CHAIRPERSON: We are reverting to the hearing of the application relating to the attempted murder of Dirk Coetzee and the killing of Bheki Mlangeni. Before we commence I would place on record that we have a new legal team and I would ask them please to put themselves on record and to speak a little bit so the people who are going to have to type out the record can get to hear the sound of your voice.
MR VICTOR: Chairperson, I am Andre Victor from the firm Goldberg and Victor of Port Elizabeth. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: And you are appearing for?
MR VICTOR: I act for General Nick van Rensburg.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Gentlemen, before we start leading evidence I don't know if I should place on record or if our leader of evidence should place on record that she has managed to obtain from the Attorney General certain of the documents and exhibits relating to this incident. They are photographs of the scene, they are photographs of the packet and matters of that nature. The part of the package is available and I do not particularly wish to have them handed in as exhibits, I would rather they remain the Attorney General's responsibility than ours but they are available for inspection by any of the interested parties and reference can thereafter be made of them. We have had an opportunity of seeing them, they will be available for reference. Right we'll now continue with the hearing.
EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Victor?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VICTOR: Thank you Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, I would just like to inform you that my client does not formally oppose your amnesty application but that he differs from the facts that your application relies on and then specifically the allegation that he would have given the instruction to eliminate Mr Coetzee? I have not had the privilege of listening to your evidence but I have checked the typed record. Firstly, are you aware of the fact that General van Rensburg has also applied for amnesty in six matters of gross human violations?
MR DE KOCK: Yes I am aware that he had applied, I don't know in how many cases, Chairperson, but I am aware that he has applied.
MR VICTOR: And would you concede that before the closing date had approached that people could lodge their applications, that he had known about the allegations which you had made with regard to the elimination or the attempt to eliminate Dirk Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not entirely certain which stage General van Rensburg had taken note.
MR VICTOR: If you accept what I say is correct can you think of any reason why he would not have applied for amnesty for this specific case?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not know the reasons for that omission on his part.
MR VICTOR: I wish to put it to you the reason why he did not apply for amnesty was because he was not involved at all?
MR DE KOCK: That would be General van Rensburg's version, he was involved.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, in some of the other applications that you have already lodged and I think specifically in the Maponya(?) incident there were certain general concessions that you made that I would just like to place on record and get your confirmation of those. Firstly it appeared that you had taken and executed certain operations on your own, I think you have conceded this in previous applications?
MR DE KOCK: Yes there were certain instances, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: And formerly you have already conceded that you did not always keep your command structure up to speed with what you had done and that on occasion you had deliberately mislead them?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the reporting back was short and sweet and not graphic in detail.
MR VICTOR: Are you saying that or are you trying to tell us now that you never deliberately tried to mislead your command structure?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that Chairperson, what I wish to say is that with the cover up actions during the Harmse Commission the senior management was informed, they knew what was going on and they did the cover up from there onwards.
MR VICTOR: And I think furthermore, Mr de Kock, it is common cause that you had on several occasions made false affidavits, perjured yourself while giving evidence for example as in the Harmse Commission?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, the Harmse Commission was a whole lie of which the judge did not know and it was orchestrated by the generals from the top and it was one global cover up action.
MR VICTOR: Mr De Kock, why should we then believe your evidence that you have given so far in this matter when we have regard for previous occasions when you perjured yourself?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, here with the TRC hearings I did not perjure myself and I do not intend to perjure myself and also did not during my evidence in mitigation during my trial did I perjure myself.
MR VICTOR: With this background in mind, I wish to specifically firstly ask you about the alleged instruction which was given by General van Rensburg. What would you say was the motive why did Mr Coetzee have to be eliminated?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the objective that General van Rensburg conveyed to me was that Coetzee had to be prevented from giving evidence against General Lothar Neethling in London and we wanted to prevent that.
MR VICTOR: Was it not initially to try to prevent that he give evidence before the Harmse Commission in London?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is possible.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock is it so that at some stage you had gone on special leave, this is when several matters were investigated against you?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: When did you go on special leave?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall the date Chairperson, it is somewhere on record in the TRC documents.
MR VICTOR: Was this before the Harmse Commission started with it's proceedings?
MR DE KOCK: I'm not certain Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: And what was the effect of it if you had been placed on special leave?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was and I've already testified about this, it was a type of suspension. Not only myself but other members as well but we had to come into the office every day and to report there and we continued with our work, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Are you saying it was more of a cosmetic suspension, just a suspension on paper?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it was made known in the media and it was also said that we asked ourselves to go on leave. That was not so.
MR VICTOR: At a stage when you received the alleged instruction from General van Rensburg where you on the special leave at that time?
MR DE KOCK: It's possible Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, is this now the instructions to take steps against Mr Dirk Coetzee? Is that the question relates to?
MR VICTOR: That is what I meant yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you say you may have been on special leave at that time?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall the dates Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock there was a stage when you injured your leg in some incident?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Can you recall when this was?
MR DE KOCK: It was during the Chant incident Chairperson, I was also suspended during that time.
MR VICTOR: And this alleged instruction, was it given after you injured your leg, can you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall the dates, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Very well Mr de Kock, you indicated that it is difficult to recall any dates but I wish to determine from you when was this alleged instruction given to you to eliminate Dirk Coetzee, can you give us a year at least?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can only recall the day when it was given to me. I had no reason to attach it to a specific date like the Monday 18th or something along those lines.
MR VICTOR: Can you tell us whether it was the Harmse Commission started it's proceedings?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall during that time, it is quite difficult to determine the time.
MR VICTOR: Was it at least in 1990?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot give you a fixed date Chairperson. There were so many incidents and I was the commander of Vlakplaas for just about 10 years and there was a myriad of incidents, not only human rights violations but other covert operations and it is not possible to place a date on it right here.
MR VICTOR: It had to be at least while General van Rensburg was the overhead commander?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, he was the one who gave the instruction.
MR VICTOR: May I ask you as follows, how long thereafter this alleged instruction was given was the packet mailed?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson, I think it was between three to five weeks, somewhere in that vicinity.
MR VICTOR: Could it have been longer than that?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: The package was mailed according to my instructions and it would appear from the record on the 10th May 1990. So three to five weeks before that brings us to the beginning of April 1990.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes it's just an estimation that I've made, I did not fix myself to any date, it is not possible, I don't have any documentary proof.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, in your evidence you said you went to the office of General van Rensburg and my instructions are that you also had an office in the same building, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: No, I did not have an office there Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: It was an office in the corner of the building where two ladies worked for you there?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was an office that was used by the two ladies for typing amongst others and for those who drew a standing advance. I did not have an office there.
MR VICTOR: From the record it would appear that you were accompanied by Mr Bellingan when you went to General van Rensburg's office?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, that is how I recall it.
MR VICTOR: What was Mr Bellingan's rank at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat that?
MR VICTOR: What was the rank of Mr Bellingan at that stage?
MR DE KOCK: I'm not certain, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: If I said he was a sergeant would you accept that?
MR DE KOCK: I would accept that it is possible.
MR VICTOR: Why was it necessary for Mr Bellingan to accompany you to the general's office?
MR DE KOCK: Most probably it was not only for the situation, I might have driven with Bellingan, sometimes we drove in twos and sometimes I had a person who drove me around. We worked on a person's capabilities and not according to their rank.
MR VICTOR: Because if I understand your evidence correct from the record he accompanied you to the office but he did not enter into the office along with you. What was the purpose thereof?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't think that was my evidence.
MR VICTOR: Very well, that was the evidence of Mr Bellingan, do you not agree with his version?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say. That would be his recollection and I wouldn't dispute it.
MR VICTOR: But Mr Bellingan also testified that he did not see Colonel du Plessis there?
MR DE KOCK: That would be Mr Bellingan's recollection of that situation, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Because if one considers your evidence along with Mr Bellingan, according to you Colonel du Plessis at some stage left General van Rensburg's office and went to his own office and Mr Bellingan says he did not see this.
MR DE KOCK: That would be Mr Bellingan's recollection, Mr Bellingan was one of my top workers. Even as a sergeant I sent him with his own team to Cape Town for example where he rendered top services and he had great leadership capabilities. It was amongst his group who shot Tony Yengeni in his leg. As I have said we worked according to a person's capabilities. A person's rank was not necessarily attached to his capabilities.
MR VICTOR: Very well, Mr de Kock, you know that General van Rensburg denies vehemently that he gave you any instruction to eliminate Dirk Coetzee and also that he would have given you an address?
MR DE KOCK: That's what I heard here Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: With regard to the address, why was it necessary to have a physical address of Mr Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this was not a physical address, it was a postal address. Maybe it was just an issue of language usage here. The physical address is your domicile, that is where I would find you, this was not a physical address.
MR VICTOR: In other words not a street name with a number?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, as far as I can recall it was a postal address, post office box address.
MR VICTOR: In your office, what exactly did he give to you? Was it a letter, was it a note?
MR DE KOCK: It was a note, Chairperson, with the address on it.
MR VICTOR: Are you saying he himself wrote that note?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that Chairperson, I did not compare handwritings and I do not have that note any longer.
MR VICTOR: What happened to that note?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was most probably destroyed by nature of the situation, we would not have kept something like that.
MR VICTOR: Can you express a theory as to where General van Rensburg would have obtained this address from?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in a discussion later I heard after this package had been mailed that General van Rensburg had obtained this address from a letter that was sent to Dirk Coetzee but had to be delivered by hand by a member of the SAP who had walked over to the ANC and with the return of this member of the force who was stationed at Piet Retief previously, the person contacted the police and this letter came into the possession of General van Rensburg.
MR VICTOR: And the discussion to which you referred to now when you determined this, with whom, when and where was this?
MR DE KOCK: It was in General van Rensburg's office, I cannot attach a time or a date to it. It was from a discussion and not with the idea that we would sit down here and give evidence today.
MR VICTOR: Who was present during this discussion to which you refer to now?
MR DE KOCK: I can recall myself and General van Rensburg but I cannot place any other persons there.
MR VICTOR: Was this before or after the package had exploded?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: This letter to which you refer to, where the address was allegedly obtained from, you say this was a letter that was brought in by hand by a police officer?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is what was told to me, I cannot render evidence as to who brought the letter and how it came into his possession.
MR VICTOR: What else was told to you, was it for example told to you that the sender which was Mr Coetzee, would his address have been on the outside of the envelope?
MR DE KOCK: I'm not entirely certain whether it was on the outside of the envelope, I did not see the letter and I am just conveying things as it was told to me.
CHAIRPERSON: Told by General van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: So then the inference we can draw is that Mr Coetzee takes the trouble to mail a letter by hand and that letter contains his address?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this thing was delivered by hand, in other words if I understood it correctly back then this letter was about or went to an address, in other words there can be no interception in the mail system itself so that Coetzee's address could be determined, in other words it was a personal delivery.
MR VICTOR: With respect, you underestimate Mr Coetzee then?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I listened to the tapes of Mr Coetzee where he had discussions with his wife and others and his telephone security was very good with reference to now that my memory has been jogged with one discussion we listened to that he made from reports offices, we did not know that it was coming from reports offices. On of reports people reported it through their channels and I don't know for which intelligence service this journalist worked for or with whom he had contact. So his telephone security was very good and people can say about Coetzee what they want to but he was not an idiot.
MR VICTOR: And just for the record I would just like to put that General van Rensburg denies this discussion to which you refer to.
MR DE KOCK: I take note of that Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Furthermore, with regard to shall we say the prosecution or harassment of Mr Coetzee, General van Rensburg says that when he became aware of it he specifically gave you instructions to cease this?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we just followed her, we did not harass her. I think she was quite safe with us following her because there was any attack on her then we would be at the scene. We did not harass her, we just executed the instruction to follow her.
CHAIRPERSON: Did General van Rensburg tell you to stop doing this?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR LAX: Sorry, can I just clarify something? Was the instructions from your client, was the instruction to stop harassing her or was the instruction to keeping her under surveillance?
MR VICTOR: The instruction was to stop keeping her under surveillance as General van Rensburg believed it was unnecessary.
MR LAX: Thank you, please continue?
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, from the record it appears that you allegedly with regard to Mr Coetzee's elimination had regularly reported back to General van Rensburg, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Will you repeat that please?
MR VICTOR: I said it appears from the record that with regard to the elimination of Coetzee after it was decided that a package bomb would be sent to him, that you regularly reported back to him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did report that a device was mailed but afterwards we waited for the thing to happen, we did not say on a daily basis that the thing has not exploded yet, we just waited.
MR VICTOR: Very well, let us just study your version. According to you, you received the instruction to make a plan with Coetzee, approximately three to five weeks before the package is mailed and during those three to five weeks up to the time that this package is mailed did you give any feedback to General van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: It is probable, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, many things can be probable, I want to know specifically, did you go and tell him we have now decided to place explosives in the earpiece of a cassette player, did you tell him that?
MR DE KOCK: I do not have an independent recollection of that, Chairperson, but he would have been kept up to speed within detail.
MR VICTOR: Did you for example tell him that the device was tested on the head of a pig and it would appear that it was successful?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I do not have an independent recollection of it.
CHAIRPERSON: But you said a moment ago that you would have kept him up to date in detail?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, if he directed such a request then I would give him the particulars.
MR VICTOR: Did you for example tell him during this five week period that the package will be mailed now?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, what I can recall is that when I arrived at Vlakplaas that morning the members informed me that Bellingan and Radebe had already departed, I would definitely have reported to Van Rensburg, I believe that I did indeed report to him but I cannot attach it to any particular day.
MR VICTOR: And as you know now he will deny it?
MR DE KOCK: I take notice of that, Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: During this reporting back you say you probably did and believe you did, were other persons present?
MR DE KOCK: It may be so Chairperson but I believe it would have been a one on one situation but I would not have spoken about it in front of any strangers.
MR VICTOR: Very well, now we know that the package was mailed on the 10th May 1990. When did you expect that this package would arrive in Zambia?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as we foresaw it would reach Dirk Coetzee before he gave his evidence in London.
MR VICTOR: To the Harmse Commission, is that what you refer to?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he had to testify against Lothar Neethling as far as I understood it.
MR VICTOR: When would he start with his evidence in the matter against General Lothar Neethling?
MR DE KOCK: I don't have the date Chairperson, I am not certain.
MR VICTOR: Very well, just to return to my initial question, how long did you think this package would take to arrive in Zambia?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot speculate because we had a postal service with variable capabilities and it was international and insofar as I know, it was never sent by airmail.
MR VICTOR: Would one expect that it would arrive within one month?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but even today with all the modern technology one mails something in Pretoria and it takes two weeks to get to Johannesburg, there could have been some problem along the way.
MR VICTOR: Then let us accept that the first and even the second month ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, what sort of problem would there be, do you think?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could have been anything, for example with regard to transport or handling. This is just speculation on my behalf, as I see it.
MR VICTOR: Just to return, let us accept that the first and even the second month had elapsed, would you report back to General van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: It could be that he asked me however I do not recall this. What I do know is that the suspicion existed that this package had been removed from the postal system, that it had been identified possibly as a bomb and that it was removed from the system.
MR VICTOR: And even the third and the fourth month elapsed then, now if I understood correctly, initially an urgent plan had to be formulated with Mr Coetzee but now nothing happened, which steps would you now take in order to rectify the situation?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, General van Rensburg did not offer any leadership to me in that regard. He didn't say that we were supposed to try anything else at that stage, I suppose he was also waiting like the rest of us.
MR VICTOR: Why didn't you ask him, why didn't you report him and say "General, our parcel bomb isn't working, we're going to try something else."?
MR DE KOCK: No, I received orders from General van Rensburg with the exception of my loathing of Dirk Coetzee as a traitor. It didn't necessarily mean that I wanted to bomb him, he didn't have anything on me.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, according to your version, certainly you received an instruction and you executed it, but you did not obtain the results that you desired. Certainly you would have taken this matter up with your seniors and your commander?
MR DE KOCK: No, it is General van Rensburg who did not obtain any results. I had the device built and I sent it and then we had to wait and see.
CHAIRPERSON: Wait a bit please, what was the original order from General van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: That we had to formulate a plan.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
MR DE KOCK: Make a plan with Mr Coetzee.
CHAIRPERSON: That's what he said and the design and the building of the bomb was your responsibility, you got your men to do it, it was your plan, not Van Rensburg's?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you not tell him that the plan you had made on his instructions did not seem to be working?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I have already testified we were waiting, we couldn't say when or how Coetzee would receive this item. He could also have asked me, that is General van Rensburg, and we waited. There was no doubt in our mind that it would arrive at Coetzee and indeed this is what took place.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, how long would you have waited before you decided that your plan wasn't working and that you would have to try something else?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the time factor for me was not the sign and that stage that Coetzee would not receive the parcel.
MR LAX: Sorry Mr de Kock, but surely the time factor was relevant?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, with regard to the evidence that he was supposed to give.
MR LAX: Just let me finish, just hang on a second, I'm not finished with the question yet. You've conceded in the past that the issue was Neethling's case and the testimony that was being taken from that case in London?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAX: And we've heard already that there was a particular deadline by which that was going to happen, somewhere in November?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR LAX: So once that deadline had passed and once Coetzee had then testified the urgency of the situation had gone out of - the urgency had left the situation in a sense?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I was not moving on the same level as General van Rensburg, I did not have the access to information planning and strategy, I didn't know what other planning there was, if any other information was available.
MR LAX: Well the issue here in the context of these questions is, what did you do about it in that context? In other words your deadline is now past?
MR DE KOCK: As I've said, at that stage I accepted that this parcel had most probably been identified and removed from the post. I didn't have any evidence indicating that the parcel was still in the post office or that it had not been picked up. I assumed that this package had been identified and removed and that there was an investigation and that this was probably being kept quiet in order to see who was responsible.
MR LAX: Who did you have in mind as having intercepted it?
MR DE KOCK: The ANC or the Zambian Security Police.
MR LAX: You don't think that your own people might have intercepted it?
MR DE KOCK: I had no reason to think that, something like that could have happened but I wouldn't have known about it, I did not have any access to it at that level.
MR LAX: And you wouldn't have made enquiries in that regard?
MR DE KOCK: No, I wouldn't have given myself away.
CHAIRPERSON: Now you had been told to make a plan?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You now believed your plan had failed?
MR DE KOCK: We didn't have any certainty.
CHAIRPERSON: You have just been telling us how you believed that the bomb had been discovered, it had been taken out, it was being investigated by the ANC or the Zambian Security, so you believed your plan had failed?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is a possibility that one foresaw.
CHAIRPERSON: But you've been telling us not that it was a possibility, you've been telling us that that was what you foresaw?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is what I believed at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Well why did you not report that to your commanding officer?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot tell you. I may be that we had such a discussion, I'm not saying that this discussion never took place, however I do not recall any such discussion.
CHAIRPERSON: When you reach a convenient stage?
MR VICTOR: I think it will now be convenient to adjourn, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a short adjournment now.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
MR VICTOR: (continues) Thank you Chairperson.
Mr de Kock we were last discussing the stage at which you were waiting for something to happen and nothing was happening and you indicated to us that at a certain stage you merely thought that Mr Coetzee had probably realised what was going on and that you then felt that you couldn't make any enquiries about the parcel?
EUGENE A DE KOCK: (s.u.o.) Yes, that was what was foreseen.
MR VICTOR: And in the meantime you also confirmed that no alternative plans were formulated?
MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I believed that General van Rensburg was also waiting to see what would happen. He did not approach me with any other suggestions.
MR VICTOR: And then we also know, as it appears from the record that on the 15th February 1991, the bomb then exploded and Mr Mlangeni was killed, am I correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR VICTOR: When and how did you come to hear of this?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I heard on the radio in my home. It was a news report.
MR VICTOR: Were you at home?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct, in the kitchen.
MR VICTOR: It would appear that you can recall this section quite vividly?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct, because my wife's radio, she had it on radio 702 permanently which I didn't like but I allowed it, it was one of those news reports.
MR VICTOR: Was this during the morning or the afternoon?
MR DE KOCK: It was during the morning, if I recall correctly it was late morning.
MR VICTOR: What was your emotion at that stage, were you frightened?
MR DE KOCK: At that stage I was uncertain because the news report wasn't very thorough but I suspected when they mentioned Bheki Mlangeni's name that it may be ours.
MR VICTOR: From the record it appears that you reported back to General van Rensburg?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that there was a discussion. However, I cannot recall the nature of it.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, did you go and tell Mr van Rensburg that the bomb had been detonated and that you suspected that this was the bomb which was originally posted to Mr Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: I think that the nature of it was that it was indeed our device which he had requested us to send.
MR VICTOR: Where did you make this report to him?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it wasn't at Vlakplaas so I would have to accept that it was in his office possibly.
MR VICTOR: Why did you report it to him specifically?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he asked us to make a plan.
MR VICTOR: Was it on the same day that you heard the radio news report?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall. My memory today indicates that I think that that day may have been a Sunday.
MR VICTOR: Very well, you say that you reported to him in his office, is there any reason why this would have been conducted in any other place than his office?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have simply answered this by means of inference.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, I would request that when you give evidence you tell us what are the facts and what are your inferences?
MR DE KOCK: Very well.
MR VICTOR: Let me ask you this. When you reported it to him was anybody else present or not?
MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall.
MR VICTOR: What was his reaction?
MR DE KOCK: I'm not certain Chairperson, I cannot recall it.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, please delve into your memory, I'm certain that the incident must have remained with you because this is a parcel bomb that detonated and killed the wrong person. Certainly you must recall more particulars that what you are providing to us now?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would have provided those particulars if there was anything outstanding. General van Rensburg was a very cool person in that regard, usually his facial expression would indicate a very neutral and controlled reaction.
MR VICTOR: Did he instruct you to take any steps with regard to your report?
MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall presently.
MR VICTOR: Mr de Kock, could we at least accept that you made the report to him here in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR VICTOR: Why are you so certain of this.
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it wasn't in the Cape, that would be my recollection of it.
MR VICTOR: And if I were to ask you that you were dead certain that you made the report here in Pretoria, your answer would be yes?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, according to my recollection.
MR VICTOR: Now this cannot be possible, Mr de Kock, because General van Rensburg was transferred from Pretoria to Cape Town and he had already moved shortly before Christmas 1990?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no response to that. I do know, however, that this matter was discussed and General Krappies Engelbrecht assumed command from General van Rensburg on the 1st January 1991. I will not dispute the dates.
MR VICTOR: You see Mr de Kock, we have to discuss these dates quite thoroughly, particularly when it comes to cases where your recollection has failed you.
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, my recollection fails me with regard to dates perhaps but not with regard to events. This may also have to do with independent recollection.
MR VICTOR: Because what we do know is that the parcel bomb detonated on the 15th February 1991, that is not in dispute?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR VICTOR: And then you state that subsequently you reported this to General van Rensburg in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: That is my recollection yes, yes that is correct.
MR VICTOR: Now he wasn't in Pretoria?
CHAIRPERSON: Well surprisingly, you went a little further, you said as I recollect it, my recollection was it wasn't in the Cape. That was before you had been told he had been transferred to the Cape. Why did you mention the Cape then?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because this is my recollection that it took place here in Pretoria.
MR VICTOR: Now I want to put it to you that what you are saying is quite impossible, General van Rensburg was not in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he could have been here in Pretoria.
MR VICTOR: And then in conclusion I would like to put to you, Mr de Kock, that these events which occurred are once again due to something that you tackled upon your own initiative?
MR DE KOCK: No, that is not the case otherwise I would have stated so. As I have assumed responsibility for myself in many other cases and stated so, in this case as well I also assumed responsibility for my actions and for those who were subordinate to me.
MR VICTOR: Chairperson, thank you, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VICTOR
MR BOOYENS: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
MR LAMEY: No questions, Chairperson, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairperson, I have a question or two. Mr de Kock, just for the purposes of the thorough disclosure there are just a number of aspects that I would like to know whether or not you can take us any further on?
The first is with regard to the interception of postal items, that the impression has been created at the very least that there was a very effective operation on the way to intercept all postal items?
MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: Now where it was part of the planning that this would be a postal item which would be handed in at a post office can you tell us whether any steps were taken at all in order to prevent that this parcel that had a specific purpose would simply be intercepted by another branch or wing of either the police or the intelligence services?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm going to give you my theory and that is that it was not only the police who were intercepting postal items, it was Military Intelligence as well as National Intelligence, this is something that I picked up from ground level. So that possibility could have existed.
MR RAUTENBACH: But you see, what I'm getting at Mr de Kock is that this is also the reason why I put this question to you, either the police services or the intelligence services, all I want to know is the following. You were busy with the plan to murder the traitor Dirk Coetzee and by nature of the situation you would desire that the project that you had started would be successful. So the question is basically the following. What did you do during your planning because you were aware of the highly effective operation of intercepting postal items, you went even further and stated that intelligence was also involved in this. The question is merely the following, what steps did you take in order to prevent that all your work would be undone to do interception by the police or by intelligence?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I still believe quite firmly today that on a much higher level than mine there must have been liaison among those persons or in that group which was involved with interception and they must have been instructed that that parcel would go through. I did not have that capacity and by nature of the situation I would not have approached that group of persons or any other divisional commander. So from my level and higher there must have been some method of co-ordination so that that parcel would move through.
MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, do I understand you correctly that you say that because the order came from higher up and because there were persons above you in the rank structure, that would be General van Rensburg and whoever else on the higher levels, because they were aware and knew precisely that this operation was going to take place, you did not regard it as your task to see to that part of the plan, in other words the possible interception of the parcel and to see to it that there would be others who would ensure that this would not take place?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I would not have possessed that authority so to speak to ensure this.
MR RAUTENBACH: But you trusted that those steps would be taken on higher levels?
MR DE KOCK: Yes I believe so because if something was going from here to Dirk Coetzee, coming from these persons who represented him, there was the chance that they themselves may have listened to the tapes or used the device and this did not take place, also not with the return of the parcel. So that is my theory and I believe this today still.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I come in at this stage on this? You have told us as I understand, Mr de Kock, that you came to Vlakplaas one day and you were told that Bellingan and Radebe had already left and they'd taken the parcel to post?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: You knew nothing about this before?
MR DE KOCK: They were delegated to handle the matter with technical and when I arrived at the farm I was told that the people had left to go and post the parcel and after this it was reported to General van Rensburg. There is no doubt about that.
CHAIRPERSON: It was only reported after the parcel had been posted?
MR DE KOCK: That would have been the very same day still.
CHAIRPERSON: So no arrangements were made before the parcel was handed over to the postal authorities?
MR DE KOCK: I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: You hadn't told anyone above you that you were going to post it on that day? On your evidence there was no plan made in advance to post it on that particular day?
MR DE KOCK: I didn't know when the parcel would be ready. As I've said this is theory.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes and you were in charge and you hadn't asked anyone to let you know?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they did liaise. The persons who reported back to me told me that the device was still in the process of manufacturing and on that particular day of the receipt of the item I was not aware of this.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so you had never told them you must tell me when it's ready so we can make arrangements, you've never done that although you were the officer in charge of the whole plan?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not have been able to make those arrangements. All that I could do from my side would be to be informed of when the parcel was ready and to inform General van Rensburg about this. Then I was not involved in the interception of the item or the posting of the item, this is something that could only have taken place on a higher level.
CHAIRPERSON: But you have not told us, in fact you have denied, Mr de Kock, that you asked them to tell you when the parcel would be ready, you said you didn't know, you had nothing to do with the technical side?
MR DE KOCK: No, I said that I delegated it to persons, Bellingan and Bosch, to deal with this aspect.
CHAIRPERSON: And did they tell you when the parcel would be ready?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, when I arrived at Vlakplaas that morning it was Bosch if I recall correctly, he told me that Bellingan and Radebe had departed to go and post the parcel.
CHAIRPERSON: So you had made no prior arrangements at all to ensure that this deadly bomb would not be intercepted in the post?
MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't have been able to, Chairperson, ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, you are talking nonsense now, you could have told those under you to tell you when the parcel was ready, you could have then gone to see General van Rensburg and said the parcel is now ready, we will post it on Wednesday of next week?
MR DE KOCK: We had already received our instructions and I want to ensure you, with all respect, that I am not misleading you and that it is really not my intention to talk nonsense here today.
CHAIRPERSON: What you are saying indicates that you had no great interest in making sure it wasn't intercepted?
MR DE KOCK: It was not within my power Chairperson.
MR RAUTENBACH: Mr de Kock, just to clear that up, perhaps it was mentioned to you that the date, what the date was when the parcel would have gone off, I understood your evidence, I may be incorrect, but I understood that the persons on top, persons more senior, General van Rensburg and other persons, were aware at all stages that a package would be sent, is that correct?
MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct, it was an instruction that a plan had to be made and this came down to the package.
MR RAUTENBACH: Just one moment, this might be of great concern, not only a package, I want to find out from you with regard to General van Rensburg, would he have been aware of the run up to the sending of the package that a package, in other words a postal item would be mailed to Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR RAUTENBACH: And as a consequence of the fact that they were aware at all times that a package would be sent, doesn't matter when it was mailed or when it would be sent that in that context you would have expected them to arrange that the package is not intercepted?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, the only address I received is a postal address, I did not have any other address.
MR RAUTENBACH: Yes but the point is that they were aware that a package would be sent to Coetzee?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that information was conveyed.
MR RAUTENBACH: And then I would like to ask you, the second aspect which I want to clear with you, you refer that after the bomb had exploded, you had a meeting with what you said was the issue of Cape Town/Pretoria whatever but you had a meeting with him in Pretoria?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, as far as I know that discussion took place at Pretoria at head office.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would just like to ask you, certainly you must have thought that when that discussion had taken place that there would be a police investigation?
MR DE KOCK: When I heard that it had indeed had been this device I knew that a police investigation would follow.
MR DE KOCK: Can you give us any information and once again I speak about the issue of total full disclosure, can you give us any information in your discussion with General van Rensburg, in that discussion what was discussed with regard to the coming police investigation that would follow?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was about denial and it was only within our small group, as I have said that General Engelbrecht was there that day but it only remained within that small group, it was not how shall I say it was not the whole head office that knew of it.
MR RAUTENBACH: Let us study this now, as I understood General van Rensburg was the overhead commander of Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR RAUTENBACH: And as I understand the evidence when he left at the beginning of 1991 General Engelbrecht was appointed to that position?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: So he was then overhead commander of Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: So if he was the overhead commander of Vlakplaas one could expect that both General van Rensburg and General Engelbrecht would have had an idea of what happened at Vlakplaas and what people at Vlakplaas were busy with?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they would not only have an idea, they would know exactly what went on there because they were the commanders?
MR RAUTENBACH: That is correct and in the light that he as you say was in command, according to your evidence General Krappies Engelbrecht was appointed at a later stage as the investigative officer?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: While he is the same person who is in command of Vlakplaas and knew exactly what happened there?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR RAUTENBACH: I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RAUTENBACH
MS LOCKHAT: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
MR SIBANYONI: So Mr de Kock, you were aware that General van Rensburg was transferred to Cape Town?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, after he left us I thought he went to Pietersburg at some stage and if I'm not mistaken he was transferred to the far north of the Transvaal. I don't have any specific idea, I could have told you it was Pretoria, Durban or Pretoria and Namibia.
MR SIBANYONI: When reporting to him you vividly recall that it was a personal discussion, it was not over the telephone?
MR DE KOCK: No it was not over the telephone, it was a personal discussion.
MR SIBANYONI: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.
MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.
Mr de Kock, on this question of interception, at what stage had you informed your commander that this was actually going to be some sort of a parcel bomb?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the impression when he gave me the address he did not say it will be a radio bomb but a package would go because it was only a postal address. I could not send anything else to a postal address and the general guideline and idea was to send a parcel, that was what it was all about.
MR LAX: Did you ever raise with General van Rensburg above you the need for interception or the prevention of interception?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR LAX: Now we've heard your testimony about who the sender was going to be and that you've confirmed that that came from Du Plessis?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAX: Would either Du Plessis or Van Rensburg have been in a position to arrange that this parcel would have safe passage through the postal service?
MR DE KOCK: I believe that Van Rensburg himself would have contacted other persons on a higher level, I'm not able to say Chairperson because he was the second in command and I would not report to him.
MR LAX: My question was, would he have had the authority to arrange that?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think it would have been delegated authorisation if General van Rensburg was not there.
MR LAX: Did you see that parcel before it left?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not see it.
MR LAX: You can't help us with what your recollection of what it looked like?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I was informed that the people had already left with the package.
MR LAX: Even the time that it sat in Mr Bosch's office, you didn't look at it, you didn't tamper with it?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I did not see the package, how it was packaged and who had packaged it, it was only when I arrived at Vlakplaas that somebody told me that - or Mr Bosch told me that the packet had already left.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't had a chance to look at my notes but my recollection is that one of the people that we've already heard said it was delivered to you?
MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, if my memory does not serve me incorrectly here, I think Bosch testified that when he got the package from the technical people he reported to De Kock about this.
MR BOOYENS: If I can be of some assistance Mr Chairperson, my recollection is that Mr Bellingan in his evidence said he would have given it either to Mr de Kock or to Steve Bosch, I think he mentioned Mr de Kock as a possible alternative that he handed the thing over because his evidence was that he and Steve Bosch went to fetch the parcel at the technical section but I do not think he made it a hundred percent positive statement. It's my recollection but my memory could also be faulty in this regard but I think you'll probably find a reference to the parcel and Mr de Kock in Mr Bellingan's evidence.
MR LAX: Yes, Bellingan does not help us a great deal in that regard, I've just read through my notes. There's a gap in his memory, he talks about picking it up from Kok and then he says the next thing he remembers was being told to post it.
MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I've also got it in my notes that Bellingan said that he gave it to Mr de Kock after he received it, after it was wrapped but he's not sure either, that's what I can recall with Bellingan and then ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Well we can leave it there.
MS LOCKHAT: Yes and then Bosch's evidence as well, just that he told Bellingan and De Kock that the parcel was ready, that's in relation to Bosch but not that he'd given it to De Kock.
MR LAMEY: Yes Bosch's evidence wasn't that he delivered it to De Kock but that he just reported it.
MS LOCKHAT: He reported it to them, that's right.
CHAIRPERSON: Right, there are two other points I'd like to raise and the one I don't expect Mr de Kock to answer but at an earlier stage at this or another hearing one of the legal advisors indicated that they still had calendars and diaries going back to these days and Mr de Kock has said he thinks it was on a Sunday. It might help us if somebody who has a calendar or a diary going back to 1991 can tell us if the 15th February was a Sunday. It's seems to look as if Mr Lamey already knows the answer?
MR LAMEY: The 15th February?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR LAMEY: 1990?
CHAIRPERSON: 1991, that was the day the bomb went off, wasn't it when Mr Mlangeni was killed?
MR LAMEY: Chairperson yes, I think it was in the matter where Klopper testified. What we did was the computer has got - you can relate the date back on the computer.
CHAIRPERSON: Well some of you have one of these modern devices that could do so?
MR LAMEY: I don't have it available but we could check at the office.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. One other matter and I don't know the relevance and I don't want to go into it in any great detail but you've told us that it's possible that at this time matters against you were being investigated and that you were on so called leave?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you still the commanding officer of Vlakplaas?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not in the formal sense but I reported to head office every day, I still had my official vehicle, I still drew money, I still drew petrol money, I wrote out reports that Baker signed and I executed other operations amongst others the Motherwell bomb.
CHAIRPERSON: You didn't actually go to Vlakplaas and command the others, you went to head office and you did your own duties, is that the position?
MR DE KOCK: I went to head office and as soon as I reported there I went to Vlakplaas and then we still went out on operations.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR LAX: Just one last thing, who was temporary commander in your place?
MR DE KOCK: It was Colonel Baker, Chairperson.
MR LAX: Thank you.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairperson, if I may just mention two aspects in this regard? I don't know whether my learned friend appearing for General van Rensburg would like to question Mr Bellingan, however we still don't know whether anybody would like to question him but we did get hold of him. Unfortunately it was a bit short notice since Tuesday or Monday and if required he will be available tomorrow. Unfortunately he is not in the Pretoria area today and then there's another aspect that's been mentioned to my attorney, Mr Chairperson, I report for what it's worth and my learned friend, the evidence leader, also has got some - oh no, Mr Chairperson, I was under a wrong impression. No there was just, basically there was somebody who claimed that he was a bomb building expert and I don't know where he came from but apparently he doesn't claim that he was responsible for this one but that he was responsible for the zero hand grenades so that was a red herring.
CHAIRPERSON: We still know nothing about who addressed the package, put the names of the sender on it? Nobody wants to accept responsibility and it also seems that I don't know if any of the present applicants had any knowledge of this, that there was another demonstration with a pig's head after the bomb went off?
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I think that was done by the - as I see from the exhibit that was handed in by the South African Bureau of Standards and Bosch was, according to the record, also examined in the De Kock trial on that.
CHAIRPERSON: No they did get some - that's why I'd seen the photographs, that's why I raised it.
MR LAMEY: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: They obviously did get some information to make sure they were using the same sort of device.
MR LAMEY: Yes they repeated the exercise, the S A Bureau of Standards and a photo was taken I gather from the evidence and after reading also the evidence of Bosch again and then the State Advocate during the De Kock trial showed him that photograph as a comparison sort of.
CHAIRPERSON: Well it is available amongst the matters which I referred you to this morning.
MR LAMEY: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairperson, in case there may not be clarity on the matter, the tests that were done on the second occasion with the pig heads was basically done for purposes of the investigation of the death of Bheki Mlangeni as well as for purposes of course that inquested the investigations that led to the inquest. It wasn't connected to so called De Kock trial, it was connected to the inquest.
CHAIRPERSON: The Mlangeni trial, yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: That's right. That's the first thing, the second thing is at some stage there seems to me there was some uncertainty about the dates if you connect the dates with the day. Now I can just put on record that we've done on numerous occasions before regarding knowledge that we obtained during the inquest that the way our recollection is that the death took place on the 15th February which was a Friday. The Saturday was the 16th February and the Sunday was the 17th February. I have not correlated this with a diary of the relevant year but this is definitely our recollection so I'll just put that on record. Thank you Mr Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, just to come in here, I hear what my learned friend is saying about that, that might be so but that exhibit my learned colleague Mr van der Merwe has got it, it might have been compiled prior to the De Kock trial for purposes of the inquest but it's got an exhibit number 15B on it and then you will not from the record of the evidence of Bosch that that exhibit, this exhibit, it's my interpretation from the evidence that this exhibit has been referred to in the De Kock trial as well as that particular photograph 28 on page 20.
CHAIRPERSON: Which is that, the pig ...(inaudible) that's the one also need to ask a question. There are two photographs, one on the same page before and after.
MR LAMEY: Yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairperson, I don't think that's contentious at all, they may have referred to it in the De Kock trial. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry?
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
Mr De Kock just a few aspects. Mr Rautenbach has to an extent done my work for me insofar as the instruction was given to you to make a plan and on that same occasion an address was given to you of De Kock and an address of a sender, - it's an address of Coetzee and of a sender, it was then clear that the suggestion was that something be sent. This came from General van Rensburg and not from you?
MR DE KOCK: Yes it did come from him.
MR HATTINGH: The plan that you had to make was just to determine which device and in which manner a parcel could be sent to him in order to execute him or a product?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: You have testified that you told General van Rensburg that the package had been sent of and that you also told him what it entailed, that it was a bomb?
MR DE KOCK: Yes I think I told him we sent him a radio or something along those lines.
MR HATTINGH: Was it necessary for you to go to him to tell him that the plan did not work, could he not realise this by himself?
MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he did realise it because he asked that we make a plan and he was told that the plan had been made and nothing happened.
MR HATTINGH: And he did not approach you again?
MR DE KOCK: No.
MR HATTINGH: How often did you see him while he was the commander there?
MR DE KOCK: I saw him on a daily basis Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: In relation to the office - no I can't get to his name, Du Plessis?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: How were the offices located in relation to each other?
MR DE KOCK: On the same floor next to each other with a temporary division, a type of hardboard division from the floor to the ceiling.
MR HATTINGH: With regard to your evidence that you reported to General van Rensburg after the bomb had exploded and it was put to you that it could not have been in Pretoria because he was in Cape Town, do you recall that?
MR DE KOCK: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: I wish to refer you to Exhibit C, this is the affidavit of General van Rensburg which was handed up and I wish to refer to the second page thereof, paragraph 8, there General van Rensburg says the following
"After Mlangeni's death was caused by a radio that had been attached to explosives there was an allegation that the packet which contained the radio was addressed to Dirk Coetzee but he sent it back to the sender. I asked De Kock who he suspected was responsible for this and he said that military intelligence might possibly be responsible because they had succeeded to lock in an agent with Mrs Coetzee."
So according to his own version there was a discussion between the two of you after the bomb had exploded. The information which he mentions in this paragraph, would you have discussed this during a telephone conversation with him?
MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Did General van Rensburg after his transfer visit head office in an official capacity?
MR DE KOCK: As far as I know yes, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Was this an irregular occurrence or was it normal practice for members of the security police to visit head office?
MR DE KOCK: It was normal occurrence Chairperson and a transferral may take place on a date but the completion and the solution to some tasks might take much longer.
MR HATTINGH: Would you say by that that he had certain issues which he personally had to see to that it be completed?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Even after he had departed which he had to return for?
MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: It's quite clear isn't it that he could not possibly sit down and tell his successor every single thing that he'd been dealing with in the last year, there must be matters that he would overlook that could come up later?
MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Just one other matter if you could give me a moment? Thank you.
MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Sorry, I'm finished. Thank you Mr Chairperson.
WITNESS EXCUSED
