Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody, we resume with the Zero-Zero Grenade hearing. When we adjourned yesterday, Mr Mafora was about to commence with his questioning of Mr de Kock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, prior to this incident, how long had you known Mr Mamasela for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I met Mr Mamasela when I started working at Vlakplaas, it was the 1st of July 1983. Somewhere during that time I met him for the first time.

MR MAFORA: And prior to this incident, you had previously worked with him on other operations, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on one occasion there was an attempt in Swaziland to kill the chief of the ANC, Mr Zweli Nyanda, which was unsuccessful. At the second operation, Mr Mamasela was not present. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR MAFORA: And how well did you know him as a person, particularly on the question of obeying instructions that were given by you or other commanders is concerned?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he never worked with me. In all my time I worked more in Northern Zululand and Western Transvaal, against the Pondrif area between Zimbabwe and Botswana. We worked in those border areas. During those times, Mr Mamasela never worked with me.

ADV GCABASHE: But Mr de Kock, would you have any other knowledge, ...(indistinct) from your colleagues, about the manner in which he would take orders, whether he was the type of person who would obey them to the letter etc., etc?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I personally, and it's my personal opinion, did not like Mr Mamasela, he usually followed his own head. He was not a person who could work in a team, he was not a team-worker. That is how I experienced him. At times he was mean with specifically the askaris, but he got on well with other persons, for example, Brig Cronje and Mr Venter. But the two of us personally did not see eye to eye.

MR MAFORA: Okay. How long had you worked with him for, prior to this incident? Or what - can you just give us the full extent of the period with which you worked with Mr Mamasela?

MR DE KOCK: I think we have to define it, that I served in the same group with him from July 1983 up to this incident, but he did not work in my section if I was sent out for field work.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you mentioned that one operation in Swaziland, did you work together there, the Nyanda one?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was present, although I was not in control of the operation and I only saw him when he reported back to Col Cronje.

MR MAFORA: In your testimony yesterday you indicated that there was - you had strict disciplinary measures that were carried out in an event where an askari failed to follow instructions, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, after I took over the command I set up a system.

MR MAFORA: Oh you set up the system?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Okay. Would Mamasela be subjected to those disciplinary measures even though he didn't work under you directly?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when I took over on the 1st of July 1985, Mr Mamasela left my service because of his problems with other members and approximately a month to five weeks he was gone from my unit and the choice was put to him that he either co-operates and that people sort out their problems so that the work could get done, or that he chooses to leave the unit, and he left the unit.

MR MAFORA: But was he ever, to the best of your knowledge, maybe called to a disciplinary hearing for failure to obey instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not know, because he did not serve under me and I did not have that problem.

MR MAFORA: And in your experience, would a - Gen van der Merwe, is it possible that he wouldn't have known that Mamasela and other operatives you know, that he was not fully aware of how this whole operation was going to be carried out? In your experience.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not know. If I was involved from the start with the operation, then I would have been able to comment.

MR MAFORA: In other operations, had you had any dealings with senior police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: How was the briefing carried out in those operations, were they simply giving out instructions and they were not fully briefed as to how the full operation was going to be carried out, or what was your experience?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I could refer to an incident like the Lesotho operation, a submission was made, a request from a senior officer, the submission was made, the capabilities were set out there and the report-back is brief, it does not entail any detail as to who fell where, whose head was where and who bled, how long and whether some persons body was cut in half or those type of details. It was a brief report, eight people were killed or one was caught and documents were seized and weapons were seized. It is short and to the point.

MR MAFORA: But the seniors, were they not briefed of the operators, the people who would be carrying out the operation, the names and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, but I think it would go to a certain level. I don't believe that Brig Schoon would for example, go to Gen van der Merwe and say Joe yesterday had contact with Jan or Koos. If I understand the question correctly.

MR MAFORA: And the - on the question of training you know, there has been this debate whether an instruction was given or not given you know, to train the victims. How did you - is this - I just want your comment here, if training was carried out, would it be in your experience, be something that is contrary to the way you used to carry out your operations? In trapping you know, potential victims.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think each operation is unique on its own, in its own approach and the objective that has to be reached. The approach is never the same because circumstances are never the same. So each and every operation or infiltration is - although there might be a basic guideline, it would be unique on its own, in its own approach that has to be followed.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAFORA

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, I just want to refer you to bundle 2A, page 198, Chairperson, that is Mr Cronje's evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, just the fourth line where Ms Khampepe is questioning Brig Cronje. She asks him:

"Brigadier, what was de Kock's involvement in the whole operation, except that which you had testified, that he collected the consignment of the handgrenades from Pretoria?"

And Brig Cronje answers:

"Chairperson, he merely assisted me with the fetching of the handgrenades, planning the operation and nothing beyond that."

Can you explain to us what did he mean by the planning of the operation? What was your role there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, the only input which I delivered was with regard to the limpet mine. Maybe - and I must draw an inference or speculate, and that is that if there were any gaps he would have wanted me to say it, or what I would say with regard to the staff, but that is speculation.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to take you also to bundle 2A, page 186, also regarding Cronje's evidence regarding the limpet mine. He says - it's in connection with Adv du Plessis' questions to him, he says

"I sent Eugene ..."

... just the top of the page:

"I sent Eugene de Kock to Pretoria to get these handgrenades. Mamasela also told me that there was one of these activists who wanted to blow up a power station in kwaThema and that he was looking for a bomb to be able to do this and for that reason I also requested a limpet mine, which works on the same principle as the handgrenade."

So I just want to get clarification here, who requested the limpet mine, you or ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was me. My recollection is clear about that.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you personally go and request this limpet mine or did Cronje go and request on your behalf? Kindly just elaborate on that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when we collected the handgrenades from head office that discussion took place between myself and Venter and it was thought then about the situation of a limpet mine, to ensure that the chief activist would be killed and that was because of the handgrenades which were of such a nature that the chances to survive would be high.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Ms Lockhat, what did Cronje know about the limpet mine at that stage, when did he get to know about the limpet mine and what circumstances did he get to know about the limpet mine?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when we returned to Springs, Venter and I - and I have a vague recollection thereof, I told him about this and that is when I informed him. I may be corrected, but that is my recollection thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

So you suggested that for this limpet mine, in order to basically eliminate Congress, is that correct? Mtweni.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if I understood it correctly, then from the information he was the only person who could identify Joe Mamasela.

MS LOCKHAT: And then one other issue. I just want to get some clarification. You were requested to come from Durban, basically just to fetch the weapons and then your other only input was suggesting the limpet mine, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why do you think you were called in, Mr de Kock, couldn't somebody else actually go and fetch these weapons? Why were you required, anybody could do that surely.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, up till today I still don't know. I have thought much about it and speculated about it, and if I have to speculate again, there can only be one reason for it and that is that if this operation did not take place in this manner with the handgrenades, then they must have had an alternative operation in mind. But that is pure speculation, because for me to drive to Durban, from Durban to Springs and stay there for two days where I never gave any input and only collected the handgrenades, it is unclear to me. But someone like Brig Cronje would not do anything without any reason and I accepted that there would have been a plan B or C if the handgrenades did not work. But as I have said, it is pure speculation.

MS LOCKHAT: So you didn't discuss plan B or C?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I say now, it is speculation. I request permission to speculate because that is the only other reason that I could think of. As I have said yesterday, not one of the two parties on both sides needed stimulation to be mean towards each other.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I just want to get some - just to see whether you know anything about this. Nkala testifies on page 156, bundle 3A, Chairperson, the top of the page he states

"After I agreed I was taken to Roelf Venter and de Kock by Joe Mamasela, where I was told to follow the following instructions. COSAS members had to be recruited in the three mentioned areas. At least five members in each of the areas, but not more than 20 in total."

Can you tell us whether you indeed had given Nkala these instructions, or whether this is just a fabrication?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not say it's a fabrication, it is probably that he might be mistaking me with somebody else. And I think where Joe Mamasela's confusion comes in and also Mr Nkala, was that they thought I was there all the time on the East Rand, only for the last two days was I there. After the infiltration had taken place, after everything had been arranged, even the handgrenades had been arranged, that is when I entered the picture.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I just want to take you further down the page as well, on page 156, the last line

"After 15 members were recruited we got hold of their names and the names were given to de Kock and Venter."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not have any lists. I had no names and I had no lists.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you ever see a list?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I didn't see a list.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I want to bring you to the next issue of the R2 000 that gets sprayed through all the papers. Matexinge(?) on page 134 in the same bundle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: 3A?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct. At paragraph 9 he states

"I later received R2 000 from de Kock for my ..."

I can't understand that word, but probably his part.

"... for my part in the operation."

And then Nkala, on page 159 of the same bundle, at paragraph 21:

"Approximately two weeks later I, Joe Tobogo each received a bonus in cash from de Kock. The amount that I received was R2 000."

And then Mamasela, on page 184, also states at paragraph 20:

"Because of this operation, Nkala and Tobogo each received R2 000 from de Kock."

Now my question to you is, why all three of these persons with these very same story, kindly elaborate whether you have any knowledge whether this took place or if this is also just a mere fabrication.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if they were paid money, it was not by me. I cannot say that they were not paid, I cannot say that, but I did not pay them, I did not write out any claims for this operation, I did not submit any claims for this operation because it was not my operation. So I cannot say that they did not receive money. If they did receive money, it was not from me.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr de Kock, was there a secret fund where people could actually get paid out at Vlakplaas for operations like this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Secret Fund, one has to submit claims and it goes through the channels and it has to be approved. For example, I can write out the claims, but there are two other situations through which the claim has to go. It has to go through Brig Schoon and he would recommend it and then the recommendation is taken to the Chief of Security and he has to approve it, depending on the amounts which are claimed, but I could not write out a claim for, in this instance, R6 000, draw the money and pay it to them. Not even our Father could do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr de Kock, when did you take over control of C1?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the 1st of July 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: Because on this page 159, Nkala said that it was about two weeks later that he received the R2 000 from you. So that would have been in July, after you were the Head of C1.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it not therefore be possible that you may have paid them the money even though it was not your operation, because it was Cronje's operation and he was no longer there and you were now the head? I mean, who else would have paid the money?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then he would have had to submit the claim, that was Brig Cronje. If I paid out the money I have no problem in saying so. There was an official remuneration, a reward scale if a terrorist was killed or caught, so it's not because I am scared to say that I did it if I did it, but I have no recollection that I paid these people for this operation and I did not submit any claims for this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it then possible that maybe the claims might have been submitted by Cronje before he left, on the last few days of June, and then when they came through that you actually paid over the amounts to the people concerned physically and that you might not be remembering it?

MR DE KOCK: That may be, Chairperson, although I don't have any independent recollection thereof, but if Brig Cronje had submitted the claims then I would have made the payouts.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, did you have any contact with any of these members, any of the victims, after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I'm asking you is because Philip Lukele says that he was arrested and that he was arrested by - after this incident, by Brig Cronje and yourself. I shall refer you to that statement, it's in bundle 2A, Chairperson, it's page 223, it's at line 10. This is basically where he was - he came home and where he was actually arrested. He says at line 10

"They knocked at the door. I got into the ceiling, I hid myself there. They came into the house, they swore at my father. One of them was Brig Cronje, he was present, de Kock was also present."

And then he goes on further:

"So they call themselves an A-Team. That is where I was taken."

Can you just explain this to us, Mr de Kock? You just said now you didn't have any dealings with any of these victims afterwards, but clearly here it seems as if you actually went to go and arrest one of these people.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the only thing that I can say is that the evidence that this man gave here was entirely false. I would go so far as to say that he is lying, and I will stand by that. If I went to fetch him from his house or out of the ceiling, then I would have said so, I have no problem with saying so.

MS LOCKHAT: And just one last question, just regarding the infiltration. Did you know whether there were any instructions, just by mere - just you being there and part of this operation, whether you heard of anything where it was given that Joe Mamasela, Nkala and maybe Matexinge had to go and actually infiltrate these people in the different areas and then obviously give them the weapons and so forth? Do you know anything of that, you personally?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when I arrived in Springs this whole group had already been infiltrated. I was not aware of people - that people had to be recruited one by one in these areas.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just another issue, just regarding the money issue. Is it normal practice for people to get rewarded in operations like this, especially when it was authorised at such a high level?

MR DE KOCK: There were remunerative scales, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you get any remuneration for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why not?

MR DE KOCK: I did not fall into that classification.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the classification for remuneration payments?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was usually of application to members of the public and then also, it was applied to the askaris. If they had caught or injured a terrorist their remuneration would be R2 000, or if they had done anything to lead to the arrest or death of such a person. This was an official remunerative list or scale, which was adjusted on an annual basis, that for example, an AK was worth R600 or R800 if it was handed in, a limpet mine was worth R2 000, a mini-limpet mine was worth R1 000, ammunition for example would be worth R25 for 75 rounds of ammunition, for a SAM7, that's a service to air missile, it would be R7-R8 000.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was a tariff.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, and it was adjusted as necessary, in order to obtain information.

MS LOCKHAT: So this didn't apply to any members of the Police Force, is that what you're saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it didn't.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you were examined regarding the evidence of Mr Cronje when he made his amnesty application. Do you know anything about the answer to his amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you were not represented to be examined in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The question of who requested the limpet mine, you have already explained that it was your idea and that you expressed this idea to Mr du Toit and asked whether it could be done, and your recollection is that you also reported to Brig Cronje about it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that Brig Cronje afterwards may have consulted the Technical Division in this regard and given them instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR HATTINGH: Then with regard to Mr Mamasela, during your criminal trial he also testified against you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And from his evidence it appeared very clearly, and let us put it lightly, that there was no love lost between you and him.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it correct that you and he, as you have already given evidence, didn't really get along, but it went further than that, in fact you clashed quite severely.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. His manner of working, as he regarded it, was not in accordance with the discipline at Vlakplaas. And I must just mention for example, that after he left Vlakplaas, approximately five weeks later, within a week or two, he shot dead an eight year old girl and he alleges that he was attacked. This was somewhere in Vereeniging. So that is the type of person that I did not want surrounding me.

MR HATTINGH: And where did he go after he left you?

MR DE KOCK: He went to Vereeniging and after the shooting of the child or the murder of this child, which was covered up, he went from there to the Security Branch here in Pretoria, where he worked under Brig Cronje, who had the capacity to control Joe to a certain extent.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the witness?

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, thanks, just one or two.

Mr de Kock, let's come back to the limpet mine. I understand that that was your idea.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Was there any suggestion, either from you when you spoke to Cronje, or from Cronje himself or anybody else that Congress, the leader, should be killed because he was the leader of COSATU. Was there any link or any discussion around that at all?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was about the identification of Joe Mamasela. I didn't even know that his name was Congress, that is why I referred to him as the chief activist. I didn't know their names, I didn't know who I was dealing with. These were simply persons who were infiltrating - had been infiltrated.

ADV GCABASHE: When you spoke to Cronje about this, did he indicate to you at all that some of the other members, some of the other activists might be able to identity Mamasela or Nkala as well?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, as I understood it during that brief period of time that I was there, Joe basically liaised on a one-on-one basis with Congress and he was a latent danger. And if he survived the operation he would be able to identify Joe Mamasela and that would create problems for the Security Police.

ADV GCABASHE: I say this because there's a statement from one of the activists in our bundles, that does identify Mamasela as somebody who he recognised when he saw him on TV. It must have been much much later, but he realised that this was the chap who had taken them through the basic training they'd been through.

MR DE KOCK: Very well, I would accept that, I would not dispute it. However, this is the concentration of the information that I had at my disposal after the entire situation had developed.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if I could just on that point. One would imagine that the persons to whom the grenades had been given had to receive some sort of training, how to pull the pin, how far to throw the grenade in order for it to be safe, that sort of advice, and one would imagine that that would be given in a group situation rather than just to the main activist to relay it on.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would concede to that, that it had to be that way. I must just state that a handgrenade although it is one of the most powerful weapons, it is also one of the simplest weapons because any person who found himself in the infantry was simple minded in any way. It is an extremely simple weapon, it is like a stone with a handle and a pin, you pull the pin and you throw it, that's that, and then you would just have to see to it that you had to be at least 10 metres away from the grenade otherwise you might encounter shrapnel, but that is a bit technical.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Did I understand you to say that on the night of the incident, you were in a motor vehicle with Mr Delport and Mr Cronje?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not see Mr Delport there, it was me Cronje and Venter. There may have been other people, but I only went to greet Brig Delport. It would be highly undisciplined not to visit the head of the unit if you were in his area.

ADV GCABASHE: But you didn't have any detailed discussions with him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not at all.

ADV GCABASHE: Had you before this incident, heard at all what problems Delport might be having in the East Rand, just generally? Because you were kept informed you know, or areas that you would have to go and help out in. Had you heard anything at all about the East Rand?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I grew up in those areas and I grew up in an area such as Springs for example, after that I stayed in Boksburg. The Vlakplaas unit, C1, operation on a national basis or at least all the reports which were sent through on a national level every day were also channelled through C1. And before this operation the East Rand was an absolute melting pot, it was a witches brew of violence, so it wasn't necessary for me to go to Mr Delport to find out whether or not he was really experiencing problems. There was violence on a daily 24-hour basis in the East Rand, but the same situation prevailed in the Eastern Cape, such as Port Elizabeth and because we worked so close to the area we were quite involved in it.

ADV GCABASHE: On the night of the incident - if I can come back to that, I forgot to ask, were any of your men deployed near any of the targets that were to be hit that night?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I drove with Brig Cronje. If he had deployed any of the other persons I wouldn't have known about it, but I would have found it strange because one wouldn't want one's people in such an area because they ran the risk of being caught by the uniform police and the uniform police didn't know who the askaris were.

ADV GCABASHE: Then finally if I can ask you to look at 3A, it's Mr Mamasela's statement. He says on page 182 that you decided that Nkala should assist him. Are you saying that that's incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: No, that would not be correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Then if we look at - this is 2A, Mr Lukele's statement, that's one of the victims, page 223. Ms Lockhat referred you to an earlier portion. Further down on page 223, around line 20 and below, about 24, he says that you put a gun into his father's mouth and he talks about - further down, that he was taken to a forest, his feet were handcuffed as well as his hands, right at the bottom of that page. I hear you when you say this was not you, you were not there.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you get to know about anything of this nature that might have happened there?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I never handled any of these persons, I didn't even make enquiries or request progress reports for further reference later on.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that point. Do you know whether Brigadier or Colonel or whatever he was then, Cronje was involved in the arrest of any of the activists?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if I recall correctly, at that stage the only reason why we moved the following morning to some of these areas where the explosions had taken place was because we were a counter-terrorism unit and it would have been strange if we did not visit these places. But then Brig Cronje also had to report about it and that is the only reason why we returned to those areas. He did not make any arrests whatsoever. And on that day in that case, I spent the whole day with Brig Cronje and I can assure you that under no circumstances would I have withheld this here. If I had arrested Lukele or interrogated him, I would have been able to provide much more detail regarding the interrogation, if that had been the case.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you, Chair. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: Just on this point, who would usually have carried out these arrests, if there is such a concept?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have been members of the uniform branch from the bottom unit and the Security Branch which was operational in that area, because they would have had to investigate these matters. Then also perhaps members of the Detective Branch, who were co-opted. I'm just providing this as a broad range of possibilities.

MR MALAN: Vlakplaas would not usually have been involved in arrests, is that what you're saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not in this case, we would definitely have kept away from these people.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: I wonder Mr Chairman, whether I couldn't assist. It has nothing to do with my case, but it is important to know that Lukele wasn't one of the persons arrested and charged together with the group of survivors. We don't know why he was arrested and when it was done, those questions were never asked of him, but he was clearly not arrested in regard to the criminal trial which followed against the survivors of the handgrenade incident. I thought that might be relevant to Mr Malan's last question.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr de Kock, I know that you say you weren't involved in the planning of the operation at all, or the conceiving of the idea and how it should be carried out, but we've heard and you've heard the evidence that information was received that these people were wanting to attack police or councillors' houses and that they were waiting for arms and so the plot was hatched to anticipate that by infiltrating them, giving them booby-trapped handgrenades and kill them. Can you think of any reason why in those circumstances it should have been so strongly stressed that those people should not in any way be incited to commit any attack or crime, once they've been infiltrated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes ...(intervention

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to find out what the logic is behind it, if there is any or why was that stressed?

MR DE KOCK: Well I have two ideas about that, the first is that if there was information that these people were waiting for weapons and that information was channelled through to the Security Branch, then one could even point out the Piet Retief incident here, where you would be one step ahead of your opposition, you would take the place of someone who was supposed to come, that would be basic interception.

The second option would be that it wouldn't help to incite people who did not want to attack the homes of policemen, because those persons that you had incited could be killed or injured, but the original persons would still be there. That's my perception of it. So you would have to see that you reach the right people. It doesn't help to swot the flies but leave the eagles.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but there would have been certainly incitement in relation to the limpet mine, because that was taken to some power supply or power station which wasn't contemplated before the limpet mine idea came to the fore.

MR DE KOCK: I have no recollection of who made the target indications and I don't have any information about that, I would simply expect that if there were target identifications, this would come from the group itself. I would not be able to testify whether Joe Mamasela told him to make certain identifications of people or homes, Mamasela would have to give us explanations about who identified the targets. I wouldn't be able to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions that have been put by members of the Panel? Thank you, Mr de Kock, that then concludes your testimony, you may stand down.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED