MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, according to our list, Mr Hattingh would not proceed, but we spoke about this during lunchtime and it makes sense, Mr Chairman, that I complete my three witnesses to come. I was hoping that we will be able to finish them today. There's no special reason in the order of the witnesses, it won't make any difference, Chairperson. So I would beg leave to call Mr Prins.
Mr Chairman, we have similarly prepared a statement on behalf of Mr Prins, for your assistance. That would be G I think it is now.
CHAIRPERSON: It will be G, no ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: I am told F.
CHAIRPERSON: The last one was F.
CHAIRPERSON: E was Brig Schoon, F was Brig Delport. So this is G.
MR VISSER: G.
MR MALAN: Mr Prins, are you Afrikaans speaking?
MR PRINS: Yes.
MR MALAN: Your full names are Lawrence Charles Phillip Prins.
LAWRENCE CHARLES PHILLIP PRINS: (sworn states)
MR MALAN: Thank you, you may be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Prins, you are also an applicant for amnesty regarding the current incident. You have completed an application for amnesty. This can be found on page 115 to page 125. In paragraph 7(a) and (b) on page 115 of bundle 1, where you were asked to respond whether you were an officer bearer or official of any political organisation, institution or liberation movement and you answered "Not Applicable" and when you were asked what your office was you also answered "Not Applicable". Do you understand now that what was meant by that is whether you were a member or a supporter of a political party? And is it your recollection that you were indeed a supporter of the National Party?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in that respect we have explained this before, that there was some measure of confusion about this and we would ask for you to accept that 7(a) should read "National Party" and (b) should read "Supporter".
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, then in fact that amendment, unless there are any objections to it, page 115 of volume 1, paragraph 7(a), deletion of "N/A" and substituted with "National Party" and similar with (b) just to indicate Mr Prins is a supporter.
MR VISSER: As it please you, Mr Chairman.
You then confirm the content of your amnesty application and you have also studied Exhibit A, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you also confirm that the content of Exhibit A concurs with your insights?
MR PRINS: Yes.
MR VISSER: And that it is correct according to you?
MR PRINS: Yes, correct.
MR VISSER: And you also request that Exhibit A and the evidence which is referred to therein be incorporated with your evidence.
MR PRINS: Correct.
MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence given by Gen van der Merwe as well as Brig Delport, regarding the general background of the political violence in the country at that stage and more specifically in the East Rand, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you concur in essence with what they say?
MR PRINS: Yes.
MR VISSER: And in Exhibit G from paragraph 4 to 11 you have verbally stated the insights of Brig Delport.
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: On page 4, paragraph 12, would you begin and inform the Committee regarding your knowledge and participation in this incident.
MR PRINS: Chairperson, from paragraph 12 onwards
"My recollection of the events is that on a certain evening Col Roelf Venter contacted me and called me to the Security Branch East Rand. He also requested that I bring my wife with."
MR VISSER: Would you pause there please. Would you later determine why you were supposed to bring your wife along?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And in principle, what was the reason for bringing your wife with?
MR PRINS: A so-called hit-list existed upon which my name appeared and Col Venter was concerned that my house would be attacked when I was not at home and then requested that I bring my wife with.
MR VISSER: Very well.
CHAIRPERSON: What was your position at that stage, what rank of office did you hold, what work did you do?
MR PRINS: I was a Warrant Officer.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairperson, that is a relevant question.
And what were you? With the exception of a Warrant Officer, what were your duties?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, my primary task at the Security Branch at that stage was the management of information regarding labour relations, more specifically and secondly, I was also a demolitions expert.
MR VISSER: Very well. Would you proceed with paragraph 13.
MR PRINS
"One we arrived there I found Brig Delport, Brig Cronje and other members of C1 there."
MR VISSER: Now, may I just interrupt you there once more. Was your wife involved in this meeting which you referred to?
MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, my office was on another floor than the Divisional Commander's office and I first took her to my office and then I went to the Divisional Officer's alone.
MR VISSER: Very well. And you were shown a so-called hit-list.
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 13. Where did this list come from.
MR PRINS
"Upon this occasion I was shown a hit-list which apparently was obtained from COSAS. On the list there were full particulars regarding quite a few black police officers from our branch as well as my own particulars. ..."
...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Before you continue, were the names of other white members also on that list?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, there was one other name which did not have any particulars regarding which there was a reasonable dispute. They couldn't identify the name. It appeared to be the name of a white member because there was a white member at our branch with that name, but regarding the particulars which would have indicated identification, my name was the only one.
MR MALAN: And what was the name of the other person, can you recall it?
MR PRINS: Hilton, simply the name Hilton.
MR MALAN: Was that the christian name or surname of the person?
MR PRINS: It was his surname.
MR MALAN: And how was he identified, or how were you identified?
MR PRINS: My surname and my address were there.
MR MALAN: And you say in this paragraph that you read to us, "apparently obtained from COSAS".
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct. If I recall correctly, it was Col Roelf Venter, the same person who had contacted me, who showed me the list and who told me that this came from COSAS members in the vicinity.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Prins. Can you think of any reason why your name got on the list and not other colleagues of yours in the Security Branch in Springs?
MR PRINS: There were other members of the Security ...(end of side A of tape).
CHAIRPERSON: ... white members name on the list from that branch?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, no, I could speculate about it, but I would like to know, I myself would like to know.
CHAIRPERSON: And where was your residence at that time?
MR PRINS: In Springs.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Please continue, paragraph 14.
MR PRINS
"It was clear to me that I was a target to be attacked. In the light of the large-scale violence which was aimed against persons and property of police officers, I immediately feared for the lives of myself and my wife. For the first few nights thereafter police protection was arranged for my house and I regularly expressed my dissatisfaction with the course of events, towards Brig Delport.
After a few days Brig Cronje informed me that the police protection would be withdrawn because they were busy working on a plan of action to protect police members and to attempt to combat the political violence.
A day or two later I was sent to Pretoria to fetch a limpet mine there. I received a limpet mine from the Security Head Office Explosions Division. At that stage I did not know that that particular limpet mine was modified and for which purpose it would be applied."
MR VISSER: Who sent you to fetch the limpet mine?
MR PRINS: It was Brig Cronje.
MR VISSER: Brig Cronje, very well.
MR PRINS
"I was instructed to take the limpet mine with to a premises outside Springs, where I found a number of members from the Security Branch that night.
On the instructions of Brig Cronje I handed over the limpet mine to Joe Mamasela, who apparently knew what to do with it. "
MR VISSER: Up to this stage, were you informed at all in any way whatsoever what the plan was which had been formulated and which would be put into operation?
MR PRINS: No.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR PRINS
"Later that same evening I was driving in a vehicle with Brig Cronje and Brig Delport. It was approximately one hour before the explosions took place. They then informed me regarding the operation and informed me that modified handgrenades were also involved and that the limpet mine which I went to fetch in Pretoria had been modified with regard to its detonator.
As I understood the plan, Joe Mamasela would provide the weaponry ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Please read a little bit slower, it has to be interpreted.
MR PRINS: I beg your pardon, Chairperson.
MR PRINS
"As I understood the plan, Joe Mamasela would have provided the weaponry to activists who had already decided upon certain targets and were simply waiting for weaponry from the ANC.
The arrangement was that Mamasela would instruct them to attack their chosen targets at midnight that night simultaneously.
Seeing as I had also received training with regard to explosives, I was tasked to assist at some of the explosion scenes which would follow and to secure the scenes properly.
Shortly after midnight I received a radio instruction from Lt Steenkamp to visit the scene of an explosion at kwaThema in order to secure it and to conduct the necessary investigations.
Sgt Gert Kruger and I went to the scene together where we found a corpse as well as a handgrenade which had not yet gone off. I blew up the latter, that would be the handgrenade, with the assistance of explosives."
MR VISSER: This Sgt Gert Kruger, as far as your knowledge goes, did he know about the prior planning in this regard?
MR PRINS: No, he didn't know about it, definitely.
MR VISSER: And you also didn't tell him about it?
MR PRINS: I also didn't tell him about it. On the contrary, shortly afterwards - he was the scene for approximately 10 minutes, I sent him home with the permission of Brig Delport, who I discussed it with first and told him that we needed demolitions persons who would be rested the following day, and that would be the reason to send him home.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR PRINS
"Later I was informed by radio that an explosion of a limpet mine had taken place near a substation of a power station."
MR VISSER: Where was that?
MR PRINS: In kwaThema.
"At the scene I found a body in whose hands the limpet mine had apparently exploded with fatal consequences. I properly secured the scene and stayed there until the following morning, after which other members took over the scene and I departed.
It was clear to me that the persons who had planned to kill me and my colleagues had been killed during a counter-attack by the South African Police. I was relieved over the fact that my wife and I would be able to live in peace from that stage onwards."
MR VISSER: What were the consequences of these explosions, if any?
I see that certain members of the audience do not like the idea that you could live on in peace, but please continue.
MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I don't think that that comment was necessary. I don't think that that is what anybody read into it, but continue nonetheless.
MR VISSER: What were the consequences of the explosion?
MR PRINS: The consequences of the explosions were that a number of people were killed and that a number of people had been seriously injured.
MR VISSER: And on the general level of violence and political violence in the area?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I can say that political violence showed a serious decrease. I received information that for example, from the 17th of February that year to the 20th of June, only in the black residential area of Duduza, at least - and I say at least because this comes only from one statement, at least 31 policemen's houses had been burnt down and after that there were no such incidents, at least not in those numbers.
MR VISSER: And you refer now to what we have referred the Honourable Committee to previously, that is an extract of the evidence given before Judge Stafford in the matter of the STATE VS JOSEPH TITUS MAZIBUKO AND SIX OTHERS, of which you read the record and counted these cases.
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR PRINS
"I agree with Brig Delport that the result of the action was firstly that the lives and property of policemen and black council members were protected, but that it led directly to a significant decrease in political violence on the East Rand.
I think it is reasonable to suspect that other prospective activists came to the conclusion that they could not trust weapons which had been provided by the ANC."
MR VISSER: Statements have been put to Brig Delport, that the community immediately knew that these weapons originated from the police and that they would never have thought that they originated from the ANC. What do you have to say about that?
MR PRINS: No, I don't agree with that. In the first place, the weaponry which was used consisted of weapons which came from the East, in other words the type of weaponry which at that stage was used by the military wing of the ANC. In the media it was published and we expected it to be published in the media. So whenever explosions or incidents took place during which weaponry was used of eastern block origin, an immediate connotation would be attached to the ANC.
MR VISSER: And as a result of your involvement in your visitation of the scenes, did you make any statements?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct, I made a statement.
MR VISSER: And did you provide all the facts as known to you in that statement?
MR PRINS: No, I did not, I bent the truth.
MR VISSER: Was it an affidavit which you made?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And then you would have committed perjury and defeated the ends of justice?
MR PRINS: Correct.
MR VISSER: Would you continue with the final paragraph, 27.
MR PRINS
"Although my wife and I were personally targeted for attacks, I did not act out of malice or personal vengeance.
The acts and omissions which I committed, I did in the execution of my official duties and as part of the opposition to the struggle and they were aimed at supporters of a liberation movement.
Whatever I did, I did in order to combat political violence and to protect and secure the lives of people.
This action also served to protect the government against which the political violence was aimed, as well as to maintain the government and to protect the interests of the National Party.
I acted as a policeman in the execution of my service in the SAP. I truly believe that such action was expected of me and that my action fell within the ambit of my express or sworn authorisations. I believed this especially in the light of the pressure which was placed upon us in the Security Branch, by the political leaders of that time.
My action in this was according to execution of orders which I received from senior officers and took place with the approval of the senior command structure of the SAP.
My involvement in the matter took place consistently with the knowledge, approval and under the orders of Brig Delport.
As far as I know, the order with regard to the relevant operation as such came from Security Head Office in the person of Gen J V van der Merwe. Consequently I consistently acted in the execution of my duties and within my capacities as a member of the SAP."
MR VISSER: Later, after the incident, you also became aware when you were busy compiling your amnesty applications, that the Minister of Police, the deceased Minister le Grange, indeed gave the order. At that stage you were not aware of this, nobody informed you about it at that stage?
MR PRINS: No.
MR VISSER: You then also request the Committee to grant you amnesty. Now these acts and omissions that you have referred to, Mr Prins, are based upon the fact that shortly before the events you realised what the planning and the operation was about.
MR PRINS: Correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And for the reasons that you have already motivated, you associated yourself with that action?
MR PRINS: Correct.
MR VISSER: And that is what you are requesting amnesty for?
MR PRINS: Correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, at page 2.
Consequently you request amnesty for the murder of eight COSAS members mentioned in paragraph (b), as well as attempted murder or a lesser judgment with regard to the seven COSAS members who were injured, perjury, as well as defeating the ends of justice or any other crime such as conspiracy, accessory before and after the deed and so forth.
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: The question of the illegal possession of explosive devices, you went to fetch the explosive device in Pretoria and so forth, and that sometimes presents a problem in amnesty applications. But Mr Chairman, I will address you about that in argument, with reference to what was granted in the case of Brig Cronje and Venter.
In either event, as far as it is required you request amnesty for any illegality in your possession of explosive devices specifically related to this incident, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Although you were a licensed explosives expert and that you were entitled to possess explosives under certain circumstances.
MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr Prins, could I just determine beforehand whether you are the correct person to which I should put the questions which I want to put. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
For how long were you attached to the Security Police at that stage?
MR PRINS: I was transferred to the Security Branch in 1972.
MR HATTINGH: So you were there for quite some time?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: At the time of this incident were you aware of how the communities in the traditionally black residential areas had ordered themselves in the township with regard to self-defence and so forth?
MR PRINS: Yes, I could say yes, but I would like you to be more specific.
MR HATTINGH: Let me be more specific. Are you aware that they had established block committees and street committees?
MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And they held meetings regularly?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: To discuss the problems that the community experienced?
MR PRINS: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And that regularly they liaised with each other in the broader community?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And are you aware that there was liaison with members of the ANC who were abroad, or with trained MK members who were in the vicinity?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Are you also aware that they established Self Defence Units?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson, it was referred to as the SDU ...(intervention)
ADV GCABASHE: You're not saying that the SDUs were established in 1985? I thought these were general questions, have I missed something here?
MR PRINS: Chairperson no, I only said that the Self Protection Units were generally known as, amongst others, the SDUs.
ADV GCABASHE: But not in 1985, that's all I want cleared up.
MR PRINS: Not specifically in 1985.
ADV GCABASHE: Ja, there weren't any, there weren't any in 1985. From the evidence we have heard as an Amnesty Committee. Unless you have better evidence of course.
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I cannot attach a specific date to the establishment thereof, but the function of those block committees and street committees were based on the same principle.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Hatting.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
May I refer you to bundle 2A, page 296. It is a statement of a Mr Joseph Titus Mazibuko and more specifically on page - the statement starts and 272, and more in particular on - excuse, I don't think it is his statement, it is the statement of Mr Joseph Mashiane which starts on page 295.
MR MALAN: Of which bundle are you speaking? Did you say 2A?
MR HATTINGH: ...(indistinct)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh, if you could push your speaker on.
MR HATTINGH: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman.
At the bottom of page 295, Mr Mashiane is asked to put his version and he said:
"It was in 1990, and I was just from work. I was working at Whiteville Airfreight and there was violence at the time. The taxis were fighting amongst each other, taxi drivers and I was getting off from the taxi. I came across Oupa Modise and they told me that we had to keep vigilant during the night because we were going to be attacked. And I went home and we collected ourselves and gathered, being the residents of Mslike. And we took our petrol bombs to go round and patrol in the streets."
It's an indication whether they were officially known as SDUs or not, but in the community there had already been groups who organised themselves to protect themselves from violence, whether it be taxi violence or any other violence.
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, the date here is 1990.
MR HATTINGH: It's my mistake, excuse me Chairperson. I thought that it was in regard to this incident. I did not have regard for the date.
But can I just ask you in general, were such actions formed and units formed, that they could protect themselves?
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And did you have knowledge about the information which the Security Police had about arms which were expected or that was needed by members of the community?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, it is difficult to specifically say that I had information available about arms which they were waiting for, but the total circumstances as it had reigned in those years was, namely I was personally involved with the "lig" of DLBs, dead letter boxes, where at a safe place arms which had come in from abroad into the RSA, which was buried and would later be applied in explosions within the country. So yes, there was that tendency.
MR HATTINGH: Can I also refer you to volume 2A, page 275. Mr Chairman, I hope that I'm not going to make the same mistake, I don't seem to find a date that this person is speaking about here, but my overall impression is - yes, June 1985. Yes, it's June 1985, Mr Chairman. So this was the relevant period.
On page 275 at the top, maybe we should start at the bottom of 274 and I start there. He speaks - about eight lines from the bottom in the middle of the line:
"To confirm that there was a hit-squad, there was a Citi Press article which showed that more leaders were to follow in the killings. They also had a list of names and some of the names which appeared then are present today and it was still like that, there was congress Mtweni which was from kwaThema and through that Congress as well as through Vally - Vally is my cousin, he's sitting on my right-hand side, and that there were MK members who were actually prepared to offer us some assistance because we were vulnerable and he offered us help in terms of weapons. So we wholeheartedly accepted his offer and that event coincided with the statement from the ANC in exile, saying that it will now train ANC cadres inside the country and duty operation. We were prepared to liberate our country by all means necessary."
Then I go a bit lower down, the last paragraph:
"We went there and they demonstrated with the first handgrenade and we were - he threw the first one to show us how to throw it as well as the second one, which was thrown by Vally. And at the very same time we were told that we should choose our targets. That was on a Monday, preparing for an attack on Tuesday night."
Maybe I should pause there. At the top it seems that this persons says that they were not surprised that they were approached by these persons and the offer was made to them to supply them with handgrenades.
MR PRINS: No, it does not sound like that, it sounds as if it was generally acceptable that the ANC would supply them with weapons.
MR HATTINGH: And if one would go to page 285 ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, I would just like to get certainty that I understand you correctly. You say that they easily accepted, you don't say that they referred to other ANCs, because from this statement it seems that he referred to Mike and James.
MR HATTINGH: The point that I'm trying to make, Chairperson, is that they were not surprised to be approached with an offer for weapons because they expected help from the ANC.
MR MALAN: They would have read from the ANC what the ANC's policy was.
MR HATTINGH: On page 275 it is even more clear, Chairperson. This time it is still Joseph Mazibuko - oh, excuse me, 285. I wish to refer to 285. This time it is Mr Vally Mazibuko and on page 285 he says at the top
"I would like that to be put through this Commission, that these people came saying they were members of MK ..."
...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh, it's the same Mr Mazibuko, J T.
MR HATTINGH: It would seem so, Mr Chairman, but his name is given somewhere as Vally as well. It's a bit confusing, but the name is not important Mr Chairman, it's the contents that I would like to point out.
I read for you again, Mr Prins:
"I would like that to be put through this Commission, that these people came saying they were members of MK and they were instructed to go to Congress because Congress was close to me and Congress had to come straight to me.
In 1985 there was a directive from the ANC in exile that certain units from the Umkhonto weSizwe would not be trained outside the country, but they would be trained inside the country and so we realised that we were going to be the first group that was going to be trained within the country.
When Congress came with the people and having briefed me that these people were coming from MK camps and they were fully trained and they were going to train us as well to be part of Umkhonto weSizwe, which was going to be trained within the country to defend ourselves against the vigilantes, so that we can hit where it has most ..."
...(intervention))
CHAIRPERSON: Probably "where it hurts most".
MR HATTINGH: Probably "where it hurts most" yes.
"... and the government or the system.
At that time I did not want to question their behaviour or manner in which the directive came because it actually coincided with the statement that was made by the ANC earlier on, that they were going to train people within the country. And that is why I never actually bothered myself to ask many questions.
We welcomed these peoples as comrades in Duduza and we said to them we were prepared that we should be trained in order to fend off attacks from vigilantes in order to protect the community."
It makes it very clear that these people were awaiting the ANC to approach them with arms, and that is why they did not ask any questions. Is that correct?
MR PRINS: That seems to be the case, Chairperson.
MR MALAN: Mr Prins - excuse me, Mr Hattingh, if I put it to you that another clear inference, and I put clear in quotation marks, in the light of the statement at the conference in '85, that it was not strange, would you agree?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, unfortunately I don't know to which reference you refer.
MR MALAN: I shall put it to you differently, the reference to the ANC here, who says that they would train people inside the country. If these people thought that they were approached by Mike and James as a flow-out of this new policy that people would be trained within the country, would that not be a clear interpretation of the statement of Mr Mazibuko?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, with all respect, I don't understand the difference between the two. As I understood it, the ANC here established a principle that people would be trained within the country and these people saw this infiltration as part of the whole ANC strategy.
MR MALAN: That's correct, that is what I put to you.
MR PRINS: Yes.
MR MALAN: Thank you very much.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, my attention was drawn to the fact that this is indeed the version of Mr Vally Mazibuko and not Mr J T Mazibuko. On page 281, Mr J T Mazibuko concludes his evidence and he then said
"Right yes, Vally would like to address the Committee, Commission.'
And Ms Seroke:
"We shall request you to take an oath. Stand and take the oath."
And then he's then sworn in, Mr Chairman.
Mr Prins, you are also aware that the areas, the traditionally black residential areas where the violence was, was an area of no-go for white police officers, specifically at night, is that correct?
MR PRINS: I would not say at night, I would say during the day as well. I would say that at night it was probably easier because you would not be seen, so the first part yes, but the second part no.
MR HATTINGH: But the suggestion was made that grenades would have been given to them, of which the explosives had been removed and then they could have set up ambushes for them where they could have been arrested. Would it be possible to send enough police officers into the area so that they could guard all the police officers' residences to combat all these attacks?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, that was indeed the problem. If one wanted to protect a policeman's house by means of guards, then one would have placed one guard there to sign his death warrant, they would have killed him as well. You would have had to place a Force large enough at a house to combat an attack from a large group of people. So it was actually a practical impossibility.
MR HATTINGH: And these houses were close to each other?
MR PRINS: Yes, in the traditional black residential areas the houses are very close to each other.
MR HATTINGH: Would it be possible to hide a group of people there without anybody being aware of it?
MR PRINS: No, not easily.
MR HATTINGH: And if they were inside the house, they had to come outside the house to arrest the perpetrators and by that time they would have got away.
MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And are you also aware that during these times of political unrest in the traditional black residential areas a communications system was set up amongst all the residents, so that when a police vehicle enters the area the message would be spread throughout the whole community that the police had come into the area?
MR PRINS: Yes, this was part of these protection units.
MR HATTINGH: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
ADV GCABASHE: Just a quick point of clarity. Are we talking about traditional black areas here, are we talking about townships? I don't want to get confused. We're talking about the townships in the East Rand?
MR PRINS: We speak of the black residential areas as it was at that time. It's the same thing, the townships and the traditional black residential areas.
CHAIRPERSON: The traditional residential areas are - I come from Transkei and they're out in the countryside and there's lots of open veld and huts, that's what I consider to be a traditional residential area.
MR PRINS: Excuse me, Chairperson, but here in our urban areas we refer to our locations, the old black locations, as traditional black residential areas because the circumstances probably differ.
CHAIRPERSON: I see that it's now 1 o'clock, we'll take the lunch adjournment.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
LAWRENCE CHARLES PHILLIP PRINS: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Prins, ...(intervention)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Prins, will you please look at bundle 2A, page 277. I think that this is still Mr J T Mazibuko who is giving evidence. I would like to read you something upon a question and I will explain to you while I'm going to ask you this question. You are an experienced security man from the East Rand.
MR PRINS: Yes.
MR BOOYENS: And certain statements are made by people who were on the opposition side of the Security Police. You see there is a paragraph which begins with Mrs Seroke, and I'm more interested in the second paragraph
"What actually pushed you to using violence and using handgrenades, as well as selecting your targets?"
Do you see that?
MR PRINS: Yes, I do.
MR BOOYENS: And then we have an answer
"Yes, well I can say we are a product of 1984, and a product of 1984 was militant, I must say."
Could you possibly inform the Committee what that statement means "a product of 1984"? What is the significance of 1984, specifically in this regard, what took place?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I will not say specifically that I would interpret the frame of mind of the person speaking, but in my mind 1984 stood out like 1976, it was a second phase during which nationwide political unrest escalated and was at the order of the day.
MR BOOYENS: I see. So the statement in other words, as a so-called "product of 1984" referred to violence?
MR PRINS: Yes, according to my interpretation.
MR BOOYENS: And apparently, according to the interpretation of the witness, because I see that just below that J T Mazibuko says
"Okay, I could say that we were a product of 1984, and at that time I've already explained to you that the whole country was in turmoil and we realised that we could only get our liberation through violence and we had to speed up the process of liberating the country, sorry, sorry, sorry."
I don't know what that was about, I'm sure he must have switched to another language. So what he says here, does this fit into the picture that you had of the youth at that stage?
MR PRINS: Yes, completely.
MR BOOYENS: In other applications in which I was involved, I viewed documents in which it was the declared policy to render black residential areas ungovernable. Would you say that some of the residential areas in the East Rand were already at that stage, in 1985, ungovernable?
MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, I would just support this by referring to the same document from which I extracted information earlier, in June or May. From 1985, in one month, six council members of Duduza resigned as a result of the violence which ruled there and that would by nature of the situation, just that one aspect would render that area ungovernable.
MR BOOYENS: And if the statement is further put that the police could not move around freely any longer, your - let us speak of your regular uniform policeman in his yellow bakkie, who has to investigate a burglary. In such an ungovernable area he would not be able to move around, it would be dangerous for him, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Yes, I can specifically recall branch commanders of the Detective Branch, who would say that they could no longer perform their regular functions because their personnel could not enter residential areas in order to investigate matters and interview persons because it would render their task impossible. MR BOOYENS: And that was already the situation in 1985?
MR PRINS: Yes, that was the situation in 1985, Chairperson.
MR BOOYENS: And it was asked about the viability of this operation or not and I would like to elaborate on that. Normal police action I have also heard, although this was in other areas such as the Eastern Cape, there was a very effective alarm system so to speak, the minute you entered a rural town area the whistles would start blowing and the alarm would be sounded. Is that how it worked here as well?
MR PRINS: Yes, the whistle system was very well-known. As soon as an identification was made, or any possible identification was made of any division of the police entering that area, this system would go into operation. I experienced it quite a few times myself.
MR BOOYENS: So to arrest somebody was everything but simple?
MR PRINS: Not only not simple, but to a greater extent impossible.
MR BOOYENS: Would I be correct in saying that when the police moved into these areas you would usually have to move in with armoured vehicle, such as casspirs and so forth?
MR PRINS: Correct. We received an order - I cannot recall specifically whether the order came from the Divisional Commissioner, I would accept that originally it came from head office or the Divisional Commissioner, that when such urgent circumstances took place, for example in my case as a demolitions expert who had to be at the scene of an explosion to undertake certain investigations, that I should not go into such an area with an unarmoured vehicle, but that I should arrange to enter the area in an armoured vehicle.
MR BOOYENS: And was it in these areas that the explosions ultimately took place?
MR PRINS: Yes, and more specifically in Duduza.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
I refer you to paragraph 17 of your application, the instruction that you received to fetch the limpet mine in Pretoria. Who gave you this instruction?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, to the best of my recollection it was Brig Cronje who told this to me.
MR CORNELIUS: I understand. And according to your observation, it was clear that Brig Cronje was in command of this operation?
MR PRINS: Correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And when you delivered this limpet mine to Joe Mamasela, you also had no doubt that he was completely informed regarding what he was supposed to do?
MR PRINS: Yes, it was very clear to me when I delivered it to him, that he knew that it would come to his side, he was expecting it. There was actually no exchange of words between the two of us.
MR CORNELIUS: I see. And at that stage when the limpet mine was handed over various members of Section C were present, can you recall who they were?
MR PRINS: As far as I can recall, Brig Cronje was present as well as Col Venter, logically Joe Mamasela was there because I gave him the limpet mine. And I believe I am correct, but I am not a hundred percent certain if I say that Mr de Kock was also there.
MR CORNELIUS: I see. And in conclusion, you believe that with your participation in this action and with this action, you succeeded in combatting the violence, in other words you dealt a sever blow to the participants in the liberation action?
MR PRINS: Yes, think that the consequences speak for themselves.
MR CORNELIUS: Yes, but what I mean is that you achieved your political target.
MR PRINS: Yes, I do believe so.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Prins, you indicated in your testimony that you were shown a list which contained police officers who were going to be targeted by COSAS, is that correct?
MR PRINS: That is correct.
MR MAFORA: Were you informed as to how the list was compiled and how it was obtained?
MR PRINS: No, Chairperson. As I have already said in my evidence, the list, I'm sure that it was Col Venter who showed it to me and told me that it came from COSAS members.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Mafora, if I could just ask on that question.
Can you recall approximately how many names were on the list and addresses?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I can recall that it was a single sheet of paper and that if it wasn't filled up, it was nearly full because my name was approximately three-quarters down in the page, but I didn't count. I also didn't have it in my possession for such a length of time.
CHAIRPERSON: And you say a page of paper, A4 size?
MR PRINS: No. I beg your pardon, Chairperson, I think it was a smaller size, such as the type that one would normally find in school books, the lined pages that one would find in school writing books.
MR MAFORA: And on that list your name was there, isn't it?
MR PRINS: As I have already testified Chairperson, my surname was there as well as my residential address.
MR MAFORA: And you were told that you are one of the people who were being targeted by COSAS for attack, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I cannot recall the precise words and whether it was Col Venter who showed me the list, but it was conveyed to me in broad terms that this was a hit-list and that my name was on this list and that it came from COSAS members.
MR MAFORA: And you were then advised of the plan which we are about today, the Zero-Zero plan. Were you at that stage informed of ...(intervention)
MR PRINS: No, no, not at all, it was a number of days before the actual plan came to execution.
MR MAFORA: And on that list - I mean, were you not given any details about when was the attack going to be possibly carried out on police officials or - you didn't have any of those details?
MR PRINS: No, Chairperson. If I may inform the Committee of what exactly took place in order for them to comprehend it fully. I recall that evening shortly after the list was shown to me, Brig Delport and I requested leave to go home, seeing as my wife was waiting in the office there. I can also recall clearly that Brig Delport was upset about the fact that I had taken my wife along and he said that at that stage it was not necessary and he then gave me permission and I returned home.
MR MAFORA: Why was he upset that you had brought your wife along? Because earlier on you testified that you were asked to bring your wife along.
MR PRINS: Chairperson yes, but it was Col Venter who told me over the phone to bring my wife with and when Brig Delport was informed by me that I had brought my wife along, I could see that he was upset in that regard, that he believed that nothing would probably happen that evening and that we were over reacting and that we were creating panic in the minds of people, which was unnecessary. I think that's what it was all about.
MR MAFORA: Okay, now let's just go back to the incident after the explosions. You indicated that you were responsible for carrying out the investigations, is that correct?
MR PRINS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR MAFORA: And you further indicated that you prepared false reports, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, later I made an affidavit which comprised part of the statements submitted in the criminal trial in which the deceased were charged. That was the only false allegation or affidavit which I put in writing. I did not prepare other reports or submissions with false statements.
MR MAFORA: But the issue is you knowingly prepared an affidavit which was incorrect, is that so?
MR PRINS: Yes, that is entirely correct.
MR MAFORA: Why should we believe you today, that after taking an oath, what you are saying is true and correct?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, certainly for quite a few reasons because it is a prerequisite of amnesty legislation to make a full disclosure. I don't think that for me who played a very minor role, if I may put it that way, it would prejudice me if I tried to cover up any facts. At that stage we were working under extraordinary circumstances and today the situation has normalised completely, therefore today it would be completely futile for me to say something which isn't true.
MR MAFORA: I mean, have you not colluded with your co-applicants to present a version to this hearing?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, the agreement among the applicants is that we are here to disclose the truth, we are recognising our participation in cruel violations of human rights. I cannot see how that can be interpreted as false.
MR MAFORA: Let's just take one aspect, the issue of Joe Mamasela. Gen van der Merwe indicates that - indicated in his evidence that he didn't know what finally happened down the line and the involvement of Joe Mamasela in the whole scenario, and you are coming here and you are testifying that at one stage Joe Mamasela was involved in this thing. There's this deliberate you know, cutting off of one person from the chain to make as if the commanders gave down the instruction and they were not involved in following up to establish what actually took place. What I'm trying to put to you is this, that this is a collusion on your part with your co-applicants and you all knew of the involvement of Joe Mamasela and you were all aware of what took place through this whole incident. What would your comment be on that?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, much has been said and if I may comment on it, it would be that the versions provided here makes sense in the light of my knowledge of how the Police Force operated back then. Gen van der Merwe was a very senior officer, who occupied a senior position at head office and it is just logically acceptable that such a person who occupied such a high position in the hierarchy would not be involved on the evening when an operation would be executed at night so far away from him.
If one understands the operation of the police hierarchy, then the applications of all the applicants make complete sense to me thusfar, because that was the operation of the hierarchy.
MR MAFORA: You see what's strange Mr Prins, is that the plan, the originator of the plan is Gen van der Merwe and this was a very unique - according to the co-applicants, this was a unique situation you know, they had never been - Delport was never involved in it previously. Or let me just ask you, were you ever involved in it previously yourself?
MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, not before and not after.
MR MAFORA: You see this was what one would call a landmark kind of an operation and I find it strange that Gen van der Merwe wouldn't have had a very keen interest and even contributed towards how the thing was to be carried out, and liaised with you down the ranks.
MR PRINS: Chairperson, I could possibly understand how a person who was not involved in the Police Force will have no knowledge of the functioning of the Police Force and may find it strange, but to me it is not strange at all, to me it is entirely logical and practical.
MR MAFORA: You also indicated that the use of - the measures that you took were the you know, were the only measures that could be taken. Actually, you confirmed the evidence of the applicants that went before you, that there was no other effective method of containing the situation, is that correct?
MR PRINS: Under the circumstances which reigned at that stage I would say Chairperson that I could understand completely. Although I was not involved in the planning itself, I can understand completely how the persons who were indeed involved in the planning regarded it as the only viable counter-achievement.
MR MAFORA: But then why did you target these people? I mean because the attack on police, as earlier stated, was the order of the day. Why did target these people, these victims?
MR PRINS: They were not targeted by me, Chairperson. If I am asked to express an opinion as to why they were targeted, then I could express an opinion about that, but I personally did not target them.
MR MAFORA: Yes, I mean you were party to the group that targeted them.
MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, I was not.
MR MAFORA: Your involvement in this thing, was it not motivated party by the fact that you had an axe to grind with them, because you knew that they were COSAS members and you had been earlier informed that COSAS was targeting a number of police people to attack and your name was also included?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, as I have already testified, I was tasked to be involved in this operation, firstly because I was a demolitions expert. My involvement as I may put it, emanated from instructions given by senior officers. I did not participate in the planning phase of the operation and I did not cherish any sinister motives, as have been reflected here.
MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAFORA
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.
I just want to get back to the hit-list. Were there only policemen's names on this hit-list?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, after I had completed my amnesty application and after we had discussed this matter during consultation, it occurred to me that there were also council members and I can recall two specific council members from Duduza, two brothers by the names of Namane. At the time of my application I could not recall it, but after the consultations certain things refreshed my memory and yes, there were two such members whose names also appeared on the hit-list. They were two council members.
MS LOCKHAT: And there were also other black policemen on the list, is that correct?
MR PRINS: That is correct, many names who were not familiar to me.
MS LOCKHAT: I just want to clarify. That evening when they called you in, were you the only person on that hit-list that was called into the office to inform you about this?
MR PRINS: I don't have any knowledge about that. I believe that the others were also informed, but I can honestly not give any evidence about that.
CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't see any of the other people when you were there that night, you didn't see any of the other people whose names appeared on the list, at the offices?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, to be honest with you I would have to say no, I cannot recall that I specifically saw anything about them on that evening. But I must also sketch the actual circumstances, that I spent a very short time there, they may have been on other floors or in other offices and I didn't see them. So they may have been there, but I don't believe that I saw any one of them, no.
MS LOCKHAT: And your relation - how long had you been working with Brig Delport?
MR PRINS: Quite a number of years.
MS LOCKHAT: So you say Mr Namane's was also on this list?
MR PRINS: Yes, the two brothers.
MS LOCKHAT: Would you say that these MKs or the COSAS members identified him on that list?
MR PRINS: No, I cannot say, I did not know about how the list had been compiled or who compiled the list. I did not know anything about the origin of the list, apart from that which Col Venter told me and that was that it came from COSAS members.
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, just for the record, I have spoken to Mr Namane and the family members, persons did come to their house on that night and there were bodies found in their grounds, the persons that were booby-trapped, Chairperson. And he also just stated to me that I must place it on record if I have the opportunity, which I think is perfect now Chairperson, that his family - he just wants to make a statement in the sense that his family was never part of a vigilante group and that his family - because his name also appeared on this hit-list and that they were targeted, that he also just wants to place on record that he denies ever being part of a vigilante group and that they experienced - their houses were burnt down, they also had lots of businesses Chairperson, that were also burnt down, and he just wanted to inform the community -because he says they still feel, that the family still feels hurt by all of these actions and I just have to place it on record that they deny that they ever were part of any vigilante group. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Lockhat.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'd just like to know what Ms Lockhat is saying. Is she saying that the police went to his, I don't know who the one is or is it both. I don't know whether it's one or both of the Namane's and whether the police went to them to warn them. I'm not sure what she's saying.
MS LOCKHAT: What I'm actually saying is Chairperson, that at the night of the incident they were targeted as well, their house was targeted and that bodies were found on their property as well and also that they had experienced lots of loss and damages to properties after this incident as well. That's all, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS LOCKHAT: Just before this incident Mr Prins, you said that later on you drove with Brig Cronje and Delport and then they informed you of this operation. I'm referring to paragraph 18 of your annexure. Can you just kindly tell us what exactly did they inform you of. It's Annexure G.
MR PRINS: I beg your pardon, could you please repeat the last part of your question.
MS LOCKHAT: At paragraph 19 on page 5 of Annexure G you said that
"Later that same evening I went with Brig Cronje and Brig Delport in a vehicle. It was approximately one hour before the explosions took place. They then informed me regarding the operation."
Kindly explain to us what did they inform you of, what are the details?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, if I may just observe this in perspective, I drove the vehicle and the two Brigadiers, one or both, I can't recall, requested that I drive the vehicle because I knew the areas very well. I was then informed that the limpet mine which I had given to Joe Mamasela had been modified with the detonator so that the time delay would be taken away and that the detonators of the other handgrenades had been modified with the zero delay and that approximately 12 o'clock that night they would be delivered to a group of activists who would then attack targets which they had selected and kill or serious injure themselves in the process. But the precise choice of words and who precisely said what is something that I cannot recall, but that would be the information that I received regarding the operation.
ADV GCABASHE: Can you just help me with one small aspect. You were driving around, where? With these two.
MR PRINS: Chairperson, from the premises outside De Notter, where I handed the limpet mine to Mamasela, we drove in the direction of the three black residential areas. The three areas, Tsakane, Duduza and kwaThema were very closely situated to one another and we drove out in that direction so that we could be nearby, should the explosions take place.
ADV GCABASHE: And were you in radio communication with anybody? I mean how would you know that these had occurred at a specific time?
MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, we were in radio communication. As I have already stated, Lt Steenkamp later gave me an instruction per radio to visit a certain scene, so we were in radio contact with one another.
ADV GCABASHE: That's with Steenkamp and anybody else, with Mamasela?
MR PRINS: No, the radios were only a communication measure between members of the Security Branch and then we could also contact the East Rand control station where incidents of crime or murder were reported, we could communicate with that centre.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thanks, Ms Lockhat.
MS LOCKHAT: And then Mr Prins, can you just tell us what your role was, you said that the scene had to be "behoorlik beveilig", what does that include, just give us more detail.
MR PRINS: Chairperson, that would mean that I as a demolitions expert at such a scene would have to ensure that the entire scene was secured. In other words, such as in the case which really took place, where there were handgrenades lying around which had not gone off in a professional manner, I would have to see to these grenades so that nobody would be injured by them.
MS LOCKHAT: Were there any black handgrenades there?
MR PRINS: No, I only know about one black grenade, which I personally was not involved in, but this was in my area during my time, involving an incident on a road. This grenade was used in an attack on a bus. Then there were also black handgrenades of Czechoslovakian origin, which were used by terrorists, although these handgrenades were very rare. They were the only black handgrenades which I knew of in my entire career as a demolitions expert.
MS LOCKHAT: Just one last question. After the incident, who told you to perjure yourself and then fill in these false statements? Who gave you that instruction?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, according to the best of my recollection I cannot recall whether I did this out of my own motivation because I interpreted the circumstances correctly, or whether someone pertinently gave me an instruction. It was generally accepted that the actual facts of police involvement had to be covered up and it may be that I did this out of my own motivation and that nobody gave me a definite instruction.
MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
CHAIRPERSON: Thanks, Ms Lockhat. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: If I may, Mr Chairman.
Perhaps just for those of us who do not know, Mr Prins. You say that you also handled informers.
MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: I wonder if you could give us some background about an informer. Let us suppose and take this group of 20 or whatever number, and among this COSAS group of 20 there would be one person who was your informer, let us just suppose this. Now to begin with, the informer would necessarily have to be one of the leaders or what would the position be?
MR PRINS: Not necessarily one of the leaders, an informer is simply a person who infiltrates, who has been recruited by us and who was prepared to be recruited and it wasn't always possible to recruit leaders in organisations. So an informer could have been an ordinary member or an executive member of an organisation.
MR VISSER: Very well. Would that mean that the informer would not necessarily possess all the information about one particular project?
MR PRINS: Definitely so, Chairperson. In many cases it happened that an informer did not possess all the information and that this was also very dangerous for him to obtain all the information because he is trained by his handler not to ask any unnecessary questions or to ask questions which could arouse suspicions that he may be seeking information to convey elsewhere. There was a great degree of sensitivity in all the banned organisations about informers and informers were specifically tasked not to reveal themselves by means of posing sensitive or other questions which may label them as informers.
MR VISSER: Yes, you have basically answered the question. So to summarise, the informer would not very easily make enquiries about things such as who is the MK member from whom we be receiving the weapons or when will it be delivered or where will it be delivered, those would not be questions which an informer would very easily ask.
MR PRINS: Under certain circumstances he could have asked it without arousing suspicion, this all depended upon his position and then under other circumstances it would have been fatal for him to ask such a question, so it is a bit of a generalisation to give one answer. He may have asked such a question with relative ease or such a question may have posed extreme danger for him.
MR VISSER: Yes. And is it also true that frequently the Security Police had to put together information which was received from various places, before anything emerged?
MR PRINS: Yes, definitely.
MR VISSER: And the reasons that you have just furnished us with, would those be the reasons for it?
MR PRINS: Yes, because one informer would not necessarily possess all the relevant information.
MR VISSER: Yes. And just another thing, you have already been examined on this by my learned friend, Mr Hattingh as well as Mr Booyens. The position during those years, as I understand from you, was that the police could not freely enter these areas.
MR PRINS: No, not at all. I think that I have already given evidence about it, especially with regard to my circumstances which dictated that I had to use an armoured vehicle, that there were specific instructions from the Divisional Commissioners. I can recall that there were even follow-up reports in which members of the Force had ignored it and where they were threatened with legal steps because there had been damage to vehicles and there were medical costs and they were actually held responsible because they acted against instructions to not enter these areas because it was dangerous.
MR VISSER: And you have also confirmed as it was put to you, that there was a warning system, a whistle system. As soon as a policeman or a casspir or a buffel had entered into a black area, whistles were blown and the whole area would know.
MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, the so-called whistle system as we called it, was very pertinent, it was part of the street and block committees of those units. It was definitely so. And I personally had heard of this a lot.
MR VISSER: With this as background, what would you say would the chances be to set up a trap for the people to whom the handgrenades had been given, so that they could be arrested at the place when they wanted to throw these handgrenades?
MR PRINS: Chairperson, under the circumstances of that time, I would want to say it was almost impossible, it would have been known before we had even implemented a plan of action.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions?
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you, Chair.
Mr Prins, the informers you handled, did they give you any information at all pertaining to this group that was killed on the 25th?
MR PRINS: No, not at all. I did not handle any informers with regard to these aspects with the Security Branch, I only at that stage handled informers with regard to labour issues, which was my chief function.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan?
MR MALAN: No, questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Prins - sorry, is there any question arising out the question put by Adv Gcabashe?
MR VISSER: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: That concludes your testimony, Mr Prins, you may stand down.
MR PRINS: Thank you, Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
