mr Chairman, you cannot hold that against a man who is now coming and making a clean breast of it, to say well, you've lied before, how can we ever believe you again? We've had that before, Mr Chairman, and we've dealt with those arguments, and I hope that we've laid them to rest. Mr Chairman, in those circumstances we submit, with great respect, that there's no reason why Willem Schoon should not be granted amnesty by you, and ask such an amnesty to be granted. And we repeat, Mr Chairman, that we don't oppose the amnesty application of Mr Dirk Coetzee. And certainly from what we have now read and learnt of what his amnesty application before the other Amnesty Committee is concerned, we don't believe that he should be refused amnesty either. Thank you, Mr Chairman. MR SIBANYONI: Mr Visser, I'm not going into details, but in general is it not so that what Dirk Coetzee was talking about during those days that nobody would believe him, no Court would easily believe him, and some of the things he was talking about during those days come out in the amnesty applications of some of the Security Police, etc? What do you say about that? MR VISSER: I say that's true, but I say, what do we make of that? What do we make of that? Mr Chairman, it's quite clear, as Justice Hookster has found, that Dirk Coetzee came to the fore in 1989 as the maker of the great revelations concerning the Security Police in South Africa. Clearly he was right in many respects, that much is clear, but it doesn't mean by a long throw, with respect, Mr Chairman, that everything that he says can be accepted, because as you yourself pointed out at a certain point in time, to lay what my learned friends refer to as a "dekstorie", you've got to sow close to the wind and then, of the truth, and then deviate just so much as to confuse. And isn't that exactly what you can say about Dirk Coetzee's evidence? Certainly, he takes incidents which occurred, yes. Sometimes he's got it all wrong, because clearly, sometimes he doesn't really have the personal knowledge which he professes to have but he take an incident and then he places himself in that incident and at times it's very close to what we now know was the truth, Kondile, Mthimkhulu, Topsi Madaka, we know that, the burning of people in the Eastern Transvaal. Mr Chairman, in 1990 nobody believed that, including myself. Nobody believed that before the Harms Commission, that that could ever happen, but Mr Chairman, there were people then that believed it and they were obviously correct, and he was right, yes. Mr Sibanyoni, I don't know what we make of that. The point is simply this, that it is equally clear that Mr Dirk Coetzee's evidence cannot be accepted unless it's corroborated, because he himself says that he likes to embroider. He's not dishonest, he just like to embroider. So what is embroidery and what is the truth? We don't know. But it really doesn't matter here, in the present case, it really doesn't matter. We've got nothing to do with what he told the Amnesty Committee in his amnesty application, Mr Chairman. We don't oppose it. It doesn't seem to us that his evidence can be an obstacle in the present application of Willem Schoon. And his counsel says that they're opposing it either. And it's quite clear, Mr Chairman, if you read Mr Marius Schoon's evidence and if you listen to Willem Schoon, that there must have been two incidents. Dirk Coetzee wouldn't concede it, Mr Chairman, but his counsel conceded it on his behalf, and with respect, that should be enough. MR LEVINE ARGUES IN REPLY: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I would ask leave to hand up what I've referred to as Part 1 of the Heads of Argument in Reply. If they could be marked as such. You will note that they run in some 47 pages. That is when the typist ran out of petrol, if I might put it that way, at about 2 o'clock this morning ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: You must have had a very busy night, Mr Levine. MR LEVINE: ... and reinforcements had then to be called in and Part 2 will be with you shortly. I would, Mr Chairman, apologise for a number of typographical errors, spelling errors and amendments that have to made on the hoof as it were. I would have ideally have liked an extra day's time, but I'm mindful of the position in which the Amnesty Committee finds itself, and I would ask you to bear with me in dealing with the relatively minor number of amendments that would fall to be made during the course of this argument. It Mr ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: If it's only spelling mistakes, I think you need not spend time on correctly spelling mistakes at this stage, Mr Levine. MR LEVINE: There are a number of more material aspects, but we'll get to them in due course. The first, paragraph one is broken up into three sub-sections. The first two speak for themselves. 1.3 is a reference to Section 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, dealing with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and the particular section is set out at pages 3 and 4 of these Heads. I have dealt ad seriatim, Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee, with the statements of Advocates Bizos and Berger in their Heads, and I believe it proper, unless I should be stopped for any reason, to be given the opportunity to deal in this manner with the remarks contained in the Heads of Advocates Bizos and Berger. Once again there is no intention to denigrate Advocate Bizos by not referring to him as SC, but it becomes rather tiresome to have to do that every time, but I assure you, no offence at all is intended and I make that assurance to Advocate Bizos as well. It is submitted that amnesty should be granted to Mr Williamson inter alia on the following grounds: Williamson has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts relating to the death of Ruth First and likewise, relating to the deaths of Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and there's no valid basis for the allegation that he has not. Williamson's assertions that he had no personal knowledge of any role played in the authorising of the bombing which resulted in the death of Ruth First by General Coetzee cannot be rejected. There's no valid basis for the allegation that there was not a full disclosure by Williamson in his evidence. On the contrary, Williamson made the fullest possible disclosure and cooperated with the TRC and with the Amnesty Committee in every respect possible. The evidence of Williamson concerning his knowledge of the intended recipient of the IED is not so contradictory of Raven's account, or so improbable that it cannot be believed. Williamson's evidence of what he saw cannot be simply rejected as false. One must bear in mind that he was giving evidence 14 or more years after the offence. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, so far it's been, you're sort of repeating your submissions that you've made to us before, so you're persisting in the submissions despite what Mr Bizos said. I don't think it's necessary to repeat it again, but if there's anything you would like to add to your main argument at the beginning, if you could point that out to us it would be of great assistance to us. MR LEVINE: Mr de Jager, I'm dealing with - in answer to your comments, Mr de Jager, each of the statements made in the Heads prepared by Advocates Bizos and Berger. You will understand that in regard to these Heads I saw the first part of them for the first time on Tuesday and was unable to work on them on Tuesday evening, and I only saw the second part of those Heads on Wednesday morning, so I've chosen rather to deal with them ad seriatim in the order in which they were made. And of course ideally given a day I might have been in the position to cut out a lot of the material that is here in this form, but being cautious ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: No, the only thing is, the right to reply to an argument isn't like you're dealing with an application at paragraph 1 I'm admitting this and I'm rejecting that, and in a further reply. But okay, I understand how you're doing it and ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: I think what ought to be made clear, Mr Levine, in case it's been overlooked, is that the underlined heading of the paragraphs is a reference to Mr Bizos' Heads of Argument. MR LEVINE: Precisely as ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: So at 2.1 you are then referring to the averments made in paragraph 2.1 of his Heads and replying to them? MR LEVINE: Precisely, Mr Chairman. The first amendment is at page 5, it should be 2.3 Raven's evidence of the manner in which he went about the construction of the IED, cannot be held to be highly improbable, especially in the light of the fact that no expert testimony was led to challenge his, Raven's, obvious expertise. It would be disingenuous to merely dismiss the possibility that Ruth First would have opened the second unmarked envelope, because the fact is that she obviously did so. Furthermore, O'Laughlin cannot be said to have contradicted Williamson's and Raven's description of the IED, due to the fact that her evidence was that she tried as hard as she could to recollect details of the package but could not, besides the fact that it looked interesting, perhaps like a book or proofs in an envelope. CHAIRPERSON: Well can you say, Mr Levine, that Ruth First obviously did open a second unmarked envelope? MR LEVINE: Well, Mr Chairman, ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Is there any evidence to that effect? MR LEVINE: The evidence is that, assuming of course this was the ... MR LEVINE: ... Mr Chairman, with great respect, then it would not relate to the IED which was prepared by Raven on Williamson's orders. CHAIRPERSON: If one accepts his evidence, which is being as I understand it, criticised by Mr Bizos and Mr Berger, as to how he prepared it, whether he looked at the envelopes and matters of that nature. MR LEVINE: That may well be so, but then it may have to be qualified in that manner. It also needs to be restated, as Advocate du Plessis said on behalf of Raven, that if it is accepted that if the IED which killed Ruth First was in the form described by Raven, then it was not Raven who built the IED which killed First, subject again to the criticism you have mentioned, Mr Chairman. There's absolutely no evidence that the IED was addressed to First. Williamson said that he always believed and assumed that the bomb was addressed to and meant for Joe Slovo, but knew that it was going to the university in Maputo where First worked. Williamson went further and said that the IED was built to replace the contents of an intercepted postal item which would have come to the SAP Security Headquarters from the OFS Security Branch or from the WH10 Operation at Jan Smuts. In either case the item would have reached Brigadier Goosen via ANC/SACP Desk at SAP Headquarters. Williamson was not challenged on this, and it must therefore be accepted that even if his recollection of the name on the envelope came only from what he was told by Brigadier Goosen, this together with the fact that Williamson knew that the SAP Security Headquarters ANC/SACP Desk did not receive innocent non-ANC/SACP intercepted mail meant that he bona fide believed that any weapon ... (perhaps it should be better expressed as explosive device) inserted into such communication, would go to a revolutionary enemy. Williamson cannot be said to be claiming an ex post facto political objective in relation to First. Both Raven and Williamson said that they knew ... CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on. Wouldn't they have intercepted mail which might have disclosed information about the ANC? MR LEVINE: Conceivably, but that would that be innocent Mr Chairperson? CHAIRPERSON: It could well be innocent. The ANC could well be writing to someone to obtain supplies which they could subsequently use, or something of that nature. MR LEVINE: It's a possibility, but I don't agree that in the normal course these communications other than as described by you might be, would be innocent. Both Raven and Williamson said that they knew that (it should read "the") ANC member/SACP member of high level and profile, Ruth First was living and working where she was and that she was the type of person who would be targeted by the Security Forces. General disagreed in his evidence, however General Coetzee did not give Williamson or Raven the order to construct the IED. Brigadier Goosen gave the order to Williamson, who passed on the appropriate order to Raven. There is no evidence whatsoever except from Williamson himself, in relation to the nature and extent of the information available to him and to those who made the decision to murder her, that is First, than to merely state that this evidence is so far removed from the truth that it must be rejected is a wild and unsubstantiated statement. Williamson did not initiate any operation to kill Ruth First. And I would refer you to the contents of 2.6 above. There is no basis in fact to state that Williamson is a vindictive human being. He did not hate Joe Slovo, but did want to eliminate and destroy the enemy and so win the war. I refer here to what Williamson told Gillian Slovo, and it should read at page 33 of Exhibit X1, not at page 22. Williamson says there: "I won't (want to should read won't) use the word hate. I don't think it was hate, but how totally and how utterly determined we were to win the war and to eliminate and destroy the enemy. It was an obsession, and the guilt we felt every time landmines went off or bombs off, and we would because it was our responsibility to make sure it didn't happen and when it did happen you know, one felt personally and organisationally responsible, you've been outwitted or you know, well nobody said to you you failed, you haven't done your job. I mean, you felt that this was maybe what they were thinking. I mean we were very, very serious about what we were doing you know." There is no basis for the submission that Williamson is a vindictive human being and certainly Professor Klug can (it should not be cannot, Mr Chairman) can at the very worst in his speculative evidence, only state that Williamson's alleged grievance against the Schoons was due only party to his alleged animosity against the Schoons. And I repeat that Professor Klug's evidence was speculative. It cannot be concluded (I say at the top of page 9) that Williamson's actions were malicious or out of proportion to any political objective. There is with respect, no basis to conclude that Williamson's actions were malicious and out of proportion to any political objective. (That's a repetition). The political objectives are fully detailed in Williamson's affidavit in support of amnesty and over many days of lengthy cross-examination as (the word "are" should read "as") also in Williamson's evidence-in-chief. We now come to the requirement of full disclosure, and I say in the introductory paragraph: Each of the allegations where Williamson is said to have failed to make disclosure will be dealt with in turn. Whilst it is conceded that there was a close relationship between Williamson and General Coetzee over many years, this is the type of relationship that should ideally operate between every officer and his superior officer. The issue of mental is perhaps misplaced, and Williamson himself states that he never (the word "knew" should read "thought") of General Coetzee as being his mentor. Williamson freely admits that he took guidance and advice from General Coetzee who assisted him in his career however. One gathers the impression that the suggestion is being made by those opposed to Williamson's amnesty applications, that he was totally dependant and reliant upon General Coetzee and that nothing could take place without Williamson referring the matter to General Coetzee. This it is submitted is stretching the matter a bit far. And the evidence is in regard to the Firsts and the Schoons, that Williamson acted on the orders of a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen, and would not have had a reason to discuss such orders with General Coetzee. It is suggested that I read pages 783 and 784 of Williamson's evidence in its entirety, which goes far wider than what is sought to be attributed to Williamson in the final sentence of the above-captioned sub-paragraph, that is 3.1.A. It reads, and this is the evidence of Mr Williamson at page 783: "Mr Chairman, I really can't say what General Coetzee knew and what he didn't know and what he would not have done unless I was specifically involved in the incident. What I do know is that where it came to the attacks on the ANC across border and the London incident being one, I know that General Coetzee approved and allowed us and in fact commanded us to do the operation, that is the London operation." At page 784, Mr Williamson says, midway down the page: "Yes, Mr Chairman, but I have to add that General Coetzee was for a lot of time, or as he became more and more senior he became more and more removed from us. And I must also add in all fairness that General Coetzee was very well-known for being absolutely opposed to acts such as for example, led to deaths in detention. So I knew on the one hand that General Coetzee was much, in fact I was present for example, at Security Headquarters when the report came through of the death of an activist in detention and I saw how angry he was. And I know that he was against this type, that type of illegal activity. But I have to draw a distinction between what we would have then regarded as openly illegal activity and what we would have regarded as actions that were covert or clandestine and that perhaps didn't accord with the laws or the morals or the norms of the society. When it came to those counter-revolutionary acts, I believe that these had the approval of everybody above me in the hierarchy." This cannot be said to be an issue of Williamson's disclosure requirement. Advocate Bizos stated in argument and in his Heads as such on Tuesday, that there was a mountain of probabilities that Williamson and General Coetzee's evidence is false, but nowhere has Advocate Bizos been able to illustrate or support this broad statement. 3.1 1-4 and 3.1.C and D respectively: This relates solely to evidence of General Coetzee and it's not my intention to deal therefore. The contents of the above sub-paragraph are admitted, but it is interesting to note the additional allegation by Advocate Bizos who argued to the effect that there may have been rejoicing about Ruth First's death. This is an unsubstantiated averment and there is no evidence in support thereof. Indeed, Mr Chairman, may I refer you to pages 35 and 36 of Exhibit X1. I think it should be Exhibit ...(indistinct), Mr Chairman, pages 35 and 36, where Mr Williamson denies any celebration. At the bottom of page 35 Gillian Slovo asks him: "Did you celebrate?" "No, we didn't. The same as when the bomb went off at airforce headquarters we didn't mourn. Dreadful I'm sure for you to hear, but it was business. Now I think the reaction was more, what are they going to do?" And that is at the top of page 36, Mr Chairman. It is on record from Williamson, as also from General Coetzee, that he did not ask Williamson for information on First's death, except of course at a very late stage, sometime in 1995. We have on record - and I'm on the top of page 12, Mr Chairman, and this has not been challenged, that Williamson received orders from a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen, and that he received no instructions in regard to either Ruth First or the Schoons or Joe Slovo for that matter, from General Coetzee. ADV DE JAGER: The latter part has been challenged. The first part, that he received instructions from Goosen? MR LEVINE: Has not been challenged. ADV DE JAGER: Ja, but it's being challenged that he did not receive instructions from Coetzee. MR LEVINE: Then that challenge remains, Mr de Jager. MR LEVINE: And I submit that the remainder of sub-paragraph 3.1.F in no way affects Williamson's duties to have made a full disclosure which he did in fact do. If there is a challenge, Williamson says he was not instructed by General Coetzee and he abides by this statement which he has made, challenge or not. The contents of the first two sentences of the above-captioned sub-paragraph are conceded, and the remark attributed to General (it should read "but" the remark attributed to General Coetzee) in the final sentence is inaccurate. Williamson received his orders from Brigadier Goosen and nothing further in the above sub-paragraph impacts upon Williamson. Advocate Bizos alleges that General Coetzee had to go three doors away to make enquiries of Williamson, but Williamson's evidence is that he occupied an office on a different floor to that of General Coetzee, and this has not been challenged. And I refer to pages 359 ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Ja, I don't think really it's very material whether it's three doors away or on the next floor, they were in the same building. And I think the submission was made in that sense. They were near to each other in the same building. MR LEVINE: It is material to the extent that this is the evidence given by Mr Williamson, that he was not three doors away. But I don't take that any further. Williamson and Dirk Coetzee both said that all Williamson said was "het jy gesien", or words to that effect. This was they both said, enough for a member of the Security Police such as themselves, involved in a covert operation, to understand. A secret covert operation. To understand that what was in fact being said was that Williamson and Security Headquarters were involved in the death of Ruth First. I stress that Dirk Coetzee was no longer within that particular operation, but he was not as much of an outsider as Advocate Bizos would like to make out. In fact Advocate Bizos has not advanced any reason why Williamson's - and if you could add in the words between Williamson and breach, reason for the breach of the "moet-weet" principle, can be said to be unconvincing. To say that because Williamson broke the need-to-know rule by intimating to Dirk Coetzee that he, Williamson had been involved in the operation which led to the death of Ruth First, it then follows that he would have discussed the matter with General Coetzee is with respect a non sequitur. It can also not possibly be said that there is only one possible explanation why Williamson did not discuss his role in the Ruth First operation with General Coetzee. As aforementioned, Dirk Coetzee was not the outsider that Advocate Bizos would like to make out to be the case. Williamson's evidence is, he did not at that stage discuss Ruth First's death with General Coetzee. Williamson has denied that General Coetzee was well aware of his role in the murder of Ruth First. We now come to the question of the Nkomati Accord. 3.1.K: Williamson has no comment in regard to the above-captioned sub-paragraph. Williamson was not at the meeting alleged and is unable to comment. And it is stated that the contents of the above-captioned sub paragraph do not impact on Williamson. Likewise the contents of that sub-paragraph do not impact upon Williamson and he was not present at such discussions as alleged. Now 3.1.N, Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee, there is a substantial re-wording of this particular paragraph and I would ask that the re-wording be inserted. It should read as follows: Williamson concedes that theoretically it was not be good practice for the ultimate commanders not to have known what was going on below them. And in this regard I would refer to Williamson at page 1017. In this instance, as also in the case of the Schoons, Williamson received his instructions from a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen. ADV DE JAGER: The reference is page number? MR LEVINE: 1017. I'm sorry, my microphone wasn't on. I'm not going to read that to you. Williamson's concessions to the extent that they were concessions appear in the record. It is conceded that Williamson was the most senior intelligence officer from the Security Police present at meetings. In response to a query by Mr Chairman, at page 1022, Williamson said that General Coetzee did not approach him for information about the death of Ruth First at the time of the Nkomati Accord. Likewise, Williamson contends that General Coetzee never asked him (it should be) the question posed in the above-captioned sub-paragraph and reiterates what is set out at page 1019 of the record. Williamson agrees with this statement that General Coetzee never asked him, Williamson, whether he had any information about the death of Ruth First. Williamson's further comment, quoted from page 1022, must be read with page 1028 of the record. Again I do not believe it necessary to read those extracts to you. We agree with what Williamson is quoted to have said at page 1032, but would point to a difference between General Coetzee issuing a statement to the Joint Security Commission and the formal question being raised which would have necessitated a formal response. Once again we have a problem with the phrase: "the matter was raised". Williamson does not say the matter was raised in his presence, he uses the words: "I did hear about it, and in fact I was given photographs of the scene." Later Mr Williamson refers to the photographs officially coming to him. It is submitted that it is clear that Mr Williamson is drawing a distinction with what he discussed on a functionary level with his Mozambican Security counterparts and what was raised officially at the plenary session of the Joint Security Commission. MR LEVINE: ... that a South African agency was responsible for the killing of Ruth First. Why would anyone wanted to know chapter and verse and so ...(indistinct) plausible deniability. The issue the South Africans were faced with was not who had done it, but how to put the matter to bed before it became a formally raised issue requiring formal investigation and response in terms of how the JSC operated. In dealing, Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee, with sub-paragraph 3.1.V, I refer to 3.1.U above and to page 239 of Exhibit QQ and in particular lines 16 to 21 thereof. And I say that it just not follow that Williamson knew Coetzee was party to the decision to send a bomb to Ruth First, and that is why he, Williamson, (if you could insert a bracket after Williamson) did not properly brief General Coetzee. Yes, my attention is drawn to a slight problem in regard to the pagination of QQ. What is set out as being 239 may well be 238 in certain bundles. We did have this anomaly before, Mr Chairman. It is document 21 of Q2 and page 30 of that particular document. Mr Williamson's version of what took place is clear from pages 1050 to 1057 of the record. Mr Williamson cannot in the this instance be joined to the criticisms of General Coetzee. Advocate Bizos stated that General Coetzee may have blamed the telephone system between Graaff-Reinet and Johannesburg for his delay in communicating with Mr Williamson, but this criticism may have been a cynical remark directed by Advocate Bizos. The obvious consideration, Mr Chairman, is why would one discuss a matter as delicate as this one on the telephone? The reason for the delay is set out in the final sentence of the immediately preceding sub-paragraph. Mr Williamson's evidence is on record. Mr Williamson did not try and exonerate General Coetzee, but neither did he pronounce judgment upon him as Mr Bizos would have liked. There is no basis, with respect, for the allegation that Williamson's evidence was false. Indeed a reading of the record goes to show the contrary, namely that Williamson was a frank and honest witness. There was no evidence that Williamson owes General Coetzee, neither was this put to Mr Williamson. I now go on to the argument relating to Williamson's attempt to manipulate the evidence as my learned friends would have it. Williamson is it is submitted, a credible witness on the record. Mr Bizos himself stated that it could not merely be said that just because Williamson was steeped in the spy world skills of deception in the past, this automatically meant that he was now not to be believed as a witness. There is no evidence or fact to support a conclusion that Williamson is a calculated liar or a calculating liar. Williamson denies the circled attempt to manipulate evidence at this hearing insofar as it is attributed to him. In fact, Mr Chairman, a reading of the record from page 811 to page 815 shows clearly that in fact even the Stratcom of false arms cache, cache incident goes to illustrate what was happening in the civil war at the time and goes to show how the mind-set of the commanders of the Security Forces worked at the time. In regard to sub-paragraph 3.1.CC, Mr Williamson stands by his suggestions that the false arms cache did not feature in the 14 June 1985 raid on Gaberone, in which he was involved. The TRC Report does not contradict him and indeed if the TRC Report is consulted at Volume 2, Chapter 2, paragraph 457, it will become clear that the false arms cache was related to a much later attack on an ANC target in Botswana, namely on 28 March 1988, by which time Mr Williamson was a National Party member in the President's Council in the then parliamentary structure. I refer briefly to two works that are before you, Mr Chairman, Jacques Pauw's "Heart of Darkness" at page 75 and Eugene de Kock's "A Long Night's Damage", at pages 117 to 119. It is clear it is submitted, that the false arms cache date was not even plain to Eugene de Kock, and we must either all accept that similar incidents in a time-frame of a decade or more ago, and lead to genuine and unintentional errors. If we do not accept this type of explanation, then it must be said that the attempt attributed to Mr Williamson to manipulate the facts in this instance, is not Mr Williamson's but is to be laid at the doors those who relied upon sections BB and CC, that is of 3.1 of the argument opposing Mr Williamson's amnesty applications. MR LEVINE: I know Mr Chairman, that Mr Bizos does not mean any disruption, but it does cause me certain difficulty. We agree with Williamson's evidence as quoted on pages 1066 and 1077, 1067, pardon me, or the record, but would have aver that in the military hierarchical structure the passing of orders and information up and down a chain of command is not unusual and cannot possibly mean that every officer between the General at the top and the foot-soldier at the bottom was merely a messenger. In this instance, Mr Williamson was part of the chain of command. It just does not follow from the evidence that Mr Williamson must either have been a mere messenger or involved in the planning in his capacity as Head of Security Police Intelligence. The fact is that Mr Williamson acted as he said he did, he received an order, gave an order and completed a task as it was assigned to him. Mr Williamson has neither down-played or exaggerated his role. Dirk Coetzee's evidence in this instance is incorrect and is denied. It is submitted that this averment is incorrect and it is therefore denied. The probabilities are that the events occurred as Williamson said they did. We now deal with the intended target of the packet bomb or parcel bomb. Williamson's knowledge of the nature of the target was important to him at the time. It is submitted that with this proviso, Williamson's further evidence as quoted from 970 of the record goes to show that he would be willing to participate in such an operation only if satisfied the target was legitimate in the sense that it was part of the revolutionary enemy. Dealing with the averment that Williamson knows to whom the bomb was addressed. It is stated that Williamson's version is that he did not see the name of the addressee on the IED. And we refer to the Appendix to the original Heads of Argument under the heading: Ruth First. Williamson's version of what he saw and did not see has been exhaustively canvassed and does not contradict his written application where he does not say that his recollection of the name or names on the intercepted envelopes came from seeing them, his recollection came from what he was told by his superior officer, Brigadier Goosen. As far as the references on page 980, 981 and 983 respectively are concerned, it is clear that Williamson is trying to recollect an exact sequence of events ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, is there evidence by, direct evidence by Williamson that his recollection didn't come from what he saw in or around the envelope, but that it relates to what Goosen told him? MR LEVINE: I think, Mr Chairman, that the evidence was that it relates to what he was told by Brigadier Goosen, but ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: If perhaps you could look that up during the lunch hour and refer us to the ... MR LEVINE: I was going to say, the passage or passages will be sought and I will come back to that if I may. As far as the reference on page - the clear effect of Williamson's evidence, taken as a whole, is that he did not look at or read the contents of the large official envelope before he reached the Brigadier's office and spoke to him. There's a quoted extract from page 980, which clearly means that Williamson went to the Brigadier who spoke and said this is a "posstuk", I'd opened it by then. Does this not in fact mean that Williamson had opened the official envelope by the time he got to, by the time that the Brigadier had spoken? This is I would submit, some unclarity in regard to this. And here we do have a perceived problem in terms of Mr Williamson's written application, but we submit that it is clear that Mr Williamson wrote on page 3 of the, it is clear that what Mr Williamson wrote on page 3 of his application is not meant to be in strict chronological order, but was coloured by his knowledge of what he came to know that it did contain. He says simply, does Mr Williamson, that he received the envelope. This contained an intercepted postal item and the envelope came with the instructions to thus discuss the contents with Brigadier Goosen. And it is submitted that in his evidence before the Amnesty Committee, Williamson gave a full explanation of how he remembers the incident. And in regard to 3.2.D, reference is made to the immediately preceding paragraph. It is submitted that there is no suggestion in Mr Williamson's written application that his recollections of the name of the person to whom the IED was addressed, was (if you would kindly cross out passed and put in based) on his reading of the name. Williamson's statement that he did not see the name of the addressee cannot be rejected. Nobody, it is submitted, has been able to suggest why Williamson would deny seeing Ruth First's name, except to suggest that he was embarrassed that he had killed a woman. It is submitted that Williamson had no reason to lie about the addressee. The assertion that Williamson knows the bomb was addressed to Ruth First. To say that the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Ruth First would not have opened and did not open a packet addressed in any way to Joe Slovo can just not be sustained on the evidence. O'Laughlin also admitted that she took care not to know Ruth and Joe's secrets. O'Laughlin also testified that she never actually saw Ruth First deal with a communication addressed to Joe Slovo. O'Laughlin stated further that Ruth First wholly supported Joe Slovo's work. Whilst this sub-paragraph can be admitted, this does not mean by such admission that the Centre was not being used as a postbox for ANC communications from Lesotho. O'Laughlin also said that she never experienced how Ruth First had dealt with a parcel addressed to Joe Slovo. There is no support (if you will be good enough to cross out the word "from" and substitute it for the word for) ... There is no support for the allegations in the first sentence of the above-captioned sub-paragraph. O'Laughlin was asked in cross-examination as to whether she had ever been present upon the receipt by Ruth First of any other communications other than in the case of the bomb, and she said no. Of course I here exclude the USIS envelopes which came at the same time. CHAIRPERSON: You say there's no support for the allegation in the first sentence, was it shown in any way to be unreliable or untrue when she said that she had been told by Ruth First and Joe Slovo that none of Slovo's parcels were ever to be opened? Was that challenged? MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman - it's the second sentence, there's no support. Mr Chairman, I believe that that evidence was challenged, and I will try and find reference to that. We don't have unfortunately the verbatim transcript available, but if I may come back to that as well. It is stated that this statement made in this sub-paragraph is purely speculative and that Mr Williamson's evidence on the matter is clear. Why would Mr Williamson testify that he (it should not be thee), that he took documents from the one intercepted envelope and not from the other, if he in fact did so? There is no evidence on the record which indicated any doubt about the existence of the intercepted mail item. Raven's written application states merely that he was ordered by Mr Williamson to construct two IEDs in A4 envelopes. It is clear that he was here referring to the IED envelopes as he testified to. O'Laughlin's evidence about the presumed IED was not unequivocal. She in fact said she could not remember details despite all her efforts. And it must be remembered that on her version, she was not senseless by the explosion, which may well explain her memory problem about the parcel. This allegation is (I would ask to amend the word "senseless" to farfetched). For Mr Williamson to have known that the IED was addressed to Ruth First, who would have either to have been told this or to have seen the name. This is not his evidence. Furthermore, we cannot understand how it is possible to say that Williamson did not bother to find out what the postal item contained because it did not contain anything of value for the Intelligence Section of the Security ... MR LEVINE: ... in this regard, and one wonders where he obtained the support for this allegation as he is certainly referred to such blatant untruths via a referral to the record. CHAIRPERSON: I think this would be a convenient stage, Mr Levine. MR LEVINE: If it pleases you, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: ...(intervention) MR LEVINE: Thank you very much. CHAIRPERSON: And we will continue till we conclude your argument this afternoon. MR LEVINE: Hopefully it will ...(indistinct) hours remaining. ADV DE JAGER: Well if you perhaps could let us have the other part we may read through it during our lunch hour and that could probably expedite matters. MR LEVINE ARGUES IN REPLY: (Cont) Mr Chairman, during the course of the argument you asked me for a reference to the remark or the statement made at page 24 - the recollection came from what he was told by Brigadier Goosen. I would refer you to page 576 and 766 of the record. MR LEVINE: You asked me a question as well shortly thereafter about Mrs O'Laughlin as I said there was no support for the allegations in the First instance. MR LEVINE: 3.2.I, quite correct. As I said, the transcript of this lady's evidence is not available. I've looked through my notes, my notes seem to bear out what I did put to her in cross-examination and I can take the matter no further than that. I'd now like to proceed, Mr Chairman, with sub-paragraph 3.2.M. We do not accept that the IED was addressed to Ruth First only. At 1080, Mr Chairman, is the correct quote of Mr Williamson, and I would ask you to disregard what is attributed to Mr Williamson at page 1080, rather than at page 28 and 29 of the argument. And that is, Mr Williamson says: "The fact remains that whether the bomb, that if this was an ANC communication going from, or Communist Party communication, going from Lesotho to Maputo, and that the intended recipient was Mr Joe Slovo, there's absolutely no reason on earth that this should, could not go via Ruth First." So I apologise for the incorrect wording in that sub-paragraph. Dealing with sub-paragraph 3.2.N: The quote of Mr Williamson's interview with Gillian Slovo at page 29 of X2 actually goes further than that quoted in the Heads opposing amnesty. The quote begins: "It was an envelope or more than an envelope ..." Williamson and Raven have described the IED. Given that O'Laughlin was injured in the explosion and only saw the IED for a very brief period of time, it can be argued that it is possible that what she believed to have seen as a sender's return address was in fact a logo. The further description of the package, namely proofs of the book, could have been in an envelope as opposed to a parcel. It is submitted that O'Laughlin's evidence cannot be said to directly contradict Williamson, and does not support the allegation that Williamson did not make a full disclosure. And if it is found that Williamson's description of the IED is false and O'Laughlin's description is correct, then we are faced with a situation that either First was not killed by the Williamson/Raven IED, that this IED was repacked by some unknown person. The record is clear as to Raven's original written application and what he said before this Committee. If Raven conceded that he had been incorrect in his written applications then this matter would have been dealt with by Mr du Plessis. Likewise, in regard to 3.2.R and in regard to 3.2.S, Williamson adheres to his written application. It is denied that Williamson made any attempt to reconcile a mutually destructive version with Raven. ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, Mr Levine, we're only trying to get a fan working somewhere here. Okay, you can proceed. Thank you. MR LEVINE: It is denied that Williamson made any attempt to reconcile a mutually destructive version with Raven. and that has been the evidence of both Raven and Williamson. It is denied that Williamson's version changed as he testified, and there is with respect, no basis for the suggestion that he had agreed a version with Raven. It is correct that Williamson got rid of the bomb without delay. The point at issue is whether the extra envelope was contained in the original envelope, and this in clarity was to be expected under the circumstances, bearing in mind that the occurrence took pace so fleetingly and so many years ago. The suggestion that Williamson could not ...(indistinct) that the indented victim of the bomb was Ruth First is yet again without foundation, having regard to the categorisation of Ruth First as Slovo in a terrorist album. The reference in Ruth First in comrade Mzala's article "A Tribute to Ruth First" and Exhibit KK, where President Mandela albeit some 15 years after her death refers to Ruth First in the same as the number of freedom fighters being prominent members of the ANC or SACP. For completeness of the picture reference should be made to Williamson's evidence at 776 of the record, as also Williamson's evidence at pages 906 to 913 of the record. Then in regard to credibility, generally would perhaps be a better word that general, there have been numerous attacks by Williamson's opponents on his credibility and it is considered that the following remarks of his Lordship, the Honourable Deputy-Judge President of the Transvaal, Mr Justice Flemming would constitute, would be of application, particularly in regard to the long period of time that has passed between the occurrence and Mr Williamson's evidence. In MALALA MALOTO, it should really read, vs MINISTER OF LAW OF ORDER, His Lordship, Mr Justice Flemming stated the following: - and his remarks are quoted at page 33 and the top of page 34. And I say that whilst the foregoing is not intended to be exhaustive of the position or nor falls in the instant matter, it gives insight into some difficulties normally experienced by witnesses as time between the incident and the giving of evidence wears on. Then, Mr Chairman, Members of the Amnesty Committee, reference is made to transcripts of tape recorded discussions between Gillian Slovo and Williamson, which transcripts were handed in by Mr Williamson's opponents. ADV DE JAGER: But aren't your submissions in 6.1 a bit unfair seeing that you objected to the transcripts and that you've only agreed on certain passages of the transcripts, and those by agreement could be used? If you had used others, then there should have been an agreement on that too. But it seems as though the transcripts are not very much in dispute because you yourself are quoting from the transcripts now. MR LEVINE: Advocate de Jager, the position is that Advocates Bizos and Berger only appear to have used one of the extracts that they had referred to by way of a preview, so I'm not going to take the matter any further. What is in 6.2 and 6.3 is on record and ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Where is the reference to Mr Bizos choice of transcript extracts? MR LEVINE: The reference to his transcripts extracts you will recall, Mr Chairman, I handed up yesterday morning ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: No, you're saying here "the quotes from the Slovo/Williamson discussion transcript extracts chosen by Mr Bizos." CHAIRPERSON: Are those the ones in the thing you handed just yesterday morning? MR LEVINE: Yes, those are in the thing I handed up. CHAIRPERSON: None of which Mr Bizos quoted from as far as I can recollect. MR LEVINE: Save for one. Save for one, as far as I can recollect. But I'm not going to detain the Committee with specific references. The one reference was made by Mr Bizos. And I go on to say what is important is Mr Williamson has said consistently that he cannot say what the specific name was on the IED which killed Ruth First. Mr Williamson has said consistently that he does not know what General Coetzee knew about the death of Ruth First and only discussed it with him in 1995. Mr Williamson ordered Mr Raven to make an IED and to replace the contents of a large envelope on its way to Maputo. He does not know how, where and with whom or with whose help the IED was made, or even what type of explosive was used. He made assumptions, many of which proved to be incorrect on the evidence of Mr Raven. Williamson is clearly of the opinion in the transcript X1, that pages 22 to 25, that the Stratcom about Ruth First's death was implemented immediately after her death. Nevertheless, Gillian Slovo herself informs Mr Williamson that the Stratcom appeared in 1984, some two years after Ruth First's death. This shows clearly that Mr Williamson did have somewhat of a memory problem on the chronology of the events some 11 years before he spoke to Gillian Slovo in the interview. Mr Williamson said that any Stratcom would be supported by the use of Soviet explosives so that the ANC or SACP could be blamed for the bomb. However, very significantly Mr Raven gave evidence that he used non-Soviet explosives and that he knew nothing of any Stratcom. If there had been a pre worked out Stratcom on Ruth First's death along with lines of which did in fact appear in 1984, would Raven not have been instructed to use Soviet explosives, the use of which would be central to the credibility of such a Stratcom. Mr Williamson has considered, has consistently said that both the First/Slovo and Schoon envelopes came to him from somewhere, that IEDs were made as replacements to contents and that the envelopes were returned to where they came. Now there are further extracts on the transcripts. They are reflected in 7.1 to 7.5, and I'm not going to deal with them. I've already dealt with the allegation regarding celebrating and Mr Williamson's comments to Ms Slovo in X2, pages 35 to 36. The entire argument should read rather ...(indistinct) agreement by the opponents to amnesty is fundamentally flawed and misdirected. ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Could you perhaps refer me to the, or perhaps Mr Berger would be in a position to help me, the paragraph where you dealt with the post, political objective, you know ex post facto. MR BERGER: I think it's on page 20, yes. Political objective starts on 20 and then 21 is the legal consequences of Mr Williamson's stated case. That's where it's dealt with. MR LEVINE: ...(indistinct). It appears at one other place, Mr Chairman. I don't know if the page is immediately accessible. Of course the last line of page 38, the provision should be (a) and (b). And it reads Inasmuch as Williamson as a member or supporter (I'd ask you to fill in those words there) member of or supporter of the National Party and Security Forces, acted against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle against the State or against members or supporters of the ANC and/or SACP, and Williamson's primary objective was to act against such liberation movements and not necessarily against specific individuals. It can never not near be said that Williamson acted only against a specific individual, that he acted against he ANC and the SACP, to mention two as a whole. As aforesaid, Williamson had no control over the bomb after it had been given back to Brigadier Goosen. Williamson justified Ruth First as a "legitimate target" for assassination, by virtue of his perception of her, shared by the Security Police and by virtue of Ruth First falling within the provisions of Section 20.2.b of the act. Ruth First's death was not a mistake, but indeed was a result of an act directed against a publicly known political organisation and/or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle against the State or against members or supporters of such publicly known political organisation and/or liberation movement, of which it was common cause Ruth First was a member. Mr Chairman, and I'm indebted to my learned friend, Mr Chairman, and Members of the Amnesty Committee, I'd now like to deal rather briefly with Advocate du Plessis's argument. We adopt as if specifically incorporated herein, paragraphs 1 to 6, paragraphs 7 for which the name Williamson should be substituted for Mr Raven, paragraphs 8 and 9. Williamson acted bona fide against members of publicly known political bodies. Williamson took orders form a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen. I would respectfully adopt paragraphs 11 and 12 of Mr du Plessis's argument, substituting Williamson for Raven. It is submitted that Williamson at all times bona fide believed that Ruth First, Marius and Jeanette Schoon were all part of the struggle, and Joe Slovo, were all part of the struggle as members of a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement. There has been no concrete evidence to show that Williamson acted other than bona fide and with a political objective. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, it may reflect on your clients credibility or Raven's credibility, but on the evidence as it was presented, at the time the bomb came into the hands of Goosen or before leaving Goosen's hands, the names of the victims would have been on the bomb, on the covering envelope or whatever. So there's nothing to suggest that Goosen didn't know who the intended victims were. MR LEVINE: That is quite correct, Mr Chairman. ADV DE JAGER: And even - suppose he didn't select the victims, at least he must have condoned the sending of the bomb if he knew there was a bomb in the papers to the addresses. MR LEVINE: We know that Mr Williamson ensured that the bomb got back, or the bombs got back to Brigadier Goosen without delay, having received same from Mr Raven. There is no suggestion that Brigadier Goosen did not know of the intended victims. ADV DE JAGER: Well if we accept that the bomb was returned to Goosen and from thereon sent to somebody, then Goosen must have been aware exactly to whom the bomb was addressed to, if it was addressed to Ms First, that it was addressed to her in person or whoever it was addressed to and to the Schoons. MR LEVINE: ...(indistinct) evidence is that - I think, my recollection is that Mr Williamson's evidence was that Brigadier Goosen told him that the bomb was intended for Slovo, without the reference to first names. ADV DE JAGER: Ja, you're quite ...(no sound) MR LEVINE: And the second one was addressed to Schoon, or to the Schoons rather. Mr Chairman, we adopt paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of Mr du Plessis's argument. And at paragraph 22 we say that Williamson acted on the orders of a superior officer, Brigadier Goosen. Williamson asks for amnesty in ordering the bombs to be manufactured, not in despatching the bombs. And he acted on a political motive in terms of orders of a superior officer under circumstance where there was a full disclosure of all the relevant facts by Mr Williamson. We adopt paragraph 30 of Mr du Plessis's argument and he has dealt with it so well, that I need not deal with it again. Likewise there are no facts to dispute that Williamson got the order from a superior officer, and we would also adopt with respect, ... MR LEVINE: ... of Advocate du Plessis's Heads of Argument. I would then like to deal very briefly with paragraph 5 of the Heads of Argument of Advocates Bizos and Berger. And we say that the first interview with Gillian Slovo was some (it should read 13 years and not 15 years) after the incident. All that was necessary, it is submitted, was for Williamson to take part in the preparation of the bomb for those persons falling within the meaning of Section 20.22.B or the Act. And it is clear that Ruth First was a beginning "legitimate" target. Williamson did not despatch the bomb as alleged, but handed same to Brigadier Goosen his superior officer, in the line of command. In regard to paragraph 7, it is denied that Mr Williamson made an ex post facto attempt to legitimise the killing of Ruth First, since he was acting against a publicly known political organisation of which Ruth First was a member. In regard to paragraph 7.1, the contents of this sub-paragraph are ...(indistinct) and the suggestion by Advocate Bizos that the attempt to introduce the National Party as a stratagem is not justified, with respect. Only a portion of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act has been quoted. And it is submitted that the political objective has been complied with on a full reading of such sub-section 20(2)(b) of the Act. It is submitted that the perpetrators of the act acted bona fide at the time the act was carried out. This sub-section of the above sub-paragraph is correct. And it is submitted that Williamson's objective was squarely within the parameters of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act. In regard to sub-paragraph 7.4, we say that having regard to the immediately foregoing, reliance is not placed on Williamson's state of mind after the commission of the act, and his requisite bona fides it is submitted, have been illustrated. In regard to sub-paragraph 7.5.1, it is submitted that Williamson's state of mind is consistent with his acts directed against a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle against the State or against members or supporters of such organisation or movement committed bona fide with the objective of countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle. In regard to paragraph 7.2, we say that the act was committed against - 7.5.2, Mr Chairman, my apologies, the act was committed against the aforementioned at a time or war. The role of Ruth First and the perception of the Security Forces has been dealt with above. The perpetrator intended to target a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle against the State, which included any members or supporters of such organisation or movement. The order to Williamson was not to kill, but to take up the manufacture of the bomb. Amnesty is being sought for the consequences of him carrying out the order to have the bomb manufactured, which Williamson did in each instance. We submit that there is no room for argument relating to an ex post facto political objective, and reference is made to what I've set forth in the preceding paragraphs above. There is, it is submitted, no basis for refusing Williamson's application for amnesty for the murder of Ruth First and the grounds submitted or any other grounds. It was the evidence of Mrs O'Laughlin in regard to paragraph 8, that Ruth First supported Joe Slovo's work for the ANC and the SACP. We submit that Williamson has given evidence of what he knew Ruth First's involvement in the ANC and SACP to be, and having regard to Section 20.2.B of the Act, this made Ruth First a "legitimate target". In regard to sub-paragraph 10.1: The statement by Williamson on page 1681 of the record is admitted. It is surprising that mention was not made at what appears at page 1001 of the record where prior to page 1003, which is what was quoted by Advocates Bizos and Berger, Advocate Bizos engages in a debate with Williamson and alleges once again that Williamson sent the bomb and elicited the response from Williamson that he did not do so, that he did not have the bomb sent, but that he had ordered it to be manufactured, assuming that it would be sent. That appears at page 1001, and it is significant to have been omitted. In regard to sub-paragraph 10.3: It is once again denied that Williamson has not made full disclosure and there is no evidence to submit this particular allegation. In regard to sub-paragraph 10.4: What is set out is correct, but this did not deal with what Ruth First was engaged in all of the time and O'Laughlin had to concede this. In regard to sub-paragraph 10.5: Williamson's description of the political objective sought to be achieved by the killing of Ruth First is admitted. In regard to sub-paragraph 10.6: It was plain that Ruth First was, in the opponents own version, a member of the ANC within the meaning of Section 20.2.B of the Act, and was highly regarded, as is plain from Exhibits N, KK and the like. It is submitted that O'Laughlin was unable to say what activities Ruth First busied herself with when O'Laughlin was not present. It is said that Ruth First's affiliations resulted in her being a "legitimate" target. CHAIRPERSON: So this is no longer on the basis of a political party, this is Ruth First as a legitimate target? MR LEVINE: As a legitimate, as is quoted, target. There are a couple of errors in this which I must draw to your attention. The first is minor, vindictive is incorrectly spelt, and there is no (if you would insert the word "no") credible and concrete evidence to support this allegation. The fact that a storeroom at Daisy Farm was jokingly referred to Joe Slovo's basement den(?) cannot be evidence of vindictiveness. And in regard to paragraph 10.2: I state that neither can the suggestion of short chain constitute evidence of vindictiveness. Both these remarks may have been in bad taste, but it does not constitute evidence of vindictiveness. In regard to sub-paragraph 10.9.3: Perhaps the statement in question was not a gracious one but this does not again support vindictiveness. Two years after the death of Ruth First the "dekstorie" appeared in Rapport. CHAIRPERSON: Well what does that say? It said it appeared two years later. That's what Mr Bizos said. You're not attacking anything else that he said in his Heads in 10.9.4? MR LEVINE: We're not attacking anything in 10.9.4 . CHAIRPERSON: So you agree that Williamson continued the attack by planting a cover-story two years after the death? MR LEVINE: Yes, we don't dispute it. CHAIRPERSON: You don't dispute that. The contents of the first two sentences of the above-captioned sub-paragraph are admitted, but it is denied that the quoted word give insight into Williamson's true motives, as was alleged by Advocate Bizos and Advocate Berger. We deal with sub-paragraph 10.9.6: And say that Ruth First was not targeted because she was the wife of Joe Slovo, and in fact what was targeted were members of a publicly known political organisation involved in an armed conflict with the State as well a members of a liberation movement. We state that morality is not at issue, which has a bearing on matters to be decided and there is no concrete evidence that the postcard in question was sent by Mr Williamson to Gill Marcus, and all that Mr Williamson conceded was that it would have been in keeping with the circumstances of the time, to destabilise the enemy, that such a postcard could have been sent. CHAIRPERSON: Didn't he say that he might have sent such a postcard? MR LEVINE: I think he said that such a postcard could have been sent and I think that that evidence of his is reasonably clear, but there is no evidence before you that the original, the lost original and the unkept copy relate directly to Mr Williamson relates to a manuscript reference "Craig", which Ms Marcus assumed had been sent by Mr Williamson. ADV DE JAGER: But I think the only relevance of it is really what his attitude would have been, would he have sent something, and that he agreed to - could he have sent something. MR LEVINE: He said it could have been sent, but I think to the extent that it is sought to suggest as a clear fact that he sent that particular postcard, this does not support that particular point. But I don't quibble with what you have said, Advocate de Jager, as to what his attitude would have been. MR BERGER: Chairperson, I don't want to be unnecessarily obstructive, but the reference is page 830 of the record. MR LEVINE: I'm indebted to my learned friend. Williamson's acts were as a result of his subjective perception of the state of affairs at the time taking place bona fide with a political motive and for no other reason whatsoever. His application for amnesty for the murder of Ruth First and the attempted murder of Joe Slovo ought, it is submitted, to be granted. Then the next paragraph, and this is not in my heads. A reading of the judgment of His Lordship, Mr Justice Selekowitz in the End Conscription Campaign case goes into far more detail than is set out by Advocates Bizos and Berger at the end of the first part of their Heads. I would submit that although the reference to this case would appear to be to a certain extent irrelevant, in keeping with my previous won't, I will hand in the ...(indistinct) report, to go with the other three volumes, Mr Chairman, if you would receive it as such. That is just for completeness. You will see it is some 30 pages in length, and I'm certainly not going to read it. I'm sorry that holes were not punched ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: No, wait a minute, it is punched on the other side. MR LEVINE: I would submit that the amended paragraph 276 of my Heads of Argument which I handed on Monday morning insofar as Joe Slovo is concerned, would apply mutatis mutandis insofar as Marius Schoon and if applicable, Fritz Schoon is concerned. Amnesty is being sought by Mr Williamson in respect also of all other aspects of the offences relating to the London bomb and the implementation by him of orders from a superior officer to arrange for the bombs which ultimately killed Ruth First, Jeanette and Katryn Schoon. Mr Chairman, I would merely reiterate that the Evidence Leader, Ms Ramula Patel, has indicated that there's no opposition by interested parties to London bomb amnesty application. I then deal with the references by Advocates Bizos and Berger to various paragraphs of my Heads of Argument handed in on Friday. And I would refer to the Mzala article, the listing of Ruth First under the name Slovo in the Security records ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, sorry, you're not now dealing with anything that's on your typed ... MR LEVINE: No, ...(indistinct) ADV DE JAGER: Is that extra argument that you want to advance, not included in your Heads now? MR LEVINE: ...(indistinct). I shall be very brief. There's Ruth First's listing as Ruth Slovo in the Security Police documentation. There is an exhibit, the descriptions in Gillian Slovo's book and the video tape, President Mandela's reference ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: But haven't you dealt with that in your main argument? CHAIRPERSON: We've heard all this. ADV DE JAGER: I think you've referred to that, yes. CHAIRPERSON: You are replying to Mr Bizos' and other argument now, you're not developing your main argument, Mr Levine. MR LEVINE: ...(indistinct) ad seriatim, which I stress, Mr Chairman, might have been a lot shorter if I had the opportunity of more time to have removed what is perhaps superfluous. The evidence of Mrs O'Laughlin was that she was kept out of secrets between Joe Slovo and Ruth First, but that Ruth First was a supporter of Joe Slovo's conduct. Now at paragraph 268.4 there is my criticism, particularly of Professor Klug and his assumptions. MR LEVINE: Yes. And to the extent necessary I'll repeat paragraph 269 of the original Heads. It is important that Klug testified that he had never met Williamson and he only said that Williamson was partly motivated by malice on some or other unsubstantiated version in regard to the Schoons. CHAIRPERSON: Are you quoting now from paragraph 269 of your original Heads? MR LEVINE: 273.11 of my original Heads. MR LEVINE: So my note has it, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: What page is that on? MR LEVINE: If you'd bear with me a moment, Mr Chairman. ADV DE JAGER: I think there's only a 273.5. MR LEVINE: At page 122 and 123, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: That's 270, not 273. CHAIRPERSON: Please, if you're going to refer us to things, do so properly, Mr Levine. MR LEVINE: Well Mr Chairman, at this time it was 2 o'clock this morning and there may have been a slight error. I do apologise most sincerely for that. Mr Chairman, I'd like to go on no if I may, to the second instalment of the argument, but Advocate de Jager indicated that you wanted, certainly that he wanted to read same during the lunch hour ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I actually started reading your first one and I've read this one up to page 55, then the time expired, so you've repeated what I've read. I've read it up to page 55, but I haven't read from page 55 onwards. MR LEVINE: How would the other members, Mr Chairman and Mr Sibanyoni, if I might ask, like me to deal with the matter? CHAIRPERSON: Well I in fact had got a bit further than page 55 because I wasn't reading the first one. I'm quite happy for you to start at page 55 if you wish to or if you merely want to refer us in general terms to some of those passages, because several pages really nothing is raised, you merely comment. MR LEVINE: Well I deal with each of them in the same manner as previously. But if it is convenient also to Mr Sibanyoni, I will start at page 55. MR SIBANYONI: Indeed it is convenient. MR LEVINE: I'm afraid the machine was not on. Mr Sibanyoni advised that it's convenient for him as well to deal with the second batch from page 55. There are one or two amendments that I would draw your attention to. At page 47 in paragraph 41, could there be a fullstop in line 2 after the word "Schoon", and the words "just" up to the word "amnesty" be struck out. ADV DE JAGER: Yes, that didn't make sense actually. MR LEVINE: Even at 3 o'clock it didn't make sense. At page 49, if you would be good enough ... MR LEVINE: "... or to Williamson for that matter". If you could add in those words. MR LEVINE: After the word "Raven" in the third line at the end "or to Williamson for that matter." Then paragraph 46, if above the start could be inserted "on Williamson's and Raven's evidence, the fact is". Paragraph 48, line 2 "order" should read "orders". Page 50, paragraph 51, if in line two the word "claim" could be struck out and the words "rely on" could be substituted. At paragraph 53, the second line, if the words "legitimate" could again appear in quotation marks. Page 52, paragraph 56, the third line "should be in accordance with Section 20(2) of the Act". Page 54, paragraph 64, second line, the "w" must be taken off the word "hew", it read "he took part in the execution of an order to manufacture a bomb meant for Marius and Jeanette Schoon, not to despatch such bomb". Page 55, paragraph 68, the word "have" should read "has". It is stated that Williamson qualified his evidence by stating that he did not know whether he did not mention Jeanette Schoon. Williamson's comments to the observer reporter are set forth in paragraph 37.2.C. It is stated that Marius and Jeanette Schoon were targeted as members of a publicly known political party or liberation movement within the meaning of Section 20.2.B of the Act. There is no dispute as to what Marius Schoon had deposed to in regarding the time he had spent in Luanda before going to Lubango. The quote of Mr Williamson is admitted. Save for the expression of doubts by Marius Schoon, there is nothing to contest that the bomb had been conveyed in an envelope intercepted from Botswana. The final sentence of the above-captioned sub-paragraph was dealt with by Advocate de Jager, who raised the same possibility as was raised in cross-examination of Marius Schoon, that possibly someone could have felt guilty or embarrassed at not having made a disclosure of any despatch of a letter to the Schoons from Botswana and did not come forward at all. I think I correctly understood de Jager's point to be that. ADV DE JAGER: Ja, I can't remember, but if it's not so, I won't hold it against you. MR LEVINE: Thank you, Advocate de Jager. We say that Williamson has made a full disclosure and no concrete evidence of any failure to disclose - if you could strike out the "n" as being submitted I would say, rather than produced. Williamson's agreement with the description of Jeanette does not take the matter any further. The contents of the first sentence of the above paragraph are admitted. Professor Klug's knowledge of Williamson, whom he had never met and to whom he had only spoken to once on the telephone, was speculative. It may well be that Mr Chairman is correct in surmising that the bomb was prepared a long time before the murder. CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) that, that came from Raven's application. MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I think you made the comment yesterday when paragraph 40 the Heads of Advocates Bizos and Berger was being dealt with. If surmise is the incorrect word, I apologise. My attention is drawn to the fact that the last page of the first bundle of the reply is 47, which also the number of the first page of the second batch. Then I would ask you to contrast the status of the Duracel battery at volume two, page 108, Raven states the battery was assembled, whereas at volume one, page 44, Raven states the battery was disassembled. These are two different batteries, but it's just as well in my submission that I point that out to you, Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee. Jeanette Schoon was a high-ranking member of the ANC in Botswana, where she served on the Political Sub-Committee of the Botswana senior organ. The four pillars of the revolution encompassed both military and political revolutionary activity. In regard to Mr Williamson's reference as set out in paragraph 43, to a fairly accurate picture, there is no dispute. The ANC itself described Angola as a military zone under regional command, which meant that all ANC camps in Angola were military in nature. The underground illegal structures of the ANC were revolutionary in nature and had the purpose aimed at overthrowing the State. ADV DE JAGER: Ja, Mr Levine, seeing my two colleagues have read it in full, as far as I'm concerned I'll go through it, but you could highlight anything that you especially want to do, but I will quickly glance through it as you go along. MR LEVINE: Paragraph 85 ad paragraph 47 I just say that Marius Schoon's evidence as quoted by Advocates Bizos and Berger says it all. There was no evidence to disabuse the minds of the Security Forces that the Schoons were doing anything different in Lubango. I would like you to strike out the last sentence: "see Exhibit 11, page 11 and 12", because I haven't been able to find that particular reference in that particular exhibit. What is of importance is paragraph 83 at page 61 in dealing with paragraph 55: The statements as made in this paragraph cannot change the fact that Angola was the ANC's military zone under a regional command. And you are respectfully referred to Exhibit N, neither can it be denied that South African troops were fighting Cuban Fapla forces close to Lubango, which was Operation Askari at Kuvelai(?) from December 1983 to April 1984, as was admitted by Mr Marius Schoon. The next item that bears reading is paragraph 98 ad sub-paragraph 57.3 where it is stated that the paragraph is admitted, but does not change the fact that Lubango was a Cuban garrison town in a war zone. The next paragraph, 99, deals with sub-paragraph 57.4: While in Botswana Marius and Jeanette Schoon taught English to Botswana school children as their cover occupation. One asks what would make their teaching English to Angolans at a university in a Cuban garrison town in a war zone where South African troops were fighting seem innocent to South African Intelligence at the time. It is denied that Williamson knew that the Schoons were living with their children in Lubango. It has been dealt with in the annexure which was handed in by me on Monday morning of this week. Now in regard to paragraph 62.1: I say at paragraph 109 on page 65 that a reading of Williamson's evidence at page 1279, that this extract does not support the wide allegations being made. I state further that it is clear from 1279 and 1280 that the only real information on the Schoons at the time was that they had been sent to Lubango by the ANC, I think deployed was the word, than were teaching English. At the first line the word "concluded" should read "conceded". Paragraph 113 ad sub-paragraph 62.5: I refer to the fact that Williamson's denial of the words attributed to him in Raven's written amnesty stands and cannot merely be rejected because it is submitted that he " did indeed utter the evil words". In regard to paragraph 65 of the opponent's Heads: It is stated that Williamson's political objective is as set out in his amnesty application and expanded on in oral evidence. In regard to sub-paragraph 65.1: I state that the Schoons were members of a liberation movement, publicly known political organisation fighting to overthrow the South African Government and that they moved from a forward area where they were doing political work with a revolutionary aim for the ANC, to the ANC's military zone under a regional commander. The first two sentences of paragraph 65.2 have been dealt with previously, and as far as the bomb is concerned, Williamson was not the person who determined the timing, nor was he the person who decided on the Schoons as a target. The first half of the paragraph has been dealt with already. The second half is a quote from Williamson's amnesty application and is as such admitted. It is stated that this particular sub-paragraph is pure speculation, it was never put to Williamson. And in any event the operation to kill Marius and/or Jeanette Schoon was not under Williamson's control or command. In regard to ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON: On that, isn't it also somewhat improbable that if these people were helping Angolan children, teaching them English, that Unita would have been that ready to kill them? MR LEVINE: Yes, Mr Chairman, I would agree with that improbability. Williamson stated repeatedly that it never crossed his mind that the Schoons would have taken their children to Lubango, which was a war zone. Williamson did not despatch the bomb. Williams's role in the attack was to have the bomb manufactured for an attack on ANC/SACP members and members of those organisations. And it is respectfully submitted that Williamson meets the criteria in Section 20.3.A-F respectively of the Act. In regard to sub-paragraph 67.1 to 67.4: It was in fact put to Professor Klug that all of his evidence consisted of speculations and assumptions. In regard to paragraph 68, 69, 70 and 71: Williamson testified at length about this matter and stated repeatedly that he did not know that either the Schoons or Mr Maharaj suspected him. During December 1979 and January 1980, Mr Williamson was preoccupied with problems of National Intelligence Agent, Arthur McGivern's defection to London and his revelations to the London Observer of SA Intelligence operations, including the fact that one was aimed at the IUEF, the organisation in Geneva of which Williamson was the Deputy-Director. You are respectfully referred, Mr Chairman, Members of the Amnesty Committee, to pages 879 and 880 of the record. This is how Williamson's cover came to be blown, not the suspicions of exiles in Gaberone. Williamson was never confronted with Klug's evidence in cross-examination, which is surprising, especially with regard to the 1985 Gaberone raid, which was dealt with both during Williamson's evidence-in-chief and in his cross-examination by Advocate Bizos. Nevertheless, Klug was not targeted in June 1985 because he was in the United States of America, and the SNS offices were targeted because they were at the very least the Gaberone ANC's propaganda department. It was said, Professor Klug's assumption that he was targeted because of some involvement in Williamson's exposure in fanciful to say the least. Paragraph 126, dealing with paragraph 72: We repeat that Williamson did not despatch any bomb to Lubango and he certainly never felt he had any old score to settle. At page 127, in dealing with paragraph 73: It is submitted that Williamson participated in an operation to attack and damage the ANC/SACP alliance through the attack on Marius and Jeanette Schoon in Lubango, Angola, and that he ordered a bomb to be manufactured which would be used as a weapon in the attack. The attack was aimed at countering the ANC/SACP revolutionary onslaught against the Republic of South Africa. The attack resulted in the death of Jeanette Schoon and in the, and I cannot repeat this enough, Mr Chairman, the tragic and unintended death of Katryn Schoon. It is for the above acts which Williamson for amnesty. And it is further submitted with the greatest respect, that amnesty should be granted, as also for all the other offences that relate to Marius Schoon et al. In regard to paragraph 74 to 79: Refer to Willem Schoon. And at the risk of incurring the displeasure of perhaps Advocate de Jager, I would like to deal with one further aspect very briefly, which does not form part of ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: I'll take this risk, but don't take any others, okay? MR LEVINE: Advocate de Jager, if ever this has been a case where ...(indistinct) races have been applied, it would be this one. ADV DE JAGER: No, apart from everything else, we all appreciate the work that everybody has put in here because it must have been days and nights, and we know that you've all been working under pressure. MR LEVINE: Well in my case I can say that night turned into day and so on and so forth, with grievous consequences upon my voice. One final matter which I would like to address in order to put Mr Williamson's attitude on record, Mr Chairman, is the constant reference to Mr Williamson's position as Head of the Security Police Intelligence Section and the inference that in his position he would know everything and be consulted on everything done by the Security Police. I would refer you, Mr Chairman, to page 285 of Exhibit Q2. It is clear from this exhibit that Mr Williamson's Intelligence Section started off very modestly in 1980. Obviously great effort was put into developing this Section, Mr Chairman, but its capability and the knowledge of Mr Williamson were not all-encompassing, and Mr Williamson was not and could not possibly consulted on everything the Security Police and the rest of the Security Forces did or knew or did not know. That, Mr Chairman, appears as I've said, in Exhibit Q2 at page 285. And lest there be any unclarity or anomaly in the numbering of the pages, I would just like to check that we are talking of the correct pages. The document in question is referred to as: "Handlers Conference - Daisy Farm: Thursday 28 February 1985". And the quote appears at page 8 of that document: "During 1980, an intelligence division was developed". "Over the past four years special attention was given to the development and improvement of techniques with regard to intelligence gathering." "Operations Highlights: 1980 until 1984: The intelligence group expanded ..." MR LEVINE: ... from a very modest commencement to a large organisation. And it goes on in the second paragraph on page 10, with further quotes which I'm not, in view of incurring the gratitude at this stage of Advocate de Jager, going to deal with it. Thank you, Mr Chairman and Members of the Amnesty Committee for affording me the time to deal with the Heads of Advocates Bizos and Berger in the most precise albeit longwinded, I will concede, manner. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Right gentlemen, that concludes the hearing. Could I express my thanks on behalf of myself and my Committee, to all the practitioners who are still with us, for all the help they have given us during the hearing. We are now left with the task of going back and getting our record of the evidence and going through all the references you have given us. MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, ...(intervention) ADV DE JAGER: And even for all the fights you had, although we didn't enjoy it very much, but ... MR LEVINE: ...(indistinct) that those were not relevant, but Mr Chairman on behalf of all the legal representatives, both present and departed from today's scene, may I express our thanks to the Leader of Evidence and to your Registrar and to all those responsible for these arrangements which we've experienced here over the last few months. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, I think we should now stop because you're not going to make it any further, because your voice wouldn't make it further. |