MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we call on the next amnesty applicant, Mr W J Loots.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, thank you. I believe it's my turn now. We're going to call Brigadier Loots. He's ready to take the oath.
ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?
WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)
MR VISSER: Chairperson, relevant documentation to the evidence of the three witnesses which will follow are contained in the amnesty decisions in bundle 1. You will find the relevant incident dealt with in the Cronje amnesty decision at page 19. We will refer briefly also to volume 2(h). We will also refer you to bundle 10, page 122 and following, where the application itself, the original application is bound into your bundles. And we will lastly and most importantly refer you to Exhibit C, which was the affidavit handed up by Brigadier Loots at the inception of the hearings. The McKenzie incident you will find at page 38, Chairperson, and I intend to go straight to page 38, with your leave.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you just allow us a few seconds to locate our Exhibit C?
MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. Exhibit C is the one. I will not refer at this stage to bundle 1, so that one you may as well ignore for the moment. So bundle 10, bundle 2(h) and Exhibit C are the ones that we will refer to.
CHAIRPERSON: We have no problem with bundle 1, we seem to know it by heart by now.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: We would like to have bundle 3, I'm sorry, Exhibit C.
MR VISSER: Exhibit C, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Whilst we are still locating Exhibit C, you've made reference to bundle 2(h), can you give us an indication which pages you will be referring to?
MR VISSER: The page numbers are as marked in hand manuscript from page 1 to page 11 and page 161 to page 169. Those are the ones that are relevant. I'm not necessarily going to refer to all of them.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Whilst attempts are being made to locate our exhibits you may proceed.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I don't think I will be able to find mine, I think it's at home. I see that there's a new person next to you, won't he be able to give us a copy?
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Visser.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Brigadier Loots, you have already appeared in these hearings cycles, if I may refer to hearings, this amnesty application cycles, and you handed in Exhibit C, and you incorporate that into your evidence, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Could you directly go to the McKenzie incident on page 38 of that specific bundle.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: That is an incident where there was an explosion on the 9th of April 1987 in Gaberone, Botswana, and you in paragraph 115 you then give an indication of your knowledge and your involvement in this incident, could you just read that?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I remember that at approximately the end of March, beginning of April '87, received information from Lieutenant Momberg, he was a Lieutenant at that stage, that Lester Dumakude or Lekote Pule - it wasn't quite clear which one of the two, made an appointment with a source to meet him during the Easter weekend in Botswana.
MR VISSER: You refer here to the source as the person that you referred to in the previous paragraph, that is the source from the Northern Transvaal.
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: So he was only known to you by means of what?
BRIG LOOTS: That was MT395, the registered number.
MR VISSER: You didn't know him, you also didn't know his identity?
BRIG LOOTS: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: I remember that I was in telephonic contact with Brigadier Cronje, a meeting was then held in the Broederstroom area. The people present were Brigadier Cronje, myself, Commandant Charl Naude of Special Forces and as far as I can remember ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Well we know that Mr Goosen and Mr Momberg were present and we also know that Mr Hechter was present. So we are now aware of what the Committee has heard, that that was the situation.
BRIG LOOTS: Thank you, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Now you say that you can't remember whether Crause was present. Now if his evidence is that he was not present, then would you contest that?
BRIG LOOTS: No, I would accept that as correct.
MR VISSER: Perhaps we should just get a bit of background information before we get to what happened at the meeting. Now you heard when I asked questions during cross-examination to Mr Momberg concerning the status and position and the activities of Johannes Mnisi, is it correct?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you agree with the statements that I put to Mr Momberg with regard to the importance of Mr Mnisi?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR VISSER: Now after the Church Street bomb, what was the situation if one refers to target priorities regarding Johannes Mnisi?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I can explain it in this way. I personally had to attend the Church Street bomb and I can give you the assurance that every member of the Security Branch at that stage was involved with investigations, that it was our aim to get the people who were responsible for this act by either arresting them or to eliminate them.
MR VISSER: Would it then be correct to say that there was then out of necessity discussions between you and Cronje before March '87, concerning actions against Mnisi?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. As Lieutenant Momberg informed the Committee, the source visited Botswana 23 times and that there also there are registers of his entering and exiting, so he visited Botswana on 23 occasions.
MR VISSER: Now if we get to the meeting, what happened at the meeting? - that's in paragraph 116, page 39.
BRIG LOOTS: At the meeting I was informed by Brigadier Cronje that weapons, ammunition, explosives, limpet mines, would be hidden in a false compartment which would then be, that was in McKenzie's vehicle.
MR VISSER: Was that the first time that you heard of this hidden compartment?
BRIG LOOTS: No, I was aware of it before that. As Colonel Momberg had testified, on six, seven occasions he brought in weapons with this vehicle.
MR VISSER: Continue to page 117.
BRIG LOOTS: The issue of the telephone call from Dumakude or Pule and the meeting with McKenzie in Botswana was discussed at the meeting and McKenzie would then book into a hotel of his own choice and then his vehicle would then, as in the past, be taken by MK members from him and they would then load the weapons and the vehicle would then be given back to McKenzie.
MR VISSER: Is that what was said to you, that is the modus operandi, that is the way in which the source gets the weapons or loads the weapons?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR VISSER: Now whilst we're at the telephone conversation, was there also anything mentioned of the tape recording?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR VISSER: Could you perhaps just tell the Committee.
BRIG LOOTS: I arranged with Brigadier Cronje to get us a copy of that specific part. During my discussions with Botswana, we at a later stage also offered them this tape. I can just mention that this tape was after amnesty was under discussion. The file with the tape was handed to Brigadier Jack Cronje. I discussed this with his legal representatives and for some reason this ...(end of side A of tape)
... where they were to meet was at Wade Adams in the industrial area.
MR VISSER: Now what was the inference that you had made from the discussion on the tape, what would McKenzie do in Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: It was quite clear that his visit was seen a very serious light by MK, or let me put it in this way, they requested him to go there that weekend because they urgently wanted to see him.
MR VISSER: What did you infer?
BRIG LOOTS: I accepted that once again as in the past it would be a case that weapons would be taken into the country.
MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 119.
BRIG LOOTS
"The opportunity was then seen by Brigadier Cronje and I want to add also by myself, to kill Dumakude and/or Pule. As Goosen and Momberg mention in their application, the name of Johannes Mnisi was also mentioned as a person who could also perhaps be killed in this way. I want to add that it was my view that the idea was to also get to any other ANC supporter by killing them by exploding the kombi."
MR VISSER: So the idea was or the targets as I understand it, they were the mentioned by Momberg and Goosen, but as Mr Goosen also said that where they load the weapons if other people who also had something to do with the smuggling of the weapons, that that would not have deterred you to also eliminate them?
BRIG LOOTS: No, definitely not.
MR VISSER: And what was the planning as explain to you on how it would take place? - paragraph 120.
BRIG LOOTS: The planning was that Commandant Charl Naude would arrange that a bomb would be built into the false compartment that had already been built into the ANC Special Forces.
MR VISSER: How do you know that?
BRIG LOOTS: I got to know that by means of discussions with Brigadier Cronje and also Momberg and the ...(indistinct) that was after the source came back and after they had taken the weapons from the compartment. I just want to put it quite clearly here, Chairperson, I also referred to a light sensitive switch.
Now I just want to put it quite clearly that after the vehicle left on that day for Botswana and the vehicle did not arrive at Wade Adams, the vehicle just went missing, I asked Charl Naude, he was on the scene, what had happened and he then enquired from the person who prepared the bomb, that was Colonel Hekkie van Heerden, the late Hekkie van Heerden, I learnt that he passed away a year ago in an aeroplane crash in Angola, and he then ascertained that besides the light sensitive switch, the remote control also had a light sensitive switch.
MR VISSER: In any case at the first meeting it was conceded by the other witnesses, that the light sensitive switch was not discussed. We'll return to that. But in your application you refer to a light sensitive switch.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR VISSER: And where it does not tally with the evidence that you have just given, that would not then be a correct version?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. I just want to put it into perspective. When I discussed this with van der Merwe, a light sensitive switch was not the case.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you will allow me on a personal note, I gave you warning earlier last week that there was a more serious mistake that I made with the papers, with Exhibit C, and we've now come to it. It's paragraph 121, it appears to have slipped in into a place where it shouldn't be. It should follow paragraph 99 in the Nietverdiendt matter. And I do apologise, I accept full responsibility. If you read it you will immediately see that it's out of place here and that it follows perfectly after paragraph 99. So if you would perhaps just strike it out here and read it in after paragraph 99.
CHAIRPERSON: So paragraph 121 is struck out.
MR VISSER: And it becomes 99(a).
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, for purposes of these proceedings we simply strike out.
MR VISSER: Thank you, thank you, Chairperson, but you will remember when you read the Nietverdiendt, when you consider the Nietverdiendt application. Thank you, Chairperson.
Then we turn the page, it should then start with:
"I welcomed the operation chairperson and the activities of Johannes Mnisi, Lester Dumakude, Lekota Pule that was a point of worry for us, also of danger, not only for the Western Transvaal, but also for other parts of the country."
And that is contained in the document that I handed in. I don't know what the exhibit number is.
MR VISSER: That was bundle 2(j). We have already dealt with that.
BRIG LOOTS: And there was documentary evidence of explosives provided to people in Durban where it had been used.
MR VISSER: And then you also refer, as the other witnesses, to the activities of Johannes Mnisi and the second part of 122, you also confirm that?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I do. He was responsible for many acts of terror in the RSA.
MR VISSER: Yes, you have confirmed. Brigadier, you agree that the planning was that an operative of Special Forces would activate the bomb in Botswana after the ANC had taken the kombi from McKenzie. That is how you understood it?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely, I want to emphasis it was after the kombi as in the past.
MR VISSER: Now at that point - well let's refer to the first meeting, did you realise that there was a possibility that things could go awry and that innocent people could be injured or be killed as a result of the operation?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, unfortunately that is the case, it's one of those incidents where you really don't have full control.
MR VISSER: But you still then reconciled yourself with it to get to the target and your main objective and that is to eliminate these people?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: In paragraph 124, if you can just continue. Perhaps I just have to ask you this, there was evidence of the other witnesses that at a meeting that they describe as the first meeting, that the planning was that McKenzie had to be blown up with the kombi and that they weren't satisfied with it. Can you recollect such a discussion that they left the meeting?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I really tried to search my memory, I can't remember but what I want to say to the Committee is that it is correct as Lieutenant Momberg and Goosen had testified that they and Brigadier Cronje had left. Personally I stayed over with Charl Naude the next morning before I went to the safe place which I referred to where we stayed that was at Lanseria, not far from Pretoria.
And the next morning I went to Brigadier Cronje to his office that was in Pretorius Street. I enjoyed a cup of coffee with him and I ceded to his request to get the necessary permission from General van der Merwe.
MR VISSER: Yes, that is where we are at 124?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is 124.
BRIG LOOTS: What I want to assure the Commission of is, I cannot remember that McKenzie, he did very good work for us in this country, that he would have part of a plan where he would have become a victim.
MR VISSER: Now that is also the evidence of the other witnesses. Nevertheless, how did it occur that you talked to General van der Merwe?
BRIG LOOTS: Western Transvaal, because of its geographic position was responsible for the co-ordinating of MK and APLA activities in Botswana and also infiltrations from Botswana and for that reason Brigadier Cronje, perhaps I had better knowledge of the geographic area of Wade Adams and so forth, we visited Botswana regularly, he then asked me to represent him and to present it to General van der Merwe, which I did.
MR VISSER: And paragraph 125, you continue where you say that you had an appointment with General van der Merwe, you saw him in his office and you informed him of the project. Paragraph 126, could you continue.
BRIG LOOTS
"General van der Merwe asked me whether that was the source which had brought, or who had brought so many weapons from Botswana. I confirmed. And the fact that the target would be Dumakude and/or Pule, that was discussed and it was quite possible that the name of Johannes Mnisi could also have been mentioned as a target. I explained that the way in which I understood the operation was that members of the Security Branch would handle the informer, that is Northern Transvaal, and all possible information would be made available to Special Forces. The operation in Botswana would be under the control of Special Forces and Special Forces alone."
MR VISSER: We also just have to add that a part of your contribution was monitoring of the vehicle from Pretoria up to Botswana, that is McKenzie's vehicle.
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. Lieutenant Momberg and Sergeant Goosen assisted in that regard up to Kopfontein gate.
MR VISSER: But besides that you had no direct involvement in this operation, or contribution, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: I was there with Commandant Crause because at that stage because of infiltration of weapons on large scale we had quite a number of dogs, explosives dogs and we then saw the unit whose function it was to search those vehicles. We then saw to it that that vehicle would not be searched.
MR VISSER: Now that was the sum total of your activity.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.
ADV DE JAGER: What is the reason, why didn't you act in a foreign country for example, Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: Now the Police Force did not have the jurisdiction to at across the border.
ADV DE JAGER: Whose task was that?
BRIG LOOTS: That was the Defence Force.
MR VISSER: And that would obviously include Special Forces?
BRIG LOOTS: Special Forces, specifically Special Forces.
MR VISSER: We are now still with the discussions between you and General van der Merwe, did he enquire about the possibility regarding danger for civilians?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, he did. I told him that we foresee a slight possibility because as I understood it, Dumakude's instruction was very specific: meet me at Wade Adams - that's according to the tape, there I take you to a hotel of your choice, the vehicle is then removed. It was not discussed in detail, but the modus operandi was of such a nature that we accepted or assumed that the vehicle would removed for the loading of weapons.
MR VISSER: General van der Merwe then gave the approval within the limitations of what you had told him what your involvement would be in the operation.
BRIG LOOTS: I could perhaps just put it that General van der Merwe gave approval that we could continue with the operation understanding that the Defence Force would handle things in Botswana and that all possible preparations should be made that people lives would not lost.
MR VISSER: That is people other than MK members.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, people other than MK members. I also informed Brigadier Cronje about this.
MR VISSER: After that there was a second meeting.
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In your application you only refer to one, that's on page 122, that's only one meeting. Now this is the second meeting that you refer to, why didn't you initially when you completed the application, why didn't you refer to this first meeting?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, as I've said in my application that was some time ago and after these amnesty applications, when the whole process got started we once again talked to other people, our memories were refreshed and in a such a way I then remembered that a person such as Colonel Crause was definitely not present at the safe place. Crause was in Rustenburg and I then called him from there for the second meeting.
MR VISSER: You also refreshed your memory by using the evidence of Momberg and Goosen and you also agree that their exposition regarding the meetings are correct.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I agree.
MR VISSER: With the exception of course as we have said, that you can't remember the issue of McKenzie in the explosion.
In paragraph 130 you get to the point where the second meeting took place, you say who were present. It's in your statement. And what you also say on page 43 is that McKenzie was later brought in and introduced to Colonel Crause and myself. Now the evidence of Mr Momberg was that he stood at a distance under the pretext that he would get some cold drink, how do you remember it?
BRIG LOOTS: We personally met Mr McKenzie there and we had a general discussion with him.
MR VISSER: Paragraph 131, please continue.
BRIG LOOTS
"McKenzie explained to us that usually he, that he smuggled into the RSA, that he usually received it from Mnisi and/or Dumakude and/or Pule in Botswana. Before McKenzie was taken away he was informed by Brigadier Cronje that a tracking device would be attached to his vehicle, or had to be attached so that his vehicle could be followed at a safe distance in Gaberone and McKenzie did not have any problems with that."
MR VISSER: We know that McKenzie was not informed that there was a bomb in his vehicle, you have no reason to contest that?
BRIG LOOTS: No.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 133 you then say what you observed.
BRIG LOOTS
"McKenzie and a woman, a coloured women then ..."
MR VISSER: That is the Saturday of the Easter weekend of '87?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.
"They then left via Kopfontein to Botswana. Colonel Crause and myself monitored them and Momberg and Goosen were also present.
MR VISSER: And you also told us about the dogs and that you made sure that the vehicle was not searched for explosives. And that was all that you had to do with this project?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: In bundle 2(h), Brigadier Jack Cronje testified, on page 3 - page 3 of bundle 2(h), Chairperson. I have it approximately two thirds down the page. Brigadier Cronje said
"Loots knew McKenzie."
If I can just stop there. If that then means that you had known McKenzie before the Easter weekend of '87, what would you reaction be?
BRIG LOOTS: This statement is not correct. I met McKenzie there for the first and the last time.
MR VISSER: And the sentence continues, and I add
"And Loots suggested to me that McKenzie must be sent through with a vehicle."
Would that be correct?
BRIG LOOTS: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: The idea was, as your evidence is, that everything there was discussed at the meeting?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.
MR VISSER: On page 4, once again two thirds down the page, Brigadier Cronje then gave an exposition, very short, of what had happened and although the order isn't perhaps as it should be, do you in principle agree with what has been said there? You have already read the paragraph, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: Is it at the top?
MR VISSER
"BRIGADIER CRONJE: I had talks with Brigadier Loots as well as with Commandant Charl Naude, Special Forces, to plan the operation."
That's correct, not so?
CHAIRPERSON: That's line 20?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, that is correct.
MR VISSER
"Charl Naude told us that he had agents in Botswana and that he would arrange for one of those agents to pass on the information when Mnisi was in the vehicle and McKenzie not being in the vehicle at the time, so that the bomb could be activated by means of remote control."
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER
"What happened there was that McKenzie booked into a motel on the outskirts of Gaberone and one of these (and it should read Pule: P-U-L-E) or Demakude (should read D-U-M-A-K-U-D-E) and Dumakude or Mnisi would have fetched the kombi from him, inserted the explosive and handed it back to McKenzie."
Well that should probably be: "inserted the weapons or whatever and handed it back to McKenzie." Do you agree in principle?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I agree.
MR VISSER: If we can then go to page 7, second paragraph. Brigadier Cronje on a question of my learned friend, Mr du Plessis
"Brigadier, could we stop there for a moment before we continue. Was there any report back to you about this operation?"
BRIG CRONJE: No, the operation was actually Brigadier Loots' affair and I just assisted in the whole operation."
What is your comment?
BRIG LOOTS: I would interpret it as if that would have been a combined operation, joint operation between Western Transvaal and Northern Transvaal.
MR VISSER: As it is stated there in the evidence you don't agree?
BRIG LOOTS: No.
MR VISSER: And then on page 165, that's 2(h) ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed to that, Mr Visser, if I may interpose. What does he say to what is contained also in relation to what you've just put to him about paragraph 7, which appears on page 3, line 10, from 10 until about line 17?
MR VISSER: Yes, Wikus Loots, the Head of the Security - that passage?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Perhaps I should read that as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Won't you just put it to him because I think it's tied to what you've just put to him.
MR VISSER: Yes, thank you for reminding me, Chairperson. Let me do that.
On page 3, bundle 2(h), it is indicated here that that is the evidence of Brigadier Cronje:
"Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Head of the Security Branch in Western Transvaal approached me about this matter. He told me that must be the elimination."
Now what happened here, Chairperson, and my learned friend can stop me, but apparently the word "neutralising" was used in the, apparently, in the original application form and he was interjection by saying it should read "elimination".
"And this was discussed with General van der Merwe and he received instructions to continue."
The only point here is the first sentence:
"Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Head of Security Branch in Western Transvaal approached me about this matter. He told me that Mnisi (and I'm reading my own words into it) had to be eliminated."
You have already testified this afternoon that discussions between you and Brigadier Cronje did take place.
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: In light of that, what Brigadier Cronje says here, is that possible?
BRIG LOOTS: That's possible, but not with regard to this specific operation, neither with regard to what he is saying about General van der Merwe here. I only spoke to him at a later stage.
MR VISSER: So are you saying now that if this is a general statement you agree with this?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: Bear with me a moment, Chairperson. It's just been pointed out to me that the same statement is made also at page 2, line 24 and 25, Chairperson. That is all I wish to refer you to in bundle 2(h).
In your evidence, and I think you have already said this, that you regard this as a joint operation?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: So it would be incorrect then if a suggestion was to made that this was your personal matter, that you were in operation of this matter and not Brigadier Cronje, would you agree with that? If a suggestion was to be made that you were the one who initiated this operation, that suggestion would be incorrect.
MR VISSER: May I rephrase your question?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, about initiating the operation.
MR VISSER: If the intention of the evidence of Brigadier Cronje is to allege that this whole operation was thought out by you and planned and executed by you, what do you have to say about that?
BRIG LOOTS: I would say that that is not correct, it was a joint operation.
ADV DE JAGER: But as regards this operation the spark which set things going was information that on that Easter weekend Mr McKenzie was to go to Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
ADV DE JAGER: That information reached you and who gave you that information?
BRIG LOOTS: As I can remember it was telephonically given through Lieutenant Momberg and Cronje.
ADV DE JAGER: Did Lieutenant Momberg or Gouws ever report directly to you?
BRIG LOOTS: From time to time Lieutenant Momberg and I did speak telephonically about aspects regarding McKenzie.
ADV DE JAGER: And the information that they received from their informers, was this conveyed to Brigadier Cronje?
BRIG LOOTS: Oh yes, it was.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Commissioner. And what is more, the informer was not one of your informers, if I may say it like that, it was an informer from the Northern Transvaal Security Branch?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes. I could perhaps just add this for clarity. Those of use who struggled to get informers inside, out of the ranks of the ANC's special operations group, Western Transvaal could not succeed in this. Northern Transvaal, MT395 was one of the few in Mnisi's group who succeeded in penetrating this and for that reason because Botswana played such an important role and because they used Botswana in such a large extent for infiltration, it was an opportunity for us which we wanted to utilise.
MR VISSER: We know now that you said that you and Crause monitored the kombi and that Loots and Goosen were there, they now passed the border and thereafter you said you had nothing to do with it. Did you a few days later hear anything about this kombi?
BRIG LOOTS: The Security Branch at Zeerust reported or informed me telephonically that over the Botswana general radio they heard about a car bomb which had exploded in Gaberone. I also read in the newspapers that three citizens or civilians of Botswana were killed and that houses in Gaberone west were damaged.
MR VISSER: Due to the action of the investigating unit we know that three people were killed and injured and a number of buildings were damaged and this seems as if it concurs with the information that you received from the newspaper reports.
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR VISSER: You speculated if it could be asked as to whether you had any information about this and in paragraph 138 you say that it's not clear to you what the citizens of Botswana would have done with the kombi and how it reached them.
BRIG LOOTS: I can only give my opinion and that is that only people who knew about that secret compartment would possibly have tampered with it.
MR VISSER: It is not to say that those people who were killed were in the kombi, they could possibly have been next to the kombi?
BRIG LOOTS: That's possible, yes.
MR VISSER: Did you receive a request from the Botswana Government, the Botswana Police?
BRIG LOOTS: It is part of this document as well. I dealt with them over a period of five years, with Mogale and ...(end of side B of tape)
... JGT375T, which seemed to be that of a motorbike. And today I am honest, I waited until they gave me the right one.
MR VISSER: And that was JGT375T?
BRIG LOOTS: That was JGT375T, which was registered in McKenzie's name.
MR VISSER: Something which is not in your statement is that - and later you were also reminded of this, is that later, after the incident, you were with General van der Merwe again, was somebody there with you?
BRIG LOOTS: Brigadier Cronje.
MR VISSER: And what did you do there?
BRIG LOOTS: This was a result of the sensation raised or caused in the newspaper after it was established that the kombi which had exploded in Gaberone west and which had caused so much death and damage, that it was a vehicle from Pretoria and on instructions from General van der Merwe we visited head office and Brigadier Noppe and all those people who worked with Botswana compiled these notes.
MR VISSER: What did you go and do when you visited General van der Merwe?
BRIG LOOTS: As far as I can remember it was to assist with the compilation of a note.
MR VISSER: A note addressed to whom?
BRIG LOOTS: I do not know, I was never stationed at head office myself.
MR VISSER: Who was there with you?
BRIG LOOTS: Brigadier Jack Cronje as far as I can remember.
MR VISSER: In bundle 2(h) on page 164, it was placed on record, and this is also in Brigadier Cronje's evidence, that reference is made to this incident and it is said
"After the incident I myself and Brigadier Loots were called to van der Merwe's office after the incident. He wanted to find out exactly what had happened, how the operation went wrong and everything about the operation because he said he would have to inform Minister Pik Botha."
And Chairperson, you will recall that Minister Botha sent a letter because he couldn't appear personally before the Committee at the time ...
CHAIRPERSON: A memorandum.
MR VISSER: ... a memorandum yes, in which he stated that he was given false information and it was with regard to that memorandum that Cronje was asked these questions.
In any case you reported what you knew, was part of your report the fact that Special Forces and the police were involved in the explosion or did you just merely report that it was a source which transported weapons and ammunition for the ANC, which had been blown up?
BRIG LOOTS: General van der Merwe was completely informed and I just reaffirmed this.
MR VISSER: We now know about evidence which was given by Mr Momberg and Goosen and from the affidavit of Mr McKenzie that when he landed up in Botswana at that period, that he was taken by people, Mr McKenzie does not say who they were, but that he finally ended up being detained in Quatro Camp where he received rough treatment.
BRIG LOOTS: I can just mention that at that stage I was in command of Security Branch Northern Transvaal. I can confirm that Mr McKenzie was part of this group which during 1991 arrived at Jan Smuts airport. I did not see him personally, but the people who dealt with him said that both of his wrists showed signs of being broken and he gave a rendition of being treated very badly.
MR VISSER: As far as you can remember, did you say anything about a light sensitive detonator to General van der Merwe?
BRIG LOOTS: No. At a later stage, but not when I informed him about the project.
MR VISSER: Is there anything else that you can recall regarding this incident?
BRIG LOOTS: No, nothing specific.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson, that's the evidence-in-chief.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Alberts, do you have any questions to put to Mr Loots?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: As it pleases, Chairlady.
Brigadier, initially it seems as if you were totally unaware, or that you could not remember about this first meeting, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: And you say that you cannot recall any plans which would have resulted in McKenzie being killed as part of the operation?
BRIG LOOTS: If I now think back today then I just would like to add that, and I'm saying this with great respect, someone who did know Brigadier Jack Cronje personally will find it difficult to understand when I say to you that something like that could possibly have happened.
Brigadier Jack Cronje is a hard man in the sense that, and I say again I'm not criticising him, we fought a hard struggle. On the one side it was the National Party who placed laws on the statute book, which we had to apply, on the other side it was Oliver Tambo and his freedom fighters who really made life difficult for us. Today I say this with hesitation, ...(indistinct) really made life hell for us. And for that reason if something went wrong or something slipped through I will not deny it although I cannot recall it.
MR ALBERTS: Is it not because eventually it had nothing to do with the operation, that you could possibly have forgotten it?
BRIG LOOTS: I accept that the next morning when I got to him, because Lieutenant Momberg testified to this, that he said to them; if it's a problem then we'll think of an alternative. And I believe in all honesty that before I went to General van der Merwe such a thing was not in dispute.
MR ALBERTS: So that possibility could have been off the table already and it would not have been possible or necessary for this to be mentioned to Brigadier Cronje.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.
MR ALBERTS: In other words at that stage it would have been accepted that as long as it was possible that it could be contemplated, that they would walk away from this and that it was not a realistic possibility?
BRIG LOOTS: That's how I accepted it. I made my submission to General van der Merwe with a clear conscience.
MR ALBERTS: Seen in that light, Brigadier, are you then prepared to accept that Momberg and Goosen's evidence is factually correct?
BRIG LOOTS: Perhaps I can just add this, that the day next to the Hennops River, where Colonel Crause and I had the privilege to speak to Mr McKenzie, during the discussion it was mentioned or it became known that there was a specific or a particular relationship between these men and Mr McKenzie.
For that reason I say that I have an understanding that if such a thing would be understood that they were to blow up McKenzie as well, that I can understand their sadness. That's the only explanation I can give. Although, I say again that my memory proves to be a problem for me and I cannot without further ado say today that Momberg and Goosen are not speaking the truth when they say that.
MR ALBERTS: One more question, Brigadier, your recollection regarding the planning with regard to the activation of the bomb, is it that it would take place in Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: By Special Forces?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, in control ...(inaudible) the forces.
MR ALBERTS: And you heard the evidence today of both Momberg and Goosen, that it was in reality done here ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Alberts, I myself have a problem with the activation of a bomb. I think there is a possibility for a misunderstanding and you must just make sure that it's not understood as I initially understood it, because I thought that if you activate a bomb it just explodes.
MR VISSER: Perhaps the correct word is to arm instead of activate or as opposed to activate.
BRIG LOOTS: There is definitely a difference between a bomb which is armed and a bomb which is activated, a bomb which is armed is as I've explained with the handgrenades, where the safety pin is bent open to keep it safe and when you want to throw it you just pull it out and you through it. That is an armed handgrenade. But the moment you pull out the pin you are activating it. I mention this as an example of how that bomb was built. And about the light sensitive switch I have no knowledge about that.
ADV DE JAGER: According to what you have explained now, their evidence is that the bomb was armed on the border.
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: And then it would be logical that the activation of the bomb would be the explosion and there can be no doubt that the planning was that this was to take place in Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: Would you just repeat that please.
MR ALBERTS: It is then a logical conclusion as regards the previous answer, that the bomb was to be activated in the sense that it would explode within the area of Botswana?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: And that was the planning at all times?
BRIG LOOTS: At all times, yes.
MR ALBERTS: The matter of your meeting with McKenzie -and I also took this up with Momberg and Goosen because your testimony could possibly have been interpreted as contradictory to theirs in that case. They tell me that when McKenzie was taken out of the vehicle with the primary objective at least of being identified they agree with you, Brigadier Cronje amongst others, that he spoke to him as well as you, but that was after you had agreed about what the plan was to be.
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: That is when the meeting between you and McKenzie amongst others took place?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: Do you agree with that?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR ALBERTS: Would you just give me a moment please? Brigadier, you regarded or described this operation technically as a joint operation and quite rightly so, between Security Branch Northern Transvaal, Western Transvaal and Special Forces.
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: And you were one of the senior members who were involved in the planning thereof?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR ALBERTS: You will surely agree with the fact that the input from, amongst others, Goosen and Momberg as handlers of the source, was necessary for you and that is was useful?
BRIG LOOTS: Absolutely, yes.
MR ALBERTS: But there cannot really be any possibility that these two men can quite rightly be regarded as part of the final planning of this operation and that they should accept responsibility for the planning thereof?
BRIG LOOTS: No, I think that was in the hands of Brigadier Jack Cronje. I was second in command according to rank, and Colonel Charl Naude in his own good right represented the Defence Force.
MR ALBERTS: So as regards Goosen and Momberg, they were ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: I don't think that can be contested, that they were subject to Cronje and to his instructions.
MR ALBERTS: Then just finally, Brigadier, it seems that you were in the unenviable position as Goosen and Momberg with regard to the feedback as to what really happened in Botswana with the explosion of the bomb, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely. As I say, I was in control here in Pretoria after he landed at Jan Smuts and from some of the younger men entered into discussions with him and we gave him a reasonable amount of money for all his pain and suffering and for the salary which he normally would have received.
MR ALBERTS: That was years later.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, it was in '97.
MR ALBERTS: What I want to determine is the situation directly after this incident. Their evidence was that there was information which was lacking that was given to the Security Police.
BRIG LOOTS: I agree, that was true.
MR ALBERTS: So it would be difficult for anyone directly thereafter to say exactly what had happened, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: I can just mention to you that the woman who was with him was at our disposal and men from Cape Town and Paarl were of the first men who reported that she was in Lusaka. Luckily she was not harmed, but later after he had returned, we heard what trauma McKenzie had experienced.
MR ALBERTS: I would like to ask the final question, was there any liaison between you, Brigadier Cronje and Commander Charl Naude immediately after completion of this operation, which would have enabled you to know exactly what had happened there?
BRIG LOOTS: We did have discussions. Immediately after it had become known that a bomb had exploded in Gaberone west, Brigadier Cronje visited me and we discussed it, but the big question mark was what had happened to McKenzie. It was a cause of great concern for us until in the end he came back with the groups.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Though Mr Alberts, your question had not been answered fully. Your question which had been posed by you was if there had been any communication between Mr Loots, Mr Cronje and Mr Naude. He's only partially answered the question in that he said there were communications between himself and Brigadier Cronje and as a result of those communications they still remained with the big question as to what had happened to McKenzie.
But did you proceed to have any communication whatsoever with Mr Naude from the Special Forces side?
BRIG LOOTS: No, I'm sorry, I did not have any further contact with him. As was testified here the BSB was established, the CCB was established and it was devolved to Northern Transvaal, it was firstly devolved to Western Transvaal.
In previous hearings I mentioned to you that we were involved in the Gaberone operation in '85 and the Nietverdiendt 10. At that stage Charl Naude was still part of the Western Transvaal, but at this stage he was in Northern Transvaal and I had no further discussions with him.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Alberts.
MR ALBERTS: Thank you, I have no further questions, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ALBERTS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.
Brigadier, did you ever at any stage hear that Brigadier Cronje said that McKenzie had to die in the operation?
BRIG LOOTS: No, never, never. And that is why I really do not want to mislead this Committee,
MR DU PLESSIS: But why do you then testify that such a thing would not be strange for you, as if you wanted to create the implication that Brigadier Cronje did say that.
BRIG LOOTS: I tried to the best of my ability to give people who did not know Brigadier Jack Cronje very well, to make them understand this and that he could possibly have let something like this slip.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, Brigadier, what you are telling the Committee and everybody here and what is being televised on television now is that you say that Brigadier Cronje is the type of man who would easily say that these people could be killed in an operation. Is that what you are trying to say?
BRIG LOOTS: No, I conveyed that incorrectly.
MR DU PLESSIS: And if I put it to you that in all the operations in which Brigadier Cronje applied for amnesty, which are numerous, there is not one case where there was any talk of anybody being on the side of the Security Forces who were sacrificed in such an operation, will you agree with me?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I was not involved in everyone in which he was involved, so I cannot reply meaningfully to that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well I put it to you, do you want to comment on that?
BRIG LOOTS: Not as far as I'm aware of.
MR DU PLESSIS: And if I put it to you that Brigadier Cronje testified that he did not get a cent extra remuneration for anything that he did personally, can you comment on that?
BRIG LOOTS: I'm not aware of anything. The same goes for me.
MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, you testified that you were contacted by Momberg with information that Dumakude or Pule had made an appointment with the source to meet him in Botswana over the Easter weekend. That is what your application says.
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: So Momberg contacted you, and what did you do after that?
BRIG LOOTS: I also testified that Brigadier Cronje, that we had contact on that same day.
MR DU PLESSIS: Your application says, and that's how I understood your evidence, that you remember that you were telephonically in contact with him thereafter and you said to Brigadier Cronje; here is a possibility that we can do something, we can use this information, we can plan an operation.
BRIG LOOTS: I will not deny that.
MR DU PLESSIS: And in all probability you said that this is an opportunity to eliminate Dumakude or Pule, is that correct?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: So in all probability you would have said to him; here is a possible of a plan?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: And thereafter the person who went to see General van der Merwe was you and not Brigadier Cronje?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And the officers in command who were present with the execution of this operation in the Western Transvaal were you and Mr Crause?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Cronje was not involved, he was no physically present?
BRIG LOOTS: The day at Hennops River?
MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am referring to the fact when the vehicle was taken out of the Western Transvaal.
BRIG LOOTS: No, he was not there.
MR DU PLESSIS: You were present there as commanding officer as well as Mr Crause?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And after the operation had been completed, can you remember who reported to General van der Merwe about the operation?
BRIG LOOTS: If I remember correctly this bomb exploded five days after he had departed and there was a reasonable period of time that passed before I got these registration numbers, so the question how long afterward I cannot say with certainty, but it could be a month or even longer.
MR DU PLESSIS: But it was you who reported to General van der Merwe?
CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Loots has not understood your question.
MR DU PLESSIS: I'll rephrase it, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: It is not about the duration, it is about who actually reported to van der Merwe after the operation had taken place. Won't you just repeat your question so that he can understand it clearly.
MR DU PLESSIS: I understand that there was a period of time in which you did not know what had happened in Botswana. Who was in contact with General van der Merwe during that period as well as after, when you became aware of what had happened? It was you, was it not?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: If we take this together we see that when you got the information you contacted Brigadier Cronje with a suggestion in order to launch an operation. Furthermore we see that ...(intervention)
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson please, when I got the information ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: Let me just go through this slowly with you. Right at the beginning when you got the information from Momberg, was it you who phoned Brigadier Cronje and made a suggestion regarding a operation? It was you who went to see General van der Merwe ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: May he just reply please?
MR DU PLESSIS: I'm making one ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Many questions are being put as if it is assumed that the witness agrees. He might agree, I don't know, but I think he ought to be given an opportunity to reply to each question.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: But Chairperson, I've gone through each of these, there are four points and I've already gone through each one. Unless Mr Visser tells me that his client who has just given an affirmative answer to each and every one of them, that his client is now going to disagree, I want to put all of them conjunctively in one statement.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, this witness never agreed that he telephoned General van der Merwe.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, I said ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct)
MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Cronje.
CHAIRPERSON: Cronje, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Cronje. He didn't say he phoned him. It might be that he did, but that's not something that he said so far.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, what should stop you from putting each and every question to Mr Loots and waiting for him to respond to each and every question?
MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I'll go through the exercise again.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do so.
MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Loots, there are four important points that I just asked you about, let's do it again. You received information from Mr Momberg concerning the possible meeting or the meeting with Dumakude and Pule, that's between the source and Dumakude and Pule?
BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: You phoned Brigadier Cronje, and you testified that there was a possibility that you talked to Brigadier Cronje afterwards, you phoned him and that you talked to him about a possible operation. That is what you testified just now, do you agree or do you want to change your testimony?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, it ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I'm going to object to my learned friend's cross-examination and - just give me a chance, I'm going to object, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. You will be given an opportunity to object, Mr Visser. Can we just try to proceed ...(indistinct)?
MR VISSER: Well would you just listen for a short moment to my objection, Chairperson? My objection goes far further than just objecting to the way in which my learned friend is cross-examining.
My objection Chairperson, starts with the original Amnesty Committee when we appeared to go and protect the interests of these people, and when my learned friend, Mr du Plessis objected to us cross-examining and a ruling was made and if you look - and I'll refer you to the passages, bundle 2(e) at page 395 and it runs through and at page 496 the rulings were made which effectively stopped me from cross-examining. And I would have cross-examined Brigadier Cronje on this very issue. It effectively stopped me from doing that and I still asked at that stage; what happens one day if my witnesses come and apply for amnesty and they give evidence contrary to that of Brigadier Cronje, what is going to happen? And the Committee through Judge Mall, said; then obviously you will have the right to cross-examine Brigadier Cronje.
So if my learned friend wishes to cross-examine this witness, fine, but then he must present Cronje so that I can cross-examine him and if he doesn't do that, Chairperson, then none of what Cronje said can be taken into account against this witness. And that also accords with the ordinary rules of evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, may I respond to that?
CHAIRPERSON: You may respond Mr du Plessis.
MR DU PLESSIS: The position is that we have now direct contradictory statements. The question - and let me get to the question I wanted to ask, I simply wanted to ask Brigadier Loots - perhaps my learned friend should have waited for the question, if it was possible that Brigadier Cronje could have been under the impression when he testified, that this was more Brigadier Loots' operation than his operation.
MR VISSER: I have no problem with that question in the world.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson. And I wanted to base that on the fact that Brigadier Loots initiated the operation, that he was at the scene of the operation ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, I ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: May I?
What do you mean when you say it would be based on the assumption that Brigadier Loots initiated the operation?
MR DU PLESSIS: Not the assumption, the fact.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, based on what?
MR DU PLESSIS: The fact that he initiated the operation, that he spoke to General van der Merwe, that he reported back to General van der Merwe and that he was present at the operation. That could have induced in Brigadier Cronje the thought, and that is why he testified it, that this was really Brigadier Loots' operation, Brigadier Loots says he thought it was a combined operation.
So at the end of the day all I want to point out is that if that is the case, there is no real contradiction between Brigadier Cronje and Brigadier Loots. That is what I'm trying to do, Chairperson, and my learned friend wants to stop me.
MR VISSER: I'm happy with that, Chairperson, but my learned put to this witness that he telephoned Cronje, and still say there was no such evidence, that is why I objected the line of cross-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, on page 39 of this witness' document, which my learned friend handed in, it says
"I remember that I had a telephonic conversation with Brigadier Cronje ..."
CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of that.
ADV DE JAGER: I think the question is, who talked to who, who picked up the phone and phoned the other one? He said that it was possible that he could have phoned Cronje. That is how he put it at that stage. Put the question that you wanted, I think we all have the other questions, and let's see what the answer is there.
MR DU PLESSIS: I don't want to do more than just clearing up the contradictions. That's all I'm trying to do, is to deal with the contradictions.
Brigadier, can I put it to you in this way, is it possible that in the light of the facts - and you have heard what I put to the Committee, now in the light of those facts and that you actually had greater involvement with this operation, that Brigadier Cronje could have been under the impression or that he considered it to be your operation and from your side that you had thought that it was a joint operation?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, the only answer that I can give is that the source was Northern Transvaal, there's no doubt about that. And for that reason from time to time there was interaction by means of telephone, personal visits. Therefore I then say that I viewed this operation as joint.
MR DU PLESSIS: I understand that, but what I want to know from you is, do you concede that Brigadier Cronje possibly could have had the impression that it was in fact your operation and that you were in control of the operation?
BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I don't make it a secret that I did everything in my power and ability to persuade Botswana to work with us, and therefore I would concede that I am one person who did everything in my ability to get people brought to justice who were responsible for the killing and maiming of innocent people in this country.
MR DU PLESSIS: Now what I want to know from you Brigadier, do you concede that Brigadier Cronje ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, isn't this something that you have to use in argument? How can he concede what Cronje had thought?
MR DU PLESSIS: He testified that he knew Cronje. But I will leave it there.
ADV DE JAGER: But I really don't know what you want to do.
MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not quite sure. I will leave it at that.
Brigadier Loots, when you reported back to General van der Merwe what did you tell him, did you tell him everything about the operation as you have conveyed it to us?
BRIG LOOTS: At what stage was that?
MR DU PLESSIS: That was at the end of the operation when you reported back, right at the end when you had a conversation with him.
BRIG LOOTS: Was that after the vehicle had left and the vehicle went missing?
MR DU PLESSIS: That was the vehicle went missing, after the bomb had exploded, after Botswana had said that there was a bomb, there were problems and political problems. What did General van der Merwe know?
BRIG LOOTS: Everything that I knew, Chairperson, I conveyed to General van der Merwe because if I remember correctly, Botswana officially gave a note of protest to the RSA. Now how it was handled, at head office, the compilation of all the memos for information of the cabinet, I can't say anything about that.
MR DU PLESSIS: He knew that Special Forces were involved?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely.
MR DU PLESSIS: And then lastly, Brigadier, you were aware that there was a source of the Security Branch who on many occasions brought weapons from Botswana to the RSA?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And as I understand your evidence, and tell me if I'm correct, you testified that you did not know who this source was, you knew of the existence of such source?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that was by means of his registered number, MT395, and he was introduced to us personally as Mr McKenzie.
MR DU PLESSIS: That was during the first meeting before this operation?
BRIG LOOTS: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: But before that you only were aware of the fact that he was a source?
BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Ms Lockhat?
MS LOCKHAT: No questions, Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you, Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, you are excused.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
