Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: The next one seems to be the last one on the roll. It is the last one on the roll, it is the applications of Coetzee, Heystek and Pretorius.

MR VISSER: Well it's the last one in which we're involved, Chairperson. And this one - while we're waiting, this one concerns abduction, unlawful detention and assault as well as contravention of border control regulations regarding entry and exit of people as well as firearms, Chairperson.

The first witness I will call will be Mr Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume the victims present are involved in this matter.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just announce yourself on the microphone for the purposes of the record.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I'm Advocate Chris van der Heyde, from Standard Bank Chambers here in Pretoria and I represent the victim, the wife, Mrs Lengene, in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, who do you call first?

MR VISSER: The first witness is the first application in the bundle, Mr W H Coetzee. His application is to be found at page 1 through to 17, and he deals with the application from page 4 onwards, Chairperson. He is ready to take the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

W H COETZEE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are an applicant in this matter and you apply for amnesty for your role in the abduction, assault or illegal detention or Mr Peter Lengene, as well as the contravention of the stipulated border control regulations which concerns the entry and exit of yourself to Botswana and back, as well as the illegal importation of weapons into Botswana, as well as defeating the ends of justice, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have studied Exhibits A and B, do you wish to incorporate the contents thereof with your amnesty application?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm the correctness subject to the evidence that you will give today, of your amnesty application which was submitted in December 1996?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Could you tell the Committee about the background, firstly, and then your share in this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we continue Mr Visser, are there any other applicants?

MR VISSER: Yes, there are two further applicants. The other one is Mr Heystek and there is Mr Anton Pretorius, as indicated by the index page of the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you think it would be advisable for them to hear this evidence?

MR VISSER: Throughout the entire process thusfar applicants have listened to the evidence, but if you feel that it would be better for them to wait outside, then ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I want to know whether it wouldn't be advisable for them to listen to the evidence.

MR VISSER: Oh, but they are seated here.

MR MALAN: But they weren't here at the beginning.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I beg your pardon, I couldn't see them.

MR VISSER: Yes, they are indeed present.

Can you please provide us with the background pertaining to Mr Peter Lengene.

MR COETZEE

"During the '80's the Intelligence Division of the Security Branch Soweto, had much success with infiltrations from revolutionary organisations and structures in the RSA, as well as in Botswana and Swaziland. We also obtained much success regarding the recruitment of members of such organisations and structures who would then work for the Security Branch as informers.

During the period 1981 and 1982, I was active as a member of that unit in the monitoring of SAYRCO's activities in both the RSA and Botswana and Zimbabwe."

MR VISSER: What does SAYRCO, S-A-Y-R-C-O stand for?

MR COETZEE: South African Youth Revolution Council.

"SAYRCO was a pertinent threat to the State dispensation as well as internal security, due to it's programme of violence. SAYRCO originated as a result of the 1975 Soweto unrest. It became all the more clear that SAYRCO had an agenda of overthrowing the existing State dispensation by means of violence and that the organisation had narrow liaison with the ANC, who at that stage was a forbidden organisation.

The Soweto division succeeded within a limited period of time in infiltrating SAYRCO in Soweto and Botswana thoroughly and among others, various in-place informers were recruited among the ranks of SAYRCO and various RS agents and informers succeeded in establishing themselves in such structures in Botswana, in both Gaborone and Dukwe."

MR VISSER: Please explain very briefly once again, what is the difference between an RS agent and an informer?

MR COETZEE: An RS agent is a member of the Force, while an informer would depend upon the occasion.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE

"Our monitoring of SAYRCO members was conducted from the objective of court oriented actions and the combatting of the revolutionary onslaught. From within this threat and the court oriented perspective the following threats from SAYRCO were important for us to monitor

The recruitment of youths in the RSA, for military training abroad;

The organisation and mobilisation of youth structures;

SAYRCO's internal military involvement;

SAYRCO's military activities in the neighbouring countries and;

The involvement of SAYRCO in the channelling of weaponry to the RSA for the purpose of proposed acts of terrorism.

In the course of such monitoring we were informed regarding the activities of SAYRCO's military wing, which indicated that SAYRCO was actively involved abroad in various countries and consulted with numerous States in order to have SAYRCO members trained in such countries and succeeded in having various members trained militarily in Namibia and other countries."

MR VISSER: What was the military wing of SAYRCO? How was it known, what was its name?

MR COETZEE: It was know as TSU.

MR VISSER: What did that stand for?

MR COETZEE: Tactics and Strategy.

MR VISSER: And the abbreviation is T-S-U?

MR COETZEE: Tactics and Strategy Unit.

MR VISSER: Tactics and Strategy Unit, TSU?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You referred to the contact which SAYRCO had with other States or countries, what was the purpose, among others, with that contact?

MR COETZEE: In order to obtain military training for their members and to obtain weaponry, so that they could also fund their struggle against the RSA.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue. Was there any information regarding what they aimed to do in the RSA?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

"In the course of such monitoring we came to know of SAYRCO's activities and the activities of the military wing of SAYRCO, which indicated that SAYRCO was actively involved abroad with various countries or States which it consulted with in order to obtain military training for SAYRCO members in such countries or States. That SAYRCO had already succeeded in having a limited number of members trained in Libya.

In the course of time the relevant threat intensified when the following dimensions began to develop regarding SAYRCO:

Proposed infiltration into the RSA;

Proposed actions in the RSA.

Confirmed information indicated that SAYRCO regarded it as necessary to organise a single controversial military action in the RSA. It later came to light that this military action was the attack on the Protea Police centre in Soweto.

INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Could the speaker please slow down, the Interpreter finds it difficult to follow the speaker as he's reading a document which speeds up his speech.

ADV SIGODI: The Interpreter is asking the speaker to slow down because she cannot keep up.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I should have thought of that.

Will you please proceed somewhat slower and just repeat. You say that confirmed information indicated that SAYRCO deemed it necessary to organise a singularly controversial military action in the RSA, and you have just stated that it became known later that this action which was proposed was the attack the Protea Police complex in Soweto, is that correct.

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Will you then just proceed somewhat slower please.

MR COETZEE

"SAYRCO deemed it necessary in order to come to the attention of other countries as an indicating power in the revolutionary onslaught, so that SAYRCO could obtain assistance and support from such countries.

In order to obtain funding for their proposed military activities, SAYRCO members went over to crime in Botswana. This, among others, include vehicle theft and other offences."

MR VISSER: Very well, if we can come to Mr Lengene himself. Can you tell us what you knew of his activities?

MR COETZEE: His participation in these activities.

"The proposed involvement of SAYRCO with ANC/MK activities ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean?

MR COETZEE: Could you repeat the question?

CHAIRPERSON: I want you to explain - just keep your finger on the mike please. What do you mean when you refer to proposed activities?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as a member of their military wing, he coordinated all their activities and he was directly in command of their military activities and everything that was committed by the military units was known by him and coordinated by him and sanctioned by him.

CHAIRPERSON: So his activities were not proposed as such, they were actual activities?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why I asked what you meant by your reference to proposed activities.

MR COETZEE

"The activities and movements of Lengene and various other leadership elements of SAYRCO was known to us by means of well placed short-term informers. Upon occasion there was contact or liaison with Lengene in Botswana and such an informer won the confidence of Lengene with promise and delivery of certain arms to him, which was provided by Soweto for this purpose. Eventually this informer reported that he was of the opinion that Lengene was recruitable as an informer for the Security Branch.

During the course of time, Lengene provided information regarding SAYRCO activities in Botswana to the informer and gradually an RS agent established liaison with Lengene.

I can recall that Lengene also provided information regarding all MK activities in Botswana which was channelled to the Security Branch in Soweto. It became all the more clear that Lengene wanted to return to the RSA, but that his status had left certain fears within him, due to the 1976 unrest and that he also feared that his family in Soweto would be attacked or killed should he return to the RSA."

MR MALAN: What do you mean when you refer to his status and the 1976 unrests?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, his involvement in the violence and his organisation of the youth.

MR MALAN: During 1976? His involvement in the 1976 unrests, is that what you mean?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR MALAN: In other words he feared that the police would descend upon him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Continue.

MR COETZEE

"The value of Lengene's information was significant and among others ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that he did become some form of an informer then?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: For you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.

MR COETZEE

"The value of Lengene's information was significant and among others contributed to the arrest of the below mentioned SAYRCO members in Soweto, after they had infiltrated from Botswana: ..."

CHAIRPERSON: Who were they?

MR COETZEE

"Izak Masemola"

MR VISSER: Just a moment. In your application on page 6, you have stated the name Khotso Seaflolo, but it has been misspelt. At the bottom of page 6 you refer to a person called Khotso Seahalelo, but you say the correct spelling is, S-e-a-h-l-o-l-o?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: As well as the other person who is Isak Masemola, M-a-s-e-m-o-l-a?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Continue.

MR COETZEE

"At a certain stage I decided to make a genuine attempt to recruit Lengene as an informer for the Security Branch. I discussed this proposal with my Commander, Col Heystek, and he gave me and Pretorius the necessary authorisation to do so. He was aware that this would include that Lengene would be abducted from Botswana and brought to the RSA for the recruitment process."

MR VISSER: May I just interpose. In 1982, who was the Commander of the Intelligence Unit?

MR COETZEE: Col Heystek, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR COETZEE

"During this period in time, upon various occasions I visited Gaborone in order to finalise the aforementioned matter, but due to the fears both within the interloper and Lengene that they may be exposed in Botswana as RSA agents, no meeting could be arranged in Botswana.

Upon an occasion the particular interloper intermediary once again established contact with me and reported that later that night I could meet Lengene in Broadhurst, Botswana."

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you ask Lengene to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: Could you repeat the question please.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you asked Heystek whether or not you could abduct the man you must have decided that he would be a good source for the Police, didn't you then discuss the matter with Lengene himself?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson, there were always the intermediaries to whom I referred, they consulted with him and discussed the matter with him.

CHAIRPERSON: What I want to establish is why did you decide that he should be abducted if the possibility existed that he might be willing to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it was important to bring him back with us to the RSA in order to finalise the recruitment process and to apply him for these purposes in South Africa. Previously on a continuous basis there had been liaison with him, as I have indicated in my application.

CHAIRPERSON: It's a simple question, was he ever asked to become a full informer?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, but there was no substantiation regarding his credibility to work with us or to cooperate with us. Information pertaining to his involvement in military activities had not yet been validated, that is why the recruitment progressed as it is set out within my amnesty application.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you, was he aware of the fact that he would be abducted?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to establish, and this is not something that concerns your application, it's just a simple question. If he had already been some form of informer, having already provided information to you, he would then be your informer, as I understand your evidence. How then did it come to be that you decided to abduct him? Why didn't you make more of an attempt and say "Lengene I think that you should become a full informer, what do you say about that?"

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, due to the psychosis of fear within him and secondly, in order to finalise the recruitment process.

CHAIRPERSON: But you could have finalised that process regardless of whether or not he accompanied you.

MR COETZEE: The process spanned a number of days, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue.

MR COETZEE

"During this period in time, upon various occasions..."

I am just proceeding to the next paragraph.

"Upon occasion the particular intermediary once again established contact with me and reported that I could meet Lengene late that night in Broadhurst in Botswana, that he would bring Lengene to the particular address. I cleared this visit with Col Heystek and he gave authorisation for Botswana to be visited and for Lengene to be brought to the RSA.

I requested Lieut-Col Heystek to send a number of members with me on this operation from within a security and executive perspective. The following members who were attached to the Security Branch in Soweto, accompanied me to Botswana:

Lieut-Col Pretorius, the then W/O Pretorius;

Maj J Matthee who was then a Sergeant Matthee;

Capt C Ludicke, then Sgt Ludicke ..."

MR VISSER: You are proceeding way too fast.

MR COETZEE: I will repeat once again, Chairperson.

"Lieut-Col Pretorius, the then W/O Pretorius;

Maj J Matthee, the then Sgt Matthee;

Capt C Ludicke, then Sgt Ludicke;

Sgt J Mothiba;

A O Selamolela, then Const Selamolela;

Const Dawid Tiyane.

On that particular Saturday evening at approximately..."

MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you. Mr Lengene refers to the date thereof as the 6th of February 1982. Lengene made a sworn statement, Chairperson, and he says in that sworn statement - I'm just looking for the exact page number, he says at page 53 in paragraph 18, he says in the middle of that page where he starts describing where he went with the informant, he says

"This day was on a Saturday, 6 February 1982"

and we have no reason to question that date.

Very well, please proceed.

MR COETZEE

"On that particular Saturday evening at approximately 24H00, Lengene accompanied by the intermediary, arrived at the particular contact address in Broadhurst, Gaborone. Upon their entry into the lounge of the particular house we seized Lengene immediately and searched him for arms. We bound Lengene's hands and feet. I can no longer recall particularly which. I must just explain that this action was necessary in my opinion. It was necessary from within a security perspective as well as a practical perspective. It was the first time that I personally established contact with Lengene and I had no guarantees of his bona fides, as well as his willingness to cooperate with the Security branch. There would necessarily have to be a procedure during which he would be evaluated as an informer, despite the fact that he had previously disclosed information.

Subsequently we transported Lengene in a motor vehicle to the border, where we crossed the border illegally. From the border onwards we travelled further per vehicle to Rustenburg where I arranged with my father-in-law to conduct Lengene's interrogation and recruitment in his garage. Seeing as I required an isolated place where there would be no disturbances.

On the way to Rustenburg, when we moved through Swartruggens, lengene attempted to escape from the vehicles. He jumped out and began to run away. I tackled him on the tar road and both of us fell reasonably hard on the road. Where Lengene refers in his affidavit to injuries which were treated, it could maybe have been lesions which he incurred as a result of his attempted escape.

In Rustenburg we interrogated Lengene for approximately a week and obtained information from him and continued with the recruitment process. The persons who participated in this process were myself, Lieut-Col Pretorius, Maj J Matthee and Sgt Mothiba.

All information was coordinated with Lieut-Col Heystek, as well as Security Head Office, Pretoria, which was informed commensurately regarding the incident by Division Soweto but not of the abduction because we did not want to be exposed to prosecution.

During the interrogation of Lengene I slapped him a number of times in the face. I think Pretorius did the same. The reason for this was that experience had taught us that hard-handed action towards the person who had to be recruited as an informer, would sketch the gravity of the situation to him and make him understand that he should not tell any lies or play any games."

CHAIRPERSON: The recruitment, was that a regular method of making the proposed informer an informer?

MR COETZEE: The modus operandi of people differed, but that was my modus operandi. This was a military person ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I want to know if you did the same to all your informers?

MR COETZEE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the first time you slapped a proposed informer?

MR COETZEE: No, there were others.

"The recruitment of Lengene proceeded quite swiftly. Within a week I was satisfied that he was sincere in his intentions to cooperate with the Security Branch and from that moment onwards he was treated very well. Clothes were purchased for him and generally all this needs were seen to.

We went to Soweto where I arranged that Lengene's mother be informed regarding his whereabouts. The following members and I contributed to discussions with Lengene's mother:

Lengene himself;

Lieut-Col Heystek and;

Sgt Mothiba"

MR VISSER: May I just take you back to this before we forget about it, when you entered to Botswana, just clarify this for us, did you enter legally via the border post or did you enter illegally over the border?

MR COETZEE: Illegally, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you take any weapons with you or not?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And those weapons were obviously not declared at any legal border post?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 32

"For security reasons, Lengene was accommodated at a safe place. He subsequently made a considerable contribution to the regulation of the violence in Soweto. He was fortunate enough to be back in the RSA and I believe that he enjoyed his job. This is confirmed by the fact that within approximately two months, upon his request, he was attested to as a Constable in the South African Police and later requested that his brother, Tony Lengene also be admitted as a policeman."

MR VISSER: Where is this Tony Lengene currently?

MR COETZEE: Currently he is a serving member. I don't know where he is stationed.

MR VISSER: Is he still in the South African Police Services?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, it is my information that Mr Lengene is deceased. I beg your pardon, I was actually busy with something else.

MR VISSER: The victim is deceased but the brother is still alive and he is still in the Police Services.

Very well, continue.

MR COETZEE

"After we returned back to Soweto, the Head of the Security in Botswana, Mr Hershveld and other officials visited the headquarters to find out if Lengene was there. Col Heystek and Mothiba accompanied him to the Pretoria Headquarters where he spoke to the delegation from the Botswana Police regarding, amongst others, the circumstances of his return to South Africa, the recruitment process, the SAYRCO activities in Botswana, crime, burglaries, robberies and the involvement of Botswana Police in amongst others, the possession of stolen vehicles and the involvement of vehicles syndicates that was operating at that stage."

MR VISSER: This information that you are now explaining, where did you get this information from?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, it was information that came up from interrogation of Lengene and other informants that provided us with this information.

MR VISSER: And were you then informed that these were the aspects that were conveyed to Mr Hershveld from the Botswana Security Branch?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I was not present.

"I then heard that Lengene refused to return to Botswana because of the fact that he was wanted in Botswana for criminal activities. Lengene told me about this during his interrogation in Rustenburg.

I apply for amnesty for my part in the abduction, unlawful detention, contravention of border control regulations, assault and any other offence or delict that occurred during this incident. I also ask for amnesty for defeating the ends of justice because I covered up the true facts from both Security Head Office as well as the public."

MR VISSER: Mr Peter Lengene, the person that you abducted, is he alive today?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened to him?

MR COETZEE: I heard, Mr Chairperson, that there was an incident in which he was involved that was partly his fault,

MR VISSER: It had nothing to do with any politics?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now Mr Lengene made a statement from page 48 and in this statement he described how he was abducted, did you study that statement?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Everything that appears in that statement, is it correct?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you just in short deal with the aspects that you do not agree with.

MR COETZEE: I can say that the fact that he allegedly was injected and the fact that he was assaulted by people in Rustenburg, that is not part of my knowledge that something like that could have happened.

MR VISSER: Can we just go through it point by point. On page 53, paragraph 19 alleges that when he arrived at the house that evening, a Saturday evening in Botswana, he was suspicious and he tried to get away. That was now while you were hiding in the house.

MR COETZEE: I do not carry any knowledge of this.

MR VISSER: And he also says that the lights in the house were switched off and that the informant tried to light a candle. What is your evidence concerning this?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge the lights were on and we did not make use of candles.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 21 on page 54, that someone threatened him with a hunting knife. According to your knowledge did this happen?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember such an incident at all. CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember such an incident at all.

MR VISSER: And then on page 54, paragraph 22, that he was injected.

MR COETZEE: I deny that completely.

MR VISSER: Was it true that you gave him alcohol to appease him? Did you give him alcohol?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: For what reason?

MR COETZEE: To get him under control?

CHAIRPERSON: Was it necessary?

MR COETZEE: I believe that it was necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: What made you think that?

MR COETZEE: Because I knew Mr Chairperson, that we were on our way back to the Republic and there was that psychosis of fear within this man and to bring him back, it was our first meeting with him, knowing that he is now in the final process of recruitment.

MR VISSER: What was his action when you seized him that night in the house?

MR COETZEE: He did not have room to move, we immediately took control of him in order to finalise this recruitment successfully in the Republic.

MR VISSER: Did he fight back or did he resist?

MR COETZEE: It could be possible - yes, there was some resistance, Chairperson, which I would ascribe to fright, the reaction to a lot of people suddenly on you, unknown people. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene says on page 54, paragraph 23, that he had to sleep on a cement floor.

MR COETZEE: I do deny that.

MR VISSER: He also ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The Security Police do have that such a habit, that after they interrogated a person they would do this.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, we were busy with a very sensitive recruitment and that is why it was very important to me that we had to look after this person.

CHAIRPERSON: He was assaulted or hit, this recruit or informant, to show to him that you were serious, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that occurred over a period of a week until you were satisfied that he is trustworthy and that he's been recruited, correct?

MR COETZEE: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was treated badly in that week, he was hit. There were no apparent reasons for that, is that not so? ....(transcriber's interpretation)

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did slap him or assault him at a certain stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Right through the week you slapped him until you were satisfied that he was - I cannot think of the right words to describe it, but he was now satisfied that he was trustworthy.

MR COETZEE: I will put it this way, Mr Chairperson, that after the conflict points were clarified, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was dealt with on such a level that he had to know that you were serious and that you were in control?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now if he was treated in such a bad way, why would this allegation that he was naked be so unusual? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR COETZEE: At no stage in Rustenburg he was naked. We were in a garage as I said in my application.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he in a garage?

MR COETZEE: Yes, and we were there with him all the time.

CHAIRPERSON: In the garage?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he handcuffed?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, from time to time, especially in the evenings.

CHAIRPERSON: His hands and is feet?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it cold?

MR COETZEE: February month in Rustenburg is very hot, it was summer.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the cement on the floor very cold? Was it cold in the evenings?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is possible, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there times that he was not aware of what was going on around him?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you speak to him in Afrikaans?

MR COETZEE: Mostly in English and in his own language, with the use of Sgt Mothiba.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he placed in the boot of the car?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a Ford Cortina XR6?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The old one?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The alcohol, whether it was brandy or whisky, how big was the bottle?

MR COETZEE: It was a quart, I think they call it a quart - a dumpie, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What type of alcohol?

MR COETZEE: I myself do not drink. It was a white alcohol.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it true that the bottle was emptied when he was forced to drink it?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, he had to finish it.

CHAIRPERSON: How was he cuffed, his hands and his feet? With cuffs or ropes?

MR COETZEE: I think we used cuffs.

CHAIRPERSON: And in Botswana, was it cuffs or ropes?

MR COETZEE: If I can recall correctly, Mr Chairperson, his feet were tied with rope.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue, please.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, just one correction if I may, I believe that you referred the witness to page 58, paragraph 33, as to where in the blue Ford XR6 he was transported, Lengene says he was made to lie on the back seat, not in the boot.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, 54.

MR MALAN: The reference is to paragraph 23, Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it this way, Mr Visser, this is one of the trips, I'm not too if they talk about one same trip.

MR VISSER: Oh yes, that may be. Thank you.

Now in paragraph 28, page 56, Mr Lengene describes an incident where your father-in-law was involved and that he took a pliers and assaulted him on his private parts.

MR COETZEE: I do not carry knowledge of such an incident, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Mr Lengene kept in the garage of your father-in-law in Rustenburg?

MR COETZEE: Yes, but he was in our company.

MR VISSER: Was your father-in-law involved in the interrogation or the recruitment process?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: Did he from time come in or was present while you interrogated him?

MR COETZEE: No.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene then says on page ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did your father-in-law know what was going on in his house?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson. He knew that we were busy with a recruitment.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he aware of the fact that you assaulted this person?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you assaulted him, did he not shout?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, he was not assaulted by me in such a way. Not according to me, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you left?

MR COETZEE: I was there on a full-time basis.

CHAIRPERSON: The whole week?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And your father-in-law never entered the garage?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, because we requested him and we told him that we were busy with work.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there anyone by the name of Willem?

MR COETZEE: Yes, my name is Willem.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Lengene know that your name was Willem?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell him?

MR COETZEE: It was well known what my name was, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: On the 6th day of your work there, is it correct that you decided to stop slapping him or assaulting him?

MR COETZEE: It was a few days before that.

CHAIRPERSON: But did you get a call?

MR COETZEE: I received various calls.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that on the sixth day?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember that, but I made various calls and I received various calls there.

CHAIRPERSON: At a certain stage - and I'm asking you, did you receive a call from Johannesburg and you took the call, you came back to the garage and you tell you colleagues "Stop now, we are going to leave, there are problems in Johannesburg"? Did this happen?

MR COETZEE: It is possible, but I cannot remember the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Then he was left behind, still cuffed while you left him behind in the garage.

MR COETZEE: As I said before, Mr Chairperson, I was present the whole time, from when we arrived until we left.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was the time when he then realised that you changed his attitude towards him.

MR COETZEE: Our attitude was very positive towards him, although I said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, but Mr Coetzee, you couldn't have slapped him or assaulted him and still be positive.

MR COETZEE: I'm talking about conflict areas or points.

CHAIRPERSON: The fact that he was assaulted is conflict in itself. The point is that on the sixth day he declared that you received a call, you spoke to your colleagues and everybody left the garage. He was still cuffed. You went to the main house, when you returned your attitude was different, it had changed and according to him you smiled at him, then the cuffs were taken off. This is what he says in his statement. I'm asking if this is how it happened.

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, because he wrote every day, how can he write with cuffs on?

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe you do not understand me correctly. I'm talking about the sixth day. On the sixth day he said concerning his detention, the day on which he was slapped or assaulted, at a certain time in that day you received a call and you dealt with it, you came back, you then went to the main house, when you returned your whole attitude was different towards him, you smiled at him and he was uncuffed. Do you say that this is how it happened, or that it didn't happen this way?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, he was first uncuffed when I returned to Johannesburg, when we left Rustenburg. That is what I can remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it fits in with the statement, but is it true that on the sixth day, it seems to me that because of the call that you received, that your whole attitude towards him changed and that he was not assaulted anymore or not cuffed anymore? Is that how it happened or not?

MR COETZEE: It can be so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you.

There is also a suggestion that was made by Mr Lengene that this call had to do with a report that was on the radio concerning his abduction out of Botswana and that that was the reason why you then changed your attitude towards him. That was on the sixth day. What do you say about that?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember it, but I know that before the so-called sixth day there were various reports in the media concerning his alleged abduction.

MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius can tell us more about this, but according to your recollection, from when was it known that he disappeared from Botswana?

MR COETZEE: If I'm correct, it was that Monday.

MR VISSER: After the Saturday?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene also said with reference to the visit to Pretoria, where he spoke to Mr Hershveld, he indicated that at that stage his comrades in Botswana were fond guilty in Botswana and were sentenced to 11 years concerning the activities around vehicle theft, what do you say to that?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I was not present in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: ... aware of that Mr Coetzee. He says that during his visit to Pretoria, his comrades had already been sentenced in Botswana, do you know anything of that?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge, I cannot remember this aspect or comment on it.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene also says that he suffered a lot in the Republic of South Africa, do you agree with this?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you provide him with a house and transport and his needs in general?

MR COETZEE: Yes, his career testifies to it.

MR VISSER: He then lastly talks about an incident, on paragraph 42, page 62, where his vehicle broke down and that he was without a vehicle for three months because you did not want to help him with the vehicle. What do you say about that?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, if I can recall correctly, shortly after his arrival and after he started working in Soweto, he was involved in two accidents with two new State vehicles and that he was under the influence of alcohol and that was why I did not want to provide him with another vehicle for that specific period of time.

MR VISSER: How long was Mr Lengene a policeman until he died?

MR COETZEE: Up until - approximately 16 years, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did he take part in actions of the Security Branch?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, Col Pretorius will be able to testify about it because he was his primary handler at a later stage.

MR VISSER: And was he a valued member by you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have not further questions to this - oh, I see that it's five past eleven, Mr Chairman, perhaps if you wish to take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you finished?

MR VISSER: I'm finished with this witness.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a short tea adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

W H COETZEE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(no recording) with the facts that you withheld the abduction.

MR COETZEE: For everything, Chairperson, within the context of this incident.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER HEYDE: Very well. Once again I want to take you very briefly to the abduction. You stated that there was a possibility and you were aware that Mr Lengene wanted to cooperate with you to a certain extent and that during his stay in Botswana, he had already disclosed certain information to you via an informer and that this led to the arrest of a person, Messrs Seahlolo and a Mr Masemola. Wasn't he valuable to you in Botswana, why did you want to abduct him from there?

MR COETZEE: There were various objectives which we sought to achieve with his abduction and one of them was that as a Commander of a military unit, we wanted to destroy the military unit and also combat the violent onslaught from the organisation. That was the primary objective with his recruitment.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In other words, were you of the opinion that he would be more valuable to you in South Africa than in Botswana?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Could you tell us who the informer was, the intermediary between you ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: How is that relevant to any interest that the victims might have, Chairperson, with great respect? We've gone through these arguments so many times ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, let the witness say if he doesn't want to, and say why he doesn't want to give the name. There may be a reason why Mr van der Heyde finds it relevant. I don't want to interfere with his questioning unnecessarily. He's a qualified Advocate and he would know whether it's relevant or not.

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, it may cause certain discomfort for the person and/or his family members.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any specific reason why you need to know the name?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: It is my instruction from my clients that they would like to know the name of the intermediary.

CHAIRPERSON: Will it be put to the witness at the end of the day that Mr Lengene was not an informer or did not have such activities?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: That is the understanding that I have with my clients, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it then be correct that you want to determine whether or not the existence of this informer is true? Because if it will be put to him that Mr Lengene was not an informer or did not interfere with such activities, then the fact that the witness states that there was an informer who contended that, is something that you would like to contest.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Chairperson, my clients is of the opinion is of the opinion that the whole reason why the applicant has spoken of the reason why they wanted to abduct him for his cooperation, was in fact not the actual reason and that according to them the informer never provided information via Mr Lengene and that if we could establish the name of this person, it would be important to see whether or not we could call him as a witness, so that he can come and tell us exactly what happened. If such a person would be available, then we would apply for the subpoena of such a person to the TRC.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you have to say about this, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the original Amnesty Committee already in 1997, make a ruling that informants, the identity of informants should not ordinarily be disclosed. That's the first thing. The second - yes, that was a ruling of Chairman, Justice Mall, at the time and that ruling ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of it, but what do you say in view of the extraordinary, the possible extraordinary circumstances, where they say "Look, the allegation that Mr Lengene involved himself in activities akin to informants, is being questioned" and they are contemplating, the families, of calling this informant, alleged informant, to come and say exactly what happened. That amounts to extraordinary circumstances, that possibility. What ...

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, my reply to you is the following. In a matter in which Mr Malan was a member of the Panel that was heard in Natal, under the Chairmanship of Justice Wilson, a so-called extraordinary circumstance also appeared on the facts and the facts there were that the two informants that went into Swaziland ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, there's no decision out on that, so I don't think it will take us any further.

MR VISSER: I know that, I know that, Chairperson. The two informers there were co-perpetrators and in that matter - and if you wish me to do so, I'll do so again here, I collected authorities, both ancient and modern to show one thing, and that is that there is a rule that the identity of an informer will be protected unless it is against contra bonos mores not to do so. And Chairperson, throughout, and I've got the authorities and comes argument stage we can argue that, it is quite clear that both in statutory law, in the Criminal Procedure Act the provision is made, as well as in our positive law, that under no circumstances will the identity of an informer be disclosed.

CHAIRPERSON: You are incorrect, it doesn't state "under no circumstances".

MR VISSER: I'm busy saying, Chairperson, barring some notable exceptions. The one is where the identity of an informer can lead to proving the innocent of an accused, where the identity of an informer can be instrumental in proving the innocence of an accused. That's an exception. It all comes down to what public policy is. The issue is public policy. Public policy plays no role here. My learned friend seems to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR VISSER: Well he seems to suggest that Coetzee's evidence that Lengene started cooperating is untrue, he therefore wants to know who the informer is, what has public policy got to do with this? There's no public, no principle of public policy is involved, it's an issue of credibility, at most.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to mull this thing over in my mind. Here is an offence for which amnesty is being applied for, notably one of them is kidnapping, it makes it worse that it was kidnapping from a foreign country. To me, on the face of it, straight, involved public policy. But let's not hone in on that. The nature of this type of investigation and this inquiry, it's the job of the Commission is to as far as possible, see to it that the truth of the matter be disclosed publicly. If the facts which we are trying to establish here involves other than what the applicant has now told us and there's reason to believe that there may be a possibility of another type of version coming out and this version can only come before this Panel through a particular person who is privy to this knowledge, certainly that person should be - or it should be considered to call that witness.

Your argument on that score I imagine would be that no, while that my be correct, here we have this person in a special situation and position, that he happened to be an informant and informants have a special place in the justice system where they are mostly protected from identity for reasons or public policy. I agree with that. But we've got to weigh that public interest against the obvious public interest in this Commission, and isn't that the issue that we must grapple with?

MR VISSER: Part of the public policy that you must consider, Chairperson, and what has been considered in all the other authorities that I referred to, is the safety and wellbeing of the informer. And it has been shown through history, through that what happens to informers during wars and after that, is that they are affected adversely if their identities are know, them as well as their families.

Now the balancing act which one has to do, is to ask yourself what is the interest of the victims here to know the identity? They say they might want to call him as a witness, who says that he is ever going to be prepared to appear as a witness? But leave that aside, Chairperson, we've already had the situation of two informers in Durban, that's why I referred to it, who refused point blank to participate in any of the proceedings.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll tell you something, if I have reason that an informant can throw light onto the truth of an application, I will subpoena him.

MR VISSER: That's not the test, Chairperson, what happens then. But the point is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: But even at the risk of the life of an informer, Chairperson. That is where public policy comes into the matter. But Chairperson, it seems that we're going to have to argue this matter in full. If you'll allow me ten minutes, I will set myself up and we can argue ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... continue with the cross-examination. Let me think about that issue as well.

MR VISSER: Mr Malan might or might not have the written argument which ...

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION

MR MALAN: Mr van der Heyde, before you continue, I don't know whether you will come to this because you are requesting the name of the identity, I want to ask Mr Coetzee whether the name George Khoza rings a bell.

Do you know such a person?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you read the affidavit of Mr Lengene?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: His reference to George Khoza, does that make any sense to you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did Lengene have contact with George Khoza after he was recruited?

MR COETZEE: One of the persons, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: After he was recruited?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Because he states in his affidavit that he determined that Khoza was actually a South African citizen.

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible, Chair. Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was he the intermediary?

MR COETZEE: He was one of them.

MR MALAN: Mr Coetzee, your evidence was that the recruitment discussions was conducted via an intermediary, not various intermediaries.

MR COETZEE: What I meant in that context is that various persons were directly and indirectly involved in the monitoring action.

MR MALAN: The weapons which Mr Khoza gave to Mr Lengene, according to Lengene's affidavit, does this balance with your information?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Are those the weapons that you made available to him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Then the question arises once again, Mr Coetzee, the person whose identity we are discussing, isn't it commonly known that it was George Khoza?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr van der Heyde, then we have clarified that.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Coetzee, when you went to arrest Mr Lengene in Botswana, the evidence is that you bound his hands and legs when you seized him there. You stated that there was a measure of resistance from him at that stage.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have counted swiftly, you were at least seven persons who seized him there, was it really necessary to bind his hands and feet and to force alcohol down his throat? Was it necessary to do all these things?

MR VISSER: There is no evidence from this witness, Mr Chairman, that liquor was poured down his throat.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you manage to get him to consume the liquor?

MR COETZEE: We forced him to drink it with his hands.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they bound?

MR COETZEE: Not yet at that stage, Chairperson. After all these years I cannot recall exactly when he was bound and when he drank the liquor. I know that I made him drink there in the house after we took over and it was part of the phase during which I had to assume control of the situation and bring him back.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us take it step for step. He was lured out at that house and when the lights went on, he was seized by your men, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, upon approach, if I recall correctly. It is very difficult.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your evidence, was it necessary for you upon first meeting the man, to immediately get him under control, to cuff his hands and to bind his legs?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. Yes, Chairperson.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: And once you had managed to gain control over him to such an extent, for some other reason that you found feasible, he had to be fed liquor, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, the liquor was in his body after he was bound.

MR COETZEE: It is possible, Chairperson, however today I cannot recall when the liquor was administered, but that he consumed the liquor is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Then it was asked of you why it was necessary to force him to drink the liquor and an objection was raised. Then I asked how this took place and you said that you administered this liquor to him, but he had to drink it with his hands, and this is what I don't understand, his hands were cuffed.

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it is still possible if one's hands are cuffed, to hold something and to drink something.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying therefore that his hands were cuffed on the front of his body?

MR COETZEE: Please repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that his hands were bound at the front of his body?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, I cannot recall precisely how we cuffed him at that stage, but I believe and a I assume that his hands were bound in the front of his body.

CHAIRPERSON: In light of the fact that your recollection is not clear, isn't it possible that the liquor was forced down his throat?

MR COETZEE: That possibility exists, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Coetzee, did Mr Lengene loose consciousness at a certain stage due to the forced consumption of this liquor?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall that, I cannot recall that he lost consciousness at any point. I would have noticed this immediately, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In light of your poor recollection, isn't it possible?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did you then leave him, or load him into the vehicle in order to bring him over the border to South Africa?

MR COETZEE: Yes, we departed shortly thereafter.

R VAN DER HEYDE: Where in the vehicle was he?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall at that stage, I think that he was with us in the vehicle. I recall that we made use of a Ford Station Wagon, a Ford Cortina Station Wagon. I'm not completely certain of the facts.

CHAIRPERSON: You agreed that he was in the boot. It was in his affidavit, it was an XR6, a blue vehicle and he was in the boot and you agreed with this evidence.

MR COETZEE: That XR6 was not in Botswana, Chairperson, the blue XR6 was in the RSA, or at least on the RSA side of the border. We crossed the border fence by foot.

CHAIRPERSON: He said that when he became conscious ... Continue please.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did I understand you correctly when you said that while you were on your way on the South African border's side, on the way to Rustenburg he tried to escape?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. Yes, Mr Chairperson, with our arrival in Swartruggens, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr van der Heyde, I think in the statement of Mr Lengene, he does refer to it himself.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Was it the same day when you were in Swartruggens that you arrived in Rustenburg, or was it the next day?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: When he tried to escape you said that you ran, you tackled him and you fell on the tar road.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Were you the only person who tackled him?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did you just tackle him or did you also assault him in any other way to get him under control?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible that I would have assaulted him there or slapped him a few times.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How could he have

CHAIRPERSON: How could he have run if he was tied?

MR COETZEE: His feet, if I can remember correctly, were in leg cuffs and there's a chain between the two legs and you can move, because he got out very quickly out of the vehicle. He was a few feet from the vehicle itself.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How long after this incident took place did you take him to the doctor to receive treatment for his injuries after you'd tackled him?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember, Mr Chairperson. What I can confirm is that with our return to Johannesburg.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In other words it was after the few days that you had him in the garage that you took him to the doctor?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Why do you then think it important to take him to the doctor, because it's been a few days since he's been tackled and he had these injuries? Why would it then be necessary now to take him to the doctor? I assume that his injuries were of such a nature that you had to take him to a doctor, you would have done it earlier on.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, from my point of view he was taken to the doctor at that stage for a full medical checkup. Our agents from abroad were taken to doctors for medical checkups in order to final out what the health of that person was and after the recruitment stage to take this informant to the doctor is a proof that we were on our way to work together, on the road of cooperation. We had to clarify his medical situation first.

CHAIRPERSON: To take him to the doctor was not for the doctor to look at his injuries, but it was more a general visit, Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was more a general visit to the doctor.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Lengene in his statement said that when he was in the garage of your father-in-law, he was assaulted, he was electrocuted, he was hit with a hosepipe and at one stage a pliers was used to injure his private parts in order to force him to make information known to you. Do I understand you correctly to say that you deny all of it?

MR COETZEE: I deny that at any stage, that I'm aware of, and I was there whole time and I was the person who assaulted or slapped him the most, that we used electrical appliances to electrocute him, a hosepipe or the pliers.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: The pliers on his private parts?

MR COETZEE: I've already mentioned, Mr Chairperson, that I don't carry any knowledge of such an incident that took place there.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Chairperson, we will call Mr Lengene's wife as a witness and she will testify about parts of his body that were so deformed that he was not able to have children after that. If you can just give me a moment.

Mr Coetzee, can you tell me, was Mr lengene fearful from when he was abducted in Botswana and while you interrogated him here in South Africa, and also afterwards? Was there a sword above his head that if he did not cooperate, it will be to his detriment and that his family will suffer because of this? Am I correct in this?

MR COETZEE: No negative, then he wouldn't have, at a later stage, requested that we must also appoint his brother.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Are you aware of the fact that Mr Lengene in his community was seen as a traitor after he was with you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You see it's my instructions from my client that the whole reason why she is here is not because she's got any problems with the fact that you had political motives, but the fact that she wants to clear his name in the community. She says that the whole community call them traitors, they were not welcome in the community anymore and up till today she cannot lift up her head in this community because Mr Lengene was abducted and then was incorporated into the South African Police. She would like to clear his name. She is also further of the opinion that he decided to join you out of fear for his family and for himself and that he joined the police for that reason.

MR COETZEE: I do not agree with that because he had a career, a future, he had the freedom of movement and I think in the beginning it was difficult for him, I think Col Heystek can testify about this, because we managed it and we dealt with it and we also mentioned it in our application that we accommodated him in a different place and that he was a very important topic at that stage. But the case, Peter Lengene, was forgotten and in my opinion he had a normal life and he could move around in the community.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr van der Heyde.

Mr Coetzee, the father of Lengene who was the Mayor in Soweto, is that same man?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you know him?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But he was Mayor under the old order.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But it was said, or the questions put to you is that he had to stay on at the police because he feared for the safety for his family. Do you know if his father or mother were under any pressure from the police?

MR COETZEE: Under no pressure from the police, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Some of his other family members?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you know his wife?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I think at a later stage, I do not know if it was a year or two after he joined, she joined him. And can I just come back to the previous question. After 1982 and 1989 I met his brother for the first time, only then at that late stage, and it shows that I did not know the people, but like Col Heystek will testify, it was his mother and sister.

MR MALAN: We will then hear what the nature was of the pressure that was placed upon the family. Thank you.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Coetzee, you said that Mr Lengene was an informant also in Botswana and that he provided you with information that led to the arrest of certain people in South Africa. Was he paid for this? Or are you aware of something like this?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he was paid?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How did you pay him?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember, Mr Chairperson, there was a phase where he worked as a normal informant and then he became a full member of the Force and I cannot remember if it was in cash or a treasure order, but I believe that there were cash amounts paid out to him.

MR MALAN: I do not know if I understand you correctly, your answer means that he was paid first of all as an informant and then later as a member of the Force? I understood the question as before the abduction. Before the abduction, when you received information through the go-between, was he paid at all then? Is that what you meant?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Yes.

MR COETZEE: I beg your pardon, he was never paid beforehand.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions at this stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER HEYDE

MR VISSER: I have no re-examination.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER

MR MALAN: I have a few questions and this one is, why would you abduct the person if you could get the information while he was in the structures on the other side? If you can maybe just answer that question, maybe you can try and answer it again.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. If you look at the history of SAYRCO at that stage and if you look at the amount of members who were trained at that stage and if you look at who trained them and if you look at the problems that they had to get funding and if you look at the aspect that they were planning to infiltrate the ANC and to tap their DLBs, they had to have a trustworthiness in order to target or - Soweto was the target of it, and I think they had certain problems according to my opinion, and that contributed to the fact that at that stage we had to bring him back in such way to South Africa. To remove him from TSU was my personal priority, knowing that he was the man with the power, he was controlling the military leg of it and to bring him back with the following arrest and the actions of the Botswana Police, with those that were left, we succeeded in our goal. And I think in the next year or two we withdrew all our agents.

MR MALAN: Well if your information was that he was willing to become an informant and to cooperate with you - and I think your evidence said that you went over once or twice but you could not organise or arrange for a meeting and you feared that he would be - the fact that they may get to know that you were corresponding with him, did you just go over and try to see him?

MR COETZEE: Let me put it this way, there were various other agents, we regularly dealt with cross-border actions and it was dealt within those actions when this aspect became part of it.

MR MALAN: So while you were there you just tried to make contact with him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, we did make contact with specific persons, but specific appointments were also made but they were not realised, and that was with the go-between and the informant.

MR MALAN: Was this done through Khoza?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: When these appointments did not realise and your information was that Lengene wants to become an agent, because this is how I understood you.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Why didn't you ask that they must just cross the border and come and see you on this side, so that you can finalise this thing?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I would like to refer to one aspect. These people from the various organisations were monitored on a regular basis by their members, and if I can put it this way, they are very careful with their contact with maybe the wrong person, that can maybe be to their detriment at the end of the day. There was a suggestion and it was well known, that the South African security community had various informants there and it created that psychosis of fear. This is how I see it, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was the obvious option then not to make an appointment through Khoza, that you will stage an abduction?

MR COETZEE: That could have worked, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But I want to know. If you want him to cooperate, why do you abduct him if you know that he wants to cooperate, why don't you just arrange that he'll come over and just stage the abduction? The question is, if you know that he wants to cooperate, why do you do it in such a clandestine way, why do you abduct him, why don't you look for a way to bring him out of his situation?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, as I said, I approached this recruitment in such a way that I can have immediate control and if there's damage done to this person, to rectify it immediately, and that's what I did in the following few years and that is how I approached my operation at that stage. I thought, get control, bring him back and we will build on that and that was my goal. He did not know what my goal was at that stage, in terms of the recruitment.

MR MALAN: The third question - it doesn't sound like the third question, but it's the third aspect. If you abducted him and you've got him in Rustenburg and he refused to cooperate, what would have happened? Did you ever consider this?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I was never in discussion with what the alternative would have been, I had to manage the problem and solve it.

CHAIRPERSON: What would you have done?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, there were two ways to deal with it, give him back to Botswana, or I would have killed the person.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would you have killed him?

MR COETZEE: The lives that he would have put in danger because of the range of agents that we had.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the point that Mr Malan tried to find out from you. If you had asked him to become an informant and he then said no, what would you have said?

MR COETZEE: Can you just repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: If he was approached in Botswana to become a full informer in South Africa and at that stage he refused to do it, what would you have done?

MR COETZEE: Then I would have withdrawn.

CHAIRPERSON: And not taken it further?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all, but I would have taken it further with agents by monitoring their actions.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

ADV SIGODI: After you had abducted him and brought him back into the country, of what use was he to you, given his circumstances?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, may I just have the opportunity. I am ready, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Of what value was he to you after he was brought back to South Africa and he was cooperating?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, he was of immeasurable value, he became part of the Police Intelligence Units. He was involved with the training and handling of various agents. He was also involved in the later in-place recruitment under similar circumstances of people such as him. He was part of the management of the Soweto Intelligence Units operational programme.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have asked you this previously, but just to follow up, wouldn't he have been more valuable as an agent if you sent him back to Botswana and placed him in the same place, so that he could extract this information from the heart of the military wing and disclose it to you?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as I have just referred to it, at that stage the organisation was in its infant stages and they were only just beginning to establish their military wing and they had quite a number of problems in doing so. We had already arrested two of the prominent figures in the structure in the RSA. If you recruited a person like that, he would be more valuable in South Africa than abroad, because SAYRCO died a very quiet death shortly thereafter.

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage he was the head of their military wing, as I have understood your evidence.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then who better to provide information for you? That was not the objective when he was abducted, the objective was not to keep him here, he had to become a full informer with you in terms of the situation in Botswana. That is how I have understood your evidence.

MR COETZEE: Our objective was to paralyse the entire military wing. After Lengene there were numerous other arrests, among others, within a week and a half, the Political Commissar. We succeeded in paralysing the entire military wing and then afterwards we also withdrew our military agents and tasked them in terms of the relevant military structures.

ADV SIGODI: Do you have any idea how many people were involved in SAYRCO?

MR COETZEE: Today I cannot recall the numbers. There was a reasonable number, but there were also many who defected and adversely affected the organisation.

ADV SIGODI: Who was the leader of this organisation?

MR COETZEE: Cheche Mashinini. However, I cannot recall all the managerial members.

ADV SIGODI: And is there any information besides the assistance which he gave when he was inside, but was he able to give you information on what was happening outside in Botswana?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, Col Heystek will give evidence shortly regarding where they were present, pertaining to a visit from the Botswana Commission of Police, where information was exchanged.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had asked him properly to become an informer and if he had agreed, were there any methods at your disposal by means of which you could test him, without having to assault him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yet regardless, you decided to abduct and assault him for a week until you decided that you were satisfied that he could be a reliable agent, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now during the week when he was assaulted, was he interrogated or was he merely assaulted?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, he placed his entire input since his days in Soweto in 1976, on document for us. He was a learned man, he was very good at English and he himself could process his input with interrogation from time to time regarding the various inputs given by him.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose with this?

MR COETZEE: The purpose was to process and use all this information eventually, that was the reason why we brought him back to the RSA.

CHAIRPERSON: How was he persuaded to become an informer, because for me at this stage, it sounds as if it was merely interrogation. He does not make any mention of the fact that he was asked to become an informer, he says that he was interrogated.

MR COETZEE: I cannot comment on that, Chairperson, but that's my version.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that. You have testified that he was interrogated regarding his history from 1976 onwards and that this was documented and that you assisted him with certain questions. Now at which stage and in which manner was he persuaded to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: It was a continuous process from the time in Rustenburg. Recruitment is not a one day process.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that.

MR COETZEE: It has to take place over a period of time, during which persons find one another and establish a relationship of trust with one another.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I must say that I am stupefied to discover that assault could lead to reliability or confidence between people. I don't know, I've heard of many divorces which produced the opposite affect, but in either event, that is your evidence.

MR MALAN: I don't know whether or not we have become confused as a result of semantics, you wanted him to be an informer via the intermediary initially, and in fact he did act as an informer of sorts, via the intermediary.

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR MALAN: And after you abducted him with the purpose of having him in South Africa and not replacing him in Botswana, by nature of the situation he would not have been an informer, he would have been an agent, why do you keep on referring to an informer? Because after that you appointed him as a policeman.

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So after the abduction there was no way in which he could have been an agent, unless you had placed him in Botswana again.

MR COETZEE: Yes, one could put it that way.

MR MALAN: That he could be an informer, unless you had placed him once again in Botswana, he may have been a local informer, but then he would have had to get other work.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Well then I don't know whether it is this that confuses me. If I've understood you correctly, your evidence is that you removed from Botswana in the first place, in order to accomplish the collapse of TSU, because he was the pivotal figure in TSU according to you and according to his affidavit he was the Secretary. Secondly, when you removed him it was less important how you would use him than how you would use his information and that is why you made all the statements. After that you told him that you wanted him to become an agent or an informer of yours, that you wanted to appoint him in service.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, that was the route that we presented for him with us.

MR MALAN: You see because in paragraph 35 he refers, this is page 59 of the documents, he refers to the fact that you spoke to him, that Matheus and Pretorius also spoke to him and that Heystek also told him that the Botswana Government wanted him, that his cohorts had already been arrested and sentenced and you presented to him the opportunity to be free in South Africa and to work for you. So his perception was that he had been abducted and that a job was being offered to him, he would be removed from the structure and have the opportunity to rehabilitate. So in the experience of the Amnesty Committee it would appear as if his perception was closer to the perception of an askari or a policeman, but definitely not that of an informer in the traditional sense of the word.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson. If I may bring it all together, I could say that we created a future for him in the Force.

MR MALAN: Yes, but you ruined another future for him, and we won't discuss that now. I beg your pardon, Chairperson, for my choice of words. But the point is simply that we have discussed the fact that you wanted to use him as an informer and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's the truth ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR COETZEE: I agree with what the Chairperson has said.

MR MALAN: But I want to know why you keep on referring to him as an informer, because he could not have been an informer in the sense that he would continue to provide the information that he formally provided because he would no longer be in Botswana. He couldn't really be an informer here because he wasn't locally familiar with what was going on. At the very best he could become an agent or an askari or a policeman, which he indeed became.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't it your intention to make him a policeman? Is that correct?

MR COETZEE: All such cases in which I was involved ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Was that your objective?

MR COETZEE: Among others, yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why didn't you say so?

MR COETZEE: Because, Chairperson, I deal with that phase from 1982 onwards, that's why I refer to him from time to time as an informer. I suppose that later I should have begun to refer to him as a member of the Force with a relevant rank.

MR MALAN: Very well, Mr Coetzee. I must just tell you that it was extremely difficult for me to listen to this after having read a lengthy affidavit and one cannot really interrupt you because then you lose the thread of everything and you cannot hear what our questions are. So it has definitely complicated the process, but it would appear to me now as if - and I have gathered this from the examination during which I feel that you testified freely, from this we understand that George Khoza was the informer through which Lengene conveyed information to you. Let me just summarise.

He felt that he wanted to return to South Africa to cooperate and to bring an end to his own exile and that on the basis thereof, you abducted him with the intention of turning him formally, as it was referred to in the Security Division, but actually you wanted to recruit him as some or other form of a conspirator in the Security Force, an askari or a policeman or something like that, because hew as very valuable to you. And based upon a question put by the Chairperson, you say that you would have killed him if you could not have replaced him in Botswana. Why then did you always refer to him as someone that you wanted to determine as suitable for being an informer? That's my last question.

MR COETZEE: I must have made an error in that regard, because I referred to an informer, but one always had to process and analyse the information given by an informer. With regard to the recruitment of an informer there would be a phase where one deals with information and gives the candidate certain tasks and without his knowledge there would be others who would also be tasked with the same aspects, so that you could measure up the credibility of the candidate. I agree with what you have said.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Chair.

WITNESS EXCUSED

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is Mr Anton Pretorius. His application is to be found at page 25 to 47 and he deals with this incident at page 34 of the bundle.