Amnesty Hearings

RECORDING STARTS IN THE MIDDLE OF MR DEHAL'S ADDRESS

MR DEHAL ADDRESSES: Originally his evidence was contained within the Human Rights Violations Health Sector Hearings, and at the pre-trial hearings, Mr Malan who chaired the hearings, indicated in my view correctly that the evidence contained within those hearings were not sufficiently categorised into pigeonhole applications, thus making it necessary for us to have formulated what has now been handed to us all and which I presume is Exhibit A.

Mr Chairperson, that would be the evidence as contained in Annexure A and may the applicant then be sworn in so we can proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we carry on, what's the application for, or about?

MR DEHAL: Mr Chairperson, it's about a host of incidents that occurred in South Africa and South West Africa and Namibia, Angola as well, in regard to the applicant's role-play as a member of the then SADF, as a Medic within the ambit of the SADF, his training within South Africa, the various crimes perpetrated as contained in Annexure A on page 2 ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Dehal, sorry for interrupting you, you're referring to an Annexure A, are you referring to Annexure A at the moment or are you referring to the supplementary statement?

MR DEHAL: Thank you. I'm referring to this document which we entitle "Supplementary Affidavit" which I've given to Mr Steenkamp ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, we have that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on with that, where has he made an application before the closing date? Or what has he made application for before the closing date?

MR DEHAL: Mr Chairperson, I can only take you through the bundle that we have, on pages 1 to 12, you will see that in the bundle 1 to 12, he's actually been far from detailed, he annexes to the application proper, pages 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which deal in what he calls "A Statement of Shaun Mark Callaghan", with the incidents and the various counts.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, you are his representative, that's why I'm asking you what is he applying for, amnesty in respect of what?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir. He seeks amnesty for his involvement at Katlehong Hospital, in regard to human rights violations there where he treated a number of black patients, possibly incorrectly and caused their deaths as well, in the execution of his training.

CHAIRPERSON: Where in the application does he refer to that?

MR DEHAL: Sorry, may I just go through the papers, I'll trace that. Thank you Mr Chair, I'm indebted to you. On page 8 in the first paragraph of the annexure to his application for amnesty, he refers to his service under the SA Medical Services and his basic training in Potchefstroom and Operational Medical Orderlies training in Pretoria. He says this took nine months and he deals with that briefly there. It is more fully dealt with in the subsequent document that we've handed in. It is also dealt with in his evidence before the Health Sector Hearings, on page - I don't know if we have copies of that, sorry, I have a copy for myself, his evidence begins on page 18 of the transcript that I've loaded down from the Internet, and on the last paragraph thereof ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, you've told me absolutely nothing thusfar, all I'm asking is what crimes did he commit for which he is applying for amnesty? Murder, attempted murder, fraud or whatever?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, thanks for clarifying, forgive me for that. In the first two incidents he deals with the murder and attempted murder ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Dehal with respect, the first incident that you list has got nothing to do with murder or attempted murder, that's a reference to a training at Tembisa and Katlehong.

MR DEHAL: Yes except, with respect Mr Malan, if you hear the evidence you will hear that Mr Callaghan was not trained enough to treat these people, but asked to train on these blacks and that many of them had died.

MR MALAN: Your response was that in the first two incidents, Mr Callaghan is applying for murder and attempted murder, now where in the first incident which is now listed on page 2 of the supplementary affidavit, and incidentally it's simply a statement, it's not an affidavit, not according to the document before me, there is no reference whatsoever to any attempt even for murder, it simply lists training on black civilian patients.

The second incident refers to his treatment of an Angolan woman referred to him by the International Red Cross. So where do you find a reference to murder or attempted murder in any of these two incidents as put before us?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Mr Malan. Sir, it was intended that this statement which you rightly point out is not an affidavit, forgive me, the word affidavit is incorrect, it's a statement, it was intended to be a précis, that when Mr Callaghan testifies he will deal more fully with the incidents and from my consultation with him, especially what Ms Mohamed tells me, is that on the first incident there were people who died, there were people who died at his hands and there were people who possibly died. Sorry, I see that Mr Callaghan wants to confer with me, could I?

MR MALAN: Mr Dehal, you were secondly asked, initially by the Chairperson, what incidents is he applying for that he dealt with in his original amnesty application. I do not see any reference in the original application to his practising on black civilian patients, let alone attempted murder or murder. Could you just list us what he really is applying for, as you have it.

MR CALLAGHAN: May I intervene at this point?

MR DEHAL: Sorry, I apologise for that. Could I confer with him, I think there's something he wants to tell me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, I'm going to give you a chance to confer with him. All I'm pointing out to you is that you are his representative, I assume that you would know what he's applying for. That is the nature of this application, this hearing and I need to know when we start to hear the evidence, exactly what he says he committed and to place that within the context of the Act, in order to determine whether he should get amnesty or not. I can't do so if I don't know what he's applying for. Now without wanting to go into the ethical part of this, I'm going to adjourn. For how long do you need to ...

MR DEHAL: Five minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: I hope those who criticise us for wasting public funds will realise it's not our fault.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Dehal.

MR DEHAL: Thank you. Mr Chairperson and Honourable Members, I'm indebted to you for the time afforded me, in fact it has assisted substantially. The applicant seeks amnesty for most of the incidents, a few of them to be excluded and I'll take you through his statement that I've handed in, in regard to which paragraphs get excluded. The remaining paragraphs deal with crimes of attempted murder, murder, assault and GBH in the main.

In the statement on page 2 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Which statement?

MR DEHAL: Sorry, the statement that I handed in which Mr Steenkamp circularised. Do you have that, Judge?

CHAIRPERSON: Are we talking about a document referred to as a supplementary affidavit? Let's make that Exhibit A.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you say on page 2 thereof?

MR DEHAL: Yes, Judge. May I continue? On page 2, the paragraph, enumerated paragraph 10 is to be deleted. The reference to persons having died does not relate directly to this applicant and he therefore will cause that paragraph to be deleted. He doesn't seek amnesty on that score.

On paragraph 12 he persists in his application for amnesty on that aspect, enumerated (i), there the crime is attempted murder. He says however, that the lady in that matter, on that incident has possibly died and since he does not know he cannot talk about murder, but at level, at best it's attempted murder.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's just stop there now. Did this incident occur in Angola? Now whatever he did there in Angola, would that have been done in the interests of the political aspirations of South Africa, no matter which side of the political spectrum one would fall?

MR DEHAL: He says yes.

MR MALAN: Sorry, Chairperson. Mr Dehal, before we go further, is that Angola or is it Namibia? Is Anjiva not in Namibia? Is that Angola?

MR DEHAL: ...(inaudible)

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: He says it was done in the interests of the South African interest on one of the sides of the political spectrum?

MR DEHAL: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, let's go on then. ...(inaudible)

MR DEHAL: Yes, indeed. Mr Chair, the paragraph 12 has (ii) beneath that, on page 3, that is to be deleted, he does not persist on any application for amnesty in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 12(ii) appears on page 3, is that what you're saying?

MR DEHAL: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: And he's deleting that? Yes?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge. And then if you go onto page 4 of Annexure A, those words from the top which start with

"Part I played"

right up to paragraph 14, is to be deleted. There is nothing there for which he seeks amnesty.

Then that takes us to what is enumerated as paragraph 15, and entitled:

"The fourth incident for which amnesty is sought"

There he seeks amnesty and the crime there is murder, assault and GBH.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, lawyers tend to want to shorten their work, but there is a public that is interested in this matter, GBH means absolutely nothing to them, would you kindly tell us exactly what he's applying for there.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge, my apologies for that. He says that the person in this matter was interrogated and tortured and that electric shocks were used, and that level, grievous bodily harm, as a crime, was perpetrated and it was therefore not just common assault but assault with grievous bodily harm. That person died and therefore, murder.

CHAIRPERSON: Now here again I ask the question, the assault and murder on this person, was the deceased a member of SWAPO? It sounds like it, I'm just confirming it.

MR DEHAL: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Would the assault on that member have been in the interest of one of the political parties of South Africa?

MR DEHAL: So I'm told, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, we'll see if that is the case.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge.

That takes us to paragraph 16, the paragraph entitled:

"The fifth incident for which amnesty is sought"

Here the crime is murder.

And then we go to paragraph 17, at the bottom of page 4, which is entitled:

"The sixth incident for which amnesty is sought"

Here the offence is attempted murder, assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm. I am told that it may possibly be murder. Mr Callaghan tells me he does not know whether the person on this count had actually died or not, but he was seriously burnt as a result of boiling water having been thrown on his person.

Judge, we go to paragraph 18 and 19, if I may deal with them together because they are both to be deleted. These are the two paragraphs on page 5, paragraph 18, entitled:

"The seventh incident for which amnesty is sought"

and paragraph 19, entitled:

"The eighth incident for which amnesty is sought"

That leaves me with two incidents only. At the bottom of page 5, on paragraph 20, entitled:

"The ninth incident for which amnesty is sought"

The crime here is murder and attempted murder and assault.

If I may then proceed to page 6, on the paragraph enumerated 21 and entitled:

"The tenth incident for which amnesty is sought"

Here the crime is murder, attempted murder, assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm.

Those are all the incidents for which he seeks amnesty. Thank you, Judge.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Callaghan, what language would you prefer to use?

MR CALLAGHAN: English.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any objection to taking the oath?

SHAUN MARK CALLAGHAN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge.

Mr Callaghan, is it correct that the application for amnesty on pages 1 to 7 in the bundle, is an application that was formulated by yourself, signed by you on page 6 thereof, and is your application for amnesty, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: It is correct.

MR DEHAL: And is it correct that as ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Who completed this form?

MR CALLAGHAN: It's completed in my own writing.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you assisted?

MR CALLAGHAN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Now if you look at paragraph 9 on page 2, (i), you were asked there to list or to say what acts or omissions or offences you apply for amnesty. The response thereto, you indicate that the reader of your application should refer to the attached statement. Now the attached statement ought to make a reference to each of the offences for which you apply.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As you proceed, will you indicate on this attached statement, a reference to each of those offences for which you apply for amnesty? Yes?

MR DEHAL: May I proceed, Judge? Thank you.

Mr Callaghan, do you confirm the correctness of the statement which serves as an annexure to the application which the Chairperson has just dealt with, pages 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the bundle, and do you confirm that you had signed same as per page 12? As per the signature on page 12?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do.

MR DEHAL: And save for the deletions, Annexure A is a supplementary statement that you have formulated, categorising the various incidents for which you seek amnesty, do you confirm that as correct, as I said, save for those deletions?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do.

MR DEHAL: And you were present here and heard my submissions to this Panel in regard to each of those remaining incidents and the crimes related to each of them, do you confirm that those crimes read correctly with those incidents?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do.

MR DEHAL: Now may I take you to your statement, Annexure A. Before I begin, you were conscripted and trained as a South African Medica with the South African Medical Services within the ambit of the South African Defence Force, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, it is.

MR DEHAL: You began ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Were you trained as a doctor?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, as a Paramedic equivalent in the Military. I had no medical experience prior to my conscription.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

MR CALLAGHAN: I was in Potchefstroom from January through March of 1982, in which time I received basic training, not medical, and from April through October of '83, of '82, I was in Pretoria where I received lectures, training at Voortrekkerhoogte, practical nursing training at 1 Military Hospital and trauma training at Katlehong and Tembisa Hospitals.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

You were seventeen years old when you conscripted, when you joined the SADF, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: And you began your training at Potchefstroom, your training there was restricted to basics in military discipline.

MR CALLAGHAN: In Potchefstroom.

MR DEHAL: Yes. And thereafter you received six months training in Pretoria and this training consisted of lectures component dealing with, amongst other things, Pharmacology and Anatomy.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: This period also included practical nursing training at Military Hospital and practical trauma training at Tembisa and Katlehong Hospitals.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: The first incident that you have cited as an incident for which you seek amnesty, which is dealt with in Annexure A, on page 3, on the paragraph enumerated 12, is one associated with the crime of attempted murder and possibly murder as you say.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: Now before we begin to deal with this, is it correct that this incident marries in with your statement on page 8 of the bundle, in paragraph 7 thereof?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: Okay, can you tell this Committee please what happened on this incident.

MR CALLAGHAN

"At a stage during January/February '83 I was posted to Anjiva, it's about 50 kilometres inside Angola. At that stage it was a 32 Battalion and parabat base, just outside the town of Anjiva.

While there, the doctor who was in the base and myself ran a clinic just outside the base. At one stage, while running that clinic for the local population, the International Red Cross who were based in the nearby town of Anjiva, referred an Angolan woman to us. She had been diagnosed with breast cancer and they enquired whether it was possible for us to arrange for her transportation to South Africa for treatment, as they were unable to treat her in Anjiva.

The doctor and I made representations to the base Commander, for which we were severely reprimanded because we had spoken to the International Red Cross. It was made clear to us that any acknowledgement of this patient by ourselves would mean an acknowledgement of South African troops in Angola at that time.

Transportation and treatment was refused by the base Commander ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The Red Cross knew you were there and yet the officialdom of the Military refused to acknowledge it?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct. I can remember a television broadcast around that time, of Pik Botha saying that we were not in Angola. The reason that I seek amnesty is that I failed to disobey that order. I failed to do something that I should have done. I feel as I sit here today, that I should have done something. I'm not sure what I should have done, but I should have done something to help this woman who obviously would have died from her condition because she unable to receive ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What crime did you commit?

MR CALLAGHAN: The crime that I committed ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm talking about a crime, I'm not talking about moral crime.

MR CALLAGHAN: The crime that I committed was in failing to take the incident or the request further, I in a sense agreed with the base Commander and therefore it resulted in her death.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you agree with that?

MR CALLAGHAN: In my inaction I showed my agreement.

CHAIRPERSON: Now assuming that you did commit a crime by not taking the matter further and disobeying your authority, how did your inactiveness contribute in one way or the other to advancing the political agenda of anybody in South Africa?

MR CALLAGHAN: The Anjiva base was a forward staging Air Force facility for 32 Battalion activities in Southern Angola. The acknowledgement, I would guess, of those activities was being held as an open secret, I would guess is the best description, by the South African Government and by agreeing not to communicate this further was to enable that situation to continue.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

MR MALAN: Sorry, may I just ask on this point. You never saw this woman, according to your application, it was simply an enquiry by the Red Cross whether you could arrange for a woman diagnosed with breast cancer to be transported, I guess somewhere in South Africa, to attend to her?

MR CALLAGHAN: We're talking about 20 years ago, I seem to recall being approached by - while at the clinic outside the base, which is where the clinic was operating, I seem to recall being approached by an International Red Cross person with what would seem to have been the patient and requested whether arrangements could be made in the next couple of days for the transport of this person.

MR MALAN: Did they tell you that woman was the patient, or is it just a deduction that you're making?

MR CALLAGHAN: It's a deduction that I'm making through the veil of time.

MR MALAN: And the International Red Cross asked you - I just want to make sure about your evidence, asked you, you were approached personally, not the doctor that you worked with?

MR CALLAGHAN: We were approached as the two of us, as the two medical personnel at the base.

MR MALAN: And the International Red Cross asked you to transport an Angolan woman, diagnosed with breast cancer, somewhere to South Africa for treatment?

MR CALLAGHAN: Somewhere for treatment, yes, and it would seem that the obvious places to take that person would either have been to Namibia or to Angola, I mean or to South Africa.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

Mr Callaghan, we then go to page 4 of Annexure A, this is the incident entitled:

"The fourth incident for which amnesty is sought"

and in regard to which the crime of murder, assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm is dealt with. Is it correct that this is an incident which is dealt with in Annexure A, sorry, in your annexure to the application for amnesty on page 10 of the bundle, in paragraph 3 of that page?

MR CALLAGHAN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Sorry, have you moved on now to the next incident, Mr Dehal?

MR DEHAL: Yes, indeed.

MR MALAN: Well may I just ask, or maybe we should leave that for argument, I'm not so sure that the evidence given in any way relates to an attempted murder, but I'll leave that to you for argument.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

ADV SIGODI: Can I ask, does he know if this woman eventually died?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do not know whether this woman eventually died, however the request from International Red Cross to us would imply that she was serious and that they were unable to transport her for treatment and therefore failure to offer treatment or transport, would have resulted in her death, I am convinced.

ADV SIGODI: Did you intend for her to die? Was it your intention?

MR CALLAGHAN: It was not my intention for her to die, however in my inaction and in my passive agreement with my base Commander, I colluded towards that end.

CHAIRPERSON: At the time did you agree with your Commander, or did you just follow instructions?

MR CALLAGHAN: At the time I followed instruction.

CHAIRPERSON: So had it been within your power you would have assisted?

MR CALLAGHAN: I would have assisted had it been in my power.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Dehal?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

Mr Callaghan, we move onto the next incident, if you go to page 4 on Annexure A, do you see that this is an incident that deals with the two SWAPO members, these are the two SWAPO insurgents that were captured, tortured, and prisoners were then murdered by members of the Koevoet team?

CHAIRPERSON: When did you join Koevoet?

MR CALLAGHAN: I was a South African Defence Force Medic at the Oshakati base and out of the Oshakati base I was sent to Anjiva for a couple of months and then came back to the Oshakati base. At the end of my first six months term at Oshakati, I was then seconded to Koevoet to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When would that have been?

MR CALLAGHAN: That would have been in March/April of '83, and I remained there for a further six and a half months, until November '83.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

Mr Callaghan, just to recap, this incident is dealt with in the annexure to your application on page 10 of the bundle, in paragraph 3 from the top, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: Would you please tell this Panel about this incident.

MR CALLAGHAN

"While on patrol with Zulu India, one of the Koevoet teams that I was deployed with, two SWAPO insurgents were captured at the beginning of the week. The way that Koevoet teams operated was they spent a week on patrol and a week back in camp, usually deployed on a Wednesday, so this would have been Thursday/Friday that the SWAPO insurgents were captured.

They were immediately reported as killed in action by the Unit Commander, which enabled the team to interrogate these two SWAPO members for the rest of the week. This interrogation led to information which resulted in the discovery of arms caches and other SWAPO members.

These two SWAPO prisoners ..."

...(intervention)

MR DEHAL: Slowly please.

CHAIRPERSON: Right.

MR CALLAGHAN

"These two SWAPO members were then murdered at the end of the week ..."

CHAIRPERSON: That was going to eventuate in any case, 'cause you couldn't, or your Commander couldn't then go back and say, "No, well these people weren't killed in action."

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly, that was the ultimate end-game of the report of the beginning of the week.

CHAIRPERSON: So the report was just premature?

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly. The report was made with the full intention of murdering those two.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you feel about that?

MR CALLAGHAN: At the time I was caught in the middle of a conflict in which I was participating, in which my death was weighed up against the death of others, and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean by that?

MR CALLAGHAN: In other words, going into battle the chances of me dying and the chances of the enemy dying were, somebody was going to die.

CHAIRPERSON: Where did the threat on your life come from?

MR CALLAGHAN: In this incident?

CHAIRPERSON: No, well, ja.

MR CALLAGHAN: Generally, the threat in my life came that I was on patrol with Koevoet and in fire-fights on a weekly basis.

CHAIRPERSON: So the threat on your life came from what you considered the enemy at the time?

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: SWAPO insurgents.

MR CALLAGHAN: SWAPO insurgents, yes.

"The role which I played in this incident again is one of omission rather than commission. I was aware of the torture and I was aware of the murder. I failed to act, both to prevent it or to report it ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did you intend that these people be killed?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, I did not.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you associate yourself with the intention to kill them?

MR CALLAGHAN: I associated myself with the team that did kill them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may have associated yourself with the team, but did you associate yourself with the team's intention to kill them eventually?

MR CALLAGHAN: I'm unclear how to answer, simply for this reason that I'm unclear on my own state at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know whether you agreed with their intention to kill them or not?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's exactly what I'm saying, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let me perhaps make it easier for you, did it matter to you, did you care at the time as to whether they died or not?

MR CALLAGHAN: Probably not, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Your moral attitude towards that is something that developed after their death?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Dehal?

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

MR MALAN: Just before you proceed, Mr Dehal. Chairperson, please.

In your statement, Annexure A, paragraph 15 you say that these people were tortured and then in line 4, paragraph 15, you say:

"These SWAPO members were then murdered by members of the Koevoet team and reported killed in action."

There's a different chronology.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, the correct sequence of events is they were captured, reported as killed, tortured and then killed.

MR MALAN: You see, why I find this difficult to understand is, who did they report killed in action? They simply said - they could at best have said "We killed two SWAPO members."

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, that's exactly what they said.

MR MALAN: So there was no need for them to kill these two people because they weren't identified? They could torture them and they could still turn them and they could have become askaris or anything.

MR CALLAGHAN: They could have, except that at the beginning of the week, I don't understand why, but at the beginning of the week they were reported as dead ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well I can tell you why, because the intention was to eventually kill them.

MR CALLAGHAN: That is the only reason. I understand Mr Malan's question in that I was housed while seconded to Koevoet, in the askari prisoner of war camp and so it would have been common practice to have brought them back to that camp and having turned them. I don't know why in this incident that did not happen, save to say that it didn't happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if they did it, how would they explain to the Commander that here we have two live insurgents who were killed in action?

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly, I think the point is that they didn't need to be reported as dead, they could have been reported as captured, tortured and then turned. That would have been an option.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless those who made the decision wanted them dead by the end of the escapade.

MR CALLAGHAN: That is the only logical answer to the situation, yes.

MR MALAN: Do you know who these prisoners were? Were they high profile? Were they known?

MR CALLAGHAN: I have no idea who they were.

MR MALAN: I find it very strange that there, you know where it's common practice to capture people, as you've said, and hundreds of them, if not more ...

MR CALLAGHAN: This is the only incident in the six month period in which I served mostly with Zulu India and a few times with another Koevoet team, that this kind of incident happened, however other Medics who served with me in Koevoet, reported that this was common practice in some of the other teams as well. I could only guess that part of the rationale was why feed and pay askaris when they could quite simply be killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Now an important question as far as your perceptions are concerned. It is now admitted, it's always been common knowledge that South Africa had a military presence in that area, some of them, some of those units acted in the interest of the then South West Africa political parties. It has been argued also in some occasions that some units acted in the interests of some unidentified South African interest. The same can be said of Angola. You say you agreed with the decision that these people would be killed eventually or you didn't care whether they were killed or not at the time, can you perhaps tell us in whose interest that particular unit was acting on that occasion?

MR CALLAGHAN: I think two specific interests were at play within the scenario and in both cases the murder doesn't necessarily make sense. The capture and torture of these two prisoners led to the discovery of weapons caches and of other insurgents which was in the interests of both the South African Government and Military machinery of the day, in that those discoveries, that information led to the discovery of weapons which would have been used against South African Defence Force Units and led to the death of other SWAPO members which would have perpetrated incidents in the ongoing conflict with Defence Force units. However, Koevoet bounty policy obviously also came into play, in that those who captured or killed SWAPO members, got paid, equipment and weapons that were discovered had a price and so the more that a team as a unit within Koevoet could, the more people that they could kill, the more weaponry that they could capture, the more that they individually would get paid on a commission basis and so I have no doubt that both of those entities would have been at play in this scenario.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to put it to you this way, I put it to you, not to dispute what you say, I put it to you because of evidence that I've heard previously in respect of foreign countries, in particular Namibia, the then South West Africa and Angola. You have half confirmed this already. The South African Government denied their presence in those areas ...(intervention)

MR CALLAGHAN: Particularly within Angola, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ... yet it was an open secret that they were there. The South African units there, it seems to me, were not acting there in the interest of the South African Government, but really in South West Africa in the interest of, I think they call it Turnehalle Party, as against SWAPO and in Angola one would be hard pressed to deny that South Africa's interest sided with Savimbi and acted in the interests of Savimbi as opposed to South Africa's own interests then. Would you agree with that or not? And I'm putting it to you, not as a challenge, I'm putting it to you in order to obtain your perception of issues at the time.

MR CALLAGHAN: In terms of South West Africa, I have never heard of that political party, even to date. In terms of Angola I would now with my political analysis be able to agree with you and I think one would be hard pressed not to agree with you on the Namibian issue as well. However, in 1982 and 1983 when I was a seventeen year old white conscript who had no political education at all, I was there on the guise that I was protecting a country in the terms of South West Africa and South Africa, from a foreign threat. The fact that in 1989 those illusions were blown away by the Namibian elections, is something which I then began to grapple with and try to understand as I went on a political educational process in my own life.

CHAIRPERSON: So you thought at the time you were acting in the political interests of South Africa?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I want you to cast your mind back to that time as a seventeen year old white conscripted person, why did you think it was essential to fight for the rights of the South African position as it was then? I can probably guess the answer, but I need you to tell me that for the record.

MR CALLAGHAN: The propaganda machine of the day had so convinced white young conscripts that the communist threat was something that we needed to deal with. I had never heard of SWAPO, I'd never heard of the ANC before I went to the Army, I had heard of the communist threat as it were and so ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: "Die swart gevaar"?

MR CALLAGHAN: "Die swart gevaar", ja.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your home environment at the time, was it conducive to that belief?

MR CALLAGHAN: My home environment? I'm not sure my father would like me to describe him as this, but I describe him as a "securocrat". I'd describe him as someone who voted for security, not for political policy.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you don't have to be shy about that, many of our parents did that.

MR CALLAGHAN: And I went to a private school, I went to a school which was integrated racially, I was - my mother particularly, and myself were involved in trying to help people who were being dislocated and moved as a result of the Group Areas Act. I was involved in an organisation called Youth for Christ, which was a very integrated organisation and yet the church, the politics, the society in which I lived said that the "swart gevaar" and the communists was a major problem and I needed to become a man and sign up and go and fight for my country.

CHAIRPERSON: It's difficult to understand that today, but I accept that it did happen. There must be given credit for the success rate ...(indistinct)

MR CALLAGHAN: That's - the success of apartheid is that it kept us apart.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed, Mr Dehal.

MR MALAN: Sorry again, Chairperson.

Just before we step away from this incident, you said that, explaining why these people were announced killed immediately, could be ascribed to the bounty policy if I understood you correctly, so that people could collect the money.

MR CALLAGHAN: No, the bounty policy was dead or alive. I do not understand why they were pronounced dead, other than there was intent to kill them eventually. There would have been no monetary difference in pronouncing them dead or alive, the only place where monetary difference would have come in is whether they were tortured or not tortured and therefore subsequently gave up information which would have resulted in the capture of ...

MR MALAN: So the bounty would have been the same whether they were captured or killed?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Do you know who collected the bounty? You were in a unit?

MR CALLAGHAN: As I understood it in speaking with John Deegan many, many years later, who was the Deputy Unit Commander at the time, I specifically said to him "Well I don't know who got the bounty, I certainly didn't get any of it", and he said to me "Who do you think paid for those braais that we had?" And I guess at the end of the day that it was divided amongst the team in a way that 'let us enjoy this and let us enjoy that.'

MR MALAN: Did you ever get bounty?

MR CALLAGHAN: I never got cash, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Well even if it was by meat, did you know it was part of the bounty then?

MR CALLAGHAN: I did not know until 1997.

MR MALAN: And on how many of these excursions did you go out with the teams? Approximately.

MR CALLAGHAN: I was in Koevoet for six months, which would have resulted in probably twelve excursions, in other words two a month, one every - one week in base, one week on patrol.

MR MALAN: And your duties on patrol?

MR CALLAGHAN: My duties on patrol, my primary duty was as a Medic and so I took all of the medical equipment with me, but as Medics within the South African Defence Force and Medics within the SAP/Koevoet scenario, one carried a weapon and one was part of the fighting force and in fact one of the incidents for which I withdrew on refers to me actually participating actively in conflict in terms of firing my weapon and so on.

MR MALAN: So if I understand you correctly for all practical purposes you were a regular member of a patrol, but you had the equipment available when needed?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Did you often have to use it?

MR CALLAGHAN: The medial equipment? No, surprisingly not, but then maybe that wasn't surprising, certainly not within the Koevoet context, no.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

Mr Callaghan, may I take you to the next incident which is dealt with on the same page, page 4 of Annexure A, dealt with in paragraph 16. Will you deal with the Medical Sector Hearings, your testimony before them and the execution of one of your patients by Mr John Deegan. Do you see that?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR DEHAL: Here the crime is murder and this is dealt with on page 10 of your annexure to your application for amnesty in the bundle and on page 10 it is contained within paragraph 5, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: Now just before we get on with this, may I just ask you, is it not correct that your instructions to me, to us ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What page did you say it was referred to in the bundle?

MR DEHAL: Page 10, paragraph 5, Sir. It's that lengthy paragraph at the bottom.

MR MALAN: Paragraph 6 it is.

MR DEHAL: Sorry, it's the paragraph 5 that starts with the words

"The third specific incident that I remember ...(indistinct) chasing is a SWAPO ..."

MR MALAN: My apology.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes go ahead.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

Mr Callaghan, is it not correct that your instructions to us is that in most of these incidents, in fact in all of them for which you seek amnesty, you at the time fell within the purview of this conscripted force, made common purpose with those people that perpetrated the crimes inasmuch as you personally did not perpetrate them and in retrospect now, see that you acted wrongly and you want to distance yourself from it, and also believe that you ought at the time to have done something to have prevented it? Am I correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That is correct.

MR DEHAL: Now dealing with this particular incident, John Deegan is a man that you've already referred to, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: He is the man whom the Evidence Leader said is in custody, but we've endeavoured to trace him in vain?

MR CALLAGHAN: That is correct.

MR DEHAL: You've recently established I understand, in discussions indirectly with his wife, that's Mrs Deegan, that he's in fact no longer in custody, but you still cannot trace him, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That would seem to be correct, yes.

MR DEHAL: Okay. Now can you tell this Committee about this incident, but before you proceed - sorry Mr Chairperson, may I hand over to my assistant, I just want to answer nature's call, it will take me two seconds, so we don't have to adjourn. Thanks.

MR CALLAGHAN: Do I need to unpack the incident for this Committee?

CHAIRPERSON: First tell me, you people discovered a SWAPO Commissar, was he injured already when you discovered him or not?

MR CALLAGHAN: We picked up the spoor of a SWAPO insurgent ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: As a unit?

MR CALLAGHAN: As a unit. ... probably two days before this incident that I'm specifically speaking about.

CHAIRPERSON: When would this have happened, during the same period?

MR CALLAGHAN: During the same period, ja, not necessarily on the same week, but during the same period working with Zulu India. There was - in fact near the end of that period, so it would have been probably October of '83.

"We followed the spoor of this person for a day, slept on it at night, picked it up again in the morning and continued. The Commissar finally having not been able to outrun the Casspirs anymore, hid within a kraal. John Deegan who was acting Commander at the time ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: A doctor?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, he's not a doctor, he was a Koevoet/SAP Special Branch.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja but he wasn't a doctor though?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, he was a Special Branch policeman.

"He ordered that a Casspir be driven over the hut in which this Commissar was hiding and that the team open fire into the rubble of that hut. The Commissar was subsequently pulled out of that rubble and handed to me for treatment. The only reason why I know he was a Commissar was because at that point his pockets were emptied and his notebooks and so on were found, and John subsequently told me that he was a Commissar.

He was quite severely injured and I was attending to his wounds, putting up a drip, bandaging him and so on. We were probably an hour or two's drive away from Oshakati and so would very easily have been able to have got him to a hospital for treatment. We were in the process of either looking at driving him into the hospital or calling for a helicopter to cassavac him in. Obviously ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Tell me, do you know whether Eugene de Kock was with you at the time?

MR CALLAGHAN: My understanding is that Eugene de Kock left Koevoet a month after I arrived and was with a different team, he was not with Zulu India.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I seem to remember somebody testifying before me on this very incident, while the medical people were treating an injured insurgent, this person was just shot, I think in the head.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, John Deegan did testify before the Human Rights Violations Committee, I think the Conscript Hearings. I'm actually not sure which hearing, but he did testify and I in fact have testified to this incident before the Medical Sector Hearings as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, okay.

"The Commissar would in all likelihood it would seem, to have been carrying a handgun and John Deegan in his interrogation of this patient of mine, desperately wanted to know where his handgun was, his pistol. The Commissar would not give out this information, and as a result while treating this patient, while putting in a drip he was shot in the head, right next to me."

Again my application for amnesty goes to the act of omission in that I did not stop John from interfering with my patient, I did not prevent the execution and I failed to report this incident to anybody when I got back to base.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you report it?

MR CALLAGHAN: Because the only person I would have had to report it to was Hans Dreyer, and that would have been pointless.

CHAIRPERSON: So there's no political reason for you not reporting it?

MR CALLAGHAN: There is no political reason other than it seemed futile at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MALAN: Sorry, may I just ask here, just to understand this again. Did you not approve of the shooting? Did you tell him he was doing a thing that was wrong?

MR CALLAGHAN: At the time I did nothing other than try and make the fastest plan to get back to South Africa, and in fact got on an aeroplane two or three weeks later and faked sickness, so as not to go on patrol during the weeks that followed.

MR MALAN: Was that towards the end of your period of service?

MR CALLAGHAN: That was towards the end of my period, yes.

MR MALAN: Yes, but the question really relates to your understanding of that incident there, you've seen a lot of killings by then, here Deegan shot this person, did you not accept that in the course of what your experience was? Or did you suffer, did you want to report it and agonise and said, 'but there's no-one I can report it to'? What was your state of mind?

MR CALLAGHAN: My state of mind was, 'this is just another day on the job.'

MR MALAN: Yes, and you accepted what happened? You had no intention or need to report it? I accept that it might have been or would have been pointless, but I'm not sure ...(intervention)

MR CALLAGHAN: Ja, at the time I felt, I - let me put it in this context, in the months that followed when I came home, this was the thing that was the nightmare for me, this was the recurring dream, this was the face that I saw day after day in my dreams. In speaking with John Deegan in 1997, this is the incident that has haunted him for fifteen years, and for me ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you believe him?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do believe him, because I spent a good few days with him in '97, at the request of his sister because of her knowledge of my dealing with post-traumatic stress and her knowledge of his very obvious post-traumatic stress.

CHAIRPERSON: You see I think you must try to understand the question, we need to find out what your state of mind was then, this is a very subjective inquiry and I put you into the category of a seventeen year old white influenced by the "swart gevaar" theory etcetera. I think all of us appreciate the trauma and the moral situation you find yourself in subsequently, but it's important for us to examine your position as at the time of these offences.

MR CALLAGHAN: I think at the time I was disturbed by the incident, but saw in the light of my answer to Mr Malan, that is was purely another day on the job.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't care really whether he died or not, it was part of the scenario?

MR CALLAGHAN: I did care for a day or two, because it was my patient that had died. Not I didn't care - my caring was because he was my patient, not because he was a human being.

CHAIRPERSON: In fact he was still the enemy?

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly.

ADV SIGODI: Tell me, did you know that John Deegan was going to shoot this person?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, I did not know that.

ADV SIGODI: So what in your mind, what do you think you could have done to prevent him from shooting the person, because you - what could you have done to prevent him from shooting this person?

MR CALLAGHAN: As a Medic who is very often out-ranked by Commanding Officers, one is able to still have influence over what happens, purely because as a Medic you can say 'no, this is a patient, no,' you know. One can in a sense challenge authority on the basis of 'because of medical reasons you can't', and I have been known to do that in the SADF prior to this incident. The direct result of his interrogation was his murder. The fact that I did not challenge John on his interrogation of a very obviously injured person, for me constitutes a violation in the sense that I did nothing. What I could have done that would have been effective, is debateable, but ...(intervention)

ADV SIGODI: Did you see him bringing the gun?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I did, I saw him. He had a pistol in his hand, a 9mm, and was interrogating the patient while wielding that weapon and beating the patient etcetera, pointing it against his head, screaming and shouting at him. All this time I was bandaging and putting in drips and trying desperately to keep this person alive.

ADV SIGODI: But did you think he was going to shoot?

MR CALLAGHAN: I was shocked by him shooting.

ADV SIGODI: He didn't expect him to shoot?

MR CALLAGHAN: I didn't expect him to shoot him, no.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you a few more questions on this incident. In your statement on page 10, which is the annexure to your application, you there say that

"The purpose of the interrogation was to find the missing handgun, and then (for John's private collection)."

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: So you knew that was the purpose of the interrogation, at the time?

MR CALLAGHAN: At the time I knew that the purpose of the interrogation was to find the handgun.

MR MALAN: And that he wanted it for his private collection?

MR CALLAGHAN: Subsequently I came to understand that that was why it was so important to him.

MR MALAN: Now why would that have been so important and why did you only learn of it subsequently? You see you didn't say that to us in the beginning when you made this statement.

MR CALLAGHAN: I did actually in this statement here mention that the interrogation was to find the handgun.

MR MALAN: Yes, you said in this statement too that it was for John's private collection.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes. People like Koevoet Commanders go home from war with prizes and collections and I don't think that John was any different to those people.

MR MALAN: Did you take any handguns for your private collection?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, I did not.

MR MALAN: So why would John have not been different, but you were?

MR CALLAGHAN: Because I was not a true blood-bred Koevoet member, I was a Medic who was on secondment to the unit. John had been a Security policeman in South Africa and South West Africa and in Koevoet for a number of years by the time I got to meet him.

MR MALAN: Now also in the bundle on page 27, it's preceded really, page 25, 26, 27, but specifically on page 27 Deegan relates this incident.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: And he says nothing about a private collection, but he wanted to find the gun and he also wanted to know where the rendezvous point was and he also states that he brought a guy named Congo, who was captured, and Congo was present during the interrogation. Can you remember Congo being present?

MR CALLAGHAN: I haven't read John's statement, but my assumption would be that Congo was an askari.

MR MALAN: I'm not asking you your assumptions, I'm saying to you that he says

"I brought the person that we'd captured the day before."

MR CALLAGHAN: Okay, no then I've ...

MR MALAN

"They had been travelling together and I said, "Look, here is your companion, we know your name is Congo."

but this is his companion, they'd been travelling together when they were captured. Sorry, I said now the captured guy was Congo, the deceased guy was Congo, but his companion was present, according to Deegan’s relating this incident, when he shot him.

MR CALLAGHAN: I do not specifically remember the scenario in which - if I can paint the picture, over here is - we are in the middle of a kraal, over here is a hut that has been completely driven over by a Casspir, a Casspir parked on top of it, behind me and around me are Koevoet members, over there are other Casspirs, I'm kneeling on the floor next to a SWAPO patient and John is standing around me interrogating him. That's what I remember.

MR MALAN: Okay. Now he says nothing about needing this pistol for any private collection.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, he doesn't say anything, that is my perception or my understanding should I say, at the time of making this statement, which was made in December '96, which was fourteen years after this incident took place.

MR MALAN: Yes, but you just told us that you had long discussions with Deegan, I mean you were both - or was that ...

MR CALLAGHAN: I had long discussions with ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: With his sister?

MR CALLAGHAN: I had long discussions with Deegan in 1997 when I was called the Medical Sector Hearings, which was prior to him making this statement.

MR MALAN: Okay. And I also see that the TRC report, the Research guys who wrote and quoted from your application on page 74, just show three dots and they leave out the reference to "(for his private collection)". Now that's really important, it goes to the heart of it, whether you assist, stand by where a man was doing a killing which was not politically related, or whether it was indeed to do with politics, and according to your statement as it reads, the interrogation was not whatsoever related to any political objective, it was simply to have a memento.

MR CALLAGHAN: I would hesitate to agree with you, but tend to agree with you at the same time in the sense that the heart of the interrogation around which John seemed to become most angered was the issue of the handgun.

MR MALAN: Which he wanted for his private collection.

MR CALLAGHAN: As I understand it, which he wanted for his private collection. As he testifies, there was no private collection. I have never seen a private collection, I am only aware of a perception of mine which I hold in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Well the important thing is, when did you become aware of the possibility of the existence of this private collection?

MR CALLAGHAN: Certainly not at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: So your impression at the time was that he was trying to find out where this handgun was because as you perceived it, it formed a threat the security of South Africa?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, and it also meant money from the bounty policy.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

Mr Callaghan, you talked at some length about your post-traumatic stress syndrome and Mr Deegan’s suffering in the same light ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you still on the third ...?

MR DEHAL: Yes. Thank you, Sir.

Is it correct that this incident, the shooting of this person by Mr John Deegan ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, unless you really enjoying this you can come back at 2 o'clock.

MR VISSER: Thank you. May we accept that we're excused until 2 o'clock then?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) we take a rain check for 2 o'clock, I don't know when this is going to end.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR DEHAL: May I proceed, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR DEHAL: Thank you.

Is it correct that one of the incidents that really contributed to your post-traumatic stress syndrome for which you were treated, is this incident of John Deegan having shot this person in front of you?

MR CALLAGHAN: That is correct.

MR DEHAL: And do I take it that you have knowledge that John Deegan, in suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome, had actually suffered so as a result of this incident as well?

MR CALLAGHAN: He refers to such in his statement as far as I read his statement.

MR DEHAL: Thank you. May I take you to the next incident which begins at the bottom of page 4 and continues onto page 5 of Annexure A. This is the incident which deals with boiling water having been thrown over a person who was interrogated, a patient of yours, causing him burns to his chest and genitals. You recall that incident?

CHAIRPERSON: What incident is this, what page?

MR DEHAL: Sorry, Judge, it's on page 4, right at the bottom of Annexure A, paragraph 17, going onto page 5.

MR CALLAGHAN: This incident I refer to in my original statement and application for amnesty on page 10, paragraph 6.

MR DEHAL: Yes, and this is an incident in regard to which the crime is attempted murder, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and you say possibly murder because this person may well have died thereafter, but you don't know that, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

MR DEHAL: Can you please tell this Panel about your role-play in this matter.

MR CALLAGHAN

"The Koevoet base in Oshakati had a number of detention cells. Those detention cells housed, at one stage, this patient that I refer to. I was asked, or instructed should I say, to attend to this patient. I went in to see him. I was told not to tell anybody about him as it had been revealed through interrogation that he had no SWAPO connections at all and so he was a member of the Namibian civilian population. He had been interrogated ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He was not a member of ...(intervention)

MR CALLAGHAN: He was not a member of SWAPO, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: He was an ordinary civilian?

MR CALLAGHAN: An ordinary civilian, yes, who at the time had been suspected of being a collaborator and which at the end of interrogation it was deemed by Koevoet members that he had no connections at all.

MR DEHAL: And you say in page 10 of your annexure to the application that is was later discovered that he had no SWAPO connects at all, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct, yes.

MR DEHAL: Thank you. Carry on.

MR CALLAGHAN

"The patient had, amongst other things, been interrogated and tortured by the pouring of boiling water over his chest and genitals. This had resulted in massive burning and blistering of the flesh in that area."

CHAIRPERSON: What kind of people would do that?

MR CALLAGHAN: I don't know, but I think as I understood it, and this is my analysis of the scenario, Koevoet Commanders were Special Branch policemen who had messed up so badly in South Africa that they had to be removed from this society to where they could do anything that they wouldn't have to give an account for.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why I ask this question, it may be an awkward question, but the frequency of such evidence troubles me. Even when I used to practice in these so-called security cases, the genitals were always a target of the police, was there any medical reason for it, or is it because it's sensitive, most likely to hurt or what?

MR CALLAGHAN: My medical knowledge is purely how to save somebody from being shot, so that you can keep them alive for a few hours until a doctor can get to them.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but there hasn't been a single doctor who's answered that question satisfactorily.

MR CALLAGHAN: The only guess that I could make is that not only does it go to the issue of sensitivity, but it also goes to the issue of humanisation.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, or perversion.

MR CALLAGHAN: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.

MR CALLAGHAN

"I was told to attend to this patient without telling anyone. I didn't know what to do, I was not qualified to attend to thispatient. I went to the Oshakati ..."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR CALLAGHAN: I do not recall how I knew that information.

CHAIRPERSON: You say he was blistered on his chest and in his pelvic area?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes. I mean the details are very sketchy, but I seem to remember not only blistering, but raw flesh and broken blisters and so on. I think particularly on a black body, when that kind of blistering happens you can see the pink flesh coming through underneath and that's the recollection that I have.

"I called in the help of a doctor from Oshakati Hospital, from the Military Hospital, and told him not to tell anybody but to please deal with the patient and make the problem go away. My silence in the face of this obvious abuse, not my silence in terms of not calling a medical doctor, but my silence in not reporting it to some kind of authority who could deal with the very obvious torture and abuse, is something which worries me and something for which I seek amnesty."

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you report it?

MR CALLAGHAN: Again it's for the very same reason that I answered earlier, it would have been futile to report it, to report this incident to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, but had you been able to report, would you have? You see what I must investigate is, was there any political reason why you did not report it? Did you do it for any political reason, or did you do it just because of sound reasoning that it would be futile to make the report because the person or persons to whom such a report would be made, would not do anything about it and possibly get you into trouble?

MR CALLAGHAN: At the time I did not consider reporting it and so as I look back on these incidents, the fact that I didn't do that constitutes an omission, that I actually should have done something.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you report it then?

MR CALLAGHAN: I didn't report it then because it was half of the ...(indistinct).

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that if - you protected that information in the interests of the political agenda of those who committed it.

MR CALLAGHAN: I don't think that I had the political suss to have put it in that many words back then, but yes, in essence that's what I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR MALAN: Mr Callaghan let me just get a picture in my mind, you were at base, at that stage you were one week out on patrol, one week back.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: So while at base, I take it it's the week that you're off.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: You're being approached by members of another patrol, not your own I assume, which was with the request to attend to this patient or this detainee who was being detained in one of the cells at base camp.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct, yes.

MR MALAN: It's not a hospital facility, you're simply brought to the cells, shown the patient and they say "Please attend to him, he's got these wounds. Don't tell anyone about it."

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct, yes.

MR MALAN: Then you go to the hospital which is not part of the cells or that base there, you go to the Oshakati Hospital, you get a Military doctor, I assume you bring him out to the cells to have a look at this patient, is that how it happened?

MR CALLAGHAN: That is how it happened, except when I approached the Military doctor ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: You asked him too, "Please don't tell anyone, this is a secret."

MR CALLAGHAN: Ja.

MR MALAN: I understand that. Now how did you get him into the cells if this was to be secret and no-one else was to know about it? Did you have access to the cells, did you have a key to the cell?

MR CALLAGHAN: I had said to the people who had brought me into the cells, "I cannot deal with this, I will go and get somebody who can."

MR MALAN: So this wasn't so secretly done, it was openly done then. Then you did not ask the doctor to keep it a secret, then you must have told the people who asked you, "I'm bringing the doctor in, this is no secret anymore."

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I did ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: It's an open secret. You had their permission to bring in the doctor.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct, yes.

MR MALAN: You told them, "I can't attend to this."

MR CALLAGHAN: I told them that I can't attend to it, not because ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: "I don't have the training and the skills."

MR CALLAGHAN: That's why I told them I can't attend to it, not because I was opposed to attending to it.

MR MALAN: Yes, yes. Now why did you in both your statement and your evidence here, tell us this was very secretly done? Why did you not tell us?

MR CALLAGHAN: It was secretly done in the sense that I never went to the hospital and filled in a 'please can you attend to this patient', I went there and said to a doctor who - I went to one of the Medics and said, "I need to see a doctor who is going to be friendly to me, who is going to talk to me." Doctors rotated in and out on a three months basis, Medics were there for twelve months, and said, "I need to get somebody to help me on something, a friendly doctor who was prepared to talk to me off the record and say, 'Okay I will try and do something for you.'"

MR MALAN: I just want to make sure, I understood you to be saying that you brought this doctor to the cell to attend to this patient.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I did, yes.

MR MALAN: The patient wasn't taken to hospital?

MR CALLAGHAN: No.

MR MALAN: Is that what you mean by "secretly treating him"? Not to register him as a patient in hospital?

MR CALLAGHAN: Not to register him as a patient because if we had registered him as a patient, we would have to declare how he got into the state that he was.

MR MALAN: Now did you go to this doctor without consulting with those who asked you to attend to this patient?

MR CALLAGHAN: I cannot recall, but my personality probably would have gone, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: To tell them that you're going to get somebody else?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, my personality probably would have gone to the doctor first and then told them that I was dealing with the problem, and here was the solution.

MR MALAN: And you never heard about this patient again?

MR CALLAGHAN: Never did.

MR MALAN: You never asked the doctor?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, I didn't know the doctor personally, it was pure ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: As a Medic, did you have no interest in getting to learn how to treat such wounds?

MR CALLAGHAN: As a Medic I had previously treated much more severely burnt people in the hospital and besides the fact that I had had many nightmares about, while I was there, about that treatment and about those people, I had very little interest. In a sense I wanted the problem to go away.

MR MALAN: Well I'm not so sure that I understand this now, did you not treat him - you see, in your supplementary statement you say you did not treat him because you were not qualified enough medically to do anything.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Now you're telling us previously you've treated more severe burns.

MR CALLAGHAN: Let me put the context. While working in the Oshakati Hospital, a casualty evacuation situation happened where ten South African troops had been in a landmine explosion and had been poured with - the explosion had blown diesel onto them and they'd all been burnt. These injured were flown in, the dead were flown in the following day, those burnt to a crisp were flown in the following day, those that were injured were flown in and the four or five doctors plus the six or ten Medics that were at the hospital, were then dealing with these patients. I was working with one patient specifically and a doctor was floating amongst a couple of those patients. The treatment which I gave him on that night as he few in, was to put up a drip to give him morphine and valium injections on instructions from the doctor and to dress his wounds for subsequent treatment, both at Oshakati and then that night those guys were flown back to South Africa and were treated. All of them subsequently died.

The treatment which I gave in those scenarios was purely a dealing with the problem right now to keep this guy alive for the next hour or two while a doctor can attend to him. Certainly I was not at all qualified to deal with the healing of a patient, I was trained in dealing with the trauma of an incident, not in the healing of a patient.

MR MALAN: Then just finally on this, to understand the full picture, Mr Dehal when he summarised it, my note is saying that on this incident you're applying for attempted murder.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Now you have no involvement in the assault whatsoever, if I understand you correctly, I just want to make sure, and if you committed any crime, it was simply the

non-reporting of the assault, because you went to all decent lengths to get a doctor out to attend to this person, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, the specifics for which I would like to apply for amnesty is for not taking responsibility to report the incident.

MR MALAN: Yes.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr Dehal.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir.

Mr Callaghan, I now take you to Annexure A, paragraph 20, which is at the bottom of page 5. This is an incident where you deal generally with:

"South African Military's Campaign in Angola between '77 and '88, which led to Gross Violations of Human Rights on a vast scale."

You say that these - sorry:

"Furthermore the Commission found that the activities of the SANDF and the activities of the SANDF and the SAP in the former South West Africa, between 1966 and '89, led to gross violations of human rights on a vast scale."

You say that you seek amnesty for your role, both passive and active in this case, as an SANDF conscript in implementing and defending the policy of apartheid and for the role you played, both in maintaining the illegal occupation of Namibia and waging war against the sovereign State of Angola.

Here of course you've identified the crime as murder and attempted murder and assault, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: Can I give you a long answer?

CHAIRPERSON: You can answer the way feel it appropriate.

MR DEHAL: Yes.

MR CALLAGHAN: Can I speak to 20 and 21 collectively?

MR MALAN: May I just enquire from Mr Dehal, why did you skip 18 and 19?

MR DEHAL: Sorry Sir, we had deleted them earlier.

MR MALAN: Oh, you deleted them. Are they deleted?

MR DEHAL: Yes.

MR MALAN: Is there - alright, I'll ask that question later, but maybe I should ask them now, I think they're appropriate because they are in the application. Why do you withdraw that?

MR CALLAGHAN: I withdraw 18, 19 ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, I'm just asking about 18 and 19, because as I read them ...(intervention)

MR CALLAGHAN: ... and others, purely because I, following your questions at the beginning of this session, was unable to pin a specific crime for which one could be prosecuted to the issue and these were more speaking to issues of intimidation and so on, which are not necessarily prosecutable crimes. I would love to apply for amnesty for them, but I have been led to believe that this Committee would not hear those applications.

CHAIRPERSON: Who told you that?

MR CALLAGHAN: That was the impression that I got at the beginning of the process, from the challenge from the Panel.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I must certainly say that whatever impression you got, that is certainly not the message we wanted to convey. I would not discourage any application. From the short explanation here, it does not look like that incident is without merit consideration. I'm willing to reinstate it if you want to.

MR CALLAGHAN: I would like to reinstate both 18 and 19.

CHAIRPERSON: You can deal with it and we can decide on it as we need to.

MR MALAN: You're very extensively with, or much more extensively with both these in your original application and in your statement.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I ...

MR MALAN: In fact, these were the most direct involvement cases of yourself, according to your application. All the others relate to your omissions, where other people committed crimes, here you were directly involved of your own volition, on both of them, according to the information and this is withdrawn. I'm happy that the Chair has ruled for this then to be reinstated, because personally I think this is important in your application.

MR CALLAGHAN: I am also happy. Shall we deal with point 18?

MR DEHAL: Yes, perhaps you can begin by dealing with 18 and we will come back to paragraphs 20 and 21.

MR CALLAGHAN

"One of the few times I was on patrol, not with Zulu India, but one of the other units within Koevoet, I think it was specifically Zulu November, we were driving home, driving back to base at the end of the week, down the tar road in Northern Namibia and I was in the lead Casspir at the time, sitting reading a book, when a number of SWAPO insurgents were noticed on the side of the road by the driver.

The driver turned off the road at high speed, drove straight towards the SWAPO insurgents, one of them managed to fire a rocket grenade through the engine of the Casspir, stalling and stopping the Casspir right in the middle of an open clearing. It was dusk at the time. Everybody within the Casspir opened fire, putting various weapons out through the portholes, firing into, hoping to hit something."

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I thought it was only in Port Elizabeth where the kids could throw a petrol bomb ...

MR CALLAGHAN

"This incident for me was very shocking, in the sense that it was the first time that I was in that kind of a fire-fight. The confusion of what happens in war came home very clearly in that situation and at the end of the skirmish I realised that my military issue R1 rifle had jammed on the first shot.

Lying on the tar road was one dead insurgent who had been ridden over by a Casspir and subsequent to the initial start of the fire-fight, as he had run off across the road, one of the other Casspirs had caught up and driven over him and so on. He was very obviously dead and lying in the road. The team split off and went to go and search the shebeen and so on, where these other insurgents were and they had disappeared off into the darkness.

I stood on the top of the Casspir, totally frustrated that somebody had tried to kill me, un-jammed my rifle and fired a shot into the body of the dead insurgent lying on the tarmac. For this I was severely reprimanded by my Unit Commander, and the result of this incident was very physical in the sense of vomiting, diarrhoea and so on. In other words, the first signs of physical trauma to myself as a result of the conflict I was involved in.

The amnesty which I seek is for the shots that I fired into the body of that person."

CHAIRPERSON: How would that have helped the political situation? Did you just not do that out of anger?

MR CALLAGHAN: I just did that out of anger, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't intended to be a political act?

MR CALLAGHAN: It wasn't a political statement, no.

CHAIRPERSON: But you see prior to that, you say you tried to shoot people but your firearm jammed.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Those I assume were directed at people who were running away, alive?

MR CALLAGHAN: In essence, yes, however in most skirmish situations very little of actual aiming took place and generally one would just fire at whatever.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I accept that, but inasmuch as it may miss, because you didn't take aim, there's a good chance it could hit the target as well.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: All I'm saying, in that skirmish which is undoubtedly a political activity, you committed this crime of attempting to kill somebody.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I did, except that as I read the Act, if those people were active combatants of an enemy force, that does not constitute something for which I can apply for amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not? How do you understand the Act?

MR CALLAGHAN: The way I understand the Act is, if one is on the battlefield and two Armies are shooting at each other, then those shots are not counted, but civilians that are - in other words, normal military campaigning is not included. That's the way I understood it, if I'm wrong ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well and good.

MR CALLAGHAN: Well and good.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll certainly look at that interpretation. I have reservations about the interpretation, but I'll look at it. I haven't come across that interpretation before.

MR CALLAGHAN: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: But I'll make a note and for your sake I hope you're wrong.

MR MALAN: Mr Callaghan, just again for the record here, in your original statement it's clear that you were attacked and this was a real conflict situation.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, it ...

MR MALAN: Mutual confrontation.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, it was a mutual confrontation, yes.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR DEHAL: Thank you. And just for the record Mr Callaghan, I omitted to deal with this, on this aspect alone, on this incident for which you seek amnesty you've actually dealt with it in your original statement annexed to the application for amnesty on page 9, the last paragraph and page 10 it continues onto the first paragraph, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR DEHAL: Okay, that takes me to the next incident which has been reinstated, paragraph 19 on Annexure A. This is the incident where it deals with SWAPO corpses attached, tied up to bumpers and mudguards of Casspirs and driven around as an intimidatory tactic. Is it correct that this incident is dealt with on page 10 of Annexure A to your application, in paragraph 4 thereof?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Dehal, ...(indistinct)

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge. Sorry, we're dealing with - well firstly, we've set out that the incident that he was seeking amnesty for, relating to having shot the dead body is dealt with in the Annexure to the application for amnesty on ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I can tell you now you needn't even argue it, I'm not going to grant him, or we're not going to grant him amnesty for shooting a dead body, because he shot that dead body out of anger. We're prepared to consider amnesty perhaps with the incident of shooting towards other people, which may or may not end up in amnesty, but at least we can consider that.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Sir. Judge, we then got onto the next incident which deals with the incident where bodies were attached to bumpers and mudguards of Casspirs and driven around as an intimidatory tactic. This was withdrawn and now reinstated. Just for the record, this is dealt with on page 10 in paragraph 4 of that page, of the annexure to the original application in the original bundle, page 10.

Now Mr Callaghan, here again you say that the attachment of these bodies was firstly on the premise that they were all dead and secondly, purely as an intimidatory tactic, is that correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: All of the bodies were dead, they were lashed to the bumpers and mudguards for three primary reasons: (1) was intimidation, (2) was to collect on the bounty and (3) was in order to compile a picture of where they fitted into the SWAPO operation. In other words, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What is the attaching of dead bodies to bumpers got to do with compiling a picture?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes. Let me put it this way, these bodies needed to be transported back to base in order for identification by askaris to be made and to build up a composite of 'this is where they fitted into the mix'. Certainly that's information which I came to understand in discussions with John Deegan much later, I certainly did know that they needed to be taken back to base because that was the way that the process worked.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, now I just want to clear up something. When you testify here before us we need to know why you did something, not why things were done.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You mention here also

"The dead bodies were ... and the practice was designed firstly, for intimidatory reasons, also to compile this picture and identify bodies and where they're from and thirdly, to collect bounty."

Now earlier you said the question of bounty only got to your knowledge sometime later after you left the area, and that's why I say we need to know why you did certain things as opposed to why they were done at the time they were done.

MR CALLAGHAN: I was aware of the bounty policy while I was there, I was not aware of my enjoyment of the proceeds of that policy while I was there.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we want to know why you participated.

MR CALLAGHAN: I participated in this practice simply because I was a member of that team and that's what we did.

CHAIRPERSON: To intimidate people and to compile this picture?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, to transport bodies back to camp, to ... The area in which one operated was one of, at times, quite thick bush and thorn trees, the tying of a body which would in 40+ degrees, heat-bloat in the sun and be ripped at by thorns, was a very intimidating factor on the local population, to have something like drive up to your house and say 'Tell me where somebody is otherwise this is going to happen to you.' The fact that I never used it as an intimidation factor, in that I never went to somebody's house to say "Tell me", but I was there, I was part of it and I was helping to do that, for me constitutes something for which I need to be forgiven.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, do you agree that if at all amnesty would be granted in this issue, it could only be in respect of mutilation of dead bodies?

MR DEHAL: Absolutely, no further. Thank you.

MR MALAN: May I just follow up on this? How often did this happen, was this regular on every patrol?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: So you brought back numerous bodies?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: How many people do you assess or estimate were killed whilst you were on such patrols, in total over the period that you were there, the six months period?

MR CALLAGHAN: During the six months period as I said, I spent one week in camp, one week in the bush and so that would have translated into twelve such excursions, of which at least once a week there would have been a contact which would have resulted in death and at least two or three people would have died in each one of those cases. So let's round the numbers at twenty-five to thirty people.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you do now?

MR CALLAGHAN: I do two things, I work for Accord, which is The Centre for Conflict Resolution in Durban, and I pastor a church.

CHAIRPERSON: I see you were born in Port Elizabeth.

MR CALLAGHAN: I was, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: When did you leave Port Elizabeth?

MR CALLAGHAN: I studied there after this, at university and I left after university.

CHAIRPERSON: University of?

MR CALLAGHAN: Of Port Elizabeth, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: When was that? Were you born and then you left Port Elizabeth after your studies?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes. I was born, I lived there until I went to the Army, came back there, studied for a further four years and then left in 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got family there?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I do.

ADV SIGODI: Tell me, when you were doing this thing, driving around with these dead bodies, would you do this in broad daylight?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, those bodies would very often stay attached to the Casspir for three or four days.

ADV SIGODI: And would you drive into the towns and which town particularly?

MR CALLAGHAN: We would continue on patrol in Northern Namibia, from house to house, area to area ...(intervention)

ADV SIGODI: In the rural area?

MR CALLAGHAN: In the rural areas. ... until we got back to a base either an SADF base, where these bodies could be unloaded and transported back to Oshakati or back to Oshakati itself and there we would have driven into the town in that case.

ADV SIGODI: So you wouldn't drive into Oshakati, the town itself, with the bodies, you'd drive only into the rural areas?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, at times we would drive to Oshakati town itself as well, yes. Well, Oshakati town was essentially divided into two areas, for want of a better description, the township area and the military base which had the white town encamped within it. Ultimately these bodies were destined for the Koevoet base which was within the white town. So that's where they would end up, either we would transport them there or they would be transported there by others if we had dropped them at another base in the rural area.

MR MALAN: And just a last question. In response to my question I heard you say that there were the twelve excursions week on, week off over the six months period, you had at least one contact or skirmish per excursion, at least two or three people per skirmish killed and therefore you get to the minimum number of twenty-five to thirty people.

MR CALLAGHAN: Ja.

MR MALAN: But it could have been many more, if you had more skirmishes?

MR CALLAGHAN: It could have been many more. I think that I was never involved in one of the bigger skirmishes that Koevoet were involved in, certainly a friend of mine who had come as a Medic with me to Koevoet, and within the first week that he was on patrol, he was involved in an ambush where thirty/forty people were killed and many of his men as well and he left the operational area that very same week, on an aeroplane destined for Pretoria for treatment, not because he was injured but because psychologically he could not continue.

MR MALAN: And again if I understood you correctly, you were part of these units, patrols going out?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I was.

MR MALAN: You were a Medic in addition to being an ordinary member. So you participated in the skirmishes?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes and no. The way that Koevoet teams operated was that usually four Casspirs would go on patrol, which constituted in the order of fifty men, those fifty men, most of them were Namibian askari operatives who were very good trackers and would run on a spoor and the four Casspirs would drive around them. I'm not a very good runner, I sat in the Casspir most of the time.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR CALLAGHAN: A skirmish would usually take place when those runners, those trackers would encounter fire and they would open fire and the Casspirs would fan out and fire into the context. Mostly with the cannons that were mounted on the front and on the top, because that was obviously the easiest way to ... And so the Casspirs became the fortress into which one would escape and so very often I was not involved in the actual fire-fight itself, I was hiding behind steel hoping that it will all end soon.

MR MALAN: So the bounty was usually collected by the askaris, the trackers?

MR CALLAGHAN: The bounty was collected by the team, it was a team effort, not a personal effort.

MR MALAN: Never personal payment?

MR CALLAGHAN: Not as far as I know.

MR MALAN: That's contrary to all the evidence that we've had.

MR CALLAGHAN: Not as far as I knew, but then again I was never given payment because I was never the one to ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: No but if you didn't kill anyone you would not have, as an individual been entitled.

MR CALLAGHAN: Exactly.

MR MALAN: But if you say bounty was paid to the team, then why did you not get some of that? Or did you think that's all going into the braai?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, I mean I've - my specific conversation with John in 1997, was "Well I certainly didn't benefit from the bounty" and his answer was ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: "Who paid for the braais?"

MR CALLAGHAN: Who paid for the braais?" That's the only evidence I have. Certainly the braai couldn't have cost R30 000, which is how many people we're talking about ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: What was the bounty per head?

MR CALLAGHAN: My understanding of per head was R1 000 per head, whereas mortars were more expensive, landmines were slightly less expensive, etcetera.

MR MALAN: You say on page 10 that the bounty ... (intervention)

MR CALLAGHAN: R2 000?

MR MALAN: R2 000.

MR CALLAGHAN: It was along time ago and I never received any. In my conversations with John subsequently - certainly if we're trying to put a price on somebody's head, they were worth a small amount of money, they certainly weren't worth tens of thousands of rands.

MR MALAN: Let me just get clarity on this, I mean you now said R1 000, here you say R2 000, how much of this is a construction and how much of it relates really to fact? Is it coming out of the memory which you tried to relate to us flowing from your discussions with John?

MR CALLAGHAN: No.

MR MALAN: You see, how are we to assess and judge this, as factual detail evidence, or as you getting to grips with your past?

MR CALLAGHAN: For the incidents for which I specifically give you information, factual evidence for which I was involved, for the information that you ask me around those facts, only what I can remember about this.

CHAIRPERSON: In any case whatever the case may be, whether it was R1 000 or R2 000, you say you never personally benefited at the time?

MR CALLAGHAN: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: And you now found out in 1997 that the only possibility that you did benefit unknowingly or unwittingly at the time, was through braais.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ... braaivleis went hand in hand with that type of operation, Security Branch operations.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What kind of beer did you people drink?

MR MALAN: Just again to do a little sum here, if we take the thirty people, which is the sort of minimum, twenty-five to thirty and if it indeed was R2 000 per body, then that would have been R60 000 going to braais over a period of six months - as the bottom line.

MR CALLAGHAN: Obviously that is not an option, obviously people got paid, yes.

MR MALAN: Yes.

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR MALAN: So it didn't go to the unit, it went to individuals.

MR CALLAGHAN: That would seem to be - I was, in a sense I was not part of the unit, in a sense I was not an SAPS member, because in a sense I was an SADF person on secondment and so I got paid from the SADF, I wore a beret that said I was part of the SADF and yet ... So I was there with them, but not part of them, I didn't sleep in a Koevoet base, I slept in the barracks next door which was the prisoner of war base, etcetera, etcetera.

MR MALAN: You just mentioned in the beginning and in passing that you were seconded to Koevoet, how did that come about, did you ask for a transfer? You visited them earlier, you testified.

MR CALLAGHAN: The way that it transpired is that while on patrol with SADF units, wearing and living under SADF structure and rules, driving next to what looks like a perfectly useful road, strapped into a Buffel all day, wearing a metal helmet etcetera, etcetera, one would be passed by by Casspirs full of jovial people sitting on top of roofs drinking Castle lager. That was a very aspirational image in a sense. I had no knowledge of what Koevoet was about at the time. When at the end of my first six months I was asked to volunteer to go across to Koevoet with four other Medics, in a sense I was - the question was, "Would you like to continue living under this regime of military strictness or would you like to go and live there, grow your hair, do whatever you like, free?" What was one seventeen/eighteen year old boy going to do other than to say, "Man, I want to get out of here as fast as possible and that looks like a good deal." So I went there, then I realised what I'd gone to.

MR MALAN: And you stayed there till the end of your conscription period?

MR CALLAGHAN: It wasn't an option, there was no "Well you can go home and you can go back." That wasn't an option.

MR MALAN: You could have gone back to your old unit.

MR CALLAGHAN: Certainly that wasn't an option which was presented in any form that seemed accessible.

MR MALAN: Did you ever consider it? Or did it not even come to your mind?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes, we did consider it a number of times. One specific time when two of the four who were with me were mainlining drugs, one of the other was an alcoholic and representation was made to the psychiatrist base Commander in the Medics, "Please get us out of this, we can't anymore", it was told "Grow up and be a man and carry on." In telephone conversations with my mother I told her, "I don't know if we're going to make it through the day because quite frankly I think we might all commit suicide by the end of this."

In the last weeks after the John Deegan incident we made repeated application to leave because our time was supposedly up and we were told "You may leave as soon as you find replacements for yourselves." I went to the airport where the replacements were flying in for the general replacements, and happened to recognise somebody who had been at school with me a year or two earlier, behind me at school, and I said to him "Get four of your friends and come with me." We loaded them into the back of a Casspir, we drove to the base, we said "Here are your four new Medics", we got in the Casspir, we drove straight to the airport and we got out of there.

We went on unpaid - we went on Awol for ten days, because in theory we were still in the operational area and reported with everybody else to Pretoria when everybody else in theory, arrived.

MS MOHAMED: Mr Callaghan, I understand that you have spoken about the last two incidents that you seek amnesty for. It was pointed out at the beginning that for the ninth incident, sorry, the incident mentioned in paragraph 20 of this Exhibit A, the reference in your statement in the bundle is page 2, paragraph 9(a).

MR CALLAGHAN: Could I summarise 20 and 21, simply to say this: That as a conscript I feel responsibility for having not taken the option that some of my friends eventually took of going to jail, of doing community service, of not participating, of not taking up a weapon. And for me it's sad that only a handful of the 150 000-odd conscripts that served in the operational area, actually came to this Commission and said "We were involved in something that was wrong."

For me the Committee found that the occupation of Namibia, the establishment of Koevoet and the war in Angola were violations of human rights and for me, I participated in that. And I have found healing in this process. I have found healing in making a submission, I have found healing in going before the Medical Sector Hearings and today constitutes the last few words in the paragraph and a fullstop for me. And for me, I want to when I'm 65 years old, look back and say "I closed that chapter in 2000 and I got on with the rest of my life."

And so I really ask for forgiveness for the role that I played, and it sounds grand in a sense, but the role that I played in defending the policies of apartheid in occupying Namibia, in waging war against Angola, in participating in a Koevoet unit, because those things were wrong and those things were violations of the basic human rights of many of those people. And today I find myself working in ACCORD having to, at times, deal with the consequences of those actions many years later, in the conflicts that persist within those communities, in the economic status of those communities and for that I'm sorry.

MR DEHAL: And you say, Mr Callaghan, on that last page of your statement, that you further seek forgiveness for the suffering inflicted on the people of those nations, that's Angola and Namibia, both then and subsequently, which resulted directly from acts of aggression that you were involved in.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's correct, yes.

MR DEHAL: And in paragraph 21 you talk about your passive and active roles which caused such harm in your participation and collaboration with the Koevoet unit, correct?

MR CALLAGHAN: Yes.

MR DEHAL: You then have a conclusion in your statement and I think you've basically dealt with that in your summary now, or would you like to add anything further?

MR CALLAGHAN: I'd like to add just one thing. I went to Klapperkop on Friday, the monument in Pretoria, I had a couple of weeks ago been to the Washington/Vietnam Vets Memorial and I stood against the wall, and I went there never knowing that Klapperkop even existed and I went and looked at 1982/1983 and I read the names on the wall and I counted the names on the wall, 375-odd national servicemen who had died in those two years. Some of them would have been my patients, some of them would have been those guys that I couldn't help, some of them were my colleagues. I think I recognised a name and I got down a phone number and tried to get some information on that person. None of them were any of the black allied forces that fought alongside us, none of them were any of the SWAPO people who died. And for them, both those names on the wall and for those allied forces who in a sense are just not remembered, and for those people that suffered as a result of what we did, for me this process has been very important.

MR DEHAL: And finally, Mr Callaghan, inasmuch as we haven't dealt with this, do you confirm the evidence you gave before the Health Sector Hearings as correct?

MR MALAN: He's already done that, that's the annexure to his application, you put that to him right in the beginning.

MR DEHAL: Yes, sorry. Is the evidence annexed to the application? I didn't mean the statement, Mr Malan, but the hearing, the evidence given there.

MR MALAN: I'll read it to you.

MR DEHAL: I stand corrected.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if you didn't do it, do you confirm that evidence, Mr Callaghan?

MR CALLAGHAN: I confirm it, yes.

MR DEHAL: Thank you, Judge and sorry Honourable Members. That concludes the application. Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DEHAL

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Callaghan, I don't know to what extent we're going to grant you amnesty in respect of all the incidents you referred to, that is something we're going to have to examine. However, it's heartening to know that you are one of very few people in this country who are prepared to face your past and to say you're sorry and it is to be hoped that there are more people, whether they appear before the Committee or not, who are willing to at least come to terms with their past, on both sides of the spectrum, not only to serve their guilt, if you want to call it, but to assist in establishing the nation that we seek and it's a pity that many of the people who were victims in those territories have not been here to hear what you have to say. I think it would have been, as much as it has helped you, it may have helped them.

It remains for me to say that we will take our time to consider your applications and to wish you well in the future. I know it's not going to be easy to forget what you did and it's easier said than done to close a chapter in one's life, but at least you came here to bare your soul, and important, to say you're sorry. On behalf of the Committee, we wish you well in future.

MR CALLAGHAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR CALLAGHAN: That's very much.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Dehal, we're going to take time to consider this, we'll deliver the decision in due course.

MR DEHAL: I'm indebted to you, Judge.

CHAIRPERSON: We adjourn to 2 o'clock.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS