Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: ... at Penge Mine. The Committee remains the same. I would ask the legal advisors to put themselves on record please.

MR HATTINGH: P A Hattingh instructed by Mr Hugo on behalf of Mr de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius on behalf of the second applicant, David Britz; the fourth applicant, Daniel Snyman; the fifth applicant, Nicholas Vermeulen; and the seventh applicant Lionel Flores.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Lamey, I represent applicant Kobus Klopper.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman Jan Wagener. I appear for Brigadier Willem Frederick Schoon and Colonel Abraham Grobbelaar.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman. My surname is Rossouw. I appear on behalf of the implicated Mr Potgieter.

MR MARIBANA: J C Maribana for the Mabotha family.

MS PATEL: Ramula Patel, leader of evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, shall we continue. Who is going to start?

MR HATTINGH: I suggest that we start with Mr de Kock again, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR HATTINGH: With your leave may I call him.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly.

EUGENE A DE KOCK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock you are one of the applicants who has applied for amnesty with regard to the death of Mr Johannes Mabotha, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You have already given evidence in previous hearings and you have given evidence in general about Vlakplaas as an operational unit of the Security police at that time.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Furthermore in your initial application you have given a broad background about your personal circumstances and your political motivations and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you once again confirm the correctness of those affidavits that you made?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. In the supplementary affidavit which specifically dealt with Vlakplaas there is a section which deals particularly with the askaris at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And therein you have given general evidence about the problems that you experienced with the askaris in general.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now Johannes Mabotha was also an askari who was at Vlakplaas for a while?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then he disappeared?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know under which circumstances he disappeared, whether he went away or whether he was abducted?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he simply didn't report for duty, and as a result of the problems with some of the askaris it was not entirely a strange occurrence, but they would usually notify us about where they were or that they would be late or that they were ill, or something of that line. But in Mabotha's case we received no such information.

MR HATTINGH: In the introduction to the supplementary affidavit which deals with Vlakplaas you also mentioned the fact that you, due to the great deal of incidents in which you were involved no longer have such a clear recollection about every particular occurrence, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And furthermore there was also a great span of time since these events took place?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Furthermore you also mentioned that you read what other applicants have stated in their applications and that you have also had the opportunity to attend hearings such as these and during such hearings you had discussions with some of your former colleagues.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that in this manner your recollection regarding certain of these incidents was refreshed.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So that you are now capable of remembering more about it than what you could when you initially made your affidavits.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. When you submitted or prepared your initial application regarding the Mabotha incident can you recall whether or not he was issued with a weapon when he vanished?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson I don't know whether he was in possession of the firearm when he disappeared. By nature of the circumstances he would have been armed. However, I cannot recall whether he disappeared with his firearm.

MR HATTINGH: What was your impression?

MR DE KOCK: My impression was that he did not have a firearm when he disappeared.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have the opportunity to discuss this aspect with other persons?

MR DE KOCK: No, not directly but by means of the legal team it has emerged that he did disappear with a firearm.

MR HATTINGH: And now that you have heard this, has this refreshed your memory? Can you now recall that he left with a firearm, that he was issued with a firearm?

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that he was issued with a firearm. If any of my other members have that information, I can't base this upon independent recollection, but by nature of the work of the askaris they would have been armed with the exception of certain of those persons.

MR HATTINGH: These askaris, Mr de Kock, for how long would they be away from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: They would be away for periods up to 20 days or longer.

MR HATTINGH: And was this then under the command of a group leader or a section leader?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was that way.

MR HATTINGH: For how long was Mabotha gone when you realised, for the first time, that he was gone and that he wasn't just busy fulfilling his duties somewhere?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson initially I thought that when we once again deployed and he wasn't there it would be one of those cases where the man had met an escort and decided to stay away and had embarked on a drinking session or had simply decided that he wasn't coming to work. It didn't place any unnecessary focus on that at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: These particular circumstances which you have just mentioned, was that a regular occurrence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it took place on a regular basis.

MR HATTINGH: And when was the first time that you once again heard about the whereabouts of Johannes Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I received a telephone call at Vlakplaas and I was informed by the Soweto Security Branch that Johannes Mabotha had once again been arrested. This was approximately in the vicinity of Marble Hall in the Western Transvaal and that he was once again involved in ANC activities.

MR HATTINGH: Can you remember who gave you this information?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't have an independent recollection of that, whether it was one of the Intelligence members or whether it was one of the counter-insurgency agents. I would like to recall that it may have been Mr Grobbelaar, however, I cannot confirm this independently.

MR HATTINGH: Were any requests made to you in this respect?

MR DE KOCK: No, except that W/O Bellingan and I decided to go to Marble Hall, and that very same evening we went through. I remember when we received this report Brigadier Schoon and General Basie Smit were at Vlakplaas and just after this telephonic conversation I cleared it with Brigadier Schoon and Bellingan and I departed late that afternoon for Marble Hall.

MR HATTINGH: When you say clear, do you indicate that you would have departed for Marble Hall where Mabotha was, is that what you cleared with Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. We wanted to determine what was going on, whether the situation was really as such.

MR HATTINGH: And you and Bellingan then left for Marble Hall, and when you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was reasonably late. We stayed over there that evening, that would be me and Bellingan.

The following morning we met up with members of the Soweto Security Branch at the Marble Hall police station, if my memory serves me correctly, and Mabotha was brought forward and Mabotha, myself and Bellingan, and the members of the Security Branch at Soweto, among others, Mr Grobbelaar, went from there to a safe premises, or a premises that was at our disposal in a rural environment.

MR HATTINGH: Was it a farm?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was a corner of a farm.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And what took place there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, during that session there on that day Mabotha was interrogated, he was assaulted, among others by means of a bag and a rubber band he was suffocated. The terminology there would be "tubing" or whatever. Among others he was hung upside down; he was physically assaulted, and in the process of this assault he was also injured.

MR HATTINGH: Did you yourself participate in this assault?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, among others I assisted in hanging him upside down, and I also participated in the suffocation by means of this rubber band.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the purpose behind this torture?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, among others from my side, from the side of Vlakplaas, we wanted to know what information he would have leaked out about Vlakplaas. We had just as much interest in terrorism as the Soweto Security Branch. There's was a more urgent case because these were things that were taking place in their environment whereas some of the askaris who were working there may have reacted.

MR HATTINGH: Were specific subjects put to him? Was he questioned about specific subjects?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am struggling to recall everything about that, but amongst others it was about whether terrorism was taking place; what happened at the Mandela Football Club. It was also about, if my memory serves me correctly, about where there were weapons. I wasn't involved with his interrogation the whole time so I didn't interrogate him literally all the time. I was more involved in the physical assault so that by means of pain and stress we could persuade him to tell us what was going on.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether you put any questions to him about the firearm that he had been issued with?

MR DE KOCK: No I don't recall anything about that.

MR HATTINGH: How long did this interrogation and this assault continue for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I think it was from approximately between nine o'clock and ten o'clock in the morning until approximately three to four o'clock in the afternoon upon which Bellingan and I departed.

MR HATTINGH: Were you consistently involved in the interrogation and the assault?

MR DE KOCK: No not all the time. There were also interruptions not only for those who interrogated him but also for the person who was being interrogated.

MR HATTINGH: So do you say that there were times when the interrogation was brought to a pause?

MR DE KOCK: Yes there was an opportunity when it ceased. That was when I asked him, during his time that he rested, that's when I asked him where he had been; who he had been with; why he had walked away. That was one of the most important facets for me because this way have been a mutual problem and I wanted to determine that.

MR HATTINGH: Did he answer your questions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. Briefly he told me that he had been abducted, that he had been detained, as he put it he was detained as a sex slave which I found very strange. However he was reasonably obstructive. I would be wrong to say that he wasn't a tough person.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he say who he had been abducted by?

MR DE KOCK: It was members of the soccer club of the Winnie Mandela soccer club, however he didn't give any names.

MR HATTINGH: What did you eventually do on that particular day?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the afternoon Bellingan and I then left that area and returned to Pretoria. We left Mabotha with the members of the Security Branch from Soweto.

MR HATTINGH: We have read in your affidavit, among others, or perhaps only from Mr Klopper, that he was taken back to Soweto after which he performed further interrogation, perhaps not on that particular day but upon later events, and that this interrogation took place by means of askari members from Vlakplaas. Are you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, but I will concede this if Kloppers says so. It is entirely possible that this may have taken place.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any further interest in your position as commander of Vlakplaas with this person?

MR DE KOCK: No he had left Vlakplaas. He was no longer an askari and I had no further use for him, or application then.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can I just ask. He had been away for how long, from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am really not sure. I would like to tell you that it was two weeks to a month or longer, however I cannot recall this. I really don't have any recollection of that.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you see that anybody searched him, be it before or during the interrogation at Marble Hall?

MR DE KOCK: No I did not observe that.

MR HATTINGH: Did you notice whether anything was put out there which may have been found in his possession, documents, objects or anything tangible?

MR DE KOCK: No. However, during January 1998 when this case was submitted in Johannesburg I heard that letters had been found and that there were other documentation and telephone numbers, but at that stage I had not been aware of it.

MR HATTINGH: So now you have no further interest with him, and when did you again hear about him for the first time?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was telephoned by Colonel Potgieter from the Soweto Security Branch during which he mentioned that Mabotha would be released at a certain stage.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know under which conditions he had been detained?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was detained in terms of Section 29, incommunicado basically.

MR HATTINGH: Did or were you informed that he would released in terms of Section 29?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was informed that he would be suspended in terms of Section 29 and it appeared from our conversation that Colonel Potgieter did not want this person to walk about again. I was of the same sentiments.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you say that? What gave you the impression that he didn't want this person to go about ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he mentioned that Mabotha was involved in the death of policemen in Soweto. If I recall correctly he stated something about two shebeens where there had been attacks and that Mabotha had been involved in these attacks and that he had participated in the shooting that led to the death of these policemen. And that if he were to be set free he would return to this terrain and that this could once again lead to the death of policemen.

MR HATTINGH: Just policemen, the death of policemen?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is the recollection that I have.

MR HATTINGH: But was he involved in terrorist activities in Soweto according to the information that you had at your disposal?

MR DE KOCK: Yes as far as I know, because if my memory serves me correctly he was involved, whether directly or indirectly, in the death of a young activist by the name of Sepei.

MR HATTINGH: At that time how did you perceive Mrs Winnie Mandela's role in politics?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, she was the African version of Juan Duc(?). She was in the middle of the struggle. She was the public heart of the ANC within the RSA, not only in Johannesburg, but throughout the RSA. She was a leading figure in the resistance and the activities that went along with the resistance.

MR HATTINGH: And you were informed that Mabotha had joined her ranks?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would Mabotha have been an acceptable askari to you at Vlakplaas again?

MR DE KOCK: No, there was no chance that one could trust him again.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You say that you had the impression from Mr Potgieter's discussion that he was of the opinion that Mabotha could not be allowed to continue with such activities as these that you have just described now?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct. And I will add that those were my sentiments as well.

MR HATTINGH: So independently from him you also decided that Mabotha could not be allowed to continue with his activities with Mrs Mandela's so-called soccer club?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson I have no doubt in my mind that he would return.

MR HATTINGH: What did you then do as a result of this conversation that you had with Potgieter?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was talk of arrangements to meet each other there at De Deur. If my memory serves me correctly we did meet.

MR HATTINGH: Let us take it step-by-step. Was this appointment made during that discussion or were arrangements made for future contact?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was arranged that there would be a future contact, but this discussion then led to myself initiating arrangements for the death of Johannes Mabotha.

MR HATTINGH: And the later contact, what was discussed during that conversation? Was it also telephonic?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it was telephonic and it was arranged that we would meet each other a distance from the De Deur SAP and that was where we would make final arrangements of how Johannes Mabotha would be handed over to the members of Vlakplaas in such a manner that there wouldn't be any other witnesses surrounding his disappearance as such.

MR HATTINGH: Would that then be the day upon which Johannes Mabotha would have been released?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you, when you made your arrangements already decide that Mabotha would be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Which arrangements did you make in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: Firstly I made enquiries at Mr Vermeulen and Mr Snyman to determine whether they had a place where we could bury Mr Mabotha. In other words the idea or the framework of the idea had already been established for his death and, if I remember correctly, Mr Vermeulen told me that we could do this at Penge Mine. The problem with Penge Mine was that that area could be traced. Sometimes there would be cattle or livestock there and this grave could be traced. The suggestion was put that explosives be used to destroy Mabotha, in other words that there should be no traceable evidence to anything about him.

MR HATTINGH: Was a decision made regarding this proposal?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you give any orders to some of your members to prepare for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I created a group, Vermeulen and Snyman would prepare the explosives. They would go to Penge Mine. The equipment and the explosives would be of such a nature that they would not only deal with Mabotha's death that day or that evening, but they would also do shooting exercises. We had a great deal of phospho-grenades which we would use to ensure that any remains be destroyed or burnt or further broken down.

MR HATTINGH: Would this also serve as a cover for the explosion which was to take place there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: The cover would then be that you were there for training of some of the members, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been night ambush exercises.

MR HATTINGH: During which explosives would be used as well as guns and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: These two members independently of the rest of you would have proceeded to Penge Mine?

MR DE KOCK: Yes they did.

MR HATTINGH: Can we have some more particulars with regard to Penge Mine, what was it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a previous asbestos mine that was no longer in use, but it was also closed because of a high level, or there was a high storage of asbestos, or asbestos dust coming from it. But this area we later found, I am not sure by which process we found it but for the training of not only the askaris but as well as Vlakplaas members, white and black members, with all weaponry that there was of Eastern origin whether it was Nato or South African arms and we also did a fitness course there and intensive training courses there.

MR HATTINGH: This mine was in a very inhospitable area and quite remote.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's quite correct.

MR HATTINGH: And there were no people living in the vicinity there?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: And the asbestos dust that was there was a great health risk to people and that is why nobody lived in that vicinity?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The mine belonged to some or other mining group, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you need their permission to use the premises?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, written application was made and because there were some legal implications if a fire would ensue or anybody else would be injured the mine would not be responsible for this. We, however, did not give them the full agenda of our training there, amongst others that we would use Russian weapons there. But there was a type of contractual agreement with regard to that premises.

MR HATTINGH: And access to the mine itself, was this controlled? The road that leads to the mine was there any control there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, there was a gate there which was locked and one had to pass the guards or the security division of Penge Mine and one had to collect the keys for the gate from them and the members in control of the security division there had to be informed as to how long one would be there. I think there was some arrangement that if we were to use explosives that the people from the mine had to be informed so that there would be no unnecessary reaction or that anybody would be upset.

MR HATTINGH: Now you have given an instruction to two of the members to make the necessary arrangements for the material and equipment and to take it along and to depart and what were the further arrangements that you had made with regard to the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was another vehicle. We had a total of, I think it was three, but if I read the other applicants' application forms, and it seems that there were two, Wouter Mentz and I would move in one vehicle and we would monitor the activities there when Mabotha would be handed over to W/O Britz and Van Niekerk. I cannot recall that Flores was present, but I see he did apply ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Would they drive in another vehicle apart from Mentz?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct Chairperson. And then they would receive Mabotha from Colonel Potgieter but quite away from, and I refer here to about 500 metres or more from the De Deur police station.

MR HATTINGH: Why was it necessary for you to keep this reception of Mabotha away from the police station?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson so that there would be no eyewitnesses and nobody could say that he was handed over and that he was signed out there by some known person and that he was released. There would be no other evidence. It works for both sides, we are not identified and no finger could be pointed back to Colonel Potgieter Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Because at that stage the decision was already taken that he would be killed?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you depart with Mentz then to the vicinity of the De Deur police station?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I departed and I drove along with Mentz and there was a second vehicle with W/O Britz and W/O van Niekerk, and as I have heard here now, Sergeant Flores was present as well.

MR HATTINGH: Did you drive in a convoy or independently from each other?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson we drove together. We first drove past the turn-off to the De Deur police station and I would say about a kilometre or so and then we turned around in the direction of De Deur and then we made a U-turn there where we met with Colonel Potgieter where he waited along the roadside for us. And he, Colonel Potgieter, myself and the other members had a discussion there as to what would happen at that De Deur police station.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mabotha already in the vehicle of Mr Potgieter?

MR DE KOCK: No, we only discussed there how this process will take place so that there would be no evidence that he was handed over to other persons.

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand you correctly to say that the vehicle of Mr Potgieter was there and the vehicle that you were driving in was there as well as the vehicle of Britz and van Niekerk and Flores?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And from that position?

MR DE KOCK: After we had our discussion there Wouter Mentz and I departed and we turned left. In other words we moved in a westerly direction, in the direction of the De Deur police station. We drove past the police station and about 2-300 metres on the other side we made a U-turn and from there we could see what happens at the police station, as well as further on from the police station.

MR HATTINGH: What was the arrangement with regard to Brits and the other persons in the other vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they would drive on slowly after they had turned off to the police station. I was in radio contact with them, by means of a two-way radio and the arrangement was that Colonel Potgieter would, after he had signed out Mabotha, he would depart with him from there. He would drive in an easterly direction away from the police station and my vehicle, when I informed them of this, would make a U-turn in front of Colonel Potgieter's vehicle as he was approaching and they would be forced off the road and he would join them and he would hand Mabotha over to them.

MR HATTINGH: And according to your observation the operation did take place in that manner?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it did.

MR HATTINGH: And after you saw that Mabotha was handed over to Britz and company did they depart?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson they left for Penge Mine. Mentz and I - I first went back to Vlakplaas and I've thought about this, and I don't remember why there had to be something that had to be completed, but after we went to Vlakplaas Wouter Mentz and I went to the mine.

MR HATTINGH: Britz and company it was their instruction to go directly to - after they had picked up Mabotha, to depart for the mine?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: When you visited Vlakplaas did you also from there leave for the mine?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Once again only Mentz and yourself in the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And yours was the last of the three vehicles that arrived at Penge Mine?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: The others were already there when you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you tell us what happened there Mr de Kock.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson with our arrival there there was a fire going and some of the members would overnight there. Mabotha was sitting close to the fire. His hands were still cuffed. I went and sat down. I greeted him and I started questioning him with regard to the shooting of police officers. Afterwards I asked him where the weapons were and I asked him more than once if there are weapons where are they? I had no doubts that there were weapons when policemen were shot and he was very obstructive in that regard. He laughed at me.

I told the members let's walk down the hill and from there and we walked to the mine shaft ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: If you talk about the mine shaft you mean ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Ja we walked to the mine shaft and in my possession I had a .38 special. With our arrival at the mine shaft, as we moved down, I would say in a southerly direction to the left there was an amount of explosives. I think it was military explosive, PE4. I think it was a block of approximately 25 kilograms.

MR HATTINGH: Can you give us the measurements? How big is a block of 25 kilograms?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would say it's about as big as six landmines. It's difficult to explain it to you. I cannot give you the dimensions at this stage.

MR HATTINGH: There's a box there in front of the photographer on the floor there, is it bigger than that box there or smaller?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would say it's about four of those boxes.

MR HATTINGH: So it was reasonably big?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it was quite a large amount of explosives.

MR HATTINGH: So when you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: We walked in single file. That was the only manner in which we could walk before one gets to the mine shaft. I heard that somebody asked from behind, "who has the weapon, who has the weapon?". And at that stage Mabotha looked to the left and he saw the charge and I think a detonator was already attached to it and he turned around, he looked at me and it seemed like he wanted to say something, but from a short distance, however, it must have been two metres or less I shot him, two bullets in the heart.

Afterwards I would imagine, when I say I imagine, this is the recollection I have, I think that Snyman and Vermeulen took off his clothes and they dragged him to the block of explosives. I turned around and I walked away.

MR HATTINGH: Did you hear the explosion later?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I waited for them to return, and the explosion as far as I know was detonated by means of some electrical device.

MR HATTINGH: Can you remember if any shots were fired with machine guns to create the impression that it might have been some other attack?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would say that it did happen although I do not have any independent recollection thereof. This does not mean that it did not happen because that was the plan although I cannot really recall that machine guns were fired there, but I would say that it did happen.

MR HATTINGH: And did the members meet again afterwards?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. I think some of the members returned to the quarry to ensure that it was a complete detonation. It sounded to me like one, and we did meet afterwards but there was not a long discussion about the incident. Mentz and I departed from there back to Pretoria. The other members would have remained behind and the following day they would continue with an exercise, and the demolition of old charges as well as the phospho-grenades. The idea there would be to cover up any other remains.

MR HATTINGH: Did you report to any of the commanders with regard to the nature and scope of the operation which you were involved with?

MR DE KOCK: I did indeed report back to Brigadier Schoon that the askari who had run away would not bother us again. And the euphemism was that "he does not exist anymore". I can recall that, because at the same time I had to report damage to my vehicle because about 500 metres from Penge Mine a large Rottweiler ran in front of the vehicle and Mr Mentz knocked the dog and this created great damage to the front of the vehicle. I had to report that as well.

MR HATTINGH: Was any official documentation completed for which a reason was given as to how this damage was done to the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I mentioned to Brigadier Schoon that I will officially report this accident but I will report that I knocked a dog and ran over a dog but that it had happened on the Ben Schoeman highway.

MR HATTINGH: Did you report this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is how I reported it.

MR HATTINGH: Can you just briefly tell us why, in your judgement, it was necessary to kill Mr Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was no manner that a person would believe that he would not once again be involved in terrorism or the death of other police officers. It was foreseen that he would have gone back to Winnie Mandela. He did leave the country for training, in other words within that political context of that time he was guilty of treason. He was then a traitor to his own organisation, he became an askari and then he went back to his own organisation. And as I heard later he had decided to testify in the Stompie Sepei matter against Mrs Mandela, so I believe that neither us nor the ANC could have trusted him anymore.

MR HATTINGH: Did you during the interrogations where you were present, did he say that he would work along with the police again?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you knew he was a potential state witness did you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I could not say that I was fully informed about this but I had some information to that and I don't know where I got it from that he would indeed testify in the Stompie Sepei hearings.

MR HATTINGH: The Stompie Sepei matter, do you know whether this was completed before Mr Mabotha was killed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot remember. I don't have the dates. I am not sure.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether he ever gave evidence in that matter?

MR DE KOCK: No he did not.

MR HATTINGH: Do you say you don't know or that he did not?

MR DE KOCK: I will say that I am not aware of it. I don't have an independent recollection.

MR HATTINGH: During the initial discussion with Mr Potgieter did he ever inform you about how they obtained information that Mabotha was once again involved with the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Not Mr Potgieter, but at Marble Hall I was informed that this was done by means of tapping devices. MR HATTINGH: Whose phone was tapped?

MR DE KOCK: It would be Mrs Mandela's phone that was tapped.

ADV SANDI: Do you recall Colonel who gave that information to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I also gave evidence to that during my court trial, with my interrogation of Mabotha at Groblersdal or Marble Hall he mentioned that he had been abducted and held as some form of a sex slave, which was not acceptable to me. I didn't know of any such things that took place before. However, I spoke to a Captain Anton Pretorius, who was also with Soweto Security Branch, and he told me that among others, he, had listened to tapes and these would be tapes which contained recordings which indicated some form of a relationship between this Mabotha and ...(tape side A ends)

ADV SANDI: Who suggested that Mr Mabotha should be killed

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there wasn't any form of a suggestion. The nature of the discussion between me and Mr Potgieter at that stage, was that this man could not be allowed to walk about freely again; that policemen would be killed again. That was the information that I had from him. The decision for him to be killed, however, was my decision. I took that decision.

ADV SANDI: Did you tell Mr Potgieter that it was your idea that Mr Mabotha should be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, the impression that I had, and the form or manner of the discussion indicated that we could no longer afford for this man to be on the loose and to be able to participate in the killing of policemen. Mr Potgieter could by nature of the situation not give me any orders because he was junior to me in terms of rank.

ADV SANDI: As I understand it Mr Potgieter was not making any specific suggestion to you as to how Mr Mabotha should be prevented from walking around or from being free.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he didn't state that he should be released or that he should be held at a safe house in the Johannesburg vicinity or that he should be kept in some or other manner at a certain place and be protected there. There was no such proposal that he be brought to Vlakplaas and be detained there. I couldn't keep him at Vlakplaas because Vlakplaas didn't have any detention facilities. It was a premises where people would come and go, people who were working there or people who were supposed to be there. I could not detain him there especially because the situation was that he had already run away.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: If Mr Mabotha was merely to be taken to Vlakplaas by your team, was it necessary to do it in a secret manner?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the use or the custom of the Security Branch throughout the country was to bring people who had given evidence to us. We didn't take these people to them. So it wasn't necessary to go and fetch him in that manner with a vehicle that would be waiting and an appointment or rendezvous. They could have taken somebody from Soweto to bring him to us so that he could stay there.

MR SIBANYONI: How was your people at Vlakplaas operating? Would you go to any police station either to go and interrogate a detainee there?

MR DE KOCK: No, persons who were detained in terms of Section 29 would be recorded in a register, so that in that register it would also be recorded who was allowed to visit this person, and I, as commander of Vlakplaas would not be allowed to drive over to Soweto and say I want to see this Section 29 detainee. I would have to obtain permission from the investigating officer and also from the person who was detaining this person in terms of Section 29. Thus I didn't have free access to Section 29 detainees.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock this discussion between you and Mr Potgieter took place telephonically, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Would he, over the telephone, have said anything to you indicating that Mr Mabotha was to be killed in those terms, expressly and directly in those terms?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, that would not take place over the phone.

MR HATTINGH: Then how did you in the Security Police speak when a message was to be conveyed to the effect that somebody had to be killed or eliminated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson one would have made use, for example, of a word such as "this guy has to go through the gates". "This guy has to be led through". Or you would say, "this guy has to say goodbye". And if you used the word "say goodbye" then you would know that that meant that he would be saying goodbye in a permanent basis, that he would not return.

I remember during my time in the north of South West Africa the term was used, "these guys have to go", and that would mean that they would go into the field. So it was by means of euphemism or a police language that existed among a specific group of people.

MR HATTINGH: And was this the form of language that was used between you and Potgieter during this discussion?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, we couldn't allow this person to be let loose.

MR HATTINGH: What was your impression with that terminology?

MR DE KOCK: What I understood was that he would be released but that we couldn't allow him to go free and this created the impression that we had to remove him.

MR HATTINGH: In other words you had to kill him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because otherwise the whole cycle would begin from the beginning.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, and that is how you interpreted it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And this was also in agreement with your opinion of the matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, entirely.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Hattingh, can I just get this clear. This communication between yourself and Mr Potgieter, what exactly did Mr Potgieter say to you in terms of this terminology frequently used by the police you've just referred to?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the discussion would indicate in which direction we had to move in terms of any action that had to be taken, and here the terminology was that this person could not be let on the loose. We couldn't allow him to be let loose, because if we - we could not allow that and we could not allow him to be detained either. We couldn't also retain him in service because this would then lead to his death. That is what everything boiled down to.

ADV SANDI: Is that, I am trying to understand the essence of your evidence clearly in my mind, is that what Mr Potgieter was saying to you? Did he say this man should be "led through the gate", what exactly did he say?

MR DE KOCK: No he said that this person could not be let loose again. The words were "we cannot allow that this person be let loose again". So it wasn't a case of only me or Mr Potgieter, I am putting it in broad terms, that in the police or that the police or the Security Police could not allow this man to be let loose again. So this is not something that I would like to hold Potgieter solely responsible for.

ADV SANDI: On the day Mabotha is released did you not Mr Potgieter again on a person-to-person basis? Didn't you see him there on the scene, or in the vicinity where Mr Mabotha was released didn't you see Mr Potgieter and speak with him there?

MR DE KOCK: Where he was handed over - yes he was at the scene where Mr Mabotha was handed over. He handed Mr Mabotha over to the members who took him through to Penge Mine.

ADV SANDI: Was there any further discussion between yourself and Mr Potgieter as to what should happen to Mr Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it was already a done deal. After we met on that road, before we went to De Deur it was already a done thing that Mr Mabotha would not go to Vlakplaas. However I didn't tell Mr Potgieter where I was taking Mr Mabotha to. I didn't tell him that I was taking him to Penge Mine.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Whatever the wording may have been, or the words may have been that were used during the telephone discussion, you understood from that that Mr Potgieter indicated that Mr Mabotha was to be removed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I had no doubt about that.

MR HATTINGH: And once again just to emphasise, you are not saying that he gave you the order, because he was not in a rank that was superior enough, and furthermore, he was not connected to the same unit as you to be able to give you an order?

MR DE KOCK: No he did not give the order.

MR HATTINGH: He took this as a proposal or a suggestion?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you agreed with it and from your side decided yes, a plan had to be made to deal with Mr Mabotha.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I decided that Mr Mabotha would not move around freely anymore.

MR HATTINGH: Were any enquiries made at Vlakplaas regarding Mr Mabotha after you had killed him at Penge Mine?

MR DE KOCK: No, no further enquiries were made at Vlakplaas, be it by means of telex or telephone or any other form of communication to determine whether or not he was still available as a witness.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me this would be a convenient stage to take the short adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE A DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Before the cross-examination starts can I just try to clarify things a little in my own mind. When did Mr Mabotha come to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot give you an exact date. I would say that he had been at Vlakplaas for approximately six months already when this incident of his defection took place. However, I am putting this very generally because I cannot give you specific dates.

CHAIRPERSON: There for six months and then he disappeared?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And as a I understand you then heard that he had been arrested?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: How long later, after he had left you, how much time elapsed before you were told that he had been arrested?

MR DE KOCK: I will attempt to speculate as closely to the truth as possible, but I would say that it was approximately a month to six weeks later.

CHAIRPERSON: So he had been out at liberty for a month to six weeks?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was arrested and - when was he detained in terms of Section 29?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot give you that date, but I know that after we had been at Marble Hall and he was left at the Security Branch of Soweto he was detained after that in Soweto. During the trial in Johannesburg I heard that there was a period of time between his arrest at Marble Hall after the interrogation where he was detained in terms of Section 29. I think that was a period of about two months, I think. I cannot give evidence about that because I simply obtained that from the records.

CHAIRPERSON: So he was arrested about six weeks after he left. He was detained, interrogated, tortured....

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And then after that he was detained in terms of Section 29.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So when he was tortured at Marble Hall he was not a Section 29 detainee?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because this was a very serious torture wasn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, yes it was very serious.

CHAIRPERSON: And were you there when ice was put into his anus?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was at that stage when Bellingan and I left because I had never heard of such a method of interrogation, I had never observed it, or at least not then and not after that. I am not aware of any interrogation or any interrogation value that that sort of action would have.

CHAIRPERSON: And no information was obtained from him despite all this torture, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson as far as I am aware there was nothing except that which I observed in 1998, in January in Johannesburg. I have no independent recollection of any additional information, and as I have stated my objective was to determine what he had to say about Vlakplaas, anything regarding Vlakplaas. That was what I was interested in.

CHAIRPERSON: And he'd had a month to six weeks to tell anybody anything he wanted to about Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was no question of preventing him telling things, he had already had the opportunity to do so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, one would have wanted to know what the nature of that may have been because there was also a situation of damage control. Was it necessary to move certain people? Who of the askaris were all known? Possibly we would have had to change telephone numbers. It would have been things in that line.

CHAIRPERSON: When was this? How long after this that you wanted to find out this, January '98?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson that was when I found that out in terms of documentation that was obtained, but during his assault at Marble Hall I had no knowledge of any documentation which was obtained and I have no recollection of that either.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Cornelius on behalf of Britz, Snyman, Vermeulen and Flores.

Colonel de Kock how old was Johannes Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I cannot recall.

MR CORNELIUS: Was he a young man or an older man?

MR DE KOCK: He was reasonably young.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you recall how he was recruited for Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because the recruitment was not managed by us.

MR CORNELIUS: When he was taken in as an askari did you have faith in him?

MR DE KOCK: By nature of the situation, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you entrust him with any confidential information, expose him to anything confidential?

MR DE KOCK: No, except the confidential information that he would have received which would probably have been photographs of ANC or PAC members who were operating at that time in an area, and their last known whereabouts would have been the confidential information that he had access to.

MR CORNELIUS: And would he have obtained information by means of communication with other askari members and other members of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes he would have been able to determine information about past actions. That is an unfortunate fact.

MR CORNELIUS: So is it correct to say that he would have had information which was very sensitive for Vlakplaas operations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if he had such information it would have been of a very sensitive nature.

MR CORNELIUS: And if this information due to the clandestine covert operation of Vlakplaas had been exposed to any of the public this would have been a very dangerous situation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and this would also have influenced the affectivity of Vlakplaas and would have been a source of embarrassment, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And as you have testified a week ago, where you gave your background evidence regarding the handling and the management of Vlakplaas an askari who turned, to put it as such, or committed treason against Vlakplaas would be a very dangerous person to have walking about?

MR DE KOCK: Yes because he would have additional knowledge that he would not have beforehand.

MR CORNELIUS: And you used the word, or the phrase "damage control", but if he had the opportunity during this month to six weeks that he had away from you, if he had the opportunity to make this information known this would have been a security risk and you had to protect the security of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if possible one would have to do what one could.

MR CORNELIUS: Is this similar to the problem that we had with Motherwell at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. In that case it was more a question of an operation or operations which had taken place in the PE environment.

MR CORNELIUS: However you would also have to protect the members and possibly change telephone numbers, as you have stated, and cover-up certain pieces of information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, one would attempt to protect the unit and its activities as far as possible because I believe that Vlakplaas in certain aspects was no longer such a secret if we can refer to the defection of an ANC member, known as Johannes Mnisi and so forth, what one would have to do in such a situation would be to determine as far as possible any damage which may have been incurred and then act accordingly to limit the extent of the damage.

MR CORNELIUS: Correct. You are aware of the fact that Johannes Mabotha was indeed a security risk for Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, by nature of his defection to the Winnie Mandela Football Club he would then undoubtedly be a security risk.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes. The Winnie Mandela Football Club, would you say that it was a very strong, militarist, almost aggressive organisation which was active at that point in time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I would concede that, it was.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you have any proof that he was involved in the youth league?

MR DE KOCK: No, not that I can recall.

MR CORNELIUS: But the fact that he liaised with and participated in the Football Club was an indication to you that he was actively involved with the enemy?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he had gone back to the heart of the ANC if I might put it that way with regard to internal activities.

MR CORNELIUS: You had no direct or first hand knowledge that he was involved in the death of policemen, is that what you heard?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is what I was informed about.

MR CORNELIUS: When he was tortured at Marble Hall, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: If you had intended to kill him you could have killed him there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson one could possibly have done it there. One might just as well have said let's do this later, a week later or two weeks later.

MR CORNELIUS: But the decision that you took was that after he had been detained in terms of Section 29, and after Potgieter had telephoned you, you took that decision. That's when you formulated it?

MR DE KOCK: Could you just repeat that.

MR CORNELIUS: You motivated the decision to kill him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was after that telephonic discussion. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: If you had killed him at Marble Hall it would have been known to all the members of the Security Police, would it not? There would have been no secrecy at all.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, unless one could have told one of the persons to remain behind and told the others to go back. But after he was arrested by the Soweto Security Branch he had been removed from Vlakplaas' hands. We had nothing further to do with him. He was beyond our control and he had been taken off the unit.

MR CORNELIUS: Now the question may be put to you, what was your political motivation in killing him? Could you briefly explain that to us.

MR DE KOCK: Yes I have already mentioned this. It was that he could not be allowed to join the organisation once again, the organisation of Mrs Mandela and the ANC, and that we could not allow the further killing of policemen. And we could not allow him to participate in further terrorist activities.

MR CORNELIUS: And the Football Club, would you say that this was - I beg your pardon Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: What was - you've told us you could not permit the further killing of policemen, but so far, as I understand it, all you had heard was that he was involved in the killing of policemen in two shebeens. Hardly political of necessity is it? I have heard many cases over the years where policemen have been involved in shootings in shebeens and they haven't been of a political nature.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct Chairperson, but we had Mr Mabotha who was a military trained member of the ANC and after he turned against the ANC and found himself with the Security Police and then once again returned to the ANC it is my contention that he acted in the name of that organisation.

MR CORNELIUS: So what you are doing in effect is you are dividing it into two aspects. On the one hand you knew about the deaths of policemen, but on the other hand you regarded him as having returned to the ANC, and in that regard once again he had become part of the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: He was once again a member of the ANC because of the fact that he was with Mrs Mandela and her group or her unit.

MR CORNELIUS: Ja. At that stage was the Mandela Football Club regarded as a political organisation or what was the opinion surrounding the organisation?

MR DE KOCK: I don't believe that they were presented as a political organisation but it was accepted as a given because of their actions against the public and others. It wasn't that they actually played any soccer.

MR CORNELIUS: Was your political objective to prevent any further cooperation between Johannes Mabotha and the military wing of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, by nature of the situation.

MR CORNELIUS: And at the same time to protect the sensitive information regarding Vlakplaas, to prevent it from ending up in the wrong hands.

MR DE KOCK: The information regarding Vlakplaas which Mr Mabotha could have given through was at that stage of a secondary nature because he could already have given it. We don't know whether or not this was made known to Mrs Mandela or other members of the ANC. I would not be able to say whether or not that information had been processed. Personally I never received any documentation from Security sources which indicated that there had been leaks and that this information which was leaked had been processed and traced back to Vlakplaas so there is a grey area in that regard.

MR CORNELIUS: You determined from your discussion with Colonel Potgieter that it would have been expected to permanently eliminate this person?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Would this action of yours to kill him have enjoyed the approval of the senior officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I have no doubt about that.

MR CORNELIUS: It would have been regarded as the correct action by you under these circumstances?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it is correct that as the commander of Vlakplaas, or the operational unit, I had to take decisions. It was expected of me to take decisions and I couldn't keep on running to head office with every request.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. Now the foot soldiers, or the other members who received orders from you obtained these instructions on a strictly need-to-know basis?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And I am referring specifically to members such as Britz, Snyman, Vermeulen and Flores?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: There would have been no doubt among these members that there was indeed a political objective in killing this person?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all. We didn't simply grab this person off the streets and kill him somewhere or blow him up somewhere.

MR CORNELIUS: And with the order at Vlakplaas, you already indicated to Snyman and Vermeulen that there would be an action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the interrogation component was just something that I would have done myself. I would have wanted to know where these weapons were.

MR CORNELIUS: And the information which was made known?

MR DE KOCK: No that aspect had already been finished off at Marble Hall. I did not do anything further about it.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well.

MR SIBANYONI: Didn't you say after, or on the arrival at Penge Mine you in fact asked him where are the weapons? Was that not part of your intending to find out where the weapons were?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did ask him where there were weapons or where the weapons were. That was as a result of the fact that policemen had been shot. This was information that had been conveyed to me, however, it would not have changed anything regarding his fate at that stage. That aspect was already in full swing.

MR SIBANYONI: You were just putting the questions. It was not necessarily an interrogation, trying to find some information?

MR DE KOCK: No it wasn't a protracted situation. I simply asked him where the weapons were, he looked at me and he laughed at me in a certain manner, in a manner of saying "you can ask if you want to but I am not going to tell you", and that's when I said, "okay let's go".

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Cornelius.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Sibanyoni.

At the scene is it correct that you gave Flores the order to fetch a weapon for you and that he placed you in possession of a firearm?

MR DE KOCK: No that is not correct, I already had the firearm with me when I went to sit by the fire and asked Mabotha where the weapons were.

MR CORNELIUS: I know that this took place a long time ago and it may be possible that his recollection is not complete.

MR DE KOCK: I would concede that.

MR CORNELIUS: And at the scene itself can you recall that Vermeulen and Britz dealt with the body and placed explosives around it?

MR DE KOCK: I can recall Vermeulen, after Mabotha had been shot, but I can't recall that anybody else was involved with that because I left.

MR CORNELIUS: And a further factor was that it was dark, I assume?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. My recollection is that it wasn't all that dark but the others recall it as being quite dark. I would not dispute this however, I would accept if they say that it was very dark.

MR CORNELIUS: And I understand that the vehicles were parked above and that the lights of the vehicles were on and that there was a measure of light as a result of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I have no recollection of any lights whatsoever, and I will reiterate in that aspect that no vehicle lights had been switched on.

MR CORNELIUS: Were there torches?

MR DE KOCK: That is possible.

MR CORNELIUS: But that would indicate that the identities of persons at the scene of the incident may be in danger?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Is it correct that Vermeulen and Snyman fired cover shots while Britz managed the detonation of the explosives?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have any recollection of that. I have an independent recollection of the explosion and that we departed after that, but I have no recollection of machine-gun fire, but this would have formed part of the planning which was undertaken before we went ahead with the operation.

MR CORNELIUS: After the interrogation at Marble Hall did you have any doubt in your mind that Mabotha would return to the police or not return to the police, that he would return to the enemy?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't know what his situation would be after that. I had nothing further to do with it. As I have stated he was left in the hands of the Soweto Security Branch and I went ahead with my work.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you listen to the tapes of the telephone discussions or not?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR CORNELIUS: You simply heard about them?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you also rely upon the judgement of Colonel Potgieter as a security officer who had taken a decision about this person's possible danger, did this play a role in your mind, his decision-taking?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had no reason to doubt his version whatsoever.

MR CORNELIUS: So you had no reason to doubt his instruction either?

MR DE KOCK: He didn't give any instruction to me. It was more of a request and those were my sentiments as well.

MR CORNELIUS: But that was also the custom among the Security sectors and Vlakplaas that you would receive a request from a Security division to perform a certain task and then you would perform this task?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And in this case did you regard it as a request that you received from the Soweto Security Branch and then you had to take a decision to carry this out to the best of your ability?

MR DE KOCK: Well I wouldn't want to use the term request. I would say that it was more a question of consensus surrounding the possible behaviour of Mabotha if he were to be set free.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes but the point that I am trying to make is that it wasn't only your judgement which served the political objective in killing this person, there must have been some form of judgement on a higher level within the security forces.

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that it was higher because then somebody else would have to give evidence about that. From my side in terms of the discussion this situation developed and I don't want to put any unnecessary blame on anybody.

MR CORNELIUS: But let me just say then that there was a consensus between yourself and other sectors of the security forces.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if people knew the right button to press then they would get the desired reaction.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman I have explained in chambers the position of client Klopper who must still arrive here at the hearings. I did not have an opportunity, in view of his circumstances, to consult with him in detail regarding this particular incident. I will proceed, however, with questions as far as it is, at this stage, possible. If necessary I will have to come back later then depending on the instructions. Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock can you remember by exactly whom, when you arrived at Marble Hall, was Mabotha at that stage arrested and by whom? By the Marble Hall branch or the Soweto Branch or do you know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson as far as I know he was arrested at Marble Hall and he was detained at Marble Hall. I don't know who executed the arrest though.

MR LAMEY: But according to you at that stage he was already arrested at Marble Hall?

MR DE KOCK: Yes he was already in detention.

MR LAMEY: You don't know whether it was by the Soweto Security Branch and by whom specifically?

MR DE KOCK: No I don't know.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall who was in command of the Soweto Security Branch during that detention at Marble Hall when the Soweto members were there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson during my evidence in January 1998 I can only remember Major Grobbelaar. I cannot remember the other members. It seemed later that if I look at the other applicants that there were other members and these would be the persons whom I liaised with at that point.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Can you recall persons like Captain du Toit, Captain Jacobs and van Tonder?

MR DE KOCK: I can recall W/O van Tonder somewhere but for Major du Toit and the other members, Jacobs, no, I cannot remember them here.

MR LAMEY: But whom of the Soweto members were the highest in rank?

MR DE KOCK: It would have been Major Grobbelaar as far as I can recall.

MR LAMEY: Is it Grobler or Grobbelaar?

MR DE KOCK: I think it's Grobbelaar.

MR LAMEY: And was he chief of the Security Branch as such or was he just in command of a certain section?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he was in control of the counter-terrorist group at Soweto Security Branch and also the tracing of terrorists, and the combatting of terrorism.

MR LAMEY: This counter-terrorism, let's call it unit of the Soweto Branch, would this be the same unit where Klopper was attached to at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: At that stage I did not know he was specifically attached to that group. He was not known to me Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: The persons who participated in the assault, specifically at Marble Hall, were these members of the Soweto Security Branch and yourself and Bellingan?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot place Bellingan here. I do not have independent memory that he was involved there. He was not present - yes he was present, but I cannot bind him to anything there though Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall what the focus of the interrogation was? What information was received or what information were you interested in, in getting from Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I cannot give you specific details. If I did have it I would have elaborated on it.

MR LAMEY: So it would seem that at that stage by means of tapping devices that Mabotha had contact with Mrs Winnie Mandela, and you refer to the group, the so-called Soccer Club, did you have that knowledge when you arrived at Marble Hall? Or did you get that information there?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I think somebody mentioned that they had picked him up along the lines. They did not tell me along which lines, whether it was telephone lines or whether it was by listening devices within a house. I cannot specifically recall.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Lamey. You have asked him if, when he went to the Marble Hall police station he had this information and - can you repeat, did he have this information when you went to Marble Hall, that Mabotha was already a member of the Winnie Football Club?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am not sure, but what I can recall from this discussion was that Mabotha was caught. He went back to the ANC. That is my memory. That information could have been given to me at Marble Hall but I don't have a memory of that.

MR LAMEY: So what your recollection is at that stage, when he was detained at Marble Hall, that he had indeed walked back to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was indeed very active for the ANC Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You just did not have any details as to who his contacts were and what his involvement precisely was?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but I did receive that later. I cannot say whether it was conveyed in an official capacity or whether it was just by word of mouth between the members.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether there was an interrogation with regard to the identities of these other comrades and with regard to the weapon caches?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would accept that it might have been because that might have been the purpose of the interrogation. I can, however, not recall any specific incident or answer that he had given there.

MR LAMEY: So you understand that if he had joined up with the ANC again, he was an MK member previously, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Ja, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: And did you understand that his rejoining the ANC that he became involved or would be involved with activities within the borders of the country with regard to ANC and MK?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he infiltrated the country as a trained MK member with the purpose of committing acts of terror and afterwards, after he left Vlakplaas he turned back to that level.

MR LAMEY: But you cannot give the precise detail with regard to the interrogation but in general with regard to such a person the subjects of the interrogation would be weaponry, where it is hidden ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes it would be arms ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: The identity of other MK members and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and who he had contact with amongst others Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Could you deny that he gave information as to the identity of his contacts, where they might be, and where weapons were hidden?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot deny it.

MR LAMEY: Klopper says in his application and I would just have to confirm in consultation with him with regard to this aspect, but he has said in his application, that after he was interrogated at Marble Hall he went back to the Soweto Security offices and he says that there were members or teams of Vlakplaas askaris who participated there in the interrogation. Can you recall whether askaris were sent there for the purpose of helping with the identification and to verify information that was received from him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I will accept it as correct because on a permanent basis in Soweto as well as in the Eastern Transvaal we had a permanent group who worked on a monthly basis so it could be that askari groups were there.

MR LAMEY: So in other words askaris were not sent specifically by you there after he went to Soweto but there could have been askaris in the vicinity who were used there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson, because every month with every deployment a specific group was sent to Soweto as well as the Eastern Transvaal.

MR LAMEY: I don't know whether you will know or whether you have heard but he was taken to ...(tape 1 ends)

...during the interrogation and the assault were members of Marble Hall also present?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I think one or two members accompanied him but I have the idea that they withdrew later. I have a vague memory that they withdrew later.

MR LAMEY: Is it your recollection that you were the person why hung him upside down?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson I could not have done it alone but some other members have helped me out.

MR LAMEY: Yes I will accept that but you played a role there is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, yes I did play a role there.

MR LAMEY: Were you present when the ice cubes were used and were pushed up his anus?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I saw it Chairperson, and as I have said that at that stage I think Bellingan and I decided to leave. As I have said because I have never seen it before and never again afterwards and I don't know what interrogation value can be attached to it and my personal feeling is that it is deviant, I have never done it before, and I've never heard about it or read about it until I saw it there. This was entirely a new facet.

MR LAMEY: But would you accept that although you did not use it that it might be a technique or method to force cooperation from persons, as for example in other instances where you would use tubing and to hang him upside down, this was all part of the methods to extract information?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson. I have been involved in many interrogations, there is a wide variety and it does not have to do with injuring persons. The best method is probably to place a person under lots of pressure and tension by binding his hands or legs, but this developed into an art, but this business with the ice, I don't know Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Can we accept Mr de Kock that with this person that his manner of behaviour could be regarded as treason, that serious techniques could be expected with regard to his interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I would just like to mention that I cannot understand, and it is something that I have wondered about, what do reach by pressing ice into a person's body?

CHAIRPERSON: It's a form of torture. What do you reach by putting a tube over his head so he can't breathe?

MR DE KOCK: Well you smother than person and this would lead to several bodily reactions, but what does ice do? Right up to today I cannot think what ice would do if you press it up his anus.

MR LAMEY: But you will accept that it is probably an extreme measure, but it's a method of torture?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson, this was the first and last time that I saw this method. I don't know if it is a torturing method. I am not saying that it does not have any effect, but I have never gone to a doctor and asked him what would the effect be. Maybe somebody else has done it.

MR LAMEY: So it might have been a senseless method and this person might have thought that it might have had some effect?

MR DE KOCK: It could be Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Well I do not want to belabour this point, but what I want to understand is that he was seriously assaulted and interrogated and the purpose thereof was because he went back to the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: Had people been drinking there that night?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, this happened in the evening.

CHAIRPERSON: Well during that day.

MR DE KOCK: Not as far as I know Chairperson, because I did not drink and also Bellingan.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the ice doing there? Where did it come from?

MR DE KOCK: I have no idea Chairperson. I know Major Grobbelaar is a person who did not drink at all or but well I would say he did not drink and I did not see any of the other members drink anything. And I don't know where the ice came from.

MR LAMEY: Was this on a farm where he was interrogated? Was there a place where you could find ice close by?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson there was a type of hunting hut. It was just some type of construction. I don't know whether it was made of wood and asbestos but there was no house as such there.

MR LAMEY: It was not uncommon in the ranks of the Security Police when persons who joined up with the ANC, and who were specifically MK members that such methods, we speak in general, these serious techniques by smothering them and suffocating them, tubing them and to assault them, hit and kick them, was used to extract information from these persons and specifically where this person returned from positions which was regarded as a traitor.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this was the normal practice.

ADV SANDI: Sorry if I can just come in here. Was Mr Mabotha injured as a result of these assaults?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I saw at some stage that there was blood on his lips and on the inside of his mouth. Later it seemed that he was dehydrated because his lips were very dry and they were chapped and cracked, not because he was hit but because of dehydration; and he had some abrasion marks. And I would believe that he had some muscle injury because of the use of the smothering technique, the tubing, one works very hard with this person. At some stage he walked with some difficulty as well.

ADV SANDI: Was he still able to talk at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he could still talk.

ADV SANDI: Was he screaming?

MR DE KOCK: No he never screamed and it was previously said that he was very tough, or he was hardened or he had a high pain threshold, higher than most others.

MR LAMEY: Would you regard him as a hardened person?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but I would not say in a bad sense. He was probably just very determined.

MR LAMEY: I speak from a perception of the Security members.

MR DE KOCK: Let me put it this way, I was very impressed with his perseverance.

MR LAMEY: Major Grobbelaar was he present at any time during the interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he was there but he did not participate in the assaults or that he administrated it or orchestrated it.

MR LAMEY: Your interest in this interrogation and the assault, what was the purpose thereof?

MR DE KOCK: It was he was a previous member of Vlakplaas and if we could get some more information with regard to him, but it was to find out what damage he had already done, if he had identified people from Vlakplaas and whether he identified the place itself. I however, do not have a recollection of any pertinent information which he had given.

MR LAMEY: But could one say that the Security Branch, with this interrogation, was interested in specific information from their side. It's not something that you can comment on but from your side, with Vlakplaas, you were also interested in certain information and that was your point of departure.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: What was your rank at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: I am not sure, I think I was a major, I think so.

MR LAMEY: So you and Major Grobbelaar were equal in rank?

MR DE KOCK: He was my senior by two or three years.

MR LAMEY: But you were the highest in rank there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman I have got no further questions at this stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, Roelof du Plessis on record, on behalf of Mr Mentz. May I apologise that I wasn't here when the proceedings started and neither for a part of the proceedings. I am sure you know what my position is Mr Chairman.

I have no questions for this witness, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: There do appear to be certain differences, don't there, between Mentz's version and this one?

MR DU PLESSIS: There are certain differences Mr Chairman. I have considered those differences and I don't intend taking them up with the witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock at the start of your evidence this morning you were led by Advocate Hattingh to the effect that you were involved in many incidents and today you do not have a clear recollection of all of them. Do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: This incident, this Mabotha incident, is this one where you have a clear recollection or not?

MR DE KOCK: Certain aspects one would recall better than others Chairperson and I do not want to attribute it to anything but that is what happens.

MR WAGENER: Mr Grobbelaar, my client, he informs me that information was gathered by means of telephone tapping, that one George, and it seemed later that this was Mabotha, that he had contacted Mrs Mandela and that he was a military trained terrorist who had infiltrated the country. But that's a long statement, can you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: He also informs me that at that stage, and this is the stage directly preceding the arrest at Marble Hall, that Mabotha could not be linked to a specific act of terror.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would not know, I was not restricted to that vicinity there, I worked on a national basis, but I would think that Mr Grobbelaar would know better.

MR WAGENER: But because of the factors which I mentioned in the previous statement, that in the light thereof Mabotha had enjoyed the attention of Grobbelaar's unit.

MR DE KOCK: I concede that.

MR WAGENER: He says further that because of these listening devices, or listening to one of these conversations that he and one of his members went to Marble Hall to arrest Mabotha there. Do you know of this?

MR DE KOCK: I know he was arrested, but I am not sure by whom and I have mentioned it already.

MR WAGENER: And directly after the arrest Mabotha had immediately said that he was one of Vlakplaas' askaris.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I was not at the scene but I would concede that he might have done that.

MR WAGENER: He contacted head office in Soweto and was later informed that it was indeed correct that Mabotha was an askari but that he had run away.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I don't remember that.

MR WAGENER: And that somebody from head office in Soweto, he doesn't know whom, had liaised with you in this regard and because of that liaison you left for Marble Hall.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, my memory is that it was Major Grobbelaar but this is the memory that I have.

MR WAGENER: Yes he says but it was not him who spoke to you but somebody from his unit. He says that he remained at Marble Hall, well he was at Marble Hall during that time.

MR DE KOCK: Well I won't dispute it.

MR WAGENER: How many persons from your unit went to Marble Hall?

MR DE KOCK: It was only W/O Bellingan and myself.

MR WAGENER: With how many vehicles?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know we drove in one vehicle.

MR WAGENER: Are you sure that it was only Bellingan and yourself? What do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: The recollection that I have is that it was Bellingan and myself and that we had spent the night in Marble Hall or in the vicinity thereof.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock Mr Grobbelaar's instruction is that the following morning there were quite a number of your unit arrived at Marble Hall, more than just Bellingan.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I don't remember that. As far as I know it was only myself and Bellingan.

MR WAGENER: He says that there was another vehicle, a kombi-type vehicle with a few black members from Vlakplaas, do you know of this?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no.

MR WAGENER: Do you deny it or can you not remember?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot remember.

MR WAGENER: You have also said previously or earlier when Mr Lamey questioned you that Mr Grobbelaar, on this particular day was present on the farm, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: Are you sure that he was there, do you remember it, or are you guessing, are you drawing some inference or do you not know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson my memory is that he was there.

MR WAGENER: Can you recall anything about the fact that Mr Grobbelaar had mechanical problems that day?

MR DE KOCK: No I cannot.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock Mr Grobbelaar's instruction is that he directly after your arrival at the farm on that morning, he went back to Marble Hall where he spent the whole day at a mechanics workshop where they did some work on his car. He only arrived later that day, after four, at the farm. Can you dispute that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't know.

MR WAGENER: That is his instruction to me. In other words he basically the whole day he was not present at the farm.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Am I right in saying that your recollection is that you left the farm at about four, you and Bellingan?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, at some stage when the interrogation took a certain direction we left the farm and it was still daylight then.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock Mr Grobbelaar says that when he came back to the farm you were still there. He says so. So he met with you there along with all the other persons that were there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't have the memory of that. I cannot remember that Mr Grobbelaar left the farm. My recollection is that he was there.

MR WAGENER: Can you recall Mr de Kock whether Mabotha, during the day's interrogation, had given any information with regard to arms that were hidden somewhere?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I don't have an independent recollection and I don't even have a vague one.

MR WAGENER: Mr Grobbelaar says that when he arrived back at the farm you informed him that Mabotha during the day would have said that he knows where weapons are hidden and this would have been at a place by the name of Toekomsrus, it's apparently not very far from Soweto. Can you recall anything like that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I can't.

MR WAGENER: Is it possible?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know because I have no recollection that such information was given to me, not the name Toekomsrus, I don't have a memory of that.

MR WAGENER: Mr Grobbelaar says further that he was never present at the farm while Mabotha was assaulted or was tortured. Can you remember, can you dispute that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot remember. As I said I saw him there. I have no memory, I cannot recall that he had left the farm, that something was wrong with his vehicle and that he had arrived later again, I don't know Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr Grobbelaar says further that he and one of his members and Mabotha then departed from there, from the farm, in his vehicle back to the Witwatersrand vicinity and that all the others who were there, you included, left more-or-less at the same time.

MR DE KOCK: I didn't see when Mr Grobbelaar departed, also not when Mabotha left. I think Bellingan and I had already left.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore Mr Grobbelaar states that during the journey back to the Witwatersrand Mabotha, among others stated, that he had realised that he had made a great mistake by defecting and that he very much wanted to work with Vlakplaas again. Do you have anything to say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I have no knowledge of that. This was never conveyed to me. Furthermore it was never said to me that Mabotha wanted to come and work for Vlakplaas again.

MR WAGENER: Mr Grobbelaar also states that upon arrival in the Soweto area Mabotha made three indications or identifications to him and his members but no weapons could be found?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: That afterwards they returned to the Soweto police station and that was already the following morning where Grobbelaar gave instruction to one of his members, du Toit, to take a thorough statement from Mabotha. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson I know nothing of that.

MR WAGENER: And that Mr Grobbelaar then departed from there to attend to his vehicle once again because apparently the vehicle had been giving problems on the way back, and that he, Grobbelaar, after that never again saw Mabotha. Do you wish to comment?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I find it difficult to comment regarding statements made by Mr Grobbelaar. I can only say that I don't know about these matters.

MR WAGENER: Thus the crux, Mr de Kock, of Mr Grobbelaar's version is actually just that

1. He was not on the farm that day when the alleged assaults were to have taken place;

2. that he doesn't know anything about any assault or torture.

MR DE KOCK: That is Mr Grobbelaar's version, I cannot give any testimony regarding that.

MR WAGENER: Regarding Brig Schoon ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Have you finished with Grobbelaar now? So you are not going to put any version as to what happened or did not happen to the statement taken by du Toit?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman I specifically asked Mr Grobbelaar about it and he said to me he can't remember what happened to that, so I couldn't put it to the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: No, another don't remember. Carry on.

MR WAGENER: Regarding Brigadier Schoon I would just like to put a few questions to you. Precisely what did you tell Brigadier Schoon after the entire operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I told him that the problem that we had experienced with the askari who had defected did no longer exist, the problem no longer existed. And upon that I informed him of the damage to my vehicle ...(intervention)

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, did you tell him that the askari no longer existed?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: Were those your words?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell him the "askari no longer existed" or the "problem no longer existed"?

MR DE KOCK: Well the "problem" Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Thus the problem no longer existed?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: Is that what you said?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and the problem was the askari.

MR WAGENER: But you misunderstand I think that is what the Chairperson is driving at. The problem didn't exist anymore or the askari didn't exist anymore?

MR DE KOCK: Well the problem was the askari Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Thus the problem no longer existed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and for that reason neither did the askari.

MR WAGENER: And you say, or your further evidence is that, if I can recall correctly, Brigadier Schoon didn't really react to this or could you at least tell me what his response was?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson Brigadier Schoon's response to this sort of admission was usually a nod of the head. He was known as a "stil Willem". He was not the type of person who would require an exhaustive explanation of things. He would simply nod his head and we would all carry on with our daily activities.

MR WAGENER: Can you recall Mr de Kock, that in October 1989, that would be the month during which this alleged discussion took place, can you recall that this was Brigadier Schoon's final month of service in the police and upon the end of that month he retired with pension?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I do not have date upon which he retired. If Mr Wagener proposes that that is the date of his retirement I would accept that.

MR WAGENER: Can you also recall that this was also the month, the same month coincidentally during which Almond Nofomela made his statements from the death cell and that the McNally/Conradie investigation, if I might put it that way, was launched in that very same month?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am not certain of the date of that but it did take place during that period of time. That was when the Vrye Weekblad began with its reports.

MR WAGENER: In other words that in October 1989 there was a period of great uproar at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, not only at Vlakplaas but more so at head office or Security head office.

MR WAGENER: Yes. My instruction from Brigadier Schoon is that it is possible that during that final month of his period of service he may have had one or more discussions with you. He says probably quite a few discussions. However, he tells me, Mr de Kock, that if you had tried to convey something about Mr Mabotha to him you must have done it in such a way that he would not have been able to conclude from that that you had murdered Mabotha.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the implication was clear that we were away and that that person, or that problem no longer existed. In that very same month Major Baker, Brigadier Schoon and I travelled to the Western Transvaal, he was busy with his farewell to various places and we accompanied him, and it was there that the next murder was discussed, the murder of an unknown person from Mafikeng.

MR WAGENER: Yes I accept that this incident will be the subject of a later amnesty hearing and then we will deal with this later.

The fact of the matter remains Mr de Kock, that Brigadier Schoon maintains that if he had known that you had murdered somebody, that he would definitely have questioned this, despite the fact that he was a man of very few words, if not just to find out who, what, where and when.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson with our attack on Lesotho in 1985 I telephoned him from the Security Branch in Ladybrand and briefly informed him regarding what had happened. He didn't ask any further questions and even after that the entire operation, as serious as it was, and with all the international implications that it held, it was never again discussed. He never asked any questions about it.

MR WAGENER: But that's not a good example because we know that Brigadier Schoon was part of the chain of command. In that instance he was directly involved. He himself is also requesting amnesty for that incident, and this will also still be the source of another amnesty hearing. This is not a very good example that you are using.

Mr de Kock, Brigadier Schoon maintains that although he was a man of very few words he was also not a prophet or a clairvoyant and he has no knowledge that any words were uttered to him which would indicate that he knew that you had murdered Mabotha.

MR DE KOCK: I understand his inability to remember this.

MR WAGENER: If you such a discussion with the Brigadier didn't you keep it vague on purpose?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson the implications would have been very clear about what this was, because he would have asked me, "what are you talking about?", "what are you telling me now?".

MR WAGENER: Exactly. Wasn't this just your manner to shift the blame for the commission of a crime onto the shoulders of a senior commander?

MR DE KOCK: No that is not so.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

MR WAGENER: Thank you Mr Chairman. I have in my possession two affidavits by Mr Grobbelaar and Mr Schoon, the last of which I obtained this morning and I would request your indulgence to hand it up as exhibits please.

CHAIRPERSON: ...problems with papers, so I suggest we call these two not "A" and "B", but "Mabotha A and Mabotha B". Schoon will be "Mabotha A".

EXHIBITS MABOTHA A AND MABOTHA B HANDED UP

I think we all want a chance to read these affidavits but we could perhaps do that during the adjournment and we continue now Mr Rossouw.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock I would like to take you to page 9 of the bundle, your amnesty application, do you have a copy of your application before you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: In your amnesty application there is a specific question regarding whether the operation was executed upon an order and upon that you answered - "Yes". That is at the top of page 9.

And then 11B the question is put for the particulars regarding so-called order or the approval for that and the date of it as well as the person who approved these orders.

MR DE KOCK: Yes I can see that.

MR ROSSOUW: I have heard your evidence this morning and just to clear out any kind of misunderstanding, especially with regard to the questions put by Mr Cornelius, here you have put it that you received an order or instruction from Colonel Jan Potgieter, that is not correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I cannot actually say that it was a request but it was a question of consensus regarding the situation with Mabotha.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well we will return to that, but there was no order?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And Mr Potgieter was also not a colonel at that stage, in 1989.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson I don't believe that I was either.

MR ROSSOUW: He was a major, if my instructions are correct. And furthermore my instructions are that he was subordinate to you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: He could not give you a physical instruction.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Before we get to the matter of consensus I would like to return to page 4 of the bundle, page 4 of your amnesty application, you will see at the top of page 4 you state that on this particular day, or on a day you were informed by Colonel Grobbelaar that Mabotha had been arrested by the Soweto Security Branch.

Furthermore in the second sentence on that page you say:

"Apparently he had once again become involved in illegalities with regard to attacks on the police and he had joined Winnie Mandela and her Football Club".

Was this the information that Colonel Grobbelaar conveyed to you?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I don't recall that he conveyed this to me.

MR ROSSOUW: You see because I read that aspect of your application to indicate that the information came from him.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson it would not be that way. I do not recall that, and I would definitely not say that either.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well I will then put it to you that insofar as it is the implication and evidence that Major Potgieter was the one who informed you that Mabotha was involved in attacks on policemen, that Mr Potgieter denies that he made any such admission.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I will stand by the fact that he was the one who made the admission.

MR ROSSOUW: The reason why he denies this is because he never knew about such attacks on policemen in which Mabotha would have been involved.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot give evidence on behalf of Mr Potgieter here. I must just say that this is indeed what I was informed about.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you informed about this by Mr Potgieter, about being involved in attacks on policemen?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was during the telephone call that he made when we achieved consensus surrounding the idea that Mr Mabotha could not be allowed to walk about freely again.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr de Kock during the Section 29 hearing of Mrs Mandela, January 1998, a question was put to you whether Colonel Potgieter had informed you that Mabotha was not involved in attacks on police, can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, if such a person had been put I did not understand it correctly, or it was not correctly put, but I do not have any recollection of that.

MR ROSSOUW: And your answer that you gave to that was, "yes, he told me that".

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman may I just come in here please. You will recall - Hattingh on record on behalf of de Kock - you will recall that at the pre-trial conference that we held, I think it was the one in the Carlton Centre, but it may also have been the one that was held here in Pretoria, Mr Rossouw told you explicitly that they are not going to rely on the record of the evidence given at the Mandela hearing because that record was so poorly interpreted, that no reliance could be placed on it, and we confirmed that and we agreed that that record would not be relied on.

If my learned friend is going to rely on that record we would insist, with respect Mr Chairman, that the original Afrikaans version of what Mr de Kock said at that hearing should be put to him and not the translated version of his Afrikaans.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman. The only - I confirm Mr Chairman that we've indicated that the record is not very clear in the translation. The only reason why I am raising this Mr Chairman, I won't take it any further, is because of the inference that was drawn from page 4 of the applicant's amnesty application seeming to be that the information, with regard to attacks on policemen, flowed from Colonel Grobbelaar. And this was indeed confirmed in the record as I have just put to you, this is something which the applicant has now, I don't want to say changed, but he's now given us another interpretation of what is written on page 4 of the bundle Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman I won't take it any further. I will leave it at that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman I am sorry to interpose here. May I just correct something or place something on record here while we are dealing with this Section 29 hearing in respect of Colonel Potgieter.

Just for record purposes, so that there is nothing afterwards that may be a problem, I acted at that hearing for Colonel Potgieter on instructions of Mr Rossouw. I have discussed the situation with Mr Rossouw and we do not feel that there is a conflict of interest for me to represent Mr Mentz at this hearing under those circumstances. There are no clashes between the versions of the two parties, but I feel that it is important to place that on record now so that it is on record Mr Chairman. Thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock during 1989 Major Potgieter was a member of an investigating unit at the Soweto Security Branch, would you deny that or would you agree?

MR DE KOCK: I would not dispute it.

MR ROSSOUW: And this investigating unit was specifically aimed at court oriented investigations which would lead to prosecutions in criminal courts?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson, I don't know what the description of his duties were at that stage.

MR ROSSOUW: Would you accept that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I would.

MR ROSSOUW: And this was, of course, another function of the police to undertake investigations.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And if a person like Mr Mabotha became involved in attacks on police it would have been of cardinal importance for an investigator who would possibly want to use such a person as a witness in a criminal case, do you agree with me?

MR DE KOCK: Yes by nature of the situation it would have been that way.

MR ROSSOUW: And the reason for that being that should it appear from cross-examination that the person himself was a murderer the credibility would be at risk?

MR DE KOCK: Not necessarily.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. But would you agree that this is an aspect which would at least be determined by an investigator so that the prosecutor not be caught unawares?

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that.

MR ROSSOUW: My instructions are that Major Potgieter at that stage, in 1989, was busy with an investigation regarding a high treason charge against Winnie Mandela, do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: No I don't know about that.

MR ROSSOUW: And that Mr Mabotha would be a witness in this trial should the Attorney General decide to prosecute her.

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat that please?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Mabotha would have been a witness in this case against Mrs Mandela should the Attorney General have decided to prosecute her, do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: I was not informed about that by Mr Potgieter or anybody else.

MR ROSSOUW: But you did know that he could have given evidence about the murder of Stompie Sepei?

MR DE KOCK: That is something that I only heard about much, much later. I don't have any independent recollection regarding when I came to hear of it, but at that stage I was not sure about it.

MR ROSSOUW: However, Major Potgieter at that stage was not a member of an operational unit so to speak, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Not with regard to the tracing of terrorists, no.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes. You have stated, and please correct me if I have misunderstood you, you stated that when there was a request and the word "request" is used as a euphemism to eliminate somebody, it would have been used within the context of a group which would be familiar with that terminology?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And am I correct in saying that one would have expected this to be among persons who were members of operational units that this is where such terminology would be applied?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson, I don't know in which other actions Colonel Potgieter had been involved, actions which I may not have been aware of.

MR ROSSOUW: Well then of which actions are you aware regarding which he acted in an operational capacity?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I have said I don't know if there were any others.

MR ROSSOUW: So you don't know of any others?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, what I mean is that he may have been involved but I don't know about it.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. My instructions are exactly that he was not an operational person, that he was involved in court oriented investigations.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I would not dispute that.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. Just to go over to how it came to be that you achieved consensus - Mr Chairman maybe this will be a convenient moment?

CHAIRPERSON: Very well you know what you are going to do.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the lunch adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE A DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: (cont)

Mr de Kock before the luncheon adjournment I asked you is the use of euphemisms to establish an agreement between parties that somebody had to be eliminated, is it correct as I have understood it, that one would expect this in a group of people who knew each other and who would know what the other one wants to say when such language is used?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And if I had to tell you that let's go and take a few turns with someone then there could be nothing sinister about it as what I am saying to you in that language?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, if it is you and I.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. When we get to the point where you said it there was consensus between yourself and Major Potgieter at that stage that Mabotha had to be killed, let's first say the following, it was never pertinently stated that that is what would happen.

MR DE KOCK: The words "murder or kill" were not used.

MR ROSSOUW: That's correct. In order to determine in which manner you reached consensus about this I would like to ask you, when you were in Koevoet in the early eighties in Namibia was Mr Potgieter also there? Did you perform service there together?

MR DE KOCK: Yes we did Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you were in an operational unit with the signal "Zulu Delta"?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Potgieter was in an investigative unit, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Investigative/administrative, he was an information officer, so he was not in an operational unit.

MR DE KOCK: No he was not in a combat unit.

MR ROSSOUW: I would like to put it to you that during the time when you rendered service together in Koevoet he never gave you any instruction in this manner and he never received any instruction by means of this language usage that would mean that somebody had to be eliminated.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson it was usually the practice that if some of the Swapo terrorists had to be killed it would have been referred to that there are three persons who had to go, or there are two persons in the cell who had to go and - or had to be taken for a drive. This does not mean that the person had to be taken for a drive but it means that this person had to be killed.

MR ROSSOUW: So in other words you are saying that this was common knowledge that everybody in Koevoet would have understood it in that way?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, only the few persons who would have worked there. In my instance I was only part of a group who had to participate in these tasks. Information officers and the people who worked with the Swapo terrorists who were in detention or who had been released from detention and had been turned and it would seem that they did not give their full cooperation, the operational person did not take the decision like I that this person had to be killed. This would be the person who gathers the information or the commander who was General Dreyer.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. Would you agree with me then that during that time there was no such communication between yourself and Mr Potgieter for the time period when you served in Koevoet, there was no such communication to that extent?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not to that extent.

MR ROSSOUW: In 1983 you returned to the Republic, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And at a later stage, at the beginning of 1984 Mr Potgieter also returned to the Republic, do you know thereof?

MR DE KOCK: I know he returned Chairperson, I just don't know when.

MR ROSSOUW: And from 1984 to 1987 did you have any contact with Mr Potgieter?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: My instructions are that he had no contact with you during that three year period.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall any such contact so I would not dispute it Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And my instructions are furthermore that in the beginning of 1987 he was involved in an investigation of an MK member by the name of Oupa Seheri. He made some enquiries as to who could help him at Vlakplaas with the identification of MK members and to use askaris, can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes he visited Vlakplaas more than once for that purpose.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes for that purpose. Those are my instructions. He visited Vlakplaas in an official capacity for the purpose that askaris were there to use them in identifying terrorists.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. And did he contact you at any other stage during that time period for any other purpose more specifically to possibly by means of this euphemism and language usage to indicate that somebody had to eliminated?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And then you say in 1989 in the month of October, on the 4th of October, when Mr Mabotha was released you say that before that you received a telephone call and this euphemism, this request was directed to you from Major Potgieter?

MR DE KOCK: It was not an instruction, the innuendo, the discussion and the manner in which the discussion took place was clear to me. I didn't have any doubt about it.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr de Kock my instructions from my client is to tell you that he does not say that you are a liar and the fact that he says that, because he said that does not mean that he is a liar and what we have to investigate here is whether there was indeed an agreement between the two of you and if it was something that you might have deduced and therefore he cannot say that you were wrong but he would say that he did not have the intention that Mr Mabotha had to be killed. Do you understand the distinction?

MR DE KOCK: I do Chairperson, then let us do some investigation.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you say that you did have knowledge about the investigation with regard to Mrs Winnie Mandela at that stage in 1989?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I have a recollection thereof.

MR ROSSOUW: And you also say that you heard at a later stage that Mr Mabotha would be a witness against Mrs Mandela?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it is quite vague but it would have been better if I did know, but I did know about it yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. And if my instructions are that Major Potgieter would say that Mabotha would indeed be a witness and it was important for him to use Mabotha as a witness in the case against Mrs Mandela can you deny it?

MR DE KOCK: No I cannot Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And do you also have knowledge that Mr Mabotha at three instances before his arrest had given evidence in criminal matters against MK members?

MR DE KOCK: I will not dispute it Chairperson, I don't have knowledge of the specific instances. I received him as an askari.

MR ROSSOUW: But the fact of the matter is that it would seem from the Section 29 statement that was taken by Major Potgieter.

And then insofar as the framework of reference with regard to Mr Mabotha he sat there with a potential state witness and this person had already previously given evidence in criminal matters against MK members.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And then you would agree with me that Mrs Mandela was a high profile ANC member at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you would recall that at the Section 29 hearing evidence was given that such high profile persons could not be eliminated because the repercussions would be too great and therefore criminal procedures would be instigated.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: So the investigation to prosecute her was of cardinal importance, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: I would Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: In order to neutralise her in the sense that she cannot continue with her activities in Soweto.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you would accept here that it was in that set-up and against that milieu that Major Potgieter wanted to use Mabotha as a witness during these criminal procedures?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson that is not my opinion because after Mabotha was handed over to us no enquiries were directed at Vlakplaas. Nobody enquired whether he was available for the Winnie Mandela hearing. And as far as I know he did not testify in the Winnie Mandela court case which took place later and nobody asked us where is Mabotha and if he is available or not. Nobody consulted with us at Vlakplaas and it was not asked of us to avail him for these procedures.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well Mr de Kock, I hear your answer Mr de Kock, but there are certain circumstances surrounding the activities and one has to have regard for that time.

As to why, first of all no enquiries were done with regard to Mr Mabotha has the statement of Mr Potgieter been brought to your attention?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it has.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman I can refer you - the relevant part you will find on page 136 of the bundle and further.

You will see there Mr de Kock that on page 140 Mr Potgieter states that shortly after the handing over, he, as commander of, he was appointed as commander of the Intelligence Unit and he did not have any contact with the investigative unit. Do you see that at paragraph 32.1.7?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: So that would serve as an explanation as why he did not enquire about Mabotha's accommodation at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot comment, I will have to leave it to others.

MR ROSSOUW: Good. And then you know that the time period at that time was October 1989, you know that the ANC was unbanned in February 1990, approximately three months later, do you know thereof?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you will see furthermore - Chairperson just a minute - you will see on page 140, paragraph 22.18 Mr Potgieter says that the political change at that stage may him realise that no prosecution would be put against Mrs Mandela, do you see that over on page 141?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I do Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And then to reach clarity, you have referred to the matter that was instigated against Mrs Mandela later, do you know that this was with regard to the charges of murder and abduction of Stompie Sepei?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I have a recollection of that Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: So it was charges laid against her and not charges of high treason?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And then you will see from the statement of Mr Potgieter that his investigation entailed the high treason matter which was investigated with regard to Mrs Mandela and no prosecution followed from that.

MR DE KOCK: No, she was not charged.

MR ROSSOUW: I would like to put it to you that against this background with the investigation that Mr Potgieter was involved in that for him, to use your words, there were three reasons why Mabotha could not be allowed to be at large or to run around free, and the reasons were firstly, that he wanted Mabotha available if the Attorney General would decide to prosecute, what is your reaction to that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson it may be so but at Vlakplaas we could not have accommodated him.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. We will get to the accommodation at Vlakplaas.

And the second reason would be that because Mrs Mandela knew that an investigation was pending against her and Mr Mabotha had been detained for six months in terms of Section 29, the chances that if he was released in Soweto he could have been picked up by the soccer team and he could have been eliminated by them because he was a risk for Mrs Mandela, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but if they had sent him to Vlakplaas we did not have any detention facilities there and I could not force him to stay there and place any limitations on him there. So the same could have happened there.

MR ROSSOUW: You see the reference that Major Potgieter had at that stage was, not that you had to detain him at Vlakplaas, but because he was indeed an askari who had been there previously and askaris were accommodated at Vlakplaas. There may have been some place where you could have accommodated him there and he could be available for any criminal procedures.

MR DE KOCK: Vlakplaas would not have been such a place Chairperson. It could not be possible that Mabotha could have returned under those circumstances.

MR ROSSOUW: And if I tell you that I accept it but then will you agree with me that that was seen from your perspective why you could not trust the askaris anymore, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was no request directed to me from Colonel Potgieter, in any of his calls, to accommodate Mabotha at Vlakplaas.

MR ROSSOUW: Good. On page 139 of the bundle you will see that Mr Potgieter mentions there in paragraph 22.13 that he cannot exactly recall the extent of your words during the first telephone discussion between yourself and him, but he says it was important for him that Mabotha had to be safe because he was a key witness if charges were laid.

MR DE KOCK: I believe it would have been important for him that Mabotha would be safe, yes.

MR ROSSOUW: So would you not agree with me then that the possibility did exist that from your reference, framework being in an operational unit where you have knowledge of this euphemistic use of language and today you have said that if an askari ran away you would not be able to trust him again, and then for you the request to safeguard such a person and to be of assistance that he does not run around anymore, this would justify the dedication that this person had to be eliminated.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I cannot say that, I can only go on what happened that day and what according to the conversation that came to the fore when Potgieter and I had our discussion there was no request from him asking if I could accommodate him or not. There was no such a request.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. Let us ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going on to something else?

MR ROSSOUW: No Mr Chairman. Is there something...

CHAIRPERSON: Somewhere, and I think it's in this section, his affidavit, there is mention of a telephone call to his home in the Northern Transvaal and the fact that he discovered he's never gone there.

MR ROSSOUW: That's right Mr Chairman. You remember that at the second pre-trial meeting we've given an indication that there was a telefax sent to the Pietersburg police and we have tried to obtain a copy of that telex, we were unable to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is the reference in this, can you tell me?

MR ROSSOUW: If you will just give me a minute Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman you will find that on page 164 in paragraph 4.8.15.

CHAIRPERSON: So it would appear from this paragraph that he did enquire about him?

MR ROSSOUW: Yes, yes Mr Chairman, we were just unable to get hold of the telex that you also see is referred to there.

Very well. Mr de Kock the third reason why Mr Potgieter wanted to send Mr Mabotha to Vlakplaas was because there was a circular from Security Branch head office that everything possible had to be done to recruit members for Vlakplaas. Did you have knowledge of that circular?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I did.

MR ROSSOUW: A copy of that you will find on page 169 and 170 of the bundles. You will see on page 171, paragraph 3 in the last sentence of that paragraph it is mentioned that every member of the Security Branch has to attempt to recruit detainees if circumstances would allow it.

And on page 172, paragraph 6, the existence of Unit C1, that's Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Is a source of concern for the enemy and all attempts had to be made to expand members numbers.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you will see, that is on page 169 it was dated 13 April 1989.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Which is after the arrest of Mr Mabotha.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: So therefore Mr Potgieter says that this circular and his investigation with Mr Mabotha was one of the motivations why he wanted to send Mr Mabotha to Vlakplaas and why he contacted you. Would you say that it is totally improbable?

MR DE KOCK: It is improbable Chairperson because I could not take Mabotha back as an askari at Vlakplaas. He ran away previously. There was no way in which I could prohibit him from running away again. There was no possibility ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But if he came back to you, as Mr Potgieter said, said he wanted to come back to Vlakplaas, he regretted what he had done, he could supply more information, why does that mean you can't accept him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson that request was never directed at me.

MR ROSSOUW: I am putting it to you Mr de Kock, and it would seem from the statement of Mr Potgieter on page 139 that he had contacted you and arranged that you receive Mabotha and you had to keep Mabotha at Vlakplaas for him. You will find this on page 139, paragraph 22.13, do you deny this?

MR DE KOCK: I never received such a request, neither written nor verbal.

MR ROSSOUW: And I will put it to you that the version of Mr Potgieter seems from his statement, as I pointed it out to you Mr de Kock, just to return to this aspect with regard to the recruitment of members for Unit C1, do you have knowledge of an askari who was sent to Vlakplaas by the name of Joseph Makuna, also known as Billy?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson I have a vague recollection of such a person.

MR ROSSOUW: My instructions are that Billy, Joseph Makuna, in August 1988, let's say it was the year before the Mabotha incident was arrested by Soweto Security Branch and he was transferred to Vlakplaas for service there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson it's possible.

MR ROSSOUW: So it was not a strange phenomenon this transferal. There is a record that it has indeed happened in previous instances as in this case of Joseph Makuna from Soweto to Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is how askaris came to us from right across the country, Piet Retief, the Western Cape, the Western Transvaal, there was nothing strange about it.

CHAIRPERSON: All your askaris were people who had been arrested and then sent to you weren't they?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: To join up with the Chairperson you said that it is not possible for you to use Mabotha as an askari because he could not be trusted again. He had already run away and defected and with you there was a question mark with regard to his loyalty if I can put it that way?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson but such a request was not directed at me and if it was and if we have to speculate now I would have said that they have to keep him at a safe house. Johannesburg had safe houses. Soweto had safe houses. The Intelligence services in the Security police had safe houses right throughout the country in every region. So it would have been much safer for Mabotha there because at Vlakplaas there were other askaris who did not like this conduct of his.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr de Kock you have to accept that, it stands that you say that no such request was directed at you and Mr Potgieter's instruction to me was that there was such a request. But let's agree that there is a factual dispute about that. But I want to determine it was a matter of you knew that Mabotha was an askari at Vlakplaas, who had run away, according to you.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Potgieter then tells me that Mabotha was abducted by Mrs Mandela and her cohorts.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson it later did seem that that was what happened.

MR ROSSOUW: So there would have been no indication from him that he had run away from Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson later it would seem that Mabotha was sent by Mrs Mandela, that was before he was arrested at Marble Hall, so he could have walked into the nearest police station and said that I want to call Vlakplaas, I work under Major de Kock, or I know Colonel Potgieter and such a call would have been made.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well Mr de Kock I accept that. All that I want to know from you is the fact that you say that by nature of the set-up at Vlakplaas, and your knowledge of that you would not have been able to use Mabotha again. But this does not necessarily mean that the same sentiment was shared by somebody else in the Security Branch such as Mr Potgieter.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, the sentiment on that day, during that telephonic discussion, was that this man could not be at large again; that policemen would be shot and that he would again dabble in terrorism. That is what it boiled down to.

MR ROSSOUW: I have already put it to you that insofar as it has to do with Mr Potgieter that he does not know that Mr Mabotha was involved in any specific act of terrorism which would have included attacks on police. I will just reiterate this, the point that I am driving at is that it is your inference, from that discussion, that there was no doubt that Mabotha could no longer be permitted to be at large. That was your inference.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was not my inference it was my understanding of the discussion.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well then, your understanding.

We have examined the circumstances and framework of reference within which that idea may have been formulated with you and in opposition to that I put it to you, seen in the light of the investigation and the order to recruit askaris, the framework of reference was not the same for Mr Potgieter at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: I will concede that it is probably so.

MR ROSSOUW: In other words then that is why he maintains that you are not a liar, that you may have formulated that understanding, however it was not his intention for Mabotha to be killed. What is your response to that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I cannot agree with that. I am not trying to implicate him here, he is not an anchor to me, he is not a lifeline for me, I can only tell you what the facts were at that stage and within that context.

CHAIRPERSON: But aren't the facts, as I understand them, completely open to two meanings? He says this man cannot be allowed to walk about, meaning because it will be dangerous for this man. But to you it means because he will be a danger to us. The same words, open to exactly opposite meanings aren't they?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct, I would concede that.

MR ROSSOUW: Then just one final aspect Mr de Kock. This question regarding the handing-over, and it appears to have occurred under very suspicious circumstances. Firstly De Deur police station is not near the Soweto Security Branch.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And if a person didn't have the correct circumstances or facts it would appear that Mr Mabotha was delivered from Soweto Security Branch to De Deur police station in order to remove him from that area in which he was familiar, so to speak?

MR DE KOCK: No that would be incorrect, because many of the Section 29 persons were detained at smaller police stations and that wasn't only here, that was nationwide.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. The reason why I am putting this to you, and thank you for that response Mr de Kock, is that the fact of the matter remains that Mr Mabotha, in terms of the register at the Soweto Security Branch in terms of a Section 29 detention, was detained under these terms on the 4th of April 1989, according to the record, and that he was discharged on the 4th of October from the De Deur police station, that is six months later.

And from the same record it would appear that he was transferred, by Mr Potgieter, from Soweto to De Deur on the 12th of June 1989. Would you deny that?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. That was a long time before his discharge that this transfer took place?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Would you say that that was usual practice or that it was something that would happen?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And the time that was arranged for the delivery was five o'clock that afternoon, did you find that at all strange, that time of day?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson not in the case of Vlakplaas because we didn't have any fixed hours, whether it was midnight or mid-afternoon it was one and the same to us.

MR ROSSOUW: But it was in the month of October, five o'clock that afternoon it would still have been light?

MR DE KOCK: Yes it would have been very light.

MR ROSSOUW: So the man wasn't delivered in the middle of night, in darkness?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And then on page 140 of the bundle you will see that Mr Potgieter gives an explanation there as to why that specific time of five o'clock was arranged for, page 140 at the top of the page.

Are you aware of the fact that persons who were detained in terms of Section 29 had to be examined by a district surgeon before their discharge?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Potgieter says that such examinations by the district surgeon would not be regarded as priority matters.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson because even though I knew about those rules I myself never had to work with Section 29 detainees.

MR ROSSOUW: So you could not deny what he maintains there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And seeing as it cannot be determined when the examination was completed by the District Surgeon the time that is given is five o'clock that afternoon and that is why that was the arrangement.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that in that regard.

MR ROSSOUW: Now you say that your vehicle was parked approximately 200 to 300 metres away from the De Deur police station and that is the point from which you conducted the observation for the delivery?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: That is not very far away, would you agree?

MR DE KOCK: No it is not very far away.

MR ROSSOUW: So if one wants to say that this person was delivered under very sinister circumstances one would have expected you to take him a great deal further away from the police station where he was detained?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I know of cases where persons were taken in the middle of the street, or let us use the word "abduct", that they were "abducted" in the middle of a city or in the middle of town. And in this case it was to ensure that Mabotha would not run away if he wanted to attempt that. On the other side it was also not to upset him.

MR ROSSOUW: But my instructions are that the delivery, insofar as it was arranged, was not suspect to Mr Potgieter, or at least it did not appear that there was anything sinister to all of this.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson we did not pick Mr Mabotha up at the police station. In other words we didn't go into the charge office and receive him there or receive him right outside the police station. We had to move away with him first. My recollection was that we drove away from the police station and that approximately 500 metres or more from there we stopped and the Vlakplaas vehicle with members inside stopped there and Mabotha was then transferred to the vehicle.

MR ROSSOUW: Did Mabotha offer any resistance?

MR DE KOCK: No he didn't expect anything.

MR ROSSOUW: Let us take the supposition Mr de Kock, that the indication would have been that there was some suspicion regarding this delivery and that you wanted to keep it as far away from the public eye as possible so that nobody would be able to trace this back to him being discharged and handed over to Vlakplaas who would then murder him. If those were the circumstances then my instructions are that Mr Potgieter would have taken him as far away as possible and not placed him that close to the scene. Would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the reason for that is so that there would be no kind-of witness from the police side. The public didn't know Vlakplaas or Mabotha. The idea was that police from De Deur were not supposed to see that he was being handed over to a group of persons in case there was an inquiry about this, that nobody could say that he was handed over.

MR ROSSOUW: Well then let us deal with police members. The same instruction would have been that Mabotha would have had to be as far away as possible because Potgieter was the person who had to interrogate Mabotha and he didn't want to be involved in any kind of delivery during which he would be the person who was handing the person over and that this person would then be murdered later.

MR DE KOCK: That's exactly what happened because there was no future reference to Mr Potgieter after that. Let us take an example, Mr Potgieter would have told the person that he was giving him a lift to the station. He would have said to him I will drop you off there and you can leave. That would have been for the purposes of staff or policemen working there and that would have served as an alibi.

MR ROSSOUW: That's possible. The fact remains that Mr Potgieter was at the scene and that he climbed out of the vehicle with Mabotha when he was delivered. So he placed himself at the scene, at the delivery, not very far from the police station. I put it to you that the risk still existed that police officers may have seen him during this delivery.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I have a vague recollection thereof, however I don't believe that they would have brought Mr Potgieter into that context. The fact that there were Vlakplaas members would only safeguard Mr Potgieter more. There was no way that Vlakplaas members would say that they had taken this man from Mr Potgieter this having taken place at that time, or during that era.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman if you will just give me a minute.

ADV SANDI: Can I just ask, at the place or vicinity where Mr Potgieter handed Mr Mabotha over to you, what sort of vehicle was Mr Potgieter driving? Was he driving a vehicle that would be easily noticeable as a police vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: No it was a sedan. I am not certain of the colour, but for a general member of the public it would not have appeared suspicious. Security Police vehicles, in general, had private numbers and most of the time these were false numbers and they also were civilian by colour and nature.

ADV SANDI: Were there any members of the public going up and down in that area?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there were vehicles driving up and down but this wouldn't have drawn any attention. The vehicle which Vlakplaas used was a civilian vehicle. My own vehicle was a secret fund vehicle. It wasn't traceable. The colour would have appeared normal by nature. There was no issue that this could lead to any kind of altercation to get him into the vehicle. The reason why Mr Mabotha was relaxed was because the person who handled him was the person who handed him over.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, okay Mr Rossouw.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr de Kock, in conclusion I want to put it to you that in terms of the evidence which was given during your criminal trial when you implicated Mr Potgieter, he has made an affidavit, this is the affidavit pertaining to his version as you will find it in the bundle. One aspect that I want to point out to you, on page 140, paragraph 22.16, that is page 140, you will see that Mr Potgieter has here mentioned that upon the delivery he walked to you and Mr van Niekerk and in preparation for this hearing, and during consultation my instructions have come to be that Mr Potgieter will concede that he may have made a mistake, that it may have been somebody else who was there, who physically loaded Mr Mabotha into the vehicle, in other words Mr Flores or Mr van Niekerk, and he also concedes that this may have been a different vehicle.

MR DE KOCK: It was definitely my vehicle because this vehicle was not in front of the police station, Louw van Niekerk was there, I cannot recall Flores, this came to my attention later.

MR ROSSOUW: So one could then expect in terms of this lapse of time that there may be certain vague elements in one's recollection?

MR DE KOCK: Yes I would concede that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry does he say he might be mistaken about saying that Mr de Kock was there?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman as far as the person taking or receiving Mr Mabotha is concerned, because from the evidence and the affidavits before the Committee, it's apparent that Mr de Kock was there but not the one who received Mr Mabotha, that was Mr Britz, Mr Flores and van Niekerk.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes he wasn't in that car?

MR ROSSOUW: Not in that car, that's correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So when he says that he discussed the situation with de Kock, he was wrong in that - page 164 paragraph 48.14.

MR ROSSOUW: Yes Mr Chairman, the reference to Mr de Kock in that regard would not be correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, did he after this ask you about Mabotha's welfare?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell him that Mabotha had left again?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I may probably have made such a remark, I will concede that, but there were no enquiries.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW

MR MARIBANA: J C Maribana for Mabotha family. Mr de Kock...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: If you could just give me a moment - you may continue.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock, in your evidence-in-chief you stated that you didn't get any information about Mr Mabotha's whereabouts, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: During our interrogation of Mabotha, and this was at Marble Hall, it appeared that he had rejoined with Mrs Mandela.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock I hear that but my question is, when you were led by Mr Hattingh, he stated that it is true that - okay you had a problem with the disappearance of askaris and then you said that is correct, and then again you indicated that, okay he said did you know, or where was Mr Mabotha and you said you didn't receive any information about Mr Mabotha's whereabouts, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson if any person had come to ask me, or anybody who had not been connected to the Security Branch had come to ask me about the whereabouts of Mr Mabotha, I would not have responded.

MR MARIBANA: Okay Mr de Kock again you make mention of the fact that askaris will be away for a period of plus or minus 20 days or longer, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.

MR MARIBANA: And so I just want to find out here, with regard to Mabotha, did you ever try to find out where he was before you received a telephone call that he was arrested?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, let me just make this clearer. Vlakplaas was not your usual police unit, so if somebody didn't pitch up for duty that morning there wouldn't be a panic or we wouldn't call his home or book him off from duty or charge him on a departmental level. From my experience in the past I would allow a lapse of time to develop as a result of askaris who had disappeared for various reasons and then arrive back two or three weeks later. It was a very sensitive issue however, we also didn't want to restrict these persons in some of their extracurricular activities.

MR MARIBANA: Okay Mr de Kock, thank you for your answer. On that basis, if one will say - okay Mr Chairman let me withdraw that.

I just want to find out Mr de Kock, did you have the first-hand information that Mr Mabotha did return back to the ANC or you were told about it?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson upon the first instant that I became aware of it, it was when I received the telephone call that he had been arrested at Marble Hall.

MR MARIBANA: So my question still remains, that I am saying did you have first-hand information that he returned back to the ANC or you were told that he did return back to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson my first awareness that I could substantiate that he had returned to the ANC was during his interrogation at Marble Hall.

MR MARIBANA: So if I understand you correctly, that information came up during interrogation, is that true?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, the telephone call that I received was not a lengthy telephone call, it was not a clarifying telephone call, it was just to inform me that he had been arrested, that he was at Marble Hall and that he had joined the ranks once again. Unfortunately I cannot tell you verbatim what the content of that telephone call was but the confirmation took place at Marble Hall.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock again on that point, it seems as if you are trying to be evasive or something like that. My question is, Mr de Kock, the information that Mr Mabotha returned back to the ANC came up during interrogation, is that true?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the substantiation for that took place there, yes. I cannot tell you that Mr Grobbelaar as it would now appear, probably somebody else who called me told me yes he's with Winnie Mandela, he rejoined the ANC, he has become involved in the football club, as they put it and I can assure you that I am not attempting to be evasive or obstructive in any way.

MR MARIBANA: Okay if I understand you correctly on that point, Mr de Kock, you were informed by Mr Grobbelaar or some people who were interrogating Mr Mabotha that he returned back to the ANC, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it is also my contention that this was Mr Grobbelaar. The information was that he had been arrested and he had once again resumed his activities with the ANC, he had been arrested and he was detained at Marble Hall.

At this stage I did not have access to the tapes which were recorded during the monitoring and even after that I didn't have access to those tapes.

MR MARIBANA: So you didn't try to verify the truth of that information, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I left that up to very professional persons, Mr Grobbelaar was perhaps one of the most professional investigators that I knew at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: And Mr de Kock, on the question of interrogation, please just tell this committee if you'll still be able to remember, for how long did that interrogation take place after the arrest of Mr Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson during my visit to Marble Hall I would say that it would have been anything from between 8 and 9 in the morning that we drove there. I will try to give you a time span; I would say from approximately 9 o'clock onwards and during that afternoon it was quite hot, Bellingan and I departed from there, but I can't give you an exact time, I can't tell you whether or not it was 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock in the afternoon, but it would have been approaching late afternoon.

MR MARIBANA: And if I understand you correctly, you went there immediately after receiving a telephone call that Mr Mabotha was under arrest, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson Mr Bellingan and I drove there in the late afternoon when we received the call and we arrived there late but we spent the night there at a hotel and only the following morning did we meet the rest of the members at Marble Hall at the police station.

MR MARIBANA: And on that following morning, when you met other members, that is when interrogation started to take place, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson we met there at first at Marble Hall and from there we drove to this farm or this premises which the Security Branch had available there, so the interrogation did not start at the police station at Marble Hall.

MR MARIBANA: And just for clarity's sake, Mr de Kock, actually who phoned you to say Mabotha was under arrest?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was always my contention that it was Mr Grobbelaar, he has denied it here through his legal representative but that is the first name that comes up to me as the person who had called me. The last person who I want to involve here is a person like Major Grobbelaar.

MR MARIBANA: And if one may ask, did they tell you the reasons for the arrest of Mr Mabotha?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't have a clear recollection and as I have said it was in the context that he was again busy with his activities and he had joined up with the ANC, it was along that line, that is why this call was made.

MR MARIBANA: And Mr de Kock, is there any particular reason why Mr Grobbelaar or whoever from Soweto decided to tell you in particular that Mr Mabotha was arrested?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am the commander of C1 and if I was not there, a junior member would have taken that call and would have informed me.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you told the reason you were phoned was because the person they had arrested said he was an askari from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson they would have automatically asked because the first one thing that someone would think that we have infiltrated this person into a organisation but we did not tell them, that we are here with something on our own and this is I would have thought in the same context, Chairperson.

MR MARIBANA: And Mr de Kock, when they telephoned, were those people aware that Mr Mabotha did run away from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in hindsight I would say that they could have accepted that if one has regard for the fact they were tapping Mrs Mandela's telephone lines and they also had sources there, so I would say yes, they could have believed so.

MR MARIBANA: And in the same breath one would be correct to say that is the reason why they decided to telephone you, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would be one of the reasons. There were several groups who had several interests there, I would have Vlakplaas' interests there, Soweto branch would have their interest there, this has regard for a wider aspect; I hope that answers your question.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock, at that time or during interrogation, did Mr Mabotha give you any information with regard to terrorism and treason?

ADV SANDI: Just for my clarity Mr Maribana, which session of interrogation are you talking about? Are you talking about the interrogation which took place before he came into the picture or are you talking about the interrogation which he was part of?

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair, I'm talking about the interrogation when the applicant was part of it, Mr Chair.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the information was scant, the man had an extraordinary capacity to endure pressure and pain, so there was no information that I could go on with regard to my unit and Vlakplaas. As I have said previously, I was not aware of the documentation and the letter and other information which the branch had already had and which they found with him at his arrest. This I only heard in 1998 at the hearing in Johannesburg.

ADV SANDI: But anyway as I understood you, you said he did confirm to you that he had gone to join the so-called Winnie Mandela Football Club?

MR DE KOCK: Yes such information did come to the fore because I want to rely on my memory, otherwise I would not have participated in the interrogation anymore because to assault the man because he was not at the club or not involved with Mrs Mandela would be senseless.

ADV SANDI: Is that the only significant piece of information which you personally obtained from him when you were interrogating him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes he did not give anything about Vlakplaas to which I could react and do some damage control, it was not necessary to move any of the other askaris, it was not necessary to change telephone numbers and so forth.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he say that he'd been abducted by the Football Club?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he told me that he was abducted by persons, and if I recall correctly, his reference was to MK members, members who were active in Soweto and that they had detained him in a house in Soweto and only once in a while he was taken to Mrs Mandela for the so-called statement of his that he was a sex-slave, something which I can up to today still not believe. But this is what he had said. This statement struck me particularly because it is a little bit too much to comprehend.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair, Mr de Kock, during that process, did he give you any information with regard to firearms?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR MARIBANA: In this bundle of documents, on page 5, the last paragraph, last sentence, it stands here that Mr Mabotha denies that he knows anything of such incidents.

MR DE KOCK: Yes I've read it Chairperson.

MR MARIBANA: From this sentence, didn't you include or didn't he deny anything or didn't he volunteer any information as far as his returning back to ANC or the Winnie Mandela Football club?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson with this interrogation we were already at Penge Mine, we had already arranged the explosives, we were already sitting by the fire and this is where I asked him about the shooting of policemen, where the weapons are, and this refers to the telephone conversation that I had with Colonel Potgieter, so this once again are not questions that were put to him at Marble Hall, this was at Penge Mine - a while later.

MR MARIBANA: As a follow-up on that question, if I am to understand you correctly, Mr Mabotha didn't give you whatever type of information at Penge Mine, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No he didn't.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Maribana, just about these police who were shot in two shebeens, who were they?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson shooting incidents did take place where persons were shot but I do not have the details with regard to that. I'm not trying to be vague but there were some instances where shots were fired at police officers, it was a number of three but two different instances is what I can recall.

ADV SANDI: According to the information that was given to you, in what way was Mr Mabotha involved in these shootings?

MR DE KOCK: He was one of the persons who fired the shots.

ADV SANDI: These police, would you be able to say whether they belonged to the Security Branch or any other division of the police force?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson my recollection of that is vague but they were uniformed persons.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chairman, thank you Mr Maribana.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair.

Mr de Kock, as a follow up from questions we have just asked here, with the shooting of policemen at the shebeen, was there any evidence which links Mr Mabotha to those shootings or was it just a suspicion that he might be involved?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I have no evidence, I don't know whether Soweto had any concrete evidence and I took it in the light of the call that I had received. I did have knowledge that police officers were indeed shot but I did not investigate these matters and from this information, this information comes to us on the periphery by means of security reports and other information as it is given through to Vlakplaas.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock, from what you have just said, I find it strange that in whatever information you were getting on Mr Mabotha, you were not making any follow-ups, what can you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson by the time these calls took place between myself and Colonel Potgieter, we were already in a situation that this person would be released and he cannot be allowed to walk around free because he will be involved in the shooting of police officers and I cannot have an investigation for another year or two while he is still walking around.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying there that you just accept anything that was told about this person? You couldn't investigate, you heard on the periphery of the information that came to you that he's been involved in the shooting at the shebeen and that was enough for you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, the source, and I refer to Colonel Potgieter, I never had a problem with him and I never doubted him. One could have gone and launched a two or three year investigation and then did not reach any point, but I did not have a problem with him.

CHAIRPERSON: One could have charged him and got him locked up in prison if there was proof.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson that is so.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair, and starting with, there's something here which I don't get it clear, that is when you and Mr Potgieter discussed about the release of Mr Mabotha, at that time did you already formulate, or decided that Mr Mabotha had to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson when the first call came that he is to be released and that he could not be allowed to walk around freely, it was clear to me, and I had no doubt that we would kill him, yes.

MR MARIBANA: If I understand you correctly, if someone didn't say that Mr Mabotha would not be let free, would you still be able to decide that he would have to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, then he would have remained a Section 29 detainee or they could have just released him without informing me.

MR MARIBANA: So if I understand you correctly, the reason why you were informed about his release is that you would have to eliminate him, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is how I understood it and that is how I acted upon it.

MR MARIBANA: And in the same breath Mr de Kock, Mr Potgieter's version before this wonderful committee, was that he didn't mean that you have to eliminate Mr Mabotha when he gets released. What can you say on that point?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the consensus during that telephone call was that Mr Mabotha will not walk around freely again indeed because they were afraid that he would start shooting police officers again, in other words he would be killed.

MR MARIBANA: And on that point, Colonel, since we have just heard the version of Mr Potgieter, on would say you just decided on your own that Mr Mabotha will have to be eliminated? It was not discussed with any members of Vlakplaas or police from Soweto, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I arranged with the members of Vlakplaas, with one group to take him from Mr Potgieter and the other group made the arrangements to go to Penge Mine. I've already said that the death of Mabotha and insofar as it concerned my people, I took that decision because that is how I interpreted this telephone call. And this might be the occasion to say that I take full responsibility for my action and my decision which led to the death of Mabotha as well as any of the actions or omissions of any of the members who served under me at Vlakplaas.

MR MARIBANA: And on that point, before people decided to eliminate Mr Mabotha, were you not aware that he's supposed to be a key witness against Mrs Winnie Mandela then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I don't have recollection of that no, if I did you can be sure I would have told you.

MR MARIBANA: And I can't remember when, who was asking you when were you aware that he was going to be a witness in the Winnie Mandela matter, and then you said you heard very very late, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson unfortunately I don't have a time or a date where one could establish these times but I could not give you a date here.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Maribana, I thought the position here was at the stage Mr Mabotha was handed over to the Vlakplaas group, that is Mr de Kock and his colleagues, the idea of criminal prosecution against Mrs Mandela had already been abandoned at that stage. I'm not sure if I misunderstood the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: With respect, I don't think that criminal prosecution, it was a question of a charge of high treason was no longer in the air, there was the subsequent trial for the murder of this young man...(intervention)

ADV SANDI: Ja but he was no longer, Mr Mabotha was no longer going to be a state witness against Mrs Mandela as I understood it.

MR MARIBANA: Mr Chair, on that point, if I understand the evidence correctly, it was that a decision was not yet formulated by the AG division to prosecute Mrs Mandela, if my memory is acting well.

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry Mr Chairman I'm sorry, if I may be of some assistance because this is something which I've put and which flows from the affidavit by my client, Mr Potgieter, that the position is indeed that the Attorney General hadn't taken a decision at that stage whether to prosecute or not on the high treason charge.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair. Mr de Kock, okay you have just confirmed that you heard he'll be - supposed to be a witness in Winnie Mandela's case very very late. When you say you heard that before you can take a decision that he will have to be eliminated or before you can shoot him at Penge Mine, when did you hear that actually?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it will be logical that one would not go and kill a person who is a key witness in the matter against a person of Mrs Mandela's stature. I had heard later that, if my memory is correct, there was no request that Mabotha had to be accommodated at Vlakplaas as a protected witness.

MR MARIBANA: Mr de Kock my question still stands as it is; what I want to find out here is when actually did you hear that?

MR HATTINGH: With respect Mr Chairman, Hattingh on behalf of de Kock, that question has been answered repeatedly.

CHAIRPERSON: My recollection is he did say he doesn't recollect knowing he would be a key witness against Winnie Mandela, he didn't know when he heard that he would be a witness.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chairman for clarity.

Mr de Kock on a question of interrogation and torture, you indicated that what you can remember is that you were involved in the - what you remember is that you hung Mr Mabotha upside down during interrogation, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson I assisted there. I'm not necessarily the person who had hung him upside down but I assisted in that process.

MR MARIBANA: On that fact, if one may ask, who was in charge of the interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson it was members of Soweto, I cannot tell you who was the person who had taken notes, as I have said my recollection is that Major Grobbelaar was there, now I understand that he denies it. I cannot give you a name here, I cannot tell you who was in command of them.

MR MARIBANA: And when being asked by John Wagener that you spent a night at Marble Hall, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the day when Bellingan and I left from Pretoria late that afternoon, well that night we spent the night in Marble Hall so that we would be fresh the next morning, so that we would be there to meet Major Grobbelaar.

MR MARIBANA: And there was a question which was asked by the Committee as did you know something about ice blocks, or where did those ice blocks come from, you said you don't know, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that's Chairperson, I did not know where the ice blocks came from, and I have mentioned that what the situation and my opinion was with regards to that.

MR MARIBANA: And tell me, when you and members of the Security Branch, when they spent the whole night there, didn't they have drinks and braais, something to eat on that particular night?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson when Bellingan and I went through to Marble Hall, we arrived there, both of us were tired, we had had a full day, as far as I know I took a shower and I went to bed, I think we shared a room, Bellingan did the same. I did not see any of the other Security Branch members, no braais were held and no drinks were drunk. And I'm not aware whether Mabotha was already interrogated by Soweto and Marble Hall police, I have no knowledge of that. The first time when I saw them was that morning at Marble Hall.

MR MARIBANA: And Colonel one might be correct to say you can't deny the fact that they might have drinks or ice blocks with other members, which you are saying that you don't have knowledge whether they had those thing, will you deny that?

CHAIRPERSON: But this was the night before and the incident that we're talking about took place the next afternoon on a farm some distance away, what is the relevance of what drinks they may have had the night before?

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman I just want to find out on a question of ice blocks, how did they come to the farm actually. Because according to the information before this committee, is that ice blocks were used there, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Somebody must have brought them in a secure thermal bag or box. You were staying in a hotel, weren't you, at Marble Hall.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair for the clarity.

ADV SANDI: Can I just come in here? When we commenced with hearings, I think about two/three weeks ago, I understood you to say that for each askari there was a handler, in other words someone he would be responsible to, did I understand you correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson there was a group leader, a black and a white group leader, and he would for example have two other members of the police under his command and then a group of five to six to eight members of askaris.

ADV SANDI: In other words each askari would be responsible to someone, he would have a handler, is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: Not every askari had his own individual handler, these persons worked in groups, but then it would work from sergeant to warrant officer, warrant officer to lieutenant if lieutenants were available, and if there was a captain it would go as far as captain level.

ADV SANDI: And if an askari were to be away for some time, it would have to be known where he has gone to and when he is expecting himself to be back?

MR DE KOCK: No it didn't always work that way. I had a man, I don't want to mention his name here, I could write it down for you, he would disappear with his camp bed on a train and then return 10 days later and tell me that he had gone visiting, that he'd met a girl. In-between you'd be losing your mind, frantic with worry, not knowing whether or not he had been abducted, whether he had been killed or whether he had crossed the border. We tried to handle these things as they occurred, we would send investigating units out, sometimes we would just keep watch for them, at times we would receive an indication that this was a visit that this person had embarked on.

Not all the members were equally disciplined, you had your well disciplined askari members and then there were others who were more problematic and had no sense of discipline and no moral values whatsoever.

ADV SANDI: When Mr Mabotha disappeared, did you have any discussion with anyone amongst your colleagues specifically about the fact that he disappeared and where he may have gone to?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson if my memory serves me correctly, we realised that he had left when a team came back from the deployments. It was mentioned that this man isn't here or he stayed behind and then what one would do in such a situation is to tell the askaris who were going to be redeployed ten days later to be on the lookout, not necessarily to arrest the person or to shoot the person because one didn't know whether this person had decided to take a few days or a few weeks worth of leave for his own purposes. This was not a unit which functioned like normal or regular units, one had to be extremely flexible in one's approach to such a unit.

ADV SANDI: I thought the disappearance of Mr Mabotha was a matter of concern amongst yourselves and one would have expected you to have held quite a number of discussions, wonder what has happened to this chap, where is he?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson what I would usually do if somebody had been gone for about two days, at least at some point one would have to sober up and come home. We would alert the border posts, not only the Swaziland border post but Botswana and Lesotho as well, all of them, we would alert them to the fact that such a person may attempt to cross the border there and that we would give them a description of such a person and ask them to be on the lookout for somebody like that.

But generally we looked at two aspects, it would be either an abduction or secondarily a defection or a desertion. This was something which came up as a daily fear.

ADV SANDI: Just on a different tack now, this information or rumour which you received that Mr Mabotha was involved in a confrontation, he had shot at members of the police force, did that influence your mind in taking the decision that he should be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. The policy of the ANC at that point as well as the PAC, was that members of the South African police were legitimate targets and many policemen were killed for that precise reason.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr Maribana.

CHAIRPERSON: Go on perhaps you could tell me something which makes things easier to understand. Had there been other cases where askaris had not come back? Was it something that was one of the regular things you had to put up with?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, unfortunately I will have to give you a name. We had an askari by the name of Shabalala, he was the type of man who would stay away for ten days and he was actually having a party during that span of time and I would have to hit it out of him. This would create a myriad of problems because one didn't know whether one had to move one's base, remove the people from the base, move out of that area, send other people in. One would have to alert border posts to these persons and then he would return a few days later and then one would have to re-alert the border posts and tell them everything's all right, he's come back.

ADV SANDI: Would I be correct to think that because of the nature of the work the askaris were doing at Vlakplaas, they would have to spend quite some time away from Vlakplaas gathering information so that when they come back to Vlakplaas they are able to convey this information to you?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, the information that was collected, such as long-term information, an example would be a route that may have been in use or a sympathiser, this type of information would be placed in writing and then be made available to the branch and then to the regional office, but information that we would receive that would indicate that there were ANC members there now, would be reacted on immediately. Yes they went to shebeens quite often and they spent a great deal of time working at train stations. That would be where we made the greatest number of our arrests, at taxi ranks or train stations and among others, also at shebeens because it would appear that these people would encounter each other there more often than any other place.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, askaris were not employed to do routine office work at Vlakplaas, they were employed to get out in the field and try to make contact with the MK and PAC people coming in, that sort of thing.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson and a contact wasn't necessarily a question of now seeing you and we've made contact; a contact would indicate a physical contact such as shooting incidents which often happened. There were cases in Natal where this took place. So a contact was not necessarily a verbal liaison, it would be a physical incident such as shooting incident.

CHAIRPERSON: But they would be away from Vlakplaas, that's the point I was trying to get at.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, there was definitely no office work for them.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock after you received that information that Mr Mabotha returned back to the ANC, you feared that he might leak information to the ANC, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson I would concede that, however near Marble Hall it was no longer a primary concern for me, we did not receive fixed information there that he had placed any of our members lives in danger.

MR MARIBANA: And as a result won't it be correct to say you never experienced any problems after the disappearance of Mr Mabotha as far as the non-safety of other askaris, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson we had no such problems.

MR MARIBANA: Thank you Mr Chair, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARIBANA

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Your Lordship, it's Ramula Patel.

Just a couple of preliminary questions, Mr de Kock. The mine that was used, do you have any idea who it belonged to?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I am not familiar with the mining group and unfortunately I no longer have the contract which was compiled for the use of that area as a training facility, I cannot give you the name of the group but I know that it has closed down and I would venture so far as to say that that company, that group no longer exists.

MS PATEL: Okay, at the start of your evidence-in-chief you stated that your memory was refreshed regarding certain aspects of this incident by discussions that you've had. Could you tell us who you had these discussions with?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson on 29th of January 1998 for a period of a week I think, some of the facts which emanated during the trial at Johannesburg regarding this evidence, I think I referred to Capt du Toit and some of the others. At that point some information came to my knowledge.

MS PATEL: Can you just tell us on what aspects your memory was refreshed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I was not even aware of letters or a telephone number which was obtained from Johannes Mabotha, as was the evidence which was given, however I did receive confirmation that Mrs Mandela's telephone lines had been tapped even though the persons who undertook this work denied it and as a result of this some of the events did come back to my memory. However I cannot tell you today that because I heard in 1998 that Capt du Toit said he was present, that the next person said he was present, I can say that as a result of that, that they definitely were present but in terms of the documentation that was obtained from Mabotha, it was something new to me.

MS PATEL: During the assault at the farm, can you tell us who was present?

MR DE KOCK: I know about Mr Grobbelaar who was on the farm, me and then Bellingan and as it appeared later then, Klopper. However I cannot recall the other persons. I can tell you now that Capt du Toit was there but that's because he said so in 1998, thus I don't want to connect that to my own memory.

MS PATEL: Could you give us a rough idea of how many people there were if you cannot remember what their names are?

MR DE KOCK: Apart from myself and Mr Bellingan, I would say that there were six other persons or perhaps seven other persons, that is just the vague number that comes to mind.

MS PATEL: Okay so all in all there would have been about nine of you present at this interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes approximately, that's correct.

MS PATEL: And you say the only thing that you can recall doing was assisting somebody in hanging Mr Mabotha upside down. Is that the only thing that you did to him during that interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I have already given evidence this morning that I participated in this suffocation technique by means of a rubber inner tube, in other words one would cut off his oxygen supply.

MR DE KOCK: Was this done by you during the time that you say that there was a break in the interrogation or was this done in the presence of everybody else and with the assistance of other people?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was assistance, however I cannot recall specifically who assisted, it would not have been during the break. We could not maintain such interrogation hour after hour consistently because it would have killed him, he had to have breaks.

MS PATEL: Alright. Can you recall how long after the first assault, from the time that you were present at the - how long after the first assault had taken place was there a break in which you could then question him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I really can't recall that, I'd like to if it would help to solve any problems but I cannot recall that.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you only question during the so-called breaks or did you question him while you were torturing him.

MR DE KOCK: No while one was occupied with torturing the subject one would also remove the rubber tube and then say, "what do you say now?" One would give the person the opportunity to regain his breath. It doesn't help to suffocate him for an hour and then ask him a question and he can't answer it. So sporadically the tube would be released because if one kept it there too long it would kill him because he would suffocate completely.

MS PATEL: Was he then questioned by you in-between the moments when the tube would be released?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, I did put questions on occasion but I was not the person who was the person chiefly entitled to the information. The Soweto Branch was the person who needed most of the information surrounding his desertion.

MR DE KOCK: Can you recall what questions you put to him during the times that he was being tubed by you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I don't have an independent recollection of that but it would have been something in the line of any leakages, whether he has identified any of our members, whether he identified Vlakplaas, what kind of information they had, it would be anything on that line.

MS PATEL: Okay the reason I ask you this is because in your evidence-in-chief, you stated that the only time that you interrogated him was during the period when there was an interruption or when he had rested and that your concern then was whether there were any mutual problems that you could then perhaps sort out, which is different to your testimony now.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson the mutual problems would have been exactly that, that of Vlakplaas. One of the last things that we could have afforded would have been the permanent observation of Vlakplaas, the identification of our vehicles, our times of deployment and return, the guard system and so forth.

I know that upon a specific occasion there was a Mopani tree, or some form of a tree, where he sat down when he was taking a break and I went and asked him questions there but that was not within the context of placing pressure on him or torturing him to get him to answer questions.

MS PATEL: So what was the purpose then if the man is on a break simply because to assault him continuously would kill him, that you would then question him during the break but not with the purpose of interrogating him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson there was the question of a hard and a soft interrogation, one didn't always know that the velvet handshake would bring him to another insight and that he might just decide at that moment to tell you what you wanted to know.

MS PATEL: You stated that during the interrogation Mr Mabotha told you that he was abducted, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he mentioned that he had been abducted.

MS PATEL: But that no names were given?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Because he could not recall the names or he did not know the names?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I just think he was being obstinate.

MS PATEL: You say you're not sure who was in charge of this interrogation?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, by nature of the situation it would have been one of the Soweto members because as I've already stated, they were the primary concerned party when it came to any information that could emanate from this interrogation because it had to do with Winnie Mandela and her football club and who was involved in that. So they would have been the party who was experiencing the greatest problems.

MS PATEL: Right, on page 56 of the bundle, Mr Klopper states that both you and Mr Grobbelaar were in charge of the investigation, what is your comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I would interpret this that in terms of Vlakplaas I had my agenda and in terms of Soweto, Mr Grobbelaar had his agenda.

MS PATEL: From the Vlakplaas side you were indeed in charge.

MR DE KOCK: Yes with regard to the information that I wanted.

MS PATEL: Can you tell us what Mr Bellingan did at the interrogation, what was his role there?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot place him as having assisted with any assaults or holding the subject down. Throughout the morning I've been trying to remember exactly what he did there but I cannot place him in that situation. I'm not trying to protect him, however I cannot link him to any offence or transgression with regards to this particular event.

MS PATEL: And Major Grobbelaar, can you recall what his role was there, what he did?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no I cannot say that I heard him pose any specific questions or I cannot say at least that he participated actively in the interrogation. I do know however that he was present. There are some of those who say that he was not there but it is my contention that he was there and I will stand by that.

MS PATEL: So you simply cannot tell us what everybody else at the interrogation did, bar yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson that is correct, I really have no recollection of that, really, I don't wish to speculate.

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh again, sorry to interrupt here, I would submit that that was not a fair question that was put to the witness, he told you that he witnessed the assault with the ice, he told you that he assisted other people with the tubing.

CHAIRPERSON: The question should be that you cannot remember anybody else participating in the activities you have described?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he was assaulted, however I just don't have a clear recollection of who assaulted him. I can't tell you that this particular person kept him busy for an hour or that another person tried to suffocate him for an hour with an inner tube. I don't have a specific recollection regarding that.

MS PATEL: Can you then, bar the tubing and bar hanging Mr Mabotha upside down and bar the use of the ice, can you recall what else was done to Mr Mabotha during that interrogation on the farm?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the primary interrogation was, as I have stated consistently to suffocate him with this rubber tube, the ice business I don't know. As I've already stated that was the first time in my whole life that I had seen anything like that and the last time as well. I don't know where this deviation emanated from.

MS PATEL: Regarding the interrogation at which Mr Klopper was present, you say that you didn't know anything about that session at which he was interrogated at which Mabotha was interrogated, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I did not sit with Mabotha for the duration of his suffocation or interrogation, Soweto had their own agenda, that was not something that I wanted to interfere with because I was not involved in their investigations to begin with.

MS PATEL: Now I'm asking you specifically about Mr Kloppers, you don't know that he was involved in another interrogation, you can't comment on that?

CHAIRPERSON: Where is that in his application?

MS PATEL: He mentioned it in his evidence-in-chief Honourable Chairperson or it might have been during cross-examination, I'm not sure but it forms parts of my notes from this morning.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson he was a member of the interrogating team with the case of Johannes Mabotha, however I don't know what he did or the others did after Bellingan and I had departed from there. I don't know for how long the interrogation continued and I have no indication of what took place after they went back to Soweto.

MS PATEL: Also just as an aside, Mr Kloppers states on page 34 of his application that he was paid informer fees, do you have any comment on this? Do you have any knowledge about it?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: How much longer are you going to be, are you going to go on to the question of fees now?

MS PATEL: No that's the only question on the fees, Your Lordship. I shouldn't be that much longer, if you grant me another 10 minutes I'm sure I'll be through by then or would you rather stop Honourable Chairperson. I'm in your hands?

CHAIRPERSON: Because there was quite - Klopper said at page 39, paragraph 4

"Major de Kock also made me draw flash money for weapons deals which he then took and gave me AK 47's etc, to make as if we bought it from arms smugglers".

Do you know anything about this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this is a situation which originated after Klopper had left Soweto to join Vlakplaas and some time after that the situation originated for which we had to generate funds for certain purposes. Money was given to a certain colonel for a heart bypass operation and also for assistance to Leon Flores who was paid off at DCC after he had been arrested in Britain for a matter concerning espionage and so forth.

CHAIRPERSON: It appears to indicate here that Kloppers says that informers fees of R100 000 were claimed and he was given R10 000 of this money.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson at that stage in Marble Hall Klopper was a member of the Soweto Security Branch, he was not a member of Vlakplaas, and this was some time after...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No this isn't in Marble Hall.

MS PATEL: The preceding paragraph reads "at Vlakplaas", Honourable Chairperson so it's read in that context.

CHAIRPERSON: He's saying what happened at Vlakplaas, he appears to say there that he was given R10 000.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just come in here, this is again an initial application where Klopper has listed several aspects relating to crimes and so on which appear from statements to the Attorney General. I don't think this portion, paragraph 4, is meant to be or has any relation to the Mabotha incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Well he may not think it has, we may do so if he gets paid regularly. Paragraph 4 he says that

"This happened so often that it is difficult for me to give the exact details".

It would appear he was in it for money. Have you read that paragraph?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, no payment of any nature was made for that. I'm inclined to agree with Mr Lamey regarding that, this is about something else, in fact

I do believe that I was charged for it but it has nothing to do with Mabotha or any actions or operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Well we'll wait till he comes. Right.

MS PATEL: Mr de Kock, just to clarify, you stated that in respect of that specific claim that it was for a heart operation for a certain colonel, would he not have had a medical aid scheme that he could have tapped into to pay for this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson some of this money was used for that among others. What happened with this specific person is that before the operation he could not determine whether or not his doctors were contracted and he determined then that this physician was contracted out and taht this money was then taken from the fund so that it wouldn't have to come from his own finances, he had already retired and for that reason we assisted him.

CHAIRPERSON: What time tomorrow morning gentlemen, 9:30? Very well we'll adjourn till 9:30 tomorrow morning?

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS