Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Are we ready to proceed?

MS LOCKHAT: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Will Counsel please place themselves on record?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Louis Visser on record, instructed by Attorneys Wagener Muller. Mr Chairman, I have been handed by Commissioner De Jager, a document which is entitled matters on the roll, I take it that you have that in front of you.

Perhaps Mr Chairman, it might be convenient for you to mark on that list, the persons for whom we are acting. In the Nietverdiendt matter, which is item 1, we act for - wherever you will see the name of Mr Muller, who is my Attorney here with me, of Wagener Muller, that is for W.J. Loots and P.R. Crause as applicants Mr Chairman.

You might add that we also act for General Viktor, which is spelt Viktor, as an implicated person.

In item 2, the murder of Fabian ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I don't think we should go to item number 2 now, because I think it has been arranged that we will start with the first one and we will finish that event.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if we are going to be strictly compartmentalised, then those are the people for whom I appear in the first matter.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, my name is Grobler, appearing on behalf of the applicant, Gen A.J.M. Joubert, instructed by the Attorneys Meltz, Le Roux & Motshega.

General Joubert is an applicant in all three matters on your roll, and I will be appearing on his behalf in all three matters.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Roelof du Plessis, I act on instructions from the firm Strydom Britz Attorneys. I act on behalf of Cronje, Hechter, Mentz, Van Vuuren and Venter, the applicants who have already received amnesty. I am not here on behalf of an applicant, I am simply here to safeguard my clients' interests in so far as their evidence may or might be contradicted.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, Eric van den Berg from Attorneys Bell Dewar and Hall together with my colleagues, Mr Powe and Ms Brushla, appear on behalf of a number of victims. We appear on behalf of the families involved in Nietverdiendt, KwaNdebele and then on behalf of Gloria Hlabangani, who is the mother of Irene Motasi.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, Jurie Wessels, I am instructed by Alex Bosman Attorneys and I appear on behalf of Mr Verster and Mr Naude and Vorster in the Nietverdiendt matter.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairman, my name is Ettiene Coetzee, I am instructed by the firm Rooth & Wessels in Pretoria. I appear in these proceedings to safeguard any interest that Gen Geldenhuys and Liebenberg might have.

MR VAN ZYL: Thank you Mr Chairman and members, my surname is Van Zyl. I am instructed by the firm of Attorneys Adolph Malan and Vermeulen. I appear on behalf of Gen Gleeson as far as he might be implicated by the amnesty application of Gen Joubert as he had been notified in terms of Section 19(4) of the Act, thank you.

MR POLSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I am Graham Polsen of the firm Ruth & Wessels and I appear on behalf of Brigadier Kendall. My colleague, Mr Rossouw appears on behalf of the applicant Gouws and Oosthuizen. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In which matters are those?

MR POLSEN: They both are relating the KwaNdebele 9 and the Piet Ntuli matter. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Who appears for Mr Naude?

MR WESSELS: I do, Mr Chairman, Wessels.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes?

MS LOCKHAT: My name is Lynn Lockhat, and I appear on behalf of the Truth Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you kindly ask the TV people or whoever is in charge of those lights, it is affecting my eyes and I know my Chairperson had an eye operation last week, and he really can't stand it.

MS LOCKHAT: In order, Adv Chris de Jager.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, who are you calling or are you going to open the batting?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, for a change, I am not opening the batting. My learned friend, Mr Cor Grobler will be doing so and I understand that he is going to call Gen Joubert of the National Defence Force, Mr Chairman.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, Mr Visser is indeed correct as we agreed amongst ourselves and subject to your directions, we would like to start the proceedings by calling Gen Joubert.

Mr Chairman, you will find two applications in the documents before you, filed by Gen Joubert. The first one was the original application in bundle 3, pages 12 to 21 and if your bundles have been updated Mr Chairman, you will also find a second application in bundle 3, pages 21.1 to 21.28. You will find the same applications in bundle 4 from pages 7 to 16, and again bundle 4, 16.1 to 16.28. Then in bundle 7, pages 1 to 10, and pages 10.1 to 10.28.

Mr Chairman, you will note that you have two applications before you, and if I may just mention that the first application deals with three matters, that is the murder of Dr and Mrs Ribeiro, the Nietverdiendt 10 and Piet Ntuli. What I have been referring to as the second application Mr Chairman, adds some details relating to the Ribeiro, Nietverdiendt 10 and Piet Ntuli matter and you will then see that there is also an application relating to Gen Joubert's involvement in the escape of Charles Sebe from a jail, which was carried out by Special Forces.

Mr Chairman, as far as the Sebe matter is concerned, there are no gross human rights' violations involved, and you have not placed that matter on the roll for the present hearing. I have reason to believe that, and perhaps I should submit to you that that is a matter that you could deal with in chambers.

Then Mr Chairman, we were requested to furnish further particulars and if I may take you to that ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Grobler, could we for the time being, I think that was the arrangement agreed to at the pre-trial hearing, that we will deal with the Nietverdiendt matter first because it involves people attending the hearing and implicated people, and they need not all be here on the first day.

Ms Lockhat, you could kindly correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't the agreement that we will today start with the Nietverdiendt matter and only refer to the Nietverdiendt matter presently?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Adv De Jager.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But Mr Grobler, may I interpose, you are still explaining that you want to take us through the request for further particulars. I don't think you intend to do anything other than that, taking us into the request for further particulars and your responses thereto in relation to the Nietverdiendt matter?

MR GROBLER: That is indeed correct Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman, if I may just take you to the request for further particulars, which relates specifically to the Nietverdiendt matter, in bundle 3 on pages 22 to 24 you will find a letter written to my Instructing Attorneys, putting four questions to my learned Attorney regarding the Nietverdiendt matter. Mr Chairman, if I may just also direct your attention to page 23 and 24, which contains the answer to that.

Perhaps Mr Chairman, I should point out a number of things. The first question was on what basis did Commandant Naude identify the ten victims as legitimate targets? Mr Chairman, the answer there was in Afrikaans and if I may quote that to the best of our client's knowledge, Commandant Naude was not the person who identified the victims as targets. According to information that our client has, the victims were identified by members of the South African Police Security Branch and Commandant Naude accepted that as correct.

Mr Chairman the second question was, why did the SAP request the assistance of Special Forces in conducting this operation? Mr Chairman, you will hear more details about this, but the answer there is on page 23, our client accepts that assistance by Special Forces was requested because this was the process that was to be followed according to our client's plan as set out in his amnesty application.

Mr Chairman, again, you will hear more details about that plan. 2.2 Special Forces had a better ability to execute this operation than the South African Police.

Mr Chairman, question 3, how many Special Forces operators were assigned to the Operation? Mr Chairman, the answer there was that our client is not able to furnish particulars. You will see as the evidence goes on Mr Chairman, that Gen Joubert was never personally involved in any of the operations.

We do however, with respect, refer you to the application of Charl Naude, Commandant Charl Naude in bundle 3, at pages 8 and 10, where the same question was put to him. You will note that he gives an answer that there were four people, four Special Forces operators involved.

Then Mr Chairman, there was a fourth question which really contains a number of questions in one. According to other amnesty applicants, the victims were injected before their vehicle was set alight. What was the purpose of this, where did the substance come from and was this standard procedure?

Mr Chairman, we have answered that question as follows - our client has several aspects on which we answer to the following. Our client found out in the settlement of his amnesty application, of this injection given to the victims. He gave permission to Commandant Naude that this substance could be acquired.

4.2, our client accepts that the purpose of the injections was one or more of the following - this is an inference which he drew and he puts it forward as just that - to limit the gruesomeness of the act, to limit escape. Our client does not know where the substance came from, but he accepts that it came from the laboratory, that it came from the District General and accepts that it could have come from the South African Police Laboratory.

4.4 Mr Chairman, we were answering the question of relating to a procedure. If I may just recap, was this standard procedure? Mr Chairman, the answer we gave was, the question was not clear, but there was no standard procedure for operations of this nature.

Mr Chairman, at the time when we settled this answer, we weren't quite sure what was meant by the procedure. You will see eventually when Gen Joubert gives evidence about the plan, that yes, there was a procedure involved, but we didn't understand the question to relate to that procedure.

Mr Chairman, you have two applications before you from the same applicant, they deal with the same matters, except that the second application also brings in the matter of Charles Sebe. With your permission Mr Chairman, and perhaps I should ask you at this stage respectfully to make a ruling that the two applications really be dealt with as one single application, the one just being supplementary to the other. If you would permit me to deal with them on that basis.

The Sebe application can clearly stand over Mr Chairman, that need not be dealt with at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think if it can stand over for the time being, because I would like to enquire whether the dependants and the victims and the relatives and other interested parties in the Sebe matter, are present or not.

MR GROBLER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should just carry on in the meanwhile with the rest.

MR GROBLER: As it pleases you.

ADV DE JAGER: As far as the Nietverdiendt incident, it is the same, word for word the same?

MR GROBLER: I cannot say that they are the same word for word, because they were typed by different persons, but it is the same two applications, it is not two separate incidents.

Mr Chairman, Gen Joubert is Afrikaans speaking and with your permission, I would then like to lead his evidence in Afrikaans.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please.

GEN JOUBERT: Abraham Johannes Mouton Joubert.

ABRAHAM JOHANNES MOUTON JOUBERT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: May I then proceed Mr Chairman. Gen Joubert, you are the applicant in the, what I will refer to as the Nietverdiendt application, the Ribeiro application and the Ntuli applications, am I correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Gen Joubert, you have two applications which you have directed at this Commission and you have copies of these applications before you. I have identified these applications to the Committee.

Are these the two applications as you have it and do you confirm the correctness of those applications?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I confirm that.

MR GROBLER: Very well, General, with the Chairperson's leave I would like to take you through a number of background details because the submission will be made that this is part of the background to the Nietverdiendt incident.

In your amnesty application, your date of birth is given? That is correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Where did you grow up?

GEN JOUBERT: I was born in Johannesburg and then we moved to the North-Eastern Transvaal, to the place called Tonteldoos.

MR GROBLER: Where did you attend school?

GEN JOUBERT: I attended Tonteldoos Primary School and then pursued my High School career in Belfast.

MR GROBLER: Just for the record, during 1943 you were born, it was not said out aloud, but is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: And did you ever have any other career than a military career?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I had no other career.

MR GROBLER: When did you join the Military?

GEN JOUBERT: I began in 1961, January 1961.

MR GROBLER: General, during the years while you were growing up and began to formulate ideas in Tonteldoos and Belfast, could you tell the Committee how you as a child at that stage, had had political experiences, the ideas which were manifested within you, where those ideas came from?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, if I might answer the question in the following manner, all of us were born at a time when there were two parties which were active in the country, namely the National Party and the United Party, which later became known as the Nats and the Saps.

Those were the two primary parties in the country, they were white parties and from a young age, at home I would almost say, one was raised to support the party that ruled at that stage.

MR GROBLER: For the record, were members of your family supporters of the National Party or the United Party?

GEN JOUBERT: My mother was a member of the National Party and my father was a member of the Saps.

MR GROBLER: Did he remain a member of the United Party?

GEN JOUBERT: No, he didn't. My mother succeeded in persuading him to become a Nat.

MR GROBLER: So your political views were the views of the National Party as you had grown up? Did you hear me General?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: I beg your pardon ...

ADV DE JAGER: You should give an answer because this is being recorded on the cassette, don't just nod your head. Give a clear answer.

GEN JOUBERT: Yes Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: Just to repeat then, the question was your political views regarding your formative years and your home, were the ideas of the National Party and your answer was that that is correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: General, regarding the school that you attended and at this stage, I don't wish to ask for commentary regarding the right or wrong of anything, but with regard to where you went to school, which party had the predominant influence at that school?

GEN JOUBERT: The school itself shared the same sentiments as the National Party.

MR GROBLER: Very well, by nature of the situation General, there were also religious influences in your life. How did you interpret the church's view?

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, I was and am still a member of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa, which had a very strong viewpoint towards people of colour.

MR GROBLER: Did their viewpoint coincide with the viewpoints of any other political party?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, it was also primarily that of the National Party.

MR GROBLER: Then you went to the Army, General. In the Army, were you also exposed to what I would describe as political influences or political perspectives?

GEN JOUBERT: One must accept Mr Chairperson, that when I arrived in the Army, the Army was predominantly Afrikaans speaking and that most of the members of the Army also voted for the National Party and thus one could say that the Army was also predominantly Nationalist although party politics was not necessarily the topic of discussion.

However, in the outer circles there was political talk.

MR GROBLER: General, how did you view your career as a soldier and as a member of the Army?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, a soldier is very well trained for his task. This leads to the fact that he is well disciplined and that he executes orders to the letter of the law. That is the culture which one will find in all levels of the Army.

A very high standard of discipline.

MR GROBLER: During the years in which you were a militarist, did you experience any doubt regarding the integrity of political leaders or military leaders?

GEN JOUBERT: I had absolutely no doubt regarding the integrity of my political leaders as well as my military leaders.

MR GROBLER: Very well, General. At this stage I would like to refer to something else. Mr Chairman, with your leave, I have at this stage to deal with this, it is not directly in point to the Nietverdiendt matter, but it deals with certain recordings of what Gen Joubert has presumably said before, and I think it is necessary at this stage to put that into proper perspective if you will permit me to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do so.

MR GROBLER: General, during a hearing before the Investigative Committee of the Commission, you gave evidence in the so-called Armed Forces hearing on the 8th of October 1997?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, the record was transcribed into English. Can you recall which language you spoke?

GEN JOUBERT: I gave my evidence in Afrikaans Mr Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: In the preparatory process we studied the record and certain points were highlighted to you, aspects of your evidence and you were asked whether or not this was a correct interpretation of your evidence, do you recall?

GEN JOUBERT: No, this was never asked to me, I was never asked whether this was a correct interpretation of my evidence.

MR GROBLER: Let me rephrase the question. The interpretation of the evidence as it appears in the record, regarding the points which were highlighted to you, were there certain points regarding these aspects regarding which you would say your evidence was not correctly interpreted?

GEN JOUBERT: I did come to the conclusion that the English version was not in all instances completely translated as per my Afrikaans version.

MR GROBLER: In order to satisfy the Committee, let me just ask the following - with what degree of certainty can you say today that you know what you said in Afrikaans?

GEN JOUBERT: I know that I can say with all certainty that I know what I said in Afrikaans, because I had it on record and because I read it from a document in Afrikaans. It was a document that we had prepared.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, with your indulgence, we have in the form of writing some commentary which we have prepared, if I may request that my learned Attorney present this to you and then we can study this.

ADV DE JAGER: We do have the transcription. You could simply refer us to which bundle we should be looking at, bundle 2K is that correct?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, I don't have bundle 2K. I foresaw that there may be problems in the process and for that reason, we have the page references for you. We have compiled this into a document form.

You will see that it is very easy to understand.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I find out from the Evidence Leader if we do have a bundle relating to the Armed Forces hearing of the 8th of October 1997?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I do have the bundles with me this morning. They were actually couriered to the legal representatives on Wednesday but I think due to the courier services over the weekend, all legal representatives did not receive the bundles, and I have got general bundle 2K with me which we have copied this morning, so with the leave of the Chairperson, I just wish to furnish everyone with a copy thereof.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just intervene at this stage. I do not think that you need to canvass the details that appear here, pointing out the difference in the evidence that he gave as against the way it was recorded at the previous hearing.

I would be quite pleased if you carried on with the rest of his evidence.

MR GROBLER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Some of that which is recorded in the document, might be contentious later on, but at least at this stage ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you just lead the evidence that he wants to give us today.

MR GROBLER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if any dispute were to arise as to whether what he is saying now, is correct or not, we will deal with it at that stage. That dispute may never arise.

MR GROBLER: I accept that, thank you Mr Chairman.

General, we may proceed to the following point. I would like to ask you to give a brief sketch of your career in the Military and to take the Committee to the point at which you took over command of Special Forces.

You will recall that you explained to us that you joined the Army in 1961 and you have said previously that you occupied various positions of command before you took over command of Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes Chairperson. In 1961 I joined the Army Gymnasium in Heidelberg on a voluntary basis. After that - I beg your pardon - the Army Gymnasium was in Pretoria. Then I qualified for junior leader training and after that, I was appointed as an Assistant Field Cornet to the Second South African Infantry Battalion Group in Walvis Bay.

From there, I went as a Full Field Cornet to Four Field Regiment in Potchefstroom. From there, I was transferred to the Army Gymnasium which at that stage had been shifted to Heidelberg in the Transvaal.

From there I was transferred at that stage, as a Major, to the Infantry School in Oudtshoorn where I provided infantry junior training. From there I was promoted to the rank of Commandant and I was appointed as the Commander of the 5th South African Infantry Battalion in Ladysmith.

From Ladysmith I was transferred to 1 South African Mechanised Infantry Battalion, also as Commander. From there I was transferred as the Infantry Branch at the Army Combat School in Lohatla. From there, I was promoted to the rank of Colonel and I was appointed as the 82 Brigade Commander, the Mechanised Brigade Commander in Potchefstroom.

From there I was transferred to Sector 10 in Ovamboland, above the Red Line, where we acted against SWAPO and four years after having been promoted to Brigadier, I was in Oshakati in Ovamboland.

From there I was transferred to Special Forces with promotion to General-Major or Major-General, where I acted as the Commanding General of Special Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: That was in 1985?

GEN JOUBERT: I was officially transferred to Special Forces on the 1st of November 1985 indeed, Mr Chairperson, I beg your pardon.

MR GROBLER: General, who was your predecessor as Commander of Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: My predecessor Mr Chairperson, was General, more generally known as Kat Liebenberg.

MR GROBLER: Very well, General, until which point were you the Commander of Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: On the 1st of November 1988, I was transferred to the Division of Military Intelligence as Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Intelligence.

MR GROBLER: Who followed you up as Commander of Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: Commander Eddie Webb.

MR GROBLER: General, this hearing is about the involvement of Special Forces and I would like for you to provide some information to the Committee regarding how Special Forces operated at that time.

First, I would like to place this within the broader military context, in other words, in which way did Special Forces fit into the broader military context?

GEN JOUBERT: By nature of the situation the Chief of the Army was the Chief of the Army, and this Army was organised into Staff Divisions, for example Operations, Finances, Information or Intelligence, Logistics and so forth.

Then there were the line functions where the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Medical Services performed the line functions.

MR GROBLER: I beg your pardon Chairperson, I pressed the wrong button by accident. May I request that Gen Joubert repeats his last words. He said the Physician General and the Special Forces.

Let me just return General. You have given the broad set up within which Special Forces operated or fitted into the military structure. I would just like for you to explain to the Committee how the line of command worked, in other words, where did the Special Forces command stand in terms of other military Commanders?

GEN JOUBERT: I had the same command status as for example any other Army component.

In other words, I reported directly to the Head of the Defence Force, he was my direct Commander.

MR GROBLER: And with regard to responsibility, General, apart from the fact that he was your direct Commander, to who did you have to account for your actions?

GEN JOUBERT: The Head of the Defence Force was without a doubt the key person to whom one had to account. But there were also other Heads of Staff with whom I had close liaison. As a result of the low availability of the Head of the Defence Force, there would be the Chief of Staff of Operations who would have the responsibility of informing the Head of the Defence Force with regard to Special Forces activities.

MR GROBLER: Who was the Head of the Defence Force at that stage?

GEN JOUBERT: At that stage the Head of the South African Defence Force was Gen Jannie Geldenhuys.

MR GROBLER: And who was the Chief of Staff Operations?

GEN JOUBERT: They differed during my time. The two that I can recall were Gen Jan van Loggerenberg and Gen Knobel.

MR GROBLER: General, I would like to return to Special Forces within its own context and I am still discussing the stage at which you assumed command of Special Forces. How did the structure of Special Forces look?

GEN JOUBERT: I have said this previously, the Commanding General of Special Forces had to account directly to the Chief of the Defence Force.

The internal structure of Special Forces itself consisted of Headquarters which would also have Staff Divisions, namely Finances, Operations, Personnel, Intelligence and Logistics.

And then there would be the line functions, those were the units. There was 1 Reconnaissance Regiment which was stationed in Durban, there was 2 Reconnaissance Regiment which was a civilian unit, there was 4 Reconnaissance Regiment which was stationed at Langebaan and then there was also 5 Reconnaissance Regiment, which was in Phalaborwa.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Grobler, could we just facilitate the matter and bring it more to the facts. I would just like to tell you how I see it at the moment, I see Gen Geldenhuys at the top of the Defence Force, the applicant reports to Gen Geldenhuys, but should Gen Geldenhuys not be available, then to the two Chiefs of Staff, in other words first to Van Loggerenberg and when he left, to Knobel.

Then we get to what we really want, and that is instead of talking about this branch or that branch, could you rather tell us with regard to this specific incident we had two branches or three branches or divisions. The one fell under, I have forgotten the rank now, say Charl Naude and the other fell under Verster or whoever, so that we can just get to the facts as quickly as possible, and get the picture of who we are going to be dealing with with regard to these matters.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, if you would grant me the opportunity - perhaps we could cut the process short, I understand that. Usually when one tries to cut a witness short all the time, you tend to confuse the witness, so I would just like to lead the witness.

ADV DE JAGER: But these are not issues of dispute, you can lead your client. If anybody has an objection to this, it can be submitted, but these are fixed matters. These are not matters that have anything to do with the merits of the case.

MR GROBLER: I appreciate that Chairperson. Might I then summarise as follows - Gen Joubert, there was another unit which was known as Barnacle, this was also a unit in Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Barnacle was earlier known as D40 and later Barnacle became the CCB which everybody knows about?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Now General, I think the indication that we have at this point is that you must accept that there is an existing measure of knowledge with this Committee regarding how the CCB and Special Forces and Barnacle operated at that time.

I would like to ask you - at this stage I am going to put the general statement to you - at a certain stage you devised a plan and I can summarise the plan as follows, it boils down to the following, that activists and co-operators, people who stood together and played a great role in the struggle against the government, would be eliminated?

GEN JOUBERT: They would be maximally disrupted.

MR GROBLER: Very well. You use the phrase maximally disrupted, I used the word eliminated, if I am incorrect, please correct me, or could this also include elimination?

GEN JOUBERT: It could have included elimination.

MR GROBLER: Now General, there is a request that we then in the light of what we must accept as existing knowledge, move to what happened with the Nietverdiendt 10.

ADV DE JAGER: Can we just achieve clarity regarding this from the beginning, the word elimination within the context of its usage here means to be killed?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, it was my choice of words which was used at that stage, perhaps under the influence of what I have read or heard. The witness has given evidence that this can be used in that context or included in that context, but I will specifically ask the applicant.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's just be clear about this, because we have disputed the meaning of the term elimination at length. Is this in dispute or does the witness concur that if he received an order to eliminate somebody, that would be an order to kill somebody?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, I wouldn't say that it meant that that person was to be killed. If one could devise another method to capture the person and imprison them for example and eliminate them in such a fashion, this means that I don't want to say that eliminate would in all cases denote killing.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I interpose Mr Grobler, before you proceed. May we just understand clearly what is meant according to your client's understanding, by elimination?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, yes, I think that is where we are heading, if you will permit me a moment.

General, I used the word eliminate and the question was asked whether eliminate within the context of your evidence today, means to kill. If I understood your question correctly, it means within the context of today's evidence, whether or not elimination denotes to kill?

The client confirms that within the context of today's discussion, it would mean to kill.

We will return later to the detail of the plan and how it was to operate, but I would like to lead you briefly with regard to this plan. You identified three flash point commandments to which you sent members of Special Forces to cooperate with the South African Police?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, one of or all three those flash points commandments were Northern Transvaal, Wits and the Eastern Cape?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR GROBLER: The Nietverdiendt 10 who were killed, did those persons die in execution of this plan of yours?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, perhaps I should now ask you to tell in your own words how the Nietverdiendt incident took place.

GEN JOUBERT: I think one should just move a bit broader with regard to this matter and place it into a broader context.

Special Forces did not operate in the interior of the country. They did manage activities internally.

MR GROBLER: Might I just understand this, are you saying that they did not operate internally, do you mean at all times or only at certain times?

GEN JOUBERT: That is why I am saying I would like to get to the point, just before the state of emergency in 1986, it was requested by the Head of the Army to me, if I could assist the Police, and provide assistance to the Police.

That is when I devised the plan. I don't wish to go into the details of the plan because that will take up too much time, but in the broader sense it boils down to the fact that targets would be identified, they could be eliminated. It was said that instant training of activists was a serious problem and facilities were also listed as targets and because Special Forces did not operate internally, I then transferred the plan to Gen Geldenhuys at the much discussed party.

Then I gained the impression that I had the green light to go ahead. The Police approached us to do certain things, in other words in support of and in co-operation with the Police. I would just like to add ...

MR GROBLER: General, I just have to interrupt you there for a moment, you say then the Police approached us. Is that something in which you were personally involved or did this occur on another level?

GEN JOUBERT: After I devised the plan and identified the commandments, I sent two groups of people, one to the Northern Transvaal and their Security Police and the other to the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg commandment.

MR GROBLER: I beg your pardon General, I was about to interrupt you once more.

GEN JOUBERT: In either event, it was never my policy to do anything that was to be done internally, on my own, if I did not have the assurance that the Police had knowledge thereof and that they supported it.

That is where the Nietverdiendt 10 came into the picture. I don't know if we should discuss the Nietverdiendt 10 in detail at this point.

MR GROBLER: I would just like to pause here, General. Were, or let me rephrase my question, in terms of this plan of yours, were there ever targets which were indeed identified, in other words people who were identified as targets?

GEN JOUBERT: The individuals who were definitely identified on the basis of intelligence which the Police had provided, were Dr Ribeiro and his wife, and I think it was Pieter Ntuli as well.

MR GROBLER: The Committee will in time hear that evidence that the Ribeiro's and Ntuli had previously been identified as targets.

Might I just pose the following question, the Nietverdiendt 10, were they ever identified as targets at a formal meeting?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: By whom Mr Grobler, by his unit?

MR GROBLER: I was going to ask that question Mr Chairman. Perhaps I should put the question further, were these Nietverdiendt 10 ever identified as targets at a formal meeting, if you could just answer that first?

GEN JOUBERT: The Nietverdiendt 10 were never identified at a formal meeting where I was in attendance. As it appears in my application, that is the information which I have.

MR GROBLER: At this point, I would like for you to explain to the Committee how the Nietverdiendt 10 situation took place.

MR GROBLER: Commandant Naude who was the Commander of the Special Forces at that stage, who was working with Commandment Northern Transvaal, came to me and told me that a plan was being devised to infiltrate these activists and to drug their alcohol and to take them out with a kombi to Nietverdiendt.

I confirmed that it was in Bophuthatswana and I was under the impression that the substance would be put into their beer or injected into their beer.

MR GROBLER: General, what was your impression as to what would - you referred to them as activists, what was your impression as to what would happen to them? Let me put it to you, would they have been killed?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that was how the plan was put forward to me.

MR GROBLER: Very well General, was it a strange idea when Commandant Naude came to you with this request?

GEN JOUBERT: When one has regard for the situation, and how the situation was at that stage, throughout the country, one could say that the country was on fire and if those people return and the other groups who went out, came back, caused much trouble and this was one of the reasons why we said that this training of activists had to be stopped in foreign countries.

MR GROBLER: General, if I could just ask a further question, this plan that you devised, where I used the word elimination, did this plan of yours exist at this stage when Commandant Naude approached you and informed you that they wanted to eliminate these activists in this manner? Did you have this plan already?

CHAIRPERSON: May I just intervene at this stage to find out whether the people that were to be eliminated, had been identified at that stage or a group had been identified at that stage?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, at the moment we are now putting various questions to the witness. Your question if I may just understand it, I am not sure that it is always heard, is had these activists been identified as ...

CHAIRPERSON: I am talking about the Nietverdiendt?

MR GROBLER: Yes, your question if I understand it correctly is whether these people had been identified as targets before the time?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, whether this group had been identified at that stage?

MR GROBLER: General, you will recall that I asked the question beforehand whether this group of persons were identified as a target, and your answer to that was not at any meeting where you were involved or where you were present.

It is in the record, they were infiltrated by a member of the Police Force who also transported them.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Grobler, I have a problem. You will have to assist me so that I am on the same page with you. Up to now, I think there is something which I am lacking.

MR GROBLER: If you will just bear with me, I am sorry I cannot hear you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I proceed, probably speak a little louder.

MR GROBLER: Thank you, I can now hear you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I have a problem, I am not on the same page with you. Maybe you could assist me so that I could be on the same wavelength with you. You have on several occasions put one question to your witness, Gen Joubert, and your question has been were the activists ever identified at a formal meeting, and his response has always been no, they were never identified at a meeting in which he was in attendance.

Which meeting are you referring to, that is the problem? I mean I think there is a vacuum, what meeting are you referring to? Could you assist us in clarifying what meeting you are referring to?

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, was there a meeting where they were identified, at which meeting he wasn't present?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, perhaps this is the difficulty that one runs into if you are trying to cut time by shortcutting a witness on what he was going to tell you, and then things do not come over as they should have been.

May I just for one moment direct your attention to his amnesty application. You will have noticed from his amnesty application, that he says that there was a meeting which he held with Brigadier Cronje and with Gen Moller, after he had devised this plan in terms of which people would be eliminated, if I could use that word, and at that meeting they identified the Ribeiro's and Piet Ntuli as targets.

Mr Chairman, the evidence is if I use the word a formal meeting, it is that type of meeting that I am talking about, where people are formally identified as targets in that sense. The evidence given by the witness at this stage, if I understand it correctly, is that the Nietverdiendt 10 were not identified as targets as such a meeting, such as the Ribeiro's or Piet Ntuli. If that answers your question.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: It does. Maybe for the record, I think you should have made sure that that particular aspect is also dealt with by your witness, for the sake of completeness sake.

MR GROBLER: I thank you Mr Chairman, I take that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed.

MR GROBLER: Gen Joubert, to return to the Nietverdiendt 10, my question was then that this plan of yours in terms of where persons could be killed or eliminated, did this plan exist when Commander Naude approached you with the information that they wanted to eliminate the Nietverdiendt 10 at Nietverdiendt?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, he approached me and gave me the plan in the broad, or in general, it was never in detail. He never discussed it in detail with me and as he told it to me, it sounded as if it could be correct. I asked if it was sorted with the Police and he said yes.

The Police will have, will participate in this operation.

MR GROBLER: My question to you, we might be talking passed each other, your own plan, this great plan that you put before Gen Geldenhuys, did that plan exist when Charl Naude approached you with the information as to what they could do with the Nietverdiendt persons?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, the plan did exist.

MR GROBLER: And then my question was, when Commander Naude came to you with the information that they wanted to eliminate these persons, was this strange when he approached you with this plan?

GEN JOUBERT: No Chairperson. It was not strange because this was part of the original planning.

MR GROBLER: Very well. Gen Joubert, you have a perception as to what these people were, these people who were to be killed. Could you please tell the Committee what your impression was as to who these people were or what these people were?

You indicate that you are not sure as to what the question is.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Grobler I think there is confusion because you speak of one plan and then you speak of another plan. Let us have a look at the main plan and I do not want to place words into the witness' mouth, but if one has regard for his amnesty application, and he confirms what he says in here and he was requested to devise a plan as to how the Special Forces would assist the Security Police in the struggle against the liberation movements, that plan which he devised consisted that identified activists had to be eliminated in some manner, let's just leave aside how this was to be done.

The identification of these marked or targeted activists would take place or would be done by the Security Police and this was to be discussed at a meeting where Special Forces and the Police were to be represented.

Let's just get clarity here, was there weekly meetings, monthly meetings, how did these two groups cooperate?

MR GROBLER: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I think Gen Joubert would be able to answer the question.

Was there fixed meetings, that is the question General, where people would be identified?

GEN JOUBERT: Since Mr Chairperson, since as I have explained it to you, Special Forces co-operated with the Security Police and teams were delegated to the Police, I do not know if meetings did take place. At my level, we did not have any meetings.

ADV DE JAGER: The co-operation was to be there, your plan was that co-operation was to be there, you gave this information through to the Chief of the Army according to you, it was approved, and according to that plan, you gave instruction to the Commanders which you delegated to the different regions.

The Nietverdiendt matter is in regard to the Northern Transvaal area, your Commander there was Charl Naude. Do you know whether Charl Naude co-operated with the Security Police and whether they held regular meetings?

GEN JOUBERT: (Microphone not on)

ADV DE JAGER: Very well, I assume that you accept it, but you have no certainty because you never attended any of those meetings.

Did Charl Naude report back to you that he attended such meetings?

GEN JOUBERT: Before they embarked on an operation, he would give the information to me in general, and then I would ask him are the Police aware of this, does it have their approval, do they have authorisation and then he would tell me that they do.

ADV DE JAGER: Let make it a little more concrete here. We are dealing with the Nietverdiendt matter and in the Nietverdiendt matter we know that ten young persons were killed.

What did you hear, how was the plan as to how these persons were to be killed, who gave the approval and who gave this plan to you?

GEN JOUBERT: The part where the Army was involved Mr Chairperson, that part Commander Naude discussed with me.

ADV DE JAGER: And you approved the policy?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I did, but I said that it had to be in co-operation with the Police, we could not do it on our own.

ADV DE JAGER: We have that now, now which part - what was your instruction to Charl Naude, what did he have to do?

GEN JOUBERT: I told him that he had to go on and do the detailed planning with the Police.

ADV DE JAGER: As far as you know, was this done and what was your follow up information, did you receive a report from him, did you read something in the newspaper, what do you know of this Nietverdiendt matter?

GEN JOUBERT: After the operation was completed, it was reported back that the operation was successful and I read it in the newspaper as well.

ADV DE JAGER: What further role did you have in the Nietverdiendt matter?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, that was basically the role that I had played.

ADV DE JAGER: You have referred in your evidence to a drug?

GEN JOUBERT: My interpretation of this drug was that it was to be something that would be added to these persons' drinks.

ADV DE JAGER: But this drug had to come from somewhere, did you give an instruction or give him authorisation to get this drug, how did he find this drug?

GEN JOUBERT: I gave him that authorisation.

ADV DE JAGER: To get it?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you very much.

MR GROBLER: General, do you know where he acquired it?

GEN JOUBERT: I cannot say with certainty, but it comes from one of the laboratories or it could have come from the Police laboratory, I cannot say with certainty.

MR GROBLER: Very well General, the death of these ten persons, did you know any of these persons?

GEN JOUBERT: I did not know any of them.

MR GROBLER: Did you receive any benefit from the deaths of these persons?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I did not.

MR GROBLER: General, if you had to put the question to yourself and answer the Committee today, how did the deaths of these persons add to your objective, in other words what was the purpose of their deaths?

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, what I can say is that the situation in Mamelodi stabilised significantly and that is all that I wanted.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know who identified the ten victims as being the people who are going to be targeted?

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, I did not know at that stage how it would be done, but at a later stage, I found out that it was Mamasela from the Police.

MR GROBLER: General, whose task was it, or there might be some doubt as to whose task it was to do the identification and without going into detail of the plan which you put before Gen Geldenhuys, but when we speak of target identification, we spoke of the meeting between yourself and Cronje and Moller, but for actions against targets, did there always have to be a formal meeting between yourself and let's say Brigadier Cronje and Gen Moller?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Grobler, I think that is the problem that we have as members of the Committee, because now speak of a meeting between Gen Moller, Cronje and I don't know who else. We have never heard of any such meetings, that is why I asked was there any meetings, did he know of such meetings, we did not hear that there were meetings between Moller and the other persons, where these things were planned and this is where the Committee has trouble with following as to what the procedure was.

Somewhere, if you could at least confirm that part of the evidence and refer us to those pages, and confirm it, he does not have to read it out word for word, if it is necessary, let him repeat it, but we need to have this picture as to see what happened. We were not there when you consulted with your client.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Grobler, I think to come to your rescue, you have already covered that point, haven't you? You have already covered that point?

MR GROBLER: Pardon?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You have already covered the point that is being mentioned by my colleague, the meeting between Brigadier Moller, General-Major Moller and Brigadier Cronje, that is when I was questioning you because I couldn't contextualise the formal meeting that you are alluding to when you were questioning Gen Joubert.

MR GROBLER: I thought that I had covered it.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In fairness too, I think you have already covered that. Whether you want to give it more detail than you already have, I think that is up to you.

MR GROBLER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I thought that I had already covered it, and again I must say that perhaps this is the difficulty that one runs into if you are trying to come to the incident very quickly without giving certain background, but with your permission, I would like to go to the application itself.

May I ...

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Can you refer us also to pages, maybe it will also assist us. As I say, I think it is important for the sake of the completeness of the record, to do refer to some of these incidents in detail, even though you think it is not particularly important to do so because they have already been covered in your client's application.

Do make reference to the pages, I think the incident that you are busy with and in particular this particular detail about the formal meeting, appears at pages 21.22, which is typed page 13 of the documents.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, you have various copies of the application before you. May I refer you to whichever version of it is, it would be a manually numbered page 17, that is paragraph 4.2 of the application.

Mr Chairman, this part of the application deals with what eventually gets the title "My Plan" on the numbered page 18. May I just with your permission, deal with this part and ...

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, but the pages or the numbering of the pages, don't make any sense because my page says application for indemnity of human rights' violations.

MR GROBLER: There are three versions, or three copies of these applications before you. Everyone of them has been numbered as either 1 to 28 or as a sub-number, for example 10.1 to 10.28.

However, whether it is chief number of a sub-number, it will be the pages 17, so if you will just consult bundle 3.

ADV DE JAGER: I have bundle 3 in front of me, page 17 of bundle 3 says actions against ANC activists.

MS LOCKHAT: If I could be of assistance here, it is actually 21.18, so you can't just refer to 18, but you have to be specific and give the full reference page number.

MR GROBLER: If you will then consult the third bundle, then it would be the numbered page 21.17 to which I am referring, with the heading sharpened actions.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you, now we know, 21.17.

MR GROBLER: General, after you had taken over as Commander of Special Forces, certain things occurred which you discuss in your application from paragraph 4.2 onwards. Is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: Paragraph 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 you point out that Gen Magnus Malan who was the Minister at that stage, asked Gen Constand Viljoen who he held responsible for combating the ANC and that this was carried over to Gen Liebenberg?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, if you had to provide your own interpretation of that question as it finally arrived at you, how did you interpret it?

GEN JOUBERT: In its particular context, this question was nothing other than an order that the ANC be stopped at all costs, it was clear that the struggle against the revolutionary forces would be sharpened at this stage.

It was also clear to everybody that the ANC could not be stopped with the usual conventional methods and that revolutionary methods would have to be applied. Special Forces as the responsible institution for as far as external operations were concerned, would also sharpen their external actions.

MR GROBLER: General, that would be the broad background regarding external operations, because you had stated that Special Forces operated externally.

But if we can just move to the internal situation, paragraph 4.2.4 I will read it to you, after I had taken over command of Special Forces, the state of emergency was expanded in June 1986 and the South African Defence Force was told to provide internal support to the South African Police.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: In 4.2.5 you say I received an order from Gen Geldenhuys to devise a plan on how Special Forces could provide internal support to the South African Police. At this stage, everybody of importance had realised that the unconventional and revolutionary methods provide the only hope on success.

The fact that Special Forces was involved on an internal level, confirmed this. I accepted that Gen Geldenhuys would have cleared the principle of corroboration between Special Forces and the Police with his equal in the South African Police, Gen Coetzee.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Then we get to the heading, My Plan. Chairperson, perhaps it would be important that when we discuss the plan or my plan, it is this part of the evidence which it is about.

In 4.2.6 you said internal operations against the liberation movements, was the task of the South African Police. The SAP wanted the South African Defence Force to work with the SAP and not the SAP to work with the SADF. The SAP was better informed and equipped to act internally and until that stage, Special Forces had fulfilled an Intelligence role.

According to my Plan, Special Forces would provide internal support to the SAP in operations, which would be aimed at disrupting the ANC completely on an internal level?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Very well. Seeing as it was clear that unconventional and revolutionary actions were necessary, it was also clear that clandestine and covert operations would have to take place internally for which Special Force members would be used. It was more or less during this time, that the name CCB was established as a replacement for Barnacle or D40?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Then you say the revolutionary and cover aspect of the plan included among others that the ANC leaders and persons who contributed essentially to the struggle, be eliminated.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, I must ask you, if one had spoken in that sense of elimination as it has been used now, are you talking about killing or something less than killing?

GEN JOUBERT: They were to be killed.

MR GROBLER: ANC facilities and support services would be destroyed, activists, co-operators, soldiers and persons who supported them, would also be eliminated.

Then you say in 4.2.10, the SAP because of their better knowledge of internal situation and the role which determined persons fulfilled, would primarily identify targets and collect and provide information regarding such targets. From time to time, there would be planning sessions between myself, Commanders a the Chief of the Security Police in the area of every command. During such meetings information would be considered and objectives or targets would be determined?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: After the determination of objectives, the Commander's role would fall away and they would no longer be party to any planning or execution thereof?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, the actual operations would be planned by the Security Police in the area of the command in co-operation with members of Special Forces who would be devolved to various areas of the command, but not under the command of the Commanders, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And the members of Special Forces would in the execution of operations provide support to the SAP because Special Forces members would then be better trained for the type of operations which were foreseen.

Before every covert operation would be executed, approval would have to be obtained on the highest level within the SAP to ensure that the targets which were identified, would not be harmless targets and would indeed contribute to the maximal disruption of the liberation movements, is that correct until thus far?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: I supposed that approval would occur on at least the same level as myself, that would mean the level of the Commander of the Security Police, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Before an operation was to be executed, the final plan was to be submitted to me, so that I, myself, could be sure that it was (a) an SAP operation, and (b) that it was aimed against the liberation movements in particular the ANC, and (c) that the action would contribute to the disruption and cessation of the liberation movements.

Then you get to the following point in which you say that you were to submit the plan to Gen Geldenhuys. You say it was a particularly busy period for all and before you could have a formal appointment with him, you saw him at the farewell function for the Chairperson of Armscor?

I beg your pardon, is there a problem?

CHAIRPERSON: The only point is this that we have all this on oath by him, and your reading it, merely burdens the record. Wouldn't you rather not put to him, he has these papers before him, to ask him whether he agrees with the paragraphs to which you would like to refer him specifically to, and whether he confirms it?

It might save you a great deal of time, having to read all these paragraphs to him?

MR GROBLER: Yes, Mr Chairman, but with due respect, it has given occasion to some misunderstanding and (a) it confused the witness and with due respect, I think it has also confused some of the persons present here.

It is just the way that one simply has to follow to catch up and to bring the witness to a point where he deals with it. If you will permit me a few more minutes of your time please Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, carry on.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, my attention has been drawn to the fact that it is one o'clock, if you would prefer to adjourn at this moment, it is a convenient time for me.

CHAIRPERSON: I will accede to your request, but let's make it quite clear, I had intended to adjourn at quarter past one, but we will now resume at quarter to two instead of two o'clock.

MR GROBLER: I can carry on Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We have decided, we will adjourn now, and we will resume at quarter to two.

MR GROBLER: As you please.

CHAIRPERSON: The Committee will rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ABRAHAM JOHANNES MOUTON JOUBERT: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: (continued) Gen Joubert, we were busy with your application and we were discussing the heading My Plan, which is paragraph 4.2.6 of your application.

Gen Joubert as you have set it out here under the heading My Plan, may I ask this question, is this how the plan would have looked, in other words, this is before the implementation of the plan?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Very well. I would like to refer to you paragraph 4.2.10 where you used the words the SAP because of their better knowledge of the internal situation and of the role which determined persons fulfilled, would primarily identify the targets and gather the information and distribute the information about the targets. Could you expand somewhat on that.

Why would the SAP primarily identify the targets?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, I think I have already said this, but I will repeat it. Special Forces had certain areas of responsibility which were allocated to them, an Special Forces was responsible exclusively for action externally.

So we had information with regard to external situations, but then we reached the stage where Gen Geldenhuys requested me to assist or support the Police in the state of emergency. I devised the plan, but because we had worked primarily externally and the Police internally, we did not have the necessary information with regard to the internal information situation.

Out of necessity we had to rely on the SAP's information. We then after identifying the targets through them, we devised a plan with them and the operation was executed.

MR GROBLER: Very well. The involvement of Special Forces, if I might ask a leading question on that, was with the execution of the final action against the target?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Now General, we discussed your statement up until paragraph 4.2.16 in which you stated that you were to submit that plan of yours, to Gen Geldenhuys.

Now General, you have the statement which you made before you, that part of your application. Could you elaborate on the circumstances at that time, surrounding the problem of liaising with Gen Geldenhuys personally. What were the circumstances?

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, I can only say that at that stage we were caught up everywhere in the planning of operations, not only Special Forces operations. We did operations with the SAP and with the Defence Force and it was extremely difficult to contact Gen Geldenhuys.

MR GROBLER: Very well.

GEN JOUBERT: The same situation was of application to me personally, because I was busy with the planning of other operations, this was not the only operation which we executed. For this reason, it was just as difficult for my people to reach me.

MR GROBLER: General, you spoke about the Chief of Staff in the set up, if I could just have a moment to get the correct wording, Chief of Staff Operations.

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Could you have taken your plan to the Chief of Staff Operations at that stage, did you do so?

GEN JOUBERT: I gave them the feedback of the operation, but I never informed him physically of the operation.

MR GROBLER: No, we are talking about the plan?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Very well.

GEN JOUBERT: Once again, one must understand the sensitivity of this sort of operation and one had to keep it as much as possible, on a need to know basis.

MR GROBLER: At the farewell of the Chairperson of Armscor, you did contact Gen Geldenhuys, or at least you came into contact with him, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: Are you able at this stage, to provide a date for that event?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I can't.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In terms of months? The month?

MR GROBLER: Could you indicate a month or a year?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes it was during 1986, and I would think that it would have been round about April or May.

MR GROBLER: Might I pose it to you as follows, was this before the expansion of the state of emergency or afterwards?

GEN JOUBERT: No, it was before the expansion, because he came to me and told me that the State President had said that the state of emergency was to be expanded and that the Department of Defence should investigate what they could do.

Then Gen Geldenhuys came to me and told me that I was to devise a plan, because the State President was going to expand the state of emergency from the 6th of June and that the broader plan should be in place by that stage.

MR GROBLER: Okay, so you are at this function, could you elaborate on the contact that you had with Geldenhuys, how it came to be and where it occurred?

GEN JOUBERT: While the function was underway, I waited for an appropriate moment when Gen Geldenhuys would be alone.

The moment arrived, and I went to him and I told him that I needed to submit the plan regarding the order which he had given to me, in broader terms.

MR GROBLER: When you say broader terms, did you mean that you wanted to provide the finer details or the general direction or slant of the plan?

GEN JOUBERT: We would call that the basic combat design, not a detailed plan.

MR GROBLER: I beg your pardon, you used the word combat design?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, the combat design as it is known in military jargon. I managed to reach him, we went outside, we stood in the foyer and within 15 minutes, I briefly explained to him what our objective was.

MR GROBLER: Very well. General, did he have anything to say about it, any remarks, any questions?

GEN JOUBERT: All he said to me was that it sounded good, and that he had never had any problems with my integrity and my judgement. If the SAP agreed, the plan could go ahead.

MR GROBLER: General, if you look back, your plan as you had planned it, it was that people could be killed or were to be killed on an individual basis. How did you interpret Gen Geldenhuys' attitude towards that at that stage?

GEN JOUBERT: Well, it depends upon the type or sort of operation to be executed. Certain operations, I mean we always went in with the objective to kill as little people as possible, to injure as little people as possible and our objective was to capture as many prisoners of war as possible.

That was our foundation.

MR GROBLER: Very well, we have these internal operations that are going to be carried out on individuals.

When you and Gen Geldenhuys parted ways there, what was your impression, what had you been given permission for?

GEN JOUBERT: Personally I understood that this was the first time that Gen Geldenhuys had said something like this to me.

I was under the impression that he had said the green light is on, go ahead, just make sure that the SAP is informed. It should be done in conjunction with the Police.

MR GROBLER: Very well. Now we will come to the next part of your evidence, that is how you put your plan into action.

We now have the structure of the plan and it is now to be implemented on ground level. That you deal with under the heading Implementation in your application. You can study your application, and if you could just explain to the Committee exactly how you implemented the plan.

GEN JOUBERT: After we had identified the three flash point commands, we divided two teams. The one team we sent to the Northern Transvaal under the command of Brigadier Cronje and the other team under the command of Naude.

MR GROBLER: If you say that team, do you mean the team in Northern Transvaal?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct. The second team was sent to the Witwatersrand command to cooperate there with the Security Police.

MR GROBLER: And who was the Commander there?

GEN JOUBERT: Where?

MR GROBLER: At Wits.

GEN JOUBERT: This team's Commander?

MR GROBLER: Yes.

GEN JOUBERT: That was Colonel Joe Verster.

MR GROBLER: General, when you speak of a flash point command, what are you referring to?

GEN JOUBERT: That would be literally a place where there was large scale revolutionary problems.

MR GROBLER: Then with regard to the Eastern Province command, did you send anybody there?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I didn't sent a team there, because I didn't have enough manpower.

MR GROBLER: If you will refer to your application once again, paragraph 4.2.18, just refresh your memory from there and explain to the Committee.

In paragraph 4.2.18 you discuss how those Special Forces members would operate within the various areas. Have you studied that General.

My question to you is, is there a reason why they were not under the command of the Commanders of those specific commands?

GEN JOUBERT: Are you speaking of the Special Forces or the Security Forces?

MR GROBLER: You state in your statement that the Special Forces members would not fall under the command of the Commanders of those specific commands?

GEN JOUBERT: And would work in the conjunction with the Security Police in that specific area.

MR GROBLER: But is there a reason for the fact that they were not under the command of those leaders?

GEN JOUBERT: It is very clearly set out in the plan, after the identification of the target, it was decided that the Commanders of those specific commands would withdraw and that we and the Security Police would go further with our tasks.

Because of the sensitivity of these operations, the Commanders were not to be involved.

MR GROBLER: And then you make the point that liaison were to take place on three levels between the people involved, between you and the Commander of the Security Police, between you and the Special Forces unit and between the Special Forces unit and the Security Police?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: You have already discussed 4.2.19. 4.2.20, the Commanders were to be involved in a limited scale and you discuss the reason for that being that they were to obtain information regarding what was happening in their areas and that units of Special Forces would be working in the areas, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Just for the purposes of the record, the statement that they would have known that the planning and the identification and the elimination of certain individuals was involved, however, they were not involved in the action itself?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: You then discuss a meeting which you held in which Gen Moller and Jack Cronje were involved, that is paragraph 4.2.21 of your statement. Can you please elaborate on that?

GEN JOUBERT: In the initial planning, we maintained that the Security Police in the area and the Commanders in the area would be those people who would have the information and they were to tell us which targets needed to be prioritised because we did not have the relevant information.

MR GROBLER: You then held such a meeting during which Brigadier Cronje and Gen Moller were in attendance, and during that meeting, were any specific targets identified?

GEN JOUBERT: There were three targets which were identified. The one which I remember pertinently was the elimination of the Ribeiro's, the following one was the problems which were experienced with activists who had received instant training in other countries, the third being the problem with facilities.

MR GROBLER: Was Ntuli mentioned?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, he was mentioned.

MR GROBLER: General, I would like to ask you to elaborate on the question of instant training. Can you tell the Committee exactly what instant training involved according to your understanding of it at that point?

GEN JOUBERT: These people were recruited usually during the week. This is how I understood it, and on a Friday evening, and here this information would be supported by the Police, on a Friday evening, those guys would drive a kombi or a minibus over the border and over the weekend they would receive training, after which they would return on Sunday evening or Sunday night.

MR GROBLER: When you refer to these people, those people that you are referring to, were they associated with any particular party in the struggle?

GEN JOUBERT: They were associated with MK.

MR GROBLER: Very well, then we will come to the Nietverdiendt 10 which you have already started discussing.

Paragraph 4.3.1 you say they were a group of activists or soldiers who were killed while they were on their way to Botswana to undergo further training. General, at this stage, if you look back, was it your information that they were activists or fighters or that they were going for instant training, can you recall exactly what your information was? Can you rely on your memory?

GEN JOUBERT: Well I could, as long as it doesn't disappoint me. If it was said to me that they were activists who were going for further training.

MR GROBLER: Okay, let's go back to the meeting that you held with Brigadier Cronje and Gen Moller. An activity which you identified there as a target, was the training of fighters externally and that this training was to be stopped?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Was this something to which one could link any names of people before hand?

GEN JOUBERT: I cannot answer that question, because I did not recruit the people. They were recruited by the Police and they used Mamasela to do this.

MR GROBLER: I see.

GEN JOUBERT: Mamasela worked quite often in Mamelodi and he knew who these guys were.

MR GROBLER: Now we are back to paragraph 4.3.2 of your statement.

You say that during that meeting which you held with Gen Moller and Brigadier Cronje, these specific groups of persons were not identified as targets, do you mean targets by name?

GEN JOUBERT: No. Here it was about ...

MR GROBLER: An activity?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: And then you say that Commandant Naude approached me at a later stage to eliminate a group of activists who were going for further training to Botswana?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct, yes.

MR GROBLER: If I might put it like this, this is where you gained your first information regarding what was going to happen to the Nietverdiendt 10?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Might I pose the following question. When Commandant Naude approached you with this plan to eliminate this group of activists or people going for instant training, was this a strange thought to you that he should approach you with this proposal?

GEN JOUBERT: This type of thing was the order of the day, men who did the weekend run.

MR GROBLER: No, but the plan which Commandant Naude brought to you in which he said to you, Gen Joubert, we are going to infiltrate a group of people who are going for training, and we are going to kill them.

GEN JOUBERT: It sounds very serious.

MR GROBLER: That is why my question to you is whether that which Commandant Naude wanted to do at that stage, whether it was strange to you?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I didn't find it strange, because as I have said, this took place on a weekly basis.

MR GROBLER: I think we are misunderstanding each other. What happened on a weekly basis?

GEN JOUBERT: The groups of people moving from Soshanguve and Mamelodi and Soweto who went over the border.

MR GROBLER: So what you are saying is that instant training groups departed on a weekly basis?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: At this point I am actually talking about the plan which Commandant Naude brought to you, and I am asking you whether the fact that Naude could say to you General, we want to destroy a group of activists, whether that idea shocked you at that point?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Very well. Was that proposal which Commandant Naude submitted to you at that stage, similar to the plan which you had devised to stop the ANC?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Then you say in paragraph 4.3.4 exactly what the plan was. They would be infiltrated by the Police and then be taken by kombi to Botswana. However, somewhere along the road, they would be eliminated, so that it would look as if they themselves had been responsible for it, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: General, one of the questions which one must ask oneself, is what purpose would it have served to kill this group? What was the objective for you at that stage?

GEN JOUBERT: Firstly, it would have served as a frightening mechanism.

MR GROBLER: For who?

GEN JOUBERT: For people and activists within the townships.

MR GROBLER: I see.

GEN JOUBERT: And there was something else, the acts of terrorism must have decreased significantly.

MR GROBLER: Could you elaborate a bit more about that, why do you draw the inference that terrorism would have subsided?

GEN JOUBERT: It would have subsided.

MR GROBLER: It would have?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, because there were ten people who could no longer stir up any trouble.

MR GROBLER: Then in paragraph 4.3.5 you say that it would be a one off operation and it was clear to me that more than one activist would be eliminated in this way.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Did you know exactly how many people were going to be eliminated?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: You go further and you say that you asked Naude whether this operation had been authorised by the SAP and that he confirmed this.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, why was it important to you, or why did you ask Naude this question?

GEN JOUBERT: Because I wanted to assure myself that this was not an operation which we would be undertaking on our own, and that this enjoyed the Police's authorisation and approval and because Mamasela had undertaken the recruitment, although I didn't know this previously.

MR GROBLER: Now I would like to ask you the following question, I think you may have answered it in many other ways, did Special Forces at that stage, possess an information network based upon which they would be able to identify these individuals as targets?

GEN JOUBERT: If they had worked for quite some time, they would have been able to determine it. We had an Intelligence capacity, but ours was focused primarily on the external situation.

In other words, we didn't have information on the internal situation.

MR GROBLER: Paragraph 4.3.7, there you say as far as my memory goes, the plan was to render the group of activists unconscious by means of a drug which would be used to spike their drinks.

You heard something about this during Taylor's evidence and there is something about this in Cronje's application.

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And from this it is inferred that their drinks were not spiked, but that they were injected?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: You discuss that in paragraph 4.3.8. The feedback that you got regarding this information, who gave this feedback to you?

GEN JOUBERT: Well, I read about it in the newspapers and Commandant Naude informed me that the operation had been a success.

MR GROBLER: Was there any reports, were there any sufficient or complete reports which were submitted to you after the completion of such an operation?

GEN JOUBERT: No, because these operations were too sensitive.

MR GROBLER: Were any written records kept about these operations?

GEN JOUBERT: Not as far as I know. I don't know if the Police kept any records.

MR GROBLER: That which Commandant Naude fed back to you was that the operation had been successful, and actually nothing more?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Did you ask him any more questions regarding this, did you require any more details?

GEN JOUBERT: Well I asked him how the operation went.

MR GROBLER: Let me ask it to you like this, did you ask him at any stage which of his men had been involved?

GEN JOUBERT: I can't recall.

MR GROBLER: Do you know today who had been involved?

GEN JOUBERT: I have a fair idea.

MR GROBLER: When did you formulate that idea?

GEN JOUBERT: After I had seen Naude's amnesty application.

MR GROBLER: General, if one were to ask you now, and you can study your statement, if I were to ask you what your motive was with the permission that you gave to Commandant Naude to go ahead with the execution of the operation - in paragraph 4.3.10 of your statement you stated as follows, my only motive was to stop or disrupt the ANC and to execute my task as a soldier as I saw it, do you confirm this?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Did you draw any financial gain from this?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Did you know the individuals?

GEN JOUBERT: Which individuals?

MR GROBLER: Those who died?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I never knew them.

MR GROBLER: This action which you authorised, did this have anything to do with any specific population group?

GEN JOUBERT: No, not necessarily because a terrorist is a terrorist.

MR GROBLER: General, at this stage I would like to take you back to the hand-written page 11 of your, or the hand numbered page 11 of your application, it is Annexure B, the second page of Annexure B.

Mr Chairperson, with any of the volumes that you are looking at, it would be either sub-number 11 or number 11. For example, if you look at bundle 3, then it would be 21.11. That is paragraph 1.8.

I beg your pardon, I would like to take you back a little earlier. General, you have studied this document in its entirety and you have also confirmed the contents thereof under oath. Do you at this stage once again confirm the contents of this document, it is Annexure B to your application?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Under this heading Introduction, you discuss the reasons why you made the decisions that you made and authorised certain actions. In paragraph 1.3 you say the following, you will elaborate on it further, as it will appear later, the actions were performed from my position and capacity as Commanding General of Special Forces and in the course of my work and capacity as Commanding General of the Special Forces, these actions were executed furthermore within the range of my responsibilities and within the general commands of my own Commanders.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt you at this stage, isn't this a repetition of the ground that has already been covered?

MR GROBLER: To some extent, yes indeed, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well then is it really necessary to do it? The fact that it appears on the record, amongst the papers, doesn't mean that you have to go all over it again.

MR GROBLER: Perhaps I was over cautious Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless it is something new which has not been covered by the previous statement.

MR GROBLER: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should leave well alone if that is the case, if it is merely a repetition.

MR GROBLER: General, just to return to the situation and the problems with instant training and the identification of targets. You were involved with the set up of what was known as Mortimer, the Mortimer submission. It is the submission from the South African Defence Force to the Commission itself, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: In that submission, there is a large amount of statistics with regard to what the situation was at that stage from a security point of view?

ADV DE JAGER: Ms Lockhat, have we got a copy of the Mortimer?

MS LOCKHAT: It is in the bundle, 2(I) Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, if you have a look at which copy of the application you have before you, the hand-written page number 13 or point 13, you will see the page references to the Mortimer report to which I am referring.

ADV DE JAGER: Is it 21.13?

MR GROBLER: Yes, that is correct. General, without reading that document again, paragraph 2.4.1 in your application the statement is made with regard to - and this is the statement as to what the military situation was at that stage in the country, that there was a purposeful plan of violence propagated by the ANC, and you have researched this?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I did.

MR GROBLER: Is this a mirror image of your opinion?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And the statement is also made that the intensity that was applied by the liberation movements, especially the ANC, was also put forward in that submission?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And then you make the statement that in the early 1980's, there was the start of pre-emptive action and disruption of the ANC's command structure - was part of the National Security policy?

ADV DE JAGER: For clarity for the record, the Mortimer report appears as Annexure B in bundle 2(I) under numbered page 30.

The pages to which you are referring in paragraph 2.4.1, is the typed numbered pages of the report itself, and not the written reference page numbers as it appears in the bundle?

MR GROBLER: Chairperson, if you would grant me a moment, I have not had the opportunity to have a look at this. I would just like to have a look at one or two things, and then I can confirm.

That is correct Chairperson, it is the typed page numbers, not the hand-written page numbers.

ADV DE JAGER: Page 18 is for instance numbered page 47 in the bundle?

MR GROBLER: That is correct Chairperson.

Can we just make sure ...

ADV DE JAGER: That is correct, it appears on that page.

MR GROBLER: Paragraph 7 - then after the banning of the ANC - General, in the middle to later 1980 years, you make the statement that it was one of the main purposes of the National Security Policy and strategy that the revolutionary organisation and mobilisation by the liberation movements had to be stopped. Do you stand by that?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I do.

MR GROBLER: And then you follow up with the following points on paragraph 2.5, sub 14 of your application, you say that objective, there was more to that objective than what could - read there, could you have regard for your application, paragraph 2.5.1. You say at that stage and we say the stage when you were the Commander of Special Forces, it was clear that normal conventional methods were not enough to win the struggle for the Security Forces, do you keep, do you stand by that?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I do.

MR GROBLER: And you make another statement, I am going to read it out, a military struggle rely on violence where destruction is seen as justification to reach a peaceful objective. The first action or pre-emptive action is an important part of success. Success or value in this violence is found in the intimidating character and effect on the participants, supporters and sympathisers of the opponent. This as regards this policy, has its grounds on whether - would you like to elaborate on what that means? Do you have that before you?

Excuse me Chairperson, I just had to show the witness where the documents are. The first sentence of 2.5.1. I think at that stage, we all accept that there was a military struggle, but the statement is made that such a military struggle had its grounds on violence and the destruction was seen as justification to reach this objective.

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, throughout the whole world we could never find a military solution for conflict and this is what had happened here. This is exactly what had happened in Southwest.

With a military solution, one never reaches a political solution.

MR GROBLER: But the statement is made that the military destruction or the violence of the military action is seen as a justification to reach a peaceful solution?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: That is what I want you to explain to us, how does one reach peace through violence?

GEN JOUBERT: By the continuous use of violence, one is forced to the negotiating table.

MR GROBLER: I see. And then you say your first action or pre-emptive action is an important part of success. I don't think that needs any explanation.

Then you deal with the intimidating character of violence and the effect thereof on the opponent. Do you see there, paragraph 2.5.2(a).

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And you speak of disruption and destruction of the opponent. This broad plan which you submitted to Gen Geldenhuys, how did you see or what did you think this plan would contribute to any part of the struggle?

GEN JOUBERT: Once again, we have a full democracy in the country.

MR GROBLER: We are just missing each other here. You remember the plan which you submitted to Gen Geldenhuys that in support of the Police, you indeed could identify a person on an individual basis as targets and could eliminate them and thus my question to you is, how did that plan or how would that plan have assisted in let's call it the Security Forces, help them to control the situation? How would it have helped?

CHAIRPERSON: Hasn't he answered that question already?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, perhaps from a different angle.

CHAIRPERSON: By attacking the ANC, by attacking people going out for training, fewer people are left to go around resorting to violence, once they attacked them, once they killed and eliminate them. It reduces the violence and so on, hasn't he said all of that already?

MR GROBLER: If I am repeating myself Mr Chairman, then I apologise.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, I am a bit uncertain about the procedure at the moment. I understood this morning that we should now carry on with the other incidents as well. I am not sure that everybody else understands it that way.

I believe some of those present have the idea that we now, if I have completed the evidence on Nietverdiendt, I stop here and that everybody else now presents his case on Nietverdiendt, or that the cross-examination is being done on Nietverdiendt, or should I now carry on with the rest of the applications, Mr Chairman?

Perhaps I should ask you to make a ruling at this stage?

ADV DE JAGER: I think we should hear what was the agreement at the pre-trial. I know you couldn't attend it, but the rest of your colleagues were represented there and there was an agreement as far as we know.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, with due respect, the discussion this morning led me to believe that perhaps it wasn't such a fixed agreement. I just want, at this stage ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think that we have taken a great deal of time dealing with this aspect of the matter, we might be delaying people unnecessarily who might have no interest in any of the other matters, only this matter, so let us just get done with the Nietverdiendt incident and let people who have an interest in that matter, now ask questions if they wish to of this applicant.

Is there anything else you wish to say on the Nietverdiendt matter as far as the evidence is concerned from this witness?

MR GROBLER: No Mr Chairman, as far as Nietverdiendt is concerned, this concludes this witness' evidence in chief.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Is there any agreement amongst Counsel as to the order in which questions may be put by interested and involved parties on the Nietverdiendt incident?

MR VISSER: I am informed Mr Chairman, Visser on record, I am informed by my Attorney that no agreement was reached in regard to the sequence of the cross-examination and as to who should go first.

Broadly speaking Mr Chairman, I think you have in the past ruled that the other applicants should ask their questions first and that the implicated persons should have their turn last. But other than that Mr Chairman, I don't believe there is any particular ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think that the implicated persons only come in after those that are directly involved in the matter, the applicants.

MR VISSER: Yes. Yes, that is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We should try and follow that procedure.

MR VISSER: But other than that, I am informed that there wasn't a specific ruling as, or agreement as to the sequence.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: To get the ball rolling Mr Chairman, I am ready to start and I can continue if you want to, unless one of my learned friends feels that he should go first.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there anybody who thinks that he has a better claim than this man Visser?

MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, Mr Van Zyl, if I could just ascertain something from you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN ZYL: As I understood the agreement at the pre-trial if I can call it that, was that the specific incidents will be finalised one by one. I just want to have clarity, my client as well as certain of my colleagues' clients are only implicated by this witness' evidence as far as the Ribeiro incident is concerned.

I just want to have clarity, if he had been, if the cross-examination on the Nietverdiendt incident had been finalised, will this specific witness then continue with the next incident, or will other witnesses in the Nietverdiendt incident, then testify, because then we can at this point in time, leave the proceedings?

CHAIRPERSON: We will come to that point a little later, because I don't think that presents an urgency just now. Just now I am interested in knowing how best we can progress with the questioning of this witness.

You see, if it transpires that all the interested parties have had their say in the questioning of this witness on the Nietverdiendt matter, all of them, including the relatives of the dependants, or the relatives and dependants of the victims, once we have dealt with them, we will then move on to the next aspect of this applicant's application.

Mr Visser, will you please proceed?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Is my learned friend, Mr Van Zyl, finished?

General, let's just discuss a few things, I would just like to find out if you agree with certain suggestions that I would like to make to you. We know that this country was in a bloody struggle, nobody has to argue that and that many things were done in the history of that struggle.

Some things which appear before the Amnesty Committee briefly, General, would you agree that - and you can answer quickly if you don't mind, that the largest revolutionary onslaught against the previous government came from the ANC/SACP alliance? Do you follow? Do you agree that there was an onslaught from the ANC/SACP alliance against the previous government of this country?

ADV DE JAGER: Excuse me, is the earphones on the correct wavelength?

MR GROBLER: General, can you hear me now? Can you hear me now?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Would you agree that there was a revolutionary onslaught against the previous government of this country, specifically from the SACP/ANC alliance?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And you as a member of the Security Forces amongst others, were with other divisions of the Security Forces, were the persons who were responsible inn combating this revolutionary onslaught?

GEN JOUBERT: That is positive Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And this revolutionary onslaught had several facets which led that your counter strategies were also made up of several strategies?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you then agree that in principle the Army and I speak of the Army, not Special Forces, that the Army in principle acted externally while the Police Force in principle acted internally?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Have you heard of the Simonstown Summit?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Chairperson, when was this Summit?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the Simonstown Conference took place and the best we could pinpoint it, was 1979 to 1981, somewhere around there, but probably 1979.

GEN JOUBERT: I know there was a summit, but I don't know what had happened there.

MR VISSER: You see General, I would like to suggest to you that the Simonstown Summit had an influence on what had happened during the later struggle, and I would like to say immediately what the relevance of the Simonstown Summit was.

You see, as I was informed or from documents that might exist, it was the decision that was taken at the Summit that the revolutionary onslaught had at all costs be combated and the important factor would be the exchange of information by all the components of the Security community.

If the Interpreter could just give me an indication whether I am going too fast. Thank you Mr Chairman.

The Simonstown Summit, it was decided that information - there had to be close work between all the safety components with regard to the exchange of information, would you agree with that?

GEN JOUBERT: I do not know what was discussed there Chairperson. If that is what was discussed there, then I agree with that.

MR VISSER: I would like to get to the relevance of this. You have told this Committee that just before the announcement of June 1986 nation wide state of emergency, a discussion took place during which it was emphasised that closer co-operation was to take place, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Between who and who General, was this closer co-operation to be established?

GEN JOUBERT: This narrow co-operation was to be achieved between Special Forces and the Police.

MR VISSER: Yes. You see from November 1985 you were the Commanding General of Special Forces, do I have it correctly?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: I think that is translated into Commanding General Mr Chairman, literally.

Would it be fair towards you if I put it to you that at any of your plannings or considerations of strategies, you would have literally thought Special Forces as opposed to the broader Defence Force? Do you follow what I mean?

Who spoke to you in 1986 regarding the closer co-operation, was it Kat Liebenberg or Jan Geldenhuys?

GEN JOUBERT: It was Jan Geldenhuys.

MR VISSER: He is talking to you and would your perspective have been South African Defence Force or Special Forces?

GEN JOUBERT: At that stage, as a result of the sensitivity of the operations which were planned, it would have been the Special Forces perspective.

MR VISSER: Yes, naturally. You are the Had of Special Forces and the Head of the Defence Force, consults with you, and there can only be one reason for this and that would be that he had something in mind for Special Forces, would you agree?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: The closer co-operation as I have understood your evidence, also formed part of your master plan which you devised namely co-operation between Special Forces and the Security Branch of the Police? What is your answer?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And are you telling this Committee that should Special Forces, which was devolved to achieve this closer co-operation with the Security Branch, would this have fallen under your direct command? Is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: No, it is partially correct, but not entirely correct.

MR VISSER: But General, I thought you said that specifically in your application?

ADV DE JAGER: I think what he is asking you is Colonel Verster and Commandant Naude would have been directly accountable to you?

GEN JOUBERT: They would report back to me regarding operations, however with regard to planning they would have done this in co-operation with the Security Police.

MR VISSER: But might I just refer your attention to page 21.21 and I hope I have the page references correct.

I understand that this would be bundle 2.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Bundle 3.

MR VISSER: Bundle 3, paragraph 4.2.18 states that the Special Forces members who would operate within the areas of various commando Commanders, would not fall under the command of the relevant commando Commanders, but under my direct command and would liaise directly with me.

Doesn't that mean that in any operation of Special Forces, with regard to your master plan, they would fall directly under your command?

GEN JOUBERT: The Defence Force policy was that the Police would never have direct command over the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: That is precisely my point, thank you very much, we can cut a long story short and say that there was no mention that Special Forces members fell under the command of the Police, would you agree with that?

GEN JOUBERT: No, they would cooperate.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is correct but they would not be under their command?

GEN JOUBERT: No, never.

MR VISSER: Thank you. The point is General, just to conclude this aspect, Gen Geldenhuys gave evidence at the so-called Armed Forces hearing - I will find the page reference number - I have found it, page 161 of bundle 2(K) Chairperson.

Perhaps I should begin at page 160, I would like to read it to you if you could get that before you, it might be of assistance. General, at the bottom of the page where Mr Glen Goosen was questioning you on behalf of the Commission, and I begin at the second sentence. Would you agree, he asks Gen Geldenhuys, would you agree that it was recognised by the South African Defence Force that it was necessary to deploy Special Forces in support of the South African Police in operations inside the country?

Geldenhuys answers as follows: yes, Mr Chairman, I will agree with that, but I must put it very clearly that the whole Defence Force, the whole Defence Force, had for years been in support of the South African Police. We had training about this question of support for the civil authorities from 1950, not just only Special Forces, it is any capacity of which a Defence Force disposes, which can be used to support the Police of a country.

Now against the backdrop of that answer, would you agree that the Defence Force for many years already, for 40 years or more, where necessary and where they held the capacity, would support the Police internally, would you agree with that in principle?

GEN JOUBERT: Certainly.

MR VISSER: Let's think about the times of the emergency, cordons which were set up in order to prevent the movement of people, wire fences which were put up, crowd control which ran out of control, that sort of thing, would you agree that that was the kind of thing that the Army would assist the Police with?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the reason for that is that the Police simply did not have the capacity to do this themselves or alone?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: With this as the backdrop, could we return to this plan of yours General, because I have a problem to understand in simple Afrikaans what your plan involved, which is different from that which the Simonstown Summit had decided, which as a result of the Simonstown Summit had been implemented since 1980 let's say and what was different to that which had been applied during the state of emergency as was well known by the public.

Can you tell me how your plan differed from that which had already been implemented in this country?

GEN JOUBERT: I think one must make a very clear distinction here between the provision of assistance to the Police since the 1950's by the Defence Force. It was something which took place on request by the Police and according to the law, and the duties of the Police and the Defence Force had to be clearly set out, so as to indicate what the Police would be doing and what the Defence Force would be doing.

Border control is a very good example. For many years, we have been undertaking border control, the Defence Force. I don't know if they are still doing it, but they used to do it.

This is a different type of co-operation than the sort of co-operation which we are dealing with where extremely sensitive issues are involved and not many people are to be informed about it. But that there was co-operation, is a definite fact.

MR VISSER: With permission, might I once again ask Commissioner De Jager's question to you. I ask this to you directly, was it your plan, the plan which you submitted, was this plan different from that which had been implemented already in regard that your plan included the elimination of selected targets. When I speak of eliminate, please understand me clearly, I am indicating killing.

Was that your plan, was that part of your plan or not?

GEN JOUBERT: Are we discussing the Geldenhuys plan?

MR VISSER: No, we are discussing the Joubert plan.

GEN JOUBERT: That would be the plan for which Geldenhuys gave me the order to devise a plan to assist the SAP internally.

MR VISSER: Did this include the killing of selected targets?

GEN JOUBERT: That is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: This plan of yours, I take it, was not put on paper?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR VISSER: Because one would not put something like that on paper?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: General, I don't feel like going into the whole issue and I am sure my colleagues on the other side of the table might want to do so, but this is really of no importance to me. With regard to the farewell function which was held for the former Chairperson of Armscor ...

ADV DE JAGER: It is Krygkor.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, it is Armscor, who was the Chairperson, Van Vuuren?

GEN JOUBERT: No, Bell.

MR VISSER: Bell. This was when you and Geldenhuys met up with each other at an appropriate time and you told him about your plan and he said that it sounded good and your evidence before the Human Rights' Violations Committee hearing in Cape Town was that you supposed that with those words, he had given you complete approval to go ahead with your plan?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I don't wish to elaborate too much on that point, but I personally gained the impression that Geldenhuys did not agree with you, would that be fair?

GEN JOUBERT: That is not the impression which I received.

MR VISSER: Did you have the impression that he agreed with you and that he told you to go ahead?

GEN JOUBERT: His precise words to me were it sounds good, I have always thought highly of you and your integrity. You have always been honest, in either event ...

MR VISSER: Well, you are misunderstanding me. I am referring to the testimony of Geldenhuys before the Armed Forces hearing. Did he agree with you in his evidence that he had given you the go ahead or did he try to avoid it?

GEN JOUBERT: There he said that it could have been that I had misunderstood him.

MR VISSER: It could have been that you may have gained the wrong impression from your discussion with him?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: To tell the truth and just to round off this aspect, at a later date after the incidents had taken place, the incidents for which you are applying for amnesty, did you once again discuss your plan with Gen Geldenhuys?

GEN JOUBERT: Not the overall plan.

MR VISSER: No, but where your plan was mentioned?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, might I just at this stage enquire something. I understood that we were talking Nietverdiendt at this stage. I specifically refrained from leading certain evidence in chief, and it seems to me that at the moment, this cross-examination is leading towards something which was specifically not dealt with in chief.

If my learned friend tells me that he is not leading there, then I have no objection, but otherwise I think it might be unfair at this stage, the witness hasn't had time to deal with that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may answer that, Mr Chairman, with great respect, what I am dealing with is the application form of this witness which was confirmed by him in evidence and the particular last evidence was given by him, viva voce today. I heard him specifically say that there were two meetings with Gen Geldenhuys, the first time was when the plan was approved and the second time when I am going to ask him now, what was discussed.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think that before you proceed, I have up to now had difficulty understanding whether the purpose of your questioning is to oppose his application for amnesty or whether there is some other reason for your questioning?

MR VISSER: No Mr Chairman, let me make it quite clear, we are not here opposing anybody's amnesty application.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the purpose of the questioning, can you tell me?

MR VISSER: The purpose of the questioning is Mr Chairman, that some of the facts relate directly to the amnesty applications of my applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you must now, I think, confine yourself you see, to where your applicant or your client is going to say something other than what he has said. Shouldn't you confine yourself just to that?

MR VISSER: I am attempting to do that Mr Chairman, and I don't mind telling my learned friend and the Commission, what this is about.

What this is about Mr Chairman, is that in the process General Johan Coetzee who was the Head of Security, became directly implicated in certain matters. We will come back to that when we deal with the Ribeiro matter Mr Chairman.

We will come back to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But at this stage Mr Chairman, evidence has now been presented to you about how this plan came into existence which led directly to what later became the implication of Gen Johan Coetzee and Brigadier Willem Schoon.

I can't leave this without placing those matters on record Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you haven't yet told us what your clients are going to say.

MR VISSER: Well, they are going to deny it. Mr Chairman, we have now established one matter which has been bandied about and that is that Special Forces acted under the instructions of the Security Police. That is now being conceded, not to be the position.

It is a very important aspect Mr Chairman. The second point which I am dealing with Mr Chairman, is the identification of so-called targets.

This goes to the root of all the Western Transvaal applications before you, who decided that these 10 activists were to be targets, Mr Chairman? We don't know. We came at the bottom of the ladder and we believe that you should know. Somebody should tell you. Was it Commandant Charl Naude, was it Brigadier Cronje, because he told you that he didn't identify them.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right.

MR VISSER: So Mr Chairman, I am sticking very closely to the evidence which is before you and I am trying to make some sense of what the motivation was to kill the ten activists from Mamelodi, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: There is no difficulty as far as motivation for killing is concerned, because everybody agrees that they viewed the situation in the country to be one where there was a revolutionary climate, that the ANC and other liberation organisations were involved in a liberation struggle, and therefore the aim of the Security Forces, including the Police, was to try and make things as difficult as possible for the liberation movements.

That seems to be clear, there can't be any dispute about that.

MR VISSER: Yes, but I have asked no questions about that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the question here is he says that a plan was drawn up and that plan was shown and received some approval from Geldenhuys. You haven't told him just exactly what your clients are going to say in that regard.

MR VISSER: Well, he knows Mr Chairman, I am going to refer you to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we don't know.

MR VISSER: Well, let me refer you to that portion then immediately Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Please. Otherwise you see, I am beginning to wonder why cross-examination were essentially you are not opposing his application. You are cross-examining him because he said certain things which your clients are not going to agree with, so you have to put to him what your clients disagree with please.

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman. I will do so, I will do so Mr Chairman.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, may I interrupt. Perhaps the solution is this, my comment about the cross-examination at this stage is really if one narrows it down, is that perhaps it is at this stage a bit premature. You will recall in terms of the agreement that we deal only with the Nietverdiendt incident today.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR GROBLER: That I have limited the evidence in chief chronologically to the Nietverdiendt incident. I am not saying that my learned friend is not entitled to ask these questions.

What I am saying is that perhaps these questions should be reserved to a slightly later occasion when this matter has been dealt with by the witness in a chronological order.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I agree with that?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I will gladly stop my cross-examination if I have another turn to deal with these matters, because they have to be dealt with.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right. You will have a chance to deal with them.

MR VISSER: You don't want me to do it now?

CHAIRPERSON: Right now, where he says he has the approval of Geldenhuys and you are saying to him that maybe he has a misunderstanding of the matter, tell him what Geldenhuys is going to say.

MR VISSER: Geldenhuys is not my client, Gen Coetzee is my client.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now, if you have a view of Gen Coetzee which is different from his evidence, please put it to him because I am keen on knowing.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in stead of me walking the tight rope, I am quite prepared and quite willing to wait until you think it is my turn to ask him the questions which are relevant to the evidence he gave here this morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Except, yes, as long as it concerns the Nietverdiendt incident, then please do so. Put your questions if it concerns that incident.

MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, with respect, these matters overlap. It was in terms of the general plan that not only Nietverdiendt happened, Silent Valley happened, all sorts of things happened Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right, but we already agreed and limited his evidence to the Nietverdiendt incident, haven't we?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you believe it would be more convenient for you, for me to deal with these issues, the matters of principle in his evidence, at the end when we speak about the last incident which was executed in terms of this master plan, I will do so gladly Mr Chairman. But I thought he gave the evidence here this morning, let me ask him the questions and get it out of our lives.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now, an objection has been raised by Counsel because Counsel didn't canvass all these issues. Please Mr Visser, I would like your co-operation in that regard.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. I just want to repeat that I am only dealing with what he gave evidence about this morning, nothing else.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, on the question of Nietverdiendt, are there any other questions?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Please put your questions.

MR VISSER: General, you have just said in your evidence in Cape Town that you thought that Gen Geldenhuys would discuss your plan with Gen Johan Coetzee of the Security Branch, can you remember that?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, I can.

MR VISSER: But you have conceded that you could not say whether he did so or not?

GEN JOUBERT: But I did not know.

MR VISSER: You did not know? With regards to the Nietverdiendt incident, I would just like to read a piece of evidence from bundle 2(C). I don't know whether this has also gone undergone a metamorphosis or a transformation, it is bundle 2(C) as we got it originally Mr Chairman.

It hasn't got numbered, hand-written numbered pages, its got pages marked in typed writing, but all over the place, in the middle.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Would that be the transcript Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: 2(C) is marked general documents and it is an amnesty transcript?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, that is the transcript in the matter of Cronje, Hechter, Mentz and Van Vuuren?

MR VISSER: Correct. I would just like to read General, in the light of my questions that I have put to you thus far, with regard to the revolutionary struggle, I would like to ask you to listen to this. Page 17 or it is 17 or 18, it is before the letter 18 that is here.

Judge Ngoepe said the following in the form of a statement to Brigadier Cronje, did I understand you correctly, paragraph 4 on page 95, isn't what you are saying that because we were going out to be trained, it should be they were going out to be trained, had they been allowed to go out and be trained, and if they were to come back, they might have perhaps killed 1 000 people on their return, and therefore it would be better as a preventing measure to eliminate them, to prevent that possibility? Do you agree with the wisdom of that statement?

The question is, was that your intention?

GEN JOUBERT: Mr Chairperson, I would not say that that was necessarily my intention, but if it had worked out that way ...

ADV DE JAGER: I think you were not at that hearing and I see Brigadier Cronje's representatives are here, so if I summarise this incorrectly, they have to point it out to me that as I understood the evidence there, the Police's point of view was that we have to stop these people from receiving training, because they might go out as innocent persons without training, but they return as well trained fighters and are a great danger when they return because they are trained soldiers, while they left here as scholars. We have to prevent them from receiving that training and returning, and I think what Judge Ngoepe has said here was, we have to do here with persons who received training, they return and because they are so well trained, they can kill much more people, so you want to prevent that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairperson, can I confirm that that is a correct summary. There are two aspects to be added there.

The first one will be, it had an intimidatory function. That was their evidence, so that when other activists decided to go for training, they would be frightened, that is the first point, and the second point, was that there was evidence with regard to a large amount of youths who at that stage voluntarily left the country for training.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Well, General, I hear all these people talking, but I would like to refer you to volume 1 of the bundles before this Committee.

MR GROBLER: Chairperson, the witness has not answered the question, whether he agrees with that viewpoint of Judge Ngoepe. Maybe we could just put to him whether he agrees or not, before we continue.

CHAIRPERSON: That was not the viewpoint of Judge Ngoepe, I think. Judge Ngoepe was putting forward a point of view to the applicant, Mr Cronje.

MR VISSER: That is exactly right, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: That is all I asked him, whether he agrees with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, whether his views coincided with Cronje's views. There might be some difference in degree in the matter.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But let's get down to the merits then Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, then I don't know what the merits are. It would be the evidence of the client for whom I appear, that they agree with what appears in bundle 1, page 13, the third paragraph. You can read it at your own time later, if you so please.

I would like to ask something else from you, how many of these incidents where people who left on Fridays and Saturdays, did you kill, that you know of?

GEN JOUBERT: I know of ten.

MR VISSER: Ten people?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VISSER: One incident?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You see, I have a problem with your statement of quick solutions, because my information is that these people were leaving the country to be trained fully. What is your comment on that?

GEN JOUBERT: My information at my disposal was that - please remember it is not my information.

MR VISSER: It is not your information?

GEN JOUBERT: It is the information which we received, with which we worked. It is information which we received from the Police.

I know of ten people who were killed.

MR VISSER: In other words with regard to the quick solution, you do not have any certainty whether that was applicable in this instance, do I understand you correctly?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, but these people could have gone for retraining.

MR VISSER: You also at paragraph 4.2.20 of your application, you say in the last sentence, that they, that would mean members of Special Forces, were not involved in the planning and executing of these operations. What do you mean by that?

GEN JOUBERT: Where are we now?

MR VISSER: 4.2.20, the last sentence. I am still busy with page 21.21 of the application, I am sorry Mr Chairman.

You should just read the last sentence.

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, that is the information that I had.

MR VISSER: General, this has nothing to do with information. These are people under your direct command who has to do what you tell them to do, and now you say here that they were not involved with the planning or execution of these operations, what does that mean?

I thought that Commandant Naude was there at the Nietverdiendt 10, that he gave them the injections, that his people drove the kombi further on and set it alight with petrol.

MR GROBLER: Chairperson, I am sorry, I don't think the question is formulated correctly. It refers to the role of the Commanders of the two commandments. When one reads that question correct and the statement that they were not involved with the planning or execution of the operation, refers to the Commanders of the command and does not refer to Colonel Verster and Brigadier Naude.

MR VISSER: I am prepared to accept that Mr Chairman. You know in paragraph 4.3.2 General, the so-called identifying of targets is put as something that I would like to suggest to you, is unnecessary. These ten persons, did they not identify themselves as targets, would you agree with that?

GEN JOUBERT: Earlier in the day I said Chairperson, that we were convinced that they were identified, that Mamasela picked them up. He went and picked them up and he knew who these people were.

MR VISSER: Yes General.

ADV DE JAGER: I have a problem with the word identify because I think we all, the first thing that we think is that we know what the identity of the person is, but as I understand it, it is when a target it identified, persons who leave the country for training abroad, does not matter what their names are, but as soon as it was found that it is persons who go for training, it would mean that that group is targeted, it doesn't matter if his name is Jan, Piet or Koos.

At some stage, it was said that a group of persons would leave the country for training, and that was the identity of persons, it was a group of persons leaving the country for training and they were identified as such a group and that is why they were targeted.

They were not identified by their names, by for instance Piet Nkosi or Paul Claasen. Would you like to comment?

GEN JOUBERT: I think you are correct.

MR VISSER: But you speak of the identification of a group as a target, a target to attack and to eliminate. I am dealing with the second aspect of identification, do you follow General? Do you follow me General?

GEN JOUBERT: No, I don't.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 4.3.2 on page 21.24 you say the last sentence, these specific group of persons were not specifically identified as targets. You said that. My question to you is simply the following, it was not necessary for anybody to identify them as targets, they would have identified themselves as targets, as soon as they moved out of Pretoria and everybody knew that they were going for military training, isn't that true?

GEN JOUBERT: I am not sure what meeting you are referring to.

MR VISSER: I don't want to focus on the meeting, I want to focus on the identification of the ten persons, whatever their names were, as a target to be eliminated.

The only thing I am putting to you is that it does not matter if it was Charl Naude or Jack Cronje or Joop Joubert that identified them. The moment they departed and everybody knows from Intelligence that they were leaving to receive military training, that means that they identified themselves as targets?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, is it not correct that somebody has to tell you there is a group leaving for military training and that person identifies this ten persons who have departed? Somebody has to gather that information somewhere, that these people are people who will go for military training and not twelve people who will fish in the Limpopo?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, may I be of assistance. I was the one offering the evidence there, can I refer you to the bundle where the evidence appears, it is bundle 2(C) on page 4. There we sees what Brigadier Cronje had to say.

Page 4 in the middle Joe Mamasela infiltrated a group of young activists in Mamelodi. He informed me that they wanted to receive military training abroad and a meeting was arranged between myself and Colonel Charl Naude of Special Forces where we discussed the matter.

Then if you page to page 25, the paragraph just before page 25, 25 is in the middle of the page. There you will see Mr Chairman, Judge Khampepe asked Brigadier, I just want to ask one question, when Mr Mamasela gave a report with regard to the activists, even as to join MK for training, did he indicate the names and the approximate ages of the activists concerned? No, he didn't Your Honour, he did also not mention their ages.

I hope that that clears up some of the confusion.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR VISSER: Well, for as much as there might have been confusion Mr Chairman, the point just in reply and in explanation to Commissioner De Jager, I act for two people Mr Chairman, who were not privy to the discussions, to the so-called target identification. They were simply told, these people in the kombi are on their way to receive military training, and that was the basis for my question. Just that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the word group may have been used loosely.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It depends, the group wasn't intended to convey an identity that all ten of them enjoyed or shared, there were ten individuals who were picked up and referred to as a group.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is right, I take it no further than that.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think that is how it should be.

MR VISSER: I would just like to put to you General, it was not the evidence in the Cronje hearing, not that I have anything to do with it, but that Mr Joe Mamasela recruited them. I think you said that, but that does not concur with the evidence. He was given instructions not to influence them at all to go for military training, do you want to comment?

GEN JOUBERT: It was put as a fact to me that he indeed went out and that he took them in and drove with them.

MR VISSER: No, but there is no discrepancy there. I thought you mentioned the name, the word, or you said that Mamasela recruited them, did you not say that?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR VISSER: You did not say so, very well. Thank you Mr Chairman. Perhaps, if I may Mr Chairman, there is just one last question, I think I must ask.

CHAIRPERSON: I am just reminding you your words, you said there was one last question.

MR VISSER: Yes, one last issue Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: How did these people die, do you know, did anybody tell you? Were they shot, were they burnt, were they killed by lethal injection? Do you know?

GEN JOUBERT: I was under the impression that they would be given a substance in their beer, they would have passed out, they would then have driven into a tree, etc, etc.

But subsequently I heard that they had been physically injected.

MR VISSER: And you haven't yet told me whether or not you know how they died?

GEN JOUBERT: The kombi went down an embankment, there was a charge in the kombi and it went off.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, now that you have asked your last question, can I ask somebody else to proceed?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, please go ahead.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I ask a few questions?

CHAIRPERSON: On behalf of?

MR WESSELS: On behalf of Naude, Vorster and Verster, I appear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: General, on page 17 of bundle 3, paragraph 2.3 you say in your application, that Special Forces with own Commanders were sent to the relevant departments Security Forces, in order to provide assistance, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Wessels, please excuse me, I have missed your reference.

MR WESSELS: Page 17, bundle 3. That is Gen Joubert's application for amnesty.

ADV DE JAGER: Is this the 21.22?

MR WESSELS: No we are still busy with the first application.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairperson, I think both of you are talking of the same page, there are three copies of this page in the documentation.

MR WESSELS: General, you have confirmed that this is correct. Do I understand your position in that General or Colonel Verster was devolved to Witwatersrand and Commandant Naude was sent to Pretoria, Northern Transvaal, where they would still have command over their own people, however that any operation which was to be executed there in co-operation with the Police, would take place on the basis that they were providing support for the Police, do you follow?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR WESSELS: And it is my instruction that in so far as it regards the Nietverdiendt 10, this operation was under the overall command of Brigadier Cronje, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is how I also understood it.

MR WESSELS: It wasn't that the Defence Force took over command of a specific operation?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Is there any other party interested in this aspect of the evidence that we heard this morning, representatives of the families of the deceased or relatives of the deceased?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I understand that there are some implicated persons who perhaps should go first and then I could follow before Ms Lockhat. That seems to have been the order thus far.

MR COETZEE: As indicated at the commencement of these proceedings, I appear for Gen Geldenhuys and any interest that Gen Liebenberg might have. I am aware that, well after this incident, I believe the witness is going to continue with the Ribeiro incident.

During the pre-trial we gave an undertaking that we will limit cross-examination. I am going to then suggest that any questions that I might have, I will ask after he has led evidence about the Ribeiro incident, it will shorten the proceedings again and I won't ask questions twice. With your permission Mr Chairman, I will then ask the questions after he has led evidence about the Ribeiro incident.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I am in the same position. There is one point that I want to put to this witness about Brigadier Cronje's evidence. I will do that at the Ribeiro matter as well.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, thank you. Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, on behalf of the family members, they recorded in the record of the Cronje application, yes, I don't need to reiterate.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, those details were placed before us in that hearing.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It is the same people that we represent on this occasion. If I understood the objection correctly to some of Mr Visser's cross-examination, then the questions on general background will be held over until an appropriate time. I had some questions that I wanted to ask in terms of more details in respect of the plan, but I understand that that evidence will be led at a later stage.

CHAIRPERSON: When you talk about a plan, you are talking about the overall plan of attacking?

MR VAN DEN BERG: That is correct Mr Chairperson, the overall plan. The plan whereby Special Forces would render assistance or support to the Police.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, my objection was not to cross-examination about the plan and the details of the plan.

The objection was against cross-examination about facts which come much later chronologically. It was simply on that basis, but if my learned friend wishes to cross-examine on the plan at this stage, I have no objection.

ADV DE JAGER: Can I please ask you to identify the plan because we've got a lot of plans here?

The first one was that the Army should be involved in assisting the Police, a general plan. Then there was the Joubert plan, as how this assistance should be rendered? And then you had a plan how the Nietverdiendt 10 should be eliminated, or a plan about the Ribeiro's. Please refer to which plan and I think at this stage, you would be entitled to ask questions about the Joubert plan.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I want to ask then some questions about what we have now referred to as the Joubert plan.

General, if I understand correctly, this is a plan in terms of which Special Forces would render assistance and support to the Police, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: General, you are at liberty to answer the questions in Afrikaans. There is an interpretation or a translation facility in terms of which it will be translated into Afrikaans and then you can answer in Afrikaans, as you are more comfortable.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed.

MR VAN DEN BERG: In terms of that plan, you identified three specific areas which you described as "brandpunte" and that was the Northern Transvaal, the Witwatersrand and the Eastern Cape, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Due to a shortage of manpower, you only delegated or designated two units. You will forgive my incorrect use of terminology and correct me if that is necessary, but you delegated or designated two units, one to the Northern Transvaal and one to Johannesburg, do I understand you correctly?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: In the Northern Transvaal, that was a unit commanded by Commandant Naude?

GEN JOUBERT: Correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And in Witwatersrand, that was commanded by Colonel Joe Verster?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Prior to the implementation or the designation of those particular units, was there a meeting with the Police and let's confine it at the moment, to Northern Transvaal, was there a meeting with the Police to discuss how this would take place?

GEN JOUBERT: With the Police, but only in Northern Transvaal and we had a separate meeting in the Witwatersrand.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The meeting in the Northern Transvaal, who was present at that meeting?

GEN JOUBERT: As far as I can recall, it was myself, Brigadier Cronje and Gen Hans Moller. That is what I can remember.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was Naude involved in that meeting, or was he only introduced to the Police at a later stage?

GEN JOUBERT: I don't know.

MR VAN DEN BERG: In so far as Witwatersrand was concerned, you say there was a separate meeting. Who was present at that meeting?

GEN JOUBERT: Once again it was the Officer Commanding, the Security Police and myself.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you recall the names?

GEN JOUBERT: Well, I am not sure, I think it was - the Security Police was Major-General Erasmus and the OC Command was I think, General Joffel van der Westhuizen. I am not sure on that point.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And the manner in which this plan was to operate was that targets would be identified on the basis of Police information?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Because you didn't have the capacity to do that?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, well, we didn't work internally.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I understand just in terms of context. This plan, what is now called the Joubert plan, did that occur prior to or after the establishment of the CCB?

GEN JOUBERT: That was prior to the establishment of the CCB.

MR VAN DEN BERG: So, there was direct Special Forces involvement in elimination of at least, on your evidence, of the people at Nietverdiendt, the Ntuli's and the Ribeiro's prior to the establishment of the CCB?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: But was it prior to Barnacle? Was it also before Barnacle or D40?

GEN JOUBERT: No, it was after this. We were in the process of beginning to establish the CCB when these things occurred, and then the CCB was only established in November 1986.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If I understand your application correctly, and I know you haven't testified in respect of either Ntuli or in respect of the Ribeiro's, there were three operations for which you seek amnesty. Those were executed in terms of this Joubert plan, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct, yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I don't have a date for the Ntuli's, but the Ribeiro's was during August 1986 and Nietverdiendt was in approximately June 1986? You are not sure about the dates?

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, if it is important to my learned friend, we can trace those.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What I wanted to ask is that these things, these three incidents occurred prior to the establishment of the CCB as an undercover or as a deeper underground type of organisation, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, this question may be premature in the light that we haven't heard all of the evidence, but was your experience in these three operations, one of the reasons why the CCB was established?

GEN JOUBERT: No, no it was decided long ago. Not long ago, a few months before the time, we determined a need for such a unit to be established.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And this Joubert plan had nothing to do with the establishment of the CCB, this was a separate entity?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And so it is pure coincidence that Verster is involved in terms of your plan and then later, in terms of the CCB?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What led to an end, if I understand correctly, because there are only three operations, why was this plan stopped?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about the Joubert plan?

MR VAN DEN BERG: The Joubert plan, Mr Chairperson, sorry. All my references are to the Joubert plan.

GEN JOUBERT: It was stopped because we established that the Police didn't get higher authority from the people above them. That is why we drew up new procedures, that procedures was never used.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If I understand correctly, that was your evidence at the Armed Forces Hearing, is that the procedures were not properly established in terms of the SAP and once they had been, there were no further operations?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: To limit the questions in respect of the Nietverdiendt, your involvement in Nietverdiendt is limited to what was reported to you, by Charl Naude, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The general target, activists seeking military training had been identified at your meeting with Moller, but not this specific group if I understand your evidence correctly? Is that correct General?

GEN JOUBERT: No, we didn't identify ten people to be eliminated. We just said the one thing ...

ADV DE JAGER: General, I know in Belfast they don't speak English. So please speak Afrikaans, from Tonteldoos, the people there, don't speak English.

GEN JOUBERT: Well, you would be surprised Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: You have chosen to give evidence in Afrikaans and it is your right to testify in Afrikaans.

MR GROBLER: I think the question has actually gotten lost in all this discussion. Could we please rephrase the question?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I will try. You didn't identify this particular group of ten activists, you identified in general, activists who were going to seek military training, that was the target that was identified, if I understand your evidence correctly?

GEN JOUBERT: That is one hundred percent correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And at a point, Naude approached you with this particular group in mind, do I understand you correctly?

This particular group of ten people were identified as a target for elimination?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now, the one discrepancy that I have picked up in your application as opposed to that of Brigadier Cronje's, is that you refer to these people as fighters and people who were going for further training. Do I understand your amnesty application correctly?

GEN JOUBERT: Do you refer to, are you referring to activists?

MR VAN DEN BERG: If you have reference to your amnesty application, Mr Chairperson, it is paginated 21.22, paragraph 4.3.1. The Nietverdiendt 10 was a group of ten ANC activists or fighters who were killed while they were on their way to Botswana to undergo further training. Do you see that?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If I understood Cronje's evidence correctly, these were - and at times the word prospective was certainly used in the translation, they were either prospective activists or prospective MK soldiers. Do you understand the difference?

They were persons who had not received any training whatsoever. Can you comment on that distinction?

GEN JOUBERT: I was under the impression that they were activists who were going for further training. That was the impression which was created in my mind.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You gained this impression from Naude, he was your channel of information?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, to the Police.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you understand that he received that information from the Police?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: If the Committee would just bear with me for a moment.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR VAN DEN BERG: There is just one further aspect Mr Chairperson. This meeting with Brigadier Cronje and Gen Moller, that meeting is never mentioned in the application by Cronje.

Can you comment on that?

GEN JOUBERT: I cannot comment on that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: According to you, that meeting took place in order to discuss this Joubert plan? Do you agree with me? Your evidence is that there was a meeting?

GEN JOUBERT: Well, I could obtain the evidence.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That would be useful because it was never mentioned in Cronje's application, that there was a meeting between him and you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In fact, Mr Van den Berg, is it not, was it not Brigadier's evidence that the meeting that ever was in this incident, was with Charl Naude? That was his direct evidence, if I recall the facts of the matter correctly?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I think that you are correct. My recollection also is that Cronje said that there were two things which had given spur to their actions, one was this overall instruction from Viktor and then a discussion which he had with Schoon, Cronje had with Schoon saying get involved with Special Forces.

Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Perhaps just one or two matters Mr Chairman. General, I am not sure if I understood your answer correctly, it was put to you that Brigadier Cronje never spoke in his evidence of this meeting which you were supposed to have had with them in order to identify targets and to put the plan into action.

You have also studied aspects of the Cronje record, aspects which I have highlighted for you, is that correct?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And you are also aware that he does not mention that meeting as it is reflected in the record.

The way I understood you and I just want to assure that this is the way that I understood you, you say that you can obtain proof of that meeting, is that so? Where would we be able to trace such evidence?

GEN JOUBERT: Here in Pretoria.

MR GROBLER: You say that there is a place here in Pretoria where we would be able to obtain proof of such a meeting?

GEN JOUBERT: No, we will have to find people.

MR GROBLER: Not documentation?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions in re-examination.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Gen Joubert, the order that you gave to Mr Charl Naude was based exclusively on the information that you had received from him with regard to the intentions of the young activists to leave the country for purposes of furthering their training in Botswana, is it not so?

GEN JOUBERT: Unfortunately I didn't get the question, if you please can repeat it.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. The order that you gave to Mr Charl Naude was based exclusively on the information that was supplied to you by him, that the young activists intended to further military training in Botswana?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

GEN JOUBERT: But he again got the information from the Police.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. And you then proceeded to give him authority to obtain a drug to administer on the youngsters as part of the execution plan that you had approved?

GEN JOUBERT: That is correct Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Did Mr Naude advance any reason why a drug had to be administered to the youngsters for purposes of eliminating them?

GEN JOUBERT: I take it that it is much easier and not as painful.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was a reason advanced to you why a drug had to be used in the process of eliminating the youngsters?

GEN JOUBERT: Well the reason that was given to me was to calm them down.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So the drug would have been used for mercy killing, so as it were?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is what eventually happened.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: To your knowledge, do you know whether indeed the young activist were administered with this drug and put inside the kombi only after the drug had taken effect?

GEN JOUBERT: Chairperson, as I understand it, they wanted to put this drug into their beer, but they didn't.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was what did you understand had happened?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Were you not given a report by Mr Naude?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, well he came back and told us what happened.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, and in his report did he give an indication whether the youngsters were put inside the kombi only after the drug had taken effect?

GEN JOUBERT: So I understand it, so I understand it.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Do you know what kind of a drug you authorised him to obtain from the laboratory?

GEN JOUBERT: Well, that I don't know.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. There was one aspect which I wasn't really clear about in your evidence, and that has to do with the meeting that you had with Brigadier Cronje and the General, Gen Moller.

Can you give us an approximate time of when that meeting took place?

GEN JOUBERT: That must have been round about the beginning of June 1986.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. And after how long you had devised the Joubert plan and had put it into operation, did Charl Naude approach you with his plan to eliminate the youngsters, do you know an approximation in terms of weeks, days or months?

GEN JOUBERT: That is very difficult to say. It could have been weeks. I don't think it could have been months.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

GEN JOUBERT: But it could have been within weeks.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you are excused.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, just arising from one question put by Judge Khampepe, may I ask a question in response to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Gen Joubert, you were questioned about the fact that you relied exclusively on the SAP's information network, is that correct, internally?

GEN JOUBERT: Yes, that is correct.

MR GROBLER: General, did you have any idea at the time regarding how wide the SAP and the Security Branch's information network went?

GEN JOUBERT: I had the impression that it was a very efficient information system.

MR GROBLER: Did you have any reason not to have confidence in that information system?

GEN JOUBERT: No.

MR GROBLER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: This might be a convenient stage to take the adjournment and the Committee will rise now and we will resume at half past nine tomorrow morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS