CHAIRPERSON: Right, who is the next applicant?
MR HATTINGH: I think, with your approval, Mr de Kock should be the next one, Mr Chairman. May I call him?
CHAIRPERSON: I think you can sit down for the moment because they seem to be having trouble.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr de Kock, you’re one of the applicants with regard to this incident, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And, upon previous occasions you have already given evidence and, upon those occasions you have given a general submission regarding your application with reference to various incidents. And you confirm the content thereof?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And do you once again confirm that today?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And also in your supplementary affidavit with regard to Vlakplaas, you have studied this and do you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: Upon the occasion when the evidence about Vlakplaas in general was heard, you referred to a document which was handed over by Mr Visser and others to us and has been marked as Exhibit A during that hearing, do you recall this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And you studied this document and do you once again confirm the correctness of the content of the allegations contained within this document?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And then, on page 9 of the bundle with regard to this incident, you discuss your version regarding the particular incident.
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: Have you studied this and do you confirm the correctness of the content thereof?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: At that stage, how long had you been at Vlakplaas when this operation took place?
MR DE KOCK: Approximately four months.
MR HATTINGH: And you were under the command of Brigadier Cronje?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: What was his rank at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: He was a lieutenant-colonel.
MR HATTINGH: And did you give you the order to become involved in this operation?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Did you comply or participate in the planning for the operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Where was this planning undertaken?
MR DE KOCK: Among others, discussions were held at Vlakplaas and further discussions were also held in Swaziland itself.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. The members who were involved, were they you, yourself, from Vlakplaas and who else?
MR DE KOCK: Colonel Cronje, warrant-officer Van Dyk, Mr Bosego, Nofomela and Joe Mamosela.
MR HATTINGH: And then there were also members from other security units, from the South African Police who were involved?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Rorich, Mr Pienaar and Mr van Zweel. There was also a Mr Deetlefs but he was not present during this particular incident.
MR HATTINGH: Can you tell us briefly what the order was which you received with regard to this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the order was that Mr Nyanda, Mr McFadden and Mr Lawrence were very active in Swaziland and were creating great problems in the Northern Natal area. That this group had to be wiped out and this phrase was used repeatedly by Colonel Cronje. The group that had to be wiped out here would then be Messrs Nyanda, McFadden and Lawrence.
MR HATTINGH: How did you go about launching the operation?
MR DE KOCK: Preparations were made here in Pretoria with regard to weaponry. After it was established what the structure of the house was, and we went with these weapons from Vlakplaas in a vehicle which had been prepared with a secret compartment. We went to Swaziland, I’m not certain where we rendezvoused with the members from Eastern Transvaal, whether it was in Swaziland or whether it was in Ermelo. However, in Swaziland, we stayed in the same hotel where we rented a room and we worked from there.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, how did the operation unfold from there?
MR DE KOCK: On a regular basis, or at least let me put it like this, the house was pointed out to me by warrant-officer Pienaar if I recall correctly. The members who would be involved in the operation were taken one by one to the house. We couldn’t all travel there in a group. The house was situated near to one of the residences of the Swazi king and there was an also an entrance gate to the area. I confirmed for myself that this house was a temporary structure, it was an asbestos panelled house, I looked at environment, there were various aspects of importance such as lighting and so forth.
MR HATTINGH: So, in other words you did reconnaissance first?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we reconnoitred the area.
MR HATTINGH: And during this reconnaissance, did you notice any persons within the house or outside the house?
MR DE KOCK: No, it appeared to be entirely deserted. It stood there deserted, there were no other vehicles parked there. It was clear that there was no person residing there on a permanent basis.
MR HATTINGH: And once you had completed the reconnaissance?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, I’m not certain whether this was on the first or the second evening, my recollection indicates that on the first evening Mr Nyanda and his company did not arrive. We stayed over for a day and the following evening we once again, on the hour drove to the house regularly.
MR HATTINGH: Can I just interrupt you once again? You’ve just spoken about what took place the previous evening. Was Mr Deetlefs present at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I cannot recall whether he went to the house as well. As I’ve said, the house was pointed out to me by Pienaar but, he was in Swaziland and he stayed in the same hotel as us.
MR HATTINGH: And he had to depart for some or other reason and could not be present the following evening?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Let’s get to the next evening then.
MR DE KOCK: Me, warrant-officer Pienaar and warrant-officer van Zweel on a regular basis, around the hour, drove from the hotel to this house and we went to see whether Mr Nyanda’s vehicle had arrived yet. And it was only between 00h00 and 01h00 or 00h00 and 02h00 that morning that we saw the vehicle standing there. The house was dark and we assumed that the people were at home.
MR HATTINGH: What did you do then?
MR DE KOCK: Pienaar, van Zweel and I returned to the hotel where we found Colonel Cronje. We awoke him and the other members and we took our weapons out of the place where we concealed them and we moved in the vehicle to this house for the attack.
MR HATTINGH: Were these weapons fitted with silencers?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. There was two Perchets, those are British weapons with an integrated silencer system.
MR HATTINGH: Is it a hand weapon or a gun?
MR DE KOCK: They are hand carbine types, almost similar to the Sting but just upgraded. We also had HMKs, those are 9mm hand carbines with silencers and we also had two AK-47s.
MR HATTINGH: With silencers?
MR DE KOCK: No, they didn’t have any silencers. Then there was also a Scorpion hand carbine which was also fitted with a silencer.
MR HATTINGH: Why was it necessary to make use of such weapons such as AKs?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this would have been in case we encounter extra or more resistance in the house or if we ran into security forces in order to get out of the situation.
MR HATTINGH: That would be the similar reason for taking AK-47s to the Chand residence as you have given evidence previously?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct. Chairperson, upon our arrival, we approached the house, I jumped out first and went to my position which was one of the bedrooms on the south eastern corner. I didn’t know who was sleeping there. Another person would have been there to break the window, I would have tossed a hand grenade through of which the pin had already been pulled out.
MR HATTINGH: Can I just interrupt you there for a moment, please, Mr de Kock? This morning an extract was given to us and we have been informed that this is from the TRC’s written report. You have not had the opportunity to peruse this?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: I myself have briefly studied the documents. I could not obtain the name of the person whose report appears here and he’s referred to as ‘the subject.’ However, on page 121 of this report, the person states
"Then around 11h30pm, Zweli and I left for the house in Fairview to try and make a last attempt to ‘phone Maputo. We failed and he ‘phoned home to wish his mum happy birthday. When we reached home, Keith had gone to bed, I lay on the bed with my clothes on. I then heard cars make their way down the road and then turn to come up. This was around 02h00 or 02h30 or so. I stole out of the house, broke through the back door and went to these vehicles. A Mercedes and two vans. I told them in the Mercedes (Boers) that the comrades were asleep. I was then to move down and immediately afterwards, break my bedroom window and dash to wait by the cars. I broke the window and dashed into the bush. I remained there until the attackers left and heard one of the neighbours, Marcel, at the house."
Now when you arrived there, did you see any person running to the vehicles to report to you as the allegation here maintains?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the back door was broken down by me in co-operation with Cronje. Nobody came out of the back door and nobody came running to the vehicles. We also didn’t drive with a Mercedes and two vans, if I may put it that way.
MR HATTINGH: What did you drive in?
MR DE KOCK: They were sedan vehicles.
MR HATTINGH: How many?
MR DE KOCK: I think there were three vehicles. I know that warrant-officer Pienaar’s vehicle was there, I also drove a sedan with Colonel Cronje. I don’t know what Nofomela and Bosego were driving in.
MR HATTINGH: But there were two vehicles which were described as vans, were there any such vehicles?
MR DE KOCK: No, not according to my recollection.
MR HATTINGH: And you say that there was no Mercedes?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: You have given a description about how you took in your position at the window where you were supposed to take your position in the first place.
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: What happened next?
MR DE KOCK: I looked back to the vehicles and saw that some of the people were still seated. Pienaar was still seated behind the steering wheel, if I recall correctly, his door was open. At that stage, the other person was not with me. I can’t recall who had been allocated to me and with the one hand, I hit the window of the house out with the AK-47 and tossed the grenade through the window. As I hit the window, I heard one of the persons rolling off the bed, however I could not determine his position, I could also not stick my head through the window because I wasn’t certain whether or not there were any weapons inside the house.
MR HATTINGH: What happened next? Did the shock grenade go off?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. It had a double action, it would give two explosions. The objective was disorientation without shrapnel. I then observed that Colonel Cronje was standing in front of the back door that he was firing his Machete into the door at the lock and handle section.
MR HATTINGH: Was the door closed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was closed and locked. Mr van Zweel was with him. I then left that section where I had been stationed and ran to Colonel Cronje to help him to kick the door in. In the process, I seriously injured my foot, I broke my toe and in the process, when the door finally went open, Colonel Cronje ran in with van Zweel behind him.
At first I tried to step on my foot, at that stage bullets which I thought originally came from within the house, about 30 rounds of bullets were fired approximately two metres away from us. The entire place was full of steam, it fired the heating system of the house. At that stage, I saw a person moving away from the house in an easterly direction. It was a shadowy figure, I wanted to fire but abstained because I didn’t know whether or not it was Bosego or Nofomela who were seeking shelter. I didn’t want to risk shooting one of my own members.
Upon that, I moved into the house where I found Cronje in the first bedroom on the left side. I don’t know who was in the second bedroom, I went straight through to the room that I had tossed the shock grenade into, I found nobody there.
From there van Zweel and I went to the lounge, Mr van Zweel fired shots with the Scorpion into the lounge and I went in. His shooting was to provide extra fire should there be anybody there. I looked around with a torch. I couldn’t switch on any lights and I didn’t find any form of occupation or any clothing or bags or documentation.
From there, van Zweel and I moved into the room into which I had tossed the shock grenade and I saw that there was blood on the floor which lead to the bathroom. The bathroom was on the right hand side. I tried to break the lock but the door was locked and there was blood of approximately knee length against the wall. I still asked somebody whether they knew whether this person had been killed but they said he had been shot. I left van Zweel at the door of the bathroom and went outside with the idea to throw a shock grenade through the bathroom window. And as I exited at the kitchen window and I was busy obtaining the grenade, a person burst through this window. He broke through, physically, through that part of the window and, I immediately opened fire. I have a vague recollection, I think I fired about six or seven shots on this person, it didn’t appear that there was any impact on this person’s body. He fell down, on to the ground and then jumped up and once again began to run. Initially I couldn’t shoot because it would have been in line with Bosego and as soon as he moved out of that line of fire, he started firing again. I fired about three or four shots at his back, he was a target which was moving away from me. And once again, it appeared to me that this person could not be killed or I wasn’t firing, that I was missing. A metre or a metre and a half from the gate, he collapsed, I approached him and saw that Mr Pienaar was approaching from my right hand side. He fired two shots with the Perchet at the person who had fallen, he fired two shots at his head. However I accepted that he had already died because he had the position of somebody who was dead.
MR HATTINGH: Could you identify this person?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he looked like the person who I had seen on photos, he looked like the person who had been identified as Mr Nyanda.
MR HATTINGH: Had you ever seen this person in real life before this incident?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. On one incident when we had tried to attack the group and it looked to me to be the same person. In his right hand there was a hand palm case and, warrant-officer Pienaar tried to remove it. We saw that is was attached to his wrist by means of a loop and I think that he had vehicle keys or what appeared to be car keys. The rest of the group moved up from behind and we began to withdraw.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, might this be a convenient stage to take the adjournment?
CHAIRPERSON: Take the adjournment?
MR HATTINGH: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: We’ll adjourn till 14h00.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr de Kock, just to correct something, before I continue. I read an extract of a document to you which I described as an extract from the TRC’s report. That is incorrect, the document is entitled ‘Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.’
MR DE KOCK: That is correct and I have just been informed of that by Mr Hattingh.
MR HATTINGH: You explained that after the shooting in the house you withdrew back to the vehicles, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Can you say, from within your own knowledge that you saw how many people in the house were shot dead?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I saw a man lying in the one room on the left side, if you move down in an eastern direction, in the passage. However I did not know who it was. I saw no other dead persons there apart from the blood mark which lead to the bathroom. And that person who was in that room was also shot dead.
MR HATTINGH: Outside the house?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether there were any women in the house? Did you hear or see any women?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. When we arrived at the hotel, we had a quick discussion which was very brief and orders were given by Cronje and there I was informed that there had been a woman who had hidden in a cupboard or underneath a bed, I am not entirely certain.
MR HATTINGH: And that she was not harmed in any way?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Of your own people, were any one of you injured?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. When I arrived at my vehicle upon our withdrawal, Bosego called me, he was approximately 12 metres to the east of the vehicles. I moved in that direction, he got up and then fell down again. He told me that he had been shot, at that stage the vehicles began to pull away, they were approximately 20 metres away but the back vehicle reversed. I then helped Bosego from there and we left in that vehicle.
MR HATTINGH: You did not see when he was shot.
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: So you don’t know whether you shot him or who shot him?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: In your application you state that he was shot by Mr Rorich. Does he know about that?
MR DE KOCK: I did not see that. At the discussion that we had at the hotel after the incident it was mentioned, I don’t know exactly who mentioned it, I don’t know whether it was Rorich himself, but it was mentioned that it had been Rorich who had thought that Bosego was a person who was trying to escape or coming from the house and that is when he fired the shot. And I would concede that in that regard, it was here say.
MR HATTINGH: Did you then withdraw from the scene as you’ve said, and then you returned to the hotel where you had the debriefing and after that, the next day, you went back to Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: No, we prepared there, immediately and departed. Colonel Cronje made the arrangements that Bosego would receive medical treatment. I think that he arranged for him to be treated in Ermelo and Cronje and I went to Pretoria. The other members, I’m not certain about where they went, I didn’t ask them. Cronje drove to Pretoria, that night, near the border post, there was a place where one could move over the international border and, in such a fashion we then moved over the border.
MR HATTINGH: You mean other than at the regular border post?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: In other words you moved across the border illegally?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And did you report to anybody when you arrived back in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I was the driver of the vehicle, early that morning we arrived in Pretoria. It was between 06h00 and 08h00. I remained in the vehicle and Colonel Cronje went in to Head Office to report.
MR HATTINGH: And is that the sum total of your knowledge of this incident?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether anything was found in the house?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn’t see that there were any documents in the house but I would accept that there were because I didn’t search the rooms and, I didn’t see any documentation but I accepted that documentation had been found in the hand briefcase.
MR HATTINGH: Was anything said about this after the time?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, at the debriefing, it was said that documentation had been found.
MR HATTINGH: Did you study these documents?
MR DE KOCK: No. However I saw the top document, it was an A4 paper when Colonel Cronje climbed out of the vehicle at Head Office. And it looked like a sketch as if it was some form of a sketch of a road system or an environment, it was a hand sketch.
MR HATTINGH: How did you regard this operation? In what light did you regard it?
MR DE KOCK: Well, it was an operation which was aimed against terrorism and terrorist activities, it was cross border, whether you shoot on this side of the border or that side, it still remains murder. And for me it was just another foreign operation.
MR HATTINGH: And you acted under the orders of Colonel Cronje?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. But I would like to use this opportunity to say that I personally accept responsibility for my own actions and my own conduct at the scene. I do not ask that Cronje do this, I do not want it, I will bear my own responsibilities.
MR HATTINGH: And the prevention of terrorism, to combat terrorism in an internal community, the security of the Republic and a service to the National Party which was the government. One cannot say that this was a community service but it was a service to the State. Community service would be to save an elderly person from a burning house but to go and shoot somebody on the other side of the border who held different views to you was a service to the State.
MR HATTINGH: Then, in conclusion, you have heard what I put to Brigadier Schoon with regard to false claims and so forth.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I will stand by my affidavits in that regard. I will stand by what I have stated about that and I believe that in future we will receive further evidence about this.
MR HATTINGH: In other words, do you confirm your versions as contained within your original application and supplemented within the document which deals with Vlakplaas specifically?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will stand by that.
MR HATTINGH: And do you also confirm the correctness of the statements which I put on your behalf to Brigadier Schoon?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, unequivocally.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR KNIGHT: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Julian Knight on behalf of implicated person Nofomela, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KNIGHT
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Chairperson. Prinsloo on behalf of applicant Pienaar and van Zweel.
Mr de Kock, is it correct that initially the then Colonel Deetlefs pointed the house out to Cronje while Pienaar was present? Do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall that but I will not dispute it. I know that the house was pointed out to me by Pienaar, but, as I’ve said, we could not move around in large groups, only in twos and threes so that we could avoid any attention. I will not dispute it however.
MR PRINSLOO: Is it correct that afterwards, Mr Pienaar went to the house and pointed this house to you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct.
MR PRINSLOO: Furthermore, with regard to your action there at that specific house, according to Mr Pienaar and Mr van Zweel, there may be a possibility of confusion in your mind regarding who entered the house. Pienaar says that he entered the house along with you and that in the house, he shot a person there who later appeared to be McFadden.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, first it was Cronje and then it was van Zweel because they were the two persons who were at the back door. I followed them, and upon Colonel Cronje’s entry, I heard him shooting with a Perchet, it was quite a silenced sound but, I cannot say that Pienaar did not enter the house at some stage. I cannot dispute. But the shooting was initiated by Colonel Cronje
MR PRINSLOO: According to Mr Pienaar, he did indeed enter the house and he along with Mr Cronje fired at that person who later appeared to be Mr McFadden. According to Mr van Zweel he was initially at the door with Mr Cronje but when they could not open the door, you kicked the door open and that is when van Zweel moved around the house and held watch outside the house at a window. And that is why I am putting it to you that Mr Pienaar is the person who moved in and that you are confused between the two.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be their perception but the reason why I recall Mr van Zweel specifically is because that he was the one who fired the Scorpion in the lounge. It wasn’t a very powerful weapon, it was a 7.65 calibre, very low penetration capacity and the bullets were flying all over the room. And the second reason is because I left van Zweel at the bathroom door so that when I ran out after throwing the grenade, nobody else would be able to run back in.
MR PRINSLOO: According to Mr van Zweel, he did not fire any shots in the house at all and he remained outside.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be his recollection. However he made specific use of the Scorpion which was a low calibre weapon.
MR PRINSLOO: Furthermore, Mr Pienaar will give evidence that in the house, in a wardrobe, he found documents which he removed, can you be confusing the removal of the documents from the wardrobe with the case that you found in the person’s hands?
MR DE KOCK: No, I’m not confusing it, there was a briefcase there, it was in his right hand, there was a loop attached to it. After Mr Pienaar had fired the two shots into the head of Mr Nyanda, he removed the case. I would imagine, I’m relying on vague recollection here, that it was a red-rusty brown colour if I’m not mistaken and there were also keys which looked like car keys.
MR PRINSLOO: Mr Pienaar says that things happened very quickly there and that he indeed fire in one shot to the head of the person who was known to him to be Zweli Nyanda and it appeared at that stage that the person was still alive. But, he does not recall anything about a case which was removed from the person.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will not dispute the number of shots that he fired into the head of the victim. The case was there, I have no doubt about that.
MR PRINSLOO: And Mr Pienaar’s further evidence will also be that the documents which he took into possession in that house, he handed over to Brigadier Cronje.
MR DE KOCK: I will not dispute that, I didn’t see it but I would not dispute it because Cronje took documentation with him to Pretoria.
MR PRINSLOO: And, Mr de Kock, at that stage, were there many attacks which were launched by the ANC from Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct.
MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT
MS VAN DER WALT: Louisa van der Walt for the record. Mr de Kock, upon conclusion of your evidence, you have put your initial application more clearly with regard to Mr Rorich denies that he shot this person in the foot but, you have just rectified the matter, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, you have not given evidence about this matter today but in your application on page 15, you mention an incident during which General Engelbrecht apparently would have made a proposal regarding the amputation of Mr Bosego’s foot. Do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: I recall that very clearly.
MR WAGENER: Are you saying through that that General Engelbrecht attempted to defeat the ends of justice?
MR DE KOCK: Yes. And to harm a person as well.
MR WAGENER: Now, I see that you mention here that the object of that would have been to prove that Nofomela was not telling the truth. Do you mean that Nofomela gave evidence that he shot Bosego and you say that the purpose of this amputation would have been to prove that Nofomela was not telling the truth?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because then there would be no scar on the foot that had been shot.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, this entire statement that you make here with regard to General Engelbrecht, are you serious about this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I am being serious because it’s the truth.
MR WAGENER: Do you say that seven years after the incident, during the Harms Commission when this incident came to light, that this was a reasonable idea, to amputate the man’s foot all of a sudden?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, in my mind it was about how serious we were but, the security police as well, in the removal of any form of evidence. We would have gone as far as radiating Mr Bosego’s foot with X-rays in order to determine whether there would be any scar around that wound.
MR WAGENER: Exactly, can you recall? And it would appear that you recall that during the Harms Commission, medical evidence was given to the effect that the man had not been shot at in the foot.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we made certain of this before Bosego gave his evidence. There was a mark on his foot which appeared to be the result of having stepped on a hot coal with a bare foot. It would be the similar kind of mark that that would leave and I am very aware of that.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, General Engelbrecht denies this allegation of yours.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I expected that. I would have been surprised if he had reacted any differently. This works according to the same system which we maintained at the Harms Commission, the system of denials.
MR WAGENER: To tell you the truth, Mr de Kock, it would have been absurd to amputate the man’s foot because that would have indicated that there was indeed something to hide on his foot while the medical evidence indicated that there was nothing.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is something which one cannot make up. I sat there, that is what General Engelbrecht said, I have repeated it and I will stand by it.
CHAIRPERSON: And what would Mr Bosego have said about the loss of his foot ...(indistinct) he was having his foot removed.
MR DE KOCK: He would definitely not have agreed with it. On the contrary, Mr Bosego disappeared at a stage and he found himself in the Mafikeng area to the extent that Mr Nortje and Ras went to look for Mr Bosego. They went there by helicopter.
MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I put it to you that this is just another attempt of yours to get at the generals.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would say that that is part of a discreditation campaign.
MR WAGENER: Your discreditation campaign towards the generals.
MR DE KOCK: No, it worked for Dirk Coetzee, it worked for Nofomela. The situation about the Griffiths Mxenge story, it's an historical fact, my own evidence during the Harms Commission is an historical face, we cannot distort that.
MR WAGENER: No further questions, thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Visser on record.
Mr de Kock, I understand that Mr Wagener has already placed you under cross-examination with regard to matters that he has already mentioned just before. There are indications that you are attempting to get at generals, I’m not going to repeat that cross-examination, I would just like to refer you briefly to evidence which you have given. You have already, in your evidence in chief stated you will stand by your evidence despite what Brigadier Schoon has stated here this morning and I will not examine this with you any further. But, I would like to ask you the following. These weapons from Ovamboland which were stored at Vlakplaas, is my recollection correct that you spoke of smuggled weapons when you gave evidence or am I incorrect?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not certain.
MR VISSER: Well, let me put it to you like this, according to your insight, was there anything illegal about bringing weapons which had been possessed by the police in Ovamboland to South Africa?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we brought these weapons in for our duties.
MR VISSER: Very well, then I would like to take you to what you said with regard to the supply of weapons and the submission of so called false claims regarding Mr Steyn. Just for the benefit of the Committee, that is bundle 2, page 30, paragraph 2.2.18.2. This refers to incident 12 in volume 2, page 332, incident 13, volume 2, page 339 as well. And there is a further reference, that would be bundle 2, page 36, paragraph 2.2.22.1 and 2.2.22.2. And that refers to incident 12, volume 1 page 325, in volume 12, page 332 and this is the allegation. You say that you provided AK-47 guns to General Steyn for their own purposes as you put it. Can you recall this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: If General Steyn says that upon one occasion he received one AK-47 from you, would you say that that would be a correct statement or an incorrect statement?
MR DE KOCK: No, that is incorrect.
MR VISSER: Well, that is what he says and he denies that on any other occasion except one occasion he received an AK-47 from you and this is a matter for which amnesty has been applied. Mr Chairman, you might remember reference was made to the Quarry road incident during the Natal hearings and that is in connection with that particular incident. General Steyn says that you are mistaken when you say or when you recall it as such, that he requested you to falsely claim money to give to him in order to remunerate his informers. He denies this, he maintains that he had almost a half a million rands in funds which he could use for this purpose and that this money had been allocated to his division.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, then I must say that General Steyn is a liar.
MR VISSER: Very well. Let us hear what you have to say about Mr Adriaan Vlok because he maintains that the reference to the purchase of furniture from your fund, if this is intended to refer to him, he maintains that this is untrue.
MR DE KOCK: Furniture was acquired for the Minister’s office.
MR VISSER: Which Minister?
MR DE KOCK: Minister Adriaan Vlok.
MR VISSER: Well, he denies this.
MR DE KOCK: I have no problem with that. I would expect that.
MR VISSER: Just tell the Committee please, did you hear that he wanted furniture or did you see that his furniture was not up to standard? How did it come about that you decided to purchase the furniture from the fund?
MR DE KOCK: I was approached by Brigadier Schoon and Louis Koekemoer worked with that aspect. I did not fill in the false claim, I did not purchase the furniture, I did not obtain the money.
MR VISSER: Why would they have made a false claim for furniture for the Minister’s office? Didn’t the police have furniture for the offices of their Ministers?
MR DE KOCK: We will have to hear that from them.
MR VISSER: But, you see, you have once again dragged Brigadier Schoon into this story. And this differs from what you did in your evidence in chief. But let us just leave it at that. Can you think of any reason why furniture would be acquired for a Minister's office by means of false claims?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is not the reason for me. I simply provided the money and it was used for that purpose. The ministers will have to answer to that if they wish to be honest and that would include, among others, Colonel Koekemoer and Brigadier Schoon.
MR VISSER: Did Mr Vlok thank you for these furniture items which you would have purchased for him?
MR DE KOCK: No, we simply received a stiff handshake and a piece of meat to braai.
MR VISSER: For these items of furniture that you had purchased?
MR DE KOCK: No, just in general.
MR VISSER: Mr Willem Coetzee says that he was not involved with the establishment of a dead letter box at Krugersdorp. In bundle 2 on page 30, you refer to that.
MR DE KOCK: I think the word Willem Coetzee is incorrect, it was Colonel Jan Coetzee from Krugersdorp who was the previous commander of Vlakplaas.
MR VISSER: We agree with that. That might have been just a mistake of yours in your evidence in chief or maybe I have heard wrongly but I heard you said Willem Coetzee. But, Jan Coetzee would be correct. And then, finally, Mr de Kock, in bundle 2 on page 30 where you refer to incident 37, in volume 3 page 522, you allege that Brigadier Loots and Crause, you didn’t say which Crause, there are two Crauses.
MR DE KOCK: It was Colonel Rudi Crause.
MR VISSER: Requested from Brigadier Willem Schoon that you, Mr de Kock, supplied him with explosives to blow up the body of an ANC member who was killed in the cells in Mafikeng, do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. The request was that we had to remove that person and to take his life which was done.
MR VISSER: Very well. Crause and Loots, and I am afraid I did not ask Mr Schoon while he was here, he also denies any knowledge of this incident.
MR DE KOCK: He would, Chairperson, but it’s a clear picture in my memory as to where it happened and what the circumstances are and there are two witnesses to that incident.
MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, this is the second time that you say that you don’t expect them to say anything else but, why do you say this? Why do you say that Brigadier Willem Schoon would deny it?
MR DE KOCK: It’s on the same basis at the Harms Commission, Chairperson, everything was denied, we had an incidence where a question was put to me in the Harms Commission: "You do cross border operations?" The answer must be yes. "Did you shoot any people?" The answer must be no. "What did you do there?" The answer was "I just collected information." And Nofomela said we used weapons with silencers, this was denied right to the end. And that was the whole story.
MR VISSER: That was the Harms Commission, but let’s speak about now. For what reason would you say that any of these people would deny it?
MR DE KOCK: If they did play a role in there, because they would apply for amnesty. I think they want to keep their egos intact and Brigadier Schoon did this by applying for amnesty in 18 incidents, then he did not apply for everything, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman? My attorney tells me that he has a recollection that you have also named Mr Willem Coetzee in another issue. I don’t have any recollection of that, maybe you can help us Mr de Kock. We now know that Mr Willem Coetzee, if you did mention him, or incorrectly called him Mr Jan Coetzee with regard to the dead letter box at Krugersdorp, is there any instance where you name Mr Willem Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there would be two instances. The one is with the killing of ANC terrorists in Manzini and if I think of the names, it was Maris, Pantso and another person.
And then there was a second instance where along with General Erasmus, General Gerrit Erasmus, Brigadier Schoon, Brigadier Oosthuizen and Willem Coetzee as the handler wanted to lure a group of people to Swaziland...(interjects)
MR VISSER: These are the seven members?
MR DE KOCK: Excuse me.
MR VISSER: These are the seven members?
MR DE KOCK: No, it was a kombi with more, I think there were ten or 12 but, then it was only a vehicle with three persons who were lured to there and we shot them there.
MR VISSER: And this is what you refer to in bundle 2, page 22 on incident 5? Indeed, Chairperson. Amnesty is sought for both these incidents by these persons so I don’t have anything to dispute with Mr de Kock there. Thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR MOHLABA: Thank you, Chairperson, B Mohlaba on record. I have a few questions. Grant me a moment, please. Thank you. Mr de Kock, how did you know about the existence of Zweli Nyanda and his activities?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I read some security reports which came from Natal and the Eastern Transvaal. I want to imagine that there were some reports from Northern Natal and I was also informed by Colonel Cronje and amongst others, the Eastern Transvaal security branch.
MR MOHLABA: And you mentioned that the planning for the wiping out of Zweli Nyanda and the others was carried out in Pretoria as well as in Swaziland, did I get you correctly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Some of the planning took place at Vlakplaas and then as far as I know, the rest was done in Swaziland at the scene.
MR MOHLABA: The planning in Pretoria, are you able to tell us who was taking part in such planning? Was it in a particular forum where this issue was discussed?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. It was at Vlakplaas as far as I recall. And it was just the group who would participate there. I don’t know whether Mr Bosego sat there, I know they received instructions to prepare to go to Swaziland because they were in possession of passports in other names but, all the arms were prepared at Vlakplaas and the stun grenades were also there. And that we prepared there.
MR MOHLABA: To put it differently, before you could move to Swaziland, to carry out this operation, I assume that some discussion was conducted at Pretoria before you could go out. Could you remember who participated in such a discussion, if any?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what was discussed at Vlakplaas is what Colonel Cronje said where he spoke, Van Dyk spoke and I believe that Cronje also because I know the black members had to use false passports just like us. It was not a normal situation, the needs were not so many. We had limited needs.
MR MOHLABA: If you could recall, was there any responsibilities allocated to the people who were to move out to Swaziland for this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, Col Cronje was the responsible person for this operation.
MR MOHLABA: Was there a detailed discussion as to the type of rules which each individual was to play, that is amongst the group which went to Swaziland for this operation?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. We waited until we got to Swaziland before places or posts were appointed. In other words, who will stand on which corner, who will break the window, who will penetrate the house first. Those details were done at the hotel where we staying in Swaziland.
MR MOHLABA: And according to what was discussed at the hotel in Swaziland, how many people were to participate in this actual operation? Was it yourself and who else?
MR DE KOCK: It was the whole group as I put it here in my application. In other words, it’s myself, Colonel Cronje and van Zweel, Van Dyk, Rorich, Bosego, Nofomela, Mamosela, I don’t know what his role was there because he was not present at the shooting but he also went through.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt for a moment? I think I understood from your evidence that you had not been a description of the house. You were merely told it was a house there and you were taken to it after you arrived in Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Try again. You didn’t know what the house was like till you got to Swaziland and you were taken and shown it?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the only information that we had was that it was a temporary structure. The panels, the walls were a type of asbestos, it was a removable thing, that is why we used stun grenades.
CHAIRPERSON: Had you been told that before you went?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was information. The size of the house was not available to us, whether it was a five bedroomed house or a two bedroomed house but, the information with regard to the structure was at our disposal because Colonel Cronje wanted to use M26 handgrenades which contained explosives and we would have been hit by the shrapnel if we did use them.
MR MOHLABA: De Kock, do you remember who provided you with the information regarding the location of this house where the attack was carried out?
MR DE KOCK: Please repeat, please.
MR MOHLABA: Do you remember the person who provided information about the exact location of the house in which the attack was carried out?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was warrant-officer Pienaar who pointed out the house.
MR MOHLABA: And do you carry any knowledge how warrant-officer Pienaar obtained such information? You don’t know.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I would accept that Mr Deetlefs must have told him.
MR MOHLABA: In this particular operation, were you assisted by way of information by other persons who were not necessarily members of the security forces or Askaris? That is it could be Swaziland citizens or other people within South Africa?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Here we will refer to a source, never mind the nationality of the person.
MR MOHLABA: Are you saying that in this particular case, you had a source which provided you with information, which source was not security officer or an Askari, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it’s not that I had a source, there was a source. Specifically whose source or sources these were is unknown to me.
MR MOHLABA: Have you ever heard of the name Edward Lawrence or Cyril Raymond in relation to this particular incident?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. He’s the person who had to be killed along with McFadden and Mr Nyanda.
MR MOHLABA: Was he present in this particular house when the operation was launched?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I could not identify him. One person did get away but I don’t know whether it was Lawrence. But, I accept that it was him because he moved with Mr Nyanda.
MR MOHLABA: Can you just expand on that? You said he moved with Mr Nyanda, at what stage? You referring to a moment when Mr Nyanda burst out of the bathroom window, are you referring to that moment?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, just before I went into the house, after the long burst that came from the other side of the house, I did indeed see somebody running in an easterly direction. In other words, away from the house where at that point I wanted to fired on this person and decided not to because I was not sure whether it was one of my members who ran there. Or whether he was following somebody else.
MR MOHLABA: So you could not fire at this person because it may have occurred that it’s one of your members, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that’s correct.
MR MOHLABA: Would one of your members run away from the scene of the target where you were supposed to attack?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I did not say somebody ran away or that one of my members ran away. One of the members might have decided to follow somebody who was running away. But I could not take the risk, in that case I must allow that person to get away before I shoot one of my own people. And as I have said previously, policemen learn to think on the ground, think on your feet, one of our greatest problems at that stage was that we did not have internal radio communication at that stage.
MR MOHLABA: And was it dark within the vicinity where this attack was carried out? What was the source of light there?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, it was dark. I want to imagine and I use the word imagine, that there was a street light or a street lamp there. It was quite a weak light though.
MR MOHLABA: Did you at the time or subsequently after the fact, did you identify the owner of the house in which these people were killed?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not. I continued with my normal services and I did not enquire about it afterwards.
MR MOHLABA: You have mentioned that at the debriefing after the attack, that is at the hotel, there was mention of a woman who was left unharmed, did I get you correctly?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct, Chairperson.
MR MOHLABA: Was there any reason why this woman was not shot at?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was not in the room. People take decisions right there where they are on the ground and my memory is that we, according to the debriefing session before the attack, we could expect five to six people in the house. I did not know of the woman and, as I say, by nature of the situation I believe that Colonel Cronje decided at the scene to leave the woman there. His reasons would have been immediate, they would have taken that decision right there within a thousandths of a second. That’s an operational decision at the scene, it was a decision taken in the field.
MR MOHLABA: Thank you, Chairperson, I’ve got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOHLABA
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Ramula Patel.
Sir, you’ve stated that Edward Lawrence was also to be killed along with McFadden and Nyanda. At what stage was this decision taken and by whom?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we departed with that knowledge. It was emphasised by Colonel Cronje that Head Quarters wants this group, Nyanda, McFadden and Lawrence, they wanted them wiped out. It was also emphasised in Swaziland at the hotel where we went.
CHAIRPERSON: In Pretoria and again in Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct, Chairperson. If I refer to Pretoria, it was at Vlakplaas.
MS PATEL: Brigadier Schoon’s testimony this morning, he stated that the only person that was identified to be killed was Mr Nyanda and that it was accepted that if there was somebody else there, that they should be killed as well but there was no mention made of Edward Lawrence or of McFadden. In fact, the information about McFadden only came to his attention afterwards. What is your comment on that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. That information was given to us here and this why the group was adjusted to the amount of men that there were. And those names were mentioned according to the information notes and the security reports that I read. I mean Mr Lawrence was just as active in the ANC ranks as Mr Nyanda.
MS PATEL: Sorry, I didn’t get the last name. Who was just as active as Mr Nyanda?
MR DE KOCK: It was Mr Lawrence, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Was this information relayed to you by Mr Cronje or was it given to you by Brigadier Schoon as well? Can you recall?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was given to me by Colonel Cronje.
MS PATEL: Regarding Mr Deetlefs role, was he present at the planning meeting at Vlakplaas where the conspiracy to murder had taken place?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I don’t have any memory of him there. As far as I remember, he was in Swaziland when we arrived there, when we reconnoitred at the hotel and it was again discussed then.
MS PATEL: Okay, so he was present at the second discussion in Swaziland?
MR DE KOCK: He was involved with the discussion that we had in Swaziland, yes.
MS PATEL: Was he involved in the reconnoitring of the target? Of the physical structure, that is?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don’t know. This house was just pointed out to me by warrant-officer Pienaar. There was information beforehand with regard to the nature of the structure, that it would not be a stone house but these types of panels.
MS PATEL: You have stated to us in your evidence in chief that certain members went back to the house on an hourly basis to check whether parties had returned or not. Was Mr Deetlefs one of those people who would have been involved in that part of the operation or the preparation rather?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. It was Mr Pienaar and Mr van Zweel.
MS PATEL: Regarding the information that you say must have come from Mr Pienaar. Do you have any idea what his sources would have been at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: Can you tell us what specific information was given to you about Mr McFadden at the planning meeting?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that he was a citizen of Swaziland, that he was a member of the ANC and that he was closely involved with the arrangements of safe houses. And then I have a memory that mention was made that he had contact with government officials in the Swazi government which made a valuable person of him.
MS PATEL: What kind of contacts would this have been with the government officials? To do what?
CHAIRPERSON: Contacts, I think he said.
MS PATEL: Oh, okay.
MR DE KOCK: I don’t know who these people were, Chairperson. All that I know that these were government contacts. I don’t know what is the nature of their ranks or their positions or in which departments they are.
MS PATEL: Would this important? Or why was this a threat?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in that sense, he was directly involved with the support of acts of terror in the Republic of South Africa, and he was a member of the ANC, according to that information he actively helped in the destabilisation and terrorism in the Republic of South Africa.
MS PATEL: Can you confirm Brigadier Schoon’s testimony this morning that the instruction was that everybody was to be killed? Or were specific persons targeted only?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not have any contact with Brigadier Schoon with regard to targets. It was conveyed to me by Colonel Cronje and it was only the three persons that were targeted.
MS PATEL: Would that then be an explanation for why the woman wasn’t killed?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don’t know. I think, in that sense, it was a decision taken in the field. There would be reasons therefor. I think Colonel Cronje would be able to give a better answer.
MS PATEL: Alright. If you’d just grant me a moment, or perhaps you can assist, you didn’t mention in your application that Edwards Lawrence, was also a target, did you? I don’t recall reading it in your application, I don’t believe that you mentioned it there.
ADV SANDI: Are you asking about Edward Lawrence?
MS PATEL: Yes.
ADV SANDI: Yes, he said Lawrence was as active as Nyanda. That is according to the information that he had obtained from Mr Cronje.
CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct)
MS PATEL: I’m just double checking, I don’t recall this being in his application to us.
ADV SANDI: Well, he said that in his overall evidence to us.
MS PATEL: But not the application. Why was such crucial information left out of your application? Why do we only hear of it now, after my learned colleague on my left hand side has asked you about? You didn’t even raise it in your evidence in chief.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it might be a mistake or I might have just omitted it, just not completed but, I think the Eastern Transvaal security branch people, like Mr Pienaar would be able to testify to that but after Mr Nyanda’s death, Mr Lawrence took over as far as I know and he filled that role for some time.
MS PATEL: Are you saying that Mr Lawrence took over from Mr Nyanda after Mr Nyanda’s death?
MR DE KOCK: That’s correct, Chairperson.
MS PATEL: And what is the source of that information, Sir?
MR DE KOCK: Once again it was security reports not only from Ermelo but from places like Piet Retief and from Middelburg that he had taken over that role, that he was once again active.
MS PATEL: And who would have draft those reports? Do you have any idea?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would be members of the security branches. These were field workers and they would receive that information from near sources.
MS PATEL: Do you know who the authors of these security reports would have been that you refer to, sir?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I cannot recall.
MS PATEL: Sorry, honourable Chairperson. I think I’m almost done I just want to double check. Thank you, honourable Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, when you compiled your amnesty application, you applied for amnesty for the death of a person, that’s correct
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that’s correct.
MR HATTINGH: Is Mr Lawrence, the person who is referred to as Lawrence, the person who was killed during this operation?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR SIBANYONI: I’ve got no questions, Mr Chairperson.
ADV SANDI: Yes, Mr de Kock, are you able to say what role exactly was played by Mr Joe Mamosela because I understand he’s one of the people who were given a promotion after this operation.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, before this occasion upon which we killed Nyanda, there was another attempt and Mr Mamosela was involved in that attempt with regard to observation. And he was not involved during this second attempt during which the victim was killed. My recollection is that he went through to Swaziland but that he was not present during the shooting incident, in that regard my recollection may not be sufficient but, he was definitely involved in the first attempt on Nyanda’s life.
ADV SANDI: I get the impression that your instructions before you went out to attack these people, your instruction was to kill everyone who was there in that building, is that so?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the emphasis given by Cronje was that this group was to be obliterated and, that would be Lawrence, Nyanda and McFadden, that group. If we had found Lawrence there, in the room or outside, we would have shot him dead, definitely.
ADV SANDI: And when you went back to the hotel, and Mr Cronje tells you that there was a lady who was hiding somewhere in the building and she had not been killed, were you not interested to find out as to what could have been the reason why she was not killed as well?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. Let me just sketch this to you. During these events on ground level, the persons who launched the action would be the script writers of the event, so to speak. But things could change on a momentary basis on ground level and this would have been the decision of Colonel Cronje to leave her or not to leave her. She could have led to the identification of operatives, that they were whites, that they were not an ANC group but, I didn’t ask him.
ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: I’m in a state of complete confusion. We were given, this morning, the Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress, 12 May 1997 which appears to refer to an agent Edward Lawrence and it sets out certain dealings of his. And how he was introduced to two Boers who introduced themselves as Captain Van Niekerk and Captain Van Der Walt. He apparently became an informer, or gave them information as to the house that was to be attacked. And he was told what he should do during the course of the attack. And yet we are now told that he was one of the most dangerous of people.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would just like to mention at this point, that the history of Lawrence, if I have it correctly from reports, is that upon a previous occasion with the Defence Force’s attack on Matola, near Maputo, he was one of the few who escaped. And that suspicion fell upon him after he escaped for a second time from Swaziland. Me, a DCC officer and a former officer were in Vienna busy with the recruitment of another agent with the Department of Intelligence and Security, the specific division referred to as Lombokodo which was highly feared. This person enquired about two persons from me consistently after we met and became acquainted. There was MK Thami Zulu, his name was Bonniface who operated in Swaziland and about whom we later made a terrible mistake.
He also asked me whether Lawrence was a source and I told him that he was not a source, that he was a very effective operative. And he once again said that we made a terrible mistake with him as well. And the idea that I had from this was that both had been murdered by the ANC.
CHAIRPERSON: If he was telling members of the South African Police Force, that he would tell them when the comrades were asleep, that he would unlock the doors and switch off the outside light for the attack, should other policemen be telling you to murder him?
MR DE KOCK: No, that doesn’t make any sense. The simple reason for that being that nothing like that happened. The back door was not open, we had to kick it in because it was locked. And it was rather solid as well. No person came out of the building, nobody came up to your vehicles. Lawrence’s escape can be ascribed to the fact that I left my post to assist Cronje and that is the only reason why he escaped.
CHAIRPERSON: Have any enquiries been made to verify this ANC information...(intervention)
MS PATEL: I’ll have to double check ...(indistinct) ...Chairperson, as to whether we have.
CHAIRPERSON: ...as to whether he was acting for the South African Police Force at the time.
MS PATEL: Okay, and honourable Chairperson, if I may, I’ve omitted to put to Mr de Kock that, in the testimony of Brigadier Cronje to us, he merely mentions that the only target that was only identified was Mr Nyanda and he gave some other version in respect of why Mr McFadden was killed and that only information was given about McFadden to them afterwards but, I see Mr Du Plessis is not here, perhaps I should confirm with him first whether that is in fact the position?
MR VISSER: Yes, well, Chairperson, we dealt with that, Visser on record, in Brigadier Schoon’s evidence. And we actually specifically refer to the evidence of Brigadier Cronje where he stated that Zweli Nyanda was the person who was targeted. And Schoon’s evidence was that that is correct although there was a broader issue at stake and he was certain that Brigadier Cronje must have understood it that way. And if we look at Mr de Kock’s evidence now it's quite clear that he did look at it that way because he said: "We have to go and take out that cell."
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is if there were other people there that night.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock’s evidence is different. Mr de Kock’s evidence is this was a specific target they were going to Swaziland to get rid of.
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, I’m not ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: He said he was as dangerous.
MR VISSER: Referring to Lawrence?
CHAIRPERSON: Lawrence, yes.
MR VISSER: Yes, yes, I’m not talking about Lawrence, I’m just dealing the last issue which Ms Patel raised as to whether it was only Zweli Nyanda or more people than that.
MS PATEL: No, with respect, honourable Chairperson, it deals with Mr McFadden as well. Mr de Kock is saying that there were three parties who were clearly identified during the planning stages whereas the evidence of Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Cronje to us at the amnesty hearing was that it was only Mr Nyanda who was clearly identified as a target but, if there were other people there, then that’s a different issue.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you wish to ask any questions or are you going to investigate?
MS PATEL: I’ll investigate it first with Mr Du Plessis, thank you...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: There is reference in the other documents we were given as A this morning, Nyanda A to the Statement to the TRC, dated August 1996 where they did list McFadden as a supporter of the ANC.
MS PATEL: Yes, my understanding was that that ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to make further enquiries and lead further reference tomorrow, you can do so.
MS PATEL: Okay.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Perhaps if I could be of assistance. On the issue of Mr Lawrence, on the little document that you got this morning, you will see his aliases. That is stated to be stated to be alias Fear or Ralph or M’China or Cyril Raymonds. Now, if you look at page 43 of the Further Submissions, Chairperson, of the ANC of M set out was, and Mr de Kock is quite correct,
"...was commanded by Henry Chelisa and later Thami Zulu, Zweli Nyanda and then Cyril Raymonds - Fear."
So, Mr de Kock’s quite correct, that he followed up apparently Mr Zweli Nyanda. And that is Lawrence, the Lawrence that we’re talking about here, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: In the document we’ve been given, page 120, paragraph...(indistinct)...(microphone not on).
INTERPRETER: Speaker’s microphone is not on.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, in 1983. Page 120 of the document we were given this morning, 12 May 1997 Submissions, it said that while deployed as a leading cadre in the Natal Military Machinery in Swaziland, he was arrested by the Swazi police.
MR VISSER: Yes, yes, there can be no doubt his status, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: And he apparently gave them certain information.
MR VISSER: Of that we have no information, Chairperson, we know that there was a source involved. Whether it was specifically Mr Lawrence who was involved in that particular operation that evening, Brigadier Schoon doesn’t know anything about. And you will recall, when Brigadier Cronje gave evidence, he was asked the question: "Who is this informant?" And he said: "I can’t remember." Or "I didn’t know." That’s around page 300 of his evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, the enquiries I think, should be made from the Eastern Transvaal people, not from the people here today.
MR VISSER: Well, there are some Eastern Transvaal people here.
ADV SANDI: He must have been very lucky as well, this Mr Lawrence, not to be killed on this day.
MS PATEL: If I may, just for the record, honourable Chairperson, state that my problem with this is not the information as to what he might have been involved with subsequent to the operation. It goes to the question of what the specific instruction was and who was to be eliminated.
CHAIRPERSON: If what they say here is true, it seems very odd that he should have been picked as a target when he was the person who was assisting in the raid.
MR VISSER: Precisely, Chairperson, and therefor the only inference, except that we could only deal with what information we have. The only inference from this information is that it couldn’t have been him. But that’s speculation on our part. Perhaps the people from the Eastern Transvaal might shed light on ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Or the Swazis, Swaziland police.
MR VISSER: Yes. And Mr Sandi’s question, Chairperson, is answered in the same document at page 120, at the end of that paragraph. At the end of paragraph 7 where it says
"Subject [which is now this person] died before implementing this next enemy plan. Details below."
So, according to the ANC, he died, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But the next plan is the raid in 1983, Deaths of Zweli Nyanda and Keith McFadden.
MR VISSER: Yes, all right.
CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone in not on)
INTERPRETER: The speaker’s microphone.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, page 122, the third paragraph on the right-hand side. It sets out that he was the chief of communications at the same time as Zweli Nyanda was the chief of staff. So, he was, if one can believe this at all, a very active double agent.
MR VISSER: That would be our submission at the end, yes, Chairperson. Of course, there is another matter to this, one must bear in mind that this was a man who had been arrested and who’s making a confession. And his confession starts off by the drafter of the document saying that first of all he made an incomplete confession, whatever that may be, and there after he made a full confession so, one doesn’t know what happened to the poor fellow before he made what was regarded as a complete confession. And what still one, has to put in it. There is of course that to it but, clearly there could be no reason for anyone to lie about his position in the ANC in Swaziland at the time.
WITNESS EXCUSED
