Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, before we start today's matter, can I mention another matter that I thought had already been dealt with, but it seems to me that it may not have been, and that is the question of next Monday, when my colleague, Mr Lax will not be available, he's finishing a matter in Nelspruit, so we will not be able to start with the Msibi matter till Tuesday morning. And as I say, I was under the impression that all the relevant parties would have been notified, but from what my secretary tells me this morning, it seems that that may not be the position. Have you in fact been told?

MR HATTINGH: I don't know about Mr Hugo, but I've not been told, Mr Chairman.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I have to inform the relevant parties.

CHAIRPERSON: You have?

MS LOCKHAT: No, I still have to inform the relevant parties.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh. Well I am informing the relevant parties who are present now, so they can make other arrangements. We will largely be the same parties for the next two matters and I think if we co-operate a bit, we should be able to finish them in the time set down. Judging by what we've done so far at these hearings, we've run well within time. So I would ask you all to think about what we can do to speed up next week. I apologise if this has inconvenienced any of you, I should have enquired earlier to make sure that you had all been notified.

We will now start with the matter set down for hearing today, which is described as "Ambush at Nerston/Amsterdam". The Committee remains the same. I would ask the legal representatives to please put themselves on record.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I am P A Hattingh, I'm instructed by Mr Hugo and I appear for Mr de Kock.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, Ruloff du Plessis, instructed by Strydom Britz Attorneys, I appear for Mr Labuschagne.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My surname is Rossouw from the firm Rooth and Wessels, and I represent applicants Douw Willemse and Steve Bosch.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson. The surname is Lamey, also of the firm Rooth and Wessels, and I represent applicant Eugene Fourie.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr Chairman, my name is Albert Ramawele, from the firm ...(indistinct) Ramawele Attorneys, and I represent the applicant, Mr Almond Nofomela. Thank you.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Harry Prinsloo, I represent the applicants Deetlefs and Pienaar. Thank you.

MS VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, I am Louisa van der Walt, I appear on behalf of Mr Greyling, Mr van Dyk and Mr Botha. Thank you.

MR NTHAI: Mr Chairman, I'm Seth Nthai, I appear on behalf of the family of Mbengeni Khone(?), alias Bernard Shange. I also appear on behalf of the family of Tollman Arthur Thimula. I also appear on behalf of the survivor, Mr Vusimuzi Sindane, who will come here and give evidence as a witness. I also appear on behalf of the family of Shadrack Sithole.

As I indicated in chambers, Mr Chairman, there seems to be a confusion about the real family. What has happened is that the family that I'm representing responded to the advert in the Sowetan newspaper, where it was indicated that they're calling the family of Shadrack Sithole. The family lives in Alberton. In 1983, their son, known as Shadrack Sithole, left the country and he was never seen since then.

What really attracted the family to respond to the advert is that the person who is supposed to have identified the body at the Piet Retief mortuary, his name is Alfeus Sithole and the father to Shadrack Sithole, who is late now, is also Alfeus Sithole.

According to the records that we have, this Shadrack Sithole, the driver, is supposed to be coming from Swaziland. We have been trying to trace the family in vain. We are now placing our hope on Vusimuzi who is not here, as indicated in chambers, who may able to identify the - because the family members from Alberton, at least they have an identity document of their son who disappeared and hopefully out of that we will be able to identify the Sithole we are actually talking about. Nonetheless, the family is here, they feel they have an interest in the matter. The coincidence that the names and the person who identified the body, really made them to come here, and we are opposing the applications on behalf of the family members. Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Lynne Lockhat, on behalf of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: One matter before we go on. Somebody I think this morning, told me that Mr Nortje was represented here this morning, is that so?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I will as far as it's necessary, represent the interest of Mr Nortje. I think one of the applicants, I think my colleague's, Bosch, has mentioned his name as well as also other people, but I think it's common cause and it will, I believe, transpire during the evidence that he was not at all present and involved in this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: That the impression I had gathered from reading the papers, but I was worried that he might not have been notified of the possibility that he was an implicated party, but if you're hear we needn't bother about that aspect.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, just the other implicated party, that's Aubrey Mgade, he has an attorney representing him, Calitz Crocket(?), they have been informed. And then Petrus Johannes Badenhorst has also been informed and Nortje in relation to Rooth and Wessels, has also been notified. Snor Vermeulen, Chairperson, who is the - Mr Wim Cornelius is his legal representative, also been notified. And then Flores, also Mr Cornelius representing him. And then just the one last party, John Walters, Chairperson, we had some problems in locating him and we never managed to establish his whereabouts.

And then just in relation to the victims, Zandele's family, Chairperson, we could not trace, and then Knox Dlamini, he's deceased and as well as Shadrack, he has also not been traced in this instant, Chairperson. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: One other matter at the preliminary stage is, I informed Mr Nthai that in the event of Mgade giving evidence in accordance with the statement which you all have a copy of, that we would consider it desirable to obtain if possible, the medical reports from the Piet Retief Hospital and from the Wessels Prison, and we've asked Ms Lockhat to take steps to obtain those as well.

Right, shall we now continue with today's hearing.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the first applicant in this matter is Mr Eugene de Kock.

MR LAX: Your full names for the record, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: Eugene Alexander de Kock.

MR LAX: Do you have any objection to taking the oath?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

MR LAX: Sworn in, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, you are an applicant in this incident and your application appears from page 1 in bundle 1, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Up to page 9, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Have you studied it and do you confirm the correctness of this document?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do.

MR HATTINGH: I shall briefly deal with the incident. At the time of this incident were you coincidentally in Piet Retief, working, or did you specifically go to Piet Retief for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I and some of my members especially went to Piet Retief, but on a date before this shooting. This was in regard to the operation to abduct Glory Sedibe, alias September, from a prison in Swaziland, and this incident took place a day or two after we broke out Sedibe from the prison there.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Who received information that the liberation movement fighters were to enter South Africa there at Nerston border post.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was W/O Pienaar from Piet Retief, who picked up a person or apprehended a person of whom they had a strong suspicion that he had on a previous occasion brought in groups of MK members who had planted the landmines in the Eastern Transvaal. And then he coopted this person with promises of financial reward and that he would not be charged.

CHAIRPERSON: If he gave his cooperation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if he gave his cooperation.

MR HATTINGH: And did this person then supply him with information?

MR DE KOCK: He gave information and this person stated his willingness to assist the police to give this group to the Security Police who wanted to infiltrate.

MR HATTINGH: Did he give information to the extent that a group of freedom fighters were planning to enter the country?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and the infiltration at that stage was latent, what we refer to as a "clear and present danger".

MR HATTINGH: And would he have been involved in the bringing in of these persons?

MR DE KOCK: It would have been his task to bring these people in as it has been previously.

MR HATTINGH: That was the following question that I wanted to ask you. Did he have information that on previous occasions he had brought in MK members into the country?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: With the same vehicle that he used in this instance?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you have any information about his own involvement with some or other political organisation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he himself was a member of the ANC, however I cannot confirm whether he had been military trained, but he was an experienced supporter and member of the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. After he supplied the information to you, did you then make a plan?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we formulated a plan to stop these persons and to literally stop them in their tracks, in other words, not a step forward and not a step back.

MR HATTINGH: What did the plan entail?

MR DE KOCK: The plan entailed an ambush in two stages. I would just like to mention that the source took us personally, Mr Pienaar and myself, to the border near Nerston where the infiltrators would stop and along with them would bring ammunition and explosives through the border.

MR HATTINGH: Would this be at the border post or a place near to the border post?

MR DE KOCK: It was a place near the border post, but out of sight from the border post.

MR HATTINGH: Would they go through the fence there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Just for purposes of the Committee - I don't know whether any of the members were involved in the Maponya matter, photos were handed up there of the Nerston border post.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it is just a normal wire there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one can just tramp it flat, take the poles and put them flat down and a vehicle can drive over it and one can just put it back up again.

MR HATTINGH: So in this manner they could easily cross the border without going through the border post.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And this person showed the place to you, and then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, thereafter, as part of the plan I asked this person that when he drives from Nerston with his vehicle in the direction of Amsterdam, he has to stop at some point. I think we marked the point with a milk container or some or other cardboard, with the excuse that he would want to urinate, upon which we would activate the ambush and then we would kill these members of the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: So there was no plan to arrest them?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Right from the start the plan was to eliminate them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we wanted to stop them right in their tracks.

MR HATTINGH: Very well then. On this prearranged point you would then wait for him to arrive there with the people.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would members of the South African Police be deployed elsewhere as well?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but we did not tell this to the source or this ANC member because one is not sure whether he would be a sell-out or whether he would try to set up an ambush for us. I decided to send another group of members with silent firearms at the point where they would cross the border over the fence and not lead them into an ambush with them coming in but the persons who returned, the persons who carried the ammunition and arms and explosives, to lead them into an ambush and shoot them as well as the person who brought them with the vehicle from Swaziland.

MR HATTINGH: So they would wait on the other side, on the Swaziland side?

MR DE KOCK: They would wait right on the border.

MR HATTINGH: And the plan was not to arrest these persons, the plan was to kill them.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you deploy any persons elsewhere?

MR DE KOCK: In this regard, Chairperson, the rest of our group would then wait on the road to Amsterdam, also in an ambush position.

MR HATTINGH: What would their task be?

MR DE KOCK: We would kill the persons in the vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: So there are only two groups?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: I have read that some of the other applicants refer to three groups, do you have a recollection thereof?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they could assist me, but I do not have an independent recollection that there were three groups.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, we shall leave that to their legal representatives. And was the plan then enacted?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then wait there next to the place and the group went to the border to wait there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: What was your aim with regard to the source?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the source was a problem to us in several aspects. The one was that he was an ANC member and in all instances it was a risk to send him back to bring this group in because he could have led us into an ambush. With his coopting for cooperation, an amount of R10 000 was promised to him if he would deliver these people to us and he was willing to do this. The problem with such a person is that if he sells out his own people, he would sell you out later for R15 000, or the ANC would find him and use him to lead us and to lure us into an ambush, whether it be in Swaziland or elsewhere and we couldn't be sure that this person would not bring ANC persons into the country for the purposes of sowing violence and planting bombs.

MR HATTINGH: And we keep all these factors in mind, what did you decide to do then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a discussion between myself, Deetlefs and Pienaar and I proposed that we shoot this person and there was consensus and then we did shoot him.

MR HATTINGH: We will arrive at that later. Did you then set up the ambush where you were present yourself?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: On what side of the road or were you on both sides of the road?

MR DE KOCK: We were on the northern and southern sides of the road. We set up some of our members along the sides of the roads, in such a position so that we would not shoot at each other in a crossfire situation. I myself found myself on the southern side of the road, in other words I would deal with the passengers. MR HATTINGH: Meaning with that, that as the vehicle passes you and stops next to you, the passenger on the left-hand side would have been on your side?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were on that side, can you recall who was along with you on that side?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can recall Mr Deetlefs and Mr Fourie were on my side, although I cannot recall all the other members. We were not certain - I would to mention, we were not certain whether five or six people would come in because the source had a bakkie and the number of persons were not sure about.

MR HATTINGH: And on the other side of the road?

MR DE KOCK: I think three or four members were there. I know Labuschagne was on the other side, and I have to depend on the other members to tell me on which side of the road they were. I did not mention all of their names here because I didn't recall all of them.

MR HATTINGH: What were their instructions, the people on the driver's side of the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on the one side it was a stopping group and on the other side, here I asked Labuschagne to shoot the driver.

MR HATTINGH: So he specifically had instruction to shoot the driver?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and he received the instruction from me, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Who was in command of this whole operation?

MR DE KOCK: That would have been myself, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And do you then accept responsibility for all the members' actions at the time of this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I accept all responsibility in all aspects, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So let us just get a description of this vehicle, you say it was a bakkie with a canopy.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did the vehicle then stop at the prearranged point?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, about three or four paces just in front of us it stopped.

MR HATTINGH: So it was quite close to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was. And after it had stopped I opened fire with an R1 firearm.

MR HATTINGH: Immediately?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see anybody climb out of the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, one does not give a military trained person the opportunity to get out and fire, he will have the opportunity to fire on you.

MR HATTINGH: So you opened fire. And I assume that the members who were there with you opened fire as well.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Could you hear shots being fired from the other side?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did hear shots, but I cannot confirm whether it was at the driver or at the passengers.

MR HATTINGH: But the shots came from that direction?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was automatic fire from there.

MR HATTINGH: And did you give the cease-fire signal at some stage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did.

MR HATTINGH: And did you approach the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And were there any survivors in the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: How many persons were killed in the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Three persons, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Does this include the source?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: So it was himself and two other persons?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: The persons who were killed, were they still in the vehicle or were they outside the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: They were in the vehicle, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: All three of them?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the driver lay on the driver's side, but I would say in the middle of the bakkie, between the front wheel and the rear wheel.

MR HATTINGH: Just to explain, the driver, that was the source?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one could call him a traitor.

MR HATTINGH: You say he was lying on the right-hand side of the vehicle and the other two, where were they in relation to the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: They were still in the passenger seats, there were two of them who were in front of the vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: So all the occupants of the vehicle were in the cabin of the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you check the persons firstly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did. With one of the two occupants, two passengers, I am not sure whether it is the one in the middle or the one close to passenger door, had a firearm standing in-between his legs. The driver of course did not have a firearm and with the opening of the firearms that were found in the back of the vehicle, I found an AK47 from the packaging there.

MR HATTINGH: Let us just get this clear. Did you then open the canopy at the back?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you find there?

MR DE KOCK: There was a large amount of handgrenades of various types, Eastern Block handgrenades, there were TNT blocks with detonators.

MR HATTINGH: There is a photo here - a photo was taken of the arms that were found, the original is now before the Chairperson and you have a photocopy of it.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Firstly, the top photo indicates bags.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were these bags in which some of the firearms were packaged?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct. The cortex was in the bag, as well as the handgrenades and the limpet mines, the TNT blocks. And from here it would appear as if it was tied with masking tape, the magazines, the ammunition and then the primary detonating charges for the RPG7 launcher.

MR HATTINGH: Was this also in the bag?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as well as the three tin containers which contained detonators for the handgrenades.

MR HATTINGH: And how was the rest packaged?

MR DE KOCK: The AK47, Chairperson, if I recall correctly was bound in plastic and taped with masking tape. That is my recollection, I may be wrong. The RPG7 launcher was in a bag, a hessian bag of sorts. And there is one AK47, but as far as I can recall there were two. It may be that the other one was attached to the driver and not shown on this photo.

MR HATTINGH: Can you please look at the object which is just left of the four wrapped up packages there. It would look like an object that is in some kind of packaging.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would appear as if it could be an AK, because it is similar to that packaging. There are two PG7 propelled rocket grenades, then there are three launching grenades. I know of some of this equipment here, I know some of it was damaged during the shooting ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Would you please look at this object right to the left front.

MR DE KOCK: That is the pin or the lever of the handgrenade which was shot.

MR HATTINGH: So was this unstable because of the fact that it had been hit by a bullet?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. The lever was still prevented from detonating because of a point of metal which might have been as thin as the point of a needle. That is the only thing that prevented it from exploding.

MR HATTINGH: And as to the rest, the other round objects which are left in front?

MR DE KOCK: Those are still sealed tins with handgrenade detonators.

MR HATTINGH: And the roll of cord directly behind that?

MR DE KOCK: That is Russian cortex, detonating line. It is an explosive manufactured as rope.

MR HATTINGH: And to the right of that there are two limpet mines.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there are two SPM limpet mines.

MR HATTINGH: And then to the right of that there is quite a large amount of handgrenades.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And on the copy it is not so clear, but on the original it is clear that there are various types, there are two various types of handgrenades.

MR DE KOCK: No, there are three various types of handgrenades, there are F1 defensive handgrenades and then the RGD, which are offensive and then there are two or three that look like small tins, those are RP42 handgrenades and those are also offensives handgrenades.

MR HATTINGH: And on the other side there is an automatic rifle.

MR DE KOCK: It's a VZ25 automatic hand-carbine and this was found on the person who was shot at the border.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And the magazine thereon, on the photocopy it is not clear but on the original it lies diagonally above the handgrenade, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is the rectangular bar, it's a 30-round magazine.

MR HATTINGH: And to the right of this weapon which you have described, there's an AK.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And to the right of that there is a pistol.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And just above the pistol there is quite a number of AK magazines.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and in the bag above the magazines there is ammunition in the bag.

MR HATTINGH: And left of those four packages there, what is that?

MR DE KOCK: It is explosives, they are TNT blocks, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And directly below that, I think on the original it is an orange-coloured tube object, what is that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, those objects, as it was described in MK Valdez, they are cardboard containers that were sealed with cherry-coloured lacquer, into which the detonators of the SPM limpet mines are found or stored. And there are several of these lead bars which serve as a time delay and it gives a time co-ordination which gives the time co-ordination after detonation.

MR HATTINGH: So this photo represents the arms and ammunition which were found in the vehicle as well as what was found on the person at the border, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you just tell us, what was found on the person who was at the border?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is the hand-machine carbines, the VZ25 and the magazine.

MR HATTINGH: And the rest were all found in the bakkie, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in the past you have testified that where weapons were not found, you planted firearms.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that did happen, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were any of these arms appearing on these photos, planted there or did you find these on these persons?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, all these arms were found in possession of the MK members. The only firearm which was not in its place was the one that I took out and placed next to the driver.

MR HATTINGH: So let us deal with that then. Did you then take one of the firearms from the vehicle and place it next to the driver who was lying outside the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I removed it from the packaging.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the purpose of that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Counter-insurgency Unit of Amsterdam heard of the shooting incident and they were on their way to the scene. But in hindsight, it might not have been necessary but for purposes of completion, that is why I did it.

MR HATTINGH: So why did you do this?

MR DE KOCK: I wanted to create the impression that this person was armed and that we were fully justified in shooting at them.

MR HATTINGH: Very well then. You went back to Piet Retief, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, from there we went to - as far as I can recall, we went to Nerston border post where I and W/O Pienaar checked all the explosives to see if it was secure and then we had to secure the detonator of the one handgrenade, which we then did.

MR HATTINGH: Was this at the police station at Nerston?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it could be that from there we went to Piet Retief Security Branch.

MR HATTINGH: Very well then. And by nature of the situation an inquest had to be held into the deaths of these persons, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then make a statement with regard to that post-mortem inquest?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is that the statement we find in bundle 2, from page 3 to 4, is that correct? Is that your handwriting that appears there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Have you studied this statement again?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have.

MR HATTINGH: Is that the truth that is in there?

MR DE KOCK: Certain sections, Chairperson, are truths, but otherwise it was amended to reconcile the action of counter-insurgency with the actions according to the Criminal Procedure Act, and this statement could be seen as perjury.

MR HATTINGH: So you said these persons were a danger to you because they had their firearms in their hands and they could fire on you at any point in time.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then legally you were justified in firing on them?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Which, as you say, is not true.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you not report about what happened at the border, did the members report what happened at the border?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr van Dyk contacted me, I think it was on the radio, I'm not certain, I speak under correction, and he told me that with the return of the two carriers, they then led them into an ambush with the silenced weapons and one person was shot dead and the VZ25 was found there with the magazine and that one of the persons had escaped, but he not confirm whether the person had been hit and he then decided, following on the fact that the person had escaped, not to cross the border and to attack the vehicle to kill that ANC member. It was an operational decision he took at grassroots level and one does not oppose it, the operative would decide what is the best course to follow.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Do I understand that he told you he decided to kill him after he had been wounded or ...?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what happened was that with the return of the two carriers, they were then lured into this ambush and the one was shot at the scene there when they fired upon him and the other escaped and they could not confirm whether he had been hit or not because it was dark, and he then, because of the fact that the person had escaped, decided not to launch the attack on the vehicle on the Swaziland side. The person who was on the scene was already dead.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether another person waited at the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, later I heard that it was Max Dlamini, a Swazi citizen but who was an experienced ANC member and had been involved in various operations of the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: Was he waiting at the vehicle or was he the one who succeeded in getting away?

MR DE KOCK: He was the one who waited at the vehicle.

MR HATTINGH: So there were three persons, there was one at the vehicle and these two carriers, of which the one was shot and the other one escaped?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And van Dyk then decided not to cross the border to attack the vehicle and the person who was waiting there?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The person who escaped, that is not the one in the vehicle but the one who was with the person who was shot dead, do you know whether or not he was captured later?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, later during that day I received a message that this person had been arrested by a group of forest workers who were working in the plantations. His feet were quite seriously injured due to running through the bush and I think that he had incurred a shot injury in the calf or the leg, I'm not quite sure.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see this person or interrogate him in any way?

MR DE KOCK: I later saw him at the Piet Retief Security Office. I did not interrogate him. He was detained as far as I know, and he was charged in court.

MR HATTINGH: Your motivation for the decision to lure these persons into an ambush and to shoo them dead, could you stipulate this briefly.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it correlates with counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism guidelines, where one has to do with armed MK members or armed and militarily trained persons. It was in order to obliterate this MK cell which was destabilising the Eastern Transvaal by means of landmine explosions and other forms of destabilisation.

MR HATTINGH: Did you obtain authorisation for the operation that you launched here?

MR DE KOCK: No, I used my own initiative as a commander of an operational unit and it was my mandate to combat terrorism.

MR HATTINGH: And after the incident, when you arrived back here in Pretoria, did you report about this to your commander?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I informed him that we had shot dead this group of terrorists near the border.

MR HATTINGH: To whom did you report?

MR DE KOCK: To Brig Schoon.

MR HATTINGH: And did you tell him that it was an ambush?

MR DE KOCK: I told him that it was an ambush.

MR HATTINGH: Were any steps taken against you?

MR DE KOCK: None.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any reward of remuneration for your participation in the operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you did not know the persons who were killed in the operation personally, apart from the person who was the vehicle driver.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any personal feelings towards them?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, Mr Labuschagne has given a short statement and there are certain aspects in his statement which I will clear up during evidence, and there are certain aspects which need to be clarified as well as other aspects where his evidence deviates from yours, which I will put to you now. With regard to your evidence that it was not your plan to arrest them, the terrorists, during the ambush or at the border and that the initial decision was to kill them, Mr Labuschagne agrees with that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that will be correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Labuschagne also agrees furthermore that he received the order from you to shoot the driver.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Labuschagne also agrees with your evidence regarding the problem which the source could have caused for them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that would be logical.

MR DU PLESSIS: This is subsequent to the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And although he only received the order to shoot the source, he will testify that he had operated extensively in Swaziland and that this sort of person would have posed a potential detriment to their activities.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, you will see that what I'm putting to Mr de Kock, varies in certain instances from the amnesty application and I'm putting Mr Labuschagne's version which he will give under oath.

CHAIRPERSON: So this is not what he told us on oath?

MR DU PLESSIS: It is not what is contained in his application. He was advised by different legal representatives at the time when he drew up the application and he will give evidence pertaining to that and the circumstances surrounding that too. What I'm now putting to Mr de Kock is what he remembers as what happened at the incident and his evidence will be that what he's going to testify is the truth. I will also, in what I'm putting to Mr de Kock, highlight the differences, Mr Chairman.

Very well, Mr de Kock, as I have already stated, Mr Labuschagne will confirm that you gave him the order to shoot the source.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And then there is one aspect, Mr de Kock, and it would appear to me to be the only aspect upon which Mr Labuschagne differs slightly from you. He stated that he cannot recall that during the ambush you were positioned in two groups on both sides of the road, he states according to his instructions, and this will also be his evidence, that you were positioned on one side of the road and the persons that he can recall who were positioned on the one side of the road were Mr Pienaar, Mr Botha, Mr Deetlefs, Mr Fourie, Mr Greyling, you and he, who is Labuschagne. And then he is not certain whether or not Mr Bosch was also there with you. That is his recollection. Do you have any comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was involved in so many incidents that it is possible in this regard that Labuschagne may be correct. My recollection of it was that on the northern side there was an embankment or a slope and that there were persons who were positioned there, but I will not dispute this with him because the possibility does indeed exist.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. He will also testify that when the bakkie stopped, the source or the informer disembarked and that he shot him dead outside the bakkie.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: He will also testify that there were two other passengers inside the bakkie who were shot dead in the bakkie.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: He will testify that no-one was on the back of the bakkie.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: You agree?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he will also testify that what he states in his affidavit, that another person wielding a pistol jumped out, is not correct.

MR DE KOCK: There wouldn't have been the opportunity for that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. He will also testify that he agrees with you regarding the evidence of the weapons which were found with the passengers in the bakkie and on the back of the bakkie.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Furthermore he will testify that subsequently, as you testified, you went to Nerston and he also agrees with your evidence pertaining to this.

MR DE KOCK: That would be correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: He will also testify that the other person who was shot at the Nerston border post, according to his knowledge, was also captured later and that he was indeed shot, as per your evidence.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: ... in the calf, that's what he's agreed?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, I'm getting to that, I'm getting to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you said "shot, according to your evidence".

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, no, I'm getting to that.

The only difference with your evidence, Mr de Kock, is that he will testify that he recalls that the man was shot in the buttock.

MR DE KOCK: Well I cannot pinpoint exactly where the shot was fired, I know it wasn't a fatal shot or wound as such.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And furthermore he will confirm in his evidence what you testified about with regard to the motivation as to why these MK members needed to be eliminated.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he agrees with this.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Rossouw.

Mr de Kock, I would just like to deal with Mr Willemse's recollection with you in as far as it affects this incident. Mr Willemse states in his affidavit that the persons who would return to the border to the point where they were deployed, the plan was for this person or these persons to be eliminated and that the purpose behind this was for them to identify the place where they had entered or crossed the border with the MK members.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could you come again, did you say the were to be eliminated?

MR ROSSOUW: No, Mr Chairman, I don't think I used those words, I'm referring to Mr Willemse's application specifically on page 52 and 53, at the top thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I just - well what did you put, what did Willemse say?

MR ROSSOUW: In his application, Mr Chairman, it says that

"The plan was for me to abduct the guide along with the other black members, so that he would be able to point out the following day the point where the MK soldiers had crossed the border."

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was given up as "eliminate". That's what I thought I heard. You say it was "abduct".

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I think that was the translation because I don't recall using the word "eliminate", I'm merely referring to what is in the application.

Mr de Kock, my question to you is whether at any stage during the planning there was any talk that any attempt would be made to arrest or abduct the persons who were returning, particularly the guide, with this purpose in mind?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was an ambush as in a fatal ambush during which people would be shot dead. This is how we had been trained to conduct an ambush. It may be Mr Willemse's perception that something like that in some or other way, may have originated in his mind, I don't know why, but we would not go in the dead of night and grab armed people in the bush. That may be Mr Willemse's recollection.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well. And my instruction is also that he will say that if you testify that the order was to eliminate these person, he would accept that, but he recalls what he has stipulated in his amnesty affidavit.

MR DE KOCK: Well Mr Willemse has quite a number of operations under his belt as well and he may have had such an idea in the back of his mind, I will concede to that.

MR ROSSOUW: Then with regard to that aspect I wish to refer to further aspects in the bundle and other applicants and perhaps put it to you as follows. During the discussion between you and Mr Pienaar and other members of the branch, was any consideration given to capturing the guide in order to obtain further information from him regarding the other members?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall anything like that, I will have to depend upon his recollection in that regard. However, the entire MK cell was supposed to be obliterated completely during that night, that was our plan and that is why I put it as such.

MR ROSSOUW: You see the reason why I ask you is because on page - or let us rather go to Mr Bosch's application which is on page 73 of the bundle, where he refers in the middle of that paragraph, to the planning session and he states that his recollection is that initially the consideration was to arrest them, but that during the meeting it became very clear to him that the MK soldiers would be shot.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no recollection of that, the planning was about the complete elimination of this group. It may Mr Bosch's recollection thereof, I will not dispute it.

MR ROSSOUW: So in other words you are in agreement that the persons would be shot dead?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And you cannot recall whether any consideration was given to any other method of stopping them.

MR DE KOCK: It may have been mentioned, Chairperson, perhaps by some other members, but this was not at all the axis around which this operation revolved.

MR ROSSOUW: Very well, Mr de Kock. Then I would like to refer you to page 104 in the bundle, this is the statement of Mr Fourie, the second sentence at the top of the page. If you just refer to the previous page you will see that it deals with the point at which Mr Willemse and the others would have taken up position, and Mr Fourie states that it was their order to arrest the guide.

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Fourie was with us down on the Nerston road on the way to Amsterdam, so he wouldn't have been with the guide.

MR ROSSOUW: And on page 111, it would appear to me - at the top of that page, that Mr Fourie once again refers to that point regarding the guide and he says that the initial plan was to attempt to arrest him, but if he were to pose any danger to the members or escape, he would be killed. However, the purpose was to arrest him in order to obtain further information from him.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be his perception, there's been quite a long lapse of time. He himself has also conducted quite a number of operations. There wasn't further information to be obtained from the guide, the entire situation was already under hand and the idea was to destroy this entire cell completely.

MR ROSSOUW: As I've already stated, Mr Willemse will say that he has a problem with his memory and he has already testified before this Committee that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and he will accept your evidence regarding the decision to kill all the persons, however he does recall the arrest of the guide. Is it possible that some of the other members may have mentioned this as a possible option, to arrest him with the eye on possible information that he could provide?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they may have discussed this among themselves and stated you know, that there may be the opportunity for this but I do not know about this myself. I can only take responsibility for the plan to kill them all.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, Lamey on behalf of applicant Fourie.

Mr de Kock, there are just singular aspects which I would like to clarify with you. The first aspect has to do with this order that you gave to Labuschagne to shoot the informer or the driver. Did this take place at the scene?

MR DE KOCK: No, this was discussed before we went there.

MR LAMEY: Very well. But this was communication between you and Labuschagne.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I know, Mr Pienaar and Deetlefs were also involved.

MR LAMEY: Yes, because you state in your statement that this decision to shoot the driver or the informer was taken among the planners and I understand that the planners were you, Labuschagne, Deetlefs and Pienaar.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: You did not have the opportunity to read what Mr Fourie has written but he states that he didn't have any specific knowledge about it.

MR DE KOCK: Well I didn't read his application.

MR LAMEY: It was only at the scene that he heard from Labuschagne that the informer was to be shot dead and he accepted that there was an amendment to the plan in that regard, but he did not have this as part of the original plan which was conveyed to him from the very beginning.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I will not interfere with Mr Fourie's recollection of the events, it may his perception as under those circumstances different persons have different perceptions of what is important and what is not important.

MR LAMEY: At that stage Mr Fourie was a member of Unit C2, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: However he had been a former member of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: This was before he went to C2. And C2's primary task was the identification by means of photo albums and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: I don't know whether you know about this, but Mr Fourie was employed at the Security Branch, Piet Retief before this informer arrived at the Security offices one day, and I would accept that it was subsequent to this episode that you were involved by Mr Pienaar, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, before this I had already been involved in the abduction of Mr Sedibe.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I accept that you were involved in the abduction of Mr Sedibe, but I am saying with regard to this particular run-up to the incident, I would accept that you were not there from the very beginning when this informer arrived at the offices of the Security Branch at Piet Retief.

MR DE KOCK: Well I didn't see him arrive there, it was later that I was informed by Mr Pienaar that such a person had arrived there.

MR LAMEY: Yes, you were informed by Mr Pienaar about this person and you were involved for the purposes of this operation.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR LAMEY: As per the request of the Security Branch in Piet Retief, by Pienaar, with the overall commander being Mr Deetlefs?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Now Mr Fourie does not dispute the fact that you and Pienaar had a meeting with this informer and that you and Pienaar went along with the informer to the place where the point was identified and a discussion was held regarding where he was supposed to stop the vehicle, but Mr Fourie maintains that before Vlakplaas, as far as he knows, was involved, or before you were involved in this operation, this informer came to the Security offices one day and he wanted to see somebody and Mr Pienaar was involved and he stated that he had information pertaining to terrorists that he had to bring through. I'm using the word "terrorists" here, but it was actually about people that he had to bring through, so I would accept that you don't know anything about that. Mr Pienaar(sic) was present at the Security Branch offices.

MR DE KOCK: Well I think that Mr Pienaar will be able to tell us more about that.

MR LAMEY: And he states that he and Pienaar, a day after the initial report, came through and when this person was supposed to report back further about when he was supposed to bring these persons through, he and Pienaar went to this place between the Nerston and Amsterdam road where a discussion was held with him as to where he was to stop the vehicle and disembark and move away from the vehicle, with the excuse of stopping in order to urinate alongside the road.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then this may have been a second occasion upon which Pienaar and I and this ANC traitor went along together because I had to look for points alongside the border so that I could inform Mr van Dyk, according to my opinion, where they should take up a position of shelter, the points between which the guides would move and where the bakkie would be rendezvoused. This was not the first time that the driver would be picking up people there, so it was a familiar place to them.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Lamey, is your client saying that Mr de Kock wasn't present with him when he went with Pienaar?

MR LAMEY: No, he says he wasn't present at that stage.

MR LAX: On the versions before us, Pienaar must have gone twice then.

MR LAMEY: I assume so. From our vantage point we don't know that, but he was with Pienaar at a stage there.

MR LAX: I'm just clarifying what your client's version is.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock, and then upon the occasion when Mr Fourie and Pienaar - and if I might add, Mr Fourie recalls that, he is not precisely certain, but that a member of the Security Branch, Mr Botha, accompanied them. Was it not said to this informer in so many words that there would an ambush? This was not put to him as pertinently, he was brought under the impression that there could be a shooting and for that reason he had to move away from the vehicle. Do you have anything to say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall that we informed the informer or traitor as such, that we were going to shoot these people at close range. That there was going to be a shooting was just about 99% sure, that they were not just going to be captured. There may be differences regarding that situation.

MR LAMEY: And then Mr Fourie states, and this is what he understands from Pienaar as well, and also from his experience, that what would usually happen is that somebody would bring terrorists through, as in this case they had a vehicle with a driver which would take them through, but the terrorists themselves would not cross the border, they would cross the border by foot and they would be accompanied by a guide or by guides. Because it happened quite often that the terrorists did not know the area very well and they would be accompanied by the guide who would point out the route to them by which they could cross the border, who would also meet them at the rendezvous point where the vehicle would pick them up. Is that also your experience?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Fourie states that his impression and his recollection is therefore that they expected a guide to bring the terrorists through to the RSA side, but they didn't know who the guide would be specifically, and for this reason the idea was to arrest the guide in order to obtain information from them so that they could determine when they captured or abducted or interrogated him, which other persons he had already brought through, which infiltration route was specifically applied and so forth. That is why he states in his evidence, and he will give oral evidence about this as well, the impression that he had was that the primary idea was to arrest the guide but it was foreseen that during the process, if there were life-threatening circumstances or if he attempted to escape, he could also be shot dead. So that is also his recollection thereof.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it may be so that this existed in his recollection, but my orders to Capt van Dyk were clear, "It's an ambush, shoot". And I also take responsibility for this.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Fourie states that he was not placed at the point where there's a T-junction with the Nerston/Amsterdam Road, he was with you and the other members at the point on the Nerston/Amsterdam road where the vehicle would be apprehended.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, he was at the scene of the shooting on the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: Mr Fourie will also agree with you that at no stage did he see that anybody disembarked from the vehicle carrying a weapon, as some of the other applicants have stated, the shooting took place according to his recollection, just after the driver had disembarked on the right-hand side and began moving to the back of the vehicle, according to his recollection. Which is actually different to what was arranged during the meeting where he was present, that he was supposed to move away from the vehicle.

MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately it is so that the persons who set up the ambush or initiated such operations, persons such as Delta Forces and Special Air Services. People setting up the operation had the script, others did not have the script to the story and if there was any other action, one would have to adjust the plans on ground level. It may be that the driver stopped 10 paces further than the point where he was supposed to stop and that's why immediate adjustments had to be made to the plan.

MR LAMEY: Perhaps I should just break up my statement to you. The first aspect is that Mr Fourie has no recollection ... sorry, before you go on.

Mr de Kock, you haven't answered the question. Let me rephrase it for you. He's saying that his client recalls the driver going to the back of the vehicle and that's when the shooting opened up. Did you see the driver go to the back of the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I saw the driver opening his door and disembarking, but after that I'd already opened fire on the passengers. We were on the southern side of the road, so we would not have been able to see the driver at all. And as I have explained, he was positioned between the front wheel and the back wheel of the bakkie.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Mr Fourie's position on where the driver ultimately lay was more to the back of the vehicle and a short distance away from the vehicle, but we will not get into a dispute about this, I'm just putting it to you for the sake of clarity. Furthermore his recollection is not that someone disembarked from the left passenger side of the vehicle, carrying a weapon.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, both persons were killed as they were seated in the bakkie.

MR LAMEY: Mr Fourie also recalls that the vehicle itself which was driven by the driver - he wasn't there physically and neither were you, but the arrangement was for this person to cross the border legally with his vehicle. In other words he would not drive through a border fence with his vehicle, he would move through the border post with his vehicle and then the MK members would be picked up on the RSA side of the border at a pre-determined place.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall whether he would go through the border post or whether he would already be waiting on the RSA side of the border and whether he had made any telephonic arrangements. I cannot give you any information about this because I don't have an independent recollection.

MR LAX: Just for clarity's sake, Mr Lamey. Mr de Kock hasn't said that he came through the fence at any stage, what he was talking about was in generality about describing the fence and how people might have come through the fence, but he's given no evidence to say that in this particular evening they flattened the fence and drove over it.

MR LAMEY: I might then have wrongly understood it and I accept it as such. I just thought that - then I understand that in general they would put down the fence and drive with the vehicle through the fence, but if it - then I leave. As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood Mr de Kock's evidence, there was another driver on the other side of the fence and that is the one they decided not to go and kill.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You remember he gave evidence that van Dyk told him that after the one man had escaped, they decided not to go and kill the other driver who was waiting for them on the other side of the fence. I gather the version that we've got is a driver drover them close to the fence, they got out with all the weapons, climbed the fence or went through the fence and the deceased in this case, was waiting for them on the other side near the road on which the shoot-out took place - or it wasn't a shoot-out, where the ambush took place. He picked them up on that road.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Well if I have my instructions correct, I don't think Mr Fourie knows anything about another driver, his impression was one driver that would bring them and come through the border and pick them up. But I'm not going to make a large point of this aspect. As it pleases you, Chairperson. May I just take one instruction?

On this point I can just mention to you that Mr Sindane, whose application is in the second bundle, page 76, apparently says that Shadrack Sithole whom he describes as the driver, would bring them through to the Swaziland side. But very well, Mr de Kock, I just put it here as what Mr Fourie's recollection is.

Then ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Lamey, just give us that reference again please.

MR LAMEY: The statement is on page 75/76 of bundle 2 -no, sorry, I see that he says that Sithole assisted on occasion to meet ANC guerrillas on the South African side of the border. I think Mr Fourie just perhaps had the impression that this was also from Sindane's statement, but I'm not going to take it further, thank you.

I've got no further questions, thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMAWELE: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It's Ramawele for Mr Nofomela.

Just a few questions, Mr de Kock. You say according to your recollection there were only two groupings.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Well my instruction is that in fact there were three groupings, it was the group where yourself, where you were stationed, as well as another group where Mr Nofomela was with about two white members, and another group where Mr Paul van Dyk was. Do you remember anything of that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I did not divide the groups up at the border, I believed that Mr van Dyk will have himself led by the geographical aspects at the border fence and includes use of shadow and moonlight and whatever accompanied it.

MR RAMAWELE: So in essence what you are saying is that there could have been three, as Mr Nofomela is saying.

MR DE KOCK: I would not know, Chairperson, I had two groups, one at the ambush on the tarred road and the other group next to the border fence. Mr van Dyk was free to place two persons at one place as a stopping group and to have another group with three persons standing elsewhere.

MR RAMAWELE: Just finally, Mr Nofomela says that when you instructed him and others to go and participate in this ambush, you also said to him that you had no time for court procedures, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I do not recall that.

MR RAMAWELE: But you wouldn't dispute, because that is what he's going to say.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if that is his recollection about something like that, I don't have such a recollection.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RAMAWELE

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Chairperson. On behalf of Deetlefs and Pienaar ...

MR DE KOCK: Mr de Kock, according to Mr Deetlefs and Pienaar, their recollection is that they were lying in a road next to you or with you next to the road and from approximately two to three paces you fired on these persons.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: That's all, thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS VAN DER WALT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, to perhaps get some clarity with regard to the location of the road close to where the incident had taken place, according to Mr van Dyk, as you call it, was along with the second group who were not at the point where you were, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: The road that runs from Nerston border post is a road that goes to Lothair(?), the straight road.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: And then the road that turns off to Amsterdam is approximately three kilometres from the border post, do you agree?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I shall concede that.

MS VAN DER WALT: That is now if one comes from the border post and then the road would turn to the left.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MS VAN DER WALT: And then I would like to put it to you that before the road was tarred, there was a dirt road and the dirt road did not join up in a direct T-junction from the border post, the road that runs from the border post to this turn-off, that road ran diagonally through the bush to the Amsterdam road and at that stage when this incident took place, this piece of dirt road was still there. Can you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but I shall concede that.

MS VAN DER WALT: And it is for that reason that Mr van Dyk, he himself was at the T-junction, that is the road that comes from Amsterdam to the Nerston/Lothair road and the other group he positioned at that dirt road there because he had to make provision if the persons came in, that they could have used that dirt road or they could have come down the tarred road.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was not at that point, so I cannot give evidence about that.

MS VAN DER WALT: And then I wish to put it further to you that Mr van Dyk mentions that the person, or that consideration was given that these persons be arrested and according to his evidence that was always a consideration.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if there was an absolute zero factor that my own persons would be injured or shot. I do not want to persons to get shot in skirmishes with the enemy.

MS VAN DER WALT: Very well then. And Mr van Dyk will also say that when there persons were brought in and they moved back on foot, the plan was that one person, if we could call it as such, could be arrested so that that person could point out the vehicle on the Swaziland side, after which the person at the vehicle as well as the other person would be eliminated. He will also further testify that because he would not have known where the vehicle and the other person were on the Swaziland side if he did not have anybody to take him there and show him.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that may be Capt van Dyk's situation as on ground level as he read it or as he decided, but my instructions were for them to shoot.

MS VAN DER WALT: And he will also furthermore give evidence that when these persons moved there there was a flashlight attached to his firearm and when he showed his light on the person and he saw that the one person had been arrested and he saw that there was no possibility that anybody could be arrested, he then fired.

MR DE KOCK: I do not understand that, Chairperson.

MS VAN DER WALT: Oh, I beg your pardon, the person was armed, I expressed myself incorrectly. He saw that the person was armed and therefore he did not attempt an arrest.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it a decision of the commander on the ground as the situation plays itself.

MS VAN DER WALT: He then fired, but he knows the one person was killed and the other person escaped and he did not know whether the other person had been hit.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is how he reported it.

MS VAN DER WALT: And because of that he did not cross the border because he did not know the situation on the other side.

MR DE KOCK: That was the commander on the ground's prerogative there.

MS VAN DER WALT: And then with regard to Mr Greyling -I beg your pardon, Mr Greyling came from Nelspruit just before this incident and he will give evidence that he did not participate in the planning of this operation but when he arrived at Piet Retief it was told to him that persons would be arrested, but that he had indeed later with the planning, or with the set-up of the operation, he knew that persons would be eliminated.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I don't have a problem with that, Mr Greyling is a trained security policeman and counter-insurgency officer and he is there to combat terrorism, so he would have been co-opted also.

MS VAN DER WALT: And according to Mr Greyling he, at the bakkie on the passenger's side, saw that a person jumped out with a pistol in his hand. You have already said that you did not see this.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we did not give them an opportunity to use their firearms, they were shot in the vehicle.

MS VAN DER WALT: No further questions, thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, you say that you heard about this group coming from Mr Pienaar, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he informed me.

MR NTHAI: When was that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, while we were still in the Piet Retief vicinity, just after the abduction of Mr Sedibe, a day or two thereafter.

MR NTHAI: Well the incident took place on the 14th, can't you recall when he told you about this?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, unfortunately not, I was involved in many, many operations in the Piet Retief/Swaziland area.

MR NTHAI: Well Mr de Kock, you were also informed that the two freedom fighters, ANC freedom fighters who were going to come in a vehicle, were involved in other incidents in the area, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is how I was informed by Mr Pienaar, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Did he tell you what incidents were those?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I know it was a matter of sabotage and then amongst other, the planting of landmines on farm roads.

MR NTHAI: Did he tell you where he got the information from?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he could have but I don't have an independent recollection thereof, he may have mentioned it to me.

MR NTHAI: Well in security ...(indistinct), as you know, you are a former security man, there is what we call reliable information from sources, there is unconfirmed sources from sources, this information that you had, was it according to a reliable source?

MR DE KOCK: We'll have to ask Mr Pienaar about that because as a senior officer he would not have disclosed his sources to me which he managed clandestinely and I did not have a right to ask him.

MR NTHAI: But you believed him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, Mr Pienaar's information I did not once find that it was not to be believed.

MR NTHAI: So the whole decision to wipe out these people was based on this information from Mr Pienaar, nothing else?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, it was about an active cell who were active in previous instances and would be active again and that this cell would be stopped once and for all.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the suggestion was that if the information that they were a cell who had been involved in previous incidents, was incorrect, then you had no other information against them.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, we did have the information.

MR LAX: I think the other statement that he made was that your sole source of that information was Pienaar.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Did you - you said that you abducted Sedibe, Glory, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR NTHAI: Did you interrogate him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, Mr Sedibe was in another class, he was not the type of person one would torture, he was a General's material, the approach to him was different.

MR NTHAI: I'm not saying you tortured him, Mr de Kock, I said did you interrogate him? Interrogation doesn't mean torturing.

MR DE KOCK: No, I just spoke to him as a senior officer to another senior officer. He was the Chief of Intelligence Services in Swaziland.

MR NTHAI: Did you know that on the 14th there will be people crossing from Swaziland, did you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I depended on Mr Pienaar, I did not have any other information.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, with due respect, would you please answer my question. I'm talking about the conversation between you and Mr Sedibe. Did Mr Sedibe tell you about this group that was supposed to cross on the 14th? That's the question.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when we abducted Mr Sedibe, he had already been detained for two or three days in the police cells in, I think in the Manzini vicinity, we broke him out of the police cells there and we took the police officers' firearms and held them there and we took Mr Sedibe from there, he could not have known.

MR NTHAI: Sedibe did not tell you about this active cell you are talking about?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: What information did he give you then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Sedibe - I'm not entirely certain what the Afrikaans word is for "debriefing", but this debriefing took place over a period of months, Mr Pienaar actively worked with him and C-Section's members who would do the identifications, worked with him and the idea was over time that he would not go to court.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, we'll come to that, we'll come to the debriefing, I'm talking about just a simple conversation between you and Mr Sedibe just before the ambush, what did he tell you? You were just talking about weather only or you talked about the incidents?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Sedibe did not give any information with regard to this infiltration.

MR NTHAI: And you are saying you did not meet the driver before, before the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I said that I did see him, that he would show some places to myself and Mr Pienaar and that we also saw some places or that we would mark some places next to the road on the Amsterdam road, and we used a milk carton as a marking point for him to stop at.

MR NTHAI: Well there's confusion as to whether that happened twice. When did you go with him, you should recall that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot speak for Mr Fourie there, I do not dispute that Mr Fourie was there, but I know that Mr Pienaar and I and this ANC traitor went to have a look at these places.

MR LAX: The question was when did you do that.

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall it was the afternoon before the shooting.

MR NTHAI: And the driver, he told you exactly who was going to come there, he knew the people who were going to come with ...(indistinct), is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not have an in-depth discussion with him, I was interested in the operational side of things, the points where he would come through, where he had to stop and so forth. Mr Pienaar managed the information part of it.

MR NTHAI: You were not worried, you were not worried to know whether those people would be armed or not, or to even know how many there are, you were not worried about that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was no certainty whether there would be two or five, unfortunately we did not have that information. And by nature of the situation, the information was that they would be armed.

MR NTHAI: And that you got from Mr Pienaar, not from the driver himself.

MR DE KOCK: I depended on Mr Pienaar there, he has proven himself in the past with the deliverance of intelligence and I depended on him.

MR NTHAI: But you were supposed to be in charge of the operation, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, in all aspects I was, but there's a situation of delegation there.

MR NTHAI: And did you come to know the name of this driver?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I still do not know who the driver is, if I did not have a look at the names here, I've only looked at my statement.

MR NTHAI: There is information here in the application documents that in actual fact the driver had been seen before, that is days before the day you were with him showing him the, showing you the spot. Did you see that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not see that, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Are you aware that there were some people who were detained under Section 29, Maseko and Dladla, did you see that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. As I have said I only read my statement and I testify from my memory, I am not trying to harmonise my evidence with anybody else's here.

MR NTHAI: No, I'm not saying you must harmonise, I'm saying did you see the statements that were made by these people which is part of the documents?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not look at it.

MR NTHAI: Well they are saying one of them was actually confronted during interrogation with the driver, he was asked whether he knew him, and that was before the 14th. Page 70 of your documents, I would like you to have a look at that. You did not see ...

MR HATTINGH: Which bundle please, Mr Chairman?

MS LOCKHAT: Bundle 2.

MR LAX: Please just refer the witness to the relevant paragraph you wish to draw his attention to.

MR NTHAI: Well paragraph 7.

CHAIRPERSON: He doesn't say he was confronted by him there.

MR NTHAI: Well I'm coming to that, that's another thing.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that's what you put to him.

MR NTHAI: Well we can go to Dladla, it's almost the same. Mr Chairman, it's almost the same incident, I just wanted to put that on record for clarity purposes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you can put it on record, but the point that caused me a problem was, you put a specific aspect to the witness, you said that there was a person detained who would say he was confronted by this man and you then said "Look at page 70".

MR NTHAI: Well Mr Chairman, it's page 73, that's the statement by Dladla. I was looking for that, I may have jut - I was looking for this statement so I could have opened the wrong page, but the two were detained, that's the point.

Can you look at page 73, the affidavit by Mr Dladla, paragraph number 5.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot answer to this, I did not meet this person and I do not know this person and I don't know whether he was a Section 29 detainee. I have no knowledge of this person.

MR NTHAI: Well I'm putting this case to you to show that the driver was there on the 11th.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say that I was there on the 11th, I know that we worked from Oshoek on the Sedibe matter and I do not believe that at that stage I would have been at Piet Retief.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, the reason why I'm bringing you to this - I know you may not know about this, but I want to know exactly from you as to what led you to believe that this man may be dangerous, he may sell you out? - as the informer.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the information was that this person had on previous occasions transported persons and landmines were planted and there were acts of sabotage and person, as I understood it, were killed and injured and maimed. And by nature of the situation - and this has been coming through the centuries, that if one person has betrayed you once, he would do it again and he was an ANC member, it was a risk we took firstly, by sending him in, a risk which we thought we could take and there was no doubt in my mind that he could have sold us out later either for money or for favour or if he was caught by the ANC's Department of Intelligence, and it could have been that he could have infiltrated other persons once more and would only have told us if he wanted money again. So this person was a danger to the Republic and to the public.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this true with every askari you had at Vlakplaas, Mr de Kock? They had betrayed you once and now they had turned?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was not an askari, this was not a person who worked for us.

CHAIRPERSON: No, he was someone who had just turned, who had on the information available to us, come to the Piet Retief Security Police and supplied them with information.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my recollection is that he was caught, he did not come to the Piet Retief Security Branch out of his own free will, on the contrary, he was already a suspect in the fact that he had transported these persons who had planted these landmines.

CHAIRPERSON: And he then agreed to be turned, as your askaris did.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but that was the objective we had in mind and we reacted according to it and that is how I launched the plan.

MR LAX: Just one further thing, Mr de Kock, your askaris also worked for money, this man was prepared to work for money. What is the difference?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is so. In this matter as far as I have it, he was an experienced member of the ANC and no formal job offer was made to him that he could work for the police, this was a risky situation which we undertook here and tried to prevent that a latent operation would be launched once again.

CHAIRPERSON: And he did exactly what he had promised to do, he delivered these men to the point agreed on, he got out of the vehicle as he had been told to do.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you killed him.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: But surely that was an indication that he wasn't selling you out, he was doing exactly what you asked him to do.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, at a later stage he may have sold us out, he was not the type of person whom once could trust in the next week or the following day and I was not prepared to take that risk, to once again go into Swaziland and here he was driving around and he could identify me to the ANC.

MR LAX: But you trusted lots of other people like him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but they could not return.

MR LAX: Let me just finish. So where's the distinction? But you did let them go back, many of them went back with you into Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if we had a specific task yes, then they did accompany us, but in this case this person was not summarised as such and in that regard we did not trust him.

MR LAX: I know what you're reacting on, but we have a bigger picture here provided by these other affidavits of Dladla and others, who talk about a few days prior to this the man having already been confronted with other detainees and so on. And at this stage ...

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I know the day of the shooting was the first time I met this man.

MR LAX: Yes, I'm not disputing that, the point is though that your colleagues had already had contact with him, if this Dladla's statement is to be believed, and at the very least the information that he's giving you is borne out by the fact that he knows these people.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I could have established my judgement on the information which I received and within the context of that time the possibility of further endangerment, and I based it on that.

MR LAX: You see the point of my question is you didn't even give him the chance to prove that he was even not a threat to you and he did what you guys wanted him to do.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by the nature of the circumstances and the information that I had, I did not want to take the risk that this person would turn around behind our back and ...(intervention)

MR LAX: But of course you had no indication whatsoever that he would go behind your back, at that stage, other than a vague suspicion based on ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: It was not a vague suspicion, Chairperson, it was a real strong suspicion and on those grounds I launched this action.

MR LAX: You see we're trying to find out on what that suspicion was based.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have been based on information. On several occasions he, as I've said, had infiltrated people and ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Yes, but so did every other askari, every other askari had been active for a long period of time before they were arrested and turned.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson ...(intervention)

MR LAX: And everyone else in that same position who has been turned in one way or another, had been active for some time before they were arrested and caught and then turned. So that doesn't seem to make sense to us.

MR DE KOCK: That may be so, Chairperson, but the operation was based on the information which was available to us at that stage.

MR LAX: No, no, I hear you.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was that this person had supplied you with important information that would enable you to wipe out this unit that was attacking the Eastern Transvaal.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And nobody was suggesting you should let him go home that evening, you could have taken him into custody, questioned him over a period of time, ascertained what further information he could assist you with and matters of that nature.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, but he was part of this cell that was so active and from the information and from the decision it was decided to wipe out this cell in its entirety.

CHAIRPERSON: From the information before us it would appear, subject to any other proof you have, that he provided transport for ANC people going to and from Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And he did it for money, he was largely a taxi, he took them. There is no information on the papers before us that he had participated in any of the activities of this cell in placing landmines, in acts of sabotage or matters of that nature.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the information which I received from W/O Pienaar, was that he transported these people up to where they planted these landmines and from there he had to transport them away again and that information was quite clear. He provided transport to these points where they planted the landmines.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR NTHAI: Yes, the Members of the Committee I think have covered most of what I wanted to cover.

If this information that this driver was there on the 11th, we can safely assume that this driver went back to Swaziland and came back again and met with you the day and he gave you the information and he complied, why did you decided to kill him? It's not very clear.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I have said, the information that I had about this man came from Pienaar and the points on the ground where we would launch this action was pointed out to me by this driver. And I have already explained in detail here and in cross-examination, why this man was killed.

MR NTHAI: But today, do you realise that the information of Pienaar is flawed, after we put questions to you, do you realise that now today?

MR DE KOCK: No, the information was entirely correct, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Where did you get the information that he was a member of the ANC, this driver?

MR DE KOCK: Pienaar gave me that information.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, I don't know whether you - Mr Chairman, I'm just going to request Mr de Kock if he can, to draw a sketch for us of - I don't know whether something like that is available, of just where the incident took place, where he was, where the other people were and indicating the distances where they were positioned. I don't know whether he'll be able to do something like that.

CHAIRPERSON: If Mr de Kock is bored with sitting here day after day and wants to do something during the long adjournment. Could you do that?

MR DE KOCK: I can do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a plan of the ...

MR DE KOCK: And I'm not bored, Sir, I'm very stressed but in any case I'll do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Well perhaps we should take the long adjournment now and get this over with.

MR NTHAI: Mr Chairman, can I also request something, that Mr de Kock - the photos, the photos that he provided, if he could just mark them and identify them the way he was, he was putting ...

CHAIRPERSON: The what?

MR NTHAI: He provided a photo of firearms that were confiscated ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think he provided them.

MR HATTINGH: They were provided by Mr Prinsloo.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the thing marked Exhibit EC, it was obviously an exhibit - was it in your trial, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No, that was at the inquest.

CHAIRPERSON: At the inquest.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, no, that particular photo album was used in the trial of Ebrahim Ismail, Ebrahim Maseko in other words, and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The trial of who?

MR NTHAI: Of Maseko and Dladla, it was used during that trial, in the Ebrahim trial, and it was marked an exhibit as you've got it there.

CHAIRPERSON: Ebrahim. It's not produced by Mr de Kock or his legal advisors.

MR NTHAI: Mr Chairman, I would then request the legal representative of the people who are represented, to do that for us.

You see, Mr de Kock has been identifying these weapons and stuff like that and I had thought he could assist us in just marking them so that we are able to identify them when we put questions. He's able to do that, I'm sure.

MR DE KOCK: I don't have any problem doing that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we call this Exhibit A?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, can I just clarity on what my learned friend wants Mr de Kock to do, does he want him to identify the weaponry shown on the photograph?

CHAIRPERSON: I think he wants him to draw another sketch, marking the name of each of the weapons on the photograph, so you don't have to remember what he said. You took him in a circular route round the ...(indistinct - no microphone), just identify each weapons, so you can put it on top of ...(indistinct - no microphone). I think, would you agree that that does not mean that Mr de Kock is expected to identify each handgrenade, he has said there are handgrenades there, he has told us the three types that are there. I think it is sufficient if he merely says handgrenades, limpet mines and things or that nature.

MR NTHAI: Yes, Mr Chairman, my interest in particular is that he must tell us - they are weapons, these weapons were confiscated in two incidents, there was a weapon that was confiscated the other side, I want him to identify that also.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the one he said quite clearly is the one next to the AK47, that's the one with the long thin rod in the place of the butt ...(intervention)

MR NTHAI: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ... with it's muzzle against the two red cardboard containers.

That is so, isn't it, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We'll now adjourn till 2 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: We have been given copies of the plan and the identification to the photographs as were requested before the adjournment, for which I think we should thank Mr de Kock.

Right, carry on.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NTHAI: (Cont)

Mr Chairman, I just want to complete that issue of the driver.

Mr de Kock, I would like to refer you to page 75 of bundle 2, that would be the affidavit made by Vusimuzi Sindane. 75. I would like to refer you to paragraph 3, 4, 5 and 6. You just indicate to me when you are finished looking at it, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: I am finished.

MR NTHAI: Yes. You will realise that indeed the two ANC fighters crossed the border on foot, especially in paragraph 4, you realise that? According to this affidavit.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR NTHAI: You also realise that paragraph number 5, the driver that we are talking about who was supposed to have been sent on a reconnaissance trip on the 11th, that is the day you - that is the day that I referred to you that he was at the police station, do you see that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, as I have stated, I don't have an independent recollection of specific meetings, I'm aware of the journey which Pienaar and I and this person undertook to the Swazi borders and then also the determination of the ambush point.

MR NTHAI: And you will also realise that he was supposed to report back, according to this affidavit, to Paul Gileli, which he indeed did. So when you met with him on the morning of the, on the 14th, that is in the morning, he was according to this affidavit, already from Swaziland, you realise that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know how correct this affidavit is, I cannot express an opinion on it.

MR NTHAI: Thank you. You are saying that in this incident four people were killed, that is correct, the three, the driver and the two in the bakkie and the other one was killed the other side, Mzwandile.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR NTHAI: You are aware of this book called "Eugene de Kock, A Long Night's Damage", written by Jeremy Gordon, you are aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I am entirely aware of it, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Is it correct when I read this book, it appears, what appears here was a narration of what you were telling the writer, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we gave my application to the author, my amnesty application which was compiled at that stage.

MR NTHAI: So what I'm trying to say is, what appears in this book, you are the only source, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: My amnesty application is the source, Chairperson, unfortunately I could not edit the book, I've already testified to that.

MR NTHAI: The book does refer to the incident we are talking about. Have you seen that portion?

MR DE KOCK: I haven't read it.

MR NTHAI: And the book refers - I will read you that portion, it appears on page 136 of the book and it reads as follows

"On 14th August 1986, we laid an ambush for a number of ANC infiltrators in the vicinity of Amsterdam in the Eastern Transvaal. Five people were killed, one survived, he was convicted of terrorism. What happened was that the Piet Retief Security Branch had succeeded in recruiting the driver of a vehicle, who had previously transported MK members who planted landmines in the Eastern Transvaal. An elderly tractor driver had been blinded and a boy of about 16 had lost his leg when the landmines detonated. It was discovered that the same ANC members who had planted the landmines were planning to launch other attacks in the Eastern Transvaal, including attacks on farmhouses, on a white primary school."

It says this information came from Pienaar, and it goes on to describe the incident itself. Now this information that the five people were killed, where did this author get this information from?

MR DE KOCK: From my amnesty application. This is also in concurrence with my amnesty application which I've confirmed here this morning.

MR NTHAI: Now who is the fifth people? Who is the fifth people who was killed in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was not a fifth person, what did happen at a certain stage is that it is possible that among the members of the TIN Unit there may have been confusion because at the scene where we shot this driver and the other members dead, I think Mr Pienaar or some of the other members went to fetch the body at the border and they also brought this to the vehicle and an understanding arose there that four persons had been shot dead there and another person up at the border. So that must have been where the confusion arose, but five persons were definitely not killed there, let me put it that way.

MR NTHAI: So it's not correct what's appearing in this book?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson no, because a fifth person was not killed.

MR NTHAI: I'd now like to bring you to the affidavit that you made in preparation of the inquest, that appears on bundle 2 and your affidavit starts on page 3. You have that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR NTHAI: I want you to turn to page 4 of that affidavit. At the end of the affidavit it appears that this affidavit was taken and attested to by Pienaar, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR NTHAI: That's the same Pienaar we are talking about?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR NTHAI: Now you have indicated that some of the portions of this affidavit are not correct.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR NTHAI: Would you indicate to me which portions of this affidavit are not correct.

MR DE KOCK: You can start with - to make matters easier for you, you start from paragraph 1, if paragraph 1 is not correct, you say it's not correct because of this and this. That's what you must do.

MR DE KOCK: The first paragraph is correct.

Paragraph 2, there was no permanent observation service, we inspected the area, myself, Pienaar and the driver.

Paragraph 3 is correct in this regard, that a vehicle did indeed approach us and that it was on a road.

Paragraph 4 is incorrect, there was no vehicle with a blue light which pulled up, it was brought in to provide a legitimate light of a formal roadblock and consequent action.

Paragraph 5 is correct, with the exception of Pienaar, there was no such blue light with the vehicle as I have stated.

Paragraph 6 is correct, the first sentence and the section pertaining to the AK47 is incorrect and the cocking of the weapon is also not correct. One of the passengers did have a handgun, but he didn't have the opportunity to open the door, or I don't even know if he had the opportunity to attempt to do so. I did not scream to the driver to throw down the weapon, he did not attempt to cock the weapon. I did fire and the passengers in the vehicle were killed, that is correct. The section where I state that the passenger and a black man were practically out of the vehicle, is correct, he did not exit the vehicle. After the fire was ceased, we did not find anything next to the bakkie. The AK47 part is incorrect, that is not a -I placed the gun there, it was not retrieved from the vehicle. The section about the weapon being cocked is not correct, it is possible that the weapon may have been secured by Pienaar or someone else, I'm not certain. There was a Makarov pistol which was found, it was of Russian origin.

Paragraph 11, the second person was not found behind the steering wheel of the bakkie. I don't remember anything about the handgrenades, I don't believe that this was there. In the back of the bakkie a large amount of limpet mines, explosives and ammunition were found, along with the launcher and the missiles. I cannot recall anything about the AK, although I mentioned something about two or three AKs.

Paragraph 13 would be correct, that it was something that I foresaw that these persons would not surrender.

Paragraph 14, it is correct that terrorists had orders to throw handgrenades at the police should they be apprehended, it had happened before at roadblocks, as in Soweto for example. I did not find a Swazi travel document in the bag of the driver, although I believe that it was found by someone else. They will have to give evidence, some of the others who were present there. The name would have been on the document quite obviously. The other two did not have any documents as far as I know, because I didn't deal with the corpses or any of the documents or their possessions.

MR NTHAI: I just want us to go to paragraph number 6. I didn't hear, are you saying that it's correct that the driver jumped out of the vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR NTHAI: Now you will agree with me that almost 90% of this affidavit was lies.

MR DE KOCK: I've already confirmed that at the commencement of my evidence.

MR NTHAI: I would not like to come to your main submission. I would like you to go to page 4 of that submission, you have it before you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR NTHAI: And you have given evidence here that you also took a decision that you were going to kill the people who were going to go back, the people who accompanied the two people who were killed in the vehicle, that's correct.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we would set up an ambush and kill them.

MR NTHAI: Why would you kill the retreating group, because according to your information you had laid this ambush because the information was that the two ANC fighters who were in the vehicle were the people who laid the landmines and explosives before? Now why did you kill the retreating people, because that was not the main reason why the ambush was planned.

MR DE KOCK: No, it's not a question of retreating, Chairperson, these were persons who were actively involved in terrorism and my experience in Rhodesia, Angola and in South West indicated that the bearers of arms and ammunition were armed themselves, were also terrorist, they were active collaborators and on the basis of that I made the decision.

MR NTHAI: I would like us now to come to the shooting incident where the shooting took place, and I would request you, Mr de Kock, to try to remember as far as possible, because this is a very important element of this hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we do that, should we perhaps number the plan drawn up by Mr de Kock, as B and the identification on the photographs, as C.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, the first question which was not very clear, your group, the group that - let me start by the two groups you are talking about, there's evidence that there were three, but let's take your evidence that the two groups, what types of firearms did they have?

MR DE KOCK: The group down by the vehicle who would fire at the bakkie had R1s as far as I know, as well as HMCs, hand-machine carbines with 9mm, the group at the border between the Republic and Swaziland had weapons which were fitted with silencers.

MR NTHAI: What type of weapons were fitted with silencers?

MR DE KOCK: I think there was an Uzzi or two Uzzis with silencers and there were two or three pistols, Barettas and P38s with silencers.

MR NTHAI: These firearms, where did you get them?

MR DE KOCK: They were issued by the police to me. This was not an official issue but it was in preparation for our services.

MR NTHAI: When you say the police, where, is that Piet Retief Police Station?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, these weapons were held at Vlakplaas, they were prepared for us by Technical or in any other case AKs would be prepared by Dennel affiliate and these were kept at Vlakplaas for the purposes of operations.

MR NTHAI: When you had them for this incident you did not take them specifically for that incident, it was for other incidents also.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, these weapons were taken down for the purposes of the Sedibe abduction from prison and a day or two later this incident took place, so fortunately we had these weapons there.

MR NTHAI: Now let's come to your sketch there. You are indicating that you were on the southern side of the road.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR NTHAI: How far were you from the vehicle, I mean when the vehicle came to a standstill? How far were you, how many metres were you from the vehicle in other words?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when we opened fire we must have been between two or three metres away from the vehicle. The vehicle was not on the ground, it was on the tar patch and we were seated on the other side, and when the vehicle stopped we moved up toward the vehicle.

MR NTHAI: Where you were positioned, were there trees there where you were hiding or something like that, or it's just an open place?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think at the northern side, at the very top it was high ground, not a small hill as such but it was high ground, there were plantations there. That place is very well-known for its plantations. However, I cannot recall anything on the southern side, I don't have a recollection of that.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock I mean, you should have a recollection of that surely. Were you not hiding, you were just standing?

MR DE KOCK: As I've said, we were seated in the grass on the other side of the road. We were seated just below the line of the vehicles so that our heads would not break into light, we were well-camouflaged.

MR NTHAI: So there was long grass?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know tall the grass was, I cannot recall very well. I know that we were seated quite close to the road.

MR NTHAI: Now the other group - of course I'll ask them, the other group, what is your estimation where they were in respect of the vehicle? How far were they from the ones who were on the koppie?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, according to my recollection, and there appears to be a difference, on the other side of the road on the high ground, I'm not certain, we could accept that the road is about 8 to 10 metres wide and then further up there is more high ground, that is my recollection.

MR NTHAI: So they could have been about 10 to 15 metres from where the vehicle came to a standstill.

MR DE KOCK: It may have been more, if the road was approximately 8 metres wide and one still had the piece between the beginning of the tar and the beginning of the slope, then that would provide additional height or distance so to speak.

MR NTHAI: And on your side, you are no longer very sure how many people were there on your side also.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, for example when I received this bundle I saw that Bosch was also present and I cannot recall him there. I saw that it was mentioned that Greyling was present and I cannot recall him either. So also with Botha, I cannot that Botha was present. Therefore I really cannot recall how many persons were indeed present.

MR NTHAI: And you are saying that you also fired, how many shots did you fire?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not certain, it may have been five to six shots. Usually one would fire two shots with double-tap, they followed so quickly on each other that it would sound like one shot.

MR NTHAI: But normally you would check after shooting, as to how many ...

MR DE KOCK: One would count as one fired, that was the training, because one would have to exchange magazines and there wouldn't be time to waste.

MR NTHAI: No, I'm talking about after the shooting. After the shooting didn't you check how many bullets were fired, you didn't check it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, we may have. The shooting report would have had to be submitted, but I cannot recall how many shots I fired.

MR NTHAI: There should be a shooting report, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR NTHAI: Who would have compiled that report?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the visiting officer and in this case I don't know, it may have been the officer who was in charge of the TIN base, but perhaps Mr Pienaar would be able to assist us better in that regard, whether that possibility actually exists.

MR NTHAI: The other issues that I just want you to clear up very clearly, I mean you have heard when my other colleagues were putting questions to you, exactly where the driver was shot. Was he shot when he was just about to get out of the vehicle or was he already outside the vehicle next to the canopy?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have stated where I found him lying. He jumped out of the vehicle quite quickly, one would see this over the officers because one was firing from above the officers. I couldn't see exactly where he was when he was shot, but I found him lying approximately at the middle point of the vehicle, if one were to divide the vehicle into two, then at that point of division.

MR NTHAI: And according to you the other two people who were in the vehicle were killed instantly inside the vehicle, they never had the opportunity to get out.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they didn't have any chance.

MR NTHAI: Now I would like to refer you to the, that's Exhibit A, the one that you showed me about the firearms, the photos. Would you say with certainty that these are the firearms that were recovered there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: And you had an opportunity to look at them? I mean you had the opportunity on the date to look at them, all of them?

MR DE KOCK: Is that after the shooting?

MR NTHAI: Yes, after the shooting, yes.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I helped to secure the detonator of the handgrenades and see whether any of the other handgrenades had been damaged or not, and I also had to look at the shells.

MR NTHAI: Yes. Well Mr Chairman, I just want to put it on record that there will be a witness who accompanied the three deceased, I may have to come back to this point at that stage. The difficulty I have is that I did not have an opportunity to consult with this witness, he is presently attached to the National Defence Force, and once I have an opportunity to consult with him, I reserve my right to put questions to Mr de Kock, in particular about the weapons that were found in possession of the deceased, the three deceased people.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you made arrangements to consult with him?

MR NTHAI: Yes, I have, Mr Chairman, I've made arrangements to consult with him before he comes to give

evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: When is that?

MR NTHAI: Well he has indicated to me that he would be able to be here on Thursday morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Will this hearing still be continuing on Thursday? I don't think you can have an unlimited right of cross-examination, without agreeing that.

MR NTHAI: Yes, I understand, Mr Chairman. I tried Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But surely you can communicate with him and ask him to tell you what weapons he says were there, you now have a detailed list of the weapons Mr de Kock says were there.

MR NTHAI: As the Chairman pleases. I can do that as I'm saying, but I will still have to come back to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you can come back tomorrow morning.

MR NTHAI: Tomorrow morning, before we finish. The other issue, Mr Chairman, which I would also like to reserve my questioning on Mr de Kock, it's in respect of the evidence of Mr Willemse, who we have heard that he has changed his evidence quite substantially. So when he testifies I may want to come back and ask Mr de Kock some few questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that is a different matter. If something arises from Mr Willemse's evidence, which does not appear from the statement at present before us, then you can apply to question further. If it is in the statement before us, that's a different matter.

MR NTHAI: As the Chairman pleases.

In your evidence you mention that you had information that these people you called the infiltrators, presented what you call a clear and present danger, what do you mean by that? That's an American terminology, what do you mean by that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it is a clear danger and it is an immediate present danger and in that regard one can expect that there would be armed conflict as in we would shoot at each other and lives could be lost on both sides, and one acts upon that.

MR NTHAI: There was no clear and present danger on the part of the driver, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, but well latently later yes.

MR NTHAI: There was no clear and present danger from what you're saying, from the group that was going back to Swaziland, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: It was so, they could have shot my people, they could have seen them and fired shots at them and they had just recently become involved in extremely an cowardly incident of terrorism, by planting landmines and so forth.

MR NTHAI: But Mr de Kock, it is in your evidence that the people who planted the landmines according to the information from Mr Pienaar, are the people who were in the bakkie, is that not correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, among others they were part of that cell.

MR NTHAI: You are aware that one of the persons who was killed, Zandile, the one who was retreating, he was not armed, you are aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know whether he had a firearm or whether he threw it away or ... I think, I'm not certain, I speak under correction, I don't know whether my people swept the area the next day but only one firearm was found.

MR NTHAI: If indeed Zandile was not armed, that he could present what you call a clear and present danger, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: To bring landmines and rocket launchers into the country is a clear and present danger and he associated himself with that. Just like he could have been shot dead, I or some of my people could have been killed by these things.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, do you know what clear and present danger is? This is coming from an American case, did you get that from your lawyer?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, my legal representatives are not familiar with this terminology.

MR NTHAI: It's very interesting that you chose these terms which are in decided cases and they are not necessarily what the, the meaning is not necessarily what you're saying.

MR DE KOCK: That is my interpretation of it and I was not incorrect in this regard.

MR NTHAI: So you can be a very good lawyer, Mr de Kock, because you know legal terminologies. This information that you are saying this man was also, the driver was also an ANC member, but when going through all these documents even including the information supplied by Mr Pienaar, they don't talk of him as a member of the ANC. Where do you get that? They just talk of him as somebody who has been transporting ANC members to plant bombs, they don't talk of him as an ANC member.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that is the information that I received then, I would have to depend on Mr Pienaar for clarity.

MR NTHAI: And it's not information which you can say it's correct, not so?

MR DE KOCK: There is nothing that says that it's incorrect, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Let's just come to - you know you have mentioned Knox Dlamini.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR NTHAI: You say what happened to him?

MR DE KOCK: I understood that he was poisoned, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: Where?

MR DE KOCK: In Swaziland.

MR NTHAI: By whom?

MR DE KOCK: I understood it was the Directorate for Covert Collections.

MR NTHAI: Why was he poisoned?

MR DE KOCK: Please repeat that.

MR NTHAI: Why was he poisoned?

MR DE KOCK: He was responsible for the death of an ANC member in a Mozambican restaurant, by the name of, I think, Ngema, Sipho Ngema.

MR NTHAI: Was Sipho Ngema working for the Security Branch in South Africa?

MR DE KOCK: He worked for me, Chairperson.

MR NTHAI: So this was - his poisoning would have been a revenge of the death of the man who was working for you, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not poison him, it may be that DCC had experienced other problems with him, they had problems with him as well.

MR NTHAI: Well I'm not saying you poisoned him, I'm saying that it could be one of the reasons because he killed one of your people, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: He was my source, Chairperson, not DCC's source, so DCC must have had another problem with him.

MR LAX: But sorry, you've just linked his poisoning to the death of Sipho Ngema.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Knox Dlamini was responsible for the hit squad which came from Mozambique and had killed Sipho.

MR LAX: Precisely, that's exactly what I'm saying.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but ...(intervention)

MR LAX: And you've created the link between Sipho Ngema and Knox Dlamini.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: So it's on the basis of that link that he's now asking you. This was your source, so why did DCC take him out if he was your source and this man had killed your source? Or arranged for him to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct. Well Chairperson, if I wanted to kill Knox Dlamini, then I would have taken the trouble. DCC, I know worked in Swaziland and I know that they worked very hard on Knox Dlamini, so I don't know what their problem was with Knox Dlamini.

MR LAX: The point I'm making is, you were the one who linked Knox Dlamini's death to Sipho Ngema's death.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: And now you want us, on the strength of what you're now saying, is that there is no link, you're saying DCC had nothing to do with Sipho Ngema.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what I'm trying to say is that I did not poison Knox Dlamini because of revenge. Because that is the question that was put.

MR LAX: Yes, but what I still want to know is, why did you link the death of Knox Dlamini to the death of Sipho Ngema?

MR DE KOCK: As I say, Knox Dlamini was probably the person who arranged the hit squad that came from Mozambique and then shot Ngema in Swaziland.

MR LAX: Did Ngema work for DCC or did he work for you?

MR DE KOCK: He worked me, Chairperson, and at some stage I paid off, so I had nothing to do with him further.

MR LAX: So you don't know why you linked the two?

MR DE KOCK: The information that I had was that he was the person who was behind this so-called hit squad who had killed Ngema.

MR LAX: But it could have been any number of other reasons, you don't really know.

MR DE KOCK: Well I go according to the information I receive.

MR LAX: But it's total speculation.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, information, depending on the degree of it, can lead from speculation to facts.

MR LAX: Well you see when I've asked you to give me a reason why there's this linkage, you say you paid the man off, you don't know.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, my information was that DCC was responsible for Knox Dlamini's death and I do not know what the trouble was with them, they had their own operations.

MR LAX: That's precisely what I'm putting to you. Sorry, please continue, Mr Nthai.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, at the time when Sipho was killed, was he still your source? Or rather let me put it this way, when was he killed?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I cannot recall the date.

MR NTHAI: You can't recall whether by the time he was killed he was still working for you or not?

MR DE KOCK: No, as far as I know he had already been paid off.

MR NTHAI: How do you know that, because you don't know the date?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I come in here. With great respect, are we dealing here with the death of Knox Dlamini or are we dealing with the shooting incident at Nerston? What is the relevance of this?

CHAIRPERSON: Would you like to reply?

MR NTHAI: Well Mr Chairman, there is evidence that has been put by Mr de Kock himself about Knox Dlamini and I am following that. I understand it doesn't have to do with the shooting incident and I'm saying it has because Knox Dlamini, according to Mr de Kock, was there and transported these people, and I'm following on that. Mr de Kock in his application has got the liberty to refer us to as far as 1962, to indicate what his justification was doing certain things. And I don't understand why my learned friend has got a problem with me just following up a matter which is closely related to what we are talking about, Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Could my learned friend perhaps indicate what the relation is, because I fail to see it, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We who have been sitting in this Committee, have heard over the last years of numerous incidents in which Mr de Kock has been involved in acts of violence against people, he has told you repeatedly today that he cannot remember incidents because he has been involved in so many. Now what is the point of starting to investigate another one that apparently has no connection with the present ambush?

MR NTHAI: Well Mr Chairman, I would leave that, I'd actually exhausted what I wanted to ask.

Mr de Kock, I am going to argue after the close of this hearing that you have killed Shadrack Sithole in particular out of personal malice and ill-will and spite, what do you say to that?

MR DE KOCK: I say that you may have to go and read up the definition of personal malice because that is false what you're saying there now.

MR NTHAI: Mr de Kock, I am also going to argue that you did not give full disclosure of all the relevant facts, what do you say to that?

MR DE KOCK: That is your right.

MR NTHAI: Mr Chairman, that will be all my questions to Mr de Kock.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NTHAI

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I'll be very brief.

Mr de Kock, can you just inform us as to how many meetings you had with Mr Pienaar, Deetlefs and then the whole, all of the people that were involved in the operation.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I recall going to the border to determine the point where these people would cross over and then the point of the ambush on the Nerston road and then the final command and deployment of the people, I think it was late afternoon or early evening. That is my recollection of it.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have told us - you were asked how many, as I understand you were asked how many meetings you had about this. You have told us already, Mr de Kock, about the planning meetings that took place before you went to the border and the scene.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, there could have been, I don't have a clear and independent recollection of it.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I'm asking you this, Mr de Kock is just that there's some links missing in relation to the other persons involved in the operation, as to the question of effecting the arrest. Those are on the people that went over to the Swaziland border and then also the not shooting of the source and it just seems that lots of people were not informed as to exactly what the plan was about. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, maybe one would have to measure this according to several aspects, one would be a time factor, the other might be a variety of incidents and maybe during the time which they had made these statements.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, is it necessary for me to just refer you to the page references of all the applicants that differ in relation to the question of the arrest and then the source, shall I ...?

CHAIRPERSON: I think you can merely put in general that many of the applicants in their applications appear to differ as to whether the instructions were to arrest or to ambush and eliminate the people returning to the border and anything else of that nature, but I don't think - I think we've all read the papers, I don't think it is necessary to go through each one because all the applicants will be giving evidence and you can then ask each of them.

MS LOCKHAT: That's fine.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should give - it's only fair to give Mr de Kock the opportunity now, if he can, of explaining why there are these differences.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr de Kock, because Mr Willemse says that there was no plan to actually eliminate those people that they found across the border, what do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then why did I give them silent weapons? Those are indeed weapons which were made to kill silently. It may be - as I have said in earlier evidence, it may be Mr Willemse's recollection of it, it may be possible that in the time when they made these statements they might have felt shy about what they had to say here, maybe they did not want the version. My version is I give it to you with blood and snot and hair and all, if you don't like it, I'm sorry.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Mr Greyling also states that he was told by you himself that the plan was not eliminate, but to arrest the people coming across the border, what's your comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: That may be people's perceptions, Chairperson, it may be what they were thinking at that stage, that they might have formulated ideas by themselves, but my orders were clear. They should not be afraid, want to run away, I will take responsibility.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Mr Bosch also states that the initial plan was to arrest, but then later at the meeting it transpired that they would actually be eliminated. He goes further and talks about this in a meeting. What's your comment.

MR DE KOCK: That just confirms what I said, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Mr Fourie states that there was no order to kill the guide, that it was just to arrest the guide.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one has to look at their memories, I understand that they're all under a lot of stress and their memories have failed them. I cannot tell you there, we will have to listen to their evidence.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Fourie goes on further and says that there was also no order to shoot the source at the incident.

MR DE KOCK: Well then he might not have heard it, but it was definitely discussed.

MS LOCKHAT: It just seems to me, Mr de Kock, that these people weren't really informed as to the exact plan of maybe, yourself, Pienaar and Deetlefs perhaps, is that possible?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it might be because of their memories, it might that some of these persons want to shy away from the truth there. In 1994 it was good to blame everything on de Kock. I don't have a problem in sitting here telling you what happened, as unpleasant as it is, I'm not here to run away from the truth.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just in relation to Brig Schoon, we all know that you, on a daily basis you contacted your commander, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, we were in regular contact.

MS LOCKHAT: Why didn't you inform Schoon of this incident seeing that there were people coming from Swaziland, that were citizens of Swaziland and so forth, that would have implications? Why didn't you inform him of this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, everything was under control here, I mean if I can go so far as to say that the person who did the inquest and did the investigation after the death, was involved in the shooting and he supplied the information there.

MS LOCKHAT: So you're saying you didn't inform him because everything was under control?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would have informed him by means of a short telephone conversation and said that we have shot four persons and one was caught and this is the amount of firearms that we found and he could relay this to the Chief of Security. In all instances there is a telex that runs immediately with a complete version of the incident and who and who was involved.

MS LOCKHAT: And how long after the incident did you inform Schoon of this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know when I physically saw him myself, I have no doubt whatsoever that I probably called him that morning, the following morning, and told him "Listen, we were involved in an operation, four persons were shot and the following firearms were found", and then it is followed up with a telex report.

MS LOCKHAT: And what was his comment?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot recall, Chairperson, it was a long time ago.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell him that it was an ambush or did you say four people involved in terrorist activities were shot?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't tell him it was an ambush, that was my responsibility.

MR LAX: Did you not tell him at any stage it was an ambush?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Because in your evidence-in-chief you distinctly said it was an ambush, that you reported to him.

MR DE KOCK: No, I told him we were involved in a shooting, but not that it was an ambush, I do not recall that, no. I told him we were involved in a shooting.

MR LAX: That's my very clear recollection of your evidence-in-chief, I'll go back and check it, but that was my clear recollection of what you said. That after the event when you finally saw him, because you reported that you'd been in this ambush, you'd killed these four people, you were then asked "Well didn't he do anything about it?", and you said "No, he didn't".

MR DE KOCK: "Nee, hy't in alle gevalle het hy niks aan die hinderlaag gedoen nie, Voorsitter. Ook nie met die Piet Retief skittery later nie".

MS LOCKHAT: And then, Mr de Kock, your definition ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: My note is - I think your last answer in evidence-in-chief, was that you said you reported back to Schoon, you told him it was an ambush.

MR DE KOCK: Then it is my mistake, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Just the issue of Labuschagne at the scene of the incident, did he shoot the driver at point blank range or how far was he from the driver?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, I was shooting myself at that stage, so I cannot answer that question.

MS LOCKHAT: And why was it necessary for you to tell Labuschagne to actually shoot the driver at that - didn't you know, didn't they know that they had to shoot the driver and everybody there? Why specially tell him that?

MR DE KOCK: He was the appointed person to do it, so one would inform him to do it, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: So did you inform him of this prior to that particular time that it happened?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, when we had the discussion there with Deetlefs and Pienaar, I think I did inform him, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just on the person that got away, did you have anything to do with his later interrogation and torturing?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS LOCKHAT

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, maybe on these differences between whether it was an arrest or an intended elimination, maybe also to look at what Mr Nofomela says, that he remembers that you said you don't have time about court proceedings, it reminds me of the fact that at a stage, or one of the hearings we heard, there was mention of the fact that it was difficult to get a conviction because of witnesses being scared to testify. Now this incident happened on the 14th of August 1986, was it already a problem to prosecute these people?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether this would have been such a problem here, it may be possible. I can only mention that this ambush was on the same basis as the one in Piet Retief, where on two occasions we ambushed people there. It is a matter of counter-terrorism in that regard and that is how we went about it.

MR SIBANYONI: And then looking at the picture you've drawn on Exhibit B, am I correct that your people were on both sides of the road?

MR DE KOCK: My recollection was that there was a group of people on the northern side, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Didn't it prevent a danger that if the target is in-between the two of you, you would shoot one another?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I may have mentioned this to you, but this was not drawn to scale, I only indicated here where persons on what side of the road, but this is not to scale at all.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but that doesn't affect the question, the question is, wherever they are, if the vehicle is between the two groups you will be shooting in the direction of the other group.

MR DE KOCK: By nature of the situation, if one looks at the angle of fire when one directs the fire, one makes sure that you do not fire in the direction of your people, there should be a 90 degree angle to the firing. If you wanted me to draw this to scale, then I would have done so.

MS LOCKHAT: But if they are on different sides of the road, there is a line in-between them, you can draw a straight line between them, correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's a perfectly simple question, you can draw a straight line between them, can't you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And if the vehicle parks across that line, you will be shooting at one another and there is no question of a 90 degree angle.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it depends on how you position the people. It is not a matter that these persons were set up to a stat, they could have 10 steps to this side and we could have been 10 steps to this side. A person ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, it doesn't matter if they're 10 steps to one side or the other, you can still draw a straight line between them, can't you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if one is 10 paces and they are 10 paces away from you and they're 10 paces on the other side and 10 paces away, then you can shoot past them. "Jy kan so ver as 6 duim van hulle af skiet".

CHAIRPERSON: And if the vehicle comes between us like this jug is between you and me, if you shoot at the vehicle you are shooting at your other party, aren't you? And they are 10 paces to the side of you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I fired, I fired at an angle at the vehicle, to the passengers in the seat, it was not a matter that I would have shot to the other side.

MR SIBANYONI: And lastly, the placing of an AK47 or planting it on the driver, was it not to make him look as if he was part and parcel of the unit, to make it look like he was an ANC when he was merely a driver?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was to place this in a legitimate light in which this person was shot, this was for purposes of the scene and the photos at the scene and the measures taken at the scene.

MR SIBANYONI: Was it not to make as if the AK47 belonged to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that he had jumped out with the AK47, yes.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There was an investigation at the scene, you knew there was going to be, that was planned wasn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And photographs were taken and he was photographed lying there with the weapon.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: The only thing you didn't plan on was that the TIN people pitched up and you weren't expecting that to happen.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think we did expect them to arrive at some stage because they usually did undertake patrols there, so one could foresee it.

MR LAX: Just one small aspect that I just wanted to clarify with you. You said this thing happened a few days after the Sedibe incident and the information you got was that Pienaar had come across the source, who was willing to provide information about people infiltrating.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, as I've already said, I think he was picked up with regard to the transport of terrorists.

MR LAX: Yes, this man was actually arrested.

MR DE KOCK: That is as I had it, Chairperson.

MR LAX: You didn't see him at that stage until a few days later.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can recall that I saw him when we drove to the scene to do inspection at the border fence and to inspect the ambush place.

MR LAX: What I'm trying to understand, was that the first day you knew about this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is how I recall it.

MR LAX: So in your mind it all happened on one day, there wasn't this sort of gap of three days between the time the man got arrested and then he goes back to Swaziland and he comes back and then the incident happens?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I attach this to the Sedibe incident and I know that it was shortly after the Sedibe incident.

MR LAX: You're missing - the thrust of my question is a subtly different one and that is, in your mind it was all one day.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is how I recall it.

MR LAX: It didn't happen over three or four days?

MR DE KOCK: Not according to my recollection, no.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chair, I'm covered on everything else.

CHAIRPERSON: Just one or two matters I'd like to ask about. It was arranged with the driver was it not, that he park at the marked spot and he would get out of the motor vehicle to go an urinate.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: And this is exactly what he appeared to have done.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was then killed.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you call him a traitor, on what basis?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was betraying his own people, he directly led them into an ambush, that certainly must be a betrayal.

CHAIRPERSON: So it's because he was a - you call him a traitor because he betrayed the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The other problem I have is, you told us that you were 99% sure there would be shooting.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Obviously if you stop a vehicle with armed ANC activists in it and start telling them you're policemen, they'll start shooting.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And mustn't the driver have anticipated this as well, mustn't he have realised the acute danger there would be that once he stopped right next to you, shooting would start?

MR DE KOCK: I believe he knew it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And yet on the evidence we have he was just walking down the side of the vehicle towards the rear.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know whether he was walking, Chairperson, because I was not aiming at him, he was on the other side of the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Well he was next to the vehicle, he didn't try to dash across the road or anything of that nature?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, because we moved quite quickly, so whether he tried to run away or not, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Well you've told us his body was lying alongside the vehicle, about the middle of the vehicle.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What happened to this bakkie afterwards?

MR DE KOCK: I think it was taken to the Piet Retief Police Station, Chairperson, I'm not sure.

CHAIRPERSON: But it would have stayed there until after the investigation on the scene, the photographing and that sort of thing.

MR DE KOCK: I believe so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So the photographs should show the amount of damage to the bakkie.

MR DE KOCK: "Ja, en die hoeke waar die ammunisie of die patrone in is, Voorsitter".

CHAIRPERSON: Was there quite a lot of bullet holes in it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I would not say that there were many, I think a shot or two was aimed through the front window, at the person in the middle, I will depend on my recollection, but it was not as bad as the kombis in the Piet Retief matter, where every two centimetres there was a hole in the bodywork.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I was just judging by the amount of injuries found at the post-mortem.

MR DE KOCK: I did not read that, Chairperson, but it depends.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAX: Just one thing, Chair.

There is some evidence, or there will be from some of the applicants, to suggest that this man tried to open the back of the bakkie. If he had done that, you would have seen that.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know if I would have seen it, that would have been on the other side of the vehicle from where I was, but from where he was lying he did not have a chance of reaching the back.

MR LAX: That was going to be my next point but you've made it for me.

MR DE KOCK: No, he would not have reached it.

MR LAX: And what happened to the reward money?

MR DE KOCK: It was never paid, no money was claimed for him because he was dead.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Yes, please, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, just with regard to askaris and their recruitment and so forth, what was the primary value which the askaris held for you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, their primary value was the identification of ANC and MK members with whom they had been in camps, the identification of these camps and the identification of these terrorists and later evidence in the courts.

MR HATTINGH: And these askaris that you had at Vlakplaas, can you tell us roughly whether all of them or most of them had indeed received ANC or PAC camp training abroad?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would say almost all of them.

MR HATTINGH: And in this manner they built up knowledge of those people who had undergone training with them.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And these askaris, were they persons who had fixed addresses before they were appointed as askaris, did they possess any property here in the country, did they have family here in the country?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they had family here but they left their families and either went overseas or to one of the neighbouring States for training and in that regard they left their families and did not see them again until they began working for us.

MR HATTINGH: And while they were involved with their ANC activities here in the country they were also not with their families?

MR DE KOCK: No, because there was fear that they would be identified should they visit their families.

MR HATTINGH: And how did you go about recruiting askaris?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the procedure was for Section C2, which would undertake the interrogation and the identification of these askaris and photos of MK members abroad, over a long period of time they were selected and they were observed in order to determine whether or not they would be willing to cooperate. There were cases where askaris were recruited and it took quite some time and some of them were subjected to violence and seriously assaulted, but it took a period of time in order to determine whether or not there would be certainty of cooperation.

MR HATTINGH: And when you refer to this period of time, is it a question of days, weeks or months?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there were cases where the person would decide to cooperate after three weeks if he was given the option of either being charged and giving evidence, but even then he would still be in detention under some or other section of the Criminal Procedure Act, for safeguarding. Usually it took quite some time. If I think about the Mosianes and Sedibe, it was about six to eight months.

MR HATTINGH: And in the supplementary affidavit which you deposed with regard to Vlakplaas, which you once again confirmed with the hearing of this cluster, you also confirmed the subject of the askaris.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: How were they remunerated for their services?

I'm referring to - it commences on page 42, Mr Chairman.

How were they remunerated for their services?

MR DE KOCK: Initially they were appointed for a period of a month or two months, as sources for head office or headquarters, after that they would be appointed as members of the SAP, which would entitle them to housing subsidies and medical aid and so forth.

MR HATTINGH: Let us deal with the period before they would be appointed as SAP members. Did they receive any salary?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they were paid from the Secret Fund.

MR HATTINGH: And this was by means of informer claims?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Which was equivalent to a salary, it wasn't an amount which fluctuated?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was equivalent to a salary.

MR HATTINGH: And every month they received the same amount which would be gradually increased.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And were they every paid incentive bonuses?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Were these astronomical amounts?

MR DE KOCK: Sometimes, yes.

MR HATTINGH: But usually?

MR DE KOCK: Usually it would be a regular amount.

MR HATTINGH: I recall an Amnesty Committee hearing which found that Mr Nofomela was paid R300, I think he actually gave evidence to that effect.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Would that be more-or-less the norm?

MR DE KOCK: I believe that it was so at a certain stage, later the scales of remuneration were adjusted as the conflict escalated.

MR HATTINGH: And this Mr Sithole, did you know the name of the source or the informer in this case?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know which knowledge he possessed with regard to ANC members and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I depended on the available information.

MR HATTINGH: And according to the information that you had, was he a person who had received training abroad?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Would he therefore have been able to assist you with the identification of terrorists, other than those that you had direct connection with in Swaziland?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't he be able to identify people he'd brought to and from the Republic?

MR DE KOCK: That may be so, but just within that cell regard or relation, but not as the rest of the askaris did.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the people who had committed the most gross crimes in the Eastern Transvaal, as you've told us.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: I mean he could have - just to follow up on that, if you'll allow me Mr Hattingh, sorry.

He could have helped to solve a whole lot of things.

MR DE KOCK: Well in this case he assisted in solving one of the biggest problems.

MR LAX: Yes, but here was a man who had been transporting people even on your own version, in the past.

MR DE KOCK: Correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: So you could have shown you where they had gone, where these people had hidden out, a whole range of stuff you could have got from him.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, these persons in the ANC in Swaziland did not remain permanently at one house only, they would use a house for one evening and after that never use it again, it was a very fluctuating situation.

MR LAX: I'm not talking about Swaziland, I'm talking about inside the country, people come in on a mission, they go and stay at a safehouse, they move on to another place, they plant landmines, they move on to another place, he could have been very helpful letting you know all that sort of stuff.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I understand he brought these persons in, they'd plant the landmines and he would take them back out to the border, it is not a question of these persons actually residing in the country.

MR HATTINGH: Let us then accept momentarily, Mr de Kock, that you had released him subsequently, to whom do you think would the finger have been pointed with regard to the fact that the police had apprehended these persons and that they were aware that these persons were entering the country?

MR DE KOCK: Well the finger would have been pointed at him.

MR HATTINGH: And if the ANC had managed to get hold of him, what do you think would have happened to him?

MR DE KOCK: He would either have ended up in Quatro or in Sun City, these were two of the torture camps which existed.

MR HATTINGH: Would he have been interrogated?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely. We had a similar situation where the woman who was a source with the Piet Retief shooting, was arrested as such and abducted.

MR HATTINGH: And would he have been able to identify you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Would he have been able to identify Pienaar?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did this pose any danger to you?

MR DE KOCK: Definitely.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore, to release him after this incident would have held no future advantage for you?

MR DE KOCK: No, he would not have presented any future advantage to us, only danger.

MR HATTINGH: He would only have been able to assist you up to that point and after that, if he had disappeared, it would have created suspicion?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would you therefore say that he would have held any value for you for the future as an askari after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But what about as an informer for the Piet Retief Police Station and for the borders?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe that if Piet Retief also felt so, then the decision that evening would not have led to his death.

MR HATTINGH: Would you reckon that after he had conveyed this information to you, this information which led to the death of his cohorts which he brought over, that he would have regained access to the ANC, that they would have trusted him and reaccepted him in their midst and provided him with information which he in turn could convey?

MR DE KOCK: I doubt that severely, he would have been the main suspect.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You were examined regarding your book and the fact that you mention there that five persons were killed, you stated that you gave a copy of your complete amnesty application to the author of this book.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that he based the book upon this application.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: If we look briefly at page 137, to which you were referred during cross-examination, and compare this to your application and your affidavit with regard to this particular incident, we see for example on page 4, at the beginning of your application you state

"Due to the landmines which were planted an elderly tractor driver lost his sight and in another case a matric boy lost his leg".

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: At the bottom of page 136 it states

"An elderly tractor driver had been blinded and a boy about 16 had lost his leg when the landmines were detonated".

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then you state furthermore that it was determined that it had been the same two ANC terrorists who had previously planted the landmines. The book states

"It was discovered that the same two ANC members who had planted the landmines, were planning to launch other attacks in the Eastern Transvaal".

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: That is a translation of what appears in your application.

MR DE KOCK: Correct.

MR HATTINGH: Even to the extent that when you state in brackets in your application that this information was obtained from W/O Freek Pienaar and his source, it is also stated in brackets in the book.

"This information came from W/O Freek Pienaar and his informant".

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore this book is a re-narration of your application.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you have stated this previously, and I would like for you to reiterate this here, was there an agreement with this Mr Gordon with regard to the publishing of this book before you have had the opportunity to study it?

MR DE KOCK: Well it was in writing that I would edit it first, so that we could be certain of its correctness, and this never took place.

MR DE KOCK: So he published it without giving you the opportunity to edit it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that is why you have previously pointed out errors in the book in comparison to your application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: The weaponry which we see on Exhibits A and C, are all of these of Eastern Block origin?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now with regard to this question of whether the persons were supposed to be arrested at the border for interrogation and so forth, if it was your order, would you say that your order had been executed?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was an ambush as one would effectively set up an ambush, shots had to be fired and we had to shoot to kill.

MR HATTINGH: And if you had given the order for these persons not to be killed, but for one or more of them to be arrested for the purposes of interrogation, it therefore did not take place?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would you then have made any enquiries from your members as to why your orders had not been observed?

MR DE KOCK: I would certainly have asked them why things had changed. One would not be able to repair the situation, but I certainly would have asked them.

MR HATTINGH: Did you deem it necessary to ask any such questions?

MR DE KOCK: No, the one was shot dead and the other wounded, as we found out later.

MR HATTINGH: And this was in concurrence with your order?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You've already stated that you were involved in numerous operations in the Eastern Transvaal environment.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were all those operations, operations during which you acted beyond the parameters of the law? Or were there also lawful actions?

MR DE KOCK: There were lawful actions.

MR HATTINGH: You say that you cannot really recall that well because you were involved in such a great number of operations.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Now with regard to the position that you have indicated on Exhibit B, you have conceded to one of my learned friends that your recollection may be incorrect with regard to this.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you finish I wonder whether you could help me with one thing. Have you got the photographs of these weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid I can't read your handwriting on this, there are two of them slightly to the left of centre at the back, one wrapped in, it looks like cellophane, and the other one looks as if it's brownish wood. Do you see the two I mean?

MR DE KOCK: It's a longish object.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. What I call the brownish wood one is still lying on the mat or the cardboard and then there's one next to it, to the left of it, wrapped up.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What are these?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, those are the rockets, the rocket-propelled grenades. One would screw the charge onto the bottom and then this would be inserted into the launcher and this is used, this is actually a Bazuka.

CHAIRPERSON: Nasty weapons to be hit with.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it could be used for a tank or a Casspir, or to fire at police buildings or fuel storage points. I just wish to make an amendment, next to the RPG7 launcher, I stated that this was three times primary charge, it's actually secondary charge.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Who is the next applicant?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I represent the next applicant. As I indicated to you this morning in chambers, Mr Chairman, will it be a convenient stage to adjourn at this stage because I have to see a doctor, it's an unfortunate point with an injury I sustained during the course of the weekend.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to delay, is there anyone's evidence we can go on with that won't affect you?

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I represent Pienaar as well as Deetlefs and I think it affects everyone.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't think of anything that won't possibly affect Pienaar. What time can we start tomorrow morning, gentlemen? Where are you all coming from? Could we make it 9 o'clock? You're coming from the furtherest. Oh you're saying you're not. 9 o'clock?

MS LOCKHAT: That's fine, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Nine?

MR NTHAI: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I just want to inform everybody that we have subpoenaed the District Surgeon in this matter, that is Mr van der Wouden, and he'll be here on Wednesday morning at nine thirty.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's only fair having called him away from his practice like this, that we interpose him if anyone else is giving evidence then. Do you agree?

MS LOCKHAT: And then Chairperson, Adv Nthai is also calling Prof Saaiman that ...(indistinct) given us the opinion on ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He's the one that has a somewhat contrary opinion.

MS LOCKHAT: ... and he's also coming on Wednesday morning, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think it's only right that he should listen to the evidence that he is going to criticise and that if necessary the District Surgeon can listen to him and say where he's gone wrong. But we'll adjourn then till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS