ON RESUMPTION
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?
EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, you are applying for amnesty with regard to this incident, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And your application appears in bundle 1, from page 2 onwards.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: In June 1985 you were already connected to C1, which was stationed at Vlakplaas.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And at that stage you still served under the command of Brig Cronje.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And at a stage in June, you were called from Durban where you were busy with your activities.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Who did you meet, or who called you?
MR DE KOCK: I received a call at Marion Hill that morning early, it was approximately 7 o'clock, and the message was that I should contact Springs urgently and drive to Springs. A telephone number was provided. I called and found a person there, although I don't know who the person was, he simply mentioned that Col Cronje urgently requested for me to come to Springs.
MR HATTINGH: Did you then go to Springs?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And who did you find there?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, upon my arrival there I found Capt Venter, he was also connected to C1, and later that afternoon he took me to a house near De Notter, which was identified to me.
MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any direct instructions from Brig Cronje at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: The instruction was that I should go through the following day with Capt Venter to head office and that we were to fetch handgrenades which had been prepared to detonate as soon as the pin was pulled or released.
MR HATTINGH: And was that message conveyed to you by Roelf Venter?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he also told me, he informed me. At that stage he was Col Cronje's second-in-command there at Springs.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And did you go to Pretoria the following day?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we went to Pretoria.
MR HATTINGH: And did you go to head office?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And did you receive handgrenades there?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, we did. I studied some of the handgrenades and found that the grenades had been divided into half approximately and according to my memory they were RG5 grenades, which is an offensive grenade, and the others were F1 handgrenades, which were defensive handgrenades. And all the grenades were of eastern block origin.
MR HATTINGH: Did you know how the handgrenades would be applied, or for what it would be applied?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, at that stage I knew.
MR HATTINGH: Who told you?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the exception of Capt Venter, Cronje also informed me about it.
MR HATTINGH: And how would they be applied?
MR DE KOCK: As I understood it and if I recall correctly, there at De Notter, Col Cronje informed me that a group of activists who were attacking the homes of policemen had already infiltrated and that these handgrenades were going to be provided to these activists.
MR HATTINGH: With the intention to eliminate them?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did you express any opinion about the capacity of these grenades to kill persons?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I asked Capt Venter if he wanted all of them killed or just half, he said all of them. I then informed him that they would not kill everybody. I said this as a result of my experience in four and a half year's worth of training in the north of South West, where I saw the effect of handgrenades, of various sorts of handgrenades, where accidents had taken place involving handgrenades of which the enemy perhaps had held the handgrenade too long or the handgrenade may have fallen back. And that is why I also asked him whether the person or the leader or the chief activist would recognise Joe Mamasela, upon which he answered yes, and then I suggested that this person receive a limpet mine in order to ensure that he be killed.
MR HATTINGH: And at that stage the limpet mine was not among the handgrenades that you had received?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: What was his reaction to that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, regarding the fact that the handgrenades would not kill everybody, he was rather sceptical. It was clear to me that he did not believe me, but with regard to the limpet mine, he was favourably inclined. I cannot recall that we spoke to Brig Schoon, but it was arranged for us to go to the Technical Division ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr de Kock, you said not all of them would be killed, which grenades would have been the more lethal of the ...(intervention
MR DE KOCK: Those would have been the F1 handgrenades.
CHAIRPERSON: The defensive one would have been - you were of the opinion that they would have killed the people handling them?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the RPG5s - RG5s, you were of the view that they wouldn't necessarily kill somebody?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the RG5 handgrenade had a very light aluminium cover, which was used by troops who were attacking. The troop could receive shrapnel, but it wouldn't be fatal. If you stood too close, it could lead to your death, but then one will have to study this in the context of a battalion of 2000 men who were being attacked. You could lose 20 men as a result of an offensive grenade. But I would say that it was a very powerful shock grenade in a very light aluminium cover.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
The limpet mine was then not among the handgrenades which you took into your possession.
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And did you and Roelf then go to the Technical Division in order to investigate the possibility of preparing a limpet mine similarly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And with who did you consult there?
MR DE KOCK: According to my recollection, it was Wal du Toit, Maj Wal du Toit.
MR HATTINGH: And did you express the need that you experienced to him?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And did he say that they would be able to do this?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, if I recall correctly, he said that they would see if they could do anything.
MR HATTINGH: And did you then depart from there?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Without the limpet mine?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And did you then go to Springs with the handgrenades?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And what did you do with the handgrenades there?
MR DE KOCK: The grenades were given to Col Cronje for use. I just want to mention here that I came in at the tail end of the operation, in the last two to three days of the operation. I'm not saying this so that I can indicate that I don't know anything, I will tell you everything that I know. It is just that at times I don't have a very clear recollection of the precise sequence of events.
MR HATTINGH: The handgrenades were delivered, and how long after the delivery would they then be applied?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was not applied on the day that we returned and delivered the handgrenades to Col Cronje, because we did not yet have the limpet mine. And as far as I can recall, it was due for the following evening, that is when the operation was launched.
MR HATTINGH: You did not fetch the limpet mine?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. On page 6 of bundle 1 you say with regard to Mr Mamasela
"Joe Mamasela's role in the operation consists of
(a) He handled the chief activist and his primary objective was to use this man in order to incite other activists to attack the homes of policemen with handgrenades which were obtained from head office, so that they would kill and/or injure themselves.
(b) The handling of Joe Mamasela was managed by Brig Jack Cronje. All information regarding this operation was conveyed by Joe Mamasela to Jack Cronje. I did not know precisely what Joe's instructions were and I was also not present when the handgrenades were delivered to Joe Mamasela. The limpet mine was fetched at du Toit and was placed in the possession of Capt Roelf Venter."
In light of the fact that you say in paragraph (b), that Brig Jack Cronje actually handled Joe Mamasela, you did not know exactly what his instructions were and that you were not present when the grenades were delivered, I want to take you back to paragraph (a) where you say that his primary objective was to use this man in order to incite other activists to attack the homes of policemen and so forth. About the word "incite", was that ever said to you or is this inference?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this is an inference from discussions which I heard, so it wasn't said to me that he had to incite these persons. That was no clear statement to me.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. On the evening which was selected for the attacks, were you present in the area?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, according to my recollection it was at approximately 2 o'clock in the morning - I listened to the other applicants, but I don't really have a very clear recollection thereof, we were on the north-west side of kwaThema, which was the back way to Brakpan through the smallholdings and the detonations took place practically in a series, simultaneously at the preselected hour.
MR HATTINGH: And on that evening, did you visit any of the scenes where the explosions had taken place?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the following morning at approximately 8 or 9 o'clock, Col Cronje and I and Capt Venter drove and visited, as far as I can recall, one of the homes where a man lay who had been killed. We also visited a power station where a tremendous explosion, according to my opinion, had taken place and where body parts lay strewn.
MR HATTINGH: Were these the only scenes that you visited?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And after that, did you have anything further to do with the further course of events?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Were you involved in the arrest of any person?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: With the interrogation of any persons?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did you leave the area?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And when I refer to you, I read somewhere that Brig Cronje stated in his evidence that you and he left the area.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Was it only the two of you who left that area or were there others?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I speak of the area where the scenes were, as far as I can recall it was that same afternoon late or the following day that we left Springs and returned to Pretoria. but that was the entire unit.
MR HATTINGH: So you had nothing further to do with the explosions which took place there that evening and the subsequent investigation?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: The deeds that you committed, you committed under the command of Brig Cronje?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Did he inform you in any way whether that order came from a higher level?
MR DE KOCK: No, however I was under the impression that it went as far as Brig Schoon. I did not know about any other approval. For me the channel went as far as Brig Schoon.
MR HATTINGH: Was the order which was given to you to fetch the handgrenades and to deliver them, and you knew what they were meant for?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And did you agree with that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Why?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, an activist did not attack the home of a policeman, a terrorist would attack the home of a policeman, and in my mind one fought terrorism with counter-terrorism. That was my opinion.
MR HATTINGH: So you believed that you were acting in the struggle against terrorism?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that is why you executed your order?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: What was your rank at the time of this incident?
MR DE KOCK: I was a Captain.
MR HATTINGH: And that of Brig Cronje?
MR DE KOCK: He was a Colonel.
MR HATTINGH: You received no reward for your participation, nor did you participate out of malice or vengeance towards the victims?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Mamasela in his statement or his evidence somewhere, states that he received a reward after the incident, are you aware of that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did you not deliver it to him?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not hand over anything to him.
MR HATTINGH: One of the victims, I forget who it was, either in a statement or in evidence during other proceedings, stated that you were present when he was arrested and that you participated in the arrest and that you also assisted in his interrogation as well as the assault which was carried out on him during interrogation.
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, then I would have requested amnesty for it and I would have stated it during these proceedings.
MR HATTINGH: Therefore you are applying for amnesty for murder, assault with the intention to do grievous harm and various transgressions under the Explosives Act, along with the illegal possession of handgrenades?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Something else has just occurred to me. Someone else, I don't know who it was, it may have been Mamasela, alleged that not only handgrenades and limpet mines were handed over to him, but also two AK47s. What do you have to say about that?
MR DE KOCK: I do not know anything about that. I cannot say that it didn't happen, but I don't know about it.
CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying you can't remember or you didn't hand any over yourself?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not hand over any guns. It was during the last two to two and a half days before the completion of the operation that I was contacted to assist. I don't wish to minimise my responsibility in this matter, but I just want to give you an indication of the scale of my involvement or my participation.
MR HATTINGH: You accept responsibility for your own actions in this matter?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I accept responsibility for my own actions, my own input and my association with the objectives and also insofar as the matter with the limpet mine is concerned, for the Technical Division and then also the members who prepared the limpet mine, that it was my idea to prepare this limpet mine. And with the exception of the preparation they had no other share in it, so I accept responsibility for my actions and their actions in that regard.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr Cornelius, any questions?
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think the sequence has been that I was always second, perhaps it will ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll stick to that. Mr Booyens, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yes. Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few brief aspects.
Mr de Kock, just one aspect. This question of the limpet mine, Mr du Toit's recollection is that the instruction to manufacture the limpet mine was sent to him by Hattingh, is it possible - you say that you cannot recall that you visited Brig Schoon, or something like that, but is it possible that before you went there you spoke to somebody else and that the instruction may possibly have arrived at Mr du Toit in that fashion?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.
MR BOOYENS: Because Mr du Toit says that you and he knew each other very well and that he cannot say that you did not visit him at some point during this incident, but what he says is that the instruction to manufacture the limpet mine came to him from Mr Hattingh.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would accept it as that, because I could not remember anything about Brig Schoon and I'm not prepared to implicate anybody in this unnecessarily.
MR BOOYENS: Just one further aspect, Mr de Kock. It would appear to me that according to your personal role in this matter, with the exception of your recommendation, you may just as well have been left in Durban because you didn't really play such a significant role.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on both sides of the struggle of the past one did not need any stimulation for meanness and I believe that Mr Cronje took me into his confidence, that there was really nothing that I could add to the incident to make it even more of a success.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you, nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr de Kock, I am representing Daniel Nkala. I believe that he was an askari at the Vlakplaas unit.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Now we have led much evidence about it and we have a very thorough history of the background of Vlakplaas, indicating that an askari was someone who had been taken over from the enemy to Vlakplaas and had become an operative who worked with you.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: The askaris also functioned on a very strict need-to-know basis, you gave specific orders which they had to carry out.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And if an askari at any stage returned to his previous political affiliation, it would present serious consequences to your detrement, for example, with the Penge incident as we have seen. And you also had an Askari Disciplinary Committee, which sat at Vlakplaas with the purpose of disciplining askaris if they did not carry out their mandates.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Now Mr Nkala's mandate to me is that he received an instruction from Mamasela, who was his senior, was this the case, was he his senior?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: And he also informs me further, and says so in his application, that he received an order during a meeting with you and Roelf Venter, to recruit members from COSAS.
MR DE KOCK: When I arrived here that organisation had already been infiltrated, there was no input that I could give. I had seen Col Cronje that evening and the following morning we drove through to fetch the handgrenades, so whatever was decided had already been decided and issued, no other persons could be recruited.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you know that there was a recruitment of at least five persons in every area and no more than 20 in total?
MR DE KOCK: No, I simply knew about an organisation which was attacking the homes of policemen and which had already infiltrated.
MR CORNELIUS: I see. Did you have any knowledge of the fact that Mamasela and Nkala were supposed to provide training for these recruited COSAS members in the use of handgrenades?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: This operation was actually under the command of Jack Cronje.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: And it would appear to me that Roelf Venter also played quite a significant role in this.
MR DE KOCK: Yes. I must just mention something, the share that Daniel Nkala performed at that stage was to provide support, for it to be an ANC situation, because he could speak the language, the camp language, that would be the ANC language, the use of certain innuendos and the basic language which the group would speak. It was to ensure that he would appear to be a bona fide ANC member. That is the importance that I saw in it.
MR CORNELIUS: And at that stage you must have known that Mr Nkala came from AZAPO in 1977 and received training from AZAPO and ANC?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was very well trained, one of the best that I had.
MR CORNELIUS: Yes, and he was specifically trained in the use of hand weapons and handgrenades?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: And so-called booby-traps?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: You did not give any orders to Nkala and tell him before the time precisely what the objective of the operation was and that zero-det(?) handgrenades would be handed over to the group?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: And I accept that the reason for that was because it wasn't necessary for him to know that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I gave no input regarding the handgrenade or its application. I'm not really certain what was said to them by Col Cronje. let me put it this way, I did not instruct them operationally in any sense.
MR CORNELIUS: The inference that you drew regarding the incitement of activists, you say you inferred from the discussions that you heard before you left the operation finally?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was an inference that I drew.
MR CORNELIUS: And in conclusion, my client will also give evidence according to his application, that he received R2 000 from you as a reward for his participation in the operation. What do you have to say about that?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage I did not have access to the funds or the delivery of funds.
MR CORNELIUS: And then my client also puts it that with the delivery of the handgrenades, you and Mr Venter were present at the hostel with the expert.
MR DE KOCK: I was at no hostel, Chairperson, not at all.
MR CORNELIUS: Were you ever provided with a thorough list of names of targets?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: That is an aspect that Mr Nkala will give evidence about, he said that when they recruited members they got hold of the names and handed it over to de Kock and Cronje. What do you say about that?
MR DE KOCK: No, I must say that my surname de Kock has rolled off the tongues of people too freely since 1985, all I can say is that I did not have such an extensive share in this matter, I have nothing to hide.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Visser, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr de Kock, I am not certain whether you will recall this, but you must have listened to Steenkamp's evidence regarding a discussion which was to have taken place, not that the discussion is in any way important, but that it was said, I think he said that you said that there would be a surprise, "the people won't sleep tonight". Is it possible that such a discussion may have taken place?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I have no independent recollection of anything like that.
MR VISSER: Very well. The issue of the limpet mine, Mr Venter gave evidence - now I know that you were not represented when the applicants in the Cronje 5 matter gave evidence, coincidentally we were there, but we were not allowed to cross-examine, whatever the case may be, on page 38 of bundle 2A - I beg your pardon, I have been rectified by my learned friend, I'll find the reference to the evidence if it's necessary - he says at the bottom of page 38
"Mamasela then received handgrenades and one limpet mine ..."
Do you have it before you? The final sentence.
"... because Mamasela said that there was one person who wanted to blow up a power station and the limpet mine would work according to the same principle."
And then he says:
"The handgrenades and the limpet mine were handed over to the activists by Mamasela."
Now it would appear as if Venter recalls the matter differently to what you have testified and it would appear that according to his evidence the inference has been drawn that the request for the limpet mine actually came from one of the activists or terrorists. Is it possible that you may have been mistaken today or is he mistaken, what would be the position? Because we have two conflict situations here.
MR DE KOCK: This was about the identification of Joe Mamasela because he was the person and as far as I know, the only person who had come face to face with the chief activist.
MR VISSER: Yes. Just one further aspect. Somewhere in the documents I read, and I cannot really recall exactly where, but Mr Beeslaar - or firstly, was Beeslaar also a member of Vlakplaas at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what's that name?
MR VISSER: B-E-E-S-L-A-A-R. There's a statement by him somewhere, my attorney has just found it. It is in bundle 3A, from page 127.
And in this statement somewhere he has said that he went with you to fetch the handgrenades in Pretoria. I'm just mentioning this because it is a bit of a loose thread.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot place Mr Beeslaar on the scene, I'm uncertain thereof, but I do know that Capt Venter and I went to Pretoria, he and I specifically.
MR VISSER: Well whether Beeslaar accompanied you or not is not really significant.
MR DE KOCK: Very well.
MR VISSER: May I just ask you, the detonators for an RDG5 handgrenade and an F1 handgrenade, would they have been the same? Would you have used the same detonator on both or would you have used different detonators?
MR DE KOCK: The detonation mechanism would be the same, but the lever would be different because an RDG5 is a more round, egg-shaped handgrenade, while an F1 is more oval, but one can adjust this simply by bending it somewhat.
MR VISSER: But the point is, that if somebody said to the Technical Division and asked them to adjust 24 detonators to a zero time delay, they could be adjusted for an offensive or a defensive handgrenade.
MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think the word is that they were interchangeable, there was no problem with that.
MR VISSER: Yes, interchangeable. And just one final question if you will grant me this, Mr de Kock. I don't know if I understood you correctly, but upon a question of the Chairperson you said that to be certain that you would kill somebody you had to use either an offensive or a defensive handgrenade.
MR DE KOCK: No, it was the defensive handgrenade.
MR VISSER: Would that be the one with the tortoise ...(intervention)
MR DE KOCK: Yes, the people like to refer to it in the movies as a pineapple.
MR VISSER: A pineapple?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR VISSER: And the other one you described as a smooth shell, an aluminium shell.
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR VISSER: And would you say that the offensive grenade with the smooth shell could not kill somebody?
MR DE KOCK: No, it could, those pieces of shrapnel were razor sharp and against that high speed and temperature they were designed so that troops using them would have the minimum injuries.
MR VISSER: So if you wanted to be dead certain that you would kill someone you would use a defensive handgrenade?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?
MR MAFORA: I do, Mr Chair, but I see it's almost 4 o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: ... maybe if we could finish this witness it might be good. I'm told that we probably won't finish because we'll do a little bit of research before asking questions. So in that event it would be a convenient time to adjourn. I think after this morning's lesson we'll adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. Would that be better? Hopefully. Thank you.
So we'll adjourn until tomorrow, same venue, at half past nine in the morning.
MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
