NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (Cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
General, when we adjourned yesterday we were discussing the cover-up of your involvement with offences before the Harms Commission, do you recall that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And if I recall correctly you said that you covered up your own participation in such matters.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I did.
MR HATTINGH: Will you please refresh my memory, in which of the six incidents for which you have applied for amnesty was Dirk Coetzee involved?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: With Kondile, with the Kondile incident and the incident of the bomb explosions in Swaziland, the two houses and then the bomb on the railway line in Swaziland.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And can you recall whether Coetzee, before the Harms Commission, mentioned these three incidents? Or shall I put the question simpler, did the Harms Commission investigate these three incidents which you have just mentioned now?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I am not entirely certain whether they investigated the incidents in Swaziland, but the Kondile matter indeed. I cannot recall with certainty about the Swaziland incidents.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. Let us then accept that he did mention the Kondile matter. Indeed this was one of the incidents which took the most time with regard to Mr Coetzee's evidence, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: You say you covered up your participation.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: What was your version about that there, did you just deny it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was a simple denial.
MR HATTINGH: And along with you with the Kondile matter there were quite a number of other police officers involved as well.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Just please mention their names again.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It was Herman du Plessis, there was Otto, there was Raath, that's all that I can recall now.
MR HATTINGH: What about Lotz?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Was he was not involved?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, he was not involved.
MR HATTINGH: And Gerrit Erasmus?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, Gerrit Erasmus.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Now all these persons names were mentioned by Mr Coetzee in his disclosure of the Kondile matter.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And therefore some of these gentlemen would have been expected to make a statement if they did not have to testify about it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And did they also cover up their involvement in that incident?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they did.
MR HATTINGH: Did you congregate and sit together and say "This is what we shall say and that is what we shall say" and so forth?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I spoke to du Plessis, we discussed it and we said that we would just deny it. I did not speak to Raath, I don't know whether du Plessis spoke to him. Gerrit Erasmus also told me that he would deny everything.
MR HATTINGH: But you would agree, General, that where such detailed allegations were made about your involvement, such as that you had killed the person there at Komatiepoort and burnt his body, and as Mr Coetzee had said, you had sat drinking and having a braai while the body was burning, that your movements could be determined for that stage, or they could attempt to trace your movements during that time.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it's possible.
MR HATTINGH: And it was not enough just to say "I deny everything that Coetzee says", you would have had to work out an alibi, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so, but as far as I can recall there was nothing on record about the whole incident.
MR HATTINGH: What happened to that which was on record?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know. I speak under correction, but I think some of these things were destroyed during the normal process because after a certain time it gets destroyed.
MR HATTINGH: All incidents, incidents where the Security Police are involved, are these documents destroyed after a certain time?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes. I mean like pocket books or S&T allowances or whatever, those types of things after a period of time, as far as I know, get destroyed. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Now you will then also accept General, that with regard to the other incidents that Coetzee mentioned, not incidents which involved you, but that those policemen who were involved in that incident had also covered up like you had covered up, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it would appear so.
MR HATTINGH: For example, those who were responsible for the murder of Mr Griffiths Mxenge. This was also denied.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And similarly there were many incidents which Mr Coetzee mentioned where members of the Security Police were involved and all those allegations were denied.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: But not only denied, evidence was put forward which indicated that Mr Coetzee's version was entirely false.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. And that evidence which was put forward in this manner was evidence which was fabricated, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know about that.
MR HATTINGH: Very well then. What exactly was Gen Engelbrecht's role in the Harms Commission?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can recall his role was to look after the interests of the non-Security Branch members and to assist the advocates with regard to any information that they wanted to have.
MR HATTINGH: But were there no security members involved in these incidents which were disclosed by Coetzee and Nofomela?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think so, I think there were a few instances and I think at that stage there were people who were no longer in the Security Branch. I did not appoint Gen Engelbrecht for that task, so I don't know exactly.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. If he looked after the interests of the non-Security Branch members, who then looked after the interests of the security members?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Herman du Plessis.
MR HATTINGH: Herman du Plessis. So he was aware insofar as the Kondile matter was concerned, that it was a cover-up?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And he went along with it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Is it not so General, that you all knew that there was truth in most of the allegations that Coetzee had made, and that all of you had participated in the cover-up and that all of you were aware that you were covering it up?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, insofar as it was not telling the truth, that is so, and everybody knew that it was so. I cannot - I mean these people were involved, yes.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Let us take the Motherwell incident. Police officers were killed there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Usually when a member of the Police Force is murdered, as it is the same case world-wide, then the police, and I speak of police in general, go out of their way to find the murderer of their colleague, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: You wanted to create the impression that somebody else was responsible for the Motherwell persons' death.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: The ANC?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I shall put it as follows. The issue of the ANC was something, if I recall correctly, was something that they admitted in the newspapers that they were responsible for that, it was not something that we placed there or that we presented as such. After it was placed in the newspaper as such and by nature of the situation it suited us. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: So you then gave them the credit for that, that which they claimed for themselves?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, we did.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. But did the police, not necessarily the Security Police, let's say the Murder and Robbery Unit, were special attempts made to find the murderers of these four colleagues?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I cannot say. The investigation was in Port Elizabeth, I don't know who exactly did the investigation and how they went about it.
MR HATTINGH: So no information came forward that led to any prosecution of any person?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Is it not because everybody knew that you were involved and that they had to turn a blind eye to the evidence that they found?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
MR HATTINGH: Let us take the Kondile matter. Did the police investigate his death or did his death only come to light when Coetzee made his revelations?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Last-mentioned.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And the Cradock 4, Goniwe and the others, were special investigative teams appointed to investigate that matter?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I recall, the Murder and Robbery Unit investigated it.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. And they did not take any statements from your people?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of, no.
MR HATTINGH: And nobody was found to be responsible or who could have been responsible for the deaths of these persons?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: And this is how it went with all these incidents where activists were killed, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, those that I know of. I don't know whether there were incidents where that was not the case, but there were cases where it was so.
MR HATTINGH: Very well, I want to return to the Harms Commission. Did you destroy any documents in order to withhold any information from the Harms Commission?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, Chairperson, not that I can recall. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock did not testify about this, but he informs me that on one day he arrived at your office and you were busy - or shall I start earlier. The Harms Commission or the representatives of certain of the parties before the Harms Commission, wanted to have insight into the personal files of certain Vlakplaas police officers, or all the Vlakplaas police officers, I'm not certain. Is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I think so.
MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock informs me that he went into your office at some stage and you were removing documents from his personal files and you complained that you had to solve this mess now.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: And that those which you removed from his file and then probably from the other members' files, were destroyed before the files were handed over.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, Sir, that is not correct.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether documents were destroyed in order to withhold it from the Harms Commission?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
MR HATTINGH: You did not even hear of this happening?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: You know, during the Harms Commission's investigation, the Honourable Justice Harms made a sarcastic remark and if I recall correctly it was about the incinerators, as he called it, were working overtime at the Police and the Defence Force. Did you hear that remark of his?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: And that he said this because documents that he wanted could not be found to be handed over to him.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I know, the most documents that they asked for - there was a Gen van der Westhuizen, and I think it was a Col Wright, who were attached to the Commission as investigative officials and I would say the requests that came from them about things that the Commission wanted, most of the things I could give to them. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Did Gen van der Westhuizen not have a nickname amongst you of "Mr Fixit, Fixit van der Westhuizen"?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I heard there was such a nickname for him.
MR HATTINGH: And that nickname he received because at that stage he was the General who was used to try to cover up police involvement in illegal activities, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know if that would be the case.
MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Hattingh, is this Ronnie van der Westhuizen we're talking about?
MR HATTINGH: Yes, Ronnie van der Westhuizen who was also involved in the investigation of the Trust Feed matter.
MR LAX: And we heard about him in Sweet Sambo as well.
MR HATTINGH: Sweet Sambo as well, yes, Mr Chairman.
Now is that not the reason why he was appointed there, so that he in cooperation with you could see to it that evidence which could lead to your demise, that that evidence would not find its way to Judge Harms?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Gen van der Westhuizen did not ask me at all to withhold anything. What I can recall, he and Wright asked me for documents at some stage and I could give it to them, it was available.
MR HATTINGH: You do agree though that his Honourable Justice Harms could not make any finding of police involvement with incidents, for example the Mxenge and Kondile matters and many others, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: So that the police was successful in covering up to such extent that their involvement did not come to light.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And we now know with the knowledge of hindsight, that most of the allegations which were made by Coetzee had a great measure of truth in them.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: There was police involvement in the killing of persons.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And I put it to you, General, the only way in which you could succeed in receiving a finding from the Harms Commission, such as you did get, was by deliberately in cooperation with among others, Gen van der Westhiuzen, withhold evidence and to fabricate false evidence and covering up. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know anything about evidence that was fabricated. To me at that stage, in Coetzee's evidence, I think there were so many things that were obviously not correct in the things he said, to such an extent that one could make it unbelievable with regard to certain things because some of these things were entirely out of proportion. I don't know why he stated it as such. He mentioned people at incidents who were not even there and this apparently created a very bad impression.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, but we know for example in the Japie Maponya incident false S&T claims were submitted to indicate that the persons who were responsible for the abduction and killing of Mr Maponya during the time that it happened, were busy rendering services at Jozini Dam.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know who made these false claims. If false claims were made during the incident or afterwards, I am not entirely certain of such claims. I don't have any knowledge of claims which were falsified or those claims that were falsified.
MR HATTINGH: The point that I would like to make, General, is that not only were denials made but false evidence and testimony was deliberately fabricated and put forward.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot comment about that.
MR HATTINGH: I just mention this in general. We know that there was evidence that Gen Engelbrecht told Mr Willie Nortje, who is an applicant here, to go to Krugersdorp Police Station and get the petrol records because the persons who were there in Krugersdorp had made the mistake of filling petrol that day at the police station, the police garage at Krugersdorp, and that Gen Engelbrecht had sent Willie Nortje to fetch the registers and afterwards these registers just disappeared. Are you aware of that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Please refresh my memory, the Goniwe matter, were you involved there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And is it not so that Brig Schoon, shortly after the bomb explosion, had visited Port Elizabeth?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I don't know, I don't know about Mr Schoon coming there.
MR HATTINGH: Was he there with the Motherwell incident?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: He had left already.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he was retired by that stage.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Joe Mamasela was involved in the Griffiths Mxenge matter.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And he was also involved in Kondile or the Cradock 4 or the Pebco 3, which one?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I think it was with the Pebco 3.
MR HATTINGH: The Pebco 3, I'm told. He was involved there.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: You said that you thought Vlakplaas members were involved there.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And I put it to you that Mamasela was one of them.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And he also gave evidence before the Harms Commission, did he not?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Can you remember whether he denied or admitted his involvement there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall it, I cannot recall whether he testified about that, about the Pebco 3. I can really not recall it.
MR HATTINGH: But the allegations which Coetzee made about him, about the Mxenge matter, he denied, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: That this was part of this cover-up plot.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know about this cover-up plot, but he did deny it.
MR HATTINGH: But afterwards we know he was involved there, he came to admit to it himself.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's correct.
MR HATTINGH: These incidents where Security Police officers were killed, the Motherwell incident, would the Security Police not themselves investigate and not leave it to Murder and Robbery?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they could probably have, but I would put it as follows. Under those circumstances the standard procedure would be that the Security Police would try and get information, but they would convey this to Murder and Robbery.
MR HATTINGH: But did they do this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
MR HATTINGH: Because everybody knew that the Security Police was responsible for that act.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know who knew besides those who were involved.
MR HATTINGH: But the people who counted, the higher officers, the commanders, they knew.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: No, you cannot sit here and shake your head and say you don't know. You knew.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I knew.
MR HATTINGH: You were one of these who were higher up in the hierarchy.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I said besides those who were involved I don't know about any others.
MR HATTINGH: Lotz, what was his rank?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know whether he was a Sergeant at that stage.
MR HATTINGH: Was he involved in any of the incidents where you were involved and people were killed?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Which one was this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: With Goniwe, the Goniwe incident and the Motherwell incident.
MR HATTINGH: Goniwe and Motherwell.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: He is your son-in-law, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And then you also state - if you would just grant me a moment please. With Goniwe, you say you were involved there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: With the killing?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not with the killing.
MR HATTINGH: Not with the killing? Did you not testify yesterday, I'm asking because I'm not sure, that only later you determined who was involved in the killing.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes. Not all of them but I only determined some of them later.
MR HATTINGH: Who are they that you only found out later about that they were involved?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The black members.
MR HATTINGH: Only the black members?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The black members and Lotz.
MR HATTINGH: And?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: And Lotz.
MR HATTINGH: And Lotz. Now you say that you did not know that your own son-in-law was involved in the killing of these persons?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I did not know.
MR HATTINGH: Let us deal briefly with the Motherwell incident. There you gave the instruction, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I gave the instruction to Mr de Kock as I have said in my amnesty application, where he and I and Huet were together and I asked him if they were capable of executing the task and if so they must go and execute it. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Yes. So it was an instruction?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was.
MR HATTINGH: And did he give any feedback to you before the bomb exploded?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Do you mean Mr de Kock?
MR HATTINGH: Yes. Did he report the progress that they made with the plan?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think the following morning when these people departed he told me that these persons had left for Port Elizabeth and that two of his members had gone along and that two of Wal du Toit's people had gone along and that they would do it by means of a motor vehicle bomb.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. So there he openly reported to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And after the bomb exploded, did he report once again to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the morning after the explosion during the night, the morning I heard it on the radio and when I arrived at the office, Mr de Kock also arrived there later and also asked me if I heard the report on the radio and I said yes, and he told me he received feedback and that everything was successful and that there were no problems.
MR HATTINGH: And in this manner Mr de Kock would usually report to you with regard to operations where he and his men were involved, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: In this instance, yes.
MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I said yes, in this incident.
MR HATTINGH: I say usually, not in this incident. Usually when he had instructions that he had to execute, he would report back to you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he was supposed to do so.
MR HATTINGH: And do you agree that he saw you just about daily at your office if he was not out of town on an operation?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I don't about on a daily basis, but I would say twice or thrice a week.
MR HATTINGH: Was he not supposed to when he was at Vlakplaas, to daily visit head office before he went to Vlakplaas?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's not how I understood it. I did not understand that it was so.
MR HATTINGH: However that may be, General, when you took over from - or shall I put it as follows. When you gave instructions for the Motherwell incident, Mr de Kock was under suspension, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And you were aware of it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: You have heard his evidence, his evidence boils down to the fact that it was a fake suspension, it was just for show.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would accord with you.
MR HATTINGH: So that the police could tell the media and whoever wanted to enquire about it "Yes, we are investigating the allegations against him and pending on the investigation he is suspended", not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes. And in practice it was - as my memory wants it, it was that he could not act operationally any longer. I do speak under correction but I would want it that he asked himself whether he could go to his office at Vlakplaas because there were administrative matters which he and only he could handle at that stage and this was acceded to and as far as I know he regularly went to Vlakplaas afterwards.
MR HATTINGH: So in reality he just continued with his work, it was only to the outside that you pretended that he was suspended.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as I have said the instruction was that he should not be involved operationally.
MR HATTINGH: That he should not become involved in an operation?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Who gave that instruction?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I am not certain, but I think it came from Gen le Roux, but he could have received it from Gen Smit.
MR HATTINGH: Were you a General at that stage?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: You were still a Brigadier?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: But le Roux was a General.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't think so.
MR HATTINGH: Was he higher than you in terms of command sequence?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And you reckon that he could have received it from higher up?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he could have.
MR HATTINGH: And now you have an instruction that de Kock should not be involved in operations and you gave him instructions to go and kill the Motherwell 4 persons.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, at that stage I was approximately there for a month to a month-and-a-half after I had been placed in overall command of C Group and when I took over Group C, Mr de Kock told me, as I have testified yesterday, that they were capable of certain operations, they were ready at any point in time ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: But that is not the question, the question as I understood it was that you knew that orders from your seniors were that he should not act operationally, yet you nevertheless asked him to do so, contrary to the orders of your superiors.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I beg your pardon, I am answering this question in a roundabout manner, but it boils down to the fact that Mr de Kock asked me and I did not know the other staff well enough there, and he asked that if there's any operation then I should speak to him first and he will instruct the correct persons.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, let us accept that answer for a moment. You had to know him so that he could give you the right persons, but now you gave him instructions to become involved in the operation himself.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not tell him that he had to go and do the work himself.
MR HATTINGH: Did you tell him he mustn't do it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: So as far as you're concerned he could have gone down himself and participated himself in the operation.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I think he was aware that because of the instructions, he should not go himself.
MR HATTINGH: But you did not tell him "You shouldn't go"?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I cannot recall if I said so or not but I think it was, "wederkerig" we knew that he was out, he could not go.
MR HATTINGH: Why could the second-in-command, Baker, not appoint the right persons to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As I have said, I didn't know those people, I had never worked with them before and I did not know whom should I go to with such an operation and that is why I fell back on Mr de Kock. He requested me to approach him in such regard and he had certain people for certain tasks.
MR HATTINGH: You - I'm not certain whether it was in regard to Motherwell, but you at some stage had directed an urgent application to the High Court in Cape Town, am I correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not with regard to Motherwell.
MR HATTINGH: In the Mthimkhulu matter?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, this was still the TRC's open hearings during those times, if I may call them as such. That is when I requested it.
MR HATTINGH: And what type of legal assistance did you want? What order did you want from the court?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: If I recall correctly, in my language it was that the persons about whom evidence would be given in these open hearings should be notified timeously that such evidence would be led and also copies of the evidence have to be made available to these persons.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ever at any stage under the oath that you made for purposes of that application, deny your involvement in incidents where you were indeed involved?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall.
MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall it.
MR HATTINGH: But you would recall that, General. This is what I ask you, in those affidavits that you made in support of your application, did you perjure yourself there by saying "I was not involved in incidents" while you were involved in those incidents?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It is possible.
MR HATTINGH: Is it possible?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I do not have it before me so that I can see.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, but you made this statement, can you not recall?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall correctly with regard to that, what the contents of the statements were.
MR HATTINGH: The application of yours, did you deal there with allegations levelled at you? Did you mention incidents in there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I can really not recall, except for the Mthimkhulu matter, yes. But I really do not know, I cannot recall. It must on record somewhere.
MR HATTINGH: You say in the Mthimkhulu matter - that is the one that you apply for amnesty for, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did you in that application which you submitted, did you deny your involvement in the Mthimkhulu matter?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I must have.
MR HATTINGH: So under oath you said that you were not involved while you were indeed involved.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And that was a blatant lie that you told there.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Because afterwards you came and applied for amnesty for that incident.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So still you tried to cover up to the TRC, when they were busy with their questioning.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It was not supposed to be a cover-up, it was supposed to be for all members of the police, to try and get them fair treatment so that the persons would know beforehand that such evidence would be led against them and so that we could get copies and according to law so that we could decide what we're going to do about it.
MR HATTINGH: If that was your intention, why was it necessary to lie under oath? Why was it necessary to say that "I was not involved in the Mthimkhulu matter"? Why did you not just say "Give me the information so that I can defend myself"?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot now in hindsight tell you it was written as such and told as such. Any person at that stage in my position would I believe, not have put his pen to paper and made a whole statement and admitted to everything.
CHAIRPERSON: But you're not being asked to admit to everything, you were making an application on legal grounds that you were entitled to copies of the evidence that was going to be led. The question was, why did you go further and commit perjury and deny your involvement? You were the applicant, you weren't being asked to answer anything, why did you choose to go about it this way? That, as I understand Mr Hattingh's question, is what he wants to know.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I cannot provide an answer. At that stage I was actually very ill, I couldn't even drive a car, I had to work with my lawyer via telephone and courier and I cannot tell you why I put it as such, with the exception that I wanted to protect myself naturally. That is true.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And in order to protect yourself you lied?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Now you are aware of the evidence which has been presented before Committees here regarding the Chand matter in Botswana.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: This was also a case during which people made use of a house in a neighbouring state as a so-called transit house in which freedom fighters were accommodated while underway to the Republic and also on their way back from the Republic, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I understand so.
MR HATTINGH: Didn't you have that information?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: But if de Kock had the information, wasn't he supposed to have conveyed it to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he was supposed to convey it to me.
MR HATTINGH: Because this is a very serious situation, not so? These were PAC persons who were infiltrating the country in large numbers and establishing stockpiles and they were also responsible for attacks on the public.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, that isn't the information which was given to me.
MR HATTINGH: Well then what information was given to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The only thing that I know about that episode is that upon an occasion some Defence Force people came to me and told me that they had a courier who was bringing in weapons for the PAC into the Republic and that we had to intercept these weapons and I then told him, well the only safe way to do so would be to establish a roadblock and to arrest this man with the weapons because then we would be able to give him some form of bail and he would disappear. We can do something like that or in any case, to protect him we would have to detain him for a day or two otherwise the people would find out that we had apprehended him. He couldn't tell them exactly what had happened. And then this Defence Force officer said to me, or at least he didn't agree with it, he suggested that the courier had to deliver the weapons at a certain address and then they would give us the address and we could then take possession of the weapons.
We tried this once, but it wasn't a fixed address such as a street, it was in the bundus, if you'll pardon my expression, it was a settlement, a kraal as we know these settlements to be.
MR HATTINGH: You are providing all the details, but what I actually want to know, General, is whether or not you were aware that the Chand house was used by freedom fighters as a base from where they could infiltrate the Republic.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Not at all?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not at all.
MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock never reported this to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not at all.
MR HATTINGH: If you had known this, if you were told, as the evidence has indicated, that PAC members were entering the Republic via that house in large numbers with weapons, what would you have done about it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I would have gone to see the commanding officer here in head office, I would have compiled a report and explained the position to him, I would have discussed the matter with him and from my side I would have suggested that this place had to be destroyed.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, just as you did in Swaziland where the two houses which were blown up were also used as transit houses.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So you would have suggested that these houses be obliterated.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And that the persons living in these houses and these persons who had collaborated in the process, then be killed simply.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, correct.
MR HATTINGH: And this is precisely what took place, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it appears to be so.
MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock maintains that you gave the order.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I did not give the order at all.
MR HATTINGH: And it was also an order which he received to execute while he was under suspension.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he was under suspension, but I did not give him such an order.
MR HATTINGH: And you know that during this incident he seriously injured his leg, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well it must have been during that operation, although he told me that he was looking for weapons somewhere at some place or that somebody was supposed to indicate a place somewhere in Natal where weapons were to be found and that was where he had injured his leg.
MR HATTINGH: But then he was involved in an operation in Natal.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did you address him about this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall whether or not I took this issue up with him.
MR HATTINGH: Well this was directly in contradiction with your authorisations and your instructions, he was not supposed to be involved with any operation.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well I would not have regarded it as an operation in that sense where they have information about the location of stockpiles and they went to remove these weapons.
MR HATTINGH: Then what would you call it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I would call it a regular investigation.
MR HATTINGH: Was he allowed to be involved in such matters?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well I didn't see anything wrong with it.
CHAIRPERSON: What do you regard as an operation then, General? If going out to seize weapons somewhere in Natal is not an operation, what is? Will you please explain what you mean by operation, that de Kock was not allowed to perform.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I don't wish to play with words, we could also call this an operation, but what I'm trying to explain is that an operation which involves preplanned violence as a result of which a finger could be pointed at us or the media could finger us as responsible, but this operation which was completely in accordance with the laws of the country, I'm placing it in this case, with regard to his suspension I'm distinguishing between categories.
MR LAX: But General, please, the man was on special leave, the whole purpose of that special leave was for him not to be on active service, isn't that so? Let's not use the word "operation", we're talking about service here.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: He wasn't allowed to be performing his duties. He even had to get special permission just to go back to Vlakplaas.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: So I mean, if he had to get special permission just to be at Vlakplaas, what other special permission would you have had to give him to be involved in operations beyond his normal boundaries?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I agree with you, Sir, he was not supposed to be on that operation to Natal or the so-called operation.
MR LAX: Whatever you want to call it, it was some activity aimed at normal police work.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR LAX: The location of firearms, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR LAX: And that was totally contrary to your order.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR LAX: So let's not make the fine distinctions that you're trying to make between operations and other kinds of work, the fact of the matter is that he was doing work that he shouldn't have been doing and you didn't do anything about it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is completely correct.
MR HATTINGH: Wasn't he supposed to have remained in Pretoria?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And now he tells you that he was somewhere in Natal, that he was injured there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: Well weren't you upset about that? Because the whole idea was to keep this man out of the public eye and off he goes without your knowledge, to Natal and becomes involved in the tracing of weapons, as he told you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall whether I took the matter up with him. I merely regarded it, and probably wrongly on my behalf, as a regular action or a regular operation.
CHAIRPERSON: The whole point is he was not supposed to be engaged in any of these, was he? If there have been resistance, as there could well have been when weapons were there for freedom fighters, and there had been headlines in the newspapers, it would have done all the damage that you were trying to prevent by putting him on special leave, wouldn't it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: So this man was blatantly disregarding what the Police Force and senior people had decided to do, yet you decided to do nothing about it, or you did nothing about it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't do anything about it. MR HATTINGH: And he incurred a serious injury due to which he had to undergo an operation at the military hospital here, at the Eugene Marais Hospital.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And he, in order to qualify for medical aid and for compensation of the expenses connected with such surgery, he had to indicate that he had incurred the injury while performing service, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I assume so.
MR HATTINGH: And these are all things which have been recorded on record, which were later determined.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And you were not upset about this, you did not discipline him for disregarding your instructions?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall whether I disciplined him specifically or whether I told him that it should never happen again. I may have said something like that to him.
MR HATTINGH: But you have stated that you didn't really regard it as wrong because this was regular police work, that was the distinction that you attempted to make.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, and what I meant was that I did not regard it as so serious, but you are correct, it was completely wrong.
MR HATTINGH: And as my attorney has just fixed my attention upon it, when Mr de Kock gave evidence before the Harms Commission his leg was still in plaster.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is possible.
MR HATTINGH: And if anybody had asked him there how or where he had incurred the injury, he would have said it was during service because otherwise he would have instituted a false claim for medical aid, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So it could have come to light very easily that he was indeed performing service while he was supposed to be suspended or on special leave.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And now we come to the Brian Ngqulunga matter. You know what his evidence was in this regard, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Now do you admit that you gave an instruction for Mr Ngqulunga to be killed?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: "Ja, ek ontken dit". ...(no English interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: Let me just put this to you hypothetically. If you had determined at that stage that Brian Ngqulunga was in the process of defecting to the ANC, and in that process the police's involvement in murders could have been exposed, what would you have done about it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I would have informed my superior about it and I would have asked him what to do.
MR HATTINGH: You see you're creating the impression with me that you were actually just a puppet, that you were just a figurehead seated up there, in command of two or three sections and every time something had to be done you would have to go to the top levels to ask them. Didn't you ever use your own initiative or discretion when it came to such matters?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: In this type of incident at head office nothing was ever said to me directly of possessing such discretion and I supposed that I would have to consult on a higher level.
MR HATTINGH: But in the Motherwell case you did not go to your superiors and you accepted the sufficient authorisation of the commander of the Security Branch in PE for you to become involved in the matter.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: But this was after he had told me that he had consulted on a higher level.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. But you have maintained that you would have consulted on a higher level, is that all? If they had told you "Leave it at that, don't do anything", wouldn't you have done anything?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well then I couldn't do anything. MR HATTINGH: At that stage the Harms Commission was in session and they were investigating the murder of Griffiths Mxenge in which Brian Ngqulunga had been involved, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And they were also investigating the murder of Japie Maponya, in which Brian Ngqulunga was also involved, well not the murder but the abduction. So he possessed very seriously incriminating evidence.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I don't if he was involved in the Japie Maponya matter, I cannot recall.
MR HATTINGH: He was. He was, because he gave evidence to this effect.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: "Goed, dan aanvaar ek dit so".
MR HATTINGH: So with regard to those two incidents he could have incriminated you very seriously.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And there may also be other cases which I've forgotten about or which we might not even know about, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: What do you mean?
MR HATTINGH: I'm referring to other criminal activities in which he was involved which he could have disclosed had he defected to the ANC.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. And now you say that if you had information that he was in the process of defecting, you wouldn't have done anything. While you were busy covering up your involvement in such matters at the Harms Commission, you were in that process, and here is a man who could corroborate Nofomela and Coetzee according to the information that you had, and you say that you wouldn't have done anything or ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: He did not say that, he said he would have gone to his commanding officer, superior officers.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, I was just busy correctly myself, Mr Chairman. I agree that what I put to him was not correct.
If your commanders had told you not to do anything you would have simply accepted that.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I had no choice, I would have had to accept that.
MR HATTINGH: But what is the difference between the Ngqulunga matter and the Motherwell matter in this regard? Because there were also four men who wanted to defect to the ANC and who could have created serious damage for the police.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And with regard to that case the decision was taken for them to be killed.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the decision was not taken by me, I was told that such a decision had been taken and that I had to provide the capacity for the execution of the decision.
MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you that Brian Ngqulunga, that there was certain information which came to light and that you were aware of this information and that you along with Gen Engelbrecht issued the order for Ngqulunga to be killed.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I deny that.
MR HATTINGH: And at that stage Ngqulunga was attached to head office, he was no longer at Vlakplaas, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And from de Kock's perspective there was no reason why he would want to eliminate Ngqulunga.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
MR HATTINGH: Particularly without consulting you in the matter.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And when Ngqulunga was killed the impression was created that he was killed by members of the ANC, because he was shot dead with an AK47, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is what I was informed.
MR HATTINGH: And at that stage, Ngqulunga resorted under your command at head office.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And what did you do to attempt to trace his murderers?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Upon occasion I told de Kock and the others to visit the investigating officer in Bophuthatswana, to consult with him and to ask him whether or not there was any assistance that we could offer, and Mr de Kock assured me that their informers would attempt to obtain information.
MR HATTINGH: So he purposefully lied to you, he told you that they would cooperate in the search for the murderers, while they in actual fact were the murderers?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And there was close cooperation between the South African Police and the Bophuthatswanan Police, particularly when it came to security matters.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot comment on the nature of the cooperation, I was not part of this cooperation with the Security Police there. I don't know how effective it was indeed.
MR HATTINGH: So you were satisfied in saying to Mr de Kock "Go and tell the Bophuthatswanan Police that we will assist if they so require", and de Kock said that he would use some of his informers and askaris in an attempt to obtain information?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And that was sufficient to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well at that stage I couldn't see any other avenue, it was beyond our jurisdiction.
MR HATTINGH: Couldn't you have gone to the Commissioner and told him "General, will you please liaise with the Commissioner from the Bophuthatswanan Police because we would like to be involved and we would like to offer the assistance of some our best detectives in order to trace the murderer of this colleague of ours? Couldn't you have done that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I could have.
MR HATTINGH: But you didn't.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.
MR LAX: Mr Hattingh, before you move onto something else, may I just interpose for a moment.
General, what would you have done if de Kock told you that his people were in fact responsible for killing Ngqulunga?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Could you repeat your question please.
MR LAX: What would you have done if de Kock in fact did tell you that his people killed Ngqulunga? I mean here you are, you're his commander, he comes to you, he says "Listen, this man was a serious problem, we killed him". He gives you a very good explanation for why he did the job, as he has in his amnesty application for example. And let's say he did actually tell you, what would your reaction have been at that point in time? Would you have broadcast it to the world?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I certainly wouldn't have done that. If you ask me now I would have had to make a choice.
MR LAX: Surely you would have done, as has happened in all these other instances where you've been involved or your men have been involved, and you made sure it didn't get found out.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as I have said, I would have had to make a choice, I would either have remained silent or I would have gone to my commander. Today I don't know which one of those two options I would have chosen.
MR LAX: Yes, but you certainly wouldn't have made it public.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, definitely not.
MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Hattingh.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Lax.
And the same applies to the Chand matter, isn't that so? Mr de Kock came to you and said "We have this information about this house", if he had done so you wouldn't have made it known.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't have.
MR HATTINGH: Upon more than one occasion we have heard evidence that cross-border operations had to be authorised from very high levels in the command structure, are you aware of that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And the operation that you were involved with in Swaziland, who authorised this operation?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know who authorised it. I can tell you from whom I obtained the approval.
MR HATTINGH: And who was that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Brig van der Hoven.
MR HATTINGH: Van den Hoven. But did he tell you that this had been authorised by head office?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: He did not put it as such.
MR HATTINGH: Because these are incidents which had international repercussions.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And in those cases where cross-border action was taken, the finger would almost automatically point at the South African Police, or at least the South African Defence Force.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And you knew this.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And that is why it was a very sensitive matter.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Correct.
MR HATTINGH: And when the Chand incident took place, there was also quite a hullabaloo about this in the media.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well I don't know if there was such a tremendous hullabaloo, if there was, I wouldn't know about it, I didn't see it. I'm not aware of it, it may have been so.
MR HATTINGH: Well I can tell you that there was much written about it in the media, there were interviews with the family members, photos were published and so forth. I'm sure you can accept this.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Well then you would have known about the incident.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ask Mr de Kock whether or not they had been involved in the matter?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: One morning Mr de Kock came to my office and he told me then if I recall correctly, that he had read something in a newspaper about PAC members who had been killed in a house or in houses in Botswana and then I asked him whether or not he knew who was responsible for it, according to his opinion, and I think his remark was that he wasn't certain, that it could have been the PAC itself who had done this, that they had perhaps determined that these persons were double-agents, but that he wasn't certain, he was speculating.
MR HATTINGH: It is very interesting that you have made the same statement that you made with regard to this incident, you asked Mr de Kock whether he knew who could be responsible for the incident.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Well why did you think that he knew anything about it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't think that he necessarily knew anything as such, I wanted to know what he had to say, what he thought, what he suspected.
MR HATTINGH: What did you about a child?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: What did you say?
MR HATTINGH: Did you say anything about a child?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Well then I misheard you. Did you attempt to determine who was involved?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not make any further attempts.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. To return to Brian Ngqulunga, that incident also took place while the Harms Commission was in session, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: So we have three such incidents, Chand, Ngqulunga and Motherwell.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I think the Harms Commission was not yet in session when the Motherwell incident took place.
MR HATTINGH: Well had it not been announced?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is possible.
MR HATTINGH: But Coetzee had most certainly made his revelations by that stage?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So you knew that these allegations were being bandied about?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: General, Mr de Kock has testified upon other occasions that home-made shotguns were manufactured by his means at Vlakplaas, and that those shotguns were manufactured on police expenses and that they were provided to Inkatha. Do you know anything about that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Have you never heard anything about this, don't you know of any such allegations?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall this.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ever hear that he implicated you in this in his evidence? Did you hear him give any evidence to such effect?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No. No I cannot recall this.
MR HATTINGH: He also testified at some or other stage before some or other Committee, that on police expenses a police vehicle was made available to Themba Khosa for use and that you knew about this.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: All that I knew about was that Mr de Kock told me one day that Mr Themba Khosa was somewhere, I cannot recall where, somewhere in the Eastern Transvaal or Vereeniging, and that he had been found there with a vehicle containing weapons. Mr de Kock then told me that this vehicle was a police vehicle, a Secret Fund vehicle, and Mr de Kock then informed me that this was a very serious problem, that Themba Khosa was his informer and that he had given the vehicle to Mr Khosa and that he had to admit that this is what had happened and I told Gen Smit exactly what Mr de Kock had told me. I told Mr de Kock that that vehicle had to be returned immediately unless the police had taken the vehicle into possession for some or other reason.
MR HATTINGH: And was it returned?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I know it was. At least that was the assurance that Mr de Kock gave me subsequently.
MR HATTINGH: So he told you that the vehicle had returned?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Who paid Mr Khosa's bail with regard to that selfsame arrest that you made mention of?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock maintains that you paid it and that you knew about and that you had approved it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: And the weapons which were found on him were taken into possession by ballistics in order to compare whether or not they had been applied in any other incidents, isn't that so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Were those weapons ever fetched by you at ballistics?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
MR HATTINGH: These are weapons which according to Mr de Kock, were provided to Themba Khosa by you, with your knowledge.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: And that you were afraid that those weapons could be traced back to you, and that - if you will just give me a moment please, Chairperson, and that you then made arrangements with ballistics, whether directly or by higher "bemiddeling", that the weapons could be fetched from there by Mr Willie Nortje, and that this was done and that then with the ballistic characteristics, somebody fiddled with the ballistic characteristics so that they could not be traced back to the police and that they could not compare the shells.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, that is entirely untrue. Those weapons were taken to ballistics by detectives and whether he received them back and what happened to them, I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I see it's past one, I don't know if you wish to take the adjournment at this stage.
CHAIRPERSON: How much longer do you think you'll be?
MR HATTINGH: I would say, Mr Chairman, probably another half-an-hour or perhaps a bit longer than that.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you think we can finish eating by half past one?
MR HATTINGH: Yes, Mr Chairman, as far as ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: We all have meals here ...(indistinct - no microphone). Right, we'll adjourn till half past one.
MS LOCKHAT: All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
NICHOLAS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: (Cont)
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
General, did you ever give instruction to de Kock to establish two weapons cache points on the East Rand and to pretend that it was discovered so that remuneration could be claimed for the source that had led to the discovery of this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Because Durban Security Branch needed money and you wanted to generate money in this manner for them.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, if Durban needed money, then they could have applied for it.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ever study Mr de Kock's complete application?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: So you do not know that he makes such allegations in his statement?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Or have you read Mr de Kock's book?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: And there he also makes such allegations. Very well. Just one aspect that I omitted from the Brian Ngqulunga aspect. Are you aware that Col Dave Baker, in the Ngqulunga matter, had given evidence that he went and reported along with Mr de Kock to you, in regard to the elimination of Mr Ngqulunga, the Monday after the incident?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I understand so.
MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's how I understand it.
MR HATTINGH: So you're saying that Baker's evidence is also false?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it is false.
MR HATTINGH: Let us arrive at this incident then. How did you feel about Mr Coetzee after his revelations?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I was disappointed, angry.
MR HATTINGH: Did you regard him as a traitor?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I did.
MR HATTINGH: Would you not have wanted to see him being taken out of the way?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would at that stage, have wished that he died at least, whether it be of natural causes or however.
MR HATTINGH: And we now know that he could jeopardise your career seriously with the information which he available to him and we know that his initial revelations in the Vryeweekblad, was not a full disclosure of all the information that he had, thereafter he wrote this memorandum, the one that I have here, in which many, many references are made to incidents where the Security Branch, not necessarily only Vlakplaas, but where the Security Branch was involved in criminal activities.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And I wish to put it to you that you were not only concerned about your own position, but as in other incidents about which you gave evidence, you were concerned about the damage it could cause to the police and the government of the day, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct, Sir.
MR HATTINGH: You knew that at that stage that he had not told everything that he knew.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I cannot comment on that now.
MR HATTINGH: And I wish to put it to you that you also knew that at the Harms Commission you manipulated the evidence there and there you could see that no detrimental finding could be made against you because the Harms Commission's own investigation man was Gen van der Westhuizen.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot totally agree with you, in the sense that is one of those persons wanted to give evidence and admit there, one of the persons whose name was mentioned by Coetzee, then we could have done nothing about it.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, but you could have fabricated evidence to contradict that evidence.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know, I don't know of evidence that was fabricated.
MR HATTINGH: I mentioned examples to you, I will not deal with it again. What I would like to put to you is, in a civil matter you would not be in control of what evidence could be put forward and so forth, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, we could not have.
MR HATTINGH: And you knew that there was a civil matter pending, in which Gen Neethling had sued the Vryeweekblad and I think, Dirk Coetzee, because of these things that were published in the Vryeweekblad.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. And also later there was quite a lot reported in the media that the State paid for Gen Lothar Neethling's legal costs in this incident, are you aware of that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So the State had an interest in these proceedings, these civil proceedings that were ongoing., not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And there you could not cover up and block because you were not in control. And I put it to you that that was the reason why you wanted to prevent Coetzee testifying in those civil proceedings.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, Sir, I don't have any knowledge of a decision in that regard, that something like that had to be done for that reason.
MR HATTINGH: Yes. And now we know from history that the initial claim before Judge Kriegler, was not granted, Gen Neethling lost the case.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I know about that.
MR HATTINGH: Which came down directly to the fact that in that court, Coetzee's word was accepted.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Did you, and when I say you, I refer to the police, the Security Police in particular, were you interested in Coetzee's movements, his comings and goings after his revelations?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Why?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well Sir, there were rumours that he was possibly still in the country and we felt that, the chiefs felt that if he was still in the Republic, he had to be found and his allegations had to be investigated in order to determine how much truth was in there.
MR HATTINGH: But you knew how much truth there was in some of his allegations.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but I was not the man who could take decisions to say what should happen and what should not happen.
MR HATTINGH: So you are saying that you wanted to speak to him, you wanted to take statements from him to hear what he had to say, so that you could investigate it, was that the idea?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not my idea as such, but the people higher up.
MR HATTINGH: Who were the people higher up?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That was now the Commissioner.
MR HATTINGH: Did you tell you this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And that is why you had to find him?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well if he was still here. We had to find out whether these allegations were true that he was still in the Republic.
MR HATTINGH: So that you could take a statement from him?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's what the Commissioner said, the matter had to be investigated.
MR HATTINGH: But you have already then had the sections and pieces which appeared in the Vryeweekblad, where he gives information about these incidents, why did you have to speak to him to investigate it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Certainly Sir, I was taught as a policeman that you obtain an affidavit from a person and then you investigate the matter. There are legal aspects which have to be looked at, one cannot just act blindly. As far as my knowledge goes - or shall I put it as follows, an investigation was launched in this matter and the reason which was mentioned by Coetzee in the newspaper, in the Vryeweekblad or wherever it was, to have them come to head office to hear what they have to say about the allegations.
MR HATTINGH: Among others, yourself?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, myself.
MR HATTINGH: And you denied it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: So how would it help if you found Coetzee, you would already have investigated and have the denials on record?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: If Coetzee at that stage was found, then certainly they - I cannot predict what would have happened, would they have appointed a judge or appointed the Attorney-General to investigate the matter, I don't know. I cannot say what these people would have done.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. So what was done to try and determine whether Mr Coetzee was still in the country?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: We applied listening devices on his ..(intervention)
MR HATTINGH: And that was approved from the highest authority, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: The requirements which the law had set down for such listening devices was complied with?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And so a hunt was launched for Coetzee?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: And this was only to get a statement from him?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And would you agree that these tapes upon which the discussions were taped, was given to Vlakplaas to listen to?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's correct.
MR HATTINGH: Why to them?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: We did not have staff to pay attention to this at that stage.
MR HATTINGH: Why did they have the time to pay attention to it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I asked Mr de Kock whether he had people who could listen to the tapes.
MR HATTINGH: You go the wing of the police which is described as the only operational arm of the Security Police, by Gen van der Merwe, they must go and sit down and listen to tapes in order to find out whether Mr Coetzee was still in the country.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I assumed that one or two men will listen to the tapes, not a whole lot of people.
MR HATTINGH: And was any feedback given to you about the information which was obtained from these recordings?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The instruction was that anything on these tapes that could be of possible interest, they had to put this in writing and then these written pieces would be brought to me.
MR HATTINGH: Was this done?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was done.
MR HATTINGH: And these notes, did this only have regard to where Coetzee might possibly find himself?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, the most was short pieces. I recall that Mrs Coetzee spoke to her mother-in-law or her mother and they speculated about Dirk and said that they think he was there and they have not heard from him.
In the time that I can recall, nothing of value came from that listening-in. They only thing that we could determine from this listening device, was that Dirk Coetzee called his wife and told her ""That cafe with the Coca Cola bottle outside, I'll phone you there in half-an-hour". And then he probably called her there. It was probably a public telephone where he spoke to her, so over their phone there was nothing really of value which we could gleam, that I know of.
Coetzee was a persons who knew how to apply these measures.
MR HATTINGH: I beg your pardon?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I said Coetzee was a person who knew how to apply these safety measures.
MR HATTINGH: In your affidavit, Exhibit C, you say that there was much speculation amongst serving and former members of the police about where Coetzee found himself. Paragraph 3 of Exhibit C.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: But former members as well? I beg your pardon, I have read that incorrectly, that is my mistake. You say that there were allegations made against serving and former members and there were speculations as to where he was. Suspicions were uttered that Coetzee was still in the Republic of South Africa, and that he was in hiding with the help of some political parties and some journalists.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR HATTINGH: So at some stage you received a visit from Mr de Kock and he informs you - what does he tell you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: He informs me that he, from a friend of his who works at National Intelligence, that they had determined that Mr Coetzee was with the ANC in Lusaka.
MR HATTINGH: And did he say exactly where in Lusaka he was, did he give you an address?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, Sir, he only said he was with the ANC in Lusaka.
MR HATTINGH: And this he told to you verbally?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Was it important for you to know this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think it was important to know because then at that stage we could certainly have accepted that he was definitely not in the Republic, he was with the ANC, and if he was with the ANC, what would they do with him, will they send him back on a mission or what will they do. It was important for us.
MR HATTINGH: This was important to you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Why was this important to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It is important to know what this man's future would be with the ANC, what would he do. From experience we know that such persons are sent back on missions in order to test their loyalty. These are all possibilities that were there.
MR HATTINGH: You were afraid that he was with the ANC and that he would make further revelations, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, he was with the ANC and he made these revelations, there was nothing that I could do at that stage.
MR HATTINGH: Did you then give instruction that the listening-in be ceased?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Why not?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Because we still wanted to find out where exactly he was and what type of messages he was sending through.
MR HATTINGH: But I thought the purpose of the listening-in was to determine where he is, so that you can take a statement from him, so that the allegations against you could be investigated.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that amongst others.
MR HATTINGH: So something else has now been added to the reason.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, to try and find out where he is, what his movements are and what messages he might send.
MR HATTINGH: Why did you want to know that, why did you want that information? Why did you want to know where he was and what type of information he was sending?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It is quite simple, in any security community in such an instance where a person had defected, would be interested in what would happen afterwards, where would this man go from there, would he become a member of the ANC, would he be militarily trained by them, would he receive intelligence training from them, what is the direction that he would move in.
MR HATTINGH: So it was also a reason why they listened in on his wife's telephone discussions?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Probably.
MR HATTINGH: And if there was an instruction to listen in to his telephone conversations, would it not be logical to give instructions that his wife's movements be determined and to see whether she did not meet with him somewhere?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No Sir, I was personally of the opinion and it was also my instruction as such, that she should not be followed because my opinion was that she would not lead us to Dirk Coetzee, firstly. To tell you now that my viewpoint at that stage was that these speculations that Coetzee was still in the Republic, is not true, or it was speculations that were based on very weak grounds. I didn't want to accept it, let me put it as such.
And Mrs Coetzee, by having her followed and specifically by Vlakplaas people, if something happened to Mrs Coetzee it would immediately have come down on Vlakplaas, even if they were not responsible. And that is why - my instruction as such was that we should not do anything where the media could point fingers at us if anything happened to Mrs Coetzee.
MR HATTINGH: A little while ago you said that you gave instructions that she not be followed.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: When did you give that instruction?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, when I determined that she was indeed being followed.
MR HATTINGH: She did what?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: She was being followed.
MR HATTINGH: And who followed her, according to what you determined?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I am not entirely certain about the facts surrounding this aspect, I did pick it up on the listening device because she spoke to a family member or her mother or mother-in-law and said that she was with another person at a restaurant and there were Vlakplaas people around.
I speak under correction, but I imagine that there was somebody there with a transmitter and this transmitter was making a noise or the reception outside in the car, was noisy or something, and that is how they realised that she was being followed and that Vlakplaas people were responsible and that is when I spoke to Mr de Kock about it and told him they should not do it at all, and I told him why I said so.
MR HATTINGH: And I infer from this that the fact that they followed her, they were not trying to hide this fact from you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I would not say that they were trying to hide this from me, not at all.
MR HATTINGH: Did you later try to determine whether they had ceased their activities of following her?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I was given the assurance that they would cease it and I never received any information afterwards that they continued with it.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Now Mr de Kock comes to you and he says "Coetzee is in Lusaka", but you continue with the listening-in, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's' correct.
MR HATTINGH: And did they continue bringing you notes with regard to information which was gleamed in this manner?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but there was nothing that was something worthwhile.
MR HATTINGH: But I do not know whether it was worthwhile. Did they still bring you notes?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, for some time afterwards they still did.
MR HATTINGH: And now de Kock tells you the man is in Lusaka, what do you tell him, what does he have to do about it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I didn't tell him to do anything about it.
MR HATTINGH: You did not tell him to enter this into a register?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is what I told him.
MR HATTINGH: What register or what type of file was this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I did not tell him specifically which file, I assumed that he would go an enter it into the ANC Lusaka file.
MR HATTINGH: In paragraph 4 of your affidavit you say
"I instructed de Kock to make an entry into the appointed file to that effect."
What appointed file are you speaking of here?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As I have said, I would have said that this would be the ANC file in Lusaka.
MR HATTINGH: Did you have a general file that dealt with the ANC in Lusaka?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: What type of information was in there?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Information about people who were there of the ANC, people who were attached to the ANC there, the address of the place, the postal address of the ANC in Lusaka.
MR HATTINGH: And where was this file kept?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: In the filing office.
MR HATTINGH: This is not your office?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I beg your pardon?
MR HATTINGH: Not your office?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not my office.
MR HATTINGH: And do you know whether he made such an entry?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.
MR HATTINGH: Because I get the impression, although you are not specifically saying so, that you want to say that the address of the ANC in Lusaka had to be in that file and that is how they found Coetzee's address where they sent the package to. Is that what you want to say?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It was just a suspicion, it was just an inference I draw.
MR HATTINGH: The ANC office in Lusaka's postal address would definitely have been entered into that file.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, because I did not know - I did not have any knowledge about it, now afterwards it was my suspicion then, that it was possibly to the ANC's postal address that the thing was sent.
MR HATTINGH: And your inference is that that is where Mr de Kock found the address to send this tape to?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that was what was going on in my mind.
MR HATTINGH: The address of an organisation like the ANC in a foreign country, in another State, would this not be easily accessible by using other methods, other than having to look in the file?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, probably if one knew that you wanted an address of the ANC in Lusaka.
MR HATTINGH: But they did not keep secret their address, did they?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Also the same with the offices in London, it was not a secret. So anybody who wanted the address of the ANC could do so without taking the trouble of going to head office to look into a file.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but it would have been easier in the file at head office.
MR HATTINGH: I wish to refer you to Coetzee's evidence in bundle 2, page 276, his evidence in the trial of Mr de Kock. At the bottom of page 276, still in his evidence-in-chief he is asked
"Did you have any contact with any persons in South Africa?"
Upon which he answered -
"I had contact with my family, my parents, my spouse and my brother."
And he is asked -
"How did you make contact with them?"
He says -
"Telephonically."
"Did you supply any addresses to them?"
"I did. I supplied the address which at that time belonged to Farouk, one of the ANC members, it was a postbox 34077, Lusaka, so that they could correspond with me."
And a little lower down, on page 277, he says -
"You say you supplied this address telephonically to certain people in South Africa, or to various people in South Africa."
"That's correct."
"And this Farouk, was this an ANC member, was he a representative of Lusaka? Who was he?"
"That is correct, but from I heard and from what I can recall, it was his private postbox."
Now if we look, General, at Exhibit D1 and we study the address there and we see -
"Postbox 34077, Lusaka."
And that is also the postbox number that Coetzee gives as the one of Mr Farouk, the same postbox number, 34077, Lusaka. So I want to put it to you that according to this the address on the package was not the ANC's postal address in Lusaka, but this Mr Farouk's address.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I draw the same inference.
MR HATTINGH: And that Mr de Kock could not have obtained from that file.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know, I don't believe he could, unless it was put there for some or other reason. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR HATTINGH: So he had to find it in some other way. He said he got it from you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is not true.
MR HATTINGH: And he gives an explanation that you gave as to how you found it, a letter which was addressed to Coetzee and which had to be delivered by hand, was handed to the police via a police officer from Piet Retief that had defected to the ANC.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is entirely correct, it was a police officer who - I cannot recall the facts exactly, I think there were two of them who went to Lusaka, they were questioned there and it was determined that this person had no political or any other background as to why he had to run away from the Republic, and they told him he must go back. He also asked them to come back and apparently, from what I can recall, he was in the same complex where Coetzee was, or they did meet each other and Coetzee heard that he was returning, and my memory wants it that he gave him two letters to mail in the Republic when he was back in Piet Retief.
When he arrived back he mentioned it to us, we went to fetch him, he gave the letters to us, we opened the letters, it was just simply family related letters, the one was to his mother. I don't recall who the other one was addressed to. I gave the members instructions there at head office to take a sworn affidavit from this person, where he said among others, that Coetzee told him that as soon as he had completed his evidence, that he would be trained and he would return to bomb Security Head Office in Pretoria.
I cannot recall and I will not say this under oath, but my memory has it that there was no sender's address on those letters. It would have been strange if a sender's address was there, what would the difference have been if he mailed it in Lusaka or in the Republic. - with regard to the security aspect.
MR HATTINGH: If you wrote a letter, do you not write your address in the right-hand corner as we were taught in school?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: "Nie die koevert nie, die brief".
MR HATTINGH: The letter itself, yes.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And in the letter in the right top corner, as I was taught in school, it says such and such an address and such and such a date.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I understand, yes.
MR HATTINGH: So there the address could have been, is that not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I am certain that there were no addresses there.
MR HATTINGH: Are you certain about that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall that there was any address on the envelope of the sender or in inside the letter.
MR HATTINGH: What did you do with the letters?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know what happened to them, I don't know whether we mailed them or what happend to them.
MR HATTINGH: Would this not have been entered into the Lusaka file?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: If there was something that was of any value of security.
MR HATTINGH: So was there not?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, there wasn't.
MR HATTINGH: What I cannot understand about this version of yours is that you are trying at all costs to find out where Coetzee is and here you get a letter where you are informed by this person who hands over this letter, he says that the letter was given to him in Lusaka.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: Then you now know that he's in Lusaka.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR HATTINGH: And so why when de Kock came to you thereafter, do you say "Oh, is he in Lusaka, please go and write it in that file"? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As I have said, I cannot recall exactly when - I suspect the person who brought the letters, I cannot recall when he arrived there. First, Mr de Kock or them, I cannot recall that, and whether they confirmed what Mr de Kock told me, the fact that he was in Lusaka. I cannot recall in what sequence it was.
MR HATTINGH: Did Mr de Kock have anything to do with the letters that you received?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know, I don't know whether I showed these letters to him, I cannot recall. I really do not know.
MR HATTINGH: But he has an explanation as to how he knows about it, he says you told him about it.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It is possible that I could have told him about it, that such letters were received.
MR HATTINGH: And that's where you got the address from.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is not true.
MR HATTINGH: But you say you cannot recall whether the address was on there.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall with certainty. As far as my memory takes me, there were no addresses on it.
MR HATTINGH: So why would you want to recall that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: If there were addresses on there it would have been of interest.
MR HATTINGH: But why? This man then told you that "Dirk Coetzee gave me these letters in Lusaka, I know where he stays, I had contact with him there".
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but if there was an address on the letter it could have been another address other than this ANC Lusaka one, it could have been another address.
MR HATTINGH: I do not understand what you are trying to say.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: And then I also don't know what you want from me.
MR HATTINGH: This question is simple, why would you specifically taken note of the fact that there was an address on the letter or not, because you say it was important to know where he was? Now I say to you, why did you look at the address to find out where he was, the person who gave you the letter said "I know exactly where he is, I know where he lives, I had contact with him there"? So why did you have to try and find an address on the letter to try and find out where he was?
CHAIRPERSON: He hasn't said he tried to find an address on the letter, he has said as far as he recalls there was no address.
MR HATTINGH: No, I'm aware of that, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: That is somewhat different from "trying to find an address". And you've gone on and on about this.
MR HATTINGH: No but Mr Chairman the point is, he says that it would have been important to find out, to establish whether there was an address on the letter or not.
CHAIRPERSON: He looked and he can't recollect if there was one, he doesn't think there was.
MR HATTINGH: I'll leave that point, Mr Chairman.
I put it to you, General, that you received the letter, that it fits in perfectly with Mr de Kock's version and that it was from that letter that you obtained the address and gave it to him to write on the parcel bomb which was sent to Mr Coetzee.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I did not obtain any address of Dirk Coetzee and give it to de Kock.
MR HATTINGH: And when the bomb detonated, did you once again go to de Kock ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on. It is quite clear that it was important to know where Coetzee was.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask the person who had the letter for information in this regard?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: What did he tell you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: He told me that Mr Coetzee was somewhere near houses - as we would say in the old language, in a downtrodden area, that he was under custody of the ANC. As far as I know he couldn't provide any street address or anything like that for me. I don't wish to waste your time, please stop me if you feel that I am, the statement was taken from him and my recollection is that Coetzee testified at that stage in London and that I had contacted Gen van der Westhuizen and he told me to fax the statement to London, which I did. And this statement contained all the information which this member could make known. The original statement must have remained at Security Head Office, where it was filed.
MR LAX: General, did you sit down with this man with a map of Lusaka and say "Here you are, show me where you went, show me where you met with this man"?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't do it personally, I gave Maj Naude the order to interrogate this man thoroughly. He or some of his people, or he had to appoint some of his officers, and one of them ultimately took the statement from him. And Mr Naude's staff was the kind of staff which would collect information about all camps and places belonging to the ANC abroad, they had the maps and such documents and if it could have assisted them it would have been plotted and they would have kept it on record.
MR LAX: You never checked with them whether they did in fact get that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall that well, I would imagine that they had an aerial plan and that he had indicated a point on the aerial plan, but I really don't have the facts surrounding that any longer in my mind.
MR LAX: Just one small thing if you'll allow me, Mr Hattingh.
This testimony that Coetzee gave in London, was that to the Harms Commission?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes. Yes, I'm referring to the Harms Commission.
MR LAX: We've heard that was in approximately April of that year.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: Thank you.
MR HATTINGH: General, one thing is for sure, the person who handed over the letters knew where in Lusaka Coetzee was residing. Whether he gave you the address or not, he had knowledge of Coetzee's whereabouts.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he had certain knowledge. I don't know how well this person knew Lusaka, I don't believe that they allowed him much freedom when he was there. I don't know, I cannot answer that.
MR HATTINGH: So the bomb detonated and you went to de Kock and asked him precisely what you had asked him regarding another incident, the Chand incident, "Who do you think who would be responsible for this?". Or words to that effect.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I did not go to Mr de Kock, Mr de Kock and Gen Viljoen and Gen Engelbrecht, in 1991 when I was already in Cape Town, upon an occasion they went not only to the Cape, but if I understand correctly they were also in other regions within the country, but they visited me in Cape Town and it wasn't very long after the bomb detonated and there were reports about this explosion of a bomb somewhere in Soweto I think, which had then resulted in the death of Mr Mlganene. And I there asked Mr de Kock "This story, I've heard a story about this bomb that exploded, a bomb which was actually intended for Coetzee, but which has now killed another man", and I asked him whether or not he knew anything about it, whether he knew who was responsible for it.
MR HATTINGH: Why did you want to know this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well it was completely normal, I heard all these things and the man was there and I simply asked him out of curiosity.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ask Gen Engelbrecht anything like that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ask Brig Schoon anything like that?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Are you referring to Gen Viljoen?
CHAIRPERSON: Viljoen.
MR HATTINGH: No, I deliberately referred to Brig Schoon, Mr Chairman.
Did you ask any other policeman who was connected to Security Head Office, anything like this?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I was already in the Cape, I wasn't up here any longer.
MR HATTINGH: But didn't you come up here at one point?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, upon occasion.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, particularly shortly after you were transferred, so that you could deal with any loose matters that were still pending up here. And upon those occasions when you visited here, did you see any of those policemen?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, sometimes.
MR HATTINGH: And did you ask them who they thought was responsible for the bomb?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No.
MR HATTINGH: Well then why did you ask Mr de Kock?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I simply asked him out of curiosity. I asked him "Listen, this story about the bomb which was sent to Coetzee, do you know about this story?"
MR HATTINGH: Why did you think that he would know anything about it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well I didn't know, I simply asked him out of curiosity. Perhaps he had heard something or picked up some information regarding it.
MR HATTINGH: You see, he says that he reported to you regarding the matter, here in Pretoria.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, that is not correct.
MR HATTINGH: And you say that you returned upon occasion after your transfer?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall when, but I did visit on one occasion for a conference which I think was held in Nylstroom(?).
MR HATTINGH: Gen Engelbrecht took over from you, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And you didn't ask him whether he knew or thought who was responsible for the matter?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.
MR HATTINGH: I put it to you, General, that you issued this order, that you provided the address to which a parcel was to be sent in order to eliminate Mr Coetzee.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I deny it.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
General - Booyens on record, I would just like to sketch a hypothetical situation to you. Coetzee could have been expected by one to be a target and based upon the information at your disposal, after you had spoken to the man and so forth, this man who had returned from Lusaka, would it have been possible for example, to launch a Special Forces operation with the certainty of success, in order to eliminate him there on the other side? What I mean is, to shoot him or something like that, or didn't you have enough information about his whereabouts?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can recall there was tremendous uncertainty, the man could not plot the place with absolute certainty.
MR BOOYENS: So there was no place that you had plotted so that you could tell Special Forces or whoever "There is the house where Coetzee is, hit that house"?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't have put my neck out like that.
MR BOOYENS: Another aspect. You have been thoroughly examined by my colleague under cross-examination ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on.
You say the man did not plot the place with any certainty, but I understood that a few minutes ago you said you didn't know if he plotted the place, you presumed he would have been shown an aerial map. How can you now say he didn't plot it with any certainty?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I said that I understood from Mr Naude and the others that they had shown him an aerial map and that he had plotted on that map, but that it was not satisfactory, he could not pinpoint it with absolute certainty. That is what was conveyed to me.
MR LAX: But General, please we've heard tons of evidence about Special Ops, about these sorts of operations, you didn't need to know the exact house to confirm exactly where you were going to carry out the operation. If you had a rough area you would use other sources, and you had plenty of sources in Lusaka, where you could have ascertained exactly where he was.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I personally did not know of these sources as you have put it, these agents. I didn't think about such a sort of attack, it never came up in my mind.
MR LAX: You see, just while we're on this issues of sources - and sorry Mr Booyens if I'm interrupting you, we understand that the Security Branch had high-ranking members of the ANC who were sources for them. Is that right?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, that may be so, but I cannot tell you.
MR LAX: You don't know.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know them.
MR LAX: You've never heard such a thing?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I heard that there was something like that, that there were such sources, but I didn't know them.
MR LAX: I'm not asking you whether you knew them.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Okay.
MR LAX: General, you're a General, you're retired now, you've been in HQ, are you seriously telling us that you don't know that there were high-ranking sources within the ANC, that they Security Branch had access to?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I knew this, but I didn't know who they were. That is what I'm trying to tell you.
MR LAX: Yes. I'm not asking you who they were, I'm saying you did have those sources ...
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: ... you could have used them if you wanted to know where Coetzee was in Lusaka.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, could probably have.
MR LAX: Just to carry on with Mr Booyens' question then.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: So the issue of location wasn't the problem, you could have easily have ascertained exactly where he was, using any number of different sources, including this aerial photograph.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: Thank you.
MR BOOYENS: General, then with regard to another aspect, you already know what Mr Bellingan said, his allegations, and I won't go into that again, but could you possibly provide the Committee with a reason as to why you think Mr Bellingan made this false allegation to you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It is difficult for me, I don't know. I did not listen to Mr Bellingan's evidence, I also didn't read it, my legal representative told me what was basically on the tape. I don't know whether it was intentionally said to Mr Bellingan by Mr de Kock when they left the office or when they walked down the passage, that I have Coetzee's address. I don't know whether it was purposefully put that way, I don't know, I'm wondering myself.
MR BOOYENS: Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS
MR LAMEY: I've got no question, thank you, Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr van Rensburg, I would just like to know the following in conjunction with the questions which were put to you. You say that at one stage there was a letter and that de Kock apparently was in Lusaka ...(intervention)
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Do you mean Coetzee?
MR RAUTENBACH: I beg your pardon, Coetzee. He was in Lusaka apparently.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I'm sorry for having interrupted you. I don't know whether Coetzee was still in Lusaka when we received the letter or whether he had left already.
MR RAUTENBACH: But as I understand your evidence, after this took place, at a certain stage Mr de Kock came to see you with regard to this information, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The information which I had?
MR RAUTENBACH: No information which he had.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Okay.
MR RAUTENBACH: And he came to you and said that he had determined, that would be Mr de Kock, that a friend connected to NI, had information that he was in Lusaka, correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: Was that old news to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, it wasn't. If I think back I would recall that this was the first actual piece of information indicating where Coetzee was.
MR RAUTENBACH: Two questions ago you confirmed for me, at the beginning of my cross-examination, that you received this letter or this information and that subsequently de Kock came to see you.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, if I said that, then I am mistaken. I cannot recall, I cannot say with exact certainty which one of the two came first.
MR RAUTENBACH: So you cannot recall which came first?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: But you would agree with me I assume, Mr van Rensburg, that it would have been senseless to tell Mr de Kock, "Well record it in the file", if you had the information as a result of the letter which the man brought.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would agree with you.
MR RAUTENBACH: Did you have a file on Coetzee?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That is something that I've thought about extensively, but I cannot recall whether we had a file on his specifically.
MR RAUTENBACH: Because the relevant file would have been Coetzee's file.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that could be so. If there was a file for Coetzee.
MR RAUTENBACH: But you don't know whether there was a file?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know whether there was a file. You see the system worked as follows, the files were kept in a records room, one couldn't simply go in and draw a file, there was strict control over these things.
MR RAUTENBACH: But that would make it even more difficult because Mr de Kock arrives and speaks to you and you tell him to make a note in the relevant file. He's from Vlakplaas, what would he know, which file? You would have to tell him, you have to tell him to make a note in the relevant file.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: When I stated that it was the relevant file, I meant that he would either know which file it was or I told him which file it was, I'm not certain.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then Mr van Rensburg, at that stage, can you tell us of the conversations which took place between you and other persons who were placed on higher levels in the Security structure, about Coetzee, what were these discussions all about? It seems that there were extensive discussions about Coetzee, what did you say, what did you discuss with them?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I didn't really discuss much with these people, it was simply general talk. This was a subject which was on everybody's lips at that stage, all the revelations and allegations which were made by Coetzee, and everybody was talking about it and wondering where he was, whether he was still in the country. Particularly Gen Joubert from the Detectives, who is now deceased, was of the opinion that he could still be in the Republic.
MR RAUTENBACH: Because it seems to me, Mr van Rensburg, that whatever the situation was, the persons in the Security Branch desperately wanted to know Coetzee's whereabouts.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I wouldn't deny that.
MR RAUTENBACH: Now if I were to tell you that you had heard the allegations made by Coetzee at that stage ...
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: ... you also knew after he had made some of these allegations, that some of these allegations were indeed the truth.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Correct.
MR RAUTENBACH: Surely you would not be interested in tracing Coetzee in order to determine the truth of the allegations, when you knew the truth of them in the first place.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well I had orders, the police had orders and there was nothing that I could do about it, I accepted that the law would run its course.
MR RAUTENBACH: Mr van Rensburg, this issue, would I be closer to the truth if I said that one of the reasons why Coetzee had to be found, was to interrogate him?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is probably so. I wasn't the Commissioner at that stage, I wasn't in charge of the Detective Branch. That is what they said.
MR RAUTENBACH: What did you think that such an interrogation would involve?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: There would be an investigation which would have followed on this interrogation.
MR RAUTENBACH: At that stage you had had sufficient experience of persons who had been interrogated and persons who had been eliminated, is that correct?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: On a serious note, Mr van Rensburg, did you exclude this as a possibility entirely, that Coetzee would be interrogated if he was ever found and that he could also possibly be eliminated?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: If I think about it today it may have been that way, but at that stage I really didn't think about it like that.
MR RAUTENBACH: But Mr van Rensburg, let us just go back, you had much experience of persons who had been interrogated and detained, who were interrogated by you and who were eliminated, we have many examples of such persons, particularly those who were involved with the ANC, are you telling me that the idea that Coetzee would be interrogated once his whereabouts were determined and that a possible elimination could follow, never occurred to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It wasn't in my hands, I couldn't decide on these things. I would definitely not have been involved in the investigation or the interrogation.
MR RAUTENBACH: That's not the question, Mr van Rensburg. What I want to know from you is what was going through your mind, you as a person. I'm asking you that when you heard that Coetzee was wanted - and we are referring now to your personal experience and the knowledge that you had built up over the years, I'm asking you, you yourself, when you knew that everybody was desperately seeking Mr Coetzee, did it ever occur to you that the interrogation and elimination of Mr Coetzee was a possibility?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, not at that stage.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would like to put it to you that your answer is surprising to say the least.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Well then that is your opinion.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would like to know from you ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I interrupt? Wasn't Mr Coetzee at this stage a worldwide figure?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would say so.
CHAIRPERSON: And if it ever came out that he had been taken into custody in South Africa, would the whole world have been watching to see what happened?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Precisely.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would like to take it one step further, in other words to put it to you as follows. Did the possibility occur to you that if it could be determined where Mr Coetzee was, Coetzee could be eliminated on the basis, as you have done so many other times, for it appear to be the work of some other organisation such as the ANC or any other such organisation? Did that ever occur to you?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: In my opinion he was beyond my capacity and I abided by that, that at the end of the day the law would just run its course. It was just one of those things which I didn't have any control over.
MR RAUTENBACH: Ag Sir, if you were in any way concerned or ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Surely you and many other members of the Security Branch were extremely anxious that the law should not run its course. The question was put to you, to avoid the law running its course, Coetzee should be eliminated before this could happen.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but as far as I knew the man had already revealed everything that he wanted to say and what was I supposed to do about it? I myself couldn't go to Lusaka and do something about it. My superiors didn't say that anything like that was supposed to be done. So if he was still in South Africa, possibly then, but even that, I don't know. The repercussions, when I think about the repercussions, I don't really know whether or not it would have been worth it.
MR RAUTENBACH: There's just one further aspect that I want to ask you about. From the side of the families we'd just like an answer to this in general. The position that you occupied and the persons who worked with you in the Security Branch, can you tell us whether there was any difference in the approach by the Security Branch before and after February 1990?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Could you please repeat that?
MR RAUTENBACH: Was there any difference in the approach by the Security Branch before the 2nd of February 1990, and after the 2nd of February 1990?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The approach to what?
MR RAUTENBACH: The approach to the enemy.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there were changes, even I worked with it, I was given an order to look at persons who were still in security detention, we were told that they would receive indemnity and that we had to begin the preparations for that, that these person would be released at some or other point in time and that we had to undertake the authorisation and the administration and prepare for this. And even Vlakplaas had to be transformed into an operational and intelligence unit with regard to criminal matters, particularly regarding illegal arms and so forth.
MR RAUTENBACH: Could you just place into context for us please something like the Motherwell bomb incident which took place in 1990 ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: December 1989.
MR RAUTENBACH: ... with regard to the execution of covert actions and action against the enemy after 1990, was there any change that you could observe, from the side of the police?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: As far as I know the approach was that there would be a settlement on a political level, we would have to act differently. As I've already stated, the persons who were in detention at that stage, and I knew personally that there were very serious prima facie cases pending against them, these persons would be released shortly, they would not receive amnesty, but indemnity and so forth. And as I have already said, we had to focus all the more on regular criminal matters.
MR RAUTENBACH: Then just in conclusion, Mr van Rensburg, was any decision taken that you were aware of, or that you took with regard to yourself, to remain silent regarding the things that had taken place in the past?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I decided to keep quiet regarding matters which affected myself and affected things in general.
MR RAUTENBACH: I just want this from you directly, Mr van Rensburg, are you saying that you decided independently to remain silent and that others probably decided independently to keep silent as well, that there was no general decision to remain silent?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Nobody told me to keep quiet.
MR RAUTENBACH: You decided yourself to keep quiet?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR RAUTENBACH: I have nothing further, thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RAUTENBACH
MS LOCKHAT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT
MR SIBANYONI: General van Rensburg, the threat by Dirk Coetzee to go over to the ANC, did you view that as more serious than the threat by the Motherwell 4 to cross over to the ANC?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I would say so, yes. I think probably he had more information. This is Mr Coetzee now.
MR SIBANYONI: Do you also say by virtue of his position as the former Commander of Vlakplaas, of being a greater danger in the eyes of the South African Government or of the police?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would agree with you.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.
MR LAX: Thanks, Chair.
General, one thing we haven't heard about, we've heard about monitoring, we've heard about watching the movements, wasn't Coetzee's mail intercepted?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, his postal items - or shall I state it as follows, his wife's postal address was monitored here and as far as I can recall - I cannot recall any letters that we received which was addressed to her. There could have been, but I can really not recall any letter that had - I speak of letters that might have been sent from him.
MR LAX: Yes. But wouldn't post being sent to him have been monitored? Wouldn't you have given instructions that post destined for him be intercepted and at least scrutinised?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall if I issued such an instruction, but I would have accepted that - or not accepted, it is a fact that all ANC offices in foreign countries were on this list. Wherever the mail was made up here to go to Lusaka, all ANC mail would have been removed and be scrutinised. But this was a branch at Jan Smuts, I think these people were at Jan Smuts, and if they picked up anything there, it would be conveyed to us.
MR LAX: But surely you would have given the name of D J Coetzee to those people and any post intended for him would have been intercepted, it would have been looked at, to make sure what is being sent to this man.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, in practice this not how it worked as I understood it, it was an impossible task. I arrived as a young man in the Security Branch and I wanted to do it and they told me "No, you must give an address, a complete address if you want us to monitor the mail, the address that you want to have monitored, we cannot just go on a name." Apparently they could not sort it out according to a name.
MR LAX: Well we've just heard from all the applicants, just about all of them, that Coetzee's post was in fact, his name was - they understood that his post was being intercepted.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Mail that went to him?
MR LAX: Yes.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't know of mail that was intercepted that was addressed to him, it could have been. His name or an address, I don't know whether his name was attached to the ANC in Lusaka or London or wherever, but I do not know of mail that was intercepted that was on it's way to him. I don't know of it.
MR LAX: Well you see this parcel, this parcel that killed Mlangene, was addressed to D J Coetzee, P O Box 34077, Lusaka. Zambia.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: Now surely it's inconceivable that that parcel wasn't stopped on it's way out of the country.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I can really not say whether it was possible or not, I cannot comment on that.
MR LAX: You see if stuff that was to be sent to Coetzee was being stopped and intercepted, and we've heard from the applicants that as far as they knew it would have been, then this parcel must have been stopped by somebody, unless someone else gave an instruction that it shouldn't be.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot answer you there, my experience in the Security Branch taught me that much mail had gone through that was not intercepted and it went through without our knowledge, that was indeed on the list to be intercepted. I think it is a human factor. I don't know whether all mail could be intercepted that goes to an address abroad, I don't know, I cannot tell you.
MR LAX: Can we accept as a given, that if you were tapping Mrs Coetzee's phone and making detailed notes of important issues that arose in those conversations and if her movements were under surveillance, even though you hadn't necessarily ordered that, that post to and from her and post to her husband would also have been intercepted? Would that have been part of the normal practice?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Correct, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid I don't know, I'm out of touch with all this, but does all mail, post, letters and things, go by airmail these days, do you know? And is that why the interception was at Jan Smuts?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I cannot answer you there, I don't know why.
CHAIRPERSON: Because Jan Smuts, if post was going by rail, it would certainly not be a place to intercept mail, would it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Chairperson, I have to admit I don't know exactly how they went about it. I myself had never gone to this place at Jan Smuts, I've never been there myself.
MR LAX: If you'll just bear with me a moment, I'm just checking that I've covered everything.
MR LAX: Just one last aspect, and it's almost at the risk of belabouring this point, you've said that you thought that once Coetzee was found the law would take its course.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: And that some sort of Commission of Inquiry would be instituted.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.
MR LAX: But there was already a Commission of Inquiry, that was the Harms Commission.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I think I corrected myself on that question, by saying that I thought the Attorney-General or a judge or somebody would be appointed to investigate it.
MR LAX: Yes but why, the Harms Commission was already there to do precisely that.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: In how I saw the matter, there would have been a difference between where he testifies before the Harms Commission in London and when he's in South Africa and he's arrested or was found here to be questioned. It would have made a difference to me.
MR LAX: You see you were asked about whether you had ever thought that they might want to kill Coetzee, and you said no, the thought never came into your head and yet very early in your testimony, under cross-examination by Mr Hattingh, you conceded that you would have wanted that man dead at that time.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Correct.
MR LAX: So having that thought in your own mind, having that desire in your heart so to speak, how would the thought not have occurred to you that he might be killed? You wanted him dead.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but as I have told you, it would not have been in my hands or in my capacity to do it, other people would have decided and done so. Whether the people higher than I decided about it, I cannot comment on that.
MR LAX: General, you were in charge of what has come to be known as "Apartheid's Death Squad", not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: Are you telling us that you didn't consider the possibility that the man might be killed, and that you didn't have the capacity to do it?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I don't know. As I have said, I did not have the capability, I did not have the power to go and do that or to give instructions to do that, to kill Coetzee abroad.
MR LAX: General, you knew that bombs could easily have bene put anywhere, you already had been involved in bombs in Swaziland, even if they might not have gone off, not so?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes.
MR LAX: You knew the capacity to send bombs existed.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I am aware of it.
MR LAX: All you had to do was give the word.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Sir, today I tell you I would not have taken responsibility in that case.
MR LAX: You could also have gone higher up and asked for permission, and it seems clear that just about everybody in the Security Branch wanted Coetzee dead.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: My thoughts at that stage were, if something like this happens and I was involved, then the command has to come from above.
MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: You told us you went down to Cape Town in the beginning of 1991.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the beginning of 1991.
CHAIRPERSON: When did you commence on duty there, can you remember?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: That would probably have been the 2nd or 3rd of January of 1991.
CHAIRPERSON: And did you remain there for the next few weeks or months continuously?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it is difficult to say now, I cannot recall. I did not only work in Cape Town, my area extended to up against the Orange River, where sometimes I had to visit Beaufort West.
CHAIRPERSON: But where was your headquarters? Cape Town?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: The Police Headquarters was in the Boydell Building in central town.
CHAIRPERSON: Central Cape Town?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Central Cape Town.
CHAIRPERSON: Would they keep records there of who was in attendance on each day?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: At the Police Head Office?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't believe so, Chairperson, I don't believe they did this.
CHAIRPERSON: So there would be no record available in Cape Town to show that Mr de Kock was lying if he said he saw you in Pretoria on the 16th or 17th of February 1991?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: I don't know, I don't have something like that available. I don't know if of the other members who were along with Mr de Kock, or whether he himself might have a pocket diary somewhere, where he had made an entry that they were there.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm asking about you, whether you have any, if we can find any evidence relating to you, to show that this is not so.
GEN VAN RENSBURG: Not that I know of.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR LAX: Just one thing, Chair, that's occurred to me. If you'd allow me.
General, this bomb goes off in Soweto and it's pretty clear from the parcel and the packaging that it was aimed at Coetzee, and that it's come back to you. Coetzee worked at Vlakplaas, it wouldn't have taken too much, bearing in mind your involvement and bearing in mind headquarters' understanding of what happened, that you would summonsed to Pretoria to say "Hang on, you were in charge when this thing probably left, what can you tell us about it, what's going on here?" Couldn't that have happened?
GEN VAN RENSBURG: It did not happen.
MR LAX: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
MR VICTOR: I do not have any re-examination, thank you, Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VICTOR
CHAIRPERSON: I thank the General for having come up from the Cape, and he's excused from further attendance unless specifically requested to be here.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: Does that conclude today's hearing, of evidence?
MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, it does.
CHAIRPERSON: What do you suggest now? Shall we have written argument in this matter?
MR BOOYENS: I don't think it will really be economically justifiable for people to fly up just to come and argue the matter, Mr Chairman, honestly. I think the sensible suggestion - although I'm the only one of course that is in that position, the others are close here. So if the Commission directs that we must argue on Monday, I'll come up.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we have other matters set down for hearing on Monday, people are coming to argue legal points and what-have-you. I don't know if any of you are involved in that one.
MR BOOYENS: No. Written argument, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: I think written argument. Right gentlemen, we will request written argument in this matter. And if any information becomes available to any of you whilst preparing that argument, I trust you will communicate with our Leader of Evidence, who will tell us and all the other interested parties.
MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, may I just enquire one thing. What is the best address to send our written argument to, to the Cape Town office?
CHAIRPERSON: I think so, they courier stuff to us wherever we are because trying to find us is not that easy.
MS LOCKHAT: The best thing to do is just to send it to the Cape Town office and just mark it for my attention and I'll see that the Committee gets it.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I just enquire, if we have to do written argument, I would like to have access to the record of the evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think you can certainly wait until you've all had the transcript, the full transcript.
MR HATTINGH: And that being so Mr Chairman, my next question is, I know from experience that we're probably going to wait about a week or two for the record, would it be in order if we only submit our written arguments next year?
CHAIRPERSON: Say in the year 2000.
MR HATTINGH: In the year 2000, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to commit myself to saying whether that is in the next millennium or the end of this millennium, there appears to be a certain amount of conflict at the moment.
MR LAX: Just so you know, the office in Cape Town will open on the 10th of January.
MS LOCKHAT: All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
