W F SCHOON: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brig Schoon, you are an applicant in this application, and you request amnesty for your share in the creation, the creation of an arms cache which would serve as a reason or an excuse for the South African Defence Force to launch a raid in Botswana in 1988, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very briefly - I am sorry, Mr Hugo hasn't placed himself on record yet Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I apologise Mr Hugo.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, yes, I appear for applicant E.A. de Kock, it is Schalk Hugo.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, if I may continue. You have already done so today, do you once again confirm that you incorporate Exhibits A and B in your evidence?
MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, in 1988, were you still the Head of C1 at Security Head Office?
MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, as I understand his evidence, he says he is applying for amnesty in respect of his activities related to the establishment of the arms cache. What about subsequent crimes that were committed as a result, he knew why the cache was established?
MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, I was going to try to explain that in the evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you can do that, I just thought I would remind you.
MR VISSER: Yes, but certainly thank you Chairperson, yes, I am aware of that, because the line goes through to the actual raid, obviously, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay, we will wait.
MR VISSER: But perhaps I should have, more correctly, immediately started with that. Brig Schoon, your application stretches further in that it is related to your knowledge of an attack in Botswana that would be launched by the Defence Force?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And this was part of the executive actions in preparation of that attack?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. Chairperson, the application of Brig Schoon, you will find at page 201 to 215 and the actual application in regard to this incident, is at 210 of your Bundle.
Brigadier, let us begin with your application. You have it before you, you have studied your application?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: With the exception of any changes or amendments that you wish to bring to your evidence today, do you confirm the content of your application as true and correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, let us then begin with the very first matter that you wish with the indulgence and leave of the Committee to change or amend. On page 210 under "nature and particulars", you have stated in your application that during 1988 you were called to Cape Town by Gen Johan Coetzee and during the afternoon, you along with Gen Coetzee and Gen Geldenhuys were in his office and that Gen Geldenhuys made certain requests to you there.
What is the position regarding that?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, in that regard it is all correct although it wasn't Gen Coetzee, but Gen de Witt. This introduction regarding the nature and particulars has to do with another incident and not this arms cache incident as such.
MR VISSER: Therefore, what do you say of your reference to Gen Geldenhuys, is that correct or incorrect?
MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: With reference to which other matter?
MR SCHOON: This visit to Gen Geldenhuys was confused with another incident.
CHAIRPERSON: Which also began with weapons or arms?
MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, that is something entirely different.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we have begun early?
MR VISSER: Yes, I thought I would start with the worst side.
CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand what you have confused. You have stated in your written application that you were called by Coetzee to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: During that afternoon you and Geldenhuys and Coetzee were together in his office?
MR SCHOON: Coetzee should read de Witt.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that Gen Coetzee?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In the second line of this introductory section, it is not Johan Coetzee?
MR SCHOON: It is Gen Johan Coetzee, but he was already on pension at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: So during 1988 you were called by Gen de Witt to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Now the second question, you state that you made this error, because you were confusing this with another matter?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And in connection with the other matter, you were also called to Cape Town by Coetzee?
MR SCHOON: No, Chairperson, by de Witt also. I was not called to Cape Town during that matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why are you confusing the two?
MR VISSER: Would you allow me one question which will clarify your problem Chairperson, because that is the problem.
The entire reference to the visit to Cape Town before the establishment of this arms cache, is that correct or entirely incorrect?
MR SCHOON: It is incorrect Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Then tell us how it came to be that you became involved in the establishment of the arms cache?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I now recall that a meeting took place at Vlakplaas where certain targets in Botswana were discussed.
CHAIRPERSON: When did this take place, this meeting?
MR SCHOON: I believe it was in March 1988.
CHAIRPERSON: And therein you state a discussion was held regarding certain targets in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: May I take over from there Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry?
MR VISSER: May I take over? Did somebody from the Defence Force have a discussion with you on that day at Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, Gen Liebenberg came to Vlakplaas.
MR VISSER: Is that Kat Liebenberg?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR SCHOON: He asked whether or not it would be possible for us to establish an arms cache in order to create the climate for them to plan actions in Botswana.
MR VISSER: Very well, did he request this during the meeting or what was the position?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I am no very clear on this point, I am not very clear as to whether or not I attended the meeting personally or whether Kat Liebenberg attended the meeting. But what is very clear to me is that Gen Liebenberg came with this request after the meeting had taken place at Vlakplaas, subsequently.
MR VISSER: So he did not request the meeting, he requested you?
MR SCHOON: Yes, he requested me personally.
CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to the meeting?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to the meeting at Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Did he tell you, I think you have already testified that he wanted this to serve as some form of an excuse to launch an attack in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you told him that there shouldn't be a problem?
MR SCHOON: Correct.
CHAIRPERSON: How would that have operated? I am sorry to jump around, but he wasn't involved in this sort of thing, how would this have served as a reason?
MR SCHOON: I don't really understand the question.
CHAIRPERSON: He told you to consider the establishment of an arms cache so that this would serve as a reason to attack people or property in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: How do you link the arms cache to Botswana, as a reason to invade Botswana?
MR SCHOON: This arms cache would then have been viewed as an arms cache belonging to the ANC, there was also a tremendous amount of weapons and the media would have exposed this and it would have been used as a reason to attack Botswana.
MR VISSER: Afterwards, when you said yes, what did you do then?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, I immediately started working on this. I got Col de Kock and Naude and asked them to get the necessary weaponry and to keep it, so that we can go and bury it at some place.
MR VISSER: Where would the weapons come from?
MR SCHOON: These weapons were from the Eastern Bloc, which was in police possession.
MR VISSER: Where was it kept?
MR SCHOON: At the storage place in the Security Branch Head Office. The explosives were provided by the Explosives Unit at their buildings, and Col de Kock also had some weapons at Vlakplaas.
MR VISSER: Did you have the authority to get these weapons from the storage places, as well as the explosives and those from Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: And was that the instruction that you gave them, that they must gather all these explosives and weapons and ammunition for an arms cache?
MR SCHOON: That is correct yes. Afterwards I contacted the Krugersdorp Security Branch ...
CHAIRPERSON: After you agreed that you would do this, did I hear you correctly, you then brought in Mr de Kock and explained it to him, what was necessary?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Did he agree?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Was he alone?
MR VISSER: It was Naude and de Kock and he gave them instructions.
CHAIRPERSON: Naude was from the Defence Force?
MR VISSER: No, he was from the Security Force, Section 2.
CHAIRPERSON: Is this another Naude?
MR VISSER: Yes, this is Martin Naude, he will still come to testify.
Mr Naude, just to - Mr Schoon, Mr Naude was also from the Security Branch?
MR SCHOON: Yes, he was from Group C2.
MR VISSER: Very well. You say in your application, and I just want you to comment on this, on page 211, some of these weapons and ammunition was borrowed. What did you mean when you said it was "borrowed"?
MR SCHOON: It was weapons that was in safe keeping, in the storage place at the Security Branch Head Office. I gave them the instruction to make these weapons available, signed for it and then later return them.
MR VISSER: That is the point that I would like to make. Was the intention that after the arms cache served its purpose, the weapons would then be returned?
MR SCHOON: Yes, they would be returned to the place where they came from originally.
MR VISSER: Let me ask you this, is this how it happened, were all these weapons transported back to where they came from?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: How did you organise that part of the plan?
MR SCHOON: I made contact with the Krugersdorp Security Branch and if I can remember correctly it was Gen le Roux who was then the Commander, he was not available and I think it was Major Jan Coetzee, that I called to the Security Head Office or to Vlakplaas, I cannot remember. These weapons were then handed over to him, it was in a trunk and he had to ...
CHAIRPERSON: Before we get to Coetzee, these weapons and what all the other items it was, it was put away at the Police Security Branch?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: There must have been somebody, there had to be somebody who was the Head of that section and who could arrange for these items to be signed out? Whether it was written in the book or not, was that person brought in and was he told what the plan was, to facilitate the transportation of the weapons from that place?
MR SCHOON: I gave the authorisation. The issuing of weapons fell under me and I spoke to the storage clerk, Capt Drury and I organised or arranged with him that he must make this amount of weapons available, and that is what he did.
CHAIRPERSON: You signed the documents?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I gave the authorisation.
MR VISSER: And Capt Drury, did he know what your intention was with these weapons?
MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, I did not inform him about this plan.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, before we get stuck into the nuts and bolts of how it actually happened, I noticed it is already passed eleven o'clock, I don't know whether you want to take your adjournment now?
MR MALAN: Just we take the adjournment, the other reference to Gen Geldenhuys, was that a mistake? Geldenhuys disappears and Kat Liebenberg comes ...
MR VISSER: Geldenhuys disappears and any reference to Cape Town disappears. That's got to do with another incident.
MR MALAN: In other words the parties of the Police and the Defence Force in this case, Kat Liebenberg together with ...
MR VISSER: Brig Schoon?
MR MALAN: No, together with Brig de Witt?
MR VISSER: No, de Witt falls away as well. The problem is, this was confused with another incident, but in that incident it would have been wrong to refer to Gen Coetzee.
MR MALAN: I would just like to - de Witt did not know about this incident at all?
MR VISSER: No, he did not. The whole first paragraph, Mr Chairperson, in terms of this witness' evidence, is irrelevant. But we will again confuse you at a later stage when we deal with that.
MR MALAN: Maybe you shouldn't clarify it, maybe you should keep me confused.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for tea.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
W.F. SCHOON: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) ... Vlakplaas in terms of the creation of an arms cache, not by de Witt or Geldenhuys in Cape Town, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: You then said that it is right, you would do it, you gave the instructions to Mr Eugene de Kock and Martin Naude from C2. Mr Eugene de Kock was at Vlakplaas to go and withdraw some weapons and you gave instructions or filled in the forms to do this, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: I do not know if I completed forms Mr Chairperson, but I did make the arrangements with the storage clerk to issue the weapons.
MR VISSER: Just before the adjournment you said that you tried to contact Johan le Roux at Krugersdorp, the Head of the Security Branch there, but you could not get hold of him and you spoke to Jan Coetzee?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: What happened then? Did you give him the instructions over the phone or what happened?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I called him in and when I personally spoke to him, I gave him the instructions and the weaponry was given to him by Col de Kock in a trunk in order for him to create an arms cache with these weapons.
MR VISSER: Is that how you remember it?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: You said this meeting took place either in Pretoria or at Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Who handed it over to him?
MR SCHOON: It was Martin Naude and Mr Eugene de Kock.
MR VISSER: Brig Schoon, Mr Naude says and he will testify, that both of you went to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
MR VISSER: Can you explain that to us then?
MR SCHOON: I can. I think the next morning together with Kat Liebenberg and Gen Joubert ...
CHAIRPERSON: The next morning, in terms of when?
MR SCHOON: It was in terms of the day when Kat Liebenberg gave the instructions to me.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR SCHOON: We went with them ...
MR VISSER: Can you just repeat again, you yourself and Mr Naude ...
MR SCHOON: Mr Joubert ...
MR VISSER: He was from the Defence Force?
MR SCHOON: Yes. We went in a Mercurius plane to Cape Town.
MR VISSER: Is that a military plane?
MR SCHOON: Yes, it was.
MR VISSER: Very well. Can I put the question to you in this way, I do not want to lead you too much, but at the meeting, in which Mr Kat Liebenberg addressed you on this issue, were you asked to say something with Mr Naude at that meeting?
MR SCHOON: I cannot specifically remember Mr Chairperson.
MR VISSER: In relation with going to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, we did receive instructions from Gen Liebenberg to be ready in case he needed assistance in the presentation of the plan of the Defence Force.
MR VISSER: What was this plan about?
MR SCHOON: For an attack on Botswana.
MR VISSER: Where would this presentation, we know it would take place in Cape Town, but who would you make this presentation to?
MR SCHOON: I was not personally present with the presentation, but I do have a suspicion that it could either by the State Security Council or some parliamentary committee.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did you go to Cape Town then?
MR SCHOON: Kat Liebenberg asked me to accompany him and to be ready to support the presentation that he is going to make, in case he received any problems from the State Security Council or whoever he addressed it to?
MR VISSER: You were on standby then?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Can you remember what the building looked like where you were, that day in Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairman, I can now remember that it was a tall white building behind the Parliament building. It was a relatively old building, I think it was in a Cape Dutch style.
I think at that stage they were doing restoration work on it.
MR VISSER: Very well. Were you supposed to do anything in Cape Town, while you were there?
MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson. We were asked to wait in a room, myself and Major Naude.
MR VISSER: Is that all that you did in Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: That is all that we did, yes.
MR VISSER: Very well. We will hear from the other witnesses what happened, but then a "fund", they found an arms cache, weapons and ammunition and then an attack also occurred in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Can you remember how long after or the same day, this is now in relation to the discovery of the weapons, this attack took place?
CHAIRPERSON: Major Jan Coetzee came to fetch these weapons?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: It was handed over to him by de Kock and Naude?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: What was he supposed to do with it?
MR SCHOON: He had to go and bury it at a certain place, where it would then serve as an arms cache that will then be found by the Police. Then that would then make known to us certain public interest and we would then get the media to come and cover this.
CHAIRPERSON: You then went to Krugersdorp?
MR SCHOON: I asked him first of all whether he had a suitable place to do this, and he said yes, there was a worked out mine in the area where he can do this, and it is relatively safe. This was also a pre-requisite that these weapons had to be safe, that any other person cannot just go and stumble upon it.
MR VISSER: Just to add to that, would Major Coetzee then report to his Commander, le Roux, concerning these instructions?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: We know that such an arms cache was then found, it was - who discovered this arms cache?
MR SCHOON: I do not know who did the discovery of it, I think it was left in the hands of Mr Jan Coetzee.
MR VISSER: You will hear that evidence from the other witnesses.
CHAIRPERSON: Who brought in the media?
MR SCHOON: I think it was Gen le Roux.
CHAIRPERSON: You do not know?
MR SCHOON: No, I do not know exactly.
CHAIRPERSON: I cannot understand this, Mr Schoon. The way in which I understand your evidence is that apart from Liebenberg and possibly Joubert, you were now in charge of the whole plan, to execute the whole plan?
MR SCHOON: That is correct yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In my opinion you also had to be in control of when this discovery had to take place, when do you bring in the media to make the story believable to the South African citizens?
MR SCHOON: That is correct, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And that is why I am asking you this question, who made the discovery and who brought in the media, you had to know who and when this will take place?
MR SCHOON: This matter was considered very seriously and if I can recall correctly, we gave instructions to Jan Coetzee, that it had to happen as soon as possible.
CHAIRPERSON: How long after you phoned him to tell him to come and see you, were these weapons handed over to him?
MR SCHOON: It was a few hours.
CHAIRPERSON: And then you went to go and put it in this worked out mine, and how long after he received the weapons, was the discovery made?
MR SCHOON: I think that the discovery was made the day when I went with Liebenberg to the Cape.
CHAIRPERSON: That was the next day, after Kat Liebenberg spoke to you?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In other words, am I correct if I say that Kat Liebenberg, after a meeting at Vlakplaas asked you or informed you that he would like to know if can execute this plan. You agreed, you go back to your office or wherever, you go to the storage room, you give the authorisation that certain weapons may be issued and then you phone Coetzee to come and see you?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the same day that Kat Liebenberg asked you to do this?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And then Coetzee came to you. I assume that you at that stage had already spoken to de Kock?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And then you handed the weapons over to him?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And Coetzee then received the instructions to go and put it away, as a matter of urgency and he must ensure that it is discovered?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: I assume that Coetzee understood the plan, he was informed about it?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: So he understood the urgency of it? And he had to ensure that the weapons must be discovered and that the media had to be called in?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And this took place the next day?
MR SCHOON: Yes, as far as I can recall.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, continue.
MR MALAN: Just before you continue, just on this point. If I understand you correctly the discovery was, if it was done on the same day or occurred on the same day, it was part of the planning to whoever had to authorise it in the Cape, to convince him that it was necessary?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that was the whole idea of this issue.
MR MALAN: So if I understand you correctly, it was rather to convince whoever had to give the authorisation, to convince, he had to mislead the person who had to give the authorisation?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In other words the person who had to authorise this, did not know the truth?
MR SCHOON: I do not know Mr Chairperson, if they were properly informed.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why do you say to Mr Malan that that person was misled?
MR SCHOON: It is a possibility, I was not present when this presentation was made.
CHAIRPERSON: But you testified that that was the plan, the plan was to mislead them?
MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, the broader plan was that the broader public had to be misled by this so-called finding or discovery.
CHAIRPERSON: When Mr Malan asked you about the person who had to make the decision in the Cape, this discovery, as it was put to you, had to ensure that he would be convinced about the urgency of the matter, and then Mr Malan asked you that that person specifically was then mislead, and you said "yes, that was the plan."
MR SCHOON: That is a possibility Mr Chairperson, but I wasn't present at the presentation that was made.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Let us just try to clarify this matter. Brig Schoon, what did you think what was the reason for the creation of this false flag operation, this arms cache?
MR SCHOON: Firstly it had to be given to the media and then the public would be misled in that this arms cache was erected by the ANC.
MR VISSER: Was there any other purpose to it?
MR SCHOON: It also had to serve to convince those who had to give the permission.
MR VISSER: That is the conclusion that you made?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is.
MR VISSER: Just the last aspect ...
MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Visser, so you do not know if the permission or the authorisation was given before the arms cache was created?
MR SCHOON: No Mr Chairperson, I think it was given afterwards.
MR MALAN: Can you just try to tell me if you must think back, why did you have to go with them? You said that you had to be available, but why, what information could you provide Liebenberg with, that he could not present them with?
MR SCHOON: Mr Naude had the necessary information which would strengthen the hand of the Defence Force, to give permission. It would be the presence of MK cadres in Botswana and their activities.
CHAIRPERSON: Should the arms cache not play a role when you went to Cape Town to convince people that there is action needed in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: It is possible Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But if that, you say it is a possibility, if it was used and weapons were found in the mine and it was the property of MK members, and that they used them, and it is very urgent now, they have got weapons, they are ready and they are in the country, would you not then provide that type of information to the person who had to make the decision?
MR SCHOON: I do not know Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: But what kind of standby were you in then, you had to be briefed about what you were supposed to say if it was necessary, that is now the person that you were trying to convince?
MR SCHOON: The person who had the information was Major Naude.
CHAIRPERSON: But you said that you went with, as your Advocate put to you, on a standby basis and that was to try and help them convince the person?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: If you were then called in, while you were on standby and said "come and give this person the necessary information to help them or assist them in making this decision", what would you have told them?
MR SCHOON: I would have told Mr Naude to tell them, because he had the facts on paper.
CHAIRPERSON: I would just like to cover one last aspect. You talked about a plan that was going to be used in this journey to Cape Town, what plan was this? You mentioned a plan in answer to a question of Mr Muller.
MR SCHOON: The plan was that the weapons be found and would then serve as a motivation to approve a request from the Defence Force to attack in Botswana.
CHAIRPERSON: Who would you have then said would have created the arms cache, the ANC or would you have said "no, it was us who did it"?
MR SCHOON: All indications had to point to the ANC.
CHAIRPERSON: And would you then have given the information that the arms cache was the ANC's, would you then have conveyed this to the person who had to make the decision?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, I was not present.
CHAIRPERSON: No, but what would you have said, what information would you have given to this person, if you were asked?
MR SCHOON: I would possibly have said "yes, it was created by the ANC", otherwise ...
CHAIRPERSON: You wouldn't have had the authority to do what you had planned to do?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: In other words you would have misled them?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that the plan?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And was this plan then discussed amongst yourself and the others before you went to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: I presume it would have been, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You are on standby, if you are called in, this is what you have to say?
MR SCHOON: Yes, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: Can we then deal with the last correction on page 211, that the media was allowed to visit the scene and take photographs, is that correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: And you said that yourself and Martin Naude also visited the scene?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I do say so in my application, but it is wrong. I was confused here with the visit of another investigation that we were involved in.
MR VISSER: What investigation was that?
MR SCHOON: That was the investigation against a Hanekom.
MR VISSER: Was that a high treason case?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR VISSER: What did you do during that investigation with Martin Naude?
MR SCHOON: This Defence Force member, a young man, we accompanied him where he indicated to us a hiding place where he hid documents, which is on the other side of Krugersdorp.
MR VISSER: Is this all that you could add to this matter, Brig Schoon?
MR SCHOON: That is all.
MR VISSER: Do you then apply for amnesty for any act or delict that was committed and that was in relation to this incident?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: What is that specifically, Mr Visser, possibly he does not know?
MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, it is obviously fraud. The whole plan has to be seen in the light of the attack which took place. You will hear that in fact the attack took place on the very same day, from the other witnesses. The attack that took place in Botswana which was obviously intended to kill people although nobody was killed, there may have been people injured, but obviously the intention was to murder people and to destroy property, and property was in fact destroyed.
We saw that on the television, I remember that well. But nobody was killed. It would include obviously connivance to murder and to damage property. In this case Chairperson, there was a clear, there was a clear defeating of the ends of justice as well. Certainly, well if you talk about fraud, I don't suppose you have to talk about defeating the ends of justice as well, but that is also a possible offence committed by the applicants.
Chairperson, my Attorney just mentions an interesting point, and that is the question of whether they should not apply for amnesty for transportation and possession of illegal arms, ammunition and I believe when he mentions it, Chairperson, I believe that in this case ...
CHAIRPERSON: Were there explosives there too, I don't know?
MR VISSER: Yes, Brig Schoon seems to remember that he obtained weapons and ammunition from Vlakplaas and from the store clerk, but he also authorised explosives from the Explosives Department, which is another department.
CHAIRPERSON: It was an air raid?
MR VISSER: Well, it was, they went in with airplanes, but they didn't bomb the place with the airplanes. They went in with helicopters, and they let down troops from the helicopters.
CHAIRPERSON: So we don't know if explosives were used or do we?
MR VISSER: They would have been, there is no question.
CHAIRPERSON: So they have contravened the Explosives Act as well?
MR VISSER: Absolutely, but of course one mustn't forget Chairperson, we are dealing here with the arms cache and there were definitely explosives.
CHAIRPERSON: Contravention of two Acts, the Arms and Ammunition and the Explosives Act?
MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson. With great respect, we would prefer it if you simply worded it any contravention in regard to the possession and transportation of arms and explosives because there are very many provisions and there is no way we can ever tabulate all of them here today, and I don't want the Attorney-General to say "you didn't get amnesty for that one".
CHAIRPERSON: Do you think he is likely to do it?
MR VISSER: Absolutely.
CHAIRPERSON: I thought those types of Attorney-Generals have retired?
MR VISSER: That is the evidence from Brig Schoon, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
MR MALAN: With your permission Mr Chairperson, I would just like to follow up on something with Mr Schoon. Your Advocate has led you regarding the building and you said that you recall that it was a long white building, somewhere behind parliament. Would you be able to say to day which building you think it was?
MR SCHOON: It was a long white building, about two to three storeys high and it dated from the early days of the Cape, because they were busy restoring the place, and there were all sorts of photographs and museum pieces inside the building if I recall correctly.
MR MALAN: The reason why I have asked this is because I cannot imagine any other building in my mind, than Tuynhuis, or do you not know where this is? Was it on the mountain side of parliament or the ocean side of parliament?
MR SCHOON: I think it was in the direction of the mountain.
MR MALAN: But you don't know who they went to see and to whom they made the submission?
MR SCHOON: I suspect that it may have been the SSC or some or other parliamentary committee.
MR MALAN: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is ...
CHAIRPERSON: Before we, Mr Hugo, do you have any questions?
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, thank you that you are looking after my interests here.
CHAIRPERSON: I unfortunately forgot you in the beginning, I am not going to make the same mistake.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, there are just two aspects. Brigadier, you have just said that the first meeting which took at Vlakplaas, was among others attended by Gen Kat Liebenberg. You would have noted in Mr de Kock's application that he also mentions Gen Joubert.
What is your recollection regarding this meeting, whether or not Gen Joubert was present?
MR SCHOON: I think he was present Chairperson.
MR HUGO: Yes, that is Mr de Kock's recollection, that Gen Joubert was indeed present. Then Mr de Kock also states that his recollection is somewhat vague regarding these aspects and he doesn't necessarily want to cross swords with you about it, however, we must place it on record that he recalls that the weaponry came from Vlakplaas and that he cannot recall that he was at Head Office to go and fetch the weapons there?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, Major Naude obtained the weapons from Head Office, however there were definitely weapons which came from Head Office.
MR HUGO: Whatever the case may be, you would concede that a substantial number of these weapons came from Vlakplaas?
MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.
MR HUGO: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP
ADV SIGODI: These weapons that you had from Head Office, where did the State get them from?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, these were weapons which had served as exhibits in criminal cases regarding MK cadres, who had been charged, and who had been captured within the country in possession of these weapons. These weapons had then be sent to Head Office for safekeeping.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, now that
Mr Hugo has had the opportunity of putting what Mr de Kock is going to say, the one thing he has not put is a matter which is raised by Mr de Kock at page 60 to 61 and perhaps I should just ask Mr Schoon about this. I suspected that it might be covered in cross-examination, but my learned friend says that I can deal with it myself.
Brig Schoon, Major de Kock has stated in his amnesty application, that at a certain stage a request was made to him by an Army Colonel for more weapons which had to be added to the original group of weapons, and that he had discussed it with you, and that you had approved it, and that he fetched two or three Macarov pistols from Vlakplaas and added this to the group of weapons. Do you recall anything about that?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I can recall vaguely that the enquiry as to whether he, Mr de Kock, could take weapons was related to the material which the recces brought back from Botswana, to be submitted as evidence, representing weapons which had been found in Botswana and brought back to the Republic.
I do not think that it really had anything to do with the arms cache at Krugersdorp. That is the only logical inference that I can draw from this.
MR VISSER: Is it correct that you do not have a very good recollection of the matter?
MR SCHOON: No, but it is very possible that I may have told Col de Kock.
MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, you testified that the person who would have given you the authorisation to enter Botswana or any place, would be misled with this planned story of yours, and that he would not be informed that in actual fact, this arms cache had been planned by you to give the public the justification to take action in Botswana?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I have already testified, I observed the request from Gen Liebenberg and what he was going to do afterwards, had nothing to do with me.
CHAIRPERSON: You testified that the story which would be given in Cape Town, was planned?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And primarily it would not have been truthful? What I want to know is, why you didn't want to present the truth to whoever you had to present it to, and why was it necessary to present a fabrication? You were aware that there were ANC members who were the enemy, there in Botswana and in other places, and that they presented a threat towards the country and that they were busy infiltrating the country and that they were busy with all sorts of activities, which were detrimental to you, but you decided that you would take them on and that you were going to do this and that to them, because it was a situation of warfare for you.
Why then was it necessary to plan to lie to the person who was supposed to give you the authorisation?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was the Defence Force's plan and by name, it was Gen Liebenberg and Gen Joubert, who devised this plan.
CHAIRPERSON: But you were there as backup. I want to know why you had to lie to that person? Why wasn't he told the truth?
MR SCHOON: I don't know what Gen Liebenberg told them, I wasn't present.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know that, but I am referring to the stage prior to this when you were still planning not to tell the truth to those people, when you decided what you were going to tell them in order to obtain authorisation, at that stage you must have known why you were not going to tell the truth in Cape Town.
I simply want to know why it was feasible not to tell the truth to those persons? You would have obtained the authorisation, you were seeking authorisation, why was it necessary to lie?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I don't know whether or not lies were told.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I want to know about the plan, why was the plan to be untruthful? You yourself testified that if you were called in, you would be there as backup, if you had been called in there to assist in persuading this person or these persons, would you also have lied, and furthermore you conceded that you knew that you had to be able to lie in that situation and the possibility of that was discussed.
I want to know why was it necessary to betray that person or those persons in order to obtain authorisation for the Botswana attack?
MR SCHOON: It is very simple Chairperson. They had to be persuaded that these were the facts, and that on the strength of these facts, they had to grant permission for an official attack in Botswana.
CHAIRPERSON: But why wouldn't they have received the truth and by means of the truth, have extended their authorisation?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, perhaps they would not have granted authorisation.
CHAIRPERSON: How was that discussed amongst you? Why did you think that if you tell the truth, you might not have obtained authorisation?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the idea of an arms cache came exclusively from the Defence Force.
CHAIRPERSON: So?
MR SCHOON: And I was simply instrumental in the execution of these orders.
CHAIRPERSON: However, you went with to Cape Town?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You went with to obtain authorisation or approval from a person or persons to take action within Botswana and to blow up a place there, or whatever the case may be? I can understand the reasons for it, the real reasons and for the purposes of the public, this additional plan or contingency plan, was put into operation in order to indicate to the public "there are our enemies, they are armed, we have the right to attack them", isn't that correct?
MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Furthermore I understand that authorisation had to be obtained in Cape Town as well from whoever it may have been, I am not certain who it was.
Previously it was planned that you would be there as a standby person to assist in convincing these persons or this person, to grant authorisation. We know that that person, or that body of persons, would have to be betrayed in order to obtain authorisation. Why was it necessary to betray them and not tell them the truth?
MR SCHOON: I don't know Chairperson, it was the plan that the Special Forces came to us with and we fell in with the plan, and did what they asked us to do.
CHAIRPERSON: But when you discussed it, when you discussed the fact that you will tell them this story in order to obtain authorisation, certainly you must have discussed the reason why you are not going to tell the truth and the reasons why it was necessary to betray them?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I cannot answer that.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't know?
MR SCHOON: No, I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: But you were prepared to go and lie there?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: One question relating to your application, you provide your history that you were a member of the South African Police from 1949 onwards, you also sketched how you were promoted and so forth. You state that you were also a member of the National Party at that stage, you were a regular member?
MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: On behalf of who did you act in all these cases?
MR SCHOON: On behalf of the Police, on request of the Defence Force.
CHAIRPERSON: From what political prospective did you act?
MR SCHOON: From the perspective that the ANC at that stage, was our enemy and I found it acceptable for them to be attacked.
CHAIRPERSON: But did you act on behalf of a political party, in the interest of any political party?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I acted in the interest of the South African Police and by nature of the government which I served.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you can assist me Mr Visser, that would be Exhibit A in which it was stated that the government of the day had to be protected?
MR VISSER: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: That is how you acted in order to protect the interests of the country and the interests of that government?
MR SCHOON: That is what I believed at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: As a policeman you acted from that political perspective.
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: These persons who had to provide the authorisation for action in Botswana, they were members of the government?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: From that perspective you could understand the importance of the question, why was it necessary to lie to them or to the person, whoever it was, because then if you had lied, it could be argued that you did not act in the interest of, or for the approval of that government because it was necessary to lie to them? Do you understand the question?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I understand it Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: It is in that regard that I have put the question, because it is very significant. I have to consider it, I don't know what our decision will be, but it is extremely significant. Do you have any comment on that?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I have put the facts to you as I recall them, and I believe that I acted in the best interest of the country at that stage and time. There is nothing more.
CHAIRPERSON: No, but in the interest of a party is also important, it was in the interest of the government, is that also your evidence?
MR SCHOON: The National Party was in power.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, basically speaking they were the government.
MR SCHOON: I acted in the best interests of their maintenance of power, by combatting the ANC.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but why did you lie to them when you sought their authorisation, because those were the rules, you had to obtain approval. The question is this action in Botswana, along with all the sophisticated planning, did it enjoy approval?
If you lied to them, then the question would be whether or not they gave the correct approval and the question which follows from that is whether or not these persons then acted in the best interests of the country or the government?
MR SCHOON: I wasn't personally present when authorisation was extended for the action and I don't know what was said to those persons by Gen Liebenberg.
CHAIRPERSON: But you must have had a fair idea of what they were going to say before they went in, because you were there as a backup person, and you knew that they would be lying. That was part of the plan?
They couldn't have spoken to you if they had said that they were going to call you in to provide backup details to whoever it was that they were making these submissions to, for example the State President, if they wanted you to come in at a certain stage to assist in persuading him to give the permission to take action in Botswana.
You would have told lies. We know that now. The question then arises, to what extent was the action in the best interests of the country or the government at that stage?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it would have strengthened their hand to give permission for the Defence Force, to proceed with an overt operation in Botswana.
CHAIRPERSON: Then why weren't they told the truth, why would they not have been told the truth in order to be able to arrive at the correct decision, whatever that decision may have been ultimately?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as I have already stated, I was not present, and it may be that Gen Liebenberg then told them the truth, that this cache wasn't really a genuine ANC cache, that it had been rigged.
MR MALAN: Mr Schoon, I don't know whether or not you have studied Mr de Kock's application?
MR SCHOON: Yes, I have.
MR MALAN: On page 61 of the Bundle, and I ask you the question now, because you will already have been excused once Mr de Kock gives evidence, he states in the middle paragraph on that page
"... in this incident, the Department of Foreign Affairs were misled by the SA Police and the SA Defence Force."
Do you see that sentence?
MR SCHOON: Yes.
MR MALAN: Now before I continue to examine you, would I be correct to understand that Mr de Kock's only involvement was that he went to fetch certain weapons at Vlakplaas, and made them available to Major Coetzee?
MR SCHOON: Yes, that is how I recall it Chairperson.
MR MALAN: But it would appear here as if Mr de Kock was also informed regarding the reason for the establishment of this arms cache?
MR SCHOON: That is correct.
MR MALAN: Because he mentions the Department of Foreign Affairs, so it would appear that in his mind he understood that the Defence Force and the Police, most probably were of the opinion that an invasion of Botswana was necessary?
MR SCHOON: I would agree with that.
MR MALAN: According to Mr de Kock, and we will examine him about this, but according to information that he must have received, and that he could not have received from anyone other than you or Liebenberg or Joubert, if they had spoken to him there at Vlakplaas, there must have been an indication to him that Foreign Affairs did not want an invasion in Botswana? Doesn't it appear to be so from Mr de Kock's document and that the persons who were misled had to be misled, or had to be placed in a predicament and that these persons were the Department of Foreign Affairs, because they had to be notified before there was a cross-border action because that would lead to a diplomatic situation?
The Defence Force reasoned that they could no longer cooperate with Foreign Affairs and they decided to create a certain scenario. In other words this arms cache and you stated that this was to strengthen the hand of the government upon a question which was put by the Chairperson, Should we not infer from that, that it was necessary to strengthen the government's hand partially in order to bully Foreign Affairs, so that they could not veto an invasion of Botswana. Can you not recall anything like that?
MR SCHOON: Chairperson, that is a strong possibility.
MR MALAN: That is not the question, I want to know whether or not you can remember that, because Mr de Kock clearly has such recollections, in actual fact he expresses his frustrations in the following paragraph, the last sentence of that paragraph where he states that he really does not know who was in control of the country any more, whether it was the Police or the politicians or the politicians, he wasn't sure who was making the decisions any more.
I have never heard such evidence from him, and he has presented many applications before us, where I have been part of the panel who heard him. In fact Mr de Kock has always blamed the politicians, but here it is clear that we have a converse approach. Here he feels that the Defence Force and the Police have cooperated in order to obtain a certain decision that they wanted from the government. Can you not recall anything like that, that during that period in time, it was said to you that it was actually about having a decision made to invade Botswana and to tie the hands of Foreign Affairs. Don't say it is possible, I want to know if you can recall this.
MR SCHOON: I cannot recall this at this stage.
MR MALAN: Very well, I will put it to Mr de Kock.
MR SCHOON: There were always problems between the Security Forces and Foreign Affairs. I know that there were such problems.
MR MALAN: But you cannot link this to this incident?
MR SCHOON: No.
MR MALAN: Then I will examine Mr de Kock about it furthermore, thank you.
ADV SIGODI: Mr Schoon, you are also an applicant in the Nat Serache matter, what I want to know is what was the difference when you went to attack Nat Serache's house in Botswana and this instance, where you had to get some authority because there you decided the matter on your own on the farm, and then you decided to go and attack Nat Serache's hose?
MR SCHOON: Mr Chairperson, yes, the Serache incident was a covert operation where the Defence Force could decide themselves to give permission, and they did not need any other authorisation. Such covert operations or operations different from this covert operation, needed authorisation from the State Security Council.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, I am not quite sure that you are right, because we have heard other matters and decisions or heard of decisions and it was explained to us who must ask whom for permission, but that is now another matter.
I am still worried about the question I put to you and Mr Malan gave you an example out of Mr de Kock's application. The question still stands, this action, the whole plan, was that done with the correct authorisation and in the interest of the government of the day, what do you say?
In the light of the lies that you had to, or that you planned to tell?
MR SCHOON: I believe so Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.
MR SCHOON: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I ask in the case of Brig Schoon, whether he can go back to bed? Thank you Chairperson, he will be available if he is needed to come back.
The next witness I wish to call is Mr Martin Naude. His evidence you will find at page 118 to 128 and he deals with the application in the present case at page 121, Chairperson. He is not Charl Naude, he is Martin Naude.
