Amnesty Hearings

MR BOOYENS: I call Mr Bellingan, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names for the purposes of the record, please.

MR BELLINGAN: Wilhelm Riaan Bellingan.

WILHELM RIAAN BELLINGAN: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, thank you. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, please page to page 12 of the Bundle. This is the section of your amnesty application up to page 27 which you have already given evidence about on various occasions and also referred to, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm this as correct for the sake of the general background and general political motivation for your involvement?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Please turn to page 28. You are applying for any offence or delict relating to the death of the deceased in this matter, Mr Brian Ngqulunga, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And we have just heard from my learned friend, Mr Wagener, that apparently you are incorrect when you say that it was the 19th of July, perhaps it should be the 20th of July, is it also your recollection that this was on a Friday?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Chairperson, may I please request that amendment, I will accept the word of my learned friend. Now in July 1990, you were a Warrant Officer?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Before the time you received an order from Col Baker that you were to meet Mr de Kock at the House of Coffees, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: According to your recollection, how long was this before the date upon which the deceased died?

MR BELLINGAN: It may have been a few days, a week, perhaps 10 days, I cannot say with one hundred percent certainty.

MR BOOYENS: But it wasn't a protracted length of time?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it wasn't.

MR BOOYENS: And it wasn't also on the same day or two days before?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it was not.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then go to the House of Coffees?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Who can you recall being there, it was you, Mr de Kock and Mr Baker?

MR BELLINGAN: I accept.

MR BOOYENS: Who else was there?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, later I heard that Piet Botha had been there, Wouter Mentz was also there, I cannot recall everybody who was there, but I believe that all of them were present.

MR BOOYENS: So you cannot recall specific persons?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: Did a discussion ensue regarding the deceased there in the House of Coffees?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Who did the talking basically?

MR BELLINGAN: It was Col de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: What did he tell you?

MR BELLINGAN: Col de Kock in so many words told us that Brian was busy turning back again and that the big guys wanted us to make a plan with him.

MR BOOYENS: Back to what?

MR BELLINGAN: Back to the ANC.

MR BOOYENS: What about the ANC, the military wing or the political wing?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I don't think at that stage there was civil and military, I think everything was military. They had their underground movements. The word ANC MK may have emerged, but I cannot say with clarity.

MR BOOYENS: You knew Mr Ngqulunga, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Previously you had worked together?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was at Vlakplaas.

MR BOOYENS: What is your recollection, you said that Mr de Kock said he was away from Vlakplaas on and off and then he went to Head Office, would you agree with that?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And from when did this thing begin that he would be gone and then back again and so forth?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot say with clarity, but it would have been in the late 1980's, early 1990's, I cannot recall the precise dates, but he would be at Head Office and then return to the farm.

MR BOOYENS: And after that he worked full-time at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And upon this occasion, was this the time when he worked in the postal section?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you have heard the evidence of the access that those people working in the postal section had to sensitive documents?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: According to your own knowledge, would that description be correct?

MR BELLINGAN: It is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. You make the statement on page 28 that according to Col de Kock he also had information about the police activities, which he had given to his comrades, which had led to the death of policemen, according to de Kock, there was a suspicion that he had already lured police officers into traps during which some of them had been killed, can you elaborate on that?

MR BELLINGAN: Well, this the inference that I drew from my discussion with Mr de Kock, so I cannot say according to my recollection that this is one hundred and ten percent correct.

MR BOOYENS: And then you say that his involvement with the ANC created a perception of fear with those in the Security Forces and at Vlakplaas and this had to do with police officers who had been shot dead on the East Rand, could you elaborate please?

MR BELLINGAN: I would not say that this is my precise recollection, but this could have been some of the black members who came forward and said "what is going on with Brian, sometimes he does this and sometimes he does that", there were rumours, we didn't know exactly what the rumours were, but they were in existence.

MR BOOYENS: We have heard evidence that the askaris didn't really trust each other either?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This is the background that was given to you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any reason to doubt the correctness of the sources or the correctness of the information which was conveyed?

MR BELLINGAN: I believed one hundred percent that if Mr de Kock came to me with a suggestion or an order, I believed what he was telling me, I wouldn't have doubted it, because he would never have made anything up. Therefore I believed what he said completely.

MR BOOYENS: And so you then believed that there was information such as the information pertaining to the involvement of Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was an order then issued that a plan should be formulated to eliminate him?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Who gave the order?

MR BELLINGAN: Col Baker spoke to us and told us that we should view a site where we could eliminate him.

MR BOOYENS: The question is who gave the order for him to be eliminated?

MR BELLINGAN: Sorry, it was Col de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: And then Col Baker who would basically be in command on ground level, gave instructions with regard to the planning of the operation?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: We have already heard other evidence that the attack was coloured in such a way that it would appear to be an ANC attack, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Where did this idea come from, that it should appear as such?

MR BELLINGAN: If I recall correctly, it was Col de Kock or Col Baker's idea that we should orchestrate it to appear to be an ANC attack because other policemen had been killed in such attacks.

MR BOOYENS: According to your recollection, was it the practice to open fire with a machine gun on people in that fashion?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And was the planning then undertaken that Simon Radebe would take Mr Ngqulunga to a certain point at which you would pick him up?

MR BELLINGAN: That is what I heard from Col Baker.

MR BOOYENS: You had nothing to do with the practical arrangements as such?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: And later that night, you went in the Volkswagen kombi to the Skurweberg Road?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Please tell the Committee what happened there?

MR BELLINGAN: When we stopped behind Simon's vehicle, I think his lights were on bright, we climbed out and I opened the door and grabbed Brian by the neck and I slipped and told Pieter Botha to take over, and that is when Brian said to us "but I am one of you, I am a comrade" or something like that. That is what it boiled down to. He made some statement, I cannot recall his precise words, it appeared that he thought it was ANC people who were taking him. We then loaded him into the kombi and drove with him to the Brits vicinity.

MR BOOYENS: The statement that you make about Mr Radebe that he would have been away for a few days to serve as an alibi, is something that you made up?

MR BELLINGAN: Later I heard that that was the alibi which was created for him.

MR BOOYENS: So you wouldn't be able to say whether he really went away or whether he went home?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: You had two AK's with you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And in every AK there were two magazines?

MR BELLINGAN: I think there were two magazines each.

MR BOOYENS: Where did you get this?

MR BELLINGAN: If I recall correctly, Col de Kock gave it to us on the farm or at a place near the road, I am not entirely certain where we obtained the arms and ammunition.

MR BOOYENS: But the point is that you had two AK's with you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How were you dressed?

MR BELLINGAN: We were dressed in very dark clothing with gloves and dark, woollen balaclavas.

MR BOOYENS: You say that you grabbed the deceased by the neck where he was seated on the passenger seat and he said something about comrades, what happened then?

MR BELLINGAN: I pulled him out of the vehicle, it was me, I slipped and then I asked Mr Botha to take over, it happened very quickly, they must have seen that I was slipping and then they moved in and took over.

MR BOOYENS: So the persons on the side of the deceased were you, Botha and Mentz?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And where was Baker?

MR BELLINGAN: The last time I remember seeing him was in the vehicle, later I heard that he was talking to Simon.

MR BOOYENS: But you were not aware of it at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, what happened then, you had him out of the vehicle, what next?

MR BELLINGAN: He was screaming and I think that Mr Botha hit him over the head and he was loaded into the kombi. There was a further struggle, I climbed in on the left front side and we immediately pulled away. I heard that there was an altercation in the back, it could have been that one of us said "just shut him up, he is making a noise" and then we drove in the direction of the place.

MR BOOYENS: Was the man silenced later in some or other way?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, later I heard that he was no longer making a noise.

MR BOOYENS: Did you hear any blows being delivered?

MR BELLINGAN: I must have heard such sounds, I just cannot remember now, but I must have heard it.

MR BOOYENS: How was the deceased transported in the back of the vehicle?

MR BELLINGAN: Later I heard from Mr Botha ...

MR BOOYENS: You didn't look?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I didn't look, it was very dark in the vehicle as well.

MR BOOYENS: Then you arrived at a certain point, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And what happened there, please tell us in your own words.

MR BELLINGAN: I think that is where Mr Baker made a U-turn and we were facing the Pretoria side once again, the door was opened, Pieter Botha and Wouter Mentz carried him out and when they put him down, I fired a full magazine into him from the back. It was very dark and then I emptied the magazine on him.

MR BOOYENS: How many shots would an AK magazine contain, about 30?

MR BELLINGAN: I think so.

MR BOOYENS: My learned friend has already asked some of your colleagues why it was necessary to fire 30 shots at a man?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, the order as we interpreted it correctly was to make it appear to be a revenge attack from MK, that it was supposed to look like another murder of one of the askaris.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, and after you emptied the magazine, did you fire single shots or automatic?

MR BELLINGAN: I think it was automatic. That is when I said to Mr Botha he should check that I had fired all the shots at him and that is when he came closer and fired more shots, we climbed back into the vehicle and drove away.

MR BOOYENS: In the final paragraph, on page 30, you make the same statement as your colleague with regard to the questioning of orders from Mr de Kock, whether it be defensive or offensive operations. With regard to you, as the footsoldiers of Vlakplaas, an operation such as this, did you think that it was something that Mr de Kock would make up or initiate by himself?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I couldn't see how Brian had a hold on Mr de Kock and I believed that if he came with such a request or an order rather, I would have believed it. As I have said in previous evidence, I did not doubt the word of Mr de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: Did Col de Kock tell you from who specifically the order came?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I cannot say precisely. He said it came from above, I believed it to have been Gen van Rensburg, but it would definitely have come from that higher level.

MR BOOYENS: It would definitely have come through him because he was the Head of C-Section at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: One hundred percent, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you or Mr Baker or any of the others at any stage have anything to do with the overall principle planning of operations, in other words "go and attack Botswana" or "eliminate Brian Ngqulunga" or "do this or do that"?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you simply act as order takers?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Questions were also put to the colleague pertaining to whether or not there were any manner that you as a Warrant Officer for example could determine whether or not the information which was relied upon, was correct, this information pertaining to Mr Ngqulunga.

MR BELLINGAN: No, I would not have made any inquiries at Head Office, because it just did not work that way.

MR BOOYENS: Did you believe that if the information came from someone in Head Office, that that information would have been correct and verified?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, just to summarise, after you had shot the man, you travelled back to Pretoria, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In a kombi? You have heard the evidence of Mr Baker and you have heard the journey that you undertook and that you slept in Johannesburg that night?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I concur one hundred percent with the evidence of Mr Baker.

MR BOOYENS: You also use the word double-agent on page 32. What do you mean when you refer to double-agent?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, a double-agent is someone who sits on both sides of the fence, and I think that there were many of those during that time who were in the Security Forces, someone who was uncertain and would work for the liberation movements and still remain in the police, or the converse being someone who was in the liberation movements, yet working for the State at the same time, that would be a double-agent.

MR BOOYENS: And could such a double-agent have been to the detriment of the Security Forces?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, because he had access to information and covert operations and he knew about incidents during the past, the apartheid past, so a double-agent would be a source of concern for anyone.

MR BOOYENS: The ANC was unbanned early in February 1990, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, the 2nd of February 1990.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, and what was the position according to your knowledge as a Security Policeman working in the field, did you still send askaris out?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes Chairperson, we still went to the airport, we were sent to the airport with the askaris and then we would let the askaris sit there on the balcony to watch people, seeing them come in and then they had to identify ANC members who were coming past, we were still allowed to operate in Johannesburg streets where the ANC had established themselves. I remember during one of the last incidents, where we caught a freedom fighter, this was in Checkers in Hillbrow, we were still permitted to continue with our activities, we had not yet been placed in the field of organised crime.

MR BOOYENS: Allowed or instructed to continue?

MR BELLINGAN: Instructed to continue.

MR BOOYENS: So with regard to your superiors, the struggle was not over?

MR BELLINGAN: We were very prepared, but we were also very uncertain, it was a very uncertain time for everyone in the Security Forces.

MR BOOYENS: What was the position regarding actions taken by MK members and so forth, did they simply make peace at that stage, what was the case?

MR BELLINGAN: Even though Operation Vula had been exposed, the Security Policemen at Vlakplaas was still trying to decipher the computer system and all of this was taking place during the 1990's.

MR BOOYENS: What was the position with regard to onslaughts on policemen, once again after the unbanning, did it continue or did it cease, what was the position?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it continued Chairperson, there were still train murders and a lot of faction and ethnic fighting. It was almost as if there was more violence than during the apartheid era.

MR BOOYENS: Especially in certain parts of the country, yes. Very well, is there anything further? Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Bellingan, we have already surmised last week that you were a founding member of Vlakplaas, C1 at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you later hear of the involvement of Vlakplaas in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: That was general knowledge amongst Vlakplaas members Chairperson, although I was not involved there. I heard that there were people involved in the murder.

CHAIRPERSON: The murder of whom?

MR HATTINGH: Griffiths Mxenge.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: ... amongst you before Mr Nofomela made his revelations, so you knew then?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And were you aware that Mr Ngqulunga had also been involved in the murder of Mr Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: According to the information I knew Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And when you met in the House of Coffees with Mr de Kock, you can probably not recall everything that he told you there?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that the murder of Mr Mxenge also was addressed there and that there was a fear that Mr Ngqulunga would go and speak about his part in this murder and in such a manner, support Mr Nofomela's revelations?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: After Mr Ngqulunga had left Vlakplaas, you did not have any further dealings with him?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I may have met him in the hall, but I did not have any further personal dealings with him.

MR HATTINGH: And you say as far as you know, Mr de Kock had no reason why he wanted to get rid of Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And up until the time that you heard from him about the information that Head Office had, you did not know that Mr Ngqulunga had considered walking over to the ANC or never had information about that?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And consequently, there was no reason to act against him?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You had no information to that extent until Mr de Kock told you what he heard at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have been questioned or Mr Baker was questioned if it was necessary to murder him in such a brutal manner and to fire so many rounds into him, what was the traditional method in which the ANC would have killed him?

MR BELLINGAN: Well Chairperson, if they didn't shoot him like we shot him, they would have killed him by means of the necklace method.

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, and the necklace method would be much more brutal because here he was killed instantly.

MR HATTINGH: And with regards to Mr Mxenge, he was stabbed with knives?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was stabbed with knives like he was slaughtered like a bull.

MR HATTINGH: With regard to the instruction to Vlakplaas after the unbanning of the ANC, did you study the part in Mr de Kock's supplementary affidavit with regard to Vlakplaas after the unbanning of the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe I have studied it, but not recently.

MR HATTINGH: Where he deals with Vlakplaas after the unbanning and where he says that he recommended to Gen Engelbrecht that the Unit be closed down because of the negotiations and the General said that the negotiations might not be successful and then you had to be prepared?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, we knew we had to continue and we had to work on organised crime, and if anything happened with the negotiations, we would be prepared.

MR HATTINGH: And you have already said now, you continued arresting political persons who had been banned, who had returned into the country?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also involved in other operations of a political nature as you had been before the unbanning of the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: You were asked about the killing of Griffiths Mxenge, do you know this, it was said by certain people that the reason for committing this murder was to safeguard the reputations of senior police officers who might have been involved in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: I heard that later Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Bellingan, at that stage in 1990, what was your rank?

MR BELLINGAN: I was a Warrant Officer Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Do you know which senior officers were implicated in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I read about it in newspapers but it was never pertinently put to me that A, B and C had been involved, but I did not pay much attention to it.

MR LAMEY: Do you know who was the Overall Commander of Vlakplaas at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: It was in 1981 and I believe it would have been Col Willem Schoon at that stage. It was the time when Dirk Coetzee started with the farm and before he left.

MR LAMEY: Did you understand according to the information, from Col de Kock that there had been a break in security or that there would be a break in security at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: I understood Chairperson, that it had already taken place and that that was the concern.

MR LAMEY: Let us suppose that he had made contact with the ANC or let us suppose that he would make contact with the ANC, is it correct that this would go further with regard to an additional person who will come around with a revelation with regard to incidents in the past of which he has knowledge and where Vlakplaas was involved with?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Amongst others the Griffiths Mxenge incident?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You have given evidence that you as a junior officer had no reason to question or to doubt the accuracy of information that came from Head Office and which was conveyed to you by Col de Kock, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: May I ask you as follows, was it also the position of your colleagues, the junior colleagues, that they never had, they would never question something like that during that time?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And if they had questions, eye-brows would be lifted with regard to that person himself?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that Mr de Kock was since he took over command of Vlakplaas, particularly a very strong leader, he had very strong leadership qualities and according to which his members at Vlakplaas believed in him and trusted him?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Bellingan, if I have a look at it, Mr Ngqulunga had already left Vlakplaas at the stage when he was eliminated, he was stationed at Head Office, he, it would seem, did not hold any threat for any of the members of Vlakplaas personally or according to the knowledge of the members of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, but he lived amongst them in Soshanguve and I believed that he was close to many of the members from Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: But what I mean is according to your knowledge, before this information came about, there was no mention that he was a threat to the members of Vlakplaas, apart from the fact that he had trouble with his nerves and the incident with his wife?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You must have heard by means of hearsay of the Motherwell incident or do you not know of it?

MR BELLINGAN: I knew of it Chairperson, it was just talk in the halls and one does not ask questions if it was not pertinently stated to you.

MR LAMEY: If I may just put it to you that it was a matter where a break in security had taken place with regard to police members and askaris in the Eastern Cape and where Vlakplaas was requested to act there, and we also find it would seem to me it was more of a security breach at Head Office and Vlakplaas was asked to act?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: If we study the Sikhakane matter which will be heard in the future, it is an askari from Natal and Vlakplaas was asked to act?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't know about that matter Chairperson, but I drew the same inference there.

MR LAMEY: So with the exception of Mr Ntehelang where there was previous approval with regard to members who were under suspicion or with regard to where a security breach was possible, Vlakplaas had to do the work?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And you had been a long-standing member of Vlakplaas, one does not know why Vlakplaas was used and why other members could not do it, but the obvious reason would be that Vlakplaas was the operational arm?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Other places were used for other operations, weren't they?

MR BELLINGAN: If I understand the Chairperson correctly, other Units were used for their own operations?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Vlakplaas from what we have heard, appears to have been the Unit that was called in where some unpleasant secretive operation had to be conducted?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson, maybe other Units did this on their own as well. In many instances Vlakplaas was called in to sort out other persons' problems.

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is what Mr Nortje says in his application, he says in hindsight it seems that Vlakplaas was only used to do other people's dirty work.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson, we were just the useful idiots.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: If I could just clarify something that really hasn't got much to do with your evidence, you said that he lived amongst the askaris at Soshanguve?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the askaris not live at Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: The unmarried members lived there Chairperson, and the married members had houses for which they had a subsidy in Soshanguve, Mabopane, Letlhabile, Atteridgeville, Mamelodi and all those places Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They didn't all live as Gen van Rensburg says, in one block?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They were scattered around, that is the married ones?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairperson. Mr Bellingan, you say that you were a founding member of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So from which year, up to which year were you there?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, let me put it as follows, I think the 4th of August 1981 as I have testified previously, Dirk Coetzee got staff members together along with Brig Jan du Preez and officially started Vlakplaas. Before that Vlakplaas existed since the Rhodesian war where some of the former Commanders were there, there were askaris and Dirk Coetzee was there, but officially they said that a structured Vlakplaas had to be established where rules and regulations could be laid down and how the people would go about their work. It was the 1st or the 3rd or the 4th of August 1981 and I was there up till 1984 when I went to the Research Desk for a while and then I went to South-West Africa for border duty and then Col de Kock requested me to return. I left on the 6th of March 1993.

MR WAGENER: So except for a small or a brief interruption, you were there for approximately 12 years it would seem?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And during that time, Mr Bellingan, were you involved in many operations of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I would not say many, many legal operations under apartheid, the combating of terrorism, the arrest of terrorists and if one could call those operations, but those were not all operations like cross-border operations, abductions and so on.

MR WAGENER: I understand your answer, but maybe my question was not so clear. In so far as you referred to legal operations, are you aware of a single such legal operation where the instructions came to Vlakplaas from outside the Security Branch?

MR BELLINGAN: Are you saying from outside the Security Branch?

MR WAGENER: Yes.

MR BELLINGAN: I think the army may have come with some requests to Brig Schoon, I cannot comment on that.

MR WAGENER: Let me put it more clear, did you at Vlakplaas ever receive instructions to launch operations from seniors, from officers, from Commanders not attached to the Security Branch?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, he would have come through the line of command.

MR WAGENER: And then I accept that you refer to legal operations and then I must accept that we could refer to illegal operations, would the same be applicable there?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WAGENER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairperson, van der Walt for the record. Mr Bellingan, what was your own political affiliation during 1990?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I was not a listed member of the National Party, but I voted for them.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were you an enlisted member of any political party?

MR BELLINGAN: No, but I registered every year.

MR VAN DER WALT: You were not a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party per chance?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do you know of Mr de Kock's political affiliations?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I heard later through media that he was an Inkatha member, but he was very apolitical, he believed in the government of the day, but he was not a person who would support a leftist party or a rightist party.

MR VAN DER WALT: But you say you indeed had heard in the media that he was a member of the Inkatha?

MR BELLINGAN: I think I might have read it somewhere, I cannot say with certainty.

MR VAN DER WALT: Also not the government of the day, was he a double-agent?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I cannot comment to that.

MR VAN DER WALT: You refer to the deceased as Brian, did you know him on a personal level?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I knew him very well. When I arrived at the farm in 1981, I think Brian was already there. Yes, he was there because we deployed in Lady Grey in the Eastern Cape and Brian was along and there was snow and it was winter.

MR VAN DER WALT: And this would not cause you to hesitate, to empty a magazine of an AK47 in him?

MR BELLINGAN: Today Chairperson, when I look back, I think differently, but then I believed that a person who betrayed one, we had a saying you could face a thousand men, but you could not deal with somebody who stabbed you in the back. If I received the instruction from Col de Kock, I would have executed it again.

MR VAN DER WALT: During Mr Ngqulunga's evidence before the Harms Commission, you were aware of the concern which was about with regard to what may be revealed about his evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, there were some rumours that he was telling lies to the Harms Commission and if it was ever revealed, it would be an embarrassment for the government.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was there a concern about his testimony before the Harms Commission?

MR BELLINGAN: Nobody discussed it with me, but it was just a feeling that there was some concern.

MR VAN DER WALT: So you are aware that from the viewpoint of the Security Branch, there was no detrimental testimony given by him to the Harms Commission?

MR BELLINGAN: Not with regard to Mr Ngqulunga, no.

MR VAN DER WALT: You have followed the proceedings here today and you have heard that Mr de Kock had testified that the information which he received, was that the deceased was trying to reach the ANC, I believe that was his evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: If I understand you correctly and if we have a look at your application, your statement, it would be on page 28 and the information which came from Mr de Kock, went much further, and I refer you to the last paragraph, you say there amongst others in the first instance, the fourth sentence that the information which you received from Mr de Kock was that he had indeed returned to MK, the military wing of the ANC, not only back to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you state further that he was busying himself with identifying East Rand police officers and their homes for the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is how I understood the information, it was generally put to us and that is how I interpreted it.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you also put further if we continue with the statement that there was concern with regard to his work in the postal section where there was sensitive information and that according to information, he was disclosing this Intelligence to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you also say the second last sentence, according to Col de Kock, he also had information with regard to police actions and members which he supplied to his comrades which led to the death of police officials, was this information that you received from Col de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: This is how I understood it Chairperson, it is put very strongly here, but this is how I understood it.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were any police officials' names mentioned?

MR BELLINGAN: Not that I can recall Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And furthermore that he had been luring police officials into traps where some of them had been killed, was this from Mr de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: This was the information, this is the inference I drew from the information Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: You see Mr Bellingan, I find it very strange that Mr de Kock would have only testified during these proceedings that the deceased had according to information, wanted to contact the ANC, if that had been the detail?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I consulted with Mr de Kock, he told me if this is the inferences which I drew, then he will accord with it.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do I understand your evidence correct if we look at page 29 - I beg your pardon, I would just like to correct that question, page 29 is not relevant, but were there fears about the other askaris or just about the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I think it was about the majority of the askaris because this was an uncertain time, we had fetched them, we turned them and now they were on our side and now the ANC comes, it must have been a very uncertain time for them. For us it was also uncertain, because possibly there might have been more of them who wanted to go back to the ANC.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were names mentioned of the other askaris who wanted to return to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: Not that I can recall right now Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Can you recall that there were pertinently allegations that there were other askaris who wanted to return?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't think it was only the askaris, there were some of the white members as well, there was a concern with regard to the white members too.

MR VAN DER WALT: But still Mr Ngqulunga was the only askari who was murdered because of these reasons and of these fears and the other askaris whom you referred to, were not murdered?

MR BELLINGAN: There are other cases where Mr Baker said that he was involved, where askaris were murdered, so there are other cases where askaris were also murdered.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you try to verify this information, you have already told the Committee that you were a personal friend of the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I would have met him and talked to him, one got on well with all the people on the farm, but you could not ask questions. If there was a leakage, then your head would be on the block. What Mr de Kock said was accepted and we left it at that.

MR VAN DER WALT: So you acted more under instruction other than the furtherance of a political objective?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, but I still had a political objective and it was still my objective to protect the government of the day.

MR VAN DER WALT: But Mr Ngqulunga had the ideal opportunity before the Harms Commission to do great damage to the government of that day?

MR BELLINGAN: I do not want to comment on that, but he did not do any damage at that stage.

MR VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon, if the Committee would just grant me a moment. The killing of the deceased, you must comprehend that there are some questions from the family which they came here to have answered. Before the deceased were shot, was he undressed, what was the situation?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, not that I can recall, he was taken as we had picked him up and I put him on the ground and I shot him, I don't believe that any of my colleagues removed his clothing Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you shoot him all over his body?

MR BELLINGAN: It was very dark Chairperson, I would have had to feel with my foot and I pressed the gun against him and I shot him.

MR VAN DER WALT: Because the deceased's spouse says at the stage when she had to identify him, he was clothed in clothing where there were no bullet holes and there was no damage to the clothing that he had been wearing and her impression was that he had been undressed when he was murdered?

MR BELLINGAN: Definitely not Chairperson, this was a matter of seconds, there was no ritual, we did not undress him or anything like that.

MR VAN DER WALT: Somewhere along the line, it must have been somebody else, it was definitely not us.

MR VAN DER WALT: The deceased at that stage, had an attaché case with him at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, not that I can recall.

MR VAN DER WALT: Because that is one of the questions that the family has, what happened to his personal belongings?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, when we fetched him from the vehicle, it was all unclear, I did not see any attaché case.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, after you had emptied the magazine of, the one magazine into the deceased, why was it necessary for Mr Botha to also fire shots at the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I called him Chairperson, and I told him "make sure that the person is dead". I don't believe that I might have misfired in the dark, but we just wanted to make hundred percent sure. We were professional at that time. We could not come back and report to Mr de Kock that the person was dead and then the following morning, the man was in hospital with multiple wounds.

MR VAN DER WALT: If I understood your evidence earlier, you made sure that you had the rifle behind the back of the man's head?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you have a reason with regard to the nature of the weapon to suspect that he might still be alive

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, it was just instinct, I wanted to make sure, I called Mr Botha and told him "make sure."

CHAIRPERSON: Is the position Mr Bellingan, when you start firing with an AK47, it kicks around?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, I would like to put it to you that the idea with regard to the manner in which the deceased was killed and the amount of shots fired, and the suspicion emanates that this man was killed in a moment of lust to murder?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I don't think any of us were psychopaths, all of us came from war situations where we performed border duties. It was not pleasant to shoot but we were in a time of war and I would not recommend for anybody to become involved in such a thing, it is very difficult to go through all these things. There was no blood lust or anything like that.

MR VAN DER WALT: You are saying that you were in a war situation, had the ANC not been unbanned at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: Operation Vula had not been disclosed at that stage Chairperson, the struggle was continuing at that stage. We know the history there, I don't think we want to go into the history there. There was not just peace and a white flag was hoisted and everybody stopped, it was a very uncertain stage and it is amazing that everything went so well that we can still live here peacefully today.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you return to the Red Ox Spur with the rest of the group afterwards?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson, I was there.

MR VAN DER WALT: No sir, you don't believe so, you know or you don't know.

MR BELLINGAN: I believe I was there, we were all there.

MR VAN DER WALT: The previous incident did not do anything to your appetite?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it did not Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: When did you drink for the first time on that day?

MR BELLINGAN: When we arrived at the Holiday Inn and we met Col de Kock there, we enjoyed a drink or two there in the bar.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, I would like to put it to you that the manner of action which was followed in killing the deceased, was totally unnecessary.

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, it was my instruction to carry it out on that basis, we could have necklaced him or we could have placed him on a chair and blew him up, but that specific instruction was that it had to appear as if the liberation fighters had killed him.

MR VAN DER WALT: And I want to put it to you that it would be argued on behalf of the family that the action was entirely disproportional with regard to the possible suggestion or fears that the deceased had been involved with the ANC.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot comment to that Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: I thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER WALT

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Bellingan, you said you were at Oshakati, that is in South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Can you maybe clarify for me, were you serving as Battalion 32 or as Koevoet or is it one and the same thing?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, it is not the same. I was not with Koevoet at that stage, I was with the Security Branch. There were two different parts, there was the covert part of the Security Police, Koevoet, and the usual Security Branch, and I was at that office in Oshakati.

MR SIBANYONI: So there were Security Police who were deployed by South Africa to go and assist in South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: And then you said you were recruited to Vlakplaas, was it by Mr de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I was firstly approached by a colleague du Preez, and after I had yellow jaundice, and later in 1984 when I left Vlakplaas, Col de Kock approached me when he took over and he asked me to return.

MR SIBANYONI: When he was the Commander, he asked you to return?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: But there were also a number of you, of other officers who had been to South-West Africa who were recruited to come to Vlakplaas when Mr de Kock was the Commander?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson, I think Mr Nortje was also amongst them, and Mr Baker was also one who was recruited from Oshakati.

MR SIBANYONI: How many more do you know who were from South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't have a list, but there were a reasonable amount of Koevoet members who were there, who were later stationed there.

MR SIBANYONI: Would it be fair to say that Vlakplaas, at the time of Mr de Kock's reign consisted mostly of people who had been at South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: I think the experience played a part Chairperson, because I don't think he would have recruited somebody who was in an administrative post at Head Office, but whether it be experienced picked up in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe and the other place, was then Namibia or South-West Africa.

MR SIBANYONI: Was the fact that de Kock was the Commander, was it the fact that de Kock was the Commander, which influenced ex-South-West African police to come to participate at Vlakplaas? Did they come because de Kock was the Commander?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe that they definitely came there because he was there, because he was a very intelligent leader and one whom one could look up to, he was not just a normal police officer, he was somebody to look up to.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just one question from me, Mr Chairman. Mr Bellingan, can you just repeat what you said about the deceased having set up a trap for the police to be shot?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, that is the inference that I drew from several discussions at the House of Coffees or afterwards, that he had possibly been involved in such traps and that is the recollection that I had that I put down on paper when I consulted with the legal representative, Chairperson. But I cannot recall any specific traps.

ADV SANDI: If I understand you correctly, during the course of those discussions, no specific person had specifically said the deceased had set up some traps for the police to be shot?

MR BELLINGAN: Maybe not at the House of Coffees, that was a suspicion, I may have discussed it later with Col de Kock and it may have come out that something like that was possible.

ADV SANDI: What were you basing that suspicion on?

MR BELLINGAN: That he had leaked information from Head Office, there was for example an instruction that all police officers from the Security Branch had to send in their addresses and they would have bullet-proof or film pasted or fitted before their windows, so that handgrenades or petrol bombs could not be thrown in and it was a dangerous thing that had been done, because the information had been leaked and the addresses of some of these people landed up in the wrong hands, these were inferences that we drew.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to ask you a question that I should have asked the previous witnesses and not you, but it may help to clear up something that was said a little earlier. I am not sure how many of them, but I think at least two of the previous applicants have given evidence that when you got to Wonderpark, you handed over your weapons and clothing to Charlie Chate?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the operational clothing that you had been using?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson. What we usually did was to take the balaclava and the gloves and place everything in a bag, the shoes and the jacket would be burnt so that no one would keep something at their home which could be discovered and forensically tested.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is not the deceased's clothing?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with the Commission's permission, I would just like to recall Mr Baker, just to identify the document appearing at page 94. I think it is relevant because it shows, this is a document he prepared for a meeting on the 24th of October 1990, it contains certain statistics that you will see at page 97 as to what they did from the 2nd of October, the statistics relates specifically from the 2nd of February 1990. If I may just recall the witness for that limited purpose.

ADRIAN DAVID BAKER - RECALL

CHAIRPERSON: Are you recalling Baker?

ADRIAN DAVID BAKER: (s.u.o.)

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Baker, just take the document appearing at page 94 in front of you. Do you recognise that document?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: At page 99, the statement appears "Compiled by Capt A D Baker", is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And first of all, it sets out this meeting was to be held on the 24th of October 1990, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And are you the author of this document?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you obtain this information yourself from statistics that were available?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And you also in 6.2 deal with what the Unit was used for and in paragraph 8 you deal with what the arrest that still took place in both, by C10 in Natal and also dealing with East London and the Free State, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The arrest of what were termed terrorists and people assisting terrorists, etc, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Was this meeting held, what meeting was this?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recollect it was a planning meeting held by Security Branch Headquarters as to the various Units under their command and as to their future utilisation.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody have any questions they wish to ask? I am quite sure if you look at it overnight and feel you have any questions tomorrow morning, Mr Booyens will not object.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, there is just one more aspect and unfortunately the author of this document is not available, my attention has been very kindly drawn to this by Mr Wagener, and that is just some statistics given by Staedtler in his book "The Other Side of the Story", and I would suggest that it may be of assistance to the Committee to look at it. The significant part being that from 1 September 1984 to 14 April 1992, the year 1990 in fact had the highest number of persons killed and injured in unrest related incidents and if I judge it correctly, 1985 and 1990, both scored well into the 16 000, nearly 18 000, as far as unrest related incidents are concerned and those were also the two highest statistics for that period. I will ...

CHAIRPERSON: Page?

MR BOOYENS: It is at page 183 Mr Chairman, I don't know if this publication is available to the Committee, otherwise I will ask your kind secretary to make a copy.

CHAIRPERSON: It will be available to me after the weekend.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, that whole document was handed into the Committee during the so-called ANC amnesty hearing, so that the whole document is already before the Amnesty Committee, if I can just add that, the full document.

MR BOOYENS: I think just for the other members, I will ask to make it available.

CHAIRPERSON: For those who have not read it, it should be placed on record, that that was a fairly prominent member of the Police Force.

MR BOOYENS: ... tomorrow at half past nine, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Half past nine?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I noticed this morning that my learned friend, Mr Hattingh's client seemed to have problems. He is not in control of his own destiny.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we have had that experience for quite some time. Pretoria seems to be a long way away. I think rather make it half past nine. Right, we will now adjourn till half past nine tomorrow morning.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS