Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today we're continuing with the hearing we commenced yesterday, relating to the Japie Maponya incident. Mr de Kock was giving evidence-in-chief when we adjourned and shall now continue. Mr Hattingh?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, yesterday we reached the stage where we started dealing with the events of the day after Japie Maponya's abduction. That morning you were at Head Office, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you specifically go there, or was it part of that routine which you told us about yesterday, where you went to Head Office every morning?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because I was once again in my own area, I had to report for meetings there, but I also wanted to discuss the situation with Brigadier Schoon, who was my commander.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you want to discuss it with him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was my direct commander. I

did not have a problem with the command of the Regional Commander of the West Rand, but he was my direct commander and I wanted to inform him.

MR HATTINGH: And you say that he was not in the office when you wanted to see him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he was not and I could not find him.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall at what time you returned to Vlakplaas, from Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think it must have been in the vicinity of 12 o'clock or 1 o'clock. I have a vague recollection. It was a long time ago, but that is the time that I recall now.

MR HATTINGH: And when you arrived at Vlakplaas, did anybody tell you that General le Roux had visited the farm?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see Mr Kleynhans there?

MR DE KOCK: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you expect him there, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.

MR HATTINGH: Why not?

MR DE KOCK: No arrangements were made that they would arrive there. There was no further interrogation of Japie Maponya. When I contacted Krugersdorp from Head Office, it was about eleven in the morning and I found Mr Kleynhans at his office.

MR HATTINGH: So the call you made to Krugersdorp was from Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, because I could not find Brigadier Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you continue, Mr de Kock, the previous evening, after you had finished interrogating Mr Maponya, did you speak to Kleynhans? What did you tell him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we did have a discussion, but I cannot recall what the nature of the conversation was. If I have to think back, it must have been very brief, but I don't have an independent recollection as to what exactly we discussed there. There was not much to say after Japie's violent assault.

CHAIRPERSON: So is it possible that Mr Kleynhans might have believed that the interrogation would have continued the next day?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we concluded talking to Japie, and I could not see after that assault that we could get anything else from him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, thank you.

MR MALAN: You said "anything else from him". If I understand you correctly, you did not get anything from him, he did not say anything at any stage?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. The impression that I had - and it was an admiring quality, was that it was one of absolute loyalty, "You will not get anything from me". That was the type of attitude he had. It is actually an anachronism in today's time.

MR HATTINGH: Did the askaris also participate in the interrogation the previous evening?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they did.

MR HATTINGH: And did they address him in his own language?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. The reason was, among others, because I spoke to him in English and Afrikaans and he did not give any indication that he could grasp what I was saying, and that is why some of the black members spoke to him in his own language, but even then there was no reaction from him.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, Mr Hattingh.

Mr de Kock, can you just clarify for me, were those askaris or black members? When you talk of black members, I assume you're talking about policemen, whereas askaris were not policemen. Can you just - which of the two was it?

MR DE KOCK: It was both groups. It was the black police members as well as askaris. An askaris is unfortunately a colonial word which was taken up in history, but this refers to former members of the ANC and the PAC.

ADV GCABASHE: So the answer is both?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct. If I may put in the following way, both those two groupings, the difference between black policemen and askaris, both of them took part.

MR HATTINGH: You testified yesterday that you gave instructions that the assault had to be stopped, because it was clear to you that no information would be obtained from Mr Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you inform those present there that that was the reason why the assault had to stop?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I just realised that we would get nothing from him and I told them that they had to cease the assaults, we are done, and I sent them back to the farm and among others, I also sent Japie Maponya back to the farm.

MR HATTINGH: One of the other applicants, I'm not sure who, says that you said that the assault had to stop because it was clear that he would not give any information.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, that applicant is quite correct.

MR HATTINGH: But did you tell them that the assault had to stop because it was clear that he would not talk?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall the last part, but I told them to stop. It was clear to me. I may have said that.

MR HATTINGH: Was the intention that Mr Kleynhans and Dunkley had to accompany you to the place where you would kill Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, definitely.

MR HATTINGH: And when was this arranged?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this was during the interrogation there. It was discussed there.

MR HATTINGH: And why did you want them to accompany you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was their subject. If I may put it in the following way, it was their operation, we were coopted to assist them in this grabbing action and it was nothing else but right that they had to accompany us. They were the authors of this operation and he had to come along and participate in this matter.

MR HATTINGH: The fact that you brought Mr Maponya from Krugersdorp to Vlakplaas, did this cause that this would be your operation, as General le Roux had said?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was a Krugersdorp operation all the time.

MR HATTINGH: And Messrs Kleynhans and Dunkley's attitude when you told them they had to accompany you?

MR DE KOCK: They agreed.

MR HATTINGH: We now know that they did not accompany you.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you arrange that they meet you at Vlakplaas at a certain time to accompany you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I called them the evening, or late the afternoon and asked them to come through. If I remember correctly, during that discussion with Captain Kleynhans, I mentioned to him that I will contact them again with regard to the time or when we will depart. I did call them later, later that afternoon.

MR HATTINGH: And what was their reaction?

MR DE KOCK: Captain Kleynhans said that he wanted to study for an exam and Lieutenant Dunkley said that his wife was in labour, or something along those lines, and not one of the two could make it. And then Vlakplaas had to solve the situation.

MR HATTINGH: And the other members who accompanied you, did you inform them of the fact that Messrs Kleynhans and Dunkley would not accompany you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. I think I did. I will say I think I did, because in the part that was known as the Clubhouse, we discussed how we would drive and I would have mentioned it.

MR HATTINGH: The decision that Mr Maponya had to be killed, you say this was taken in Krugersdorp already?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Now we'll get to the following day. You said last that your memory was that you had Mr Maponya take a shower. What time did you leave from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think at approximately 6 o'clock or 7 o'clock, 6 or 7p.m., or late that afternoon/evening.

MR HATTINGH: And what equipment did you take with you, if any?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had four containers, four 20 litre containers on the vehicle, which was standard equipment and then we took along a 9mm and an Uzzi submachinegun which was fitted with a silencer.

MR HATTINGH: And did you take subsonic ammunition with for it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, subsonic ammunition was already loaded into the magazine.

MR HATTINGH: There is some discrepancy between your and the other applicant's versions as to whether you took a spade or any other garden equipment with you. What is memory in regard to this?

MR DE KOCK: We did not take along a spade or any other garden equipment, although I do not want to say thereby that they are lying. I think that will be their perception of it. But we did not take a spade with, Chairperson, because I knew that we would go to Warrant Officer Pienaar's house.

MR HATTINGH: And when was this arrangement made, or when was this decision taken that you would go to Mr Pienaar's house?

MR DE KOCK: This would also have been in the late afternoon of the day that we would depart. I asked him about movements along the border movement, because he was the chief of the subbranch of the Security Branch at Piet Retief, and he had knowledge on a daily basis of the movements of the Police Counterinsurgency Unit and the Army, who patrolled the border and where their patrols were made.

MR HATTINGH: So had you already planned to take Mr Maponya to Swaziland?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was already decided.

MR HATTINGH: And that is why you enquired about patrols along the border?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you take the petrol along?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the idea was that we would not fill up gas along the way. In other words, we did not want to be traced. We did not want to appear in public anywhere because if there were any enquiries, nobody could refer to us.

The vehicle was not a general vehicle on the road and it would have been easily recognisable, according to description.

MR HATTINGH: What vehicle was it?

MR DE KOCK: It was one of these Toyota Land Cruisers, but the station wagon type.

MR HATTINGH: And who drove the vehicle when you eventually departed?

MR DE KOCK: Nortje was the driver.

MR HATTINGH: And where did you sit?

MR DE KOCK: I was the passenger, left in front and the other two members sat at the back on the back seat.

MR HATTINGH: This now Messrs Fourie and van der Walt

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Maponya, where did you place him?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just before you proceed, you said this was a Toyota Land Cruiser type vehicle, do those vehicles have a spade as a sort of standard equipment, part of four wheel driving?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And where did you place Mr Maponya in the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was in-between the front seat and the back seat. There is a lot of room there and we made him lay down there.

MR HATTINGH: Was he blindfolded?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was and he was cuffed and I think we put a blanket or a something of that type on the floor.

MR HATTINGH: And where did you go to then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, from Vlakplaas we went directly to Piet Retief.

MR HATTINGH: To Mr Pienaar's house?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So why did you got there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, firstly, it was to enquire if there were any other movements of members of the Forces or the Army, if there were any new developments with the movements of troops with regard to roadblocks and also then to get a spade and a pick.

MR HATTINGH: Did you get a spade and a pick from him?

MR DE KOCK: I got a garden fork and a spade from him.

MR HATTINGH: And the other members who accompanied you, there is some discrepancy there, whether Mr Pienaar accompanied you from there. What do you say to that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he did not accompany us.

MR HATTINGH: Is there any reason for you to try and protect Mr Pienaar in this connection?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because I implicate him in other cases which have to be heard in future. If he was there, I would have said so.

MR HATTINGH: So you implicate him, among others, in the two cases which will be part of this month's proceedings, which will be heard in Durban, the Piet Retief incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and there are other incidents, the Amsterdam incident as well as an event which has been concluded, the shooting of Siphiwe Nyanda - sorry, Zwelibanzi Nyanda, as well other incidents and actions.

MR HATTINGH: And with these other incidents that you mentioned now, were people killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, at every instance everybody was killed.

MR HATTINGH: And the other incidents which you mention now, Mr Pienaar does apply for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he does.

MR HATTINGH: He does not ask amnesty for this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were you and Mr Nortje and the other members, except for the incident that you have mentioned now, were you involved with other incidents where Mr Pienaar was also involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, Nortje, I know he was and Fourie, van der Walt, not that I can recall now.

MR HATTINGH: Were these also incidents which took place in the vicinity of the border or across the border?

MR DE KOCK: This was across the border as well as on the South African side of the border.

MR HATTINGH: So this was not the only incident where you had dealings with Mr Pienaar?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You say Mr Pienaar did not accompany you. So the same persons, the four of you and Mr Maponya departed from Piet Retief.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Where did you go to?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we went to the Nersden border post, or the vicinity of the Nersden border post. I did not know the vicinity of the Swazi border too well, but we have used that border post previously, therefore I knew the area there.

With our arrival at the border post - one has to drive almost right up against the border post before you turn right to move down along the South African/Swaziland border.

MR HATTINGH: So did you move along the border?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. There was a type of - I would not say it was two lanes in the road, I would say it's a tertiary gravel road, which runs directly along the border.

MR HATTINGH: Can you more-or-less recall how far from the tarred road you moved along the border?

MR DE KOCK: I would say it was approximately two or three kilometres.

MR HATTINGH: And then?

MR DE KOCK: At the scene where we stopped, Chairperson, we climbed out of the vehicle, we fetched Japie Maponya from the vehicle, and at the fence he had some trouble climbing through to the Swaziland side and we removed his blindfold.

MR HATTINGH: Why was it necessary to remove his blindfold?

MR DE KOCK: Because he had trouble climbing through the fence, Chairperson, and the area there was plantation area and it was quite overgrown. I would not say like a jungle, but it was quite overgrown.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the lighting in the area like?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a moon, but it was quite a weak moon, there were some thunder clouds in the sky and it was busy building up.

MR HATTINGH: At what time was this now, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would estimate it must have been between twelve and one in the morning.

MR HATTINGH: So it was in the middle of the night?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So you take Mr Maponya through the fence, this is the fence that forms the border between the Republic and Swaziland?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So now you are inside the borders of Swaziland, where do you move to then?

MR DE KOCK: We moved straight into Swaziland, I would say in an easterly direction, and we walked about 80 to 100 metres into the plantation.

MR HATTINGH: And then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, while we were moving in, just before we would stop, I heard a loud sound behind me, I was right in front, and it was a sound similar to a shot being fired through an Uzzi, with a silencer and I thought that Nortje had already shot Maponya. I turned around and he told me that he had hit him with the Uzzi.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Maponya still on his feet when you turned around?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he was lying on the ground and it looked as if he - the English word is "stunned", I'm trying to think of the Afrikaans word,

MR HATTINGH: So he was stunned.

MR DE KOCK: And when Nortje wanted to shoot him, the working part of the Uzzi did not want to work and did not fire off the shot. And while we were standing there we took the machinegun apart to see if it would, what the problem was, because we thought the problem had happened when he hit Mr Maponya. It still did not work.

I took the gun and I went back to the vehicle and I took the equipment bag in the vehicle and I tried to get the firearm into a working condition. There was no success. I then took out some of the ammunition which was in the magazine of the Uzzi, because it was subsonic ammunition, and I went back to where Nortje waited and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what is subsonic ammunition, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: It is a round of which the load has been limited, so that it would not make such a loud noise.

MR HATTINGH: So the noise, when it goes through the sound barrier ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and that is when in comes through the barrel. I gave Nortje one of these subsonic rounds and we were loading it into his Beretta, his service pistol ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: May I just interrupt you there. This Uzzi is what calibre?

MR DE KOCK: It is also a 9mm parabellum.

MR HATTINGH: It uses the same rounds as your service pistol?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well.

MR DE KOCK: And while he was loading this into his gun, Maponya had got to his feet and he tried to run away. His hands were still cuffed behind his back. He moved for about 10 metres before I caught up with him and I hit him across the back with the spade, where he fell to the ground.

I picked him up by his hands, which were still cuffed behind his back and I took him back to where Nortje stood, and Nortje fired a shot through his head. My recollection is quite clear, he shot him from left to right, through his head.

MR HATTINGH: Before you continue, let me just clear up one aspect. In your application itself, your application for amnesty to this Committee, you don't mention the fact that you hit Mr Maponya with a spade, but in your book, of which an extract is attached to the document - Mr Chairman, I refer to volume 2(A), page 13 - there in the final paragraph on page 13, you say

"I went back to Nortje and gave him a subsonic cartridge that he loaded into his 9mm pistol. Maponya, whose hands were still handcuffed behind his back, had got up and was trying to escape. I hit him with the spade in my hands ..."

And then there is a punch mark through the next word.

MS LOCKHAT: Could it be "and caught him"?

MR HATTINGH: And "caught him", I think so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Page 128, I think.

MR HATTINGH: Page 124, Mr Chairman.

"I hit him with the spade in my hands and caught him. Nortje shot him in the temple I think, the left temple. He died instantly."

May I ask you, during previous applications you have given evidence about the circumstances under which you prepared your amnesty application. Could I ask you to discuss that briefly. It involves a great number of volumes with several hundred incidents, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And at that stage you did only had the legal assistance of your attorney, Mr Hugo?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And when you were preparing your application you were already in prison?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you briefly explain to the Committee what the position is with regard to a consultation with you in prison, with regard to consultation times which you were permitted and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the times which were permitted usually fell according to the programme of the Prison Service. Sometimes there wouldn't be enough members. Furthermore, we didn't have an office which was available, we'd sit in the open air. Regardless of whether it is summer or winter, that is where we will undertake our consultations.

The Correctional Services do however try to do as much as they can in order to accommodate on, but unfortunately this is not always possible. In fact, most of the time it is not always possible.

MR HATTINGH: I just want to state it clearly, Mr de Kock, we are not busy with an attack on Correctional Services here, it's just the fact that there is a shortage of manpower.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the inmates are locked up for the night, after normal office hours.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then there will only be a limited number of members on duty.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And until what time are we usually permitted to consult with you?

MR DE KOCK: 3 o'clock is the maximum time, which is permissible.

MR HATTINGH: And after hours consultation are out of the question, due to this lack of manpower.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then it will happen sometimes, such as last Wednesday when we wanted to consult with you, that there is some or other event under way, which meant that we had to cease our consultation at 12 o'clock?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And these things happen from time to time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, such situations do occur.

MR HATTINGH: And apart from the limitations which exist in this regard, at the time when you prepared your application you also gave your co-operation to an Attorney-General team with regard to an investigation that they were busy with?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did they consult with you from time to time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at a stage they arrived there quite regularly.

MR HATTINGH: As a result of which it was not possible for Mr Hugo to consult with you in preparation of your application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then you also gave evidence during the criminal trial, on behalf of the State?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you are still consulted and spoken to by members of the Attorney-General's team with regard to cases which they are preparing?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also approached by other government officials with regard to information that you possess?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: These consultations which are conducted with you, invade the time that you would spend with your legal representatives?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And eventually your application was completed. And with regard to the closing date for applications, when was your application served?

MR DE KOCK: A few minutes before 12 o'clock on the closing date.

MR HATTINGH: Was it 12 o'clock that night?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was 12 o'clock the night of the day for which applications were cut off.

MR HATTINGH: Is your amnesty application a thorough explanation or summary of the incidents in which you are involved?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there are gaps.

MR HATTINGH: Did you and Mr Hugo also have the thorough opportunity to work through your application after you had prepared it, and to make certain of its content?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were opportunities, but it is not yet thoroughly complete. So there will be gap and we will hear an example of this within the next few minutes probably.

MR HATTINGH: Now this book which you wrote, was it published after your application was submitted, or before the submission of your application?

MR DE KOCK: We can consult the date of publication. I can't recall. I think it was published after my submissions were made.

MR HATTINGH: In 1998?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: So it is quite some time after the cut-off date for amnesty applications?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Let us return to the incident itself. You said that you hit Mr Maponya with the spade, can you recall how many times you hit him?

MR DE KOCK: No, I hit him with one blow only and he fell and collapsed on the ground and he collapsed quite hard because he couldn't prevent himself from falling, with his hands. After ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, whereabout on the body did you hit him?

MR DE KOCK: I hit him against the shoulders. I would say that I hit him in the middle of the back, on the right shoulder blade.

MR HATTINGH: You are now in the plantation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the trees were quite tall?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And was the lighting in the plantation the same as what it had been before you entered the plantation?

MR DE KOCK: It was actually somewhat darker, as a result of the break in the lighting.

MR HATTINGH: Due to the leaf coverage from the trees above you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you take any torches or anything of that nature with you?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Was there any reason for that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we didn't want to draw unnecessary attention. I wasn't completely up-to-date with the level of population or the residence of people within that vicinity. I didn't know if there was a kraal or homes 600 metres away from that place.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. After you had hit him and he collapsed to the ground, you took him back?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: What happened next?

MR DE KOCK: He was shot through the head by Warrant Officer Nortje, from the left to the right, through his temples. He fell down from where he had been standing, he ended up on his back. I bent over him and I observed no signs of life within him. There was no eye movement. His eyes were half open.

MR HATTINGH: Now we are getting to contradictions again. It is said that you, after Mr Maponya had been shot, administered several blows to his body with the spade.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after Mr Maponya had been shot and he collapsed, I made certain of the fact that he was dead and I stood between his knees and his ankles and administered two tremendous blows with the spade to his head. I wanted to determine that he was dead, or at least I wanted to ensure that he was dead. And let me put it in this context, if the Uzzi had not been defective or broken, we would have fired two shots through the head.

I would almost venture to say that this was standard practice, that after our shooting combat situations we would shoot a victim through the head once again, even though we could see that he was dead. It was just to make certain that he was dead.

MR HATTINGH: Let us return to the ammunition and the weapon that you used. We know that a subsonic round was used, where the bullet would move slower than the speed of sound, but the sound which is caused when such a weapon is fired, is identified by two sources, one is the explosion of the gunpowder and secondly, it is when the bullet exceeds the limit of sound.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now if you place the subsonic round of ammunition within a firearm which was not furnished with a silence, what would the effect of that be?

MR DE KOCK: It would sound like a normal shot, because it would move just below the speed of sound. I think it's approximately 1000 feet per second, perhaps somewhat more.

MR HATTINGH: Can I put it like this, the effect of the silencer, the silencer only muffles the sound of the explosion of the gunpowder which drives the bullet?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but also as a result of the build-up of gasses within the silencer, let's call it an extended round, where the empty bullets are dropped, with a Beretta or a subsonic weapon the empty shells would not be dropped, so you wouldn't have to go and look for the shells afterwards.

MR HATTINGH: Let's forget about that, let's just focus on the sound. The fact that the firearm did not have a silencer, did not muffle the sound of the explosion itself?

MR DE KOCK: No, it didn't.

MR HATTINGH: And thus, it was the usual loud sound which one would have when firing a firearm?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did this play a role in the decision to fire one shot only?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, from my experience, not only in this instance, but in the former Rhodesia and former South West Africa and even here, where I had conversations with people who had similar experiences, was that one shouldn't fire more than one shot. I saw this in South West Africa as well. Because if you fired on shot, you could say that it came from a westerly direction, but more than one shot would help someone to determine exactly in what direction one should go to find the source of the shot, or that person.

MR HATTINGH: Now after you had hit Maponya with the spade, what happened next?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Nortje, Fourie and I, because Fourie first stood away, we didn't want to have a shot deflected by a bone or a skull and I think he stood about five to ten paces away. The three of us then began to gather branches and leaves.

MR HATTINGH: Why didn't you dig a hole, seeing as you had the pickaxe and the spade there?

MR DE KOCK: After I had hit Maponya with the spade I put the pickaxe into the ground, with the objective of loosening the ground and I couldn't move the pickaxe. I did the same with the fork. I leaned against the fork and the teeth of the fork actually gave way, or at least began to bend.

MR HATTINGH: Is the result of the root system of the trees?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's something we didn't take into account, the interwoven root system of such a plantation. And the spade had absolutely no affect on the roots, and that's why we didn't dig a hole.

MR HATTINGH: You say that you gathered leaves and branches?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct. After we had removed the handcuffs and the clothing off Maponya's body, we gathered branches and leaves and what we could find in the vicinity to cover his body with.

MR HATTINGH: What was the objective in removing his clothing?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was about identification, so that a photo wouldn't appear somewhere and the family or somebody would then be in a position to identify him as a result of his clothing. It would also not be wise to leave pieces of evidence on the scene of the incident, such as clothing or bags which could help to identify the person, so we removed everything.

MR HATTINGH: And from there you returned to the vehicles?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, from there we returned to the vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: You have described Mr Fourie's position, what about Mr van der Walt, can you remember where he stood, what his role was with the killing of Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: He did climb over to the Swazi side, but he was approximately five to ten paces away from the vehicle, from where one could see the vehicle. Mr van der Walt was very restless and I don't blame him for that. I think that all of us were very restless.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Hattingh, was your question not what was Fourie's role?

MR HATTINGH: No, it was van der Walt, Mr Chairperson.

Very well. You returned to the vehicle, where did you go then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we first looked around in the vehicle and once again I asked that the members ensure that they had all their equipment with them. Before we disembarked we ensured that our bags were empty, so that we wouldn't lose anything at the scene of the incident. And someone reported an appointment certificate is missing, so we had to start a search and it began to rain, the raid was quite heavy. I will tell you that this suited me at that stage because upon driving away the rain would also remove any traces of vehicle tracks or footprints.

MR HATTINGH: Did Mr van der Walt end up finding his certificate of appointment?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was still in the vehicle, but at that stage it created some form of a panic situation.

MR HATTINGH: So then you drove back to Piet Retief?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I drove back to Mr Pienaar's house and we returned his pickaxe, his fork and his spade to him. And there I asked Mr Pienaar if he didn't have eight beers for us, which he did provide to me. We departed from there. I didn't tell him what we had done. However, for quite some time thereafter I subtly attempted to make enquiries as to whether anybody had found a body in the area, or whether there had been any queries and there had been nothing.

MR HATTINGH: What time did you return to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, but it was during the early morning hours.

MR HATTINGH: And the following episode in this story took place when Mr Nofomela, on the evening before his sentence made certain admissions, especially with regard to Mr Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Dirk Coetzee also came forward with revelations?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: As a result of which the McNally Committee was appointed, which was succeeded by the Harms Commission of Inquiry?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the Maponya matter was one of the matters which was investigated by the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And what was done in this regard, did you cover anything up? What was the position?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the entire process was a cover action. From the very first day until the final day it was a cover action.

MR HATTINGH: Were your immediate commanders aware of the fact that there was a cover action under way?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Brigadier Schoon and I, among others, were in his office one Friday and we discussed the situation surrounding a report which had appeared in the Vryeweekblad, and Brigadier le Roux, who was then with the Inspectorate and was the former Head of the West Rand Security Branch, entered the office and sat down, there was a chair and there was also a steel filing cabinet in Brigadier's Schoon's office, and he expressed sympathies with us regarding this terrible time that we were about to enter. He also wished us strength and said that he would pray for us, everything in that line.

MR HATTINGH: The question was actually whether Brigadier Schoon knew about the cover action.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did.

MR HATTINGH: The version which you presented to the Harms Commission, was that, or was at least completely false.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very briefly, the version was that the members who were allegedly involved in Mr Maponya's abduction and his subsequent murder, were at the time of the alleged abduction and murder deployed to the Josini area, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The situation surrounding the cover of this Maponya incident began just after the death of Maponya, approximately two to three days thereafter, with the completion of the travel and accommodation claims of the Vlakplaas members, because the method which I applied, which others didn't apply, but I used this method, and that would be that if there was an interruption in your service within a specific area, you would report it.

You would say, for example, we worked from the 6th to the 12th in Josini and then from the 13th to the 20th we were in Newcastle, but in this case we did report that interruption and state that work had been performed in Krugersdorp. The claim was made out for the entire period of service, in order to show that they had been in the Josini area.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh.

Mr de Kock, when did Brigadier Schoon learn of the death of Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, upon the termination of our service, during that specific month I had a meeting with him and I told him that we had indeed performed work in Krugersdorp, that there had been a problem in Krugersdorp and that this problem in Krugersdorp had been solved.

So nothing was said in direct terms, with regard to murder or how the murder was committed or the nature thereof, but the word "problem" at that stage was a very clear reference to the fact that something serious had taken place on an underhand level, otherwise it would have been put in detail.

MR HATTINGH: And when you were in Krugersdorp, to see General le Roux, do you know whether any vehicles of the members who were present there took petrol at the Krugersdorp Police Station?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot give direct evidence about that. However, there were certain of the vehicles which we had, which I took over from the previous commander, which had to go to the police stations to obtain petrol. Later I changed these practices for us to obtain petrol from the Secret Fund, because it wouldn't help to use a vehicle for covert purposes and then obtain petrol for a police station. But at that stage we did have such vehicles.

MR HATTINGH: And when petrol is obtained from a police station for such a vehicle, would any record of this be kept in some from of a petrol register?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the date and the SAP number of the vehicle, which is allocated to it by the Quartermaster, would be recorded, along with the quantity of petrol which was taken.

There was a directive about this, in that the member who had taken the petrol, apart from his signature, had to print his name in the register in block letters, because those persons who dealt with the register at the end of every month could not determine who had taken petrol because of weak handwriting.

MR HATTINGH: Did he have to put down his Force number as well?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: So if people were to consult the register thereafter, it would be clear - along with the supposition that petrol had been taken, it would be clear that Vlakplaas vehicles had been at the Krugersdorp Police Station on that particular day?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether any steps were taken with regard to the petrol register?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know that enquiries were made at Krugersdorp, but I don't have any independent recollection thereof. However, during my trial, Mr Nortje gave evidence about it and this peaked my recollection. I knew that a petrol register had been fetched. I don't know by who.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nortje testified that he fetched it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And he says so in his application as well.

MR DE KOCK: I would support that, because this would not be something that he made up.

MR HATTINGH: So an absolutely false version was submitted to the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And after that there was also a Post-mortem Inquest into the death of Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you also give evidence during those proceedings?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And your version which you submitted there, was it also false?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, everything was denied.

MR HATTINGH: Could you refresh my memory please, which came first, the Harms Commission of Inquiry or the Post-mortem Inquest?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that it was first the Post-mortem Inquest. I think so.

MR HATTINGH: And then the Harms Commission of Inquiry?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct. Or at least let me qualify it like this. I first gave evidence during the Post-mortem Inquest and then I gave evidence before the Harms Commission.

I think that the Harms Commission had already commenced in 1989, but I only gave evidence in 1990, because when I gave evidence before the Harms Commission, my leg was in plaster-of-paris. When I testified with the Post-mortem Inquest, my leg was not in plaster-of-paris. That's how I remember it.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, perhaps I could assist you. The Harms Commission was in 1990 and the Inquest was in 1991. That appears from bundle 2B, the dates.

MR DE KOCK: Well I would just reiterate it, I associated myself with the situation where my leg was in plaster and when it was not in plaster.

MR HATTINGH: So would you accept that the Post-mortem Inquest took place after the Harms Commission of Inquiry?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And did you give evidence during both those sets of proceedings?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And some of your other members also gave evidence during both those sets of proceedings?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Nortje and I gave evidence, but as far as I can recall, no other members from Vlakplaas gave evidence there, unless my memory fails me. But as far as I can recall, it was only Nortje and I.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Nofomela also gave evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: During both sessions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know who was in command of the Harms Commission's investigation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was General Engelbrecht. There were several commanders. First it was Mr McNally and General Alwyn Conradie and they were followed up by General Joubert and afterwards, if I recall correctly, it was General Engelbrecht who, from there onwards was continually working with the Harms Commission and dealt with the investigation.

MR HATTINGH: We've heard of General Ronnie van der Westhuizen, was he also seconded to assist the Commission in their inquiries?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not sure and I do not want to take a guess.

MR HATTINGH: During these two inquiries, how many of the commanding officers were aware of the fact that you were presenting false versions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no doubt that Brigadier Schoon was aware of it. General le Roux had no doubt about that anymore. General Engelbrecht had no doubt about that. And although I did not liaise directly with General Smit and the others, I also have no doubt that they knew of it. General Nick van Rensburg, who was the commander of C Section, definitely knew of it.

MR HATTINGH: Why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, one morning he lost his temper and he spoke out sharply and he went on about it, he said he's now involved with - excuse the word, all Vlakplaas' shit, little knowing that I knew what happened in Port Elizabeth.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Were you ever admonished about your ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, just before you continue.

You differentiated between Nick van Rensburg, you said he definitely knew, all the others you say that you had no doubt that they knew. Do you have any information that they knew? Why do you say you don't doubt that they knew?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in the instance where General le Roux came to sit in Brigadier Schoon's office, Brigadier Schoon and I discussed the Japie Maponya matter, when he arrived there and he came to sit there. This was not the only allegations that were made by Nofomela, which we discussed. We talk about cross-border operations. So whether you shoot someone on this side of the border or on the other side of the border, people can come with international law, but it is still murder.

MR MALAN: No, but you said you discussed it with Schoon, and discussed the allegations of Mr Nofomela.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the allegations were in regard to Mr Maponya.

MR MALAN: You spoke about Mr Nofomela's allegations.

MR DE KOCK: That's right.

MR MALAN: His allegations. But you do not say that you told Schoon "I killed Maponya", you spoke about Nofomela's allegations, not about the fact that you had murdered Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot directly tell you and I do not want to involve anybody for no reason here, I want to tell you that I am not looking for some lifeline, but the essence of that discussion would have been clear as to what had happened to Japie, and that is that he was dead.

MR MALAN: But Mr de Kock, with all respect, this was general knowledge at that stage. There was an Inquest, there were many things in the pipeline after Nofomela's allegations.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But you have told us nowhere that you told Schoon directly "I killed Maponya". You did not say that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because I don't have an independent recollection thereof, and I am not going to say.

MR MALAN: But that you don't have an independent recollection that le Roux knew that you killed him, because le Roux was present during the discussion with Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage I told Brigadier le Roux, after he wished us well, that this case, this instance that Nofomela was talking about was your operation.

MR MALAN: Yes, that's correct, he knew about the abduction and this flowed from the abduction. Why would he necessarily attach that to murder?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't believe that at that stage there was any doubt with General le Roux that Japie Maponya was dead.

MR MALAN: And then you say that you had no doubt that General Smit knew about it. Now why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: This is an inference that I drew because all these facts, all these cases, all the information was channelled from Brigadier Engelbrecht, through General Nick van Rensburg to General Smit. So I cannot see how in our Intelligence Service such as we had and the information which was available, that it wouldn't have come out by him. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR MALAN: And Nick van Rensburg's knowledge, you just attach it to the fact that he said that "Now I have to deal with Vlakplaas' shit"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's not all, Chairperson. Afterwards, my unit and I executed some other operations under the instruction of General van Rensburg, which was similar to the Japie Maponya incident, not to abduct a person and chop his head etc., but which once again led to cross-border operations and the deaths of people.

MR MALAN: Before the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: No, during the Harms Commission. While we were making statements that we did not know anything, we went to Botswana and under the instruction of General van Rensburg and Engelbrecht, we shot people again. In that time we went across and we killed Brian Ncqulunga. In that same time we go down to Port Elizabeth and we blow up three Security Policemen and an askari. In that time General Basie Smit came to me and asked me to send some people down to Cape Town, which led to the fact that an explosion, or two explosions took place in the Cape. The one blew up an ATM teller. So also a direct ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I just want to ensure, you distinguish that Nick van Rensburg definitely knew that there were specifically similar instructions from him to you, but the others were not similar instructions. With the others you say you had no doubt, but with Nick van Rensburg you say that he knew. Do you distinguish in that nature? That is my question.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because I don't have a direct memory that I went to Brigadier Schoon and told him "Listen here, Brigadier, I abducted Japie Maponya ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: That's all, thank you. I just wanted to know why you distinguished.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr de Kock, I think somewhere in the translation we lost the channelling of information from General to the other. You went through three Generals and I didn't quite get which ones. Just in answer to Mr Malan just now. Can you just go over that again? And Engelbrecht, I thought you mentioned Engelbrecht as well. It went from one person to the next, to the next. Just those three names again, in the right order.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I will tell you that the problem that I have now is the problem that I had then. With these revelations of Dirk Coetzee and Nofomela, there was a type of - it was as if there was an isolation process from the members of C1, where previously they worked on a basis of compartmentalising and this was multiplied by one hundred this time, whereas you could talk to two or three of the Generals, one could only speak to the one and he would convey it to the other General.

General Engelbrecht's function at that stage with the Harms Commission, at that stage General Engelbrecht was devolved to the Detective Branch at Police Head Office and he was the Chief of the Murder and Robbery Units in the country, but he was devolved to the Security Branch or to Security Head Office for purposes of this inquiry.

I think here it was a case of manipulation of damage control and let's keep the people on the ground comfortable and keep them covered. That is what we experienced.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, in the light of the fact that - or let me put it this way, Mr Nofomela in his revelation said that he was involved with the abduction of Mr Maponya and that afterwards he was taken to Vlakplaas, where he was assaulted and interrogated and according to his initial revelations you there and then at Vlakplaas where the interrogation took place, killed Mr Nofomela(?). Do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can remember.

MR HATTINGH: Ag excuse me, Mr Maponya. Please excuse me. Indeed during the Inquest, he pointed out where - if I recall correctly, where he was shot.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And I ask you to refresh my memory because I rely on what I read in the media, but wasn't there an allegation that he was buried on the farm there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not sure.

MR HATTINGH: But in any case, the fact that you had allegedly killed Mr Maponya, was clearly revealed by Mr Maponya, is that correct.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And if Brigadier van Rensburg, Engelbrecht, Schoon, any of these gentlemen asked you whether you had killed Mr Maponya, what would you have said?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would have told them. And I would like to give you an example which has just come to me. It was that when General Engelbrecht and I and other members of the investigators were present, we went and investigated this situation and if I recall correctly, Nofomela said that we drove with a Safari Land Cruiser, or with a Nissan Safari 4X4 vehicle. We accepted it, while I told Engelbrecht "It's not so, we drove with my Land Cruiser".

In other words, the vehicle that they were looking for, they would test it forensically until they were blue in the face and they would not find any hair or blood or any form of DNA in this vehicle. So it was a general attempt to cover up the whole situation.

MR HATTINGH: We have already ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, there's just one question that I would like to ask Mr de Kock here.

If I understand you correctly, this was during the scope of your tasks, under the instruction of your commanders, including the killing?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Now if you regarded it as an instruction, why did you not report directly that the operation was executed? And if the instruction does not thus come directly down, isn't there a report-back directly?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that must have been what we would have wanted, but that is not how it worked in the Security Branch. One did not go and tell Brigadier Schoon "Listen Brigadier, Japie Maponya was first shot and then he was hit with the spade".

MR MALAN: No, Mr de Kock, that is not my question. My question is, if Schoon gives you an instruction - and this is now hypothetical, "Kill Japie Maponya" and you go and kill him, would you not report back to him and say "I have killed him"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, but you would do it in a type of terminology, like saying that the case has been concluded. You will not discuss it further. I'll give you an example ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I hear you, but you would have told him the matter has been concluded. In other words, "I killed him". So you would report back to him ?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you report back to General le Roux, after the killing of Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. It was already discussed in his office and it was concluded.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

During the previous hearings, the de Kock Cluster 1, we dealt with the Chand family and the Brian Ncqulunga matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And we never concluded the Brian Ncqulunga matter, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, we never concluded the Brian Ncqulunga matter.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, it was supposed to be heard, but we got stuck and it was postponed. But in any case you said that the instruction to kill the Chand family you received from Brigadier van Rensburg, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that General Engelbrecht was present, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: As well at the same place it was asked of you to kill Mr Ncqulunga.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that was while the Harms Commission was busy with its inquiry?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: It was one of the reasons why Mr Ncqulunga had to be killed, because it was feared that he would join the ANC and tell them that his evidence before the Harms Commission was false.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you were informed that there was already approaches from him to the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And he was unstable because he had shot his wife with a firearm and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you have also applied for the death of Mr Nyanda in Swaziland and Mr McFadden. Those were cross-border operations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And this instruction you received from whom?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it came from Colonel Jack Cronje.

MR HATTINGH: And he accompanied you during this ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh, do we need to know about these other applications?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I'm just trying to establish why he would not have hesitated to disclose to him that he'd actually killed people, it wasn't an unusual occurrence.

Cronje was present during this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And people were killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So was there any reason to withhold the fact from them that you had killed Mr Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: When you killed Mr Maponya, was it the first time that you were involved with the killing of persons?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The Nyanda matter preceded this one?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And which other incidents? - briefly.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a matter in '84, where the defective handgrenades - well the handgrenades weren't defective, but the detonators were changed and the time delay was to zero seconds ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: To cut you short, we're talking about ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We've read the papers, that's the one we'll be dealing with next week?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So the instruction to kill people was not foreign to you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The killing of Mr Maponya, did you do it on instruction of General le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Except for the fact that he gave you the instruction, did question whether it was necessary to kill him or not?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was concerned about the identify of my people.

MR HATTINGH: Was Vlakplaas - did this matter take place before Vlakplaas was disclosed?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was it then still very covert?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, absolutely.

MR HATTINGH: And was it supposed to be managed so covertly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In your supplementary affidavit you said what the case was with regard to the covertness of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, my attention is drawn to the fact that we still have photographs which were used at the trial of Mr de Kock, of the Nersden area where Mr Maponya was killed. I don't know if that might be of any assistance to the Committee. If so, we are prepared to make them available, Mr Chairman. We don't have them here, but we will bring them tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks, if you could bring them, then we can just perhaps circulate them just to get an idea of the nature of the vegetation there.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we will do so, thank you, Mr Chairman. We have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh.

MR DE KOCK: I would just like to say something. This is something I did in all my other applications, in all the other opportunities where I had to give evidence.

I would just like to tell you that I take responsibility for my actions and my conduct and there, without any exclusion. I take

responsibility for my own members, black or white, whether they were askaris or not, where this was in relation to his instructions or what this member saw as his instruction although I didn't know about it. I believe there are such cases, and I will testify for those members if it is necessary. I take responsibility for C1, Vlakplaas, but for no other member and for no other person who had a rank higher than I did, even if he was the commander of Vlakplaas.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any questions you'd like to ask the applicant?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I actually wanted to ask you whether Japie Maponya was the first case where you had to deal with the killing of somebody, but you have already told us yourself now that it was not. You took it further than that to say it was not strange to receive an instruction to kill someone at the stage when you received the instruction to kill Japie Maponya, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And would it be correct to say that it would not be strange for people who worked with you, who had already previously had such an experience?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it would not be strange.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that Dunkley and Kleynhans at approximately the end of August/beginning September had visited Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not sure of the date, but they did visit, must have visited there during one of my deployments.

MR VISSER: What was the purpose of their visit?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall, at that stage they wanted a group and I know they had photos, I think between eight and twelve photos of suspects, suspected terrorists they were looking for and this would be shown to the askaris for identification.

MR VISSER: Was Ondereli discussed at that instance?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have a recollection that Ondereli was mentioned at that stage to me. It may be that the name Ondereli was mentioned, but we worked on a national basis and we literally worked with thousands of names and reports.

MR VISSER: I would just like to find out what you are saying. The visit of Dunkley and Kleynhans in that area, according to your recollection, was not specifically aimed with regard to Ondereli Maponya, but it was in general with regard to all terrorists that they were looking for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say so specifically.

MR VISSER: You see, the reason why I ask you this question is because you said in your evidence there was no telex or printed telegram at that stage. Can you recall that you said so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I had to decide about the deployments and who has to go where, and usually there are more requests than I have teams to deploy and you give priority to those where there is a serious need, or a serious danger and there was no pressure from there.

MR VISSER: But I understood from General le Roux, that there were specific instructions that if you wanted a team from Vlakplaas, you had to discuss it with Head Office, not with Eugene de Kock, with Head Office. And usually a telex would be sent to direct the request at Head Office. Do I have it wrong, or does he have it wrong?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the Divisional Commander would direct such a request to Head Office and it has to be print telegram.

MR VISSER: Then I do not know what Dunkley and Kleynhans did at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: What happened was that Dunkley and Kleynhans were not the only members of the Security Branches who arrived there. Those who were close enough, for example, Johannesburg and people from Pretoria, Witbank and surrounding areas, if they had any photos - because their sources bring them photos, they would drive through to Vlakplaas.

They usually called in to understand when we would deploy, because then we have the whole group of askaris there and then we have several Security Branch members from several branches, who would come there for purposes of identification.

And in other cases where the branches were in a hurry, they would send the photos by post and then we would do the identification and send the answers back to them.

MR VISSER: So are you saying that Kleynhans and Dunkley often visited Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they were definitely not there often.

MR VISSER: Because I was under the impression this was the one and only time, or the first time. Am I wrong if I think that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. I know of this instance where they came to me and wanted a team.

MR VISSER: And what I want to know from you, Mr de Kock, is why do you say you're so sure that there was no telex? Why did you say that?

MR DE KOCK: Because I did my deployment on the ground of telexes.

MR VISSER: But there was no telex here, so you would not have deployed a group to them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Well at that stage I did not have a telex that they wanted people there. The one that I did get later, as far as I know, came there after we were already deployed.

MR VISSER: Arrived where, with you at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when I went to Head Office to look for Brigadier Schoon and I did not find him, I found Captain Martin Naude and he gave me a telex where he made a note that he deployed my people from Josini, back to Krugersdorp, and I did not like this, he should have cleared it with me, but he did not.

And afterwards, after the Japie Maponya incident, I did not receive a telex from Krugersdorp that they wanted askaris to further for Ondereli and they did not request it.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, did Captain Martin Naude hand over the telex to you and tell you "There you have it now"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And now you have said that there was a note written on it, that Naude deployed a team to Krugersdorp, and he discussed it with Brigadier Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in whose handwriting was that, do you know?

MR DE KOCK: It was his handwriting, because he made a note on that telex.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, have you ever previously at any hearing - and I ask because I don't know, have you ever given this evidence previously?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall right now.

MR VISSER: To be truthful, you did not say it at your trial, that there was a note on the telex. You didn't say it there, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You did not mention it in your amnesty application.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, may we just get clarity. Mr de Kock said that he doesn't know if he testified about it and now Mr Visser said that "you also did not", which suggests that he did testify about it and he doesn't mention it. Mr de Kock only gave evidence in mitigation. I, as I sit here, also cannot recall whether he specifically testified about the Maponya matter in evidence-in-chief, or if he was just cross-examined about it. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: I'm putting it to the witness that he didn't say this.

CHAIRPERSON: In the application?

MR VISSER: And during his evidence in mitigation. I'm putting it to him that he didn't.

Well do you agree that you didn't testify about it, or do you say you cannot remember?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall now.

MR VISSER: It's an important fact, isn't it? Because it involves Brigadier Schoon with the Japie Maponya case, does it not?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am only saying what I know and what I can remember, and the more I am exposed to this situation at the TRC and the more I come into contact with normality ... because I am in an abnormal situation that has the influence not that one starts to forget, but that you totally loose touch with time.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, this is not what it's about. I am asking you, this is an important piece of information that you can submit to whoever to involved Brigadier Schoon with the Japie Maponya murder, is it not?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot decide whether it's important or not, that is for the Commissioners and the Chairpersons.

MR VISSER: No, Mr ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: No, let me tell you, Mr Visser, please. I sit here for two reasons, the one is because the law forces me to make a full disclosure otherwise I'm a law-breaker, and the secondly, I took the oath.

MR VISSER: Are you done? Thank you. But you are not brain-dead, you can decide for yourself what is important and what is not, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I just testified to what I know and I do not want to say anything about that any further.

MR VISSER: This telex - let's just conclude this, it now appears that some time during the Harms Commission you burnt documents at Vlakplaas, as I understand it.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And your evidence is that Baker and Bellingan told you "Look at this!".

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: So why would they do that?

MR DE KOCK: Because, Chairperson, they all were members of Vlakplaas, and the mess that runs off me and which I must bear, at the old end contaminates all the people at Vlakplaas, whether he was there for one month and did not do anything. It is important. If anybody from the opposition - let's call it the opposition, if anybody found that telex ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: What did the telex say?

MR DE KOCK: Well the telex said - I cannot recall the contents of the telex, but there was a reference that members were moved from Josini to Krugersdorp, and that is what we denied.

MR VISSER: But what of it?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, then all our denials that we were in Krugersdorp and did not work there, it would be senseless.

MR VISSER: Were there any other telexes between the documents that you destroyed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, but I know there were files and files with source reports.

MR VISSER: And Bellingan and Baker, did they specifically draw your attention to any telex that they found while they were burning it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but here and there we had a look at the other reports. There were some interesting reports and the reason therefore was that we realised that while we were burning these documents, that we had a cold feeling that if the opposition found these documents and specifically the source reports, it could identify your sources. Right up to that stage we did not realise how thin the cover was.

MR VISSER: I want to put it to you that there was no evidence before this Committee so far, that the telex or the print telegram which requested you to go to Krugersdorp, did not refer to Japie or Ondereli Maponya. Do you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have an answer for that. I can only tell you what I know about the telex and what emanated from this.

MR VISSER: Well you had them in your hands. I put it to you that he would not have referred to Japie Maponya or Ondereli Maponya, or do you now say he did refer to it? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not read through the whole telex, the telex was there itself. It was a deadly piece of evidence that we did indeed deploy people to Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Was it a long document? Was it a document that said "We requested that you send a team to Krugersdorp, to help with a problem that we have"? Or words to this effect.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot remember that. It was in the print telex and if I think back I think it was a full document. It was a fully typed document.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Sorry, Mr Chairman. If I could just point you at this stage to de Kock's application on page 110 of bundle 1A. He refers in the last paragraph of that page, he says

"Captain Naude showed me a telex in which le Roux, from Krugersdorp, requested a few members and askaris from C1 for the tracing of MK, Mainstay and for covert activities."

So according to that, the telex must have contained a reference to Mainstay. 110, bundle 1A.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van der Merwe.

MR VISSER: Mr learned friend, Mr van der Merwe is one step ahead of me, because I wanted to point out to you that in your application you made specific reference to Mainstay, whereas in your evidence you did not mention it. I don't know if you have anything to say about that now.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. Let us return to this visit which was paid by Dunkley and Kleynhans to Vlakplaas, without any print telegram. And I don't wish to go beyond the cross-examination of any other person, but did he indicate that before he went to Josini in September, that Dunkley and Kleynhans were at Vlakplaas? Would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that may be so.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm referring to bundle 1C, page 336, paragraph 2.

And that when he went, or at least, before he went to Josini you, Mr de Kock, said to him:

"You must be in Krugersdorp on the 25th of the month."

Do you have any comment about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, except that I would not have been surprised or asked him what he was doing in Krugersdorp when he phoned me, because that was one of my first questions. In fact it was my first question "What are you doing in Krugersdorp?".

MR VISSER: But he says that you sent him there.

MR DE KOCK: No, I didn't.

MR VISSER: So are you saying that's incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be his recollection, but it is not correct. I am not going to attack him over it.

MR VISSER: The fact is, it's either right or it's wrong. So forget about whose memory we're discussing. You either told him to be in Krugersdorp on the 25th, or you didn't.

MR DE KOCK: I didn't.

MR VISSER: Very well. You see because the way we understand the evidence thusfar, Nortje did arrive in Krugersdorp on the 25th, along with van der Walt and that there was also a team of black members and then also askaris, who accompanied them to Krugersdorp. Do you say that you had no prior knowledge of that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I heard about their shift from Josini to Krugersdorp when Mr Nortje phoned me from Mafeking and I asked them what they were doing there.

MR VISSER: You see Mr de Kock, if Mr Nortje is correct, then this makes nonsense of your evidence regarding this print telegram which you saw with Martin Naude, and that you were upset about it and that you didn't know about the shift from Josini. So this is actually a very important piece of evidence. You told him to Krugersdorp on the 25th. That is what he says.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will stand by the evidence which I have given, because it is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. Now at Krugersdorp they are informed, according to Nortje, about the problem. Japie Maponya is the brother of Ondereli Maponya and Kleynhans would indicate that they had information about Ondereli and they wanted the information from him. That is the situation pertaining to Krugersdorp. You can't comment on that because you weren't there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And a plan was formulated after they had participated in this briefing session, and the plan was to send a newly recruited askaris to Japie Maponya, to attempt to win his trust by, among others, showing him a Makarov pistol to indicate his status as an MK member and in so doing to attempt to obtain the information. You don't know anything about that probably, unless somebody told you about it later?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was informed about it, but I don't have all the details.

MR VISSER: And then that didn't work, and then a discussion took place between Nortje and le Roux, at Krugersdorp in the office. And Nortje then said to le Roux that the askari suggested abducting this man so that he could be interrogated by them, or by us, us being the Vlakplaas people. And that he then contacted you where you were at Zeerust.

MR DE KOCK: I wasn't in Zeerust, I was in Mafikeng.

MR VISSER: Mafikeng, Zeerust, it doesn't matter.

MR DE KOCK: No, it's not one and the same place.

MR VISSER: It's in the Western Transvaal. Did he contact you or not?

MR DE KOCK: He contacted me, but not at Zeerust.

MR VISSER: Very well. And he then told you to come to Krugersdorp immediately?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And you went with Fourie?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we left the following day.

MR VISSER: Were you then confronted by an already taken decision that Japie would be abducted by Vlakplaas members and be interrogated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. When I arrived at Krugersdorp, this abduction situation had already been created, it was not something of which my opinion was enquired. No-one asked me what I thought, it had already been tabled and discussed.

MR VISSER: But I put it to you like that, Mr de Kock, so there's nothing further to say about it. What I want to know from you is the background, was the background with regard to Ondereli Maponya sketched to you by the others, what he had done, why they were looking for him and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I believe so, I don't have any independent recollection thereof, but what I can tell you is that I was satisfied with the information which was given. My recollection thereof is that it was reasonably thorough, but I cannot tell you exactly what the content thereof was.

MR VISSER: Was it not your impression that Krugersdorp was only interested in Japie Maponya, insofar as it could lead them to Ondereli?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. The only inference that I can draw is that Japie definitely did not want to co-operate and that situation had unfolded of the gloves being removed, and if there was no further success, we would move beyond the parameters of the law.

MR VISSER: You've said a lot, Mr de Kock, but you haven't answered my question. Was it not your impression, from that which was said to you, that the only reason why Krugersdorp's Security Branch would be interested in Japie Maponya, was for the purposes of him leading them to Ondereli Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is possible.

MR VISSER: No, it isn't just possible, is that correct or not?

MR DE KOCK: I have no independent recollection thereof. If I had I would be able to tell you exactly what they said.

MR VISSER: Well let me put it to you like this. Can you give any reason to this Committee today, which would indicate that the Security Branch from Krugersdorp would be interested in Japie Maponya for any other reason that obtaining information about the whereabouts of his brother, Ondereli? Can you think of any other reason or fact or factor of that time, which you could furnish us with?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. Now you see ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, when it comes to - you needn't stop now, but when it's a convenient stage, we will take the tea adjournment. If you want to finish this point, please do so.

MR VISSER: It's convenient right now, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll now take the short tea adjournment and reconvene at twenty five past eleven.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)

... 1A. I beg your pardon.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have it here. Which page?

MR VISSER: 108.

MR VISSER: At the bottom of the page, the second-last paragraph, there you refer to a discussion that you had with the men from the Krugersdorp Security Branch, after you had arrived there from Mafikeng, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do I have it correctly, that during this first meeting, or first discussion, if I might refer to it like that, it was mentioned to you only that the person called Japie Maponya was to be stolen, in other words, abducted. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: What would have been the objective with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the objective would be to interrogate or torture this person, without any kind of resistance by means of violence or aggression.

MR VISSER: Was this said during the discussion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. If one abducts a person there must a reason for it, and that would have been the reason.

MR VISSER: But wouldn't the reason have been to interrogate him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. By nature of the situation, the interrogation would have been violent otherwise it would not have been necessary to abduct him.

MR VISSER: But Mr de Kock, if you had abducted Japie and he had become mortified and told you everything that you wanted to know, would you still have assaulted and tortured him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if a man tells you everything, then it would serve no purpose to assault him.

MR VISSER: But you didn't know what his reaction would be during this first discussion, did you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, we couldn't make any predictions, but up to that stage he had refused to co-operate with the Security Branch and this was the last illegal action or last resort then.

MR VISSER: Well I didn't mean to say that you could predict that he would be assaulted, but the question is, was this discussed, that he could indeed be tortured? Was this discussed during the first meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, but it would be a natural result of such an abduction, because no other methods which the Security Branch of Krugersdorp had applied, had in any way assisted.

MR VISSER: Very well. I beg your pardon, may I just ask you. Was Mr Fourie present during this first meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no recollection of that, I will have to rely on his version.

MR VISSER: You say that you and Fourie went to Krugersdorp where you met Kleynhans, Dunkley and Nortje and you were introduced to le Roux.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: Well I want to know if Fourie was present during this discussion.

MR DE KOCK: No, I have no recollection of that. I can say for clarity's sake, that all members of Vlakplaas would move in groups of at least two or three, as a result of the nature of our work. And this was an instruction that I had issued in the past.

MR VISSER: You see, Mr Fourie said at a stage during his application, that you went up to the offices and that you later reported back to him regarding what le Roux had said. Did you read that evidence of his? In fact, it was during his evidence which he gave during your trial. Can you recall that he said that, that he waited below and that you went up to the offices?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I didn't read it again, so I don't recall it at the moment.

MR VISSER: Well if I'm correct in saying that that is what he said, would you say that it is correct? That he waited for you below at some stage and that you reported back to him and told him what le Roux had said?

MR DE KOCK: I would have to study those aspects of his evidence. I cannot confirm or deny it.

MR VISSER: Now a second discussion took place on that same day, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you deal with that at the bottom of page 108, going over to page 109. And now you say

"I mentioned to le Roux that we could indeed abduct the man."

And one would have thought that this had been concluded during the first discussion, but let's leave it there. "But I wanted to know from him what Colonel le Roux wanted us to do with the man."

Is that how you recall it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. The situation was - and I think that this took place during this space between the first discussion and the second discussion. I was taken along with some of my members - I was not familiar with Krugersdorp or the surrounding area, but we were taken for reconnaissance on the ground itself, in order to observe the environment, the buildings, the pavement movements, the traffic movements and so forth.

MR VISSER: But the question is, is that the way you recall it, that you waited until the second meeting before you asked le Roux what you were supposed to do with the man?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is my recollection.

MR VISSER: Well why wouldn't you have asked him this question during the first meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Because I still didn't know whether we would be capable of abducting this person.

MR VISSER: But that's no answer, Mr de Kock. Le Roux says to you that Nortje spoke to him and that the askaris had suggested that you abduct the man and interrogate him. Now didn't you then say to him "What are we supposed to do with him?". You waited until the second meeting and then you said "What are we supposed to do with him?".

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, as far as I can recall, the aspect regarding the abduction, or that the man was going to be abducted, had already been concluded before I arrived at Krugersdorp. The first discussion, which is reflected from page 108 over to 109, was the discussion regarding the abduction, but I wasn't certain whether it would be viable under the circumstances.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, whether the abduction was viable or not has nothing to do - and I say this with respect, with your discussion with le Roux as to what you were supposed to do with the man once you had abducted him.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, during the first discussion I still didn't know whether we would be able to abduct the man and it wouldn't have made any sense to ask him then "What am I going to do with this man?", because I didn't know whether I would be able to abduct this man or whether other options could be explored even if they were underhanded by nature.

After we performed our reconnaissance and found it to be viable under those circumstances, I returned to him and that is when I said "We can abduct this man". And then I wanted to know from him what he wanted us to do with the man.

MR VISSER: Very well, if that is your best answer we shall proceed. But you knew exactly what he wanted you to do with the man.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, because from within the abduction this information would have to be beaten out of the man.

MR VISSER: You've said it again. Was this discussed, Mr de Kock, that he would be beaten, that the information had to be beaten out o him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a natural inference which one could draw because no other method of any sort which was at the disposal of the mighty Security Police, had worked at that stage in managing to get Japie Maponya to provide his brother's address.

MR VISSER: Well then I'm going to put it to you again, within the framework of human experience, can you say that it would have been impossible for Japie to become so frightened that he would freely have given you that information if asked for it? Can you say that today?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know.

MR VISSER: Very well. The fact of the matter remains, Mr de Kock, I want to ask you, did the then Colonel le Roux prescribe to you and tell you "I want you to take this man and seriously assault him and I want you to ask him about this and that and so forth"? Did he say that to you?

MR DE KOCK: He didn't explain it as such, but his behaviour and his attitude and the implications that we discussed there were very clear. And perhaps I should make use of this opportunity to say that on both sides, the ANC and the Security Forces, there was a level of zero tolerance for each other on ground level when it came to placing each other at a disadvantage where it came to placing of bombs or physically touching each other.

MR VISSER: Are you speaking of your own experience?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but I will also say that this was a general framework of reference of those people who got to do with the enemy, in actual on ground level.

MR VISSER: Would you say that that was the same framework of reference for General le Roux? Is that what you are trying to say?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say that that's what I'm trying to say, I'm saying that it could be probable.

MR VISSER: Do I have it correctly then, that Mr le Roux was not descriptive towards you? He didn't say that you should take this man and assault him until you obtain the information from him? That is not what he said?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but I also accepted that that is what he wanted and that is how he understood it.

MR VISSER: He gave evidence here that he regarded you and your team as a specialist unit and that he accepted that you had your own methods in obtaining results. Did you hear that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would that link up with your comprehension of his behaviour on that day, when he left everything over to you?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we required his members. They were the experts regarding what they wanted from Japie Maponya. This was a person whom I'd never met until I myself began to interrogate him. With regard to the specialist division idea, there was a component at Vlakplaas, a smaller inner group so to speak, which performed more specialised operations such as cross-border operations or internal destruction actions, such as placing bombs. And I didn't possess the specialist capacity to interrogate people. Usually in all the interrogations where I was involved, the person who was being interrogated would determine in a certain manner, his own treatment.

We had no medical background to degenerate a person psychologically or be means of medication, and in this regard our specialist capacity which we possessed was in the form of the askaris, who you certainly couldn't trick when you began to speak about camps in Angola, or circumstances regarding terrorists. I know this is a bit long-winded, but I'm trying to explain the situation to you.

MR VISSER: But you have given the answer that I wanted. At Vlakplaas, were there people who, due to their framework of reference and experience, were better capable of interrogating ANC supporters and other freedom fighters?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and they were limited to what the person who was being interrogated wanted to say or discuss with them.

MR VISSER: I'm not disputing this with you, Mr de Kock, but the question is simple. You had persons at Vlakplaas who were better capable of interrogating certain people than what the other divisions were.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I think that the other divisions had seasoned torturers and it wasn't necessary to make use of Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: But then why did the entire country make use of Vlakplaas and its team, when it came to the detection and interrogation of terrorists?

MR DE KOCK: Because we could move where normal groups couldn't. My people were much better trained in rural and urban guerrilla warfare and we also possessed other capacities, by means of infiltration for example. The askaris could identify much better with rural populations or persons on ground level. There were various facets to this, but we didn't have a specialist torture team.

MR VISSER: And I also didn't suggest this to you. But I'm entirely satisfied with your statement that your persons were better trained. I'm satisfied with that response.

Now we know that General le Roux did not prescribe to you in terms of how Japie was to be interrogated. Would you agree with that now?

MR DE KOCK: He did not tell us explicitly how were supposed to hit or kick him, Chairperson, that was left over to us.

MR VISSER: Please, Mr de Kock. Was there any discussion between you and Mr le Roux regarding assault?

MR DE KOCK: No, not explicitly. The circumstances during those discussions made it very clear that Japie was on his way to a bad time.

MR VISSER: But Japie had to be abducted and interrogated in order to determine where Ondereli was?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR VISSER: But le Roux did not prescribe to you that you were supposed to assault him, or in fact how you were supposed to assault him?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR VISSER: Thank you. Now at the top of page 109, you say that when you asked him "What are we supposed to do with the man?", he said that he never wanted to see this man in Krugersdorp again. Do you have a clear recollection of that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Now logically speaking, can you assist us in understanding why he would have said that?

MR DE KOCK: Because he'd only be interested in Japie so he could obtain information about the whereabouts of Ondereli.

MR VISSER: So what is the reason for this dramatic turn of events?

MR DE KOCK: I believe that he wanted to remove Japie from Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: He wanted him dead?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Why?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that one of the reasons may be that Japie did not want to co-operate at all in exposing his brother, or disclosing the whereabouts of his brother and that as a result of that this could lead to more incidents of terror. And that is pure speculation on my behalf, because I really wouldn't know what General le Roux's inner sentiments were.

MR VISSER: Because you see he denies that he said this and he also denies that he had any reason at that stage to even think about the murder of Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: I expect that he would deny this. The Generals have a natural built-in resistance to admitting to anything of this nature.

MR VISSER: Yes, we know what your sentiments are regarding the Generals, Mr de Kock, you have made this abundantly clear during the previous instances that you have given evidence. But this General has applied for amnesty.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. He has already given evidence during the Harms Commission. He may even have given evidence during my trial.

MR VISSER: But he hasn't. The fact remains that he applied for amnesty and the maintains that he had no reason to think about the killing of Japie Maponya when he had the discussion with you, and he also explained to the Committee why not. And the reason was that he had no problem with Japie Maponya, he simply wanted information from him. What do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I understood it very clearly, that Japie Maponya would die.

MR VISSER: Very well. Now you abduct Japie and take him to Vlakplaas, we know that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And when you arrived there where Japie found himself, had he already been assaulted or was he assaulted later?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my recollection thereof is that upon my arrival there, they were already busy assaulting him.

MR VISSER: So in other words, they performed these assaults without any instruction from you? Whoever they might be.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, it's not a question of an instruction that has to come from me, the information has to come from Japie. He wasn't willing to provide the information and therefore he was assaulted.

MR VISSER: So in other words, you as the commander accepted that if you took a man to Vlakplaas, your soldiers could begin to assault him as they wanted, without any reference to you, is that what you're saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, that is not what I'm saying.

MR VISSER: So who assaulted him before you arrived there?

MR DE KOCK: There were various members there.

MR VISSER: Name a few.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can recall that there was a Mr Bosigu ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Jeff Bosigu?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. There was a Mr Nofomela there, Moses Msimande was there, ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Did you find them with Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: At Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, near the dam.

MR VISSER: And they were busy assaulting him?

MR DE KOCK: Among others they were assaulting him, others just stood around there.

MR VISSER: And you say that it wasn't as if you would have accepted that they could assault people as they wanted without referring to you, is that what you said?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, these members had already attempted - and I'm trying to place this into context for you, these members had already attempted to obtain information from Japie, they had not succeeded in any other manner ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: How do you know that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there had been an infiltration, he had been approached by an askari so that it could be determined in that manner whether he could be enticed. And the Security Branch at Krugersdorp intercepted letters and telephone calls, as we heard yesterday, and tried to get sources closer to him. So every other possible attempt that the branch could have made was not successful and that is why Vlakplaas was ultimately approached to abduct this man.

MR VISSER: You see, Mr de Kock, I'll tell you why I'm asking you this question - or perhaps I should first put something else to you. When you had finished your discussion with Mr le Roux, and you had received your very clear order that Japie Maponya was to be abducted and murdered - are you with me so far?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I am.

MR VISSER: ... you then went and spoke to your soldiers, is that correct? Yes, you would have had a discussion with them, wouldn't you?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, I believe that the arrangements for the abduction were initiated there and I can't recall whether I said to them specifically to assault him or whatever. The result of the abduction would have been assault, no other method had succeeded up until them.

MR VISSER: But the result of the abduction would not necessarily have meant his death?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that possibility existed very strongly and that is why I asked Colonel le Roux "What do you want us to do with this man?", and you said "Kill him". He said he just didn't want to see him again in Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: And you regarded that as him wanting the man dead?

MR DE KOCK: Well his behaviour and the way that he said it indicated that to me.

MR VISSER: So you said that to your soldiers outside Krugersdorp? You went to Fourie, what do you say to him? "Le Roux said we must abduct the man and kill him". Is that what you said to him?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall whether I said that to Fourie.

MR VISSER: But why wouldn't you have said it to him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage Fourie was a Sergeant, I was working with a Colonel, who was the Commander, in part, of the West Rand. One would keep these things among the ranks where they belonged, for as long as possible, and as far as possible.

MR VISSER: But why would you do this, when you had people who were on the point of abduction and interrogation and murder? Why would you withhold this information from them?

MR DE KOCK: It wasn't a question of withholding information from them, at that point one would work according to the principle of need-to-know.

MR VISSER: Well need-to-know simply wasn't going to work here, because the need-to-know principle for these persons would be terminated the minute that they abducted Japie, because then they would need to know.

MR DE KOCK: Well they needed to know at that moment that we were going to abduct him.

MR VISSER: And that is the instruction that you gave to your soldiers "Go and abduct this man"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct. And I was at the helm of this.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: But the aspect surrounding the death of Japie was kept between Commander and Commander, between me as Commander of C1 and le Roux, as Commander of the West Rand region.

MR VISSER: But you had to convey this instruction to your soldiers, otherwise it was only you that was going to kill Japie.

MR DE KOCK: But that could happen at any suitable time, there was no prescribed routine or order as to when and where I was supposed to inform my soldiers about when we were going to kill somebody.

MR VISSER: But you said to this Committee, during these proceedings, that le Roux had carried out instructions to kill someone before, and it wasn't anything out of the ordinary.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well then why were you so prim and proper all of a sudden and adhering to these need-to-know principles, when you knew that the instruction was to abduct and to kill him?

MR DE KOCK: It wasn't a question of being prim, one wasn't prim when one murdered people. It happened during other incidents, especially during cross-border incidents, where I withheld the information up until the eleventh hour, to such an extent that I would tell my people "Prepare for an operation", we would give them as much detail as possible and then I would tell them "We're going into the Botswana area for an operation", and we would leave for Swaziland. One would not give out information on a random basis, one would be prepared for one's operation and possible implications.

MR VISSER: And you say that this is a comparable example to the Krugersdorp incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, one could adjust these situations as one goes along.

MR VISSER: But the fact of the matter is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, Mr Visser.

Do you say, Mr de Kock, that you can't remember what you told Mr Fourie? You know when he was waiting for you downstairs or whatever.

MR DE KOCK: I have no recollection of going down to Mr Fourie and telling him that we were going to kill Maponya.

CHAIRPERSON: So - I don't know what Mr Fourie is going to say, but if he said that you did, would you deny that? - seeing that you can't remember.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because I have no independent recollection. But just to qualify this for you, the group of persons who would have been used for the abduction, would have been called to one side because the askari group was much larger at that stage, than simply the persons whom we had used for the abduction. In other words, we would have for example, sixteen members, but only seven to eight for the abduction. Those persons would have been taken aside.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, let me put it to directly and pertinently, did you inform the askari members who were in Krugersdorp, that Japie Maponya was to be abducted and killed?

MR DE KOCK: I did not inform them about the murder aspect, but I did inform them about the abduction aspect.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us why you didn't tell them that he was going to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Because we tried to keep that kind of information in a small a group as possible. Just the same as I didn't tell all the members of Vlakplaas that we had shot six people in Swaziland or killed eight people in Botswana.

MR VISSER: So now we're speaking of a small group, which consists of you and Fourie. I want to refer you to page 478 of bundle 1B. This is the evidence that was given by Fourie in the de Kock trial criminal trial. I begin at the second-last sentence on that page. I don't know if you'd like to have this in front of you so that you can follow, Mr de Kock. I'm reading to you and I'm going to read it slowly, so that it can be interpreted

"We then drove to Krugersdorp and when we arrived in Krugersdorp, the accused said (that is you, the accused) that he just wanted to go and see Colonel le Roux, who was the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch at West Rand and the accused then went up. (Up would then indicate up to the offices) He said that he was going to Colonel le Roux. I personally did not accompany him to Colonel le Roux's office."

Then he is asked:

"Did you remain at his vehicle?"

The answer is:

"I remained below in the parking area. Later some of our blacks from Vlakplaas arrived there and we stood there below and chatted. It was approximately lunchtime, because we also stood there and ate. Then the accused later came down and he said that Colonel le Roux had said that they had a problem with a person and that we were supposed to go and help them to get hold of him and they, Krugersdorp, were interested in the person."

And that is the sum total, Mr de Kock, of what Fourie recalls of what you said to him. There may be more, but I have studied it as closely as possible and there appears to be no further reference to this discussion between you and him as to what le Roux may have said. But the point is this, do you have any specific reason other than that the fact that he was a Sergeant and you occupying a higher rank, is there any other reason than that for why you didn't tell him that you were going to pick up a man and kill him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when it came to these aspects regarding taking the lives of others, one didn't swing it around, one tried to confine it to as small a group as possible. And one would not know whether Fourie would participate in such an operation later. I'm referring to abduction and assault. If one didn't use Fourie in the future, one wouldn't have wanted him to know anything.

MR VISSER: I read somewhere that one of the witnesses admitted that you wanted Fourie to be present because you wanted him to be involved in the Japie Maponya murder. Do you have any recollection of such evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there is evidence to that effect somewhere, but I think it is in the Brian Ncqulunga matter. I never felt it necessary to involve someone in a murder.

MR VISSER: No, I don't want to leave the track, I just remembered that at this moment. Now you arrived there and Nofomela and Bosigu and another, whom you mentioned, were busy assaulting Japie Maponya, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were also other members, but that is what I can recall.

MR VISSER: Were Kleynhans and Dunkley there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they were there.

MR VISSER: Were they interrogating Japie Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: I'm not very certain about Dunkley, but Kleynhans was actively participating, in terms of the fact that he was asking questions. At one stage we sat in the kombi again and he, among others, did put questions.

MR VISSER: And you say ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, could I just ask one quick point.

After the abduction and after Mr Maponya was put in the vehicle at the taxi rank, they went directly to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were observing this from another vehicle. Did you also go directly to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we first went and dropped Captain Kleynhans off, so that he could collect his vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: To get his vehicle. So what would you say - I know you can only guess, but if you had to make an educated guess, how long after Mr Maponya arrived at Vlakplaas, would you say that you and Kleynhans got there, or how long after Kleynhans had got there did you get there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will go as far as to say that we arrived shortly after each other. I don't know who first, but we arrived there shortly after each other, because Kleynhans had to lead us as to in what direction they wanted to go in with this interrogation. It doesn't help if I hit and hit him and I don't have any questions to ask.

CHAIRPERSON: But after you dropped Kleynhans to get his vehicle, him and Dunkley, they must have then also gone directly to Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless you had a breakdown or went somewhere else they might have arrived there not more than a few minutes before you sort of thing, because it's not all that far away.

MR DE KOCK: That is why I say we basically arrived just about the same time there.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Have I understood your evidence correctly, you say this assault carried your approval, you didn't ask them to stop and you didn't ask them "Why are you hitting him?".

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we have already abducted him and now we want to hit the truth out of him as they wanted.

MR VISSER: So you say because it was a serious crime, the abduction, so he would assaulted no matter what?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at no stage did he answer to any questions and then the assault would start.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you don't know what he was doing there the evening before you arrived there. Did it not come to you to ask the people "Wait, let me first talk to this man", and you tell him "Japie, you are in big trouble now, we have abducted you now and I have instruction to kill you. Please tell us where your brother is". You did not think about this?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, for that man it was repeatedly asked of him "Where is your brother, give us the information, help us with this", and there was not even an answer from him, he didn't even say no.

MR VISSER: This is another interesting thing that you repeatedly keep saying. You said that from the time that you arrived there, Japie did not speak a work, not "ouch", not "sorry", not "no", not a single word.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he refused to give any answer. He did not even try to lie or to draw your attention away from something? He just did not answer to anything.

MR VISSER: And if any of the other witnesses say that they can recall he said that he doesn't know where his brother was, then they would be wrong?

MR DE KOCK: I would not say that they are wrong, but my recollection thereof is clear, he did not answer, he did not talk.

MR VISSER: Well that's highly unlikely, except if he was a person who was mute, that he did not utter a single sound.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I don't think he was mute. My memory is clear, that this man did not want to answer, he refused to answer any question.

MR VISSER: Did you have the impression that he had information that he was refusing to give to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he did not talk, he did not try to mislead us. I could not get that impression. The only impression that I had was that this man refused to give any information if he had it.

MR VISSER: I believe it was Mr van der Walt who said that Japie Maponya had information that he was refusing to give to you.

MR DE KOCK: Well I have to agree with Mr van der Walt, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I see Mr van der Walt frowns, maybe it is not Mr van der Walt. Well one of the witnesses said so. CHAIRPERSON: What are you putting, Mr Visser? That somebody had said that Mr Maponya had information, but was not willing to release it, that's the impression he had.

MR VISSER: That's the impression that he had, yes. And I was just looking for the passage, Chairperson. I wasn't intending to ...(inaudible)

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, Mr Fourie draws my attention that he said that in his amnesty application.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. So Mr Fourie said it.

MR VISSER: So I'm wrong with the person, but I'm correct with the fact, that Mr Fourie had indeed would have said so. You did not have that impression?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the impression was that this man will not tell us anything.

MR VISSER: In any event, you say - or when you arrived there, you immediately started assaulting Japie, along with the askaris and the other members?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would not say that I jumped out of the car and ran to him and started assaulting him, but I put some questions to him. We asked him in English, in Afrikaans, the black members took over and in that attempt, if he does not give an answer or he doesn't want to talk, we would assault him again.

MR VISSER: "Where is your brother?"

MR DE KOCK: Amongst others, yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well, what else. What else could you have asked him? "Did you see your brother?"

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have a specific recollection about the questions, but I would concede that the main subject was his brother.

MR VISSER: Yes. You see, Mr de Kock, we speak of a long time ago and one sometimes forgets things, but this is such a simple case, Japie Maponya has to tell the police where his brother is. This is the sum total of the whole abduction and interrogation. It could not be something that one could get confused with, except for if you know something that we do not know.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as difficult as it was to get over certain difficulties, to explain the more gruesome details to you, I don't have any other information that I am hiding from this Committee.

MR VISSER: Did you at a stage send people away or did people leave out of their own accord, where you had Japie there at the dam?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, some of the members - and I refer to the white members, may have left and came back, or arrived there later. I don't have any independent recollection. It is possible. The black members I needed there for putting questions. It does not help if I asked questions in English or Afrikaans and he does not understand.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, while you were there near the dam, interrogating Mr Maponya, did you at any stage send anybody away, tell them to leave?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I may have done so.

MR VISSER: Yes, very well. And at a stage, 30 to 45 minutes later, you decided that Japie Maponya will not talk and you gave instruction that the assault be ceased.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, just on this.

After 45 minutes you arrived at that decision, why did you not think about using other forms of torture, like the electric shock device, the wet bag treatment, the helicopter treatment, all these other forms of torture, other than just physical assault with hands and feet?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it might sound strange to you, but the other members can correct me later. Not in one of my vehicles or at Vlakplaas did I have an electrical device. I do have recollection that we did strangle with some type of cloth that we wet and it has the same affect as an inner tube if you would put it over a person's mouth. Because of the swelling of the fibres in the cloth, that person will not get any oxygen. And it was my opinion - and I am not an expert in interrogation, but what he experienced there any other form of torture would not have helped.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, how is that now for the first time you tell us of this form of assault on Japie Maponya, the evening of the 25th of September, that he was strangled?

MR DE KOCK: He was strangled at some point and this happened in the minibus, Chairperson. Because I was there at that stage and Jan Kleynhans was there.

MR VISSER: But that is not what I'm asking you, I'm asking why is it that it is now the first time that we hear of this type of assault?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is not a matter that I am withholding anything. I did not say that we tubed him with an inner tube, and I have no problem telling you what happened there. I am not trying to deny anything. One would like to defer from any other methods of torture, but I don't do it in this case.

MR VISSER: By the time you told the black members that they could go when the assault had been ceased there at the dam, did you tell anybody that Japie Maponya was to be murdered?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no I did not speak of murder.

MR VISSER: Taken out, eliminate?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. I may have said something, where somebody understood it as such, but I did not say we will take this person out.

MR VISSER: No, I'm putting the opposite to you, because you see Mbelo in his evidence - on page 655 of bundle 1C, Chairperson, in paragraph 17 he says

"I did not expect that he would be killed."

Can you comment on that? Here is one of the people who abducted the person with you, who was present all the time and he says he didn't expect him to be killed. How on earth could he have come to this conclusion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, maybe we should ask Mr Mbelo.

MR VISSER: Yes, we will ask him. And you see, Mr Nortje says in his evidence on page 89 of bundle 3B. This is the new bundle, Chairperson. Page 89, in his evidence during your trial, he says the following: - I'm reading the second paragraph from the top. It's 3B.

MR LAMEY: Can my learned friend just repeat the page?

MR VISSER: The page number is 89, 3B. ...(inaudible)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR VISSER: Sorry. It's the typed page 6161 of his evidence, and ours is paginated page 89, in the middle of the page, Chairperson. I'm not sure whether yours ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Does that say 6162?

MR VISSER: It's just above 6162.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is your bundle not paginated?

CHAIRPERSON: No, it is paginated, it's page 89.

MR VISSER: I wish to start reading at the top of that page, from the word "Ja"

"Yes, let us not diverge, Mr Nortje. We were busy at the scene. At some stage in your evidence you said that if the man had spoken up and given the information, then you would probably not have killed him."

- "Yes."

- "Even after you had assaulted him, even after you had obtained the information violently from him."

- "Yes, I believe we would have done so."

- "Now why would you release him after you had abducted and assaulted him? Why would you release him?"

- "Well, if he then co-operated, we would have looked after him and treated him until he was well and treated him well. This is how it worked."

What do you say to that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is Mr Nortje's evidence.

MR VISSER: Yes, we know that. I am asking what you say of it.

MR DE KOCK: The only comment I can give on that is that that situation did not arise, and the man's death was already discussed with Colonel le Roux, in Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: But you see, Nortje says there when Japie Maponya was abducted. It may be, I will concede that, it may be that he speaks of that assault as well, but he says he never had the impression that Japie would necessarily be killed, because if he co-operated he would not be killed. That is how I understand his evidence. Now my question is, how could he have been under that impression if there was such explicit orders to you that Japie had to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be his perception. If it did happen that Japie co-operated, whether he was assaulted or not, it would have created a situation where in any case I had to receive further instructions because the danger already existed. And I touched this yesterday, that here we have a man who had identified some of the askaris, he identified some of the black policemen and this would create a problem. The abduction led to the following problems ...

MR VISSER: And that is exactly the point, Mr de Kock, because Nofomela, in bundle 1A, page 32, in his amnesty application - 1A, page 32, Chairperson, top of the page under IV, at page 32 of bundle 1A, he says

"De Kock at one stage whether I thought Maponya would be able to recognise me. Upon which I answered in the affirmative."

Did you ask this of Nofomela, the evening of the assault on Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot remember. I will deny it if he says so.

MR VISSER: But would it not be logical that you would have asked this of him and others?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know of the others, but if Nofomela says that he had that problem, or that I have said something like that to him, I will not dispute it.

MR VISSER: But I speak of the other black members, because your evidence is, and you have just repeated it, that your concern was indeed the identification of these black members.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's what I testified yesterday as well.

MR VISSER: And Mr Nortje says, on page 338 of bundle 1B - and once again we will hear what he says in his evidence, but I will read to you what he says here: - page 338, paragraph 9. He refers to the 26th of September, that is the day after the after the assault on Japie Maponya. Paragraph 9, in the middle of the page, Mr Chairman. Just the one sentence.

"After de Kock returned from Security Head Office, I realised that a decision was taken that Maponya would be eliminated."

Nortje says in his amnesty application - I don't know what he'll say when he testifies, but he says that it was after you returned from Security Head Office on the 26th of September, that he realised that a decision was taken to eliminate Japie Maponya. Can you comment on that evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, it relates to the fact that I went to Head Office and I could not find Brigadier Schoon, and that I contacted Captain Kleynhans and asked him if he could enquire from Colonel le Roux if he still wants Japie Maponya killed. And this I mentioned here.

MR VISSER: We'll get there, but I want to know if you have any comment on what the man says here, that he realised only after you returned from Head Office, that a decision was taken to eliminate Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: What he had done, Chairperson, was to confirm if it is still this Colonel le Roux's sentiment, or his order, that Japie must disappear, that he does not want to see him in Krugersdorp anymore. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: Very well. Then let us arrive at that situation if we cannot get any other answer to my question. On the 26th you go to Security Head Office, you want to report that you are back in the vicinity and you want to tell Brigadier Schoon what you are busying yourself with. Did I understand you correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we would have done so, and I wanted to discuss the matter with him.

MR VISSER: And if you found him, what would you have told him?

MR DE KOCK: I would have told him about the abduction, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: No, Mr de Kock, what would you have told him?

MR DE KOCK: I would have told him about the abduction and the situation at hand and what Colonel le Roux's request was.

MR VISSER: I see where you are going, but let me tell you what you would say "Brigadier Schoon, Colonel le Roux told me to abduct and murder a man".

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I would probably not have used the word "murder", but the word "abduct", yes. I probably would have said that he wants us to get rid of him.

MR VISSER: Yes, and forget September 1985. When later you spoke to Brigadier Schoon, did you tell him this, what you had just said now? "You know I want to tell you, in Krugersdorp we lifted a man and we eliminated him"? The question that Mr Malan asked you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can't remember the specific words, but I may have referred to the fact that we lifted a man and he greeted.

MR VISSER: But that's the point, Mr de Kock, your evidence at your trial was that later you mentioned to Brigadier Schoon that Krugersdorp had a problem and you resolved it.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, and the problem was resolved.

MR VISSER: But that is something else to what you've said now. - in any Afrikaans language.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm trying to tell you what it could have been during that time. I don't have any recordings of those discussions, otherwise we could have been very explicit.

MR VISSER: And that is what is surprising about your evidence, with respect, Mr de Kock. You can't recall what you told a person, but you do not hesitate to involve people with murders and abductions.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not dragging anybody into murders and abductions. A murder was requested and it did happen. It is not a matter of involving or dragging people into the story. I have no reason to say so if it was not so.

MR VISSER: I want to tell you that Brigadier Schoon denies that he was aware at all that you were involved in the murder of Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: I understand that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser.

Mr de Kock, why were you generally so loathe to be explicit? Why, if you're reporting to your Commanding Officer, do you talk around the subject, like "We got rid of him" or "We helped them out"? Why didn't you say "Well we abducted him, took him into another country and killed him"? I'm asking this because we keep hearing, it's not only from yourself, but generally speaking, this talking in riddles almost. When one would expect there's a situation, you're with your commanding officer, he knows, according to you, what's going on and you want to inform him what's going on, and you don't speak straight.

MR DE KOCK: I can put it like this, Chairperson. It was type of - it was police language and it was in the police culture that you would refer to such matters, you would not directly go and admit to a crime. If one for example referred to - between two policemen or a group of policemen, that "That guy went to the tall trees last night", then a normal member of the public wouldn't realise that this person is now dead. But the "tall trees" means it's Cyprus trees and that's at the cemetery. This is the type of language in which such a message would be conveyed. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

CHAIRPERSON: You're saying it just part of the police culture, the way they talked?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't want to openly admit, even in private amongst each other, the commission of a crime such as killing.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr de Kock, but the "tall trees" is a bit of a funny manner of referring to a cemetery, the Cyprus trees. It is imagery of referring to a cemetery. You don't have to be a policeman to make that inference. If you read it in a novel you will draw the same inference. That's a statement, you don't have to comment on that. My question to you is, if you tell someone that somebody had a problem and the problem was solved, does this convey the same as "The man went to the tall trees"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, in this instance it would mean that the man is dead. C1's task orientation would be more covert operations and it was illegal conduct.

MR MALAN: I understand that it was illegal, Mr de Kock, but the question was if this refers specifically to a man who had to be killed and who had indeed been killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And if you had to cover up any evidence, or had to get rid of any evidence, you would not report there that there was a problem, but it was solved?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. Let me put it in the following way. If I explained it in that manner to Brigadier Schoon, and it was another problem as for example, somebody was killed, then he would have enquired what is the problem, was there a vehicle accident, did one of the people break their legs, was one of our members arrested by the Swazi Police? In other words, there would be a follow-up and we would solve this problem. The manner in which these discussions took place was on a one-to-one basis, Commander to Commander.

If we say that we lifted a guy and the problem was solved, there would be no doubt as to what the situation was. To clear it up further for you, the first time that I heard the term, and it was in a discussion where Brigadier Schoon was present and then he was a Colonel in Oshakati, where I sat with a Captain and I was a Lieutenant and Schoon asked him "We need this man, we want to ask him further questions", and this Captain's answer was "I understand that the man does not exist anymore". And that was the end of that situation.

MR VISSER: But you see, Mr de Kock, that is not your evidence. Your evidence is not that you told Willem Schoon "We lifted a man in Krugersdorp", your evidence was that "Krugersdorp had a problem and we solved it" and that is what Mr Malan's question is about. What did this mean to the average intelligent person? Would this mean that you would kill somebody in Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Not that we killed somebody there, but that Krugersdorp's problem and for which they needed Section C1, was solved.

MR VISSER: Now I ask you, does this mean that you killed a person?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, by implication that is what it would mean.

MR VISSER: But Mr de Kock, that's a senseless answer you give. For years you worked where you placed right throughout the land, where you lifted people, is that not so?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the impression that wants to be created here is that it is senseless. Let me give an example again. Brigadier Schoon, together with another General drives with us to Oshoek, the Generals remain at Oshoek in the canteen facility, the Vlakplaas group goes across the border, Brigadier Schoon's instruction is that there are some people that must fall, we go, we kill all of them, I return and I tell them "they all fell" and it was solved. It is not because we rushed into the house that people fell over the furniture or down the steps, we killed the people.

MR VISSER: You are blatantly avoiding my question, Mr De Kock. You say Schoon must have known, when you told him that Krugersdorp had a problem, that you killed somebody. That's what you said. Did you say that, or not?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the manner in which these discussions took place was a matter of "We know what we are discussing here, let us not use dirty terms like murder". There was no unclarity about the message which we conveyed.

MR VISSER: But you did not say that you lifted a man. That was your evidence. That is the point.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I don't know what else I must explain to bring this situation home to Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Well then let us leave it at that if you cannot think of a better answer.

Now the following day, we are speaking of the 26th of September, you did not get hold of Brigadier Schoon to tell him whatever it was that you wanted to tell him and you telephoned Kleynhans. And I want to ask you, please explain why you did this.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wanted to know precisely what Kleynhans wanted, did they want us to go ahead with his death, or did they want us not to proceed with his death. The death of a person wasn't something that we took lightly.

There are many people who think the opposite, but it is not true. And I wanted to know whether that person who was acting as my commander at that stage in Krugersdorp, and whose problem I had been handling all the time, still wanted this man dead.

MR VISSER: You see I asked you why you telephoned Kleynhans. Let me be more specific, why didn't you contact le Roux?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, whether I contacted Kleynhans or le Roux, was immaterial to me. Kleynhans was the person who carried the files, he was the investigator. He was the chief cat in this cage, if I have to put it that way, and he had to go and speak to his commander and find out if he still wanted that.

MR VISSER: No, Kleynhans did not give the order for Japie Maponya to be killed, according to your evidence, le Roux was the one who gave the order.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: Well why didn't you speak to him? Why didn't you say to him "Listen, are you still with us, do you still want us to carry out the order that you gave yesterday, Commander to Commander"?

MR DE KOCK: I don't think it would have made much difference. I contacted Kleynhans, not le Roux. That is now an historical fact and we can speculate this fact, but that's what happened and that's how it was done.

MR VISSER: Well let me tell you what my speculation is. That is that le Roux never gave the order in the first place, and that is why you were looking for an order the next day, after you knew just how serious Japie Maponya's injuries were as a result of his assault, and after you had realised that you could not release him. That is why you went seeking instructions from Schoon and Kleynhans and/or le Roux, at Head Office.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was already in Krugersdorp when I spoke to le Roux, that that decision had been taken by the Colonel and for those purposes I had always carried out his instructions and worked with Krugersdorp's problems, not Vlakplaas' problems. It is Krugersdorp who enlisted the efforts of Vlakplaas, to abduct and assault people, as a last resort.

MR VISSER: Well why was it necessary for you to obtain more clarity regarding this clear and concise instruction that you had received from le Roux, to kill Maponya on the 26th of September, why?

MR DE KOCK: Apart from the popular opinion, I can assure you that I and the other members of Vlakplaas, including the black members and askaris, were not a pack of wild dogs who simply ran around biting whoever we wanted to. We were called to a place and we requested and by nature of the situation and the timeframe, we had no problem in carrying out those instructions.

MR VISSER: When you received the instruction to go to Swaziland and murder Nyanda, did you once again make certain of the nature of your instruction afterwards, that that was what you were supposed to do, or did you simply go and do it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I wasn't the commander at that stage, I was second-in-command. Cronje was there and if Cronje had been shot, under those circumstances I would have either assumed the command, or if he had not been shot, have telephoned and asked whether I was supposed to continue with the operation.

MR VISSER: There from Swaziland, while you were shooting everybody in the house?

MR DE KOCK: No, I wouldn't have used the house's telephone, but things never happen the way that you think that they will because the opposition does not have the script, you are the one who writes the script.

MR VISSER: I want to read to you what Cronje said, and ask you whether this is the truth. Volume 3B, page 89. It's the same page I referred to a little earlier, Mr Chairman.

And by the way, while we are waiting ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did I hear you incorrectly? You said Cronje, you mean Nortje?

MR VISSER: Nortje, Nortje.

And by the way, was Kleynhans your senior or your junior as an officer, at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know.

MR VISSER: You were a Captain, he was a Lieutenant.

MR DE KOCK: I'm not certain, Chairperson. I would concede that he may have been junior to me.

MR VISSER: Yes. Nortje says on page 6162 of the record, in our bundle, page 89 of bundle 3B. I'll read it out. He is asked

"So at a stage even if it was before the assault had been completed, it was clear to you that this man had reached the end of his lifetime, not so?"

Mr de Kock, I must just tell you that within this context it is very clear that these questions have to do with the point in time at which Japie Maponya was assaulted. If we can just accept that. Then it goes further, Nortje says:

"Yes, well that was the next step which we still (and then he is interjected)"

"Yes, but you had realised it already."

What had he realised? Namely, that the man had come to the end of his lifetime.

"You realised look, we have now abducted this man and we have assaulted him seriously, he isn't going to talk, he'll have to be gotten rid of."

And Nortje answers:

"Well, yes, that is the decision which I and the accused, or we began to speak about that then."

And what do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, we had already received the instruction from Colonel le Roux.

MR VISSER: Yes. The evidence of Nortje does not correlate very well with the concept of a previous order from le Roux, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. I cannot arrive at those findings, I am the witness here. I will leave it up to the qualified persons to make such judgements.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser.

When you had that second discussion at Krugersdorp, the second one, after you had done your drive around to see the pavements, movements etc., who was present there?

MR DE KOCK: It was me, Nortje and le Roux.

MR VISSER: I was going to get to that, but upon the question put by the Chairperson, we must just make it clear. During the second discussion to which you refer on 109, Nortje was present when you spoke to le Roux. That is the discussion that you had with him, during which le Roux would have said "I never again want to see this man in the Krugersdorp area". That would be the case that the Chairperson is referring to.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, we will come back to that. And I just want to read some more to you from page 89.

"Very well. When the decision was made that the assault had to be ceased, what happened next?"

Answer:

"Well we then started talking and said well, there isn't, there is only exit, we may have to kill the man."

"Who are the 'we' that you are referring to?"

"Me and the accused."

Is that evidence correct, or incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall it, but I will concede it.

MR VISSER: Well if you are prepared to concede to it, it can mean only one thing and that is that General le Roux was correct in his evidence, that he never gave you the order and that you decided this at Vlakplaas, after you had assaulted Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. The following morning I went to Pretoria Head Office to go and speak to Brigadier Schoon, I couldn't find him. In terms of le Roux's order I telephoned Krugersdorp and spoke to Kleynhans and asked whether his commander still wanted this man dead and his instruction was that this man had to disappear.

MR VISSER: Yes, and I will argue that your evidence fits in perfectly with the decision to kill Japie Maponya, which was taken the previous evening after the assault and that is why you went to Head Office and that is why you tried to obtain authorisation from Schoon, and that is why you contacted Kleynhans.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, those decisions had already been taken by Colonel le Roux and these decisions were made in his office in Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: In bundle 3A, I want to present the last aspect of Nortje's evidence to you regarding this point. It's the same bundle 3B - did I say 3A? I'm sorry, Chairperson. 3B, Chairperson. Just the next page, 91. Just before page 6164 starts, Mr Chairman.

I read to you the second-last paragraph. He's asked - Nortje.

"But at which stage did this discussion take place during which it was decided and said that someone would have to be killed?"

The answer:

"As far as I can recall, it was there on the scene."

And we speak of the scene of the assault in this context.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I've said I cannot deny it and I have no independent recollection thereof, but the decision that Maponya had to be killed had already been made during the second discussion in the office in Krugersdorp, where Nortje had been present and I followed it up the following day. The popular opinion which was presented to the world, was that we were a pack of wild dogs that ran around biting. That is not the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Just to get back then to Mr Visser's earlier question. If you had been given an order to the effect that Mr Maponya be killed and that was your firm view, that that is what had to happen, why was it necessary to go and get that confirmed, either by Schoon or by le Roux, again? Were you hesitant at all? What was the problem, didn't you want to carry out the order or for what reason was it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the killing of any person was a psychological obstacle to be overcome, regardless of your background and your training. And here we had a case where it wasn't a question of two men confronting each other, one with an AK47 and one with an R4 and seeing who would be the winner in the end. Brigadier Schoon, if he had been there, may have had other advice, unfortunately he wasn't there. And I go and confirm, I want to be certain in my mind that this murder that we were about to commit, was still a reflection of Colonel le Roux's sentiments the following day.

I wanted to determine whether or not he had changed his mind. There are various emotions which have to be overcome. This is not something which one desires or needs.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, and now the obvious question is the question which the Chairperson asked you when you gave your evidence-in-chief. What would you have done if you had called Kleynhans back and he had said "listen, le Roux has decided that he doesn't want to go ahead with this murder, le Roux's order is that you are to bring him back and drop him off at his house" ? That would be Japie Maponya. What would you then have done?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then I would have had to have waited until I got hold of Brigadier Schoon.

MR VISSER: Because you wouldn't have accepted his order, because you would have known that you couldn't take Japie Maponya back home and that you would have to obtain another order from somebody else to kill Japie Maponya, isn't that correct?

MR DE KOCK: The person giving the order for the murder, in the event of this person changing his order would have created a situation in which I would have had to consult Brigadier Schoon and hear what he had to say about it. And also bearing in mind that the problem of the identification of askaris still existed and today without prejudice to Brigadier Schoon and in consideration of that period in time, I believe that he would probably have said yes.

MR VISSER: That is hypothetical however, it doesn't answer my question. I don't want to know what Schoon would have done, I want to know what de Kock would have done.

MR DE KOCK: Well you don't want to know what de Kock would have done if Colonel le Roux had changed his order, which is also hypothetical, because it never really happened.

MR VISSER: But it could have happened, according to your evidence. You went to make certain that le Roux still had the same sentiments and you received a message from Kleynhans "le Roux went to sleep last night and he came to different insights, he wants you to take Japie home". I'm asking you a very simple question, what would you have done?

MR DE KOCK: I would then had to have consulted Brigadier Schoon. I would not have been able to adopt this operation on my own.

MR VISSER: What would you have wanted from Brigadier Schoon, other than the authorisation to kill Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: Well I would have had to present the entire situation to him from day one and hear what he has to say about it. I don't know what he would have done. That is also another hypothetic issue.

MR VISSER: Well I'm not asking you that, I want to know what you would have wanted from Brigadier Schoon, other than the authorisation to kill Japie Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I don't know, because that never happened.

MR VISSER: Well just think about it, Mr de Kock. It is not as hypothetical as it seems, because you see I have a great problem with your allegation that the following day you contacted Kleynhans to make dead certain that le Roux still intended for Japie Maponya to be killed. Because you see, Mr le Roux has denied it and I'm asking you now.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, my recollection is not that le Roux denied it, my recollection is that he conceded that such a discussion could possibly have taken place. He pertinently conceded to it.

MR VISSER: Yes, my learned is entirely correct. I expressed myself very poorly. I'm not referring to the telephonic discussion, but to the order. General le Roux denied it and now I'm asking you. That the following day, by means of Kleynhans, he conceded that the discussion may have taken place, but if he had notified you via Kleynhans, to not go ahead with the operation to kill Japie Maponya and to take him home, my question to you was what would you have done and your answer was that you would have consulted Brigadier Schoon.

And I'm asking you just this one question. To consult Brigadier Schoon, other than killing Japie Maponya, what would your reason for that have been? What would you have wanted from him, other than, you would have said to him "help me, Japie Maponya is going to blow Vlakplaas' cover, he can identify Nofomela and the others. We assaulted him very seriously, we cannot release him". What else were you going to tell Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, at that stage I was a Captain and I would definitely have consulted Brigadier Schoon. He possessed a great deal of knowledge, and I would have wanted to make use of his expertise, and he may have had another opinion of the matter, I don't know. Those are the things that could have happened there.

I don't have a crystal ball and I can't predict what Schoon would have said or done. The situation with regard to Japie Maponya having originated from le Roux, was very clear.

MR VISSER: Well it wasn't that clear because he said he never wanted to see the man again, and from your framework of reference you inferred that he wanted the man dead. It's as clear as water.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, if he never again wanted to see him in Krugersdorp and he wanted him to disappear, how else was I going to keep him away from Krugersdorp for the rest of his life?

MR VISSER: Yes, well whatever the case may be. I want to put it to you that Nortje is correct and that you are incorrect. Read along with the evidence of Nofomela and other evidence - and I will probably have to put it to you, that the decision regarding the killing of Japie Maponya did not take place before the assault on Japie Maponya. That is when the idea originated for the first time. Exactly because of the fact that he had been abducted and so gravely assaulted. What do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it took place in Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Yes. Japie Maponya would not have known, would he, that General le Roux had anything to do with his abduction. What do you think about that? What do you think about that statement?

MR DE KOCK: That Japie Maponya would not have known?

MR VISSER: Yes, he would have known that he was abducted, but he wouldn't have known that le Roux was involved, would he?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't think that Japie Maponya even knew le Roux.

MR VISSER: You see I want to put it to you that le Roux had absolutely no reason to see Japie Maponya dead. He did not present any problem to him.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, then it certainly wasn't necessary to bring Vlakplaas in from Josini to Krugersdorp, to bring me from Mafikeng to Krugersdorp for the purposes of an abduction which had already been tabled and discussed.

MR VISSER: But it wasn't le Roux that enlisted your efforts, it was Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: Nortje called me, but Nortje worked under the direct command of Colonel le Roux.

MR VISSER: Very well, I'm not going to debate that with you. In that sense you are certainly correct. But you see, what I want to put to you is that according to the evidence of le Roux, read together with that of Nortje and Nofomela, everything falls perfectly into place. Then it is no longer a fairy tale. Then we understand why Japie Maponya was killed. It was because you couldn't risk releasing him again after his assault. But you see, according to your version, Mr de Kock - and I'm giving you the opportunity to comment on this, on this, according to your version, nothing falls into place.

The then Colonel le Roux gave you a pertinent order, according to your evidence, and what did you do? You went back and asked him "are you dead certain about this order". Where did a soldier or a policeman ever do anything like that? Had you ever heard of it in your life, that this happened to somebody else, that he had received an order and gone back and said "listen I just want to make double sure, are you serious about that order, do you really want me to carry it out?" Had you ever heard of anything like that, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I had the experience. For example, during one incident, when Brigadier Schoon gave me the order to blow up Cosatu House, and I said to him "no, from whom does this order come?" And when he said it came from very high up, and I asked "how high?", he said "from the most high, from the President.

MR VISSER: That is a question of dispute that you have mentioned here. You know it is an issue of dispute.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well the senior staff will put anything into dispute where they could be involved in any way.

MR VISSER: Perhaps on that high note, perhaps you've listened enough to me before lunch, Chairperson. Would you like to take the luncheon adjournment now? I'm going onto something else hopefully.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly, Mr Visser ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: At this point I'm slightly confused. If I understand you correctly, you understood the order as an order to eliminate or take out this person, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And you undertook the interrogation and you returned via Kleynhans, to le Roux, to determine whether or not his sentiments had changed, whether he still felt the same.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And you told us that you did this because it was very difficult, regardless of one's education and background, to take someone out if he wasn't also facing you with a weapon in his hand. It was difficult to go through with such an operation and that is why you asked again.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR MALAN: And your evidence is further that if he had told you not to go ahead with the murder, to cease the operation and to release him, you would not have done this immediately, you would first have consulted Schoon as to what to do next, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that situation would have developed.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, we'll now take the lunch adjournment and reconvene at quarter to two.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. It's getting warmer now, so if you wish to remove your jackets, please do so. Mr Visser, you were still questioning Mr de Kock when we broke for lunch. You may continue.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (cont)

Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I would just like to conclude quickly the last aspect which we were dealing with. If le Roux told you "take Japie home", I asked you what you would have done, would you have released him, and then you said "if I recall correctly, I would not have immediately released him", or words to that effect. Did I hear you correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because the problem still exists with the identification of the Vlakplaas members, the police officers as well as the askaris and in that sense I would have gone to Brigadier Schoon.

MR VISSER: Yes, and your concern about the identification, you would have mentioned this to Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would have.

MR VISSER: And you would have hoped that Brigadier Schoon would have said "but then you have to kill Japie".

MR DE KOCK: I believe, Chairperson, that would possibly have been his attitude.

MR VISSER: No, I'm asking about what you hoped he would say. Did you hope he would say "well then you have to kill Japie"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is an assumption, I cannot say that. I did not want to kill Japie out of my own.

MR VISSER: But Mr de Kock, you are causing these assumptions. Let me put it this way, let us say Brigadier Schoon said "take Japie back as Colonel le Roux said", what would you have done then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then I would have carried out Brigadier Schoon's instruction. But the assumptions are not made by me, they are made by you.

MR VISSER: Are you saying, Mr de Kock, that you never decided on your own that Japie Maponya had to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is why I went and asked Colonel le Roux "we can abduct the person, what do you want us to do with the man?" I was satisfied in my mind - and once again, after I spoke to Captain Kleynhans and he gave me the feedback that the information that they had available was enough to have us there for further interrogation. I had no problem with the command of General le Roux.

MR VISSER: Yes. The question is, if I ask you today "did you ever independently on your own, decide to kill Japie Maponya?", what would your answer be?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did independently decide on that.

MR VISSER: By the end of your evidence-in-chief - I wrote it down here, and I will apologise if I am incorrect, that you said

"I was concerned with regard to the identity of my people and therefore I decided that Japie Maponya had to be killed".

Did I write that down wrong?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know if you wrote that down incorrectly, but I did not decide that he would be killed.

MR VISSER: Was that what you said in mitigation at your trial?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall what I said there.

MR VISSER: Let me remind you. Bundle 3B, page 229, Chairperson. That's a reference to two pages of the record, 13469 and 13469 again. It seems ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think it seems that they've been printed half page per half page from the original transcript of one page.

MR VISSER: Well in all events, it's the last paragraph where I want to start reading at that page, 229.

I want to read to you what you said. You were asked:

"Well now, as I understand your evidence here, the instruction was ..."

May I interrupt myself. Did le Roux give you any reason why he wanted Japie killed? I think I have asked you this question already.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I believed that he realised that with this abduction and whatever accompanied it, we could not release this man again.

MR VISSER: I will start reading again.

"Well now, as I understand your evidence here, the instruction was that he (referring to Japie Maponya) as a trained active member of MK, and it is clear that he did not want to see this man ever again."

Can I just stop there. This refers to your evidence as you said in your amnesty application that le Roux said that he did not want to see this man ever again. Do I have that correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you submitted at your trial, that the reason therefore was that he was a trained member of MK, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would qualify it. The relation herein, I maybe could have put the relation to this wrongly. Not that he planted the bombs himself and shot people himself and received training outside the borders of the country, but he was actively covering up for his brother by not disclosing where he was, and this led to further murders and acts of terrorism.

MR VISSER: Very well, let's continue with the quotation of your evidence.

"Do I not draw the inference from there that your instruction was to kill him?"

This is what is put to you. Your answer is the following:

"Yes, it is so, but it would also have depended on whether this man wanted to co-operate or not. A man who co-operates with you is willing to deliver his brother or other members of MK, is of value to you. You cannot get information from a dead man."

Can you recall that you said something like that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. If this was my evidence, then this is what I said.

MR VISSER: But how could you have said that, in the light of what you have told the Committee now?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I have to start right at the back, you cannot get information from a dead man and this man did not give us any information of any value and in the contrary, no information.

MR VISSER: But we're dealing here with the instructions from Mr le Roux, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: Well he said that he didn't want to see the man ever again.

MR VISSER: But you also told us that this means that he has to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the question flows from this assumption that the instruction was that he's supposed to be killed, but you said no, it depends whether he co-operates or not.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believed that I mentioned this yesterday and I was asked questions on it, that if this person had co-operated with us and it led to him delivering his brother, then it may be that we could have caught his brother and I think I mentioned that it does not necessarily mean that his brother and he could appear in Court, they could also have been stolen, like his brother.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, I don't know what your answer means. Maybe the Committee understands what you are saying. I continue

"Yes, my question now is, here you had a man who gives you information, what would you tell le Roux?"

Your answer:

"I would tell him that it is not necessary to kill the man, he co-operates. It is as simple as that."

MR DE KOCK: Well that's correct, Chairperson, because at that stage we knew, and as I have said that Colonel le Roux did say that he did not want to see this man in Krugersdorp, we had to take it from there.

MR VISSER: No, Mr de Kock, we speak Afrikaans to each other, your evidence is that le Roux said "abduct him and kill him, I don't want to see him again." And you told Justice van der Merwe, in spite of that instruction, it would have depended on whether the man co-operated or not and if he did co-operate, I would tell le Roux "it's not necessary to kill him".

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, but then he didn't co-operate.

MR VISSER: Yes, but this has regard to who gave the instruction and what you meant. Because you will recall that I asked you "Did you ever decide on your own that Japie Maponya had to be killed?" and you said "No". Do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We are dealing with that now and I want to read further to you, page 220.

"What impression did you want to create when you said the instruction was to, at the end he wanted to get rid of this man, he did not want to see him again because he was an active member of MK?"

And your answer:

"Well it has regard here, you know that up to that stage they could not get any information from Japie Maponya. I believe that we were used as a last resort and if we could not get Maponya to talk, well then he has to go. I believe that if Maponya had spoken out and he was willing to point out his brother or to point out the weapon cache places, then the situation would have been quite different. That is my opinion."

Do you agree with that, that that is what you said?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that was my evidence and this supports to a large extent what I have already said.

MR VISSER: Well I will tell you what it supports, it supports the evidence of Mr Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, this supports my evidence that I have given here.

MR VISSER: That is a matter for argument. I will read further. I skip one paragraph, and a question is put to you

"In any event, this person was seriously assaulted, do you agree?"

And your answer:

"Yes, he was seriously assaulted."

And a question:

"And eventually you decided to kill him?"

Your answer:

"That is correct."

What do those words mean to you, those words in Afrikaans?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the words mean that I already had the instruction from Colonel le Roux to kill him, and the fact that I had that instruction did not mean that the Colonel would kill him, I would kill him. And I actively participated in that murder which was authorised.

MR VISSER: No, Mr de Kock, the simple meaning in Afrikaans is that you decided eventually to kill him.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is a matter of interpretation. I had a specific instruction and I executed this instruction.

MR VISSER: Well that is an instruction which you qualified in your evidence, as I have read to you earlier on. It depended on whether Japie co-operated or not.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but he did not. We cannot go on what did not happen.

MR VISSER: Yes, but the point is you have told this Committee that you had an instruction to kill him, period.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Not depending on whether he co-operated or not.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we are all thinking people on certain points, or otherwise not. If he co-operated, what does it help if he says "I will point out my brother to you, just give me another hour", and I decided to kill him and then I just defeat the whole purpose of the abducting him and interrogating him.

MR VISSER: But why didn't you just agree with me when I put the proposal to you? This is what I have been putting to you over and over.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because it did not happen, Japie Maponya did not speak up, he refused to give any answer.

MR VISSER: The simple truth, Mr de Kock, is that after the assault on Japie you realised that you could not release him because of the identification of your people and the secrecy of Vlakplaas and you decided that he had to be killed. I put it to you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is not correct.

MR VISSER: Because you see, it is strange that le Roux's evidence, from what Kleynhans told him, is incredible. He says Kleynhans told him that there was a concern that Japie Maponya could identify the people from Vlakplaas and could endanger the secrecy thereof and therefore he has to be taken out. And this fits perfectly with the proposition that I put to you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is General le Roux's evidence.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: I want to put it to you unequivocally that Colonel le Roux was not at Vlakplaas, not as he said that he arrived there. I say once again, Colonel le Roux was not there and Captain Kleynhans was not at Vlakplaas that morning.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, I want to put it to you ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr de Kock, why do you say so because you say you were also not there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, but there are guards at the farm and there are workers there and they would definitely have told me if a Colonel arrived at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not on.

MR VISSER: And that is the only reason why you say that he was not there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: According to your personal knowledge, you cannot deny whether le Roux or Kleynhans were both at Vlakplaas on the 26th of September.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because when I called Krugersdorp from Headquarters, I spoke to Kleynhans and the message came back from him that General le Roux wants this person to disappear.

MR VISSER: Yes, that was 11 o'clock, you say.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now I ask you again, from your own personal knowledge you cannot deny that le Roux or Kleynhans or both of them were there.

MR DE KOCK: I did not physically see them myself, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Why did you - in the light of what your answers were to Commissioner Malan, that you never said or told Schoon about the murder and abduction of Maponya, why did you say that Schoon knew about the cover-up before the McNally Committee and before the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, when we had that discussion in Brigadier Schoon's office and I told General le Roux "This Maponya ...", or "Concerning the charges surrounding Maponya is your operation, Brigadier Schoon was there.

MR VISSER: You see it is interesting that in your statement, Mr de Kock, you did not refer to Maponya. I refer you to page 110 of bundle 1A. I apologise, it's 113. You see the third last line of page 113, you choose these words

"I then informed him (that is le Roux), that one of the allegations to which is referred was his operation ..."

Now you say:

"Namely, the Maponya matter."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was the Maponya matter that was written there in the newspaper, there was no other case of Maponya.

MR VISSER: Yes. And I would like to ask you - you remember it now so well, this newspaper to which you refer, was it the Vryeweekblad?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you read what Mr Paau says with regard to that discussion in the office? On page 22 of bundle 2A. Chapter 5: The Age of Innocence. Have you read that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but I will have a look at it.

MR VISSER: Have a look at it and see if you can remind yourself whether you've ever seen it, because the following question that I want to ask you is, did you give him the information?

MR DE KOCK: Can you specifically refer me to a line, so I don't have to read the whole thing.

MR VISSER: Do you not recognise the book, did you not read it?

MR DE KOCK: I've heard of the book, but I have not read it.

MR VISSER: On page 22, Mr Paau says

"November 17, 1989, was a dark and sombre day for the South African Police. On that Friday morning, the front page of a small and independent Afrikaans newspaper, Vryeweekblad, carried a larger than life portrait of a former Vlakplaas commander with a banner headline in Afrikaans 'Bloody trail of the SAP'. And it continued: "Meet Captain Dirk Johannes Coetzee, Commander of a Police Death Squad."

Now I want to know from you, according to your recollection, was this the newspaper report that you and Schoon discussed that morning of the 17th November 1989?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether it was this one or any other one, I cannot tell you.

MR VISSER: What do you say of Paau’s recollection that is was November the 17th, 1989? He attaches it to this specific article. What do you say of that date?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know.

MR VISSER: Let me ask you another question. Did Nofomela, in his revelations the evening before he was to be executed, did he refer to Japie Maponya by name, or did he refer to a security guard from Krugersdorp?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. What I do know is that the chief subject was the death of Griffiths Mxenge, but I am not sure what the nature of the rest was.

MR VISSER: You are quite correct. But the point is, Mr de Kock, you tell us of a discussion which took place between yourself and Mr Schoon, and I would like to know from you, is Paau correct when he attaches this to this particular issue of November 1989?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say and the reason for that is that before this revelation in the Vryeweekblad, there was already information that Dirk Coetzee wanted to talk, he wanted to run away. And as I said, I think in 1980 or '81 or '82, somewhere, he wanted to disclose Vlakplaas. There was much other information which was supplied to us from Intelligence sources.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, you are saying something that is news for someone who went through the Harms Commission, who read the statement of his that he made in Mauritius. Now you're saying that he started in 1980 already, and I want to say that this is the one thing that Dirk Coetzee did not say.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there were specific instances where he went to see one of the spiritualists in Durban. I don't know whether it was the Reverend Hurley or Storey. There was a case where he laid charges - and I depend on a vague recollection, that he wanted to bring it to the attention of van Zyl Slabbert. There were several instances.

MR VISSER: Yes, we are diverging. Mr de Kock, what does your recollection tell you, was this conversation a result of the revelations of Mr Dirk Coetzee this day?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, I cannot.

MR VISSER: Did you give any information to Mr Paau?

MR DE KOCK: For sure not.

MR VISSER: You did not have an interview with him?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: I want to put it to you that Brigadier Willem Schoon retired on pension on the 30th of October 1989. Do you know thereof?

MR DE KOCK: I am aware of it.

MR VISSER: So if Paau is correct, he could not have been there.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And I'm going to tell you now that Willem Schoon says that you often had discussions in his office, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And it sometimes happened that some people looked in there. So in other words, what Willem Schoon is saying and what le Roux said here is that they cannot deny that there was a discussion on some day in Willem Schoon's office. They concede that you may be right.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am correct.

MR VISSER: But they both say that Japie Maponya was never mentioned.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the reference that I made to Brigadier le Roux when he wished us well ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: And you said he prayed or he wanted to pray.

MR DE KOCK: He said he will pray for us. I hear it every day still.

MR VISSER: And this is also something that you thought of for the first time today.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where did you say it previously, that le Roux said that he would pray for you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he sat in that chair, and I will describe it ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: No, no, please not, we've heard that story.

MR DE KOCK: Very well.

MR VISSER: Le Roux says he never sat down in that office. On the day when you were discussing the newspaper report, he never sat down in the office.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he went and sat down between the door and a steel filing cabinet. I know he did it and he knows he did it.

MR VISSER: Yes, and the whole point of the exercise of these questions is, Mr de Kock, Paau is wrong, it could never had referred to Dirk Coetzee's revelations, this was a report with regard Nofomela's revelations, because this came in October 1989.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can only rely upon my memory. I know about the incident which took place, that is how it happened. And that is all that I can say.

MR VISSER: Because you see, Willem Schoon could still have been sitting in his office and chatting to you and then le Roux could have walked in and did whatever he did. If it had taken place before the end of October. There's nothing more to that, I'm just putting it to you as a fact and you can consults the facts if you wish.

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that is Mr Visser's statement and I have nothing further to say about it.

MR VISSER: Very well. Mr Chairman, I'm almost through. The telex which you received, according to your evidence of Captain Naude, you say that you cannot recall what he said, that it was quite a lengthy document?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is quite correct.

MR VISSER: So would a division which required Vlakplaas' assistance and which requested the assistance from Security Head Office, from C1, would he have given the entire story of their problem in the telex, or would he simply have requested assistance?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they would request assistance, sometimes with specific reference to particular askaris, who would know the subject that was being sought. There may a brief history and for security's sake there could further addition of details in order to obtain a group on an urgent basis.

MR VISSER: I would like to ask you, according to your recollection, whether Japie Maponya's name was mentioned in that telex?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't see his name there.

MR VISSER: Yes. Because you see you say on page 110 of bundle 1A, that

"Captain Naude sent or showed me a telex in which Colonel le Roux from Krugersdorp, requested a group of members and askaris from Section C1, with the objective of detecting or tracing MK Mainstay and for covert actions."

Is that what you remember about that telex?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this section as I have it here, is how I understood it. When we speak of covert actions it would not be said that we were going to abduct somebody or blow up somebody's house, but it would most probably refer to an infiltration at an existing cell, or to prevent that a cell be formed, something in that line. It could be very general.

MR VISSER: You see the whole point is this, according to your evidence you burnt this telex in 1990, that was when the Harms Commission got under way.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Then why did you keep it in a trunk at Vlakplaas since September 1985?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it wasn't only that telex which we kept there, we had security reports which came from Head Office, and security reports were submitted on a national basis from all over the country to Head Office, including from the PAC/ANC and other organisations and the volume of it was massive. After our members had read and noted it, they would then put it away for safety.

MR VISSER: Mr de Kock, you murdered Japie, you removed his clothing and the handcuffs, you were worried that something may have been left behind, which could link you to the crime, you drove back to Pretoria and did everything in your power not to be connected to the death of Japie Maponya. You even took petrol with you and poured it out of a can alongside the road. Am I correct so far?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And now in October or November of 1989, you read in a newspaper report the entire story of Japie Maponya's death, which is not headline news. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: But you didn't think at all of this telex in which mention was made of the tracing of Mainstay and that you would be in Krugersdorp for covert actions. Didn't you think about that and think for one moment, hold on, le Roux, that operation of ours, I better go an look for that telex.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a multitude of documents. There were telexes, security reports regarding other operations which were also launched in neighbouring states and we also stored such documentation. It wasn't a question of gathering evidence about ourselves.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think, Mr de Kock, what Mr Visser is getting at - correct me if I'm wrong, Mr Visser - is that after the killing of Mr Japie Maponya there was an immediate implementation of a cover-up. You took the clothes, to avoid identification, you didn't buy petrol on the way, to avoid being traced down that part of the world etc.

Now at that stage, when the telex was still very fresh in your memory and it was still new and it wasn't at the bottom of a huge pile of documents because it was near the top still, why didn't you remove the telex at that stage, as part of the cover-up operation? I think this is what Mr Visser is wanting to know. Not only in 1990 or whenever.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at that stage I had already thought, and I'm using the word "thought" here, that we had destroyed all the documents, because since 1989 we had already destroyed massive quantities of these documents and in 1990, from one of the storerooms in Vlakplaas, we removed two police trunks ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I think you're still missing the point. The question is, why not on the 27th of September 1985, did you not destroy that telex? Why did it remain in existence? As soon as you got back from Piet Retief, or even before you left, why didn't you destroy it? Because you knew there was going to be a cover-up and this was this little piece of evidence that may point to your, and when I say "your", Vlakplaas' involvement in the killing of Mr Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was no reference to us which we could not intercept and this is nothing that emerged, it wasn't an important aspect to us at that point. With the cleaning up of any possible evidence, in 1989, that telex did not emerge. There was no reference to it. The only reason that I can find in retrospect is that that telex ended up in a bundle of documents on Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Yes, I understand that, but why? The question is, why? Because you've just murdered Maponya and you attempted to eradicate all clues or cover up all clues which pointed at you and the one thing that you didn't think of was the telex which would be the death bell for you, because it would prove that you were in Krugersdorp in September, when in actual fact you say you were somewhere else.

MR DE KOCK: But there was no other document to destroy at that stage. I cannot give you an explanation surrounding the telex and how it came to be there, whether it was an oversight or something else. I'm not trying to evade you here, but it just happened that the telex ended up there.

MR VISSER: As I have summed you up, Mr de Kock, it could not have been an oversight. I want to put it to you that you probably never received this telex that you have spoken of, because if you had received the telex containing a reference to MK Mainstay, you would have seen to it that that telex would be destroyed immediately.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I received the telex by hand from Mr Naude and that is the telex which was burnt in 1990.

MR VISSER: Well with regard to Captain Naude, I must tell you that he says that he cannot recall this incident whatsoever, but that he would not be able to argue with you because he simply cannot remember anything about this discussion which you have referred to in your application, and that he will leave it at that.

In other words, he says that you may be telling the truth when you say that he showed you a telex, but then I must just tell you as well, that it was never testified by you previously that he gave you the telex and that you left with the telex. That is what you said before this Committee for the first time, and I have not had the opportunity to put this to Captain Naude yet, but seeing as this is not so important, I will leave it at that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will reiterate, the telex was given to me. I was concerned about the fact that people had been redeployed and that I had not been notified about this, but I received the telex personally. Naude and I were good friends, I don't know what the situation is at present, but there was no way that I would implicate somebody like him just to have an extra name.

MR VISSER: I want to conclude my examination of your, Mr de Kock. Some of our usual casualties, when they cannot remember what took place 14 to 15 years ago, they simply say "I can't remember, it's possible that it may have been that way or this way". However, you know it has always been a characteristic of your evidence to me - and I'm going to argue this, that's why I'm putting it, that you are not prepared to make concessions. You say that the way that you remember it is correct. Am I summarising your evidence correctly?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I want to tell you that I would not underwrite a situation or a condition here simply because it would be popular. It will be that I will differ from many persons and not because I am attempting to conceal or disguise something. I'm simply saying that if it was that way, that is the way I will put it. And if people don't wish to believe me, then that is acceptable.

But I am not going to concede to something simply because it is a question of popular opinion, or because it will make a popular person out of me. I will bear my own burden and I will deal with the consequences of my actions and assume responsibility for those who worked below me.

MR VISSER: Well can I give you an example then. You gave evidence before this Committee, that after Japie Maponya had been shot, you struck his head twice with the sharp end of the spade.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Can I read to you what you said on page 113 of your amnesty application. Bundle 1A, page 113. You see you have evaded the point. Listen to what you have said.

"I want to put it clearly that Fourie was not present when Nortje and I killed Maponya and I deny emphatically that I struck or struck open Maponya's head with a spade before he died."

MR DE KOCK: That is entirely correct, Chairperson. Because it is a very popular statement, or a very popular gruesome message was sent into the world, that I chopped him to death with a spade. That statement is untrue. I did strike his head after he had died. And that is not to evade anything which is said here.

MR VISSER: But is it not your evidence that you struck him with the spade in order to ensure that he was indeed dead? In other words, you didn't know?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was to ensure that he was dead. And I also gave evidence that if the gun was still in working order, either Nortje or I, or both of us would have shot him two more times in the head. During previous situations of combat or actions in which we were involved, you would administer two to three shots to the head to make sure that he was dead.

MR VISSER: I have no further questions, thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Wagener, do you have any questions?

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Chairperson. Mr Chairman, on the 24th and 25th of May this year, Mr de Kock gave evidence before another Amnesty Committee, in respect of what he regarded the general background to Vlakplaas. We have been handed a bundle. The bundle has not yet been identified of that evidence. Maybe we can identify the bundle now.

CHAIRPERSON: I think let's call it 1D. Sorry, 1E.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, you will have noted that the evidence contained in this bundle was largely uncontested, although a week later I was given the opportunity to cross-examine Mr de Kock rather extensively on this very same evidence and I have been giving the transcript of that only yesterday, by Ms Lockhat.

Mr Chairman, there I dealt with a number of issues and in order to save time during this present process, I would request Ms Lockhat to make that part of the transcript available to you. It is the same record, pages - it starts on page 455 and it goes to page 527. Because I will, if permitted, argue at the end of this present hearing partly on what transpired there, on what was asked and responses given by Mr de Kock, and therefore I will not repeat everything there, although it may be relevant to a large extent concerning the position of my client, General Engelbrecht. If I can proceed on that basis.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly. Ms Lockhat, would it be possible to get copies of that part of the record?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I do have a copy with me. I shall have copies made by the end of today and then submit it to the Committee tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I'm sure Mr Hattingh would like an opportunity to read it and consult with his client in respect of it. I think at this stage we can proceed on that basis, but subject to, if there's been any dispute about the accuracy of the record or anything else like that, we can revisit it later.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. No, the only point it, I think it may save time that we don't have to repeat the same issues that were dealt with before another Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I wouldn't like 70 pages of evidence repeated here. Thank you, Mr Wagener.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I am going to a repeat a measure of what we discussed last time, but I will try to be as brief as possible. The Security Branch of the South African Police at that time, were they a closed group?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: Was the so-called need-to-know principle strictly applied within the ranks of the Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: Was it also the position at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, inasfar as it was possible.

MR WAGENER: Do I understand it correctly that there was a reasonably great measure of former Koevoet members, who found their way to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Was there any reason for that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. Most of the members of all of them had combat experience. They had been exposed to guerrilla warfare in all its facets, against opponents which had already been trained by the East Block countries and they were also then familiar with their techniques and weaponry.

MR WAGENER: So was there an extensive degree of camaraderie among the members of the Security Branch who had been former members of Koevoet?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: Did you members, former members of Koevoet, trust one another with your lives?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: With your biggest secrets?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't say with all secrets, Chairperson, but yes, with secrets that fell within work relation.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I wasn't actually referring to private matters, but those secretes that pertained to work.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And was there the same level of confidence among members of the Security Branch who were former Koevoet members, and other Security Branch members?

MR DE KOCK: If you could just clarify this for me. Are you referring to Security Branch members who came from Koevoet, and other Security Branch members, but all of them being at C1?

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, the question must have been unclear. The Security Branch members who were former Koevoet members, was there an extra special relationship of trust among them? If I may put it that way.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. I just want to qualify. You would know that this man would not let you down under pressure. In other words, they had already been tested under fire.

MR WAGENER: Is it also correct that you former members of Koevoet, if I might put it as follows, spoke your own language?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we spoke the same language as the rest of the Security policemen in the branch.

MR WAGENER: What I mean by that, Mr de Kock, is that in my life I have encountered numerous Security Branch members who were largely administrative members and then I have encountered others who, for want of a better word, were operatives.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: And these operatives were people like you and the former Koevoet members?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I met many other operatives at other branches throughout the country.

MR WAGENER: Just for interest' sake, was General le Roux a former Koevoet member?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not that I was aware of.

MR WAGENER: Was he not a member of that special group of confidants that we have just spoken of?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was a member of the group inasfar as it had to do with the culture that reigned in the Security Police.

MR WAGENER: Now with regard to the Security Branch, on the one hand, and the rest of the former South African Police, on the other hand, was there a great level of confidence among one another with regard to operations?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. We could not share the information and the knowledge that we had with the uniform branches or the detective branches. What happened was that if we picked up information surrounding crime, we would send it through to the uniform or the detective branches. But this also happened sometimes with, or via another route. We didn't always tell them what we were busy with.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I have recently had the opportunity of studying your entire amnesty application, in which reference is made to more than a hundred incidents which are crimes and for which you have applied for amnesty.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: Now these deeds or offences which have to do with your amnesty application, would you have discussed these acts with your friends?

MR DE KOCK: Not friends beyond the parameters of Vlakplaas. If there was a friend who I had known since my schooldays, or with whom I'd grown up, I may have referred to him that unpleasant things had taken place, but I wouldn't have discussed it in detail.

MR WAGENER: Would you have discussed it with your neighbour?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall that I ever spoke to my neighbour at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking now, Mr Wagener, at the time these crimes were committed, or now at the time of applying for amnesty? - at the time of the commission of the offences.

MR WAGENER: Let me put it more clearly. Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, I'm referring to those times. So if you want to give me another answer, or if you want to comment, you are more than welcome.

MR DE KOCK: Could you please repeat your question.

MR WAGENER: In other words, the questions that I am putting now would be whether you discussed the offences for which you are applying for amnesty now, with anybody else at that time. I'm speaking of your friends and your neighbours. Do you understand me? Did you for example, discuss these matters with your father?

MR DE KOCK: There was only one case that I discussed with my father one day, something which upset me, or just after it had happened it had an impact on me. I'm referring to the Lesotho situation.

Let me put it like this, he was very sad about it. And the second that he ever asked me about was the Lubowski incident. He asked me if I had been involved in this matter, because he was familiar with the Lubowski family, but he never said anything else.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I recall, he was a District Court Magistrate.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was a District Court Magistrate for quite some time.

MR WAGENER: So what you're actually telling us, Mr de Kock, is that your involvement in that series of offences and the facts pertaining thereto remained, as far as you are concerned, within your small group, namely Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: I believed that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any rule, written or otherwise, restraining members of Vlakplaas to talk about their work outside, you know in a social atmosphere or to the family or to friends.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was no rule at Vlakplaas, but every member of the Security Branch undersigned the official Secrets Act. I know of two members of the Security Branch in Pretoria, who provided information for the ANC. We caught them in Swaziland. They both got 14 years prison sentence. It was a question of loyalty and trust.

CHAIRPERSON: A question of National Security - let's talk about the killing of Mr Maponya, that wouldn't be a question of National Security, would it? I mean was there anything to stop any of the other people who went with you to Piet Retief, to go to the rugby club and start talking in general to people there about how they went and killed this person at Piet Retief?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, something like that was simply not done.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean, were they told not to do it, or was it just an unspoken rule, an unwritten rule?

MR DE KOCK: It was unwritten rule, an unspoken rule. One of the situations, and it appeared later, was that the club facility, after an action on a cross-border level, the club facility was used for people to drink alcohol and relax.

You couldn't allow a person who had shot people dead six hours ago to go home. If he wanted to go home he could, but one had to monitor his actions because he could walk into a bar in Pretoria and begin drinking and start a fight.

There was no psychological assistance for such a person. One couldn't speak to a Chaplain, because that would disclose the identities of the person, so there was nowhere to go.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, wasn't the reason simply that those members were too scared to talk?

MR DE KOCK: We were all too scared to talk, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: We know even now that some of your own members were murdered because the possibility existed that they may speak out.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, this situation originated in approximately 1990/1991.

MR WAGENER: In fact, during a previous hearing in this venue I heard of two of your members - if I recall correctly they were Britz and Vermeulen, who said that they were afraid of you. Do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there was such evidence, but if there were two people who weren't afraid, it would be Britz and Vermeulen, Chairperson. Because if you know Britz the way I know him, the devil would be scared of him because his name is "Devil".

MR WAGENER: You see the fact of the matter remains, Mr de Kock, that you were so involved in your management of the need-to-know principle that up to and including 19 October 1989 - that would be the day upon which Almond Nofomela made his affidavit at the Supreme Court, up to and including that day nothing, or basically nothing had been leaked out about all the crimes that you had committed at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it didn't leak out, but there was still some of this information which became known. I could inform you about it, but I don't wish to be longwinded.

MR WAGENER: Well then my statement is that according to my knowledge basically no information was made public, up to and including that day.

MR DE KOCK: No, it was not known to the public.

MR WAGENER: Perhaps we should examine the chronology, it must just be handy for all of us. I have already said that the 19th of October 1989, was the date of Nofomela's urgent Court application.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I recall that.

MR WAGENER: And as a result of that on the next day, 20 October 1989, Adv McNally and the then Detective Head, Conradie, were appointed in order to investigate these allegations made by Nofomela.

MR DE KOCK: I will concede to the dates that you are providing here because I don't have the dates myself.

MR WAGENER: My client, General Engelbrecht, can you recall which position he occupied during October 1989?

MR DE KOCK: As I believe it to have been at that time, he was the Head of the Murder and Robbery Division.

MR WAGENER: So he was a Detective?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but he was connected to Head Office as Head of the Murder and Robbery squads throughout South Africa, and he was a Detective.

MR WAGENER: And at that stage had he spent longer than 20 years as a Detective?

MR DE KOCK: I would not dispute that.

MR WAGENER: And was he at no stage connected to the Security Branch? That would be October 1989.

MR DE KOCK: I will have to rely upon you, I cannot dispute that.

MR WAGENER: In fact he says that up to and including October 1989, he had very little contact with any members of the Security Branch.

MR DE KOCK: I would accept that, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Precisely as a result of the fact that the Security Branch to a great extent, operated within a compartment separate from the rest of the Force.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one could accept it as that.

MR WAGENER: And he was then a Brigadier.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: And you are correct in saying that he was the National Head of the Murder and Robbery Units of our country.

Now just to continue with the chronology, Mr de Kock, Brigadier Engelbrecht was instructed by General Conradie to assist him and Adv McNally in their investigation, within a day or two after their own appointments. Do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know about the appointments, Chairperson. One day I became aware that Brigadier Engelbrecht was there.

MR WAGENER: On the 25th of October 1989, General Conradie and Adv NcNally and he visited Nofomela in prison and obtained further information from him with regard to his initial allegations. Are you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Would you accept it as that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: You and a number of your Vlakplaas members, your names came forth from Nofomela, indicating you as suspects in certain offences, would you agree? Do you have anything to say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I would accept it if that is what you say, Mr Wagener.

MR WAGENER: Then, Mr de Kock, on the following day, the 26th of October 1989, those three persons conducted interviews with you and a number of your members, here in Wachthuis. Do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we were in Wachthuis, that is where we were interviewed.

MR WAGENER: My instruction is that the discussion - and I will now limit myself to the discussion which was held with you because you might not know about the interviews with the others, but this discussion with you was largely led by Adv McNally, who put the questions to you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: General Conradie assisted him in the process and put certain questions to you.

MR DE KOCK: I am not certain, but I would accept it if that is the way that you put it.

MR WAGENER: And at the end of the consultation, Brigadier Engelbrecht immediately compiled a statement and had it typed, and on that very same day it was confirmed by you under oath. Do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall, it may be so. But there was more than one affidavit which was put before me and which I signed.

MR WAGENER: Yes. That would be the affidavit which we will find in volume 2A, on page 261, Mr de Kock. That is a statement which you undersigned under oath on the 26th of October 1989. I don't know if you want to take a look at this. I'm not really going to make much of the content of this document. What is of interest, Mr de Kock, in this statement is that you deny your involvement in any offence.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And I infer that in the fourth paragraph you deny accountability insofar as Nofomela refers to Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: General Engelbrecht says that this was the first occasion upon which he heard a version from you, of any nature, regarding Maponya. And let us just limit ourselves to Maponya. Is he correct in saying that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know. With Mr McNally's examination he made notes and I don't know whether this is the information that he gleaned from his notes. McNally also made notes. And I don't know whether Engelbrecht sat in on the interview, I have no recollection of his presence there.

MR WAGENER: But that is the statement ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Wagener.

Did you have contact, or did you know General Engelbrecht prior to the 26th of October 1989, when this statement was taken down in the presence of Messrs McNally and Conradie?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I met him and Warrant Officer Mostert of the Soweto Security Branch. Engelbrecht was then a Brigadier. They arrived together at Vlakplaas. Initially we did not want to allow them at Vlakplaas.

I contacted Brigadier Schoon and told him that there was a Brigadier Engelbrecht and Warrant Officer Mostert here and he said that we could allow them on Vlakplaas and have a discussion with them.

Engelbrecht wanted to know whether we knew anything about the Khotso House explosion. And also at a later stage they wanted to know whether we knew anything about the burning down of Khanya House. I told them nothing. I once again contacted Brigadier Schoon and he said that I was free to talk to Engelbrecht and explain to him what was going on there. It was then about cover-ups. And the then Minister Vlok was also involved.

I told Engelbrecht that I had been involved in the explosions and the arson, but I didn't give him any other names. And that was the first occasion upon which I met him.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my statement that I put to you was that upon this occasion, that would be the 26th of October 1989, Brigadier Engelbrecht heard for the first time a version from you regarding Maponya and he heard this in the presence of McNally and Conradie. And your version is one of denial, as contained within this affidavit.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. I just want to mention that I answered the Chairperson's question, I did not mean to evade your question. Yes, it would be one of denial, as the whole Vlakplaas situation was a question of denial.

I sat there with a Brigadier, a General and an Attorney-General and even though I wanted to tell them what I had done, I certainly wouldn't have told them in that office.

CHAIRPERSON: That was the first time you mentioned the Japie Maponya matter in the presence of General Engelbrecht? That was also part of the question.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So Mr de Kock, do I understand you correctly, that you were lying here on your own, you were not lying with the assistance of anybody. You decided independently that you were going to deny these claims?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, before we entered that office, Joe Mamasela and I, along with Lieutenant van Dyk and Bosigu, all of us sat there in an office and the message that to us was clear, by implication and attitude, was "you know nothing, just deny it". And we did deny it in order to make matters easier for us with regard to the questions that were put to us. There was a tapping device placed in this office where we were being interviewed and the radio receiver was in the office where the others were seated. We had that brought in from the Technical Division.

MR WAGENER: And if I might just move back chronologically, because your alibi was already in place since 1985, since a day or two after the incident, correct? I beg your pardon, perhaps I should just put my question more clearly. A day or two after the murder of Maponya, you made use of false travel and accommodation claims in order to create a so-called alibi for yourselves in order to prove your innocence.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this was nothing new. To give you an example, this would have been one of the incidents. What we usually did when we had an operation in Swaziland, was that we would submit petrol receipts for the Secret Fund, coming from Mafikeng, Zeerust and the Botswana environment. We had receipts from all areas in the country, along with third party discs and so forth and we would submit a claim that indicated that we had worked in Botswana. To ensure that you would be placed as far away from the scene of an incident as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question put by Mr Wagener is that you did that to cover up the period when Mr Maponya was killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, absolutely.

MR WAGENER: And just to make it perfectly clear, Mr de Kock, this had already been done in 1985, the submission of these false claims. This wasn't something which was done in 1989 only when Nofomela began talking.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it wasn't the claim itself that was false, but the area in which we operated was not given as the correct area. The claim itself, regarding the content of the times and the amount was correct.

MR WAGENER: Yes, but what I'm saying is that this was already done in 1985.

MR DE KOCK: Well we weren't only covering ourselves, we were covering the rest of the Security Branch members as well. And just to refer you, this was not only a question of 1985 - I might be interrupting here, but I deny that I was involved in the interception and abduction of Glory Sedebe from a neighbouring State. Now this neighbouring state would have been Swaziland and while Brigadier Engelbrecht was visiting us at Vlakplaas, Glory Sedebe would be walking around there. He was an askari. It was about complete denial that we were involved in internal or external operations.

CHAIRPERSON: You told us earlier that you put in claims to indicate that you had been in Josini, you and the others had been in Josini at the time that Mr Maponya was killed.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?

MR WAGENER: Now if I might continue chronologically, Mr de Kock. You have agreed that Brigadier Schoon retired on the 31st of October 1989, the end of October, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would accept that. I don't have the dates before me.

MR WAGENER: And the on the 17th of November of that year, the revelations of Dirk Coetzee appeared in the media and the rest that followed with that ensued.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I see that that would be the date.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is all this taking us, Mr Wagener? All this history, this chronology, where's it leading to?

MR WAGENER: If I have to show my hand, Mr Chairman, it leads to the clear point that the allegation against my client ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, as long as it's relevant. I don't want to stop you, you can carry on. As long as it's relevant to your client.

MR WAGENER: Please stop me if you think it's improper, but I have a clear idea in my mind.

Mr de Kock, perhaps I will have to speed up to the point.

MR DE KOCK: I'm just uncertain, can you tell me when Brigadier Schoon retired?

MR DE KOCK: The end of October 1989.

MR DE KOCK: I see.

MR WAGENER: After the McNally/Conradie investigation we had the Harms Commission, which lasted from February to August, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Did you give evidence there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Now Mr de Kock, you persist in saying that General Engelbrecht was the investigating officer of the Harms Commission, and I persist in telling you that he wasn't and that it was Brigadier Wright and General van der Westhuizen. Do you stand by your allegation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because General Engelbrecht was the one who consistently, almost on a daily basis, had liaison with me and my members. I had nothing to do with Brigadier Wright, and I had met General van der Westhuizen upon isolated occasions. I had nothing further to do with them. I was simply involved with Brigadier "Krappies" Engelbrecht.

MR WAGENER: And during the Harms Commission you maintained your denial regarding Maponya. Let us just limit ourselves to Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.

MR WAGENER: Did your version or the nature of your denial change in any way since the McNally investigation, up to and including the Harms Commission, or did it remain the same?

MR DE KOCK: Please could you repeat that, my attention was distracted.

MR WAGENER: The content of your denial, did it change in any way, or did it remain the same? That is, from the McNally investigation to the Harms Commission.

MR DE KOCK: No, we simply continued denying it.

MR WAGENER: A year after that, 1991, we had the Post-mortem Inquest here in the Magistrates Court in Pretoria, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And you gave evidence there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: And once again you denied any involvement.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: And once again you submitted that you had been somewhere else at the stage when Maponya would have disappeared.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, you had to stick to the alibi that you had created.

MR WAGENER: So your version had by 1990, not changed, it remained the same?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct. One had the full support of the police and it was possible to do so.

MR WAGENER: Well Mr de Kock, you did not require the support of anybody to make denials. I'm not sure what you mean.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have been much simpler for General Engelbrecht to arrest all of us in terms of the evidence which they had.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, General Engelbrecht had evidence that you denied your involvement and that you could prove it with your documents which would indicate that you had a basic alibi.

MR DE KOCK: Well he could have arrested me for many other things, among others the Khotso House explosion. This was a cover-up, it was purposeful. It is not something that I alone, as a Major, could operate within the South African Police. It simply wasn't possible for a Major to succeed in this.

MR WAGENER: But Colonel, you explained to us at length a few moments ago how you and your fellow Vlakplaas members maintained this information among yourselves, on the need-to-know principle.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: I want to put it to you that that is exactly what you did with regard to the McNally investigation. That you perpetuated this to the Harms Commission and in the same way you perpetuated this right through the Post-mortem Inquest. You denied your accountability, you said that you weren't there and your documents proved that you weren't there.

MR DE KOCK: It is not that simple, Chairperson, ever since 1989, I have been bearing the burden of the Harms Commission and everything that went along with it and it has been 10 years. And I want to tell you that it really wasn't all that simple. It was a cover-up on the highest level, it was a denial on the highest level, along with the concealment of facts, so that the Security Police would not collapse on itself. If any of my members or I had been arrested, it would have led to the fall of the government at that stage.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, is it your evidence that during 1989 and 1990, you told all your secrets to a Detective, an outsider, such as General Engelbrecht, and that you trusted him with this information. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, that is not my evidence, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: But you persist, Mr de Kock, every time when you give evidence, in dirtying the name of General Engelbrecht, by saying that he assisted in covering up information.

MR DE KOCK: I am not slandering the name of General Engelbrecht, I'm just telling you what I know. All that we have here is a further cover-up of the truth because you are protecting your client and rightfully so. I am no longer prepared to sit here and protect the former dispensation, and unfortunately that includes General Engelbrecht, a person for whom I had a lot of time.

MR MALAN: Mr de Kock, let me just ask you the following, because I'm not certain whether I understand your answer. Do you say that you at no stage gave information to McNally or Conradie or Engelbrecht, with regard to the Maponya incident or any other incident for that matter, that you kept this information to yourself? Let us confine ourselves to Maponya. You didn't tell anybody that you killed Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. At a later stage - if I am correct it was in 1991 or 1992, I told Engelbrecht directly and there was a witness present, that Maponya was dead, that Maponya had died in Swaziland and he had those facts.

MR MALAN: Very well. Are you speaking of the time before or after the Post-mortem Inquest?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was after the Post-mortem Inquest. I gave him the information just like that.

MR MALAN: No, I'm not interested in that information, I just want to know, because you say that Engelbrecht had all the information, that he covered it up, he and other persons on higher levels, or the highest level perhaps, but the information which they covered up was not information that they had obtained from you. Is that your evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I misled them by nature of the situation and it wasn't only about me ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, we're not talking about you, we're talking about the cover-up and Maponya and then your involvement in this matter. You say that it was a cover-up which they orchestrated to prevent the Maponya incident from emerging, among others.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Well what could they have covered up if they didn't have any information? Because they didn't obtain this information from you and they certainly didn't obtain it from other Vlakplaas members. Why do you say that they covered it up?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not even an aggressive investigation would have been capable of exposing that entire situation. The usual inquiry and investigation without consulting me, would have exposed that situation.

MR MALAN: So you're saying that they may have found out according to your judgement, but you know nothing that indicates that they had information?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, for how long was it necessary to maintain the cover-up? Did you apply for indemnity in terms of the '91 or '92 Acts?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Is this now for amnesty?

CHAIRPERSON: No, the old Indemnity Act.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I applied, I think in 1993.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you make application - let's just confine ourselves to Mr Japie Maponya's incident, did you make application in respect of this incident, the Maponya incident, in 1993 for indemnity?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall. A form was handed in at my trail, but I think I asked for more than one hundred. We had to give names, but I'm not sure if I had the name there.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you said now in response to a question put to you by Mr Malan, that you spoke to General Engelbrecht only after the Inquest, saying that Maponya was dead.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we've heard that the Inquest, that was the last of the - besides your trial, the inquiries into this matter, is that not so? You had first of all the McNally Investigation, then the Harms Commission and then the Inquest.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you spoke to Engelbrecht and told him about Maponya, when you first mentioned Maponya's name, was there any need to cover up at that stage? Or had you applied for indemnity and had you confessed by then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I did not make any statements as we have done here. But at that stage it was not requested, there was a short form where a case had to be mentioned, but in my instance I needed a couple of forms. There was something that I had to fill in and then hand it in.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you first publicly tell the truth about the incidents that you were involved in?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I disclosed this information in my trial.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry, this was after you were found guilty?

MR DE KOCK: This was I was found guilty, Chairperson, or during my trial ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Before you were sentenced, but after you were found guilty?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So Mr de Kock, did I hear you correctly, you misled General Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the whole action was a misleading action. It went right through to the lowest level.

MR WAGENER: If you have a look at bundle 2A, from page 151, there is a sworn affidavit which General Engelbrecht made with regard to his investigation into the death of Maponya.

MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat the page number?

MR WAGENER: Page 151, bundle 2A. This is a affidavit dated the 24th of maybe the 29th of January 1990. Do you see that? It looks like the 29th of January. Now here General Engelbrecht says that, he starts saying that he was the investigating officer and then he gives 13 numbered pages where he gives the facts which came to light during his investigation. And then on page 154, the second paragraph he says - and I would like to read it quickly

"In the light of the above-mentioned facts, I am convinced that Japie Maponya was not murdered by Nofomela and his cohorts and was neither murdered by Major de Kock. These allegations are not true and are supported by documents and sworn affidavits."

Did you see that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So your misleading of this experienced Detective was one hundred percent.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is the impression that is created, but that was not the spirit and circumstances which reigned at Security Head Office.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, you have even misled General Engelbrecht, just as - and at a previous occasion we dealt with this, in your career you have lied to many Courts, Tribunals and Judges successfully.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, if you have the help of the State, then these things are possible.

MR WAGENER: You testified with regard to the matter of the petrol records during the Harms Commission and I realise that I must actually ask this to Mr Nortje, but it is probably only correct that I put it to you that General Engelbrecht denies that he was involved with a cover-up or a disappearance of petrol registers during 1990.

In fact, he gave evidence at the Inquest that - Chairman, I'll get the page, it's bundle B, page 343, that those petrol registers were destroyed after three years in the normal course of time.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think the interpretation was they were destroyed in three years in the normal course of time. It should be in the normal procedure, course of procedure.

MR WAGENER: So he said there that during his investigation he also went and looked for these registers, but they were already destroyed. It was standing practice that those books would be destroyed after three years.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I can also mention here for clarity, that I was also a Station Commander, and I know how every facet works of the petrol register as well as the other registers of the SAP. Registers are kept back if there are any irregularities or if any certain aspect cannot be clarified with the amount of the petrol tank was filled up and the numbers don't register. And when I took over a station in South West, I found registers that should have been destroyed 12 years ago. So although those rules about the destruction of the registers were there, they are not followed as closely as they should be.

MR WAGENER: I am just putting it to you, Mr de Kock. We know that you personally don't bear any knowledge of this, you depend on hearsay, but I ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: No, I depend on the experience of police documents ...(intervention)

MR WAGENER: I'm sorry, you depend on hearsay with regard to this instance, the matter of the petrol registers and Mr Nortje and General Engelbrecht. So I'm just putting it to you for completion's sake.

MR DE KOCK: Just for the sake of completion, there was a situation where there was a register which was at ABSA Bank, which was found by General Engelbrecht and which wasn't handed in, or it disappeared. I think the Committee should just take note of that as well. Maybe that could be dealt with later. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR WAGENER: What register are you referring to, Mr de Kock?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to get involved in matters that have nothing to do with the Maponya incident now.

MR DE KOCK: No, but this specifically has to do with the Maponya matter.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, the witness keeps on defaming my client in all different respects and I have to respond to that.

Tell me about this register, Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: No, he did mention that it's got specifically to do with the Maponya case, so he mentioned it.

MR DE KOCK: We will have to go through the record, but I think that Judge van der Merwe found it very strange, He even made some remarks about it. And at no stage am I trying to defame General Engelbrecht, that is the last thing I want to do.

MR WAGENER: Please show me where in his judgment does the Judge say anything negative towards the General.

MR DE KOCK: I did not speak of the judgment, it was during the proceedings where the Chief of Security of ABSA Bank or United, gave evidence with regard to a General or a person who approached him with regard to registers regarding Japie Maponya's period of service and this register was handed over and it disappeared. It was long those lines that that whole situation goes.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I will ask Mr Hattingh after the adjournment and I will take instructions.

Mr de Kock, you have also further testified during the Harms Commission, and we all know that this was during 1990, that that afternoon at Vlakplaas there was a big party going on and ten steps ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could you just repeat that date again, Mr Wagener.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, you have testified that during the proceedings of the Harms Commission, and we all know that this was in 1990, on a good day there was a party going on at Vlakplaas and ten paces from there members of Vlakplaas were burning documents. Do you recall your evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And during this party there were not only Security Branch members, but other persons as well.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: General Engelbrecht was there, he was a Detective.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, in control of the investigation of the activities of Vlakplaas.

MR WAGENER: Yes, that was your opinion. The fact of the matter is - or maybe I should ask you this, who was also present there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall. It was not a big function, but there were quite a number of people. I would say 15 to 20 people.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, General Engelbrecht denies it, he denies that he was present during 1990, when he was still a Detective, that documentation was burnt in his presence at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: I have no comment, Chairperson. There will most probably be evidence with regard to that.

MR WAGENER: In fact he says that if you at that stage wanted to cover up your crime trail by destroying documents, you would not do it in his presence, he was an outsider. Would you like to comment?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: May I just ask? Would it not stroke with your evidence, that you wanted to mislead him, that you did not give him information?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, these documents were shown to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?

MR WAGENER: Lastly Mr de Kock, General Engelbrecht says that in spite of all the times when you had defiled him of the last two years with your evidence with regard to his alleged involvement, you probably only at one occasion spelt out his position correctly and I would like to refer you to it. This is when you gave evidence in your trial. The page number that I have is 13008. Mr Chairman, this is very short and I will merely read it. It's not before you in any bundle, as far as I know.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what is the page number?

MR WAGENER: 13008. That's the page number of the criminal case record. But I will read the paragraph into this record now. There you said, Mr de Kock

"General Engelbrecht is not a cruel person. You know there are many people who would like to make a caricature of him as this ruthless you know, monster-like person. He is the only person on the contrary, who showed comprehension for the people of C1. And if there is one policeman in this country who was more abused than the whole C1 together and the whole CCB together, it would General Engelbrecht. This man has a clean record and he has an open gleaming career before him and this was effectively destroyed by the Security Police."

Mr de Kock, I want to put it to you that you played a large part in the destruction of General Engelbrecht's career, with the manner in which you misled him.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it is a load that he has to carry himself. This attitude of "always blame it on the bunny", and this is now me, is past and every man has to carry his load and I carry my load in my sleep. And there is no reason - after what I said there, that I want to place General Engelbrecht at a disadvantage or I want to defame him in any manner.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, if you say that you are the man that everybody must accept you are, then you will apologise to General Engelbrecht.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. If General Engelbrecht wants to make the man that he is, and this includes the other Generals, then they would come and sit here and tell what happened and why, but they choose to hide under the stones and they have to be drawn our before they get to the truth.

MR WAGENER: And in conclusion, Mr de Kock, you are aware that I represent more than 20 old-Generals, who have applied for amnesty.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So you are not reeling in anybody?

MR DE KOCK: Well it is a formidable obstacle if everybody lies together.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener. Mr Williams, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLIAMS: Thank you, Chairperson. Just a few aspects that I want to question the witness about.

Mr de Kock, yesterday in your evidence-in-chief you said that three black members executed the abduction, namely Nofomela, Msimande and you could not recall the third person. You would not deny that it was Mbelo? You were Mbelo's Commanding Officer at that stage, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLIAMS: Did you personally give the instruction to the mentioned members, or did you give them the instruction through a team leader or anybody else?

MR DE KOCK: I think, Chairperson, I directly did the planning and therefore I would have done the division myself and I would have given the advice and synchronisation as to how this abduction would take place.

MR MALAN: The question, if I understand correctly, is did you give them the instruction personally?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WILLIAMS: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR WILLIAMS: You said at some stage that you take responsibility for all the members, whether they are black or white, does this include Mbelo?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, this includes the askaris. And at previous occasions I have said that I heard in Durban of a murder that was committed in Durban, of which I did not know and that because of the members who were under my command, because of their viewpoint of the struggle which reigned at that time and the circumstances, that although I was not involved there and although I did not give the instruction and I was on leave, I will also take responsibility therefore.

MR WILLIAMS: Do you have any photos of Japie Maponya in ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Williams. I want to understand this. Maybe this will clear this up for me. You say that although you were not involved and any of your members were involved, then you take responsibility?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You do not test as to what they did?

MR DE KOCK: No, there would be a qualification. If a guy came in with rape and such things, then it would be out.

MR MALAN: But any murder or torture ... (intervention)

MR DE KOCK: That has a relation to the past.

MR MALAN: Yes. You will stand in for that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But is this not the basis that you're asking the Generals to stand in for you and you are angry because the Generals do not want to stand in for you?

MR DE KOCK: I don't want to have anything to do with the Generals, the Generals should mean leaders and they've already disqualified themselves in that sense, so I will take responsibility for all those people and if my head has to fly, it must happen, Chairperson. I know what happened and I fought very hard and I will not abandon them. I take responsibility for them, even for the worst or the weakest one. If he committed a murder on an activist, ANC or PAC, and he believed he was correct and it was in the struggle, then I will stand up and take responsibility for it.

MR MALAN: And if I understand you correctly - my question is, that is the basis that you expect the Generals to stand up for you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, that is what one would have expected, but it's too late now, I don't think they qualify to do it anymore.

MR MALAN: But you would accept that Mr Mbelo participated in this incident in the execution of his tasks as a member of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WILLIAMS: Do you have any photos, or did you show any photos of Maponya to any of the three askaris?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I don't have a recollection thereof. There was a clear description as it was given by Captain Kleynhans to us, but I think he was the only security guard who worked at that branch of the United.

MR WILLIAMS: And then another aspect. The actual vehicle that was used in the abduction was a Jetta, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WILLIAMS: And the members were supposed to transfer Japie to a kombi, do you know whether this indeed had happened?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not see it, but it did happen because that is how we arrived at Vlakplaas, in a kombi, in a panel van kombi.

MR WILLIAMS: But you were not present when the members arrived at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I was still on my way there.

MR WILLIAMS: Mr de Kock, my instruction from Mr Mbelo is that Mr Japie Maponya was never transferred in the kombi on the way to Vlakplaas, that it happened after they arrived at Vlakplaas. Would you like to comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I believe that is his recollection, but that is how I have the information and I stand by my statement.

MR WILLIAMS: Will you accept that you might be wrong on this aspect?

MR DE KOCK: I may be wrong, Chairperson, yes.

MR WILLIAMS: And a final question, did you pay any monies to any of the members as reward money for this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, there was no reward money, Chairperson.

MR WILLIAMS: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLIAMS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Williams. Mr Knight?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KNIGHT: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, just two aspects.

Mr de Kock, I appear on behalf of Nofomela, in respect of his implicated status. In terms of Nofomela's original evidence given, he testified that a photograph was given to him of Japie Maponya, because he had no idea of who or what he was. Can you dispute that this possible happened? That a photograph was given to him prior to the abduction?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall a photo of Japie Maponya. I don't have a memory thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that you wouldn't deny if somebody said well they had a photograph?

MR DE KOCK: No, I wouldn't deny, Chairperson. I have no independent recollection thereof.

MR KNIGHT: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNIGHT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knight. Mr van der Merwe?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, this telex to which you have referred to, where you referred to Mr Bellingan, Captain Bellingan - excuse me, Captain Baker and the late Lieutenant Bellingan, do you have an accurate time recollection as to when this telex appeared to which you refer to on page 111 of bundle 1A?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe it was during the beginning of 1990 somewhere. If I remember correctly.

MR VAN DER MERWE: But you have no reason why it has to be the beginning of 1990, this is just the recollection you have?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have anything to base it on, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: The contents of that telex, according to your recollection, is it as you refer to it at page 110, that this telex was a telex where a redeployment of a group of members and askaris were requested to launch a covert operation and a search to MK Mainstay? In other words a telex which didn't really say anything specific, except a deployment of members.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: At a stage which you refer to, when this telex was shown to you by Captain Baker and Lieutenant Bellingan, were the revelations of Almond Nofomela already public knowledge and the allegations were the whole country full, that you were involved with the killing of Maponya?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Lieutenant Bellingan and Captain Baker's instructions to me is that at the stage when you say this telex came to the for, they were involved in a cleaning up operation at Vlakplaas on instruction from you, that they heard from you came from a higher authority, to destroy documentation and to remove documentation from Vlakplaas. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That would be correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And they informed me that this process entailed that documentation which was irrelevant was heaped up on one side and things which they had doubts about they would to you to consider whether it should be destroyed or what else should happen to these documents, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is what could have happened.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Bellingan and Baker's instructions furthermore to me are that at a stage when this specific telex was shown to you, it did not jog any specific memories with them, but when you saw it you immediately indicated that this telex has relation to the Maponya incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that would be so.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Lastly, my instructions from Captain Baker and Lieutenant Bellingan is that they have a recollection that you did show the telex to General Engelbrecht, but they cannot say whether there was any discussion about it or what the situation was, but they do have a recollection that General Engelbrecht was present there.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is what happened.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further - maybe just one last question.

Mr de Kock, my instructions briefly, are also that Bellingan and Baker didn't have any knowledge of the Maponya incident or after they were not involved in any cover-up of this incident, except for the fact that they handed this telex over to you.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER MERWE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, do you have any questions?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I do have a few questions. I see we've still got some time. I see that it's quarter to four. There are certain instructions on certain details that I also wanted to get from my clients, which I will have to put to Mr de Kock. I was wondering whether this could be a convenient stage perhaps to take the adjournment for the day.

CHAIRPERSON: My only concern is that I'm worried whether about whether we're going to finish this matter or not on time.

Let's carry on till four and then we'll stop. I'm sure you'll be able to carry on until four without getting further instructions.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I will.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, when did you take over command of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: On the 1st of July 1985.

MR LAMEY: And you took over command from Brigadier Jack Cronje, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: How long were you at Vlakplaas, before you assume the command?

MR DE KOCK: I had been there since the 1st of June 1983.

MR LAMEY: And before that you were in Ovamboland, with Koevoet, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Lamey, are we going to listen to all the evidence that he has given already? Because this information was led as evidence-in-chief.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon.

Mr de Kock, since your arrival at Vlakplaas, in how many covert Vlakplaas actions in the Swaziland vicinity were you involved?

MR DE KOCK: Would that be in total or before I took over control?

MR LAMEY: Before you became the commander.

MR DE KOCK: At this stage I know of one in Swaziland, and then internally there was one which will be heard next week, and there are also various other cover operations, nobody was killed in these operations.

MR LAMEY: No, I'm speaking of the period between 1983 and 1985.

MR DE KOCK: In Swaziland there was one that I can recall now.

MR LAMEY: Cross-border?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And covert actions in the vicinity of the Swaziland border posts? Piet Retief - I'm speaking specifically of the Swaziland border area.

MR DE KOCK: If it was between '83 and '85, I know only of the one in Swaziland. I must mention that before that there had been an action on London, where we had blown up the ANC Headquarters.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I know about that. I'm referring specifically to covert operations and actions in the Swaziland environment and the border area between the RSA and Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: All that springs to mind is the shooting of Zwelibanzi Nyanda.

MR LAMEY: That would be Zweli Nyanda?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And between 1985, or at least July 1985 and September 1985?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall whether there were actions in Swaziland at that stage in time. Someone might have to refresh my memory, but in December 1985, we launched an operation in Lesotho, during which 9, 10 or 11 people were killed.

MR LAMEY: But you have no recollection of any other actions until the Japie Maponya incident in 1985, with the exception of the Nyanda incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. If someone were just to correct me regarding that, I will concede, but this is a question of memory.

MR LAMEY: No, I'm simply asking you. I have no further instructions about that, I'm simply putting it to you.

CHAIRPERSON: What's the relevance of it? We want to finish this matter, we don't have to find out where operations were etc. If you could just keep it to the Maponya incident.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, there's a good reason why I'm asking this. The relevance will ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: But Mr Lamey, then you are misleading the witness if you say that you have no instructions with regard to this information.

MR LAMEY: No, what I meant is that I have no instruction to correct him in this relation. Perhaps that is what I intended. Thank you.

The Swaziland action with Nyanda, was that upon the request of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch? Or let me put it this way, was the working area of Swaziland the primary responsible of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And I was not involved personally in the Nyanda incident, I'm simply putting it to you, but no on behalf of clients. I want to know whether that action was requested to Vlakplaas from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't be able to say. Brigadier Cronje informed me to prepare myself and to be prepared. And as I understand it, on his turn he received the order from Brigadier Schoon. By nature of the situation then, the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch had to be notified because it was their operational area, it was their area of responsibility as a neighbouring State.

MR LAMEY: But what I want to ask you is, whether in that case there had been a request for assistance from Vlakplaas for the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch in this action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So this was one of the cases in which a regional branch, or regional Security Branch, enlisted the assistance of Vlakplaas, as it happened in many other cases?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And was Mr Freek Pienaar one of the members from the Eastern Transvaal's Security Branch at Piet Retief, who became involved in that incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And has he also applied for amnesty for that incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then can you recall, and I'm speaking after 1985 and after the Maponya incident, in how many actions, upon the request of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch, you were involved in?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there were numerous.

MR LAMEY: Well can you recall how many of them are the subject of your amnesty applications?

MR DE KOCK: It would be all of them.

MR LAMEY: Can you not give us a figure?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And was Mr Pienaar, as a member of the Security Branch in the Eastern Transvaal, also involved in those incidents?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. As far as I know he was involved in all of the, perhaps with the exception of one. He was involved.

MR LAMEY: But all those further actions in Swaziland were also cases in which Vlakplaas' assistance was enlisted by the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would just like to qualify something here, Mr Chairperson, and that is that Head Office could infer from reports from regions that there had been an enhancement in the destabilisation or terrorism tendency. They could send Vlakplaas to work in that region without the authorisation of the region, but this was not something which was enforced.

MR LAMEY: Now at the stage when the Japie Maponya incident took place, can you recall what Mr Nortje's rank was?

MR DE KOCK: I think he may have been a Sergeant.

MR LAMEY: Yes, those are also my instructions. And Mr Fourie was also a Sergeant?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So too Mr van der Walt?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You have previously given evidence regarding the command structure of Vlakplaas, with reference to Head Office and particularly where other Security Branches would have given assistance. If I could just summarise and if you could just tell me if I'm correct or not. Vlakplaas, C1, had an overall Commander by the name of Brigadier Schoon?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Or at least it would a Brigadier or a General at Head Office, and at a certain stage it was Brigadier Schoon? Such as the Japie Maponya incident, at that time it was Brigadier Schoon.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR LAMEY: And then there was C Section, C1, C2 and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, a unit was later created by the name of C3, which was responsible for statistics.

MR LAMEY: But in the organogram of that structure, C1, for want of a better word from my side, is a parallel or a sister division to C1.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: C2 did not link up with the vertical line of command, not with C1?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And then above Brigadier Schoon, who would have been the overall Commander in the vertical line above?

MR DE KOCK: It would have been the Head of Security.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And then there were deployments to various areas and there were group leaders who went out with the askaris.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Vertically you were the commander of that group of group leaders.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that when they were deployed to various areas, during their deployment they had to maintain contact with you and keep you in touch regarding what was happening there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: This be a convenient time to adjourn. Would 9 o'clock tomorrow morning be convenient?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, just one last aspect. The bundle that was furnished to everybody, we shall mark that bundle 1F. That is the cross-examination of Mr Jan Wagener of de Kock in the Chand incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Ms Lockhat. Yes, we'll mark that 1F. This is the evidence referred to by Mr Wagener. Thank you.

We've now come to the end of today's proceedings and we will adjourn until tomorrow morning, same venue, at 9 o'clock. Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS