Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: I apologise to counsel and applicants for any inconvenience that may have been caused by our starting a little late. It was unfortunate. It is something that we could not avoid.

We were interviewed by people who were interested in one of the applications that is before us, the victims or rather the relatives of victims in the matter, in an application which unfortunately will not be proceeding because the applicant has passed away and these victims wanted certain clarification as to their rights and we had to explain the position to them. That is what took up the time. I'm sorry about the delay. Can we begin?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we'll begin with the Nietverdient incident, we'll commence with that and we'll commence with the evidence of Charl Naude.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CHARL NAUDE: (sworn states)

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application for amnesty appears in bundle 3, on page 2. Mr Chairman, may I just state for the record that my client is a bit hard of hearing and he tells me that he cannot hear Judge Khampepe when she speaks. Perhaps if he have a difficulty he will draw my attention to it and I will ask them to speak louder.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, is it correct that you have applied for amnesty and that your amnesty application appears on page and further of the bundle?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, could you briefly describe your career in the South African Army?

MR NAUDE: I joined the Army Gymnasium. I spent two years there, after which I was transferred to the Infantry School where I was an instructor for standing forces. After that I went to the military academy where I became an officer and after that I went to the Parachute Battalion for a while. From the Parachute Battalion I went to Special Forces where I spent the rest of my career for 15 years.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that you left the Army as a Colonel?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it also correct that during your career in the Defence Force, and specifically when you were with Special Forces, you participated in 141 contacts?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: And during these contacts there was fire?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: In other words, where there was shooting upon each other?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it true that you were discharged with honourable service for performance in operational areas?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: In 1986 you were still a member of Special Forces and you served under General Joubert, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: At a stage in 1986, General Joubert called you and Colonel Verster in and made certain statements to you.

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: What were those statements?

MR NAUDE: He told us that because of the political situation in South Africa, the necessity had arisen that we be divided to SAP units and we had to act in support of the Northern Transvaal Commando and the Wits Commando. I was devolved to the Wits Commando.

MR WESSELS: What would your duties have involved?

MR NAUDE: I was devolved in support, and I should elaborate regarding the command situation at that point. In support of denotes that it was not under the command of the police but that it was in support, which meant that me and the police would make joint decisions about operations and that we would identify targets jointly, although this would take place based upon their information.

MR WESSELS: And with who in the police were you supposed to cooperate?

MR NAUDE: With Brigadier Jack Cronje.

MR WESSELS: And what was the purpose of this co-operation?

MR NAUDE: The point of the co-operation was to combat the onslaught of the enemies of the State. I had certain limitations according to which I was to act. Among others, the General told me that we could only carry out operations which would have a great impact on the enemies onslaught in the State. We had to use minimal violence and we had to maintain absolute secrecy. Furthermore, all operations were to take place in co-operation with the SAP.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that during June 1986, Cronje approached you with certain bits of information and certain proposals were made for action?

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, could you please repeat the limitations which you have just given or Mr Wessels could repeat it? I couldn't follow all of them unfortunately. I couldn't write them all down.

MR NAUDE: The first one was that it was to be operations which would make an impact on the enemy's situation at that point, minimal violence was to be applied.

MR WESSELS: What is meant by the application of minimal violence?

ADV DE JAGER: If we could just deal with the previous question. Impact on enemies?

MR NAUDE: Okay. Then the application of minimal violence, absolute secrecy and all operations would be carried out in co-operation with the SAP.

MR WESSELS: What does the concept of minimal violence involve?

MR NAUDE: Minimal violence in my mind was that we should rather take out one leader instead of eliminating hundreds of soldiers.

MR WESSELS: Very well. What was the proposal and information which Cronje provided to you during June 1986?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, the first meeting that we held I asked the question what are we going to do next and we tabled a number of proposals. Among others, it was put to me that streams of people were going out for instant training and re-training and permanent training.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you, Mr Naude. Could you please give assistance to us, approximately when did this meeting take place, and who attended it?

MR NAUDE: It was a meeting between myself and Brigadier Jack Cronje. This was approximately a month before - I can't recall the exact date, but it was a brief period of time before the Nietverdient incident.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you say it was a month before the Nietverdient incident, we know that the incident occurred in June and according to the evidence of General Joubert the co-operation or the implementation of his plan also occurred in June.

MR NAUDE: Very well, I could put it like this. It took place shortly after the General had given me the order. It was the very first meeting which I had held with Cronje. I can't recall the exact date, but it was definitely still in June.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I just needed to have that corrected because it would have actually thrown your approximation completely out of sync with the evidence of General Joubert.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, what else happened during that meeting?

MR NAUDE: We decided what the sequence of events would be from that day forward. It was the first planning that took place and Brigadier Cronje said that streams of people were leaving the country for instant training, and to tell the truth, he told me that there were people who were wanting to leave at that time for instant training. He told me that he also had a very well placed source who knew exactly which people wanted to go and so forth.

The Ribeiro couple were also involved in this meeting. Many other operations and possible targets were proposed, of which I decided not to execute because it did not fall within the limitations given to me by the General, namely that minimal violence was to applied. It wouldn't have helped to eliminate very low enemy status soldiers.

Furthermore, we decided that the best target at that stage would be the people who were going for instant training. During the meeting which was held with General Joubert, he also pointed out to us that this was one of the problem areas within the RSA. I would like to tell the Committee that we did not act internally, so we were not aware of precisely what the Intelligence situation was in South Africa, all we knew was what we read in the newspapers. The fact of the matter is that we regarded the departure of people as a target.

We then planned an operation. I reported back to the General. I think that we should also make a distinction here between what the General's evidence was and the fact that he said that they decided on a high level that instant training or the cessation of instant training would have a certain influence on the security situation in the Mamelodi, Northern Transvaal area.

They also said that this would serve as a deterring mechanism. But that was on a very high level and this was on a specific operation which we were planning. We didn't necessarily envisage the same impact of this operation as they had seen it from their high level.

We proceeded and planned the operation. I reported back to the General and said that the operation would take place more-or-less as follows; that the people who were led by the police source who had been approached by the local population to go out for instant training, would then be taken to a certain point. At that point we would take them out of the vehicle, we would drug them after which we would make it appear as if an accident had taken place. The General agreed with that.

We went ahead with the planning of the operation. The General also gave me the authorisation to use drugs. Seeing as these drugs would have a scheduling status, I had to get authorisation from the General in order to obtain these substances from the physician.

There were approximately 15 doctors in Special Forces at that stage and I gave my medical ordinance the order to withdraw the medicine, seeing as he was trained to know exactly how the dosages were to be applied and how much was to be injected and where it was supposed to be injected.

Later I asked him ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could you please go a little bit slow, we are struggling to keep up with you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Will you kindly repeat what you said about what you stated to the medical ordinand? I couldn't take all that down, you were too fast.

CHAIRPERSON: And while you are about it, if you can we would like you to give us the name of this medical ordinand.

MR NAUDE: The name of medical ordinand was Dave Tippet and he was to go to the physicians and fetch the medicine.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You may proceed, Mr Naude.

MR NAUDE: Very well. We went to a predetermined place in the Western Transvaal, and there I met Cronje and Rudi Crause of the SAP. We reconnoitred a place where this operation could take place, the first meeting with the kombi full of activists. And then we also ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you say "we", you are talking about yourself and who else?

CHAIRPERSON: Cronje.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Cronje?

MR NAUDE: We're talking about Cronje, Crause and myself.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, I think there is a measure of confusion. You said that you drove to Western Transvaal where you met Cronje and Rudi Crause there. Did you with them or did you meet them there?

MR NAUDE: No, I met them there. I actually meant that I drove to Zeerust and met them there.

We did a reconnaissance of the exact place where we wanted this meeting to take place, and we also reconnoitred a place where we would stage the so-called accident.

After that we spent quite some time waiting. The operation would take place on that specific evening. Eventually the vehicle approached and we surrounded it, we took the passengers out of the vehicle and injected them with the drugs.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Naude, you must please give us the details, then we don't have to ask you for the details. When you say that you surrounded it, it denotes more than one person, more than yourself.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I wanted to say that the layout of the operation there was as follows: It was Major Derek Vorster, who was part of the early warning group at the entrance of the farm, who would give us early warning if there was any kind of external influence coming in such as a farmer passing by he would give us prior warning. Then it was me and Tippet and another person who I cannot remember at this point, I can't remember his name. It was either somebody from the Security Branch who assisted us, but I do know that there was a third person, however we could not make out who this third person was. We removed the passengers from the vehicle and injected them with this drug.

MR WESSELS: Was every person injected individually?

MR NAUDE: Yes, every person was injected individually.

MR WESSELS: And what was done with them after that?

MR NAUDE: From there on ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Who administered the injection?

MR NAUDE: I administered the injection.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Without the assistance of Mr Tippet?

MR NAUDE: He also assisted, but he filled up the syringes and I administered the injection.

MR LAX: You are free to respond to my questions in Afrikaans.

MR NAUDE: The people were reloaded into the vehicle, and after that phase 2 of the operation followed, which involved the departure to the place where the accident was to take place.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you please provide some more particulars regarding that? You have injected the people, they have been reloaded, were they already in a coma so to speak or had they reacted to the injections, how did they react, what were the results?

MR NAUDE: The people didn't react immediately, they were able to re-embark onto the vehicle themselves. After 12 years I can't remember exactly how long it took, but they were already in the vehicle and a short while after that they had fallen asleep and they appeared to be unconscious to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's just understand this. Were they fully conscious when you commenced to inject them or were they already partly unconscious?

MR NAUDE: No, they were completely conscious when we injected them. After they had come back into the vehicle, after they had been reloaded into the vehicle, they became unconscious.

CHAIRPERSON: So did they volunteer, did they come out of the vehicle and voluntarily submit themselves to the injection?

MR NAUDE: They were detained with firearms, they didn't have a choice.

CHAIRPERSON: So they were forced out of the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: Yes, they were told to climb out, but under duress or in detention.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before we lose this point, how long would you estimate that it took for you to administer those injections?

MR NAUDE: It probably took approximately 15 minutes, perhaps even shorter.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And immediately after injecting each of these young persons, were they then instructed to go back to the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: It occurred right next to the vehicle. Before we injected - as we were injecting every person they were told to climb back into the vehicle.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So you would be unable to say whether the drug had taken any effect by the time they were told to go back to the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: I think it had already had an effect on them at that stage, but they were still able to move independently, they could climb back into the vehicle themselves and sit down themselves, but shortly after that one by one they all became unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You may proceed, Mr Naude.

MR NAUDE: From there on phase 2 of the operation began, where Rudi Crause of the Security Police led us to the point which we had reconnoitred beforehand, because he knew the road to the place where we were going to make the so-called accident happen.

MR WESSELS: How did he lead you?

MR NAUDE: He drover in a separate vehicle which drove ahead in the procession. Major Derek Vorster climbed into the vehicle which contained the 10 activists. He drove that vehicle and followed us on the road to that specific point.

MR WESSELS: Were you in the front vehicle?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I was in the front vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: At that stage the vehicle had arrived driven by a member of the Security Police, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know who the driver was?

MR NAUDE: Later I heard that it was Mamasela, but I didn't know that at that stage.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he the only member of the Security Police who was present when the injections were administered?

MR NAUDE: As far as I know. As I've said, apart from the one person of whom we weren't sure who he was, I would say that the Security Police were sheltering in the bushes approximately 50 to 100 metres away from there and that was all of the Security Police. There was Mr Cronje and Loots and Crause who were the people from the Security Police whom I know that were present there.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I think you may proceed, Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Thank you. Mr Naude, we have a vehicle in which the police and yourself were, followed by the kombi which was being driven by Vorster, were you in radio contact with one another?

MR NAUDE: I can't remember whether or not we had radios at that stage. I think they maintained a following distance of about 500 metres from us. I can't remember whether or not we had radio contact.

MR WESSELS: What happened next?

MR NAUDE: When we arrived at the given place, Vorster drove the vehicle into a ditch and into a tree, he threw petrol in the vehicle. I omitted to say that in order to make the whole situation look realistic, we also had a limpet mine and an AK47 which we placed in the vehicle. He then set the vehicle alight.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that the purpose was to make it appear as if this mini-bus had left the road, been involved in an accident and then burnt out?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: What happened next?

MR NAUDE: After Vorster had completed this he walked along the side of the road so as not to leave any tracks and he climbed into the vehicle with us, we drove back to the place where we had administered the drugs and everyone climbed into his own vehicle and drove back to their respective units.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's just achieve some clarity of this. There's petrol in the vehicle, it was set alight and a limpet mine was placed in the vehicle. Did this explode or what happened?

MR NAUDE: It did explode later on as a result of the heat. Everyone refers to the vehicle as exploding but in actuality it didn't really explode, it was set on fire.

MR WESSELS: The drug which was applied, what was the purpose behind that?

MR NAUDE: The purpose behind the drug was firstly to calm the people down as quickly as possible and secondly, we would be able to keep the people in the vehicle while the accident was being staged. We also debated at length and felt that it would be the most humanitarian way in which to execute this operation seeing as any other method was not acceptable to us.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Naude, let me understand you. The purpose of administering this drug was to calm the young persons down, and you say as quickly as possible, had you been advised by whoever provided you with the drug how long it would take for them to be calmed down, on administration of that drug?

MR NAUDE: As far as I can remember they just said quickly, they didn't tell me specifically how long it would take but they did tell me that they would be drugged very speedily.

ADV DE JAGER: You're speaking of calming people, was the idea to calm them down or to render them unconscious?

MR NAUDE: No, the purpose was to render them unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But that what you've just stated just now, was that an error? That's how it was translated to me

"The purpose of administering the drug was to calm the people down as quickly as possible."

MR NAUDE: By nature of the situation the drug had a calming effect which would take place very quickly. After that however, it went over into unconsciousness.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But what was the read purpose of administering the drug, to calm or to render the young activists unconscious?

MR NAUDE: It was to render the unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The second reason you gave was that the intention was to keep them in the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident, what do you mean by that?

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. The second reason you have given was that the drug was administered to the young persons in order to keep them inside the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident, what do you mean by that?

MR NAUDE: The objective behind the administering of the drug was dual, firstly we felt that the most humanitarian way in which to carry out the operation and secondly, it was also to ensure the passengers would remain seated in the vehicle and not resist and so forth, while the accident was being staged.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Did you expect them to be able to run out of the vehicle, to be able to open the doors? Is that what you are saying?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, I couldn't hear that one.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I be of assistance? Some of the people don't know how these things work and nobody ever thinks of explaining to the witnesses how they work. Perhaps if Piet could just tell him, channel 2 or whatever, Mr Chairman, there will be no problem.

MR WESSELS: Well it's just that the witness is hard of hearing and he has a difficulty hearing you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, you have actually apprised me thereof. I'm trying to be as loud as I can.

You stated that the reason why you administered the drug was also to keep them inside the vehicle, to prevent them from leaving the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident. Did you envisage a situation wherein they would be able to come out of the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: You know, obviously if we want to stage an accident they could have jumped out the vehicle or attacked the driver, then we would have had to shoot them or something, so that was the secondary reason why we wanted to calm them down.

CHAIRPERSON: To make them unconscious in fact.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You were satisfied that once they were unconscious they wouldn't be able to get out of the vehicle.

MR NAUDE: That's right, Chairman.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, you may proceed.

MR NAUDE: From there I drove back to Pretoria and the following morning I reported back to General Joubert and informed him that the operation had taken place and that there should not be any problems if everything had gone according to plan.

At this stage I would like to explain exactly where the misunderstanding occurred with General Joubert having the idea that we would have spike the beer with the drugs beforehand. It is obvious that some of these people might not have wanted to drink beer, and that is the reason why we decided against the beer plan and moved over to the idea with the injections.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Had that idea ever been canvassed with General Joubert? - the idea of spiking their beer?

MR NAUDE: I heard whether or not I was supposed to clear it with him?

MR WESSELS: I think the witness didn't quite hear your question. May I just repeat it to the witness?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, yes. Are you explaining, Mr Wessels, or do you want me to repeat myself?

MR WESSELS: Perhaps if you could repeat the question.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you spoke to General Joubert and advised him of the plan that you jointly devised with Brigadier Cronje of the Security Police, did you canvass the idea that you would spike their drinks with a drug that you wanted him to authorise you to give?

MR NAUDE: I'm very sorry, but once again I could not hear the question.

ADV DE JAGER: I think there may be a confusion about him speaking to Cronje and what he reported to Naude.

Did you and Cronje devise the plan together with regard to the administering of a drug?

MR NAUDE: Yes, we devised the plan together.

ADV DE JAGER: So what was your plan before you went to General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: The plan was that Mamasela was their guide and that he would place a crate of beer which was spiked with drugs in the kombi, which he would give to them at a certain time and then they would fall asleep and they would be asleep upon their arrival at us, but we realised that some people might not want to drink beer and that is why we left that plan and decided to inject the activists on the spot.

ADV DE JAGER: Is it true that you told Joubert that the beer would be spiked with drugs, when you explained the plan to him?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's why we have this misunderstanding.

ADV DE JAGER: Only after you had discussed the plan with him did you amend the plan?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct. After we did that we amended the plan.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Can I understand you properly on that aspect, it's been worrying me. You never discussed with Joubert your intention of administering the drug to the activists.

CHAIRPERSON: You mean injecting.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Injecting.

MR NAUDE: No, I never discussed it with him.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So Joubert was under the impression that only the beer would be spiked with the drug that you authorised him to give, that you requested him to authorise?

MR NAUDE: As a matter of fact the doctor pointed out that the drug administered in beer won't work so well, so he said that the injection would work better. And that is the point where the change in the plan came.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now you requested General Joubert to give you permission to obtain a drug, is that not so?

MR NAUDE: That is right.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: What kind of a drug was it?

MR NAUDE: I did not know what type of drug it was at that stage, we would find out from the doctor which was the best drug to be administered.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And his understanding was that that was the drug that would be used and to be put inside the beer, was that Joubert's understanding at that stage when you were having that discussion?

MR NAUDE: I think we had a wider request than that. We said that we were looking for a drug whereby we could drug the people before the time, before they reached the place. And when we spoke to the doctor he told us that the beer would not work, we should rather use an injection and he gave us some syringes. Excuse me, I might be wrong, I did not personally speak to the doctor, the medical ordinand spoke to the doctor and that is the feedback that he gave to me, that we could not use the beer because some people might drink more or less and so we would have no control over the intake of the drug, it would be better to administer it by injection and then we would know how much everyone would get and we would have control over how everyone would get.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So that information was never relayed to General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: No, I did not discuss it again with General Joubert because, as he said in his evidence, he was busy and I already had the authorisation to use these drugs. I did not think of going back to him and telling him that we would not be using beer but injections.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you, Mr Wessels, you may proceed.

MR NAUDE: I returned to General Joubert and reported to him that the operation had been successful.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are you involved in this?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed, Mr Chairman. Do you want me to start?

CHAIRPERSON: Well you might as well start.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You have never shown much hesitation in the past.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Commandant, I appear for Brigadier ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I think he retired as Colonel.

MR NAUDE: Some people have called me General so I don't mind.

MR VISSER: May I call you Mr Naude to avoid confusion?

Mr Naude, I appear for Brigadier Wikus Loots and Colonel Rudi Crause. I know it was a long time ago and one's memory is not so good, just by means of a few questions could we get as close to the truth as possible because Crause and Loots' memories are just not as good. It was a long time ago and one tries to forget these things.

MR NAUDE: That is so for sure, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: By the way that was the first thing that I wanted to ask you. During this action, Mr Naude, what was your emotional state while you were injecting these 10 persons who had to be killed later?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I would just like to say that this was outside the nature of our actions. We were soldiers where the enemy was some distance from you and we shot at each other and once we've done the shooting we would treat each other's wounds and the war would be over for that moment. In this instance it was a difficult operation.

What I omitted to say was that afterwards I went to the General and said that I do not want to continue with this type of operation because I felt that I had placed a great responsibility on my men and it was not in our nature to execute such operations. And the secrecy which he gave to me or which he placed as a limitation I could not maintain because there were so many people involved in this operation.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Naude. Mr Crause says, or he will give evidence - and you can say if this is correct according to your memory, that Brigadier Cronje and yourself arrived at his office in Zeerust the day before the incident or the day of the incident and that you informed him there that you were looking for a place where this incident could take place. Is that correct or do you recall it differently?

MR NAUDE: It's probably correct. I cannot recall exactly whether we met at his office, but the fact of the matter is we arranged a meeting but whether it was in a hotel or in his office I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: That is in order. The evidence of Mr Crause will be the same as yours, that he was asked because of his knowledge of the area, to identity a place that he went and indeed he identified such a place. The evidence of the two gentlemen would concur with your evidence as to what happened that evening where the injections were administered. The evidence looks the same. There is just one aspect which you might have forgotten or which you do not agree with. The Honourable Chairperson asked you if these persons, when you injected them, were fully conscious, do you remember the question?

MR NAUDE: That is true.

MR VISSER: But there is evidence, I'm not entirely sure, I have not found it, but I think it was Brigadier Cronje that had said that by the time the people arrived at the farm they were under the influence of alcohol, somebody said it, can you comment on that? In other words, that their consciousness or their minds had been touched by alcohol by the time when these injections were administered.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, perhaps I can be of assistance to my learned friend. You will find that evidence on page 5. And I'm interrupting here because I wanted to ask that question, and if I can deal with it through Mr Visser's questions then I won't waste your time. The evidence there of Brigadier Cronje, was ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Page?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 5.

ADV DE JAGER: Bundle?

MR DU PLESSIS: Of bundle 2(c). Page 5, bundle 2(c). The evidence there, perhaps I can just read it to you. He testified, that's the fourth line from the top

"Mamasela gave these persons beer"

The rest is irrelevant. And then further on he testifies:

"When he stopped, they took the persons out of the vehicle. They were under the influence of alcohol to a considerable extent at that time."

MR VISSER: I'm indebted to my learned friend. That is where I remember it from. Do you have any comment? Do you recall this, because it seems that this is connected with the question that the Chairperson asked you.

MR NAUDE: The persons smelt of drink, but I cannot confirm here that these people were under the influence of alcohol. This was 12 years back and I do not know if they were strongly under the influence of alcohol.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, it seems that I should then be the next person to ask questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Please do.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Maybe I should follow the position of Mr Visser and address you as Mr Naude.

I would put a few statements to you and I will put an abridged to you which I will argue. Your position was that of a soldier, you were trained as a soldier, you executed orders, you do not question these orders, you just follow them. Would that be a correct statement?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: When you were devolved to the Northern Transvaal area, was this according to a plan where you would be in support of the South African Police?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And at the stage when you had been devolved, at that stage did you realise that this plan would entail individual persons would identified as targets and eliminated? And I mean elimination in the form of killing. Did you realise that then?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did.

MR GROBLER: I'd just like to go a bit further with regards to information. If one works with the totality of the evidence there is information that has to be gathered before any operation can be executed. You touched on it and I think you said that Special Forces at that stage had no internal activity or did not execute activities within the country, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Would it also be correct to say that Special Forces did not really have an internal intelligence wing, if I could put it that way?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: If you had had any internal intelligence, it would be because the so-called pipeline of intelligence was followed from outside the country into the country and where Special Forces gathered information as to where what happened internally and they gave it to the police, actually the Security Police, whose task it was to hand the internal problems.

MR NAUDE: The information was followed through our military intelligence channels to the police centre.

MR GROBLER: We've called it the Joubert Plan so far, did you hear Joubert's evidence?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: When the Joubert Plan was implemented and you had been deployed, at the level where you were working would there be discussions about the identification of targets?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And if a statement would be made that you specifically identified a target, would that statement be correct or would you not agree with it?

MR NAUDE: As I have said in my evidence, we did not know individuals within South Africa, so if I had to identify a target it would be an action for example, people who go out for instant training but not a specific person.

MR GROBLER: Let me put it this way, this relationship between Special Forces and the Commandment and the Security Police - I am visualising this but correct me if I'm wrong, that one primarily has intelligence on the basis of which a target is identified and that information comes from the SAP. Would that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I thought your question specifically was whether he was in a position to identify targets. That was your question originally, wasn't it?

MR GROBLER: Yes, Mr Chairman, but I thought he had ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And he said

"no".

MR GROBLER: ... but I thought he had answered that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And now I'm dealing with another aspect. I'm sorry if it didn't come across clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR GROBLER: May I just explain, I just see it from another angle. In the whole set-up as you were working there, one had the intelligence that was used to identify a target. That intelligence was the statement that I put to you as primarily based on South African Police information.

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And then one gets to the following phase where an action has to take place and one needs information to execute that action. I think the correct word to say that it would the tactical intelligence, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: The tactical information, how was this gathered?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, tactical information was gathered by ourselves and the police. Certain things we had to get from them and certain things we would get ourselves. What I could do myself I did myself, what I could not do myself I left to the police.

MR GROBLER: I cannot recall whether you have said it specifically, but you would recall that General Joubert said that a question was put as to whether the police authorised or approved the operation.

MR NAUDE: That is positive, he did ask me.

MR GROBLER: As far as you know, was there a reason why General Joubert would ask that question?

MR NAUDE: It was one of the four limitations he put to us, and he wanted to ensure that we operated within those limitations.

MR GROBLER: Mr Naude, as to the external ...(indistinct), would a person who arrived at the scene have seen 10 people, he would seen a limpet mine, he would have seen an AK47, he would have seen people who had died, I don't if he would have seen any drink, but from the outside he would held the image of an amount of people who (a) could not control themselves, (b) were incompetent and had destroyed themselves, would you agree?

ADV DE JAGER: Why would it not have been an image of a driver who had made an accident, why would this reflect on the passenger that he would be a person who could not control himself or whatever?

MR NAUDE: I would say, Chairperson, that he would have thought that it was someone who had made an accident and at closer inspection he would have come to the conclusion that these people had something to do with the liberation struggle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR GROBLER: If you could bear with me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: May I suggest that you don't have to get him to agree with the evidence of Joubert where that evidence has not been challenged by anybody. Where Joubert gave evidence on matters which were accepted and nobody has challenged it, there is no real need for you to put all of that evidence to him just to get his opinion on it.

MR GROBLER: I accept that, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It hasn't been challenged.

MR GROBLER: General, - sorry, there I make the mistake - Mr Naude, yesterday the need-to-know basis was discussed, do you recall that?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I do.

MR GROBLER: When you reported back to General Joubert, did you tell him anything more, other than the fact that the operation was successful?

MR NAUDE: It's difficult to recall exactly what I told him. I think I told him what had happened, but I cannot say under oath that I explained in detail what had happened.

MR GROBLER: But for purposes of the record this was not the type of operation where there would be any written record?

MR NAUDE: No, the less we communicated the better, there had to be absolute secrecy.

MR GROBLER: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER

CHAIRPERSON: Is there anybody else who is involved in this evidence who wishes to put questions to this witness, to this applicant?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I act on behalf of Brigadier Cronje and Captain Hechter who have already received amnesty for this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right.

MR DU PLESSIS: I therefore do not want to become embroiled in any of the applications, however I have a duty to put the evidence of my client which has already been led before this Committee, insofar as it may be necessary.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Naude, may I just ask you, on page 5 of bundle 2(c), Brigadier Cronje says that the four Special Forces operatives wore balaclavas, can you recall this or not?

MR NAUDE: That's correct, Chairperson, all were wearing balaclavas.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And Brigadier Cronje, on page 4 of the same bundle, says that there was a meeting between yourself and him with regards to the Nietverdiendt incident. Is this the meeting that you referred to in your evidence, that you had with Brigadier Cronje with regards to certain objectives?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I'd like to state clearly that there were many meetings and it is impossible at this stage specifically to say which meeting was which meeting. At the first meeting it was decided on the Nietverdiendt 10, but there were repeated meetings after that, sometimes on a daily basis.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Naude, on page of Jack Cronje's evidence in bundle 2(c), it was said that the kombi with the trainee was pushed down an incline and the kombi was filled with explosives that had blown up, nowhere did they say it was pushed into a tree or whatever. What is your submission on that?

MR NAUDE: The evidence is also right there because it was an incline but on the other side of the river there was a tree, and it went through the river into the tree.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just tell us, basically how many meetings would you normally have in Special Forces? Would it be once a month, would it be once a day, basically what, how would you communicate with one another?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before he can answer, do you mean ...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: Just generally, relating to Special Forces incidents.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Do you mean a meeting between him and his General, General Joubert?

MS LOCKHAT: General Joubert, yes that would be one.

MR NAUDE: We had meetings, Mr Chairperson, as and when required. Sometimes the frequency of meetings was high and sometimes it was very low. Sometimes in two or three months I never spoke to the General, but sometimes we virtually saw each other every day and sometimes twice or three times a day.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, is it correct that Special Forces had a kind of a bible in a sense, where all the matters were set down, all the incidents, and people that you were going to eliminate or targets were actually included in that, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: Not as far as I know. I know nothing about that.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, what were the functions of Special Forces?

MR NAUDE: The function of Special Forces is to carry out special operations which not any of the other units are capable of doing, due to their special training and parachute jumping, deep-sea diving etc.

MS LOCKHAT: Would you also say that Special Forces functions were actually to eliminate and kill?

MR NAUDE: Yes, for sure, Mr Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Excuse me, I didn't hear that?

MR NAUDE: That is definitely so, that was the purpose of Special Forces, to kill people.

MS LOCKHAT: So when you talk about this minimal force that you'd actually used regarding these 10 soldiers, would you say that it was just another way of just getting rid of people and that this minimal strategy of yours was really not of essence?

MR NAUDE: When one is in a fight or a normal war situation, the minimal force is not applicable but the General told us that minimal force was to be used because this was an urban operation where one could not just walk in and use a mortar attack in Mamelodi, that is not minimal force. But where one has to kill as little people as possible to have maximum effect, that is the purpose of minimal force.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, what was the role of Loots in this incident?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I'm not sure. I think Mr Loots was involved because he was the commander of Crause and Crause did not work on his own without his commander's knowledge, but he did not play a key function in this operation.

MR VISSER: I will confirm, Mr Chairman, that will basically be the evidence of Loots and Crause.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Oh, I'm sorry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Chairperson, I'm indebted.

What information did you have in respect of the identities of the individual persons who were killed? Did you know names, ages?

MR NAUDE: I had no intelligence with regards to these people. The first time that - right up until today, I think I saw the people's names in the paper for the first a week ago. I saw them for the first time when they arrived at the scene. I had no idea what they would look like or how old they were.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The evidence at the previous hearings, and that's contained on page 13 of bundle 3(c), gives their names as well as their ages. Can you recollect, when you took them out of the vehicle, as to how old some of these people were?

MR NAUDE: Some of the persons were young, I can recall but I cannot specifically remember. I would have judged it was - it's difficult for me to judge black people's age, but I would have said between 17 and 25.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The evidence is that for example, Abraham Makualani was 17 years old at the time and Samuel Masilela was 16 years old and Sipho Philip Sibanyoni was 15 years old.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just come in here. You will recall that there was quite a dispute at the hearing of this matter, about the ages of these victims. You will also recall that there wasn't evidence led, the information was provided by my learned friend and Mr Currin, and there was a question of birth certificates which would have been provided and which weren't eventually all available. But at the end of the day there was some confusion about the ages and some of the post-mortems indicated some of the persons as having been up to 40 years old. I just want to make that point. If my learned ask a question and says there was evidence, that is not the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now I think that, is it really material because this witness tells you that he can only guess that some of them may have been 17 years old and some older. How much clearer can he get?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I'll leave it at that point, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The message that was to be sent back to the townships to other prospective soldiers was that this was a dangerous thing to embark upon, if I understood your evidence correctly.

MR NAUDE: I don't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When you say that this was a message, I don't think it was intended that somebody was going to carry a message to the people. As I understand the evidence it wasn't that way. What he really means is that news of this event would reach the township and that in itself would convey to the young people in the township that it is not safe to do what they were planning to do.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You've phrased it far better than I have, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you want to react to the question as reformulated for me by the Chairperson?

MR NAUDE: I don't think there was - due to the fact that we wanted it to look like an accident, we didn't want a direct message, we couldn't send a direct message back to the township. But the point it, eventually these people will go missing and eventually the news would get through that, and it will have an effect later on, but it wasn't a direct purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Would that explain why the vehicle was set alight? Because for many of the victims, up until the stage when the Cronje applications were launched, it was unclear to them what had become of their next of kin. The bodies apparently were very badly burnt and in many cases, if not all, the identification was impossible.

MR NAUDE: That was the reason, yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What was the role of Captain Hechter in this operation?

MR NAUDE: Mr Chairperson, Captain Hechter, as I saw him, was second in command of this operation on the SAP's side and in this operation I cannot think that he would have played such a tremendous role. I remember that he attended some of the meetings but he certainly didn't play such a big role.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The information that you received was that these people were fighters, "vegters", soos dit in joy aansoek staan, that were going for further training. If I can refer you to your application, page 3 of the bundle and the response under paragraph - it's headed;

"Daad A"

and then paragraph (a)(iv):

"Nature and particulars: I was a member of a team consisting of Defence Force and Security Police members who apprehended a group of 10 ANC MK activists while they were on their way to Botswana in a kombi for further training."

MR NAUDE: Yes, I see that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was that the information that was conveyed to you by the police?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, that was the information which we had.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you conveyed that information to General Joubert, that they were fighters who were going for further training in a sort of an instant training ...(intervention)

MR NAUDE: Might I just interrupt at this point? The word is "activist", not "fighter".

MR VAN DEN BERG: The word "vegters" is used in General Joubert's application and I'm just checking whether his source of information was this particular witness, Mr Chairperson.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did inform General Joubert accordingly.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And that was for some form of instant training, if I understand his evidence correctly?

MR NAUDE: Yes, at that stage people would leave on a Friday and return on a Sunday and complete certain phases of training on that weekend. They would then complete the rest of the training on a following weekend, so that they would not have to defect, that they could carry on with their work on a Monday, they wouldn't go missing. This meant that they would be able to undergo training under cover and not create any suspicion with the police.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Is this type of training something, according to the information that you were given, which occurred regularly?

MR NAUDE: According to my information this took place every weekend, sometimes during the week, but mostly on the weekends they would depart for such training.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now this evidence in terms of a "kits opleiding", was never led by Brigadier Cronje or by Captain Hechter. Their evidence as I recollect it was that these were people that were going out of the country for military training. Do you want to comment on that difference?

MR NAUDE: It may be that he thought so, but the fact of the matter remains that I was under the impression that they were going for retraining, that they had already received training on an earlier stage. Perhaps he omitted to say that they had already been trained. But the fact of the matter remains that that is what I knew.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Based on the information that you had been told by Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, yes, that is the information which emerged at this joint meeting. I can't say with certainty at the moment that it was Brigadier Cronje who had said it or whether it was Hechter or one of his other people, but the fact remains that during this meeting this information became available to me.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was Brigadier Cronje present at that meeting?

MR NAUDE: I suspect that he was present. We held a great number of meetings and I think that he was present. If I can remember this after 12 years I would say that he was present.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When the kombi was stopped at the point at which you surrounded it and removed the occupants and injected them, was there any resistance offered?

MR NAUDE: No, none whatsoever.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It must have been obvious to those persons that they were now in some serious difficulty, surrounded by a group of heavily armed men wearing balaclavas, you say that there was no resistance offered whatsoever, none of them made a run for it?

MR NAUDE: There was no resistance whatsoever. Chairperson, with a kombi you can only exit from one door and we were standing there, there was no resistance whatsoever.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now the injections were given for purposes of reducing the level of resistance and to make, if I understood you correctly, to make the killing more humane. Did I understand you correctly?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he said that, to make them unconscious.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairman, thank you.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

CHAIRPERSON: ... those who were doing the killing.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Finally Mr Naude, some of the mothers of the people who died in that incident have been to the scene of where the "accident" took place, and they say that it doesn't resemble that which you've described, they say that there is no incline or anything like that, that it's a flat area. Can you comment on that?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, the first thing that I would like to say is that I was in the front vehicle which was driving approximately 300 metres ahead and there was definitely a stream that crossed the road and we drove the mini-bus down the embankment of the stream into a tree on the other side. I can't say exactly what happened because I was driving in the front vehicle which was 300 metres ahead. I'm almost certain that this question can be answered by Mr Derek Vorster who was on the scene.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Before I adjourn, is there likely to be any re-examination of this witness?

MR WESSELS: No, Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you may stand down. We will taken an adjournment and resume in 15 minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

RECALL OF MR CHARL NAUDE

CHAIRPERSON: ... applicant come back again, a member of the Committee wishes to clear up on or two points with him.

MR WESSELS: He is present, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you're still under your former oath.

CHARL NAUDE: Mr Naude, I just wanted to get clarity on one issue and that relates to the plan with regard to the manner in which the elimination of the young activist was to be carried out. Brigadier Cronje has already in his evidence alluded to the meeting that you and him had, wherein you were advised that Mr Mamasela had infiltrated the young activists who intended to undergo military training in Botswana. What I want to find out from you is whether the manner in which the elimination was to be executed was planned at that meeting?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, no, I don't think that the detailed plan had already been devised by then because that was the first meeting. I think we then went back

and somewhat later, approximately a day or two later, we decided to devise a plan.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you refer to the "we", are you referring to yourself and Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: That's correct, I'm referring to the Security Branch by name, Brigadier Cronje and myself.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And are you saying therefore that the notion of blowing up the kombi as part of the execution of the operation was known to Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: I'm very sorry, could you just repeat that please, Chairperson?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was the notion of blowing up the kombi as part of the execution of the operation known to Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: I think he - you know I don't think he was informed in too much detail as to exactly what is going to happen on site, I think what happened there is that he thought that the kombi was blown up but it was in fact set alight and it exploded later due to the fact that the limpet mine was put in the vehicle.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But was he aware of how the operation was going to be executed?

MR NAUDE: I would assume that, yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And if he says that he was not aware of the details of how the operation was to be executed, what would be your response to that?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Could you just repeat that again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In his evidence it would seem that he did not know of how the operation was to be executed, that's his evidence.

MR NAUDE: I really don't know whether he knew about it or not. I assume he knew that because he was there that night, so you know it's very difficult for me to understand that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I'm not talking about him being present at the scene of the accident, I am talking about knowing the plan and the manner in which the operation was to be executed.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I must say that he must have known. You know the police came, the vehicle came to a pre-arranged "AW", then he knew about the plan. He must have known otherwise the kombi wouldn't have arrived at the prearranged place.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. In your earlier evidence you stated that you jointly devised the plan of eliminating the activists.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that plan would have entailed the manner in which the elimination would be carried out.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Which would then include the putting of an AK47 inside the vehicle.

MR NAUDE: Yes. I must say that I'm not exactly sure that we've decided that on the meeting, I think I decided that on the last moment, and I can't exactly remember who was present when we decided that, but it is a fact that Brigadier Cronje was aware of how the operation would be executed.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks very much.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I would just like to make a final remark. I would like to tell General Joubert, in times when Generals don't wish to know us, I would like to thank him for standing by us. The other Generals gave orders but forgot very quickly that they were involved, and I would like to thank him in front of this Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) that is recorded.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MR DEREK J VORSTER: AM NO 5641/97

CHAIRPERSON: Yes? Where do we proceed from there?

MS LOCKHAT: We will proceed with the applicant D J Vorster.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application of Mr Vorster appears on page 33 of bundle 3.

DEREK J VORSTER: (sworn states)

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the witness will give his evidence in English.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Did I hear you say page 33?

MR WESSELS: 33, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Vorster, is it correct that you retired from the South African Defence Force as a Major?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Can you just briefly sketch your history as a soldier?

MR VORSTER: Yes. I joined the - I was called up for National Service in 1976, the beginning of 1977 I joined the Permanent Force, in the same year I underwent selection training for Special Forces, and I was with Special Forces until I left the forces in 1988.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that during 1986, you were working under the command of at that stage, Commandant Naude?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it further correct that at some stage during the course of that year he called you in and told you that your group had to work with the police in combating the onslaught against the country, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: And at some stage he came to you and he said that there was certain plan wherein certain activists were going to be executed?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Can you tell us in more detail what was told to you and what happened thereafter?

MR VORSTER: Okay. Firstly, Commandant Naude came to me and said that - I was part of the group that was allocated to the Northern Province Command, and he said an operation had been identified and he briefly explained to me that there was a number of activists that were going out to Botswana to receive retraining, specifically training in limpet mines, and that we were to intercept this group and eliminate them.

MR WESSELS: Yes, what were your duties?

MR VORSTER: Firstly my duty was, at the initial farm which was the rendezvous point where the police informer would have brought the activists, at that stage I was to be an early warning group to make sure that no civilians or unauthorised people entered a specific road while the activists were being injected. Thereafter, my task would have been to take the kombi to a spot which would be pointed out to me and to stage an accident and burn the vehicle, including the occupants.

MR WESSELS: Right, on this particular day, what did you do?

MR VORSTER: On this specific day, if I recall correctly, I left Pretoria some time after dark. I was told of a specific point on a farm where the rendezvous would take place. I arrived there and at this specific rendezvous point I met Commandant Naude as well as Sergeant-Major Tippet and various members of the Security Police.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and then? Proceed.

MR VORSTER: Okay. At that time, if I recall correctly, it was early evening, in the region of 9 o'clock or half past nine. Between Commandant Naude and myself we just discussed exactly where I'd put the - I'd be the early warning group. We stood around waiting for this mini-bus. The bus was late. I think the driver was told to be there by a specific time and he arrived about an hour or an hour and a half later than what we expected him.

MR WESSELS: Yes, what did you observe happened there and what did you do?

MR VORSTER: When the vehicle approached I was in position in a early warning group, the vehicle moved past me and stopped plus-minus 50 metres or 70 metres away from me. The vehicle was surrounded by Commandant Naude and the other people who were present. They all had weapons. Well we all had weapons, including myself. And I saw them order the people to get out of the vehicle.

I was not present right there at the vehicle, but I knew how the plan would go, it's that the activists would be told to get out of the vehicle, they would be searched for any weapons and they would be given an injection and put back into the vehicle. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did you actually see that from where you were?

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I could see activity around the vehicle, I did see people get out of the vehicle and because all the occupants were first taken out and then there was a large group of people around the vehicle and then were starting to get back into the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and then?

MR VORSTER: Okay, once the vehicle, the activists were back in the vehicle I was called by radio - I had radio communication with Commandant Naude at the time, and I was told to get back into the vehicle. I got into the vehicle.

There were two activists that were in the front seat next to me. When I got into the vehicle most of them were already unconscious and some of them were still conscious but very, on the verge of being unconscious.

An escort vehicle which was also a mini-bus, with Commandant Naude, Brigadier Cronje and I think Captain Crause or Colonel Crause - at that time I think he was a Captain, was also in that vehicle and they drove ahead. I was in radio communication with them ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: Who drove this vehicle in which the activists were?

MR VORSTER: I drove it.

MR WESSELS: Yes?

MR VORSTER: I drove behind the escort vehicle because I did know the place we were going to. We drove for plus-minus 45 minutes, an hour, I can't remember exactly. And when we reached - at one point the lead vehicle went through a dip in the road and I was told from the escort vehicle that they think that this would be a suitable spot to stage the accident. I stopped the vehicle and I inspected the place. I saw that it was a dry river bed and there was a very prominent tree on the other side of the river bed.

I got back into the vehicle ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: What was the condition of the activists at this stage?

MR VORSTER: Okay, at this time they'd all been sleeping or were unconscious, none of them were coherent or conscious at all.

MR WESSELS: Yes?

MR VORSTER: I got into the vehicle, I put on my safety belt and I drove at a reasonable speed into this dry river bed, straight into the tree. I then got out. I had 25 litres of petrol in the vehicle with me. At this stage the lead vehicle was plus-minus 250/300 metres up the road. I could just see the back lights of the vehicle, although I was in constant radio contact with them. I then proceeded to pour petrol over the occupants of the vehicle, the full 25 litres. I then set the vehicle alight and I proceeded to the escort vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that there was a limpet mine placed in this vehicle?

MR VORSTER: Okay, I did not know about the limpet mine, it could have been inserted in the plan. Nothing was originally discussed about a limpet mine or any weapons. Only at a later stage did I understand that a limpet mine and an AK had been hidden in the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: And then you got in the vehicle and you left the scene?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that on the following day you went to Colonel Verster about this operation and you complained to him?

MR VORSTER: That is correct. That same evening I had a discussion with Commandant Naude, expressing my feelings that I did not think that we should be involved in operations of this nature for various reason, firstly being the security aspect of too many people of which we did not know the people were present and also that I felt that it was not our operation, our type of operation.

The next morning I phone Colonel Verster and I requested an interview with him. The reason I asked him for an interview is because at that stage I think he held the position of SSO Operations within Special Forces as well as we were in the process of the establishment of the CCB, of which the unit I was in would be incorporated.

I went to the meeting with him, I said that I was very unhappy with the way that the operation had been conducted and the people that had been present and also that I didn't feel that it was the type of operation that a highly trained Special Forces member should be involved in. And I requested that in future I not be considered for any operation of this nature.

MR WESSELS: And what was his attitude?

MR VORSTER: He agreed with me that it wasn't an operation for a Special Forces soldier and also that the security aspects of an operation, a mixed operation like this, was doubtful and that he would convey my feelings to higher authority.

MR WESSELS: Were you ever thereafter involved in similar types of operations?

MR VORSTER: No, I was not.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, who wishes to commence?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I have no questions for this witness, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR GROBLER: I also have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR GROBLER

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions, Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, have you any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Just give me one minute, Chairperson.

Mr Vorster, how long were you in Special Forces?

MR VORSTER: I was in Special Forces from 1977 until 1988.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it correct to say that Special Forces were basically trained to eliminate and kill?

MR VORSTER: That is ...(incorrect)

MS LOCKHAT: So why would you say that you had problems after this incident that you discusses with Colonel Verster, that this was not the type of operation for Special Forces? I don't understand that.

MR VORSTER: Okay. A Special Forces soldier was trained to do reconnaissance and to eliminate the enemy behind enemy lines, and I felt that this was not an operation that anybody needed special training for and it was not an operation that a soldier should be involved in.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr van den Berg?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

You'll forgive my absence of military knowledge. You referred to an SSO Ops, what is that?

MR VORSTER: It was a staff officer who was in charge of Special Operations.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was he a type of complaints officer or somebody that you would take personal or other types of problems to?

MR VORSTER: No, it's not, he is in charge of Special Operations. The reason I went to Colonel Verster is that I'd served under him since 1977 and I had a lot of confidence and respect for him.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I understand. Now if I understand what happened correctly that evening, is that you were part of an early warning unit at the scene where they were injected, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Who else was part of that early warning unit?

MR VORSTER: There was a - one of my team members was a person called Jose de Souza.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It was yourself and de Souza?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Where were the policemen at the time, that's Crause, Loots, Cronje, Hechter?

MR VORSTER: Can you just tell me at what time?

MR VAN DEN BERG: At the time that - once the vehicle had passed you and the activists were being off-loaded, where were the policemen at that time?

MR VORSTER: I wouldn't be able to tell you because they were 60 or 70 metres away from me and all I could see was the mini-bus with a number of people around it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Is it your evidence that they were assisting Mr Naude in the off-loading of the activists?

MR VORSTER: No, I couldn't say that because I wasn't present there and I wasn't in a position to identify exactly who was doing what.

MR VAN DEN BERG: No subsequently you drove the vehicle with the semi-conscious and later unconscious activists to the scene at which an accident was staged, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Were you the only Special Forces person in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You say that you didn't see the AK47 or the limpet mine being placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: No, I did not.

MR VAN DEN BERG: This is perhaps something I should have asked Naude, but do you have any idea when these were placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: Say again?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I said it's perhaps something I should have asked Naude, but when do you think these things were placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: I would assume that it was placed in the vehicle after, either while the activists were being injected or directly after they had been put back into the vehicle - but I can only assume that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I understand. By the time that you took control of that vehicle, what was the situation in respect of the activists?

MR VORSTER: As I said, most of them were unconscious and the others were on the border of unconsciousness.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you special training in staging of accidents?

MR VORSTER: No, I do not.

MR VAN DEN BERG: So you took your own life into your hands by driving across a dry river bed and into a tree if I understand you correctly?

MR VORSTER: No, I'm a trained reconnaissance commander soldier. I did a reconnaissance first and then I drove into the river bed. I selected the tree and the exact point where I was going to enter the river bed.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was there anybody else from Special Forces present at the time that you poured the petrol over the bodies of the activists?

MR VORSTER: I was the only person present. The nearest person to me was in the escort vehicle which was plus-minus 250 to 300 metres away from me. I was the only person at the scene.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you have any recollection of the age of the people involved, a guesstimate?

MR VORSTER: I've got no idea. It was dark and when I got into the vehicle the activists were already in a state of semi-unconsciousness and I did not put on any lights in the vehicle. So at no stage did I physically get a good look at the activists.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But could you determine that they were in a state of semi-consciousness?

MR VORSTER: Because they ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In the dark.

MR VORSTER: Sorry, say again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How could you be able to ascertain that they were in that state because it was completely dark according to your evidence?

MR VORSTER: That is correct, but they were all asleep and a number of them were snoring and there was no talking in the vehicle and they were all slumped backwards or to the side.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Proceed Mr van den Berg.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you. The reconnaissance which was done for the accident, when was that done?

MR VORSTER: When the escort vehicle radioed me and said that the dry river bed which I was a approaching should be a suitable place for the accident, I then stopped the vehicle plus-minus 50 or 100 metres from this dry river bed, I got out of the vehicle and I walked towards the dry river bed, I saw that the embankment was high and I saw that there was a tree and I then looked which would be the most appropriate way for me to approach this so that it looks as if the vehicle skidded of the road, went into the dry river bed and into the tree.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Presumably it was dark when all of this took place.

MR VORSTER: I did have a very powerful flashlight with me and the vehicle's lights were on.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just remind counsel that this is an application for amnesty and not a trial and the questions ought to really relate to whether the applicant ought to get amnesty or not. Questions relating to details of this kind, when one knows it is common cause that there was a crash, the vehicle collided and people died, when those facts are common cause how much further is it taken by putting the kinds of questions that you are putting to him?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I summarise it, Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please, unless you are going to throw in, you say no, you're not going to rely on his evidence because he's not telling the truth on material points.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I accept that, Mr Chairperson.

Some of the mothers of the victims concerned have been out to the scene of the accident and they say to me that it doesn't resemble what you have described, can you comment on that?

CHAIRPERSON: That's it. You see you put that to them, it's the kind of question I understand you should be putting to him. Please answer that.

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairperson, I do not know where the families were taken. My recollection is of what happened 12 years ago and a place and the geography of the place where I staged the accident and set the vehicle alight. So I cannot comment as to where the families were taken.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Finally, the information that you had in respect of the activists, that was the information that was conveyed to you by Naude, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: No further questions, Mr Chairperson, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR WESSELS: There's no re-examination, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: You've just told us it's 12 years ago, do you know whether the road was rebuilt, whether there's a bridge now or what the position may be?

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I've not visited the scene since that night and my recollection was that it was a small farm road and I doubt very seriously that a major highway or road would have been built there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sici?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination of this witness?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Wessels?

MR WESSELS: No re-examination, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Yes, you may stand down, thank you very much.

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I would also just like to take this opportunity to thank General Joubert for his presence here, I appreciate it a lot, thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Lockhat, who do we proceed to now?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we could proceed to Mr Crause.

MR VISSER: That is in order, Mr Chairman. I call Colonel Crause to give evidence. His evidence will be given in Afrikaans.

PHILIP RUDOLPH CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, the spelling is it C or K?

MR VISSER: C-R-A-U-S-E, Mr Chairman. I beg leave to hand up an affidavit that was drawn up by Mr Crause. It is an elaboration with regards to certain aspects of his amnesty application as it serves before you and which will also form part of his evidence. May I hand this up to you as well as to my colleagues?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Could this be marked Exhibit A, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, this will go in as Exhibit A.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman. If I may proceed, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, is it correct that you are an applicant for amnesty?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regards to three incidents that are to be heard before this Committee, the Nietverdiendt incident and the second incident which we refer to as the Silent Valley incident and the McKenzie incident, and we are presently only dealing with the Nietverdiendt one?

On page 2, Mr Chairman, at the bottom of the page you will find a reference to the bundles in which the applicant's evidence appears. You would have noticed that paragraph 10(a) and 10(b) of the applicant's application was not bound in this bundle before you. This problem is chronic and it seems as if this problem will not go away and we'd like to correct it but we cannot seem to. Mr Chairman, if I may explain?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Earlier on in the amnesty applications there were certain amendments brought in the applicants, on the forms of the applications of some of the applicants and we have attempted, Mr Chairman, - those amendments had been granted, I think all of them were by Justice Wilson, we've been attempting to get that done, Mr Chairman, and there seems to be a problem as far as the administration is concerned. We make no point of it, Mr Chairman, other than saying that in all instances for the clients for whom we act, paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) are identical. So if you have one you have them all, they've simply been copied, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are, thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, if I can just come in here. I've made copies of the Annexures 10(a) and 10(b) relating to the political objective of Advocate Visser's clients. I have discussed it with him previously and he said I should just keep it available, which I have, and then once we commence with Crause's application I can just submit it. I have it with me, so if the Chairperson would allow me I will just present it to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if the need arises.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the Evidence Leader is quite correct, I confirm what she says, Mr Chairman, but frankly I don't believe that you need it before you right now. Perhaps one set could be handed to you, Mr Chairman, it will be applicable to all the applicants, which you can place somewhere in your record. But you will find in the applications which are all over the bundles of the Amnesty Committee, you will have copies of the 10(a) and (b)'s, Mr Chairman, so I am not insisting on you having them.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if can just continue. You are up to date with certain documentation which serves before the Amnesty Committee ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: In order to avoid any confusion because of a multiplicity of documents, the affidavit you've just handed in was described as Annexure A and this document which now is presented by Ms Lockhat will be referred to as Exhibit B, should the need arise.

MR VISSER: As it please you, Mr Chairman. Yes, with the rider that it will be applicable to all the applicants for whom we appear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You are up to date written information which has been handed up before the Amnesty Committee, amongst others on page 3 of Exhibit A you refer to the Foundation of Equality Before the Law, Exhibit P45 before the Amnesty Committee, General Johan van der Merwe's submission, Exhibit P46 and a statement by ex-Generals.

This documents, Mr Chairman, you will find in bundle 2(a), pages 55 to 117. That is the evidence which we are now going to refer to of the 21st of October of General van der Merwe. And in bundle 2(i) under (a), pages 1 to 29 there is a submission of General van der Merwe. This is the one that is referred to as Exhibit P46 and on page 136 to 147 of bundle 2(i) you will find the submission by the Generals, of the previous Commissioners.

Chairperson, we will just refer to this, we will not waste time by referring to it in the light of the evidence that will be led here, because we will refer that the original Amnesty Committee has taken note of this already in the Jan Hattingh/Cronje matter and has already summarised that evidence and we can save time by not reading it word for word.

We have referred Mr Crause to the evidence of General van der Merwe's submission which is indicated on (d) and then you would request that the Amnesty Judgments in the incidents which you mention at the bottom of page 3 be taken into consideration with the decision as to your amnesty application, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You were born in the Free State in Bethlehem on the 26th of May 1945 - I'm on page 4, Mr Chairman - and you are now 53 years old.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The Amnesty Committee - page 5 - has made a summary in the amnesty decision of Brigadier Jack Cronje, on page 2 where he says, and you quote on page 5

"Almost all policemen giving evidence before the Amnesty Committee referred to their background. Almost all policemen appearing before us joined the Police Force after the National Party became the Government of South Africa in 1948 and implemented the apartheid policy. They were brought up under this doctrine, which was supported by schools and all Afrikaans churches. There was rarely any voice in the circles they moved in, condemning the policy. On the contrary, the churches proclaimed the policy to be in accordance with the scriptures and even acted against preachers like the Reverend Beyers Naude, who spoke out against it. As policemen they were indoctrinated to defend a policy and a government of the day, even with their lives should it be necessary. They accepted the legality enforced environment as the accepted and acceptable social structure of the country."

That passage has been put to you, do you find that that passage is applicable to your situation?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You joined the police in 1962, you went to the college and you retired because of medical reasons on the 21/12/1993, with the rank of Colonel.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And thereafter you acted - page 6, Mr Chairman - from January to August 1994, as the advisor to the then Boputhatswana Special Branch, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What is of import in your career, on page 5 of Exhibit A, is that from 1971 you were stationed at Zeerust. You started as a detective and in 1972 you went to the Security Branch, and from 1985 to 1986 you were the Branch Commander of the Security Branch at Zeerust, do I have that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, you do.

MR VISSER: On page 6 you referred to the struggle of the past, which you have summarised. You refer in paragraph 9 to bundle 2(a) of the Cronje Five's evidence, pages 58 to 117, and bundle 2(e), pages 300 to 344, once again incorporating the evidence of General Johan van der Merwe. Do you concur with the policies as he put there in the struggle of the past and the actions and convictions of the Security Branch's members?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: On page 7 you have a quotation from Judgment of Brigadier J Cronje on page 2 to 4, I am not going to read it, but in those paragraphs, Mr Chairperson, the evidence of General van der Merwe is summarised. And the only thing that I would like to do is ask Mr Crause if he concurs with that summary there, as a correct summary of the struggle of the past in the country.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I do, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you continue in paragraphs 11 and 12 and mention key points with regards to the struggle with the ANC/SACP, the four pillars of their struggle and the violent attempt to usurp the previous government.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it was an undeclared war in the past - as found in the amnesty judgment of Brigadier Cronje, page 2 to 3, which you quote at the bottom of page 9 and over to page 10, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now you yourself, Mr Crause, anything that you have done, was it done out of malice or to your own advantage, or why did you act in the manner in which you did act during the incidents for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR CRAUSE: I did this in my service and I did not receive any remuneration.

MR VISSER: And not from any personal malice?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: And then you said that the struggle that reigned, which was marked by assassination attempts of members of the Security Forces, did you take note of this and did this have an influence on your work environment?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that the ANC/SACP alliance focused itself on soft targets. And then I would like to take you to paragraph 20 on page 11, and I would like to ask you to please read this to the Committee.

MR CRAUSE

"All the incidents for which I apply for amnesty happened in the heat of the struggle, which was an undeclared war. Nothing that I have done for which I ask for amnesty was for personal gain or out of personal malice. Everything that was done was to combat the total onslaught of the revolutionary forces."

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if we could, with the permission of the Members of the Committee, go directly to the role that Botswana played in the incidents which will be heard by the Amnesty Committee during this session. Could you please inform us as to how you experienced this?

MR CRAUSE

"It was the knowledge of myself an other members of the Security Branch in Western Transvaal, that Botswana since 1977 played a more important role for the ANC/SACP alliance with regards to the organisation, strategy, planning, provision of weaponry and other sources for the revolutionary struggle in South Africa."

MR VISSER: Yes, you refer in paragraph 24 that this was on the assumption that General van der Merwe would give evidence before you, which has not happened, you refer to Mr Marius Schoon. Mr Chairman, the purpose of that is to draw your attention to some evidence, documentary evidence which was handed in, Commissioner de Jager was present in that hearing and he would know about it, in the Marius Schoon application. We don't want to belabour any points in this regard, Mr Chairman, and what we have done, and we hope it will carry away your approval, is not to hand in all the exhibits which served in that application, but to allow me just to refer you to three passages in one of the exhibits, which was Exhibit RR.

Mr Chairman, what this issue concerns is that since 1979, Mr Marius Louis Schoon went to Botswana and he established infiltration routes, as he himself testified before the Committee under the Chairmanship of your brother, Justice Wilson, and where - perhaps I should just make it clear that the other Commissioners were Commissioner de Jager and Commissioner Sibanyoni - from which it appeared Mr Chairman, that - I'm talking about the, I'm referring to the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon -that his role in Botswana became a very important role for the ANC. He took it as far as saying, Mr Chairman, and the record will speak for itself, I'm trying just to shortcut the issue ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I'm speaking for myself and not on behalf of the Committee, but I think for purposes of these applications it could be accepted that Botswana was a country sympathetic to the cause of the liberation forces and they have received assistance from Botswana in certain respects.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are very indebted, particularly if we were assured that that would be the position taken by all the members of the Committee, that that is so ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should have no difficulty in that regard.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How does it affect the present application, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, the way in which it affects it is from a point of view of proportionality the question may well be asked, why do you simply take three people and shoot them, in the Silent Valley matter, why do you take 10 people who are going out to be trained and simply shoot them or simply eliminate them, why don't you follow other venues? The state of emergency had just been declared countrywide on the 16th of June. This is 10 days after that date, when the Nietverdiendt matter takes place.

And what we are saying, Mr Chairman, and the message which the applicants for whom we appear wish to convey to you is that the problems from Botswana were so great and their capacity to deal with them was so limited that it led to drastic action having been taken. And that in short, Mr Chairman, is hopefully the answer to Commissioner Khampepe's questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it can be accepted that Botswana played a particular role in the struggle of the liberation organisations, in the sense that it rendered assistance to them in several respects. And I don't think you should labour that point.

MR VISSER: May I just for clarity's sake make one point. Whatever we say about Botswana is no reflection on the Botswana Government, please.

CHAIRPERSON: We understand.

MR VISSER: As long as that is understood. You will references, Mr Chairman, in Exhibit 2IL. Now 2IL is a bundle which was compiled in 1988. Now immediately let me say this comes after all the incidents which you are going to hear, but it starts with reference to 1984 and it runs through. And you will find a number of references that the Security Police of the Western Transvaal complained and reported to the Botswana Police, certain incidents, the whereabouts of certain people whom the Security Branch thought were enemies of the State, and that it had very little effect. Apart from that criticism, Mr Chairman, - I just want to make it clear as I've done before, that we are not referring to the Botswana situation with a view of discrediting the Botswana Government.

CHAIRPERSON: Understood.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we are not going to go through - while we're on the point, perhaps I should just deal with it, bundle 2IL was placed before you ...(no microphone)

MS LOCKHAT: It's bundle 2J, so it's incorrect to say bundle 2IL.

MR VISSER: Alright, if it's undergone a metamorphosis then 2J.

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: It is now 2J, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: We are not going to deal with it, Mr Chairman, but in argument we will draw your attention to the fact of the amount of weapons, explosives etc., which were smuggled in through Botswana, and the number of cadres who went out, left the country through Botswana and re-entered the country from Botswana, in order to show, Mr Chairman, the mental makeup and the motivation of the applicants when dealing with the applications which are not before you. Other than that, Mr Chairman, I'm going to step off that if I may.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well when the time comes for you to address us, you will specifically draw our attention to it.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, if I could assist in that regard, bundle 2J has reference to a large number of MK cadres, and evidence was led in the amnesty application of Aboobaker Ismail relating specifically to infiltration routes from Botswana into South Africa, particularly reference to the bomb blast at Wits Command, where Grosskopf and Lester Dumakude were involved.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to my learned friend. In fact we do make a reference to Rashid, to Mr Aboobaker Ismail, to Mr Maloi and others in the application. We'll run through this paragraph, Mr Chairman, very briefly without wasting time and we'll draw your attention to those paragraphs. But I thank my learned friend for his contribution.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if we have to move to page 11 then, your evidence is that Botswana played a very important role in the revolutionary struggle in the country, with special significance for the network of infiltration routes and logistical support which was established between Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Indeed it changed to such an extent that by 1989 it was, according to statements made by the ANC, regarded as the most important entry and exit route from the RSA.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, then at page 14, paragraph 32, the reference there should now be amended to be 2J. At page 14, paragraph 32.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: And then I deal, Mr Chairman, I promised that I will draw your attention to them, we deal in paragraph 33 with the complaints to the Botswana authorities in regard to the problems which the police had in the Western Transvaal. We take it no further than we've already done, Mr Chairman. And we also refer to the fact of that, and it is relevant we submit, Mr Chairman, that in 1986, on the 12th of June, a countrywide state of emergency was declared by the then State President. That's paragraph 34, Mr Chairman.

Then you say in paragraph 35:

"Despite the additional capacities which were created in terms of the emergency regulations, the security situation still worsened and the government and the Security branch were forced to take drastic steps in order to combat the revolutionary onslaught."

Can you tell us whether or not it was possible for you to simply arrest all those individuals who were creating problems for you and lock them up?

MR CRAUSE: No, it was impossible at that stage.

MR VISSER: Well why would it have been impossible at that stage?

MR CRAUSE: There were a great number of people, these people went out for military training, we didn't know who or what they were, then they would come, they would commit sabotage.

MR VISSER: And you maintain in paragraph 36, that it happened more and more that the police, as you put it, began to act beyond the parameters of the law, in order to combat the freedom activities effectively?

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 37 you provide a summary of the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance within and outside Botswana. And at 37.1 on page 15, Mr Chairperson, you refer to certain well-known names who were indeed operating in Botswana, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Among others you refer to Mr Aboobaker Ismail, MK name Rashid, Lambert Maloi, Johannes Mnisi, Lester Dumakude, Lekhoto Pule, who were all the most important individuals, and you say that there were also others who were involved in these activities.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: We will not read the rest of paragraph 37 point for point, but you are simply making the point about how busy your life as a security officer was with regard to the Botswana situation, correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Then with regard to what is now referred to as bundle 2J, you also refer in summary on page 16, paragraph 38, to the activities, which was intended to be of assistance to the Committee in order not to have to read the entire bundle should there not be enough time, you have provided a summary of why you regarded the entry route from Botswana as important.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 39 on page 17, you have then attempted to sketch your position as well as those of your comrades in the Security Branch. And you ask the Committee to pay attention to that when considering your application.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Then finally, with regard to, or second last, with regard to the introduction, the Committee has repeatedly heard how important it is that information had to be gathered and exchanged. The Committee has also made a decision regarding the Cronje judgment, do you agree firstly, with regard to the significance of important and the fact that information was exchanged between members of the security community as far as your memory goes?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: You have provided your political reasons in Exhibit B before the Committee, you are familiar with that?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Once again you confirm this in your evidence?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And you refer to paragraph 52 and following by means of summary to your political movement reasons, or motivation, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And just for summary, you maintain that you made an oath towards the State when you became a policeman and that you regarded it as your duty in order to combat the struggle, and especially because this was part of your struggle in terms of the Police Act, that you had to ensure internal security?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 55 you refer to an extract of the evidence of the former Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, which speaks for itself, and you request that the Committee consider this when considering your application, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: If we proceed to page 24, and before we get to the Nietverdiendt incident on page 30, you wanted to inform the Committee that you have a problem with your memory. Also when I questions Colonel Naude I made a point thereof that this took place quite a while ago and he said that this took place 12 years ago, I think it may actually have been 13 years already, and you say that you are no longer entirely certain of all the incidents or events in precise detail.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: However, you have listened to the others who are involved and as far as it is possible for you, you have attempted to search your own memory and you believe that the evidence which you will place before the Committee today will be the truth and the whole truth, according to the best of your memory regarding what took place there.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And this is of application to all your applications?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could proceed to page 30, I would like for you to tell the Committee in a relaxed fashion about your recollection about the Nietverdiendt incident.

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, on the 26th of June 1986, I was visited by Brigadier Jack Cronje and Commandant Charl Naude at my office in Zeerust. At that stage I was the Commander of the Zeerust Security Branch. Brigadier Cronje informed me that there were 10 ANC activists who were on their way from Mamelodi to Botswana for military training. His request to me was that he was looking for a suitable place where these people could be intercepted and killed. I told him that I would not be able to be of assistance to him without the authorisation of the appropriate officer.

After that I contacted Brigadier Loots from Potchefstroom by telephone and he informed me that I could go ahead and be of assistance to them and that he was on his way.

MR VISSER: If I might interrupt you, what was his description of command at Potchefstroom?

MR CRAUSE: He was the commander of the ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Crause, I think it may be of assistance to you - I see that you are referring to the document, if you could just tell us which points you are dealing with, specifically which paragraphs, it will be of assistance to us.

MR CRAUSE: Just to return - I'm dealing with paragraph 91 at this stage. We are going to page 31, paragraph 92. I then took Brigadier Cronje and Naude on various routes and we identified two places. One I do not name here but my memory has subsequently been refreshed when Naude mentioned it. The one was the place where the vehicle would be stopped, the second was an appropriate place where an accident could be staged.

From there I returned to my office and there Brigadier Loots joined us.

MR VISSER: On that very same day?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, on that day. I must mention that the plan was submitted to me and the intention thereof was to eliminate the people, and I accepted at that stage that the vehicle would simply be exploded with the people inside.

Later that evening I returned to the scene where the vehicle would be intercepted. I would just like to tell the Committee exactly where I am now.

MR VISSER: Perhaps you could return to that later. I would just like to ask you this first. You've heard from Brigadier Cronje and from Commandant Naude that these people were involved or on their way to receive extra training and that they were to be eliminated, what was your feeling about that?

MR CRAUSE: I personally agreed with the order that the person were to be eliminated. Once they had been allowed to leave the country and received their training there could be no guarantee that the Security Branch would be able to trace them or prevent them from committing acts of terror. I was convinced that these persons should be prevented at all costs of leaving the country and receiving military training.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 94 is about a piece of evidence from bundle 2(c), page 29 regarding which the current witness is making a few remarks. We are not going to give any further evidence regarding that.

MR CRAUSE: I'm now moving ahead to paragraph 95,

Chairperson. My knowledge of the events stretches from my arrival on the abandoned farm in the Nietverdiendt environment. I would just like to re-emphasise that this the place where the vehicle was to be pulled off the road. Brigadier Cronje, Commandant Cronje and Colonel Loots were also present on the farm and there were also other unknown persons who were present. I later heard that these persons were Captain Hechter and members of Special Forces.

I was a distance away from there but I saw that the black men were being taken out of the vehicle and injected with a substance and then helped back into the vehicle. Colonel Loots and I did not participate in that.

MR VISSER: And do you know what the substance was and what its affect would be?

MR CRAUSE: I did not know what the substance was that they were injected with, but I do recall that very soon after the injection they fell asleep or became unconscious or dead.

We drove ahead to the point upon which we had decided that morning. I drove the vehicle while the kombi with the sleeping men followed us. It was being driven by a member of Special Forces. I would just like to mention that at that stage I did not know that it was Mr Vorster that was driving the vehicle. I also cannot recall that Mamasela drove with us.

MR VISSER: Your memory or your recollection is that after you left the farm he went back to Pretoria?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. We drove ahead - and I cannot recall because I only heard about the radio contact a few moments ago. After we had driven through the ditch we allowed the vehicle to be driven into the ditch. I was not personally present but the person who drove the vehicle into the ditch came to us and we saw the vehicle explode.

MR VISSER: You are prepared to accept the evidence of Mr Naude as correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. From there we drove back to the place where we had parked our vehicles and from there we separated. And that is what I know about the incident.

MR VISSER: Did you have anything to do with any aspect of this incident after the incident, after the 26th of June?

MR CRAUSE: No, none.

MR VISSER: Do you know whether an inquest of a post-mortem was held after the incident?

MR CRAUSE: I must mention that the incident took place in Boputhatswana and as far as I was aware they held a post-mortem inquest.

MR VISSER: Did you make any enquiries regarding that?

MR CRAUSE: No, I did not discuss the incident with anybody else.

MR VISSER: You refer - well, Mr Chairman, perhaps I should refer you to bundle 2(i) just to draw your attention to the fact that you might remember in 1997, we handed in affidavits on behalf of Mr Crause and Mr Loots to the original Amnesty Committee. They are bound in, Mr Chairman. We asked for them to be bound in. They are to be found in bundle 2(i), page 127 to 129. For Mr Crause and Mr Loots is at 130 to 133 - lest I forget when I lead his evidence.

Mr Chairman, that's the evidence which we wish to present. Oh sorry, Mr Chairman.

MR CRAUSE: I would just like to clear up one matter which has become a problem and that is the road there. Once again I have driven that road in Boputhatswana, it has been rebuilt, it is now a broad tarred road whereas previously it was a narrow dirt road. I might just mention that the indentation in the road has been filled up and levelled.

MR VISSER: That's the evidence-in-chief, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, any cross-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: May I go first, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Crause you have accepted Mr Naude's evidence, do you also accept the correctness of Mr Vorster's evidence as it has been delivered here?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR WESSELS: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks. Any other questions by anybody else?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Crause, what did Jack - when Jack Cronje and Mr Naude came to you about the plan, what exactly did they inform you of?

MR CRAUSE: Brigadier Cronje told me that 10 activists were on their way from Mamelodi to Botswana for extra training and that they were to be eliminated.

MS LOCKHAT: Did he tell what his plans were as to how they were going to eliminate the 10 victims?

MR CRAUSE: Not at that stage.

MS LOCKHAT: Didn't you ask them?

MR CRAUSE: No, I didn't ask him at that stage because I told him that I wanted to inform my commanding officer about the matter.

MS LOCKHAT: And I assume you asked them thereafter, or did you just direct them as to the place?

MR CRAUSE: Later on the way I was informed that they wanted to stage an accident, but I didn't know that the passengers of the vehicle were to be injected or that the vehicle was going to be blown up. I was only informed about this later.

MS LOCKHAT: So you knew that they were going to be eliminated but you didn't know how and you didn't bother to ask either.

MR CRAUSE: No, I didn't.

MS LOCKHAT: So you were party to this although you didn't know how the people were going to be eliminated?

MR CRAUSE: I was satisfied that they were going to be eliminated. It didn't matter what the method of elimination would be.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, were you the only person from your branch that participated in this incident?

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MS LOCKHAT: You didn't include other people in this mission?

MR CRAUSE: No, not at all, it was only me and my commander, Brigadier Loots.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson, I don't have any questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DEN BERG

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Has this evidence cleared up the difficulty that you were putting for the previous witnesses about the fact that the dependants of the deceased not being able to find the area being described as it was, because of the levelling and the development of the road in that area?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I'm instructed that a policeman was on the scene some time after the incident took place, a policeman who is stationed at Madikwe. I've been given a contact telephone number and I will attempt to contact him to take the matter further as far as that's concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, doesn't know just now how long after the incident this road or this area was looked at or examined by these dependants.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That's correct. Certainly when they went out there it was after the applications of Brigadier Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh well.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Which is quite some time after the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, some years. Thank you very much.

There's no point in asking you whether you want to re-examine the man, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you. May he be excused, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly he's excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MS LOCKHAT: Mr Chairman, it is now 1 o'clock or no, one minute past one. I don't think I'll be able to finish Mr Loots before 1 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Gentlemen, can we - ladies and gentlemen, can we resume at a quarter to two? We will adjourn

now and resume at a quarter to two. Thank you very much.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS