ON RESUMPTION
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we'll commence with General Steyn's evidence.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, we are sorry that you have no clothing to discard because of the heat but we didn't ask you formally but would you mind if we did not sit with jackets before you?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes I do mind if you remove your jacket because that would entail my having the only clothing which I have on my body.
MR VISSER: Which is your dress.
JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, with your leave, just before I lead the evidence of General Steyn, may I refer you to volume 2G, page 875 and let me introduce the reference to you by saying the following. It appeared to us during your questioning of Mr Crause that you might be under the impression that Venter stated that the decision to eliminate rather than to arrest was taken in the presence of General Steyn, that at this page Venter deals with that issue, he starts at the third line on page 875 by saying
"Yes, that was my evidence that myself, Captain Crause, Captain Smit and Colonel Loots who was in charge there at the roadblock, we just decided that we were to eliminate the terrorists and him as well. If I remember correctly, Loots or Crause said that they could not sacrifice the lives of the security people and therefore that all three had to be eliminated."
"No, I understand that" says Commissioner de Jager.
"But as I understand the situation from your application, you already that afternoon decided to kill him?"
"Colonel Venter: No, no, it was that evening at a roadblock where we set up a roadblock, it was only then because Colonel Steyn who was the overall commander, he was not at the roadblock but his express instructions were to arrest these people and we decided differently at the roadblock."
"Commissioner de Jager: But Colonel, if that was the decision then, it wouldn't have mattered whether he was still in the middle of or in the back of the bakkie or wherever, you would have killed him?"
"Colonel Venter: Correct."
And we submit to you, Chairperson, that it is quite clear from that passage as well as from another passage at page 871, the middle of the page, the last sentence of that paragraph:
"Colonel Venter: And at the scene the decision was made by myself, Colonel Loots, Captain Crause and Captain Smit."
That it is clear that he never intended to convey the impression, that is now Venter, that Steyn was present.
CHAIRPERSON: I concede Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
General Steyn, you are also applying for amnesty in the Silent Valley incident and that is the only case which you are applying for amnesty within this hearing of the Amnesty Committee?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You have referred once again to previous submissions and evidence which you request to be incorporated with your evidence in the evaluation of your application?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: On page 2, paragraph (e) you've also referred to evidence which you have heard or delivered in other amnesty applications so that the Committee can be aware that you have already been placed on record under oath with regard to amnesty applications and you have listed the applications there?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Your personal particulars and background and circumstances as well as your police career, do you confirm this?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: That which is relevant is that you were in the Western Transvaal until December 1983 and that from 1983 onwards up until 1986 you were in the Western Transvaal as the commander of the Western Transvaal, is that correct?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And in 1986 you went to Port Natal?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: You repeated what has already been said by various applicants with regard to the struggle, on page 5?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And you have elaborated somewhat on page 11 in order to refer the Committee Members to certain aspects in Sitchaba in order to support your submission which you continue with until page 13?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: With regard to the role played by Botswana, before 1983 you didn't really know much about it but it was within the knowledge of the security branch due to information that what you say in paragraph 29 and following, according to your opinion this is correct?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: If you could bear with me just a moment, I've received a note, Chairperson. At December 1982, at page 5 - oh, I'm sorry there's a typing error. There's a typing error, it's December 1982 to May 1986 in the third line at page 5.
MR LAX: I was just checking the date of this incident to confirm because it suddenly struck me that this was '83 and then if this wasn't corrected he wouldn't have been there.
MR VISSER: Right. It slipped my attention and I apologise for that.
And on page 19 you reiterate what the other applicants have also stated before this Committee with regard to the position within which members found themselves. We don't have to discuss the exchange of intelligence, neither do we have to discuss the political motivations, you confirm what you have said in your affidavit regarding all these aspects?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you also confirm the application form that you filled in and the information which you set up within that form insofar as it is confirmed in Exhibit H?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You pointed out in your form and I omitted to say, Chairperson, that this is in bundle 11, page 15, you have pointed out that your recollection is not of the best and that you are trying to obtain documentary information but that not much documentary information was still available in order to supplement your recollection?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And just as Mr Crause, you were able to have the benefit of the applications and evidence of others?
MR VISSER: Can we get to the Silent Valley incident, General, and if I may, let me lead you. You referred to Loots and Crause's applications on page 27, paragraph 80 and you state that when you filled in the Amnesty Application you had Colonel Venter's application before you and you suspected that his recollection could be better than yours and consequently you referred to this application with agreement. Later, in retrospect, and after having had more time to improve your recollection regarding the facts, you realised that there were certain aspects of Colonel Venter's evidence which according to you were incorrect?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you will deal with this in the course of your evidence?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: Might I then lead you further? To sketch the background to this incident as set out in paragraph 81 that during the course of the 4th May 1983 you received a telephone call from Colonel Crause during which you were informed about a planned illegal infiltration of two armed MK commanders to the R.S.A. You and Brigadier Loots, who was then a Colonel, thereupon departed for Derdepoort?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Where were you physically, in which town or city?
MR STEYN: Chairperson I was in Potchefstroom.
ADV DE JAGER: And this Derdepoort, how far away from Potchefstroom would that be, approximately?
MR STEYN: If I had to make a quick approximation, I'd say 250 kilometres, perhaps a bit more.
MR VISSER: I should perhaps have highlighted that when you at that stage were in the Western Transvaal you were the Divisional Commander?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: And then from paragraph 82 onwards, on page 28, could you please submit to the Committee what your recollection is to the best of your memory regarding what took place on that day?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, Brigadier Loots and I went to Derdepoort where we found Colonel Crause as well as Colonel Venter. Colonel Crause informed us that a suspected collaborator of the ANC had spoken to him at the border post, Andries Moatshe was his name, and that this Andries Moatshe had said that during that night two armed ANC MK commanders would infiltrate the R.S.A.
He further informed us that according to Moatshe, the two insurgents would be picked up next to the border in a red Toyota bakkie after they had climbed over the fence. It was some distance north or north east from the Derdepoort border post. These suspected collaborators or MK commanders would then be taken to a point in the vicinity of Swartklip where he would drop them off. He would then contact Colonel Crause and inform him of where he had dropped them off upon which Colonel Crause would be able to act against them.
I was not satisfied with this plan seeing as there was great danger that the insurgents would have too much time over such a distance to climb off at any point or give other instructions to the driver. It was a very risky plan to me in the sense that these persons could disappear, we could miss them and I gave the instruction that a roadblock be established with the purpose of attempting to arrest these persons.
MR VISSER: Did you yourself go to the point where the roadblock would be established?
MR STEYN: Yes I did.
MR VISSER: And what happened?
MR STEYN: At this point we used a gate that was in disuse to place it over the road as well as branches from trees and stones in order to close off that section of the road which was situated around a bend with the consequence that when the vehicle with the insurgents arrived there they would necessarily have to stop there upon which this action would be executed by our members.
MR VISSER: In order to save time and with the indulgence of the Committee, your recollection was that the persons who were there were Major Jan Truter, Lieutenant Colonel Loots, Captain Crause, Lieutenant du Preez Smit, Warrant Officer van Zyl and then Marais and that your memory has been refreshed and that you also accept now that the following people were also present and that would be - or at least this is a repetition of some names who have been mentioned such as Senior Superintendent C J du Preez Smit, but Colonel R J Venter was there, Warrant Officer Smith and D J Nieuwenhuisen, you say that is correct?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: We also know that there was a generator on the scene which was manned by the counter-insurgency unit of the South African Police. It belonged to TIN the counter-insurgency unit?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson
MR VISSER: We are now on page 30, paragraph 87, you say that the scene was selected by Lieutenant du Preez Smit, you've already indicated that there was the farm gate. If you would just proceed with paragraph 88.
MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been established and the situation had been analysed, Commissaris Jan Truter and I left Brigadier Loots at the scene in command and we took up position near the Botswana border in order to observe the infiltration.
MR VISSER: What was the objective with that?
MR STEYN: The objective was that as soon as we had observed the infiltration we would then inform Brigadier Loots and other persons on the scene that the vehicle was under way.
MR VISSER: So you would then be in radio contact with the persons on the scene?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: Before you get to paragraph 90 would you just explain to the Committee Members what exactly you did with the vehicle and what you and Truter did?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, Truter and I concealed the vehicle that we were driving in the bushes a little way away from the road and we lay in the grass near the road so that we would easily be able to observe the vehicle going past.
MR VISSER: So in other words you were not with your vehicle, you were near to the road and your vehicle was hidden in the bushes?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: How far away from where you were was the vehicle?
MR STEYN: It's difficult to say but I would say that it was approximately 30 to 40 metres.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, you saw the bakkie?
MR STEYN: Yes, we observed the bakkie and we ran to our vehicle after which we followed the bakkie and if I recall correctly we contacted either Brigadier Loots or somebody else on the scene by radio that the bakkie was under way and that we would follow this bakkie in our vehicle without the lights switched on.
MR VISSER: When you arrived upon the scene what did you find?
MR STEYN: Upon my arrival I found that all three passengers of the vehicle had been shot dead. I also established that weapons, pistols and hand grenades had been found in the bakkie.
MR VISSER: General, your evidence or your application form which runs from page 15, began on page 17 to deal with this incident and on page 18 of bundle 11, the final paragraph, you stated
"I was informed after the shooting incident that weapons had been taken to the scene because should it be necessary, these weapons would be planted on the terrorists. I did not discuss this aspect in relation to said weapons further because the terrorists were indeed armed."
Would you forgive me a moment Chairperson? Thank you Chairperson.
Now we are discussing specifically the final paragraph on page 18 and we're discussing weapons that were allegedly taken to the scene. To which information are you referring here? Who would have given this information to you or from where would you have obtained this information because you say that you were informed?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I later studied the application of Colonel Venter in which I drew the inference about the weapons.
MR VISSER: And that is what you are referring to here?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: What is your recollection today if we were to discuss not the weapons which were brought along with the infiltrators but specifically weapons which were taken by security branch members to the scene? What would be your recollection today, did you see anything there or not?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, according to my recollection, I gave the order, I did not give the order that any weapons be taken to the scene to plant on the persons. I cannot exclude the possibility that some of the members themselves may have decided to take weapons to the scene.
MR VISSER: And to plant them?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. I do indeed recall that during the incident that evening on the scene after the incident I found an AK47 on the scene.
MR VISSER: An AK47 assault rifle?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: Can you recall where you saw it?
MR STEYN: No, I can't remember precisely. I'm really not certain.
MR VISSER: General Steyn, just to explain to the Committee, Brigadier Loots will give further evidence regarding this AK47 which you have mentioned. If we can then return to the passengers of the bakkie, what can you tell the Committee regarding weapons in the bakkie itself. If you look at page 30, paragraph 90?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, upon my arrival on the scene I established that there were weapons in the vehicle of these three persons. I was informed that the two MK Commanders were armed and not the driver, Moatshe. Insofar as my application form may create another impression it is incorrect.
MR VISSER: Yes and you refer specifically to page 18, the fourth paragraph - Chairperson, of bundle 11, because there you have stated, I'll begin in the middle of the sentence
"...upon arrival on the scene I found that the three passengers who were armed with hand grenades and pistols."
You say that that is not correct?
MR STEYN: No, it's not correct.
MR VISSER: Is that how you recollected it when you signed the application form in 1996?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Venter, when was this application form signed?
MR VISSER: It's bundle 11, page 18 and if you'll ...[intervention]
MR LAX: In December 1996, sorry, to just put on record that application was signed on 16 December 1996.
MR VISSER: Yes correct, thank you Commissioner and Madame Chairperson, we're referring to the fourth paragraph where the applicant said in that application form all three of them. Well it gives the impression at least that he says all three of them had weapons on them and he's now rectified that by saying Moatshe was not armed with anything.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and that mistake occurred as a result of him having had sight of Mr Venter's evidence, is that how I understood ...[indistinct].
MR VISSER: I think he must reply to that Chairperson.
General, why do you realise today that your mark that you made in your application form is incorrect?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, is this about the ...[intervention]
MR VISSER: The three passengers who were armed instead of two who were armed.
MR STEYN: Later I was informed that the two MK members had hand grenades and pistols in their possession and I myself saw hand grenades in the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Yes, but the question is why did you say in your application form that all three had been armed while today you say that only two were armed?
MR STEYN: I was corrected later and established that not all three had been armed only the two MK commanders.
MR VISSER: But just to defend yourself, did you participate in cleaning up the scene?
MR STEYN: No.
MR VISSER: Who is the person or who are the persons who tidied up the scene?
MR STEYN: Brigadier Loots was in charge of this function along with other members.
MR VISSER: And by cleaning up we mean that the bodies were removed from the vehicle and that the scene was made safe and that there were no explosives or limpet mines which would explode or go off later?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, please assist me? The reference where he would have said that all three had weapons is where?
MR VISSER: Bundle 11, page 18. This can be found in the fourth paragraph.
MR LAX: Could I just interpose here just for one second please Mr Visser? I'm just having a difficulty with what's just been said. You see, if one reads that paragraph, it doesn't say "I was informed", he says "I found that these people were there". Now one implies his personal inspection of the actual weapons and the other one is having been told afterwards. Could you just clarify that for us please General?
MR VISSER: Yes point taken Chairperson, I tried to clarify but obviously not sufficiently.
General the point is and I will repeat this question. In terms of this which you've said in your application form you stated that you saw that the three persons had been armed with hand grenades and pistols. The question is, did you indeed and you also said later today that you saw hand grenades and pistols. Could you please just clear this up because you have also stated that you were informed, that only the two MK commanders were armed. Can you just clear this up for us?
MR STEYN: The fact of the matter is that the moment upon which I looked into the vehicle I did not see weapons with the driver Moatshe. I think that when I submitted my application by saying that the three passengers had been armed with hand grenades was an oversight on my behalf and I did not define it properly by saying that only two persons were armed and that the driver was not armed. Upon later discussion it became clear to me that I could not have seen any weapons on him because he didn't have any weapons according to all the other members who were present on the scene.
ADV DE JAGER: But when you looked into the vehicle, did you see weapons in the vehicle?
MR STEYN: Yes I saw weapons in the vehicle.
ADV DE JAGER: And the three persons were still in the vehicle?
MR STEYN: Yes.
ADV DE JAGER: Did you see where the weapons were situated in the vehicle, did you attend to that?
MR STEYN: What I could see was that hand grenades were on the laps of the two passengers, that's what I can recall.
CHAIRPERSON: But do you recall how many weapons you saw and what kind of weapons were they?
MR STEYN: At that stage as a result of the shooting incident, the three persons who were dead at that stage had fallen over one another and were lying askew in the vehicles so it was very difficult to make out which weapons belonged to who, I could only make out that they were hand grenades. The other staff members later determined precisely who owned what, I simply assumed which was actually a faulty assumption that everyone was armed. That was not correct.
CHAIRPERSON: I think it was a reasonable assumption based on the fact that you saw a vehicle, I mean you saw weapons inside the vehicles wherein three people had died, the only mistake obviously is that in having to read your application to mean that the three dead people were armed, all of them were armed, your assumption was that because there were arms in the vehicle, you simply assumed they were all armed.
MR STEYN: Entirely correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: According to your estimation, how long after the incident would you have arrived on the scene?
MR STEYN: It was very quickly. Instantaneously, within a little while, not seconds, I held back for a minute so as not to be seen.
MR VISSER: So it was a minute or two, so it was a question of minutes instead of question of hours?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: General, when you arrived upon the scene, you knew that your instructions had not been observed. Did you then talk to Loots?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And what was his explanation? We refer to page 31 paragraph 92, beginning on page 30 paragraph 91 where you said that
"The elimination of the infiltrators took place upon the command of Brigadier Loots who I left in command of the scene. When Commissioner Jan Truter and I left this order was in contradiction to my instructions."
And what was this discussion which you had with Brigadier Loots in this relation?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I spoke to Brigadier Loots and he told me that after I had left the scene he came to the conclusion that it would be too dangerous to attempt to arrest these people. The reasons which he put to me were among others that it was a known fact that MK members who had been interrogated in the past without exception emphasised the fact that infiltrating MK members were very tense and would take the maximum prevention or preparation for an assault should they be encountered or should anybody attempt to arrest them. Furthermore he said that seeing as the infiltrators were MK commanders he had accepted that they would be armed and according to him he already had that information from Colonel Crause.
MR VISSER: Yes but you also had that information, no so?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. According to Brigadier Loots should a shooting incident occur our members would have to start shooting at one another because of the way that the roadblock had been constructed and the execution of an arrest or such an attempt would probably lead to the death of injury of some of our members. Brigadier Loots also said that the place which had been selected by Du Preez Smit had been a good selection from the view that there was an existing gate which made it easy to establish a roadblock but that with regard to the aspect of shelter it had not been such a good choice. There was not sufficient shelter and this also influenced his decision and he also said that according to him that some of the members would have been exposed should a shooting incident have occurred.
MR VISSER: According to you observations it was already dark?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: It was approximately 9 o'clock in the evening?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: But according to your observations from that afternoon, what was your conclusion that you would have reached after hearing Loots' explanation?
MR STEYN: After Brigadier Loots had explained the matter to me I realised that I may not have given sufficient attention to the plan for the arrest seeing as the correctness of what he was saying immediately impressed me. I agreed with him. Chairperson, if I'd had more time to plan the strategy and to reconsider I would probably have come to the conclusion as Brigadier Loots did indeed that elimination was the only way out.
MR VISSER: Can we pause there for a moment, do I understand correctly that Moatshe spoke to Crause, Crause spoke to you and you went to the border post where you received the information from Crause and all of this took place during the course of the day of the 4th May?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: Is it correct for me to say that your departure to the place which Du Preez Smit was instructed to seek you were in radio contact with one another, you arrived upon the scene, is that correct? Or was it still light or was it dark when you arrived on the scene where the roadblock would be constructed?
MR STEYN: I think it was twilight at that stage.
MR VISSER: Late afternoon, would you describe it like that?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: But it was still light?
MR STEYN: Yes I would say that.
MR VISSER: Now when you speak of your experience of the practise of obstructing a vehicle in a roadblock, what would you be able to say to the Committee or perhaps you should first say whether or not the practising of an apprehension of a vehicle was undertaken while you were on the scene?
MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been constructed and it was already twilight because we couldn't exactly construct this roadblock in the middle of the day because the message could go through that there had been a roadblock.
MR VISSER: Where to?
MR STEYN: To Botswana.
MR VISSER: Was it your experience that such messages did indeed go through?
MR STEYN: Yes indeed.
MR VISSER: And was it important to you to keep the roadblock a secret?
MR STEYN: Yes it was important and consequently this roadblock and the practise round surround the roadblock due to the fact that this infiltration would take place in the dark also had to take place in the dark.
MR VISSER: Why, could one not practise the apprehension of the vehicle in daylight even though it would be executed at night time?
MR STEYN: Apart from the fact that if we undertook the practise run during the day, it would become general knowledge, we wanted to keep it a secret because of the situation. The operation was to take place at night and it would be incorrect for them to practise during the day for something which they were going to do at night.
MR VISSER: So in other words the circumstances were not practised under the exact circumstances under which the matter or the incident would take place?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And you have reconciled yourself with the actions of Brigadier Loots and that is why today you request amnesty. I've said that you have reconciled yourself with his order?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: That the MK commanders as well as the collaborator was to be eliminated. Tell me, what was your idea about Moatshe, the collaborator, the fact that he had also been eliminated.
MR STEYN: Chairperson, the fact that he had also been eliminated was impossible - it was impossible to launch this action and eliminate two out of three people in a vehicle and not eliminate the third person.
MR VISSER: The suspicion that these people would have been armed was then confirmed as we now know?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And the two deceased or the MK commanders were later identified and how were they identified, according to what?
MR STEYN: If I recall correctly they were identified according to fingerprints.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 97 you have further information surrounding these persons. You state that insofar as it is known MK Karl Marx initially or originally came from Soweto and that his correct surname was Ramokopa?
MR STEYN: That is the information which we had at that point.
MR VISSER: And that the third person Moatshe was a Botswanan subject and that according to your information he was responsible for the regular infiltration of ANC members?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You would probably would not know but nonetheless in paragraph 98 do you know whether Moatshe had been an informer of the security branch Western Transvaal?
MR STEYN: No, I don't know.
MR VISSER: Just to pause there because perhaps one should repeat certain things for oneself, informers during the struggle were classified as A1, A2, B, C and D, category informers, is that correct?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: How many people would for example been aware of the identity of an A or B informer?
MR STEYN: Probably only the handler and possibly depending upon the circumstances, a second handler.
MR VISSER: Was the rule that an informer's identity was known to his handler and that under certain circumstances due to practical considerations there was an alternative handler for the same informer?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: Other than this person or these two persons would any other member of the security branch ever know what the identification of an informer was?
MR STEYN: No, it was not supposed to be that way.
MR VISSER: Informers were indeed identified with numbers?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: We will hear more about that with the McKenzie matter. Now in paragraph 99 you deal with what we have already discussed, the AK47 and you also refer there that you have referred to it on page 18 of bundle 11?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you also concur with the remark of Mr Crause and Commissioner Lax that it was very clear due to evidence which we have heard before the Amnesty Committee that some of the members of the security police had Russian weapons on them just in case they could use it should circumstances require it?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: And that is why you concede that it is possible that there were such weapons and that you support your recollection of having seen an AK47?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. If there was such a conspiracy which cannot recall you ask that in either event this Amnesty Committee would grant you amnesty in that case as well as you have stated in paragraph 100?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In paragraph 101 you discuss the three passengers, with regard to the two passengers, which has been put into perspective by the Chairperson. Do you want to place that on record?
MR STEYN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And on page 18 of bundle 11 you have also stated and I refer to paragraph 102 where you refer to Moatshe who was regularly responsible for the infiltration of armed ANC members. You have said that you wish to qualify that. Would you qualify that please?
MR STEYN: I would like to state it clearly that I based my information upon information which I received from Colonel Crause. It was not my own information, not my own direct information.
MR VISSER: Yes and Madame Chairperson, please blame this on me, the ...[indistinct] words after "ontvang het, Brigadier Loots in vermoede" is clearly a mistake on my part when I tried to type this and I do apologise.
MR LAX: What was in fact intended to be said there, was that just superfluous?
MR VISSER: It wasn't supposed to be there.
CHAIRPERSON: To be there at all.
MR VISSER: I believe that what happened is that I might have either started - I think more probably I was working on different documents and I was importing from another document and I can't explain it.
ADV DE JAGER: I think it was late at night.
MR VISSER: It was in fact late at night, I can assure you about that.
CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]
MR VISSER: Yes thank you and when we come to McKenzie there's another more serious mistake, also my fault but we'll deal with that then.
You say in paragraph 103 that a post-mortem inquest was held and you have given the numbers according to the best of your recollection and that this inquest was held at Thabazimbi?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And you say that according to your recollection the Magistrate's finding was that the death of the victims was due to gunshot wounds but that nobody could be held directly accountable for their deaths. Did you exercise any influence or control over that inquest?
MR STEYN: I merely saw to it that Brigadier Loots would handle the matter.
MR VISSER: Your knowledge is that the body of Moatshe as well as the red Toyota vehicle was handed over, what happened to it?
MR STEYN: Apart from the fact that the bodies had been handed over at an earlier stage, the bakkie was handed over to the Botswana authorities later.
MR VISSER: You said to the next-of-kin or to the Botswana authorities.
MR STEYN: I can't recall exactly, it was one of the two.
MR VISSER: Were you personally present or is this the recollection of the event?
MR STEYN: No, I was not present, I simply heard later that this is what was done.
MR VISSER: You attempted to obtain documentation from the inquest?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And you were informed that it was no longer in existence?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: It had been destroyed?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you then confirm the evidence which you have given here today as well as the other evidence which you have confirmed in Exhibit H?
MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you through with your examination in chief Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR LAX: Sorry Mr Visser, just to interpose here, there was something I wasn't clear on that's just been said and I thought while the issue is still warm I could just follow it up?
MR VISSER: Yes certainly.
MR LAX: Did I hear correctly that the bodies of these deceased were handed over to the next-of-kin?
MR VISSER: No, no, only Moatshe. Only Moatshe.
MR LAX: That's what was worrying me. What happened to the bodies of the two MK cadres, does anyone know?
MR VISSER: Could you say General?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not sure, I doubt if they were handed over to the family members. I have a vague memory that they were buried as paupers, I think I am correct.
MR LAX: One last aspect in that regard was you mention that the person who was known as Karl Marx was later identified as Ramakoba, what about the person known as Kruschev?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall what was his identification, I can really not recall.
MR LAX: But you did that you said through fingerprints and so on? That information might still be available somewhere in the central register.
MR STEYN: It's possible Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: But as a Botswana citizen, would we have the fingerprints?
MR VISSER: No, I think Ramakoba was a South African citizen and the other one also was a South African citizen, that is the evidence of all the applicants. Only one person was a Botswanan and that is Mr Moatshe whose body was handed to the Botswana Government and presumably to his family.
MR STEYN: That is correct. It's only Moatshe that was a resident of Botswana.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you have no information about the address having been established of the families of Mr Ramakoba, do you know whether that information surfaced during the inquest hearing?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly one of them and I think it was Ramakoba, was originally from Soweto.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the whereabouts, the exact address, were families of Mr Ramakoba ever contacted, did they form part of the inquest hearing?
MR STEYN: Normally it would happen so, Chairperson, but what I would like to say is that later I discovered or by someone maybe Brigadier Loots, that one of their parents had been in Soweto and I suspect it was Ramakoba's parents.
CHAIRPERSON: At what stage did you - do you know when the inquest might have taken place, was it immediately after the incident, we know when the incident occurred?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall and I think if I have to make an estimation, it was not close soon thereafter. I would not say that it was a week or a month or two months later but it was not immediately within a few days or a week.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and the identity of Karl Marx was made available to those who were investigating this matter?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So there is a great possibility that the families were present at the inquest hearing?
MR STEYN: I'm not sure Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We are just trying to establish this information because procedurally this is the information that we should have established before we come to this level. Maybe Ms Lockhat will be in a position to throw more light on this aspect?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, in fact, in fact this information already appears from the application form itself at page 19.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware, yes, at page 19, that's why I think Ms Lockhat will be in a position to throw more light on this information because applications coming before us should be properly investigated by our investigative unit and all such information should be placed before the Committee when hearing applications of this nature particularly where on issues of reconciliation it is important to make sure that the victims are informed of an application of this nature, there has been no indication to this Committee that the victims were informed. There has been no indication to the Committee whether any attempts were made to establish the whereabouts of the victims. That is the procedure but we merely wanted your assistance served because we might be in a better position than us to give us this kind of information.
MR STEYN: Chairperson, I do not wish to speak on behalf of Brigadier Loots but I have a vague suspicion that Brigadier Loots might have had contact with at least one of the family members if I recall correctly. I'm not sure of the second one. I'm not sure of the facts but I have a strong suspicion that he did indeed have contact with one of the family members, I think it's Ramakoba but let me say rather it is the person who originated from Soweto.
ADV DE JAGER: General Steyn, he is seated behind you and he indicates that he agrees with you that he contacted one of the members. I'm just saying this because you did not see him and it is not on the record.
MR STEYN: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may just add on this score that we would like to be of more assistance but we live in a new era and yesterday was another country and nowadays ex-policemen don't have the access any more which they had before and unfortunately doors are closed in their faces when they started asking information.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: It's a sad reality but we are bound by that.
CHAIRPERSON: But they still have information that could still assist us.
MR VISSER: Yes and whatever information obviously we give you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. Ms Lockhat?
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, in relation to the tracing of the victims I believe our investigative unit was in possession of all this information and they attempted to investigate and attempted to locate the victims. When I received the matter we also wrote to the ANC desk to find out whether, seeing that we have their names, their MK names, that they could probably trace them accordingly and unfortunately we still haven't received any response relating to that, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Has there been any kind of investigation with regard to whether an inquest was held in respect of this killing?
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I believe they could not trace the inquest reports relating to this incident, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you in fact aware that such an inquest was held?
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, reading the documents I saw that they referred, the applicants did refer to an inquest if my memory serves me correctly but whether this has been investigated previously, there were no - because we received these matters from the investigative unit for a hearing so I would assume that they could not trace the necessary documentation, Chairperson. I have also enquired from my investigative unit for all the information in relation to this matter and their response was that this is what we have before us and there are no reports in their possession.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I wonder if I may be allowed to refer you to something else right now because it is relevant to the investigation or to the enquiries you're making. If you look at Exhibit C that is the affidavit of Loots and if you turn to the end of that exhibit, you will find an extract of Dorm, it's at page 25 I see here, well, it's marked F24 it's obviously from another exhibit but the point I'm trying to make is at F26 you will see two photographs of two people under the caption "These Two were Tigers". The one is referred to as Solomon Nlonzi and the other is referred to as Calvin Kakaza. This is information which was not available to Ms Lockhat and they say here that Calvin - a little down that page - that Calvin, and they mention his "MK name, Karl Marx, Kakaza" So we know Karl Marx according to this news report was in fact Calvin Kakaza. Now it really confuses the issue because it does not accord with what General Steyn has told you.
CHAIRPERSON: No, it is, it's correct.
MR LAX: It's confirmed further down, the next sentence.
CHAIRPERSON: It's confirmed, the second paragraph says both of them were simple young patriots of humble stock, Schoeman's query Ramakoba as the real name of Karl Marx. One definitely would have expected our investigative unit to have at least have made proper investigation, went to Miyabuwa Centre, caroused the records, because the applications had referred to reports of these deaths having appeared in Sitchaba and the Miyabuwa Centre we know is the library of Sitchaba and other related publications of the ANC. So I'm more than startled and extremely disappointed that no such investigations were conducted from the side of the investigative unit. It is very upsetting to have a hearing of this nature where no attempts have been made to advise these victims and in this case the relatives of the deceased of an application of this nature.
MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson. What I would do is I'll give all this information to our investigative unit, Chairperson, and see whether we could trace on these new leads that we've got in relation to this article as well.
CHAIRPERSON: These are not new leads Ms Lockhat, this is information that our Committee had as at December 1996 and up to now no investigations whatsoever have been conducted in a matter which involves the elimination of persons whose relatives would definitely have an interest in the proceedings. We are now proceeding with these applications without having made an effort at establishing the whereabouts of the relatives. This definitely to me does not advance reconciliation, it is insensitive and should not be tolerated. I hope such matters will be taken into consideration when applications of this nature are set down for a hearing.
MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put to General Steyn?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: General Steyn, you said that you planned the operation with Loots and the others and that basically these operatives were supposed to be arrested?
MR STEYN: That is correct.
MS LOCKHAT: You say you were in radio contact with Loots once you went to the border post, is that correct?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS LOCKHAT: Did you expect Loots to contact you after this huge and drastic change in plan?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, in my evidence in chief I had said that our vehicle was quite a distance from where we were, about 50 metres where Truter and I were concealed in the grass next to the road. I believe that he could have contacted us but the question that I cannot answer to myself today was if our radio was at such a volume that I would have heard him at that stage because time was a problem for us, we expected that those people would pass us at any point in time and therefore we focused our attention at the road so as not to miss this vehicle.
MS LOCKHAT: But surely, General, this was such a major operation, surely you would have been in radio contact and had the volume of your radio on at all times?
MR STEYN: That's possible, Chairperson, I believe that it was on.
MS LOCKHAT: So you're saying it's possible that they attempted to contact you? What are you saying, General?
MR STEYN: Repeat the question please?
MS LOCKHAT: Are you saying that it's possible that Loots had attempted to contact you or what?
MR STEYN: No, I'm not saying it's possible, I am saying that he could have contacted me but I doubt if he did contact me.
MS LOCKAT: Did he expect him to contact you, General?
MR STEYN: No.
MS LOCKAT: So here was a huge change in plan, they were supposed to just arrest these people but in the end they decided to eliminate them. You expect them not to inform you of this? I don't understand that.
MR STEYN: I understand that but in the light of his decision after I left the scene and the reasons advanced by him were acceptable to me that he did not contact me.
CHAIRPERSON: The question is why in your opinion did he not contact you to advise you of the change of plan and of particularly to advise you that he has decided not to go along with your decision.
MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I understand correctly I would like to answer in the following that Loots' decision, he decided that it was the correct decision and he did not deem it necessary to contact me to tell me that he was changing the plan.
MS LOCKAT: Did you think that his decision was the right decision at the end of the day?
MR STEYN: I think so Chairperson, definitely.
MS LOCKAT: General, you said you were following the car, the bakkie, you were at close range just behind the bakkie in a sense with your lights switched off, is that correct?
MR STEYN: That is correct, we drove without lights, how close to the bakkie I could not say, it was within close range but just so that they would not notice us easily.
MS LOCKAT: Were Loots and the others aware of the fact that you were behind these operatives, behind the bakkie?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS LOCKAT: Surely they should have also taken into account that it was possible that seeing that your lights were off that shooting at this bakkie would actually possibly shoot at you as well if you were at close - well behind the bakkie?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS LOCKAT: So don't you think that at the end of the day it was actually a wrong decision by Captain Loots and ...[indistinct], that he could have shot at you?
MR STEYN: No Chairperson, when we got close to the scene, we held back a little so that they would not shoot at us or rather that we would not be hit if a fight ensued.
MS LOCKAT: Were you aware of the fact that these operatives stopped at the roadblock, they did not open fire?
MR STEYN: I was informed when I arrived at the scene.
MS LOCKAT: Did you expect Captain Loots and the others not to fire or shoot because of this factor and then just attempt to rather arrest them?
MR STEYN: Please repeat, I could not hear.
MS LOCKAT: Were you aware that the operatives stopped at the roadblock, they did not open fire but yet Loots and the others opened fire and eliminated them?
MR STEYN: I was informed at the scene that the vehicle had come to a stop and they did not fire from the vehicle, they did not have a choice, there was a roadblock, they had to stop and that members under the command of Loots did indeed fire at them.
MS LOCKAT: Don't you think that the best thing in this position in your mind ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] before proceeding to put another question.
MS LOCKAT: In your mind, General, don't you think it would have been proper that once they stopped at the roadblock they did not open fire, that Loots and other actually would have made the right choice to actually arrest these people?
MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I understand correctly when I arrived at the scene, it was decided that when the vehicle would stop they would start shooting, in other words there would be no time to execute an arrest and in the light of the fact that those persons could throw a hand grenade at them or start shooting first.
CHAIRPERSON: Isn't what is being put to General Steyn inviting pure speculation on your part?
MS LOCKAT: Thank you, Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: General Steyn, it would seem that when one wants to steal my vehicle, a hijacker, and he comes with a revolver to me and the argument is if do I have to wait before he shoots?
MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: Do you think that I will have a chance to shoot him or would they bury me?
MR STEYN: I think they would bury you.
CHAIRPERSON: In any event a decision had been taken to eliminate or whether they shoot or they don't shoot, if they had an opportunity to shoot them or wouldn't have had an opportunity to shoot is really academic. The decision was very specific to shoot, not because of anything but to shoot because insurgents were in the car, whether they were armed or whether they were going to shoot first was really not a material issue?
MR STEYN: Correct Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I'm sorry, I wasn't here this morning when proceedings started. I represent Colonel Venter's interest in the proceedings and I also represent one of the applicants, Mr Smith. Is it possible that I may address one question to General Steyn please?
CHAIRPERSON: You will do so once Ms Lockhat is through Mr Du Plessis.
MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, I thought she was finished, I'm sorry.
CHAIRPERSON: No, we simply interjected just to clear one or two issues because of the way she was putting questions to General Steyn.
MS LOCKAT: Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKAT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, I think you are a prophet.
MR DU PLESSIS: I think I know Ms Lockhat well, Chairperson. Chairperson, I only have one question.
General, I was not here when Mr Crause gave evidence but I was informed that he testified that Colonel Venter was under the impression that Moatshe was an informant and that would seem a wrong assumption now. Would you agree with that evidence that it is possible that Colonel Venter was under the wrong impression with regards to Moatshe?
MR STEYN: I do not recall Colonel Crause’s evidence exactly with that aspect but I would agree with such an idea that Colonel Venter was under the impression that the person was an informant.
MR DU PLESSIS: But you say it's possible?
MR STEYN: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis.
General Steyn you are excused.
MR STEYN: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any - well I have one question in re-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't asked you Mr Visser whether you should re-examine?
MR VISSER: Just one Chairperson, I think which might be relevant.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it a question flowing from questions put to General Steyn?
MR VISSER: Yes, about the distance that they followed the car in front of them.
CHAIRPERSON: You may re-examine.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Was it a tarred road or a gravel road?
MR STEYN: It was a gravel road.
MR VISSER: Was it wet or dry?
MR STEYN: It was dry and there was dust.
CHAIRPERSON: Was this a public road if it was gravel? Was this a public road which was used frequently by people who were coming to Botswana or going to South Africa?
MR STEYN: Correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, is it convenient for you to take the adjournment now?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser, I think it's convenient to take a lunch adjournment. I don't think it would be proper to start with an applicant who might be interrupted after about five, ten minutes, to enable the public definitely not the Committee, it can do without lunch and counsel to break for lunch. So we will afford counsel an opportunity to break for lunch, particularly the applicants. We will take an adjournment for an hour.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
WITNESS EXCUSED
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
