CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ras, which language would you prefer to use while testifying?
MR RAS: Afrikaans please.
MARTHINUS D RAS: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair.
Mr Ras ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it, Mr Jansen, I just need to get some air into this room. Thank you, Mr Jansen.
MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair.
Mr Ras, is it correct that you apply for amnesty for the incident at Ramatlabana - it appears on page 109 up to 116 of the bundle, or rather, to page 117?
MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: What do you apply for?
MR RAS: For murder.
CHAIRPERSON: How many?
MR RAS: Two, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you know the names of the victims?
MR RAS: No, Chairperson. As well as terrorism in another country, in that we detonated a bomb in a house across the border.
CHAIRPERSON: And two people died because of the explosion.
MR RAS: No, Chairperson, I personally shot them both.
CHAIRPERSON: Any other charges? Mr Jansen, you can help with that.
MR JANSEN: Mr Ras, concerning this there's seems to be uncertainty as to how many persons were killed that night. If it does appear that more people died that evening in that operation and that other offences were committed in which you part, do you also apply for amnesty there?
MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, then you must argue now. How can someone apply for amnesty for something that he doesn't know about? There's not a question of amnesty for culp, let us say?
MR JANSEN: No, Chairperson, I would like to limit the applications for amnesty to aspects or the fact that the person did not know of certain incidents, because he had a certain perspective on this operation. In other words, just like any of the other operators he did not know exactly what the others did at a given moment, but there is no doubt that in the broader spectrum or view of the incident, they do agree that there is a common purpose.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, they had a plan to detonate a bomb, they do have knowledge, they do foresee that people will be killed in the process that may be in the way, in the execution of this plan. This I can understand. Do we include that?
MR JANSEN: Yes, Chairperson, it could also go further, which did not happen here, but if a person goes on an operation like this they definitely foresee that they could come across a patrol of the Botswana Defence Force or the police and that a shooting could take place. ...(transcriber's interpretation)
VOORSITTER: Om die plan te bewerkstellig is daar 'n moontlikheid dat ander klagtes of ander verkeer aksies gedoen word in die naam van die plan."
MR JANSEN: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: But it does not include other charges that are not necessarily part of the execution of the plan.
MR JANSEN: Yes, if something happened that did not apparently seem part of the plan of such an operation rather, yes then definitely that must be excluded. I'm struggling to think of an example, but one could probably think of if an operator for example raped somebody in such a situation, then it would definitely fall outside of the frame-work of the initial plan or understanding in the beginning.
CHAIRPERSON: Let's say they move past a place where somebody is selling fruit and they kill the person who is selling the fruit and take the fruit to eat.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that would definitely also fall outside the objective of that ...
MR RAS: Chairperson, can I just mention there that we went in with a specific plan and at short notice it changed at that scene and at that stage we would have, and the plan was then, that we would kill all the people at the scene and those who escaped. According to myself I would then also have to apply for attempted murder for those who got away.
MR JANSEN: Could we just leave that aspect for argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. In other words, Mr Jansen, how many applications have been made then?
MR JANSEN: Chairperson, unfortunately in the application itself ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: You see, my problem is that if we have to decide on this and write it out and we have to give amnesty, we have to give amnesty for deeds that are related to the murder of such on such on that specific day, we cannot come and say we give amnesty for five murders and leave out the detail.
MR JANSEN: Chairperson, the way in which I understand the practice in this and as the process developed over the last few years, it is that most of the applicants have got the problem that their specific charges or offences are not very well described in their applications and what their legal advisors then do is, just before argument a formal wording of the terminology in which amnesty is asked for is given. And I would foresee that in this situation, amnesty will be applied for the murder of two people, and then any other people ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: After the evidence?
MR JANSEN: Yes, after the evidence, Chairperson. And according to myself it became practice to add an umbrella aspect. It is not without controversy however, but it seems as if because we have so many statutory offences and potential judicial offences, it does seem as if there's no reference to specific offences regarding the main incident.
CHAIRPERSON: I think that that judgment of the Western Cape is wrong, but I am tied to it. There's nothing like blanket amnesty. The practical problem that we experience is more important than that statement, but we do have it.
MR JANSEN: Yes, we will deal with that, thank you.
Mr Ras, in the hearing you went again through your application as it was set up initially, is that correct?
MR RAS: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: Except for the qualifications and the supplements that you are going to give now in your oral evidence, do you confirm the contents of it as far as it is related to your political motive as well as your version of the facts as it appears from page 112(a)?
MR RAS: That is correct, yes.
MR JANSEN: You are also aware of the fact that at the start of the de Kock cluster, there was evidence given about Vlakplaas in general.
MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: You also then wish that that evidence will be added in your current application.
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
MR JANSEN: Concerning the application, is it correct that apart from this incident you also applied for amnesty for approximately 20 other incidents?
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
MR JANSEN: You were stationed at Vlakplaas from 1984 up to 1992.
MR RAS: That is correct, yes.
MR JANSEN: What was your rank in 1988 when this incident occurred?
MR RAS: I was a Warrant Officer.
MR JANSEN: When did you become an officer?
MR RAS: In 1990. It was December 1989.
MR JANSEN: Could you just in short explain to us what the circumstances were under which you applied for all the incidents. How did it come about that you - or first of all, who helped you to apply or make your applications? What were the circumstances surrounding this?
MR RAS: Chairperson, before the TRC was in place I was charged with an incident that occurred in Port Elizabeth, the Motherwell incident, I came back, I was found guilty and then I contacted the Investigative Officers and made a full disclosure. They took down statements of all the incidents that I was involved in. Adv McAdam helped me with my statements, affidavits, and in that way I submitted my applications to the TRC.
MR JANSEN: At that stage did you have any documentation that could help you to refresh your memory concerning these incidents?
MR RAS: No, Chairperson, I did this by myself without assistance from anybody else, I couldn't really contact anybody else.
MR JANSEN: That was just my next question.
CHAIRPERSON: That case of the Motherwell, were you a suspect in that?
MR RAS: Yes, I was a suspect and I was found guilty.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you apply for amnesty for that, or have you received amnesty?
MR RAS: We did not receive amnesty and we are applying for a review.
MR JANSEN: At the point of your compilation of your applications, did you have any contact with your previous colleagues in order to refresh your memory with regard to the various incidents?
MR RAS: No, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: Among others you have also applied for a similar incident, namely an operation which was also executed in Botswana against the Chand family, is that correct?
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
MR JANSEN: And in your application you have also stated that the children of the Chand family were also young when you compiled the application according to your recollection?
MR RAS: Yes young, in the vicinity of 20 years of age.
MR JANSEN: Which part of the country did you work in primarily, when you were stationed at Vlakplaas?
MR RAS: Primarily Botswana. There were other times during which I worked in other areas, but my primary area of concentration was Botswana, as well as the structures within Botswana and Zambia.
MR JANSEN: Who was your direct Commander in 1988?
MR RAS: Eugene de Kock.
MR JANSEN: Very well. Can you explain to the Committee and elaborate somewhat on the events leading up to this incident at Ramatlabana.
MR RAS: Chairperson, it actually took place over a period of time of approximately six months. While I was working there, there was much talk of the transit house in Botswana which was applied by members of the ANC for overnight accommodation. It was also used for when they returned to the other side. However, it wasn't possible to identify the place and none of the ANC members could identify the place for us.
MR JANSEN: Where did you get this information?
MR RAS: From members of the ANC who were arrested and also from reports at head office of persons who had also been arrested. I had also interrogated some of the arrestees and there were also reports from persons who had infiltrated from Botswana and who described the house, but they couldn't really pinpoint it. I could say that the reason for that was that the persons would arrive there at night or late afternoon most of the time and would also infiltrate at such time. The place which was observed showed that persons very rarely left the rooms. I had a sketch of the place which was made early this morning, which we will submit later.
MR JANSEN: Therefore you would wish to say tot he Committee that you identified a place at some point which you would have referred to as the transit house. How did that happen?
MR RAS: We went over the border, I also made use of a chopper from Botswana, I made a video recording of the entire border fence and that material coupled with the material which was taken from persons that we interviewed, as well as sketches of the premises, led us to a comparison which ultimately assisted us in identifying a place which was approximately 20 kilometres away from Ramatlabana, approximately one kilometre into Botswana. That is the place that we began to monitor.
CHAIRPERSON: How far was it from the border?
MR RAS: Chairperson, I would say that it was about 800 metres in, it was very close to the border.
MR JANSEN: These premises, were they isolated or part of some small settlement or village?
MR RAS: Chairperson, it was a rural area where houses were distributed about 8-900 metres away from one another. The premises was divided into three parts, namely the part where the family lives or at least the persons to whom the place belonged, they lived there. As far as we could determine there was a man and a woman and this young person who lived with them in the house. Then there was a rondawel behind the house which we couldn't really observe from our point of observation, and then there were also two rooms which were constructed of cement. These two rooms were used primarily by the ANC members as such.
MR JANSEN: Could you explain to the Committee from which position you conducted your surveillance and what your surveillance routines involved.
MR RAS: Chairperson, when we identified the place we looked for a position from which to conduct our surveillance. It was very difficult terrain because there were many shepherds in the vicinity, so it made it difficult for us to move around freely. The terrain was quite open. We identified a bushy area of about two to three metres. Although it was the Bophuthatswana border, it was patrolled by the South African Police. I went to TIN and I said that we were busy with surveillance for possible border crossings ...(intervention)
MR JANSEN: TIN, could you just explain to the Committee, what does TIN stand for?
MR RAS: That is the Counter-Insurgency Unit of the police, which conducted the border patrols. At a certain stage they were also used in South West and on other borders as well. Now they were responsible for the border patrols, not Bophuthatswana at that stage. I went to see them and we made use of their facilities because early morning, before the light of day, we would drive with the Casspir to the bush which was next to the road where we disembarked and went into the bush, where we would be picked up again in the evenings.
For the three months prior that I had spent observing the place we were never observed or picked up inside the place. Many of the shepherds and the cattle came close to the bushy area where we conducted our observation from and nothing was ever noticed.
MR JANSEN: Very well. And what did you learn from your surveillance?
MR RAS: After the house had been identified I requested permission to destroy the premises, to kill the persons and to destroy the premises.
MR JANSEN: Now before you get to that, the information that it was a transit house, was this confirmed in some or other way or not?
MR RAS: It had already been confirmed at that stage, due to the all the information that we had from persons whom we had interrogated, the sketches and so forth. All of these things assisted us in identifying the place. That is when Brig Schoon had said that the place had been positively identified. Brig Schoon and the others would have also returned and they told us that the Defence Force refused to attack the premises.
MR JANSEN: Just a minute. Did you observe any activities there which looked as if they were connected with infiltrations?
MR RAS: That is exactly what took place, Chairperson. I was then instructed to observe the place and to determine whether or not we could arrest any of these persons. When we began to observe the place on a daily basis and I began to give feedback. From dawn to dusk we would patrol, we began to conduct patrols to see whether or not we could arrest these persons. I must just add that there was quite a lot of traffic from the Botswana side to the RSA side, although it was not a border post, it was one of the places where there was a bridge over the border fence which the local population used. There was a bus and taxi activities some distance from that point and the population made use of these services.
We began to identify the persons. I received binoculars from the Navy, which stood on a tripod. I also received a camera with 1000mm lens, I think it had a two-time converter as well which would double the size and due to this one couldn't identify the persons' faces, but what did occur was that I could take photographs which would have observed the clothing of the persons.
And while we were busy with the observation we arrested two persons in Vereeniging. I went through and interrogated them and when I walked in with the photos that I had, I saw that the clothing that the person was wearing was the same. I showed him the photo and said "I took a photo of you while you were still in the transit house." His face went pale and he wanted to know how we had managed to do this.
He further gave descriptions of the place, which confirmed that the persons who had dropped him off were Sebata and Noga, who were both members of transit within Botswana.
Then we came to a point ...(intervention)
MR JANSEN: Now this Sebata and Noga, are these MK names?
MR RAS: Yes, these are the MK names of persons who were ANC members in Botswana, who were responsible for the transportation and accommodation of ANC members in Botswana.
Then at that stage we arrived at the point where we could see that there were persons inside the house. One would usually emerge from about 9 or 10 o'clock, walk around and go back into the house. Although we had all these patrols, we couldn't arrest the persons. We then saw the shepherd or the young person who appeared to be very nervous, especially if there were persons at the house, he would go over the fence, and the next day the people would be gone. The following day he came over the fence again and I grabbed the person and I interrogated him ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR RAS: Chairperson, it was probably two months before the time of the attack. We interrogated him and at first he didn't want to say anything ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I am referring to the person, he was a shepherd as you've said, what was he a shepherd for?
MR RAS: I could deduce that he also did odd jobs at the house and that he guarded or looked after the livestock.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that all?
MR RAS: That is all that I could observe. I also saw that from time to time he would go to the door. There were two doors that we observed, which were used by those rooms. If there were people at the house he would take things to the rooms and also from that point onwards we saw that he would sometimes cross the fence, stay away for a few hours and then return. And for that reason we decided to see if we could not detain the person and interrogate him in order to obtain more information about the house, especially those persons who would leave.
And it appeared from his interrogation that these were indeed ANC persons who were armed and that he was not actually permitted to go into those two rooms, that persons were being dropped off with a Toyota bakkie, that these were ANC persons who were armed who entered the country and his parents were not the persons from the house. He showed us a house near Mafikeng, whether this was true or not, I don't know, but his parents were supposed to have resided in that city.
I then recruited him as a source and told him that we would meet with him at certain times when we knew that he was there, so that we could determine the information. The person never returned. It is possible that this could have been that due to the fact that if the information indicated that he was an informer, he would have been killed because it would have created suspicion. But it was very clear that he didn't say anything about his arrest or his interrogation because the circumstances continued.
The information that he also conveyed to us at that stage and which was confirmed by other ANC members who were captured in the country, was that one of the persons who acted as a courier made use of a red Corona Mark II vehicle. We also put people on the road until we traced the person and detained the person and he later admitted that he was acting as a courier. We also tried to recruit this person at that stage, to act as an informer for us, to tell us when there were persons who were entering the country, so that we could arrest such persons. This also didn't work because this person later obtained an interdict against me, so that I could not get any access to him. I actually cannot recall what happened later with that case.
I later returned to Brig Schoon and to Eugene de Kock and told them that at that stage there were approximately 30 ANC persons who entered the country, according to our observations. We could not arrest these persons. At some or other point during the night they had entered the country and simply disappeared, they were no longer at home and we could go directly to the point where they were crossing the border fence, due to footprints.
I could not monitor that point from our point of observation because there bushes and plant growths in-between. If we had walked there the footprints would have been picked up by the shepherds or the local population and we decided against it.
I then submitted a thorough report - it was one of the rare occasions upon which I submitted a report, recommending the destruction of the premises on the other side, with reference to the persons who were infiltrating. I gave this to Brig Schoon who would then personally clear this with the Defence Force.
The following day he returned to me and said that they couldn't do it, or at that stage approval was extended upon the precondition that the Defence Force would do it themselves. They wouldn't allow for us to enter the house and shoot these persons dead, due to the fact that two of the Defence Force members at that stage were being detained in Botswana and they were afraid that if it appeared to be the Defence Force's actions once again, these two persons would once again be assaulted or be more gravely assaulted, and they wanted to see to the interests of these two detainees. They wanted to place a device which would make it appear as if the persons were busy with a bomb, made a mistake and consequently detonated themselves.
Then along with Brig Loots, Craus and members of Special Forces we met at a farm at Nietverdiendt in order to plan such an operation in Botswana. I went with the Special Forces member to Botswana, where we would have placed the device next to the house that night, particularly next to the two rooms in which the ANC members resided. Unfortunately it was raining to such extent that night, it was very dark, we couldn't really use that night, I couldn't find the place and we gave up.
We then returned and formulated a plan to approach the place in the same manner at a later stage, but then Vlakplaas members were approached. The place was continuously under observation because we were afraid that the tracks that we had left that night would be observed by members of the local population or the shepherds or any other people there, who would have realised that there were people going to that house from the RSA's side. I think that the tracks were removed that night by the rain. We saw that the activities still continued.
And then at the ...(indistinct) dam we conducted the planning. There were Vlakplaas members and Mr de Kock was also there, three members of Special Forces were also there. We formulated the plan. At that stage we were monitoring the place on a 24-hour basis. We saw that there were people inside the building.
That night when we were certain that there were persons inside, we went into the house with the explosives. At the house I myself, Snor Vermeulen and Basie Riekert went to the house, we went directly to the side of the house, the others remained some distance back. Basie carried the explosives and I was responsible for providing the protection for him.
CHAIRPERSON: What is his name again?
MR RAS: Basie Riekert from Special Forces.
CHAIRPERSON: He is not an applicant?
MR RAS: No, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: Chairperson, you will note on page 112(c), three of the Defence Force members' names are mentioned and not one of them are applicants.
MR RAS: I went through - I will give you the sketch later. I went through to the side of the room where I saw the person who spent the night in the house. The light was still on. While the other person was busy preparing the explosives, a person emerged from the house.
While the person was emerging from the house - he must have taken about five steps past, I gave him a chance, hoped he did not to see me, but he returned and when he returned we were approximately a metre away from each other, perhaps two metres maximum. I saw that there was no other way out, other than to shoot the person, but when I wanted to shoot my weapon stalled. I tried for a second time to cock the weapon and the person ran into the room.
At that stage I realised that there was big trouble. I ran back to Snor Vermeulen, who was laying the explosives. We were approximately 20 metres away from the charge in the open field. We had not other choice, I told them to detonate, which then took place. But before we conducted the detonation a second person emerged from - the second person started shooting at us from the left-hand room. We drew direct fire from that side. There was no other choice, I told them to detonate the charge. This did indeed take place, and when the explosion went off, I ran in and passed the house and I realised that what we had originally planned wasn't viable because there was already a shooting and we had to fall back on the initial plan, meaning that we would kill the persons who were in the house and destroy the premises.
I ran into the house where the persons were living as well. I only saw one person who had acted as a courier, or at least the young boy, and I shot him. While I came from the house he was shot inside the house, the thatch roof house. As I turned around the person from the left-hand room threw a handgrenade at me.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you shoot him?
MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage I knew that he was already involved, I tried to recruit him as an informer. He had already given me information and at that stage I returned to plan A when I realised that this person was an ANC member and regardless of his tender age, he was a sympathiser and so also those persons who lived in the house.
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Ras, you yourself said that you believed that he did not go to those people and tell them that he had been arrested and interrogated and the like, because you reasoned that these things continued as if nothing had happened.
MR RAS: That is the point, Chairperson, he didn't know that we were lying in wait in the bushes, he was still going to ...
DOUBLE TAPING ON CASSETTE - CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMATLABANA AND E A DE KOCK COMING THROUGH ON CASSETTE AT THE SAME TIME AS EVIDENCE-IN-CHIEF OF MR RAS
MR RAS: ... the persons that he had identified and the information that he had given to me was still being contacted. Everything continued unchanged despite the fact that we had contacted. Despite the fact that he had been told to give us information, he continued. The same with the persons who lived in the house.
INTERPRETER: Could the applicant ...(double taping) it is somewhat difficult to follow him.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Ras, they are trying to translate, so we are being to requested to request you in turn to speak at a pace that will enable the translators to translate and also to enable us to take down what you are saying.
MR RAS: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, I will speak slower, Chairperson.
And when I returned to plan A, which I had originally wanted to conduct with regard to the original facilities of the ANC members and with regard to killing the persons on the premises, I went into the house, saw one person there, shot him and then left the house. At that point I saw one of the ANC members who was on the left side room, he threw a handgrenade at me, the handgrenade exploded next to me against a stone. I was tossed aside, I was not injured, but I went into the room and shot the person as he was still standing next to his AK47.
I then went through to the other room, the other members at that stage came to join me. We didn't find any other persons at any other places. I heard that there was someone who had been found underneath the wreckage of the building. I heard that it could have been an MK member who was asleep in the room that night. I then took a photograph of the ANC member who I had killed in the room, which I later showed the askaris in Pretoria, and the person was identified as an ANC member.
I must also mention that at that stage the members of the Defence Force wanted us to withdraw rather quickly. The photos - after the time no documentation was sought after. What I did see was that there were handgrenades when we entered the room, there were also AKs. The person who I killed had an AK47 in his hands. And the photographs after the time indicated that there was cupboard against the opposite wall. It looked like a bank cupboard. We didn't search any further. We withdrew at that stage.
MR JANSEN: I beg your pardon, Chairperson.
Mr Ras, you were aware of the information system within the Security Police at that stage, is that correct?
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
MR JANSEN: And to give a brief summary of that, on a daily basis information was sent through various channels from the various units and the various specialised divisions to a central point at head office, all the time.
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
MR JANSEN: And the incidents and so forth were discussed at these daily meetings which were referred to as the Sandhedrin.
MR RAS: Yes.
MR JANSEN: Where the senior staff officers would be present.
MR RAS: That is correct.
MR JANSEN: Now the fact that with the exception of Brig Schoon, who you consulted personally, the fact that there was an operation in Botswana and that persons were killed in Botswana, according to your knowledge, would this have come to the knowledge of the head of the Security Police at that stage?
MR RAS: Chairperson, at a later stage I received a commendation from Gen van der Merwe for our actions in Botswana pertaining to this incident. This is also in my application. Before the second operation took place there were discussions. It was discussed at a high level.
MR JANSEN: This was also not the first incident in which you were involved, during which persons were killed, is that correct?
Earlier in 1988, approximately during June, you were involved in a shooting incident in the Piet Retief vicinity.
MR RAS: Yes, Piet Retief and Swaziland.
MR JANSEN: You've already testified in that amnesty application with regard to the matter.
MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I interpose, Mr Jansen.
When you say that this incident was discussed at a high level, what do you mean?
MR RAS: Chairperson, that in the first instance, Brig Loots and the Defence Force had discussions. It was the first time that I had to put down the details of an operation on paper. All the other operations, such as the Chand matter and so forth, were conducted verbally, and here I had to put down on a document what had taken place, what we had observed, what we found with the observations, how many persons infiltrated or entered, what we could find out from other persons and other documentation.
Brig Schoon cleared this on another level, so in the first instance it was that it was on a much higher level and secondly, I could not obtain a personally undersigned certificate from Gen van der Merwe if the others didn't know about it. The other is that Brig Loots had approached members of the Defence Force for an operation in Botswana, while it was known that some of their persons were already in the jail in Botswana. This was handled with tremendous sensitivity. So this wasn't taken up very lightly, the decision was not taken very easily to conduct such an operation and persons on a higher level had to have known about it. The highest that I know is Gen van der Merwe, Brig Schoon and Brig Loots. All three of these persons would have known about it.
With regard to Bophuthatswana, they knew that we were working there, we worked there with their permission, but they didn't want us to launch the operation as a result of the fact that they didn't want us to use their territory. Mr Mills and Mr Esterhuizen didn't know about the operation, we cut them out.
MR JANSEN: A part of the information or the gathering function of the Security Police was amongst others, to study reports in the newspapers from abroad and internally and what information you can gather from that.
MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: So although you did not have personal knowledge of who Brig Schoon contacted, the specific detail of what the knowledge was of the people above Mr Schoon, or what they knew, that was only an inference you just made.
MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: You say it was a reasonable inference based on the knowledge you had of the information system at that stage. Except for Gen van der Merwe who - that certificate that you, or that was part of the documents, does not specifically refer to Ramatlabana, but it does refer to an incident in 1988, where under very dangerous circumstances you acted in an operation. Could this have been something but the Ramatlabana incident?
MR RAS: No.
MR JANSEN: Did anybody say directly to you that it's got something to do with this incident?
MR RAS: Yes, when I got the certificate - I think Brig Schoon handed it over, I may be wrong here, Eugene de Kock also said it was for the Ramatlabana incident when he applied for these certificates.
MR JANSEN: Somewhere in your application you do refer to the weaponry that was found at the scene and there's specific reference to the RPG, could you just place this in context please.
MR RAS: Chairperson, that RPG went with us to the other side. The purpose of it was that we weren't sure if people get there with a vehicle or maybe leave with a vehicle, we would have used it for that purpose then. Because we left it there I cannot say.
MR JANSEN: At that stage I did not carry it, but insofar as it created the impression here that it was something that you found there - that is wrong, you brought it with you or you took it with you.
MR RAS: Yes, we did. And specifically what I saw where it was left behind, when I took a photograph of the room, everything was full of dust and I saw that the RPG was clean, without dust on it, and I think any person who would have appeared at that scene at that stage would have asked how it got there because everything was full of dust except for the RPG. It bothered me, but there's nothing that we could do at that stage.
MR JANSEN: In your application, or in the general background of what your perceptions were of the political situation at that stage you included the following - or what was your perception of infiltration and of the ANC cadres. Did you think it had anything to do with acts of terror in South Africa?
MR RAS: Chairperson, most of them, those who were rearrested came in with weapons, those who did not come in with weapons we arrested or they took us to places where they kept the weapons. It definitely related to it.
MR JANSEN: Did you believe that the actions of people to kill people in other countries will help in preventing other people being killed in South Africa?
MR RAS: Yes, definitely.
MR JANSEN: This incident, did you believe that it was directed at the enemy of the day, namely the ANC?
MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: Did you receive any remuneration specifically for this, except for the certificate that you received?
MR RAS: No, Chairperson.
MR JANSEN: The people who lived in the houses at that day, who were present there, did you know them in any other way? In your workings as a policeman, did you know them apart from that?
MR RAS: No, not at all.
MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair, that's all.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
CHAIRPERSON: First of all I have a note here on this table that there's sets of keys that have been found and they're looking for the owners of these keys. Here they are.
Secondly, - and I'd like especially the relatives of the victims to listen to this, that through circumstances beyond our control, coupled with compassionate grounds, we are going to allow applicant Radebe to intervene in the evidence of Mr Ras and testify, so that he get treatment as I understand, for his condition. I'm given to understand that it is so urgent that we need to take these steps. I hope everybody understands the situation.
WITNESS STANDS DOWN
