Amnesty Hearings

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I then beg leave to call Brig Delport. We have prepared a statement for him as well, it has not been handed to you yet, which will be F, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, we will then receive this statement from Brig Delport as Exhibit F.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Delport, your full names.

JAKOBUS MARTHINUS DELPORT: (sworn states)

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier, you are an applicant in this matter, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have studied Exhibit A, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is there anything in Exhibit A which according to you and your knowledge, is incorrect?

BRIG DELPORT: Nothing.

MR VISSER: And do you confirm then, regarding your knowledge, the content of Exhibit A and do you also request that this be incorporated into your application, as well as the evidence which is thereafter referred to?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Gen van der Merwe.

BRIG DELPORT: Correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur with his evidence?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Do you also particularly concur with the background of unrest and violence which reigned in the East Rand in 1985?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 2 of Exhibit F you say that during 1985 you were the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch on the East Rand.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where were you stationed?

BRIG DELPORT: I was stationed at Springs.

MR VISSER: And as such you received information from the members of the Security Branch, who served below you?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And was information obtained from informers who were handled by your subordinate members?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in this manner information was obtained from an informer with regard to the events which led to your current amnesty application?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 3 and 4 and 5, you have summarised what the problems were which you experienced and you refer to school boycotts, stay-away actions, malicious damage to property, arson, murder and a video, or two videos were displayed here yesterday, which gave an idea of what you had to deal with.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Just to put it clearly, the videos were not all of application to the East Rand necessarily.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: There was one aspect of it which related to Soweto if I recall correctly.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: However, did those videos create the correct impression of that which you had to deal with, when you speak of these school boycotts, stay-away actions, malicious damage to property, mass actions and so forth?

BRIG DELPORT: Without any doubt.

MR VISSER: Now in paragraph 5 you refer to the problem which existed regarding attacks, specifically on police members and also specifically members of the police who resided in black residential areas.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you stated there that according to your recollection, within a number of weeks 90% of all the police members' residences had been burnt to the ground and broken down.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed from paragraph 6 and tell the Committee what your impression was of the circumstances at that time.

BRIG DELPORT

"These events led to the fact that the moral of the black police members reached an all-time low. They and their families, of which many were minors and school children, as a result of the above-mentioned traumatic events, experienced serious stress. These members were demoralised to such an extent that they could not perform their duties."

MR VISSER: Now this violence, Brigadier, was this something which had started shortly before the events of the 25th/26th of June, or was this political violence which had built up over a period?

BRIG DELPORT: No, it was definitely political violence which had already come into existence since the last part of 1984, specifically October 1984.

MR VISSER: And from when did COSAS come to the fore with regard to this violence? COSAS as an organisation or the members of COSAS.

BRIG DELPORT: COSAS members were involved, as far as I can recall with regard to February/March, they became more pertinently involved.

MR VISSER: Is that from 1985?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 7 that there were requests for you to act in order to protect persons, what did you do for example in order to protect policemen who resided in these residential areas as well as their homes?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, we went to the extent - as a result of the petrol bomb attacks which had been launched on the homes of police members and council members, we provided them with large fire extinguishers and in certain cases we also enforced policemen's windows so that bombs could not be thrown through the windows.

MR VISSER: Would that be by means of fencing made of expanded metal? I don't know what one would call that in Afrikaans, some form of steel reinforcement in front of the windows so that petrol bombs could not be thrown through the window.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I don't what the Afrikaans is, it's expanded metal, Chairperson, it's a steel - one sees it often in front of homes. It's more than just wire, it's steel plate.

The consequence of the reinforcement of the homes of police members, did you achieve any success with this, regarding your knowledge?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say that we achieved a certain measure of success.

MR VISSER: In other words, success in the sense that petrol bombs were no longer really effective when used in attacks on police homes, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. You say in paragraph 8 on page 4, that you and your staff were approached daily by members for assistance, protection and guidance and you also state that you submitted reports to Security Head Office. Now I want to ask you, was there only one report or did you send a number of reports into Security Head Office regarding the political unrest on the East Rand?

BRIG DELPORT: No, there would have been more reports. As these things took place, they would be reported.

MR VISSER: Yes. And if the informer of one of your subordinates had for example, provided a list of names to you, these names would have been sent through?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, the names would definitely have been sent through.

MR VISSER: Then you say in paragraph 9 - can you continue with that?

BRIG DELPORT

"During mid-1985, the Security Division East Rand was in possession of information which came from a reliable source. According to the information a group of activists comprising members of COSAS, were desirous of entering the armed struggle ..."

...(intervention)

MR VISSER: If you could just pause there. The question was put that these activists threw stones and petrol bombs, now why would they want handgrenades or weapons? What would be your commentary regarding that?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I would allege that as a result of the precautionary measures which were taken, they decided to look for something more drastic, which would have had a far better impact than a petrol bomb.

MR VISSER: The petrol bombs didn't work on the houses because the houses had been secured.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue.

"According to information they had already identified certain targets which they intended to attack. These targets consisted predominantly of persons and residences of black policemen and black council members.

The source also reported that these activists were only waiting to receive weapons before they would continue with the attack."

MR VISSER: And this information was also reported to Security Head Office by you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was there any reaction to this report? Did Gen van der Merwe contact you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Gen van der Merwe contacted us.

MR VISSER: And he paid a visit to Springs?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you say in paragraph 10 that you recall that you were present during the meeting and that Brig Cronje and other members, who you can no longer recall, were also present. Would you accept that Col Venter was also present during that meeting?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would accept that.

MR VISSER: Because that was the evidence. And what did Gen van der Merwe tell you? If you look at paragraph 11.

BRIG DELPORT: Gen van der Merwe informed us that he was convinced that in the light of the information, if something was not done swiftly and drastically against these inciters, police members and black council members, their families and even others, would be killed and/or seriously injured.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

BRIG DELPORT

"In the light of the perpetual political violence which I experienced, supported by independent reliable sources of information, I shared his perspectives personally."

I can only say that at that stage many police homes had been attacked.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, while the witness refers to that, what we have - Gen van der Merwe said yesterday in his evidence that we will attempt to find some statistics for you. The only statistics which we were able to find, which are pertinent to the East Rand, appear from the record of the criminal trial of some of these people that had been prosecuted, as we know, before his Lordship, Justice Stafford and an assessor. And it appears, Chairperson, that from that record it appears that up and to the 25th of June in 1985, for the period immediately preceding that period, 31 homes of policemen were in fact burnt down. These do not include, as I understand it, the attacks. Now the problem which we have, Chairperson, is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, would that be the 1985 figure?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: For the first six months of, more-or-less six months of ...

MR VISSER: One could put it down to the first six months of 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: And is that East Rand or is that national?

MR VISSER: East Rand, particularly East - this is only in relation to the East Rand. Chairperson, I'm told - I haven't read this myself, I'm told that you've got to read through the whole of the evidence because different people gave evidence before Justice Stafford, to say that his house was burnt down. So you've got to add it up as you go along. Now that exercise was done last night by Mr Steenkamp - Mr Prins, I'm sorry, and he informs me that he counted 31. He also found another reference, Chairperson, at page 2528 of that same record of the criminal trial, where a certain Mr Sithole, who is a policeman, gave evidence that his house was attacked 10 times. So it appears from this, Chairperson, that attacks on policemen's houses were rather prevalent at the time.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Visser, before you put the Sithole one down, 10 times, again between January and May/June? Or does it not indicate?

MR VISSER: No, no, as I understand it Chairperson, it was specifically for the period immediately preceding June 1985. Because you will recall that the trial was about this particular incident, so the only relevant evidence would have been relevant to June 25/26, before his Lordship, Justice Stafford. But again, I haven't read it and I just put it before you for what it is worth.

Chairperson, and perhaps in the Further Submissions and Responses by the ANC to the TRC, dated 12th May 1997, there is a reference, unfortunately it is not complete, but at page 82 there is a reference to SAP Building and Personnel, Brakpan SAP Barracks, three explosions and no details, on the 15th of May 1985 and again on the 15th of May 1985, Government Buildings, Brakpan Commissioner's Court. But clearly what is attempted to be set out here is not the attacks on private homes, it's the big attacks that the ANC have ...

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Visser, before you finish. The killings, do we have anything on killings in those records, how many policemen might have been killed? We're just talking burnt houses.

MR VISSER: No, this only refers to attacks on homes, Chairperson, unfortunately. But we're still looking and we might find specific information about the East Rand for you. Of course the problem which we have is at the time, the statistics were really not specified to particular areas, but it was more nationally orientated, although there was some specific statistics in regard to areas. We'll try to find something for you.

Chairman, as far as Sithole is concerned, my attorney has just picked it up, on page 2529 he's asked - actually the page just before that, at 2528 to which I referred you, he was asked:

"How many times was your house attacked?"

And he says:

"10 times."

And then at the bottom of the page he starts giving examples and the one is on the 7th of May 1985, and then on the 11th of May 1985, and then over the page at 2529, on the 12 of May 1985, and then on the 16th of June 1985, and on the 19th of June 1985 and on the 23rd of June 1985, and apparently thereafter on the 26th of August 1985, and he goes on, Chairperson. The 14th of December 1985, he says at page 2530, there was clearly a message for him in this whole affair.

Brigadier, we were busy with paragraph 11 if I recall correctly, and this has to do with the meeting. Certain admissions are made to you there regarding a plan which was formulated.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we all know that the plan which was formulated was that the detonators of handgrenades were to be modified so that they would explode in the hands of the persons who wanted to throw them.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with that operation?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Did you think that this was the most effective method to combat violence?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And to protect lives?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 12.

BRIG DELPORT

"Due to the high degree of intimidation, it became all the more difficult to arrest inciters of political violence with the assistance of the public. It was even more difficult to charge such activists because nobody was any longer prepared to give evidence in Court against political activists, due the fact that they feared for their lives and their possessions and their families."

MR VISSER: If I might just pause there with you. You already had the names of certain activists which you had already submitted to head office at that stage, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now how would you have reacted if it was suggested to you that the simple method of combatting this situation of political violence was just to detain these persons?

BRIG DELPORT: No, it definitely would not have helped.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that?

BRIG DELPORT: Because nobody would have come forward in the first place, to give evidence, no informer would ever have risked his life in this regard.

MR VISSER: And if you were to detain them in terms of Section 29, and if you did not detain the informer, what would the situation then have been?

BRIG DELPORT: The situation would just have deteriorated.

MR VISSER: And if you were to detain the informer, how would he feel about it?

BRIG DELPORT: Well naturally the informer would not have agreed with it.

MR VISSER: We watched the videos, Brigadier, and I want to ask you because you were in command in this region, was it your experience of that time that it was only a small group of people who were inciting and committing the violence, or what was the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, it was a singular exception when there were groups of 10 to 20, usually we dealt with groups of 200 and bigger.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen van der Merwe issue any particular orders or instructions? I refer to paragraph 14.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, General van der Merwe emphasised that there should be no enticement or incitement to commit a crime and that the weaponry should only be delivered to the activists under the impression that it was from the ANC, and that it was available for application as planned by themselves.

MR VISSER: Yes. The idea was to strike those who had already decided to go over into attack?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would there have been any sense in enticing persons who were not involved in this objective?

BRIG DELPORT: No.

MR VISSER: Now Brig Cronje gave evidence during his trial or his hearing, and I think Ms Lockhat referred to page 185 of bundle 2A, but he gave evidence that he received a list from you consisting of names - yes, that is page 185, Chairperson, that he received a list from you containing names. Would that be correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that would be correct.

MR VISSER: And he also testified that he had not given the list to Mr Mamasela and Nkala and that instead he had used it as a check list to ensure that the persons with whom Mamasela had made contact and the people who he had infiltrated were the same persons that you suspected.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, if he says so, I would accept it as such.

MR VISSER: And Mr Mamasela gave evidence that he was taken by a member of the East Rand Security Branch, to the home of Congress Mtweni and that this house was identified to him. Do you know anything about this?

BRIG DELPORT: No.

MR VISSER: Is it possible that it may have taken place?

BRIG DELPORT: I suppose it is possible that something like that may have occurred.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 15 please.

BRIG DELPORT

"Chairperson, I was informed that it was alleged that Mamasela received an order to penetrate the group and to deliver the handgrenades to them.

I was also informed that it was alleged that Mamasela recruited persons to participate in attacks on the residences of policemen and black council members and/or other targets. If he did this, according to my judgement, he acted beyond the orders of Gen van der Merwe, as I understood it and that I was also not aware of it. It was not the intention for any person to be recruited, the intention was to strike those who had already decided and who intended to attack targets, to provide them with weapons, thus to strike those who already intended to do this."

MR VISSER: Did you know anything about training which may have been provided?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't.

MR VISSER: And those aspects were left over to Brig Cronje?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Brigadier was there every day, he dealt with this operation. I had a whole other division with many other branches in Benoni and Germiston and Tembisa, which I also attended to. Brig Jack Cronje managed this matter.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen van der Merwe tell you there during the meeting where this order had come from, or where the approval for the action had come from?

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, before you continue with that. Do I understand you correctly when you say that at that stage Cronje was permanently on the East Rand and that the operation in other words was for all executionary purposes, something from Vlakplaas?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask, did that mean that your members were not involved at all with the Vlakplaas people, none of your personnel?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Vlakplaas did not operate from our offices, they operated on their own.

ADV GCABASHE: The question is really, did any of your members work with them because they were working in your area?

BRIG DELPORT: It's very difficult to say because there may have been liaison with them from the staff. It is possible.

ADV GCABASHE: You don't know about it?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't know about any other staff members who liaised with them, apart from myself.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay.

MR VISSER: Just to return to Mr Malan's question. There were two questions

"It was indeed a Vlakplaas operation?"

The other question was:

"Was Brig Cronje then permanently stationed on the East Rand?"

BRIG DELPORT: No, he was not stationed there.

MR VISSER: What was indeed happened was that from time to time they went out to the various divisions where there were problems, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And on the occasion of June 1985, they were stationed on a plot in the De Notter vicinity.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And to continue with what Commissioner Gcabashe had asked, it would be logical would it not, that Vlakplaas' people would work together with the people of the division under you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is very possible.

MR VISSER: But if they needed information there was no other way to get it other than getting it from you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I liaised with Brig Jack Cronje.

MR VISSER: Excuse me, I once again arrive at the question, did Gen van der Merwe tell you at the meeting who had approved the order?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson, Gen van der Merwe mentioned that mt came via Minister le Grange, and it was approved by Minister le Grange.

MR VISSER: And your comprehension, as you have said, at the meeting was the execution of the operation was left to Brig Cronje and his people and the modified detonators and handgrenades would be supplied to Mamasela.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The point is that after the meeting, it was only after the meeting that Mamasela had to infiltrate the group.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you are aware that handgrenades with modified mechanisms were handed over to certain people.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 22 you state that as far as you know it was General van der Merwe, Mr Cronje, yourself, Mr Roelf Venter, Mr Eugene de Kock and Joe Mamasela who were involved in the execution of this operation.

BRIG DELPORT: We were aware thereof, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But would you accept that there were also other people, as we will eventually hear, who were also aware of this whole exercise?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you state that in paragraph 23. Would you like to continue with paragraph 24.

BRIG DELPORT

"Chairperson, I would like to put it unequivocally that I had no part in the manner in which there would be acted. As Divisional Commander, it was because of the post which I occupied whereby I was the appointed person and I had to liaise with Security Head Office in such a capacity."

MR VISSER: What would your task be?

BRIG DELPORT: My task was to ensure that on the particular evening of the 25th or 26th of June, a team of explosive experts would be placed on a ready basis to investigate the explosion scenes, to conduct investigations.

MR VISSER: We know that some of your people were indeed there, can you recall whom as explosive experts were brought on a contingency basis?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, it was Lt Steenkamp at that stage.

MR VISSER: Anybody else?

MR VISSER: Andre Roos and Lt Prins.

MR VISSER: And all three of them are also applicants before this Committee?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was there a specific instruction to Steenkamp?

BRIG DELPORT: Do you mean that particular evening?

MR VISSER: Yes. Did Steenkamp have to visit all the scenes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I instructed him to visit all the scenes and to handle everything there.

MR VISSER: And what was the purpose thereof?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, at that stage he was the officer who handled the handing out of explosives, the investigation of storage places, and just to use one person to give evidence in Court later whereas otherwise we would have used many witnesses and many explosives experts in Court and I foresaw that it would be better if only one person gave evidence.

MR VISSER: And he was the person whom you chose to visit all the scenes?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And we know on that evening several explosions took place, which were visited by the explosive experts and later there were prosecutions of the persons who had survived.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And we know that eight COSAS members were killed and seven were injured. And the information which you put in Exhibit F is information which you received from the Investigative team of the TRC, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And paragraph 29, if you would complete it.

BRIG DELPORT

"Chairperson, the result of the actions was firstly that the lives and property of policemen and black council members and their members were protected, but just as important it led to a marked decrease in political violence in my division and I suspect that other intentional activists came to the conclusion that they could not trust weapons which were supplied by the ANC.

Although I was aware of the true facts with regard to the explosions which I referred to, I did not disclose such facts and in the process I committed - I defeated the ends of justice.

And shortly after the incident, Minister le Grange visited, amongst others, the black members who were housed in the tents, he also visited the councils of Nigel and Heidelberg and during the visit I accompanied him, and we travelled which was driven by Director A Roos.

And during the ride, Minister le Grange congratulated me with the action. I can give you - I can tell you that there were no other actions during that immediate time period for which I could have drawn the inference that he was talking about something else."

MR VISSER: Very well. So you were satisfied that he was referring to this instance?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Can I just get clarity with you, you say he visited the people where the black policemen were housed in tents and when he left from there he congratulated you with ...

BRIG DELPORT: No, no, he landed with a helicopter and after he landed we took him with the vehicle and he travelled in the car with us, and the moment he climbed into the car he congratulated me.

MR MALAN: But that was not the order in which you gave your evidence.

BRIG DELPORT: I am sorry, that is how it was, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Can you continue please, paragraph 32.

BRIG DELPORT

"Chairperson, I had no personal motive to do what I had done there and I did not act out of malice or personal vengeance. The acts and omissions which I have committed were done during the execution of my official duties and as part of the opposition of the struggle and were aimed at the supporters of a liberation movement.

What I had done I did to combat political violence and to protect the lives of people. The action also served to protect and maintain the government against whom this political violence was aimed and to protect the National Party's interests.

I acted as a policeman in the execution of my duties in the South African Police, and I believed that such action was expected of me and that this action took place within the scope of my expressed or tacit authorisation.

I believed it, especially in the light of the pressure that was placed upon us in the Security Branch by the political leaders of the time.

We were also informed that the authorisation for such action came from a higher authority and I regarded it as an instruction.

And under the circumstances I humbly request that the Honourable Committee would find that the acts and omissions committed by me were in regard to a political objective and it was proportional to the political objective of the government and to protect the State and keep the State in power, as well as protecting the lives of people and this formed part of my official duties as a security policeman."

MR VISSER: Yes. This is the only case for which you apply for amnesty, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application as it appears in bundle 1, page 57 to 67?

BRIG DELPORT: I do so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then you, on the grounds of your association with the action, you request amnesty for the murder of the eight COSAS members and attempted murder or any lesser finding with regard to the seven persons who were injured, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only one question, thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Delport, page 4, paragraph 9 of the document, the source, did the source give the names of the activists to you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Was this handed up to Gen van der Merwe?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it happened so, as the names were made available it was sent up to head office.

MR CORNELIUS: So eventually the targets would be identified?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And furthermore you don't know which instructions were given by Jack Cronje to the operational team? You had no knowledge of it and you did not know what methods were to be used?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chaivperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Yes thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Delport, when did you have this meeting with Gen van der Merwe, approximately?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I think it was in the beginning of June that we had this meeting.

MR MAFORA: And who was present at that meeting?

BRIG DELPORT: As I have already said, Chairperson, it was myself, Gen van der Merwe was present, Jack Cronje was present and I accept that Roelf Venter was also present.

MR MAFORA: And at that meeting you discussed the whole incident, you planned the incident that we are about today, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And I suppose you are aware that the idea came from Gen van der Merwe, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And the instructions that he basically gave you to implement, to carry out the mandate, did he - did you make any further contact with him? You know, after - I mean during the process, until the instruction or mandate was terminated.

BRIG DELPORT: I must state it clearly, Chairperson, that Gen van der Merwe - this instruction specifically to Brig Jack Cronje in my office, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question Mr Mafora asked you was, after that meeting - I presume, Mr Mafora, between that meeting and the 25th of June, did you have any other communication or contact with Gen van der Merwe regarding this particular incident.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that reports would have been sent to head office.

MR MAFORA: I'm ...(blank in tape) whether you personally, Mr Delport, whether you had any further contacts with him direct on the matter.

BRIG DELPORT: I don't understand the question, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, during the period, from that meeting until the 25th when the explosions took place, did you have any personal contact with Gen van der Merwe regarding the incident.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that I would have, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora, I see you were speaking to Ms Lockhat. The answer was yes, he believes that he would have had personal contact with Gen van der Merwe in that period.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

You see the evidence of Gen van der Merwe has been that he gave instructions, delegated the process down and you know, the thing was carried out and he finally got the report you know, that the thing was done. What discussions, if any, as you have said there could possibly been, what did you discuss with him?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, later, after the incident, I informed Gen van der Merwe, but during that time period I would not be able to say what discussions there were, I was still the Divisional Commander of the East Rand, which included a large area and I would have discussed a variety of things with him and I would have discussed other problems with him in my division.

ADV GCABASHE: No, you see Mr Delport, I understood your evidence to be that concerning this incident, this incident, you would have had discussions with Gen van der Merwe, which is why the follow-up question is, what would the nature of those discussions have been?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I cannot recall anything specifically, except that I sent through reports continually to head office and to Gen van der Merwe.

ADV GCABASHE: Are you talking about just general reports about everything that happened in your area?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson, it would have included amongst others, this.

MR MAFORA: Mr Delport, the issue is you know, Mr Schoon earlier on testified that this was one of the first operations of its kind, did you no of any similar operation previously, prior to this incident?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Were you ever involved in any of this - a situation of this nature previously?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: So it was something that was fairly new in your line of operations, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Then one would assume that you have had you know, constant touch with Gen van der Merwe, to discuss strategy, to inform him how things were going and how the whole operation would be carried out. Would that be feasible in your mind, or what to you think, what would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, Brig Cronje would have handled that with Gen van der Merwe.

MR MAFORA: You were in possession of the list, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And you got the list from your subordinates, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Can you give us the names of those subordinates who provided the list to you?

BRIG DELPORT: I don't understand the question properly.

MR MAFORA: The names of the people who provided the list to you, your subordinates.

BRIG DELPORT: It was provided by a source, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Directly to you? From the source to you or was it from the source to a subordinate of yours and then to you, what is the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson, it was from a source to a handler to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the question asked by Mr Mafora is, who gave you that list.

BRIG DELPORT: This list was supplemented from time to time and the person who handed up the list was Lt Oberholzer, he was at that time in command of the Terrorist Unit which existed at the Springs Security Branch.

MR MAFORA: And you were the overall commander isn't it, in the area for Springs, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That was indeed so, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And you should have been aware of an incident that took place in kwaThema earlier in that year, in the Tobela family. Do you know anything about that, where their house was bombed and two children in the family were killed?

BRIG DELPORT: It is difficult to recognise the surname, but there were people who were murdered, but I cannot recall the surname.

CHAIRPERSON: In which area was this, Mr Mafora, do you know?

MR MAFORA: I think it was in Duduza, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In Duduza.

BRIG DELPORT: That's very possible, Mr Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Was the general understanding or belief in the area is that your men or members of the police were involved in that, because those members were members of COSAS? What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: I would not know whether he was aware of it, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And that was one of the things that actually triggered the violence and the violence was actually you know, instigated, or the riots were instigated by your - the police action against the Tobela family, what would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I cannot comment to that. I don't know that that was the reason which caused the unrest, the unrest came about since late in 1984.

MR MAFORA: But then did you believe in the general philosophy that existed at the time, that there was - that has been given, related here in these hearings, that there were no other measures of containing the situation other than to proceed in the manner in which you have carried out your actions, by booby-trapping the handgrenades? Is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: I'm not sure what the question is.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, we've heard evidence and do you agree with it, that there was no other step to be taken to protect the attack or the proposed attack on police houses, other than modifying these grenades as what actually happened?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And the general belief in the community is that you actually as members of the police, were primarily responsible for the general you know, acts of unlawfulness and violence. You know, you were primarily responsible for those actions. What would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: If I understand the question correctly, that we cared for the life of the community, then I would say yes.

MR MAFORA: But the community's view is that you went on a total onslaught against them and you created situations which would - you know, which would justify you taking drastic measures and actions which were aimed at either killing or maiming or injuring members of the community. What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I think the total onslaught was the other way around, it was aimed at innocent people.

MR MALAN: If I understand the question correctly, then the question was whether you would concede or agree that the perception of the community was that the police's actions had caused this violence, with dispersing them or whatever.

BRIG DELPORT: It is difficult to say if that is the perception. I cannot say that that would have been a perception with the community. The community many times asked us to help them and we conveyed it on our part to the Divisional Commissioner, who was the uniforms, who was in control.

MR MAFORA: Mr Chairperson, I see it's five to eleven and I'm getting quite a number of notes, may I beg your indulgence just to adjourn now so that I can ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you want to just take further instructions during the tea adjournment. It's now in fact even closer to eleven than five to, we'll take the short tea adjournment now.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

JAKOBUS MARTHINUS DELPORT: (s.u.o.)

MR MAFORA: Yes, thank you. Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: (cont)

Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Delport, let's just go back to that list that you had in your possession, of the COSAS members. Do you, you know, now can you link up the names or can you recall and make any linkages between the names then and the names of the people who were subsequently injured and you know, oppose the hearings now?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot.

MR MAFORA: So you cannot match the two. And the - my instructions are that the police actually were primarily responsible - and I'm going to put this to you because I put it to Gen van der Merwe, but you may shed some light, in instigating this whole operation about the weapons and the attack and the use of weapons. The weapons were never contemplated by the members who were injured in this operation, it was something that was suggested by Mamasela. What would your comment be to that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, it wasn't like that.

MR MAFORA: Did you have any discussions with Mamasela as to how this operation was to be carried out?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Would you then be in a position to dispute the allegation of the - I would want your comment on this, of the victims when they say that they obtained training from Mamasela and that this whole operation was instigated or was at his instance?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, if Mamasela alleges that, it would be completely incorrect.

MR MAFORA: How so? Because you were not involved in the actual operation and he was.

BRIG DELPORT: The orders were very clear, that nobody should entice these persons or incite them or encourage them.

CHAIRPERSON: But do you exclude the possibility that Mamasela might have exceeded his orders?

BRIG DELPORT: No, he may have done that, certainly he may have done that, but not with my knowledge.

MR MAFORA: And that the police were I mean, actually using such tactics throughout the period you know, to contain the violence, ie they were using criminal tactics to contain the violence in the area, would you deny that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would deny that.

MR MAFORA: And that the police would create or stage events which would actually justify the actions - I mean, which would just justify them acting against the members of the community, would you deny that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would definitely deny that.

MR MAFORA: Why then if the police were so clean and never involved in criminal activities, why did you agree to be party to this criminal activity?

BRIG DELPORT: I cannot say that the police were not involved in anything whatsoever, but with regard to my knowledge, I do not know of any cases in which the police were involved.

CHAIRPERSON: The question Mr Delport is, this particular operation was a criminal activity, why did you personally involve yourself in it seeing that it was unlawful?

BRIG DELPORT: There was no other way out.

MR MAFORA: Was this the only incident where people were involved in activities which threatened the security of the members of the police and their families? Or was this the only grouping of people - let me put it this way, was this the only grouping of people that you knew were involved and were a threat to the life and property of members of the police or the then black town councillors?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, this is the only case where I became aware that these persons were looking for stronger things than petrol bombs.

MR MAFORA: Now I'm asking you whether you were aware of any other case - grouping of people, who were a threat to the members of the police or the local councillors in the area of Springs, that was under your control?

BRIG DELPORT: It was of such a nature that there were constant incidents in which the police acted.

MR MAFORA: And how did you deal with those people?

BRIG DELPORT: Many of those cases were never solved, people were murdered and they were never charged, people's vehicles were burnt and they were never charged, they simply got away with it. They conducted this in groups and the police came to hear of it afterwards or the uniform police were near the scene and they simply heard of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have, during that period or at any time, situations where you had received information about a proposed attack in which information contained details relating to a particular group that were about to launch such an attack?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: So you couldn't do - did you at any stage you know, either before this incident or afterwards, have any number of people that you suspected that were involved in attacks on police and their families and - on members of the police and their families, subsequent - I mean before or subsequent to this incident? Did you have any suspects on your records?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I'm sure that there were investigating teams at that stage in the residential areas who had such information, but not that I can recall.

MR MAFORA: And how did you deal with those people, those suspects?

BRIG DELPORT: Those persons, according to the best of my knowledge, if they could be traced or if you could be caught with your hands in the till so to speak, there would be no other method to arrest them.

MR MAFORA: So are you saying you had people that you suspected but you couldn't arrest them?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, it is possible that there were such cases, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: But you failed to arrest them?

BRIG DELPORT: That we could not arrest, there may have been such cases.

MR MAFORA: Okay, and why didn't you use these drastic measures that you used in this incident?

BRIG DELPORT: Well we were convinced in this case that the information at our disposal indicated that an attack was going to be launched on the homes of policemen and we believed that they and their families and the council members could be killed in such attacks.

MR MAFORA: I put it to you that that is not true, this was an action that you simply planned against the leaders of COSAS in the area and you devised this plan specifically to injure, maim and kill them. What would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, that is not true.

MR MAFORA: Would you deny that young people in the '80s were very instrumental in mobilising the people?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, definitely, they were the front runners.

MR MAFORA: And that your actions were primarily aimed at eliminating and creating a vacuum in the leadership, in the student leadership and the community leadership because the young people were leading? What's your comment to that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, we wanted to ensure and prevent them from continuing with their activities.

MR MAFORA: You wanted to prevent them to continue with their activities, but this had - I mean, the whole plan came from you, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: The question of the use of handgrenades and the works was a plan which was hatched by the police and sold to them by Mamasela. What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAFORA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Delport, how long were you at the Springs branch, how long were you stationed there?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I was there from the beginning of 1970.

MS LOCKHAT: So you knew the area very well?

BRIG DELPORT: I knew the area reasonably well, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: You said in your examination-in-chief that COSAS members really came alive more in February/March 1985, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Were they a small group of people?

BRIG DELPORT: Initially, as we gathered the names, there were just a few names that we obtained. That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So because there were so few of them it was easier to target them and in so doing possibly eliminate them, as it was afterwards planned.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, how many black members were stationed at your police station?

CHAIRPERSON: You're talking now Security Branch?

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

BRIG DELPORT: Are we referring specifically to this period in time?

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct, ja.

BRIG DELPORT: Probably - I would estimate about eight persons.

MS LOCKHAT: Was it possible for you to assist these eight persons by maybe taking out of their community and housing them somewhere else?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it wasn't only aimed against these members of the Security Branch, it was aimed against all policemen.

MS LOCKHAT: But in your instance those eight policemen could be housed somewhere else, isn't that so?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, and later they were re-established as a result of these attacks on their homes.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to get back to the meeting, you said that Venter was also present at the meeting, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Now in Nkala's statement that he made to the Attorney-General, he was - de Kock and Venter were basically the link with them. Do you know of that?

MR VISSER: Sorry, I don't understand the question.

MS LOCKHAT: Let me just rephrase that. Nkala, that was one of the persons that went out into the community, that was approached from Vlakplaas to go and also - his instructions were to actually go and infiltrate MKs, that's in his statement. It's contained in bundle 2A, page 155. He makes a statement there and in that he says that his instructions were to basically come into Springs and infiltrate MKs with Joe Mamasela. And I just want to - that's why I asked you if Venter was with you at that meeting. So I just want to just draw the link, I just want to explain to you what I'm getting at. He goes on further that Venter and de Kock then told him that they must infiltrate these COSAS members, but they must infiltrate them in separate regions, in three separate - in that area, but three separate regions. So my question to you is, at that meeting was there a discussion as to how these people were going to be infiltrated, as to the regions where they're supposed to be infiltrated?

And then Nkala goes on further and he actually mentions a total of 20 people, where he was instructed to get about 20 people from this COSAS and from three different regions. Can you comment on that?

BRIG DELPORT: I don't know about that, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Ms Lockhat, we don't have that reference, can you just help us find it.

MS LOCKHAT: It's on page 155, bundle 3A - sorry, Chairperson, it's 3A. It's on - at paragraph 4 on page 155, he states

"The operation involved the infiltration of COSAS members in the three mentioned residential areas."

And then he goes on further:

"The objective was to determine whether MK members were active in these areas."

I'll turn the page to page 156, at paragraph - it's also 4, but 4.1 he says his instructions were the following:

"COSAS members had to be recruited in the three mentioned areas. At least five members in every area, but not more than 20 in total."

And therefore I just wanted to clarify whether at that meeting, because Venter was there, whether any of these were discussed. Because Mr Delport was there as well, Chairperson, and he said - his answer was "No".

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask. Mr Delport, apart from that particular meeting, do you know anything at all about the recruitment of COSAS members?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: And then on the same page, page 156, the last paragraph, at paragraph 8 he goes on further, it's regarding the list. He says

"After the meeting with the COSAS members, there were discussions with Venter and de Kock, where instructions were received. Progress by us was reported back. After approximately 15 members had been recruited, we obtained their names and the names were given to Venter and de Kock."

So my question to you is, is it possible that the very list that you had in your possession was the list that came from Nkala and Joe Mamasela, is it possible that that list actually originated there with them at this point in time?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't believe so.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it possible though?

BRIG DELPORT: Perhaps it is possible.

MS LOCKHAT: So it could be possible that they were instructed to come into the area to identify who the MK soldiers were in that area, draw up the list - because you had one name, that was Congress Mtweni, you had one name who could actually identify his other fellow comrades and the identification, with the help of Nkala and Joe Mamasela this is where this list actually originated from and thereby the plan actually started as to eliminate them. Is that possible?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, we already had those names at our disposal and it was consistently reported.

MS LOCKHAT: I also just want to clarity one other aspect. At that meeting, was it intended to eliminate these people, was it the intention to kill them basically?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say yes, that this person who was prepared to kill somebody else with it, would kill himself in the process.

MS LOCKHAT: I'll tell you why I ask this question, I'll revert back to the issue of the meeting because Venter was also there. De Kock in his statement to the Attorney-General stated that he asked explicitly, he asked Venter whether these persons had to be eliminated and Venter then said to him "Yes, definitely they needed to be eliminated". I can also refer to that page, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Ms Lockhat, is this taking us any further if the witness wasn't at this meeting at all? What more can he speculate about?

MS LOCKHAT: I'm just putting it to him, Chairperson, because he said Venter was at the meeting. I just wanted to check whether any of these plans actually were made at that particular meeting and that Venter was actually informed of everything when he met de Kock and when he met Joe Mamasela. That is just where my questions are leading to, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I didn't want to interfere with Ms Lockhat's questioning, but there seems to be a confusion of meetings here. I don't know whether the questions, except that Venter was at the meeting where Venter and de Kock gave instructions, because there seems to be a confusion here.

CHAIRPERSON: No, my understanding, and correct me if I'm wrong, Ms Lockhat, you're referring to the meeting, the initial meeting which was attended by Mr Delport, Gen van der Merwe, Brig Cronje and Venter.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, I just ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Where the plan was first mentioned and developed.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson, I just want ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: As long as you understand that de Kock and Nkala and Mamasela were not there.

MS LOCKHAT: No that is exactly my point and I just wanted to check because Venter was the link between all of them, Venter was the link between de Kock and then Nkala and everybody and he was also the link with the Generals and Brig Delport. And I just want to just canvass these issues with him.

MR VISSER: Now where's the evidence that Venter was the link with Delport or van der Merwe?

MS LOCKHAT: I'm not saying he was, I'm just canvassing this issue, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I think you can just ask the questions, we needn't get any argument now at this stage.

MS LOCKHAT: It's just on page 146 in bundle 3A, it's at paragraph 3.5. De Kock says

"I asked Venter whether they wanted to kill only half of these persons or whether they wanted to kill everyone. He said that everyone had to be killed."

And that just goes into the initial meeting where - Brig Delport did say that the intention was to eliminate them, and that is just - I just want to get he comment there.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it mentioned at that meeting that the people on the list be eliminated or killed?

BRIG DELPORT: Would you repeat that please.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it mentioned at that meeting, the first meeting, that the targets, the persons on the list be killed?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I accept that it was said that these persons had to injure or kill themselves if they were prepared to kill other innocent people.

MS LOCKHAT: And just one other issue. You said that you got the list - the whole operation was you got the list, but the names of these people were not given to Joe Mamasela, he had to go and actually create his own list in a sense as to, just to clarify your list. Is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: I did not negotiate with Joe Mamasela.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes just one perhaps, Chairperson, with your leave.

Mr Delport, I don't understand so well. Ms Lockhat put it to you whether there was a possibility that the list which you spoke, that would be the list which you sent to head office, was a list which may have originated after Mamasela and Nkala had infiltrated, and then you said it was possible.

BRIG DELPORT: No, it is not possible at all, it is not like that.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to put?

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Delport, if we go back to page 4 of your statement, Exhibit F, paragraph 9. Just to explain this to me, the second last sentence, that the activists were expecting weapons before they would get involved in an operation. That's the rough English translation of that, yes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Now tell me, you had been given information that was from the informers, what did the informers say, via Oberholzer, who were these activists expecting would provide them with these weapons? I'm assuming you had the bigger picture from the informer. Take us through that.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson, they were waiting for the ANC to provide them with weaponry. He waited for the ANC, they were in anticipation.

ADV GCABASHE: But you know I visualise these fairly young people talking about, if we could get hold of this and get hold of that, this is what we would do. All of it just being general talk, it would have nothing to do with a definite idea to source from X, weapons a, b, c, d. This is why I want you to help me understand what the informer said to you. Did the informer say there's this general talk amongst the activists, or did the informer say they are actually waiting for X to provide them with these things?

BRIG DELPORT: That is precisely the way it was, they were waiting to be provided with weapons.

ADV GCABASHE: But not from a definite source, the were just hoping somebody would pop by and give them - I don't understand this, just help me through this.

BRIG DELPORT: No, the information which was available indicated that these persons were in anticipation of weapons. As I stated before, they saw what the results were of using petrol bombs and other such items and that it wasn't very successful, and on the basis of that they - the information which was submitted to us indicated that these people were waiting for weapons, that they were looking for weapons from the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay. Let's take it step by step. In looking for these weapons, did the informer say to Oberholzer, therefore they have contacted so and so to try and source weapons, they have also contacted X in Botswana or Swaziland or Lesotho? Did you get that type of information?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, except that they were looking for weapons. Nothing wpecific or pertinent was mentioned about names from people in other countries.

ADV GCABASHE: So this person really just put two and two together, that these young people are talking about attacking the policemen or councillors and this person assume that they were then going to hope, or expecting to get weapons just generally, from the ANC? There's no hard evidence of any of this?

BRIG DELPORT: No, there had been incidents within the Republic at that stage where they had found weapons from other members of the ANC, so these people were also talking in the same direction, that they were waiting for weapons which they could use in actions against the police.

MR MALAN: If I may peruse this question, because I asked certain questions of Gen van der Merwe on this score.

I understood, Mr Delport, that the weapons were under way and that was the urgency. When Gen van der Merwe gave his evidence. Now I don't want to quote him, but that is the impression that I have received here and from you I have the impression that there were people who said, we want weapons and if somebody could just provide us with weapons, we could use these weapons.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I said that they were awaiting these weapons.

MR MALAN: No, let us not play around with the word "wait", let us achieve clarity about what the information was. Were these persons who were saying, if we could get hold of weapons, specifically handgrenades and so forth, we could do the things that petrol bombs cannot do, or were these persons who were waiting specifically for a consignment which was under way to them?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say it was person who were waiting for a consignment, that is the inference that I drew.

MR MALAN: So if they were waiting for a consignment you would also have the information of the source from where it was coming?

BRIG DELPORT: From the ANC yes, but not necessarily from precisely who in the ANC.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Leah.

ADV GCABASHE: You will accept a lot of talk amongst young people then was about going out of the country to join the struggle, wherever, yes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, from 1976 onwards it was so.

ADV GCABASHE: Did your informer give you that information as well, that these particular people are also very keen on leaving the country to go and train and come back and be active?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that such information was available, but I cannot say it with certainty.

ADV GCABASHE: I'm really trying to relate it to this specific group of young people, who couldn't be too different to any other group of young people.

BRIG DELPORT: I don't know Chairperson, whether there were some of them who had already stated that they were going to leave the country. It is possible.

ADV GCABASHE: Let's talk about the meeting that you had with Gen van der Merwe and the other persons. You say there were no options, what options did you consider? I'll tell you why I ask this. If you were to hand me that as happened, that grenade, I maim myself with it, you haven't - you're not rid of me, I will come back and do whatever I had been doing anyway. What was the thinking, what were the plans, how were you going to stop me from coming back again and again and again?

BRIG DELPORT: Well there was no other manner in which to prevent them from conducting the action that they wanted to carry out. And to make use of methods of arrest would not have helped.

ADV GCABASHE: But that can't be right because for instance, Lukele was eventually arrested and imprisoned, but that's only because he wasn't killed. Why could you not work on a plan that would lead to an arrest such as happened with Lukele, but not lead to the elimination of people? I'm just trying to understand the mind-set in what you were discussing at that meeting.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I am not at all aware that Lukele was arrested and charged and spent time in jail.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it just comes to mind, why couldn't it have been planned in such a way to say well let's take the gunpowder out of the handgrenades, let's give them handgrenades that just won't work, duds, and then we'll get them all together, we will arm them with these handgrenades, they'll go to their houses and we'll jump out of the bushes and arrest them there and charge them with being in possession of explosives and handgrenades and that sort of thing? I think this is what Adv Gcabashe is getting at. Couldn't there have been a plan that led to their arrest and deter them that way?

BRIG DELPORT: Personally I did not know what the action on that particular night involved. I knew that it was going to take place in different areas and conducted by different people.

ADV GCABASHE: No, but that's not correct Mr Delport, because you knew they would be eliminated, that was the essential decision that was being discussed at that meeting, elimination. Now my difficulty is with the elimination. From what I understand of the evidence, policemen's houses had been burnt, they had been harassed, they had been intimidated, I haven't heard of killing of policemen in that period leading up to this incident. Why do you then kill, why don't you meet - if you are going to go for an eye for an eye, why don't you meet that threat with a similar threat? Yours seems to have gone a little way beyond meeting that particular threat that presented itself. And I won't understand it unless you are able to communicate the situation that had you agree with van der Merwe to the elimination of these people.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, there was no other way to prevent that, they were determined in their intentions to attack the homes of black policemen and black council members and they could have killed them in that.

ADV GCABASHE: Then we come to the killing, because the decision was to eliminate. Now how would the rest of the community know that it was the ANC that supplied defective handgrenades? Who was going to communicate this to the rest of the community?

BRIG DELPORT: The inference would have been drawn that these persons had obtained their weaponry from the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you discuss this at that meeting, this type of thing, you know the repercussions, what - I mean you were all seasoned police officers, did you discuss this type of thing?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think there's a difficulty with the mikes, I'm not getting the translation coming through.

ADV GCABASHE: Oh, I'm talking too fast.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think it's the actual mikes, there's something - I'm not getting the translation coming through. I heard the translator speaking there, but it wasn't coming through the earphones and there also doesn't seem to be much in the way of amplification now when I speak into the mike.

PROBLEMS WITH MICROPHONES

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, sorry.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Delport, I was asking about, as seasoned police officers why it is that you didn't look at all these possibilities?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it must have been investigated at a later stage, but I cannot say that before the time it was specifically discussed. However, I believe that we accepted it that these weapons, or at least that the community would accept that these weapons were provided by the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: You are essentially saying you don't recall the detail of the discussion, you are not just reconstructing and assuming that you inferred then, you just don't recall why you may or may not have discussed it. What is the position?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I accept that we would have discussed it, but I wouldn't be able to recall in finer detail.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Delport.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, do you have any questions?

MR MALAN: Mr Delport, on this very same point, you know if one looks at the statements which have already been made about the matter and also some of the applications which will be served before us during the course of this week, it would appear that another objective was understood, namely to transmit a greater message to the broader community that we, the Security Branch and the Security Police are everywhere, we can reach you, we can present ourselves as ANC and we can see to it that you are obliterated. In other words, if the message wasn't supposed to go to these specific persons or if the objective was not to prevent them from launching the attacks, but instead to send out a message that if anybody else had similar plans they should think about it twice. It would definitely concur with the stories of the other applicants or at least their versions, which state that you had to recruit people, recruit activists. Would you agree with that?

BRIG DELPORT: What I've said here, Chairperson, is that this must have served as a deterrent.

MR MALAN: No, not for the persons who were going to throw the handgrenades, because they would be dead. In other words, for other persons.

BRIG DELPORT: Correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And the probability - and it ran that way as well, we know that, is not that they suspected the ANC of providing poor ammunition, but that they immediately suspected the Security Police.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there were all sorts of allegations that were made after the fact, that is entirely correct.

MR MALAN: Yes, immediately.

BRIG DELPORT: Which were also faulty.

MR MALAN: With the exception of the implication of the Security Police, which was not incorrect.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR MALAN: And that took place immediately. The ANC was never accused, not according to my knowledge from that which I have read, which has at least been presented to us.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR MALAN: In other words, if it was supposed to be a deterrent, it had to be a message which was sent to the broader community of activists.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And then it would concur, then it wouldn't have been inappropriate to recruit and train some of the activists if that was the plan, because then it wouldn't have been as effective.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Delport, you said that these police houses had been protected with fire extinguishers and putting this mesh over the windows to stop handgrenades being thrown into them. This mesh is sort of like the mesh you get on a braaivleis grid, that ...(indistinct)

BRIG DELPORT: One hundred percent the same, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If you threw a handgrenade at that mesh, wouldn't it just bounce off and blow off in the garden?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that would have contributed to it that it would have helped.

CHAIRPERSON: So what was the big difference then between a petrol bomb and a handgrenade, insofar as attacking those particular houses are concerned? Because you've got the situation where you've got young untrained people, all they're going to do is lob the handgrenade, it's going to bounce off the mesh or the wall. They're not going to get into the house like a trained MK soldier might have done, got into the house and lobbed it through the front door sort of thing, they're not doing that, they're untrained. Why was the handgrenade perceived as such a huge difference in attacking police houses?

BRIG DELPORT: The East Rand consisted out of quite a few residential areas and it was completely impossible to secure everybody's house.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask you about this Sithole who has been mentioned in the Court record, did you know him?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: He wasn't part of the Security Branch?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: And you had never heard of him in particular, having difficulties within the community? Him in particular.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: If the activists were waiting for a consignment of arms, then the probabilities are that they had already made contact with some person about getting those arms.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: They now get infiltrated and they get supplied arms by the police, surely immediately there's a problem with those arms that they have received they would go - the person who had contacted them would immediately realise that there's been an interception by the police or an interference by the police in the operation because they would know that they didn't supply the arms. So what I'm trying to get at is, the probabilities must have been apparent from before it happened, that seeing that they were waiting for a consignment of arms, if they were given arms by the police it would soon be realised that the arms didn't come from the ANC. So I can't see how that could have led to a reduction in violence following the incident because the people now didn't trust ANC arms.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I believe that that weaponry was given to these activists probably on the day of the action.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but then the person who they had contacted for the arms would have come and said, we didn't give those arms to them, who did they get them from, no-one know, it must have come from the police.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there must have been a risk if they specifically had contact with somebody else.

CHAIRPERSON: And then from the answers you gave to Mr Malan, it would seem that it was almost immediately thereafter realised that the arms didn't come from the ANC because there were no allegations made against the ANC by members of the community.

BRIG DELPORT: I cannot say with certainty whether there was any allegation against the ANC at that stage, but it is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are there any questions arising from questions that ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: May I just follow up on this last question again.

I just heard your answer in Afrikaans and that is how you responded. Upon the question of the Chairperson you said that there was a risk that they had had contact with somebody else.

BRIG DELPORT: No, what I was trying to say is that there was a certain risk. As I understood the Chairperson, he wanted to know about when they would be provided with the weaponry and if somebody else said, be careful, that belongs to the police. So if they were in contact with somebody, then that possibility existed. That is what I'm trying to say.

MR MALAN: No, Mr Delport, it was quite a course to ask of you why they would have thought that these were ANC weapons, because other persons, if they had been approached, somebody else would have been able to say, wait we did not provide those weapons. And the Chairperson spoke to you regarding an evaluation of after the event. And then when he asked you that, you said yes, there must have been a risk, that they already had contact with somebody else who specifically would bring them the weapons.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: So if that risk existed, then such information wasn't available, otherwise it wouldn't have been a risk, it would have been a certainty.

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot say that specifically.

MR MALAN: You see, if I have to analyse your answer in terms of all the other alternatives which are available to us on paper and you refer to the risk that they contact with somebody else, then the probability emerges for me - and I want your commentary on this, that these persons as Adv Gcabashe put it, generally spoke about, if only we had weapons and handgrenades. Then that becomes the probability.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, the information was that they were waiting for this from the ANC.

MR MALAN: What in heavens name does it mean when you say that they were waiting for it?

BRIG DELPORT: That they were waiting for the weapons.

MR MALAN: That they would obtain from where?

BRIG DELPORT: From the ANC, but not with regard to specific particulars, those were not available to us.

MR MALAN: So you had a highly reliable source which you did not doubt in the correctness of his information.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Could he tell you that they were waiting for weapons specifically from the ANC abroad or in another branch or that they had contact with another person?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't think that they said specifically that there was someone who was going to supply these weapons to them pertinently.

MR MALAN: They were simply waiting?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, they were looking for weapons, definitely.

MR MALAN: Yes, that is correct, they were looking for weapons, but that is something different than waiting for delivery of weapons, Mr Delport. And please give me some clarity regarding this. What was the framework of the source and his message to you, via Mr Oberholzer, that they were waiting for weapons, that they wanted to obtain weapons, or that a delivery was going to be made to them?

BRIG DELPORT: Definitely that a delivery was going to be made to them.

MR MALAN: Was there any date for this delivery?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson. In the near future.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just one question. This list that you got, you said it was supplemented from time to time and you sent it through to head office, now I presume that your office would have kept copies of the names? After all they were activists in your area, the fact that you sent it off to head office doesn't mean you don't keep your own. Would there still be a copy of that list around?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, we made enquiries, there is no such list in existence.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, my follow-up was going to be on what Mr Malan had questioned you about, the same issue that bothered me. So they were waiting for a delivery you say?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Who were these weapons going to be delivered to?

BRIG DELPORT: It would have been delivered to this group.

ADV GCABASHE: Who in the group? You cannot deliver a consignment of weapons to a group of 15 to 20 young people, who in the group? Didn't your informer tell you this?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot say that there had to be a specific person, it may have been delivered to a group.

ADV GCABASHE: A group doesn't live together. You see if a consignment comes it will come to my house, it will come usually to a person who has some kind of leadership role. The informer didn't give you any information at all about those types of issues?

BRIG DELPORT: What I can recall, Chairperson, is that the group as such were waiting for the delivery.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, part of the ...(intervention)

BRIG DELPORT: There wasn't a specific person who was going to be in command of this consignment.

ADV GCABASHE: But as I understand it the group of 20 who were on the list were from various parts of the East Rand, not all of them were from Duduza, some were from Duduza, others from kwaThema, is that correct or have I got that wrong?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: This is where my difficulty is. You then deliver to a group who did not even live in one street, in the same street in Duduza.

BRIG DELPORT: But this group had liaison on a daily basis with one another, they were part of the total onslaught.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, and they went to school at different schools at that, but came together for meetings.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would doubt whether there was any school attendance during that period in time, the way that schools operated. These persons may have met at a school, but at that stage there was a total stay-away action, nobody attended school.

ADV GCABASHE: Anyway, just to summarise this. So you don't know who in the ANC or which part of the ANC was going to send the weapons and you don't know who specifically of the group was going to be receiving the weapons?

BRIG DELPORT: That is entirely correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising from the questions that have been put by Members of the Panel?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes, one please Mr Chairman. In 1985, according to your recollection were there already handgrenade attacks launched by members or supporters of the ANC on anyone?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, they had been committed.

MR VISSER: Were weapons such as handgrenades in circuit in the country, were they available to the people?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: Did you in your area find so-called DLBs? That you can recall. DLBs being weapons stockpiling locations or store places.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there were weapons stockpiling locations, but I cannot recall whether they were specifically in our area. However, I do know of the existence of such places.

MR VISSER: But weapons of war were available in 1985

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: In other words, if you had received information that people were waiting for weaponry, would you have put this off as a pipe dream, something which would never happen? What was the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I took it very seriously and accepted that they would obtain those weapons.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any further questions arising? Thank you, Mr Delport, that then concludes your evidence, you may stand down.

BRIG DELPORT: Thank you, Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED