Amnesty Hearings

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today is the 16th of August 2000, we're continuing with the application of Mr Eugene de Kock. The incident is that of the Attack on a Transit House in Mbabane, Swaziland, known as MK Jabu - Injured.

When we adjourned yesterday afternoon, the 15th of August 2000, there was an application before us by the legal representative of the victims, Ms Cambanis, that the informer which Mr de Kock referred to whilst giving his evidence, should be made known and at the end of it all a ruling was reserved, to be given this morning. However, the legal representatives went into conference this morning and the position is as follows, that Mr de Kock would continue with his evidence and we need not give a ruling at this stage, but it may become relevant at a later stage. Is that a summary of our understanding? We'll start with Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Cambanis.

MR HUGO: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I think before Mr de Kock proceeds, there is an omission that for tidiness of our record I would ask Ms Cambanis, just for the record, to state the names of the victims.

MS CAMBANIS: Solly Zacharia Shoke and Charlotte Shoke. I do not have another name except Charlotte. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: What is her relationship to Solly?

MS CAMBANIS: She is married to him, she is she wife. Sorry Chairperson, I'm actually inaccurate, at the house at the time the children of the Shokes were also present. There was a cousin whose name I have - sorry, the youngest brother of Charlotte Shoke, whose name I have only as Cedric, I unfortunately do not know, I cannot place his surname on record, and the three minor children of the Shoke family, Lerato, Tefu and Chris. That totals six persons.

CHAIRPERSON: Were these children in this transit house?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes they were, together with Cedric.

CHAIRPERSON: Cedric.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel, Cedric I assume if he's a brother, would fall under the maiden name of Charlotte Shoke?

MS PATEL: Well I'm not certain, perhaps not necessarily if Charlotte's taken on her married surname, then her brother would have obviously her maiden surname, so it wouldn't be a Shoke, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, that's what I'm saying.

MS PATEL: Sorry, I misunderstood you.

CHAIRPERSON: And we only know that today there was no way of probably giving him notice.

MS PATEL: That is correct, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I will go on record in respect of all five the Shoke family and the brother, Cedric. I represent all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, I was about to ask you that.

EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, let us just get back on the track that we had yesterday with the evidence. You stated that this operation originated from a discussion that you had with one, W/O Labuschagne, who made a request to you to launch an operation against Jabu.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Very well. And just tell me if I'm incorrect regarding your evidence from yesterday, that the information that was given to you was that Jabu was responsible for the supply of weapons to ANC insurgents who in their turn would place such weapons in the Transvaal?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And that Mr Labuschagne during this discussion, informed you that he in his turn had obtained this information from an informer?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: May I ask you this, the discussion that took place between you and Mr Labuschagne, was it telephonic or did you speak man to man?

MR DE KOCK: It was a personal discussion, it was a person to person discussion in direct view of one another.

MR HUGO: When did this discussion take place?

MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately I cannot remember, I can only infer that it must have been either in Middelburg or in Ermelo, but the discussion definitely took place in the Eastern Transvaal.

MR HUGO: Were you in the Eastern Transvaal coincidentally at that stage, or were you requested by him to move into that area?

MR DE KOCK: No, we had a permanent presence in the area, so I was most probably there and he then found me in the area where I was, near the border.

MR HUGO: And where was Mr Labuschagne's point of station at that point?

MR DE KOCK: I am uncertain whether or not he was at Ermelo or whether he was at Middelburg. He spent some time in Ermelo, but then he was transferred to the Security Branch in the Head Office, which was situated in Middelburg.

MR HUGO: And what was his task and instruction in the Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was tasked with the collection of information, intelligence work, the recruitment of sources and the infiltration of intelligence networks of the MK.

MR HUGO: And in general terms, would it be correct to say that he was involved with counter-terrorism as part of his task?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.

MR HUGO: And when he told you about the information that he had, what was his request, what were you supposed to do about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the request was for us to attack the house and we had to kill this person who was known as Jabu.

MR HUGO: And did you have any idea why he specifically made the request to you and not to any other division of the Police?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was our task at that stage to execute such actions, or at least it was one of our tasks and then it was also his request to me.

MR HUGO: Were there any other persons present during this discussion? When I refer to any other persons, I refer to those persons specifically from the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch.

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, Capt Johan Botha was the person who was with him. Johan Botha was his senior and he was the head of this intelligence group, although Mr Labuschagne was actually the brain and Mr Botha was the Commander.

MR HUGO: Any other persons?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not that I can recall.

MR HUGO: And by the way, what was your rank at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think I was a Major at that stage.

MR HUGO: You heard the request and what did you do about it then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as a result of the sensitivity and the circumstances which led to conflict upon previous occasions with Col Visser, I contacted Brig Schoon at Head Office, I telephoned him and notified him of the request which was put through by Labuschagne and I explained the circumstances to him, explaining why they wanted to do this, who the person was, and he gave permission for us to launch this operation.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr de Kock, may I just interrupt you. I beg your pardon, Mr Hugo. Was Capt Botha present when Labuschagne told you that Jabu had to be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is my recollection, that he was the person who was present.

ADV BOSMAN: In other words, by necessary implication did the order come from Botha? Because you have stated ... (intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is one of those cases where Capt Botha, due to his rank, would automatically be the head of that division, but the person who managed the sources and was actually the brain behind the operation, was Labuschagne. So yes, as the senior person it would have been his situation, but Labuschagne was the person managing the sources, who had the information, who knew where these people were. It's almost a case of the tail wagging the dog.

ADV BOSMAN: But my concern is whether or not Capt Botha is aware of the proceedings which are taking place at present.

MR DE KOCK: I mentioned Mr Botha's name because he was present that night in Swaziland, when we sent the askaris in.

ADV BOSMAN: Yes ...(intervention)

MS PATEL: Sorry, if I may just for the record, he has been notified.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Ms Patel.

MR HUGO: When you had the telephonic discussion with Brig Schoon, did you have the impression that this was the first time that he came to hear of the proposed operation, or was it your perception that he had already been informed of it?

MR DE KOCK: My impression was clear that he already knew of this person known as Jabu and it wasn't even a question that I had to make a submission to him or had to summarise the proposed operation to him, it was concisely understood that we could continue with this action.

MR HUGO: Very well. He gave you permission after the telephonic discussion, what other arrangements were made?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, due to the information that Labuschagne had provided, we then decided to make use only of black members and of askaris in particular, due to the circumstances on ground level regarding the house which was viewed as a target. If I recall correctly, one or two of these askaris also knew Jabu. I have a vague recollection of that. The reason why no whites participated was because according to Labuschagne's information the house was situated very close to a police station and whites didn't really move around in that area and any white face in that vicinity would have immediately attracted attention and we did not wish to enter into conflict with the police.

MR HUGO: The planning which was then conducted for the operation, where did this take place initially?

MR DE KOCK: Initially on the South African side and then the final ground level planning took place near a park which wasn't very far away from the house, where we made the final arrangements before they were sent in.

MR HUGO: And when you refer to the South African side, was this near a border post or near a town?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think it was in Piet Retief.

MR HUGO: And during this planning in Piet Retief, can you recall the names of any other persons who were involved in the planning?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I took Mr van Dyk with, I think he was a Captain or a Lieutenant at that point, and then there was Johan Botha, Labuschagne and me.

MR HUGO: Very well. And the askaris that you used, can you recall their names?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was Geoffrey Bosigo, he was a former ANC member and he had spent quite some time at Vlakplaas. By that stage he was already a member of the force. I found him at Vlakplaas in 1983 when I returned from South West. Then there was Jimmy Mbane, who was also a former ANC member who had been arrested in Kimberley, and then there was also a former ANC member by the name of VZ, which were his initials, Ndam, N-d-a-m. He had been arrested in Cape Town and recruited there in the Cape.

MR HUGO: And what orders did you issue to the askaris?

MR DE KOCK: The orders to the askaris were that Jabu had to be shot, that he had to be shot dead and then they had to withdraw. In other words, strike and leave.

MR HUGO: And were any weapons given to them for the operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, they were issued with three 9mm Walter sub-machine guns with silencers and subsonic ammunition. These weapons I found upon my arrival at Vlakplaas from Ovamboland and it was the same weapons which we used in the Siphiwe Nyanda case or the Zwelibanzi Nyanda case.

MR HUGO: And were vehicles issued to them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Bosigo was the driver. There was a Secret Fund vehicle which was provided. I can no longer recall the numbers or the make, but it was a Secret Fund vehicle.

MR HUGO: Very well. And were they also involved in the initial planning stage in Piet Retief?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they were briefed there regarding who the target was, because in general one would conduct the planning there and then as soon as one was closer to one's target, one would begin the final planning, depending upon circumstances in the area at that given time.

MR HUGO: And at what time during the day or night, or for what time during the day or night was the operation planned?

MR DE KOCK: According to Labuschagne it would have to take place at night. According to his source, Jabu would have been at home during the evening. Unfortunately the time was not available due to movements and particularly with operatives one didn't have a fixed routine.

MR HUGO: And the askaris then crossed the border with the vehicle into Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we followed them and in Mbabane at a park, it was some sort of park where people could walk around or sit down, at this park we rendezvoused and once again the matter was discussed in depth with them. The source also arrived there and Mr Labuschagne also spoke to him, I also spoke to him and once again the source was sent to the house in order to determine whether or not Jabu was there. And I'm relying upon my recollection because it was quite some time ago, if I am not mistaken, the source drove with Geoff Bosigo alone, so that they could properly identify the house to Mr Bosigo, so that there wouldn't be a mistake and then the wrong house would be struck.

MR HUGO: Very well. And the white members, what was their role?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we would remain in the park, we ourselves were also armed and the idea was that if a crisis were to originate at the house, we would then move in regardless of the fact that we were white and we would then get the people out in any manner possible.

MR HUGO: Regarding the attack itself, on the house and the attempt to kill Jabu, what were the orders, who would do the shooting and how would they go about it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was discussed, Mr Bosigo was he leader of this attack, Mr Ndam was his second-in-command if Mr Bosigo would be unavailable for some or other reason, and the orders were to enter the house, shoot Jabu and withdraw.

MR HUGO: Was any description given to the askaris regarding how Jabu appeared?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I believe it was done but I cannot tell you verbatim how it was described to him, but two of these askaris, as I have already stated, knew Jabu, he was known to them.

MR HUGO: Could you just tell me once again to which two he was known?

MR DE KOCK: I know that Ndam was the one who knew him, I'm not certain of the other one. I don't know if it was Bosigo or Mbane, it was one of those two.

MR HUGO: The role of the informer during the attack, what was his position?

MR DE KOCK: After he had identified the house to Mr Bosigo and the others they returned, Mr Bosigo and the others remained in this park where we were and the informer was once again sent to the house to determine when Jabu would be there or when it was a suitable time. At a certain stage the source returned and he told Mr Labuschagne and me that now was the time, that Jabu was there at that point in time and it would now be the time to launch the attack.

MR HUGO: And you then issued instructions to the askaris to launch the attack?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And what happened to the source?

MR DE KOCK: He remained with us in the park and Mr Bosigo, Ndam and Mbane departed from there and approximately twenty minutes later, it may have been longer, it may have been shorter, Mr Bosigo came driving along to the park at a relatively high speed, Ndam was with him. Mr Bosigo was bleeding profusely when he climbed out of the vehicle. He fell to the ground. He had been shot a number of times and Mr Ndam as well. Mbane wasn't there, but approximately ten minutes later he came running to the park as well. He was without his weapon.

At the scene we dealt with Mr Bosigo swiftly and so too with Mr Ndam. We put them in the Land Cruiser that we had, we put the seats down and I was on the point of moving into the house when Mbane came running along. He wasn't injured and he didn't have his weapon either. He said that he had lost his weapon in the house and Botha, Labuschagne, van Dyk, the injured and I went back over the border. At the Nerston border post we crossed the border illegally. There was a section where one could drive over the border if one just flattened the fence. During that journey Bosigo told me that Mbane's weapon had been taken by Jabu in some or other way, I no longer recall the details, and that Jabu had fired back with the weapon and that this had led to the injury of both Mr Ndam and Bosigo. We took the injured to the Piet Retief Security Branch and in the offices we applied further first-aid and set up intravenous drips for them. There was another wound that Mr Bosigo had which I hadn't noticed in Swaziland, and Mr van Dyk and I brought the two injured through to 1 Military Hospital. We arrived here at approximately 5 o'clock/five thirty that morning. We had them admitted to hospital and they went into surgery immediately.

The firearm which was lost, I later heard via Mr Deetleffs from Ermelo, that the police took the weapon into possession and that it was taken to Pretoria for forensic testing and ballistic testing. I informed Brig Schoon and in some or other way, I don't know who he liaised with, the weapon was intercepted between Ermelo and the forensic laboratory and we managed to get the weapon back to Vlakplaas.

MR HUGO: Very well. And what became of the weapon?

MR DE KOCK: This weapon became part of another group of weapons which I had to hand over to Labuschagne under the instruction of Brig Schoon and upon the request of Col Visser, because they wanted to establish their own operational task force, so to speak, and I handed over this ammunition to them.

MR HUGO: I just want to return to the attack in Swaziland itself. What did the askaris report to you regarding precisely what took place during the operation?

MR DE KOCK: As I managed to ascertain from Ndam and Bosigo later on, it was a general failure as a result of Mr Mbane's actions. Mr Mbane on his turn denied it because he lied back and forth as it suited him, but it was due to Jimmy Mbane's conduct that the situation failed. I had to accept the word of all three these persons as it came to me and I knew that I would never really find out what truly happened and why it had failed.

MR HUGO: Very well. With regard to the treatment which was administered at 1 Military Hospital, what was the explanation that you offered regarding the injuries on the persons?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in Piet Retief I made an entry in the Case Book, because they were members of the force at that stage and in order to deal with the medical expenses and the fact that the incident had to be reported later, I stated that on the RSA/Swazi border there had been crossfire between members of my unit and unknown persons, reputedly ANC members, and that is how I dealt with the Injury Board. Due to the covert nature of this action, I could not state that we had acted in Mbabane with weapons which had been fitted with silencers.

MR HUGO: Regarding the co-operation that you may have obtained from other sources, was there every any co-operation from the Swazi authorities who may have known of the operation which was to be launched?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not be able to say that, I think that a person such as Mr Labuschagne or perhaps Mr Deetleffs, would be able to inform you better on that, I myself did not liaise with this person.

MR HUGO: The border that you crossed, was this in the regular course of events or was it an illegal crossing?

MR DE KOCK: When we went in it was illegal, because we made use of false passports and we had also had weapons and upon our return we did not go through the legal structure of the border post, we moved approximately 500-800 metres away from the border post where there was an even area and we flattened the fence, crossed the border and then just put the fence back up.

MR HUGO: And after this operation, did you report back to anybody?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I reported the incident to Brig Schoon. Indeed it was also his members who were wounded. And naturally there was always the possibility, and usually there would be subsequent inquiries or accusations from other departments, and it was all about damage control which had to be conducted.

MR HUGO: And what was Brig Schoon's attitude when you reported back to him?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was non-committal although he wasn't satisfied. I could see by his attitude that he wasn't satisfied with the fact that we had failed.

MR HUGO: Did he admonish you at all regarding the fact that you had launched this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, definitely not.

MR HUGO: What information did you have, personally, regarding Jabu's activities?

MR DE KOCK: That he was very active in the supply of weapons and ammunition and explosives and particularly pertaining to the landmine issue and that he was a member of the senior personnel operating in Swaziland, and that at that stage he had developed quite a profile as a person who was causing problems in the RSA.

MR HUGO: Did you have this information before Labuschagne liaised with you or was it subsequent to his liaison with you that you obtained the information?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there were security reports, but I must just tell you that my unit functioned on a national basis and we received reports from all over the country and the volume of names and numbers and particulars were too much to absorb completely, but once there was reference to a particular person, one would research such a person more. At that stage I didn't really concentrate on Jabu, I was more involved in border protection until Labuschagne came to me and said that the person had been identified and that we had to launch an action against him.

MR HUGO: Then I would just like for you to comment regarding a certain affidavit which was filed by Mr Labuschagne. I will take you through it briefly. Mr Chairman, this is part of our bundle. I'm going to refer to pages 58 and 59 up to page 60.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HUGO: The first aspect that Mr Labuschagne dealt with in his affidavit is where he says that Jabu was identified as a target and Trevits and was involved with the Special Operations section of MK in Swaziland. Did you have any confidential information concerning Trevits and what their actions or operations were?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, my knowledge is that it is an Anti-Revolutionary Information Target Committee. This is a group that come together and it consists of National Intelligence, Military Intelligence and then the South African Police, who then consolidate their information of people who are active in South Africa. It is also a type of workshop that clarifies and ensure that if they decide on a target, that this target is not a source, that it is not a source who's been taken out possibly by the Military Intelligence. Then they would decide if this person is a problem to all of them, whether it is National or Military Intelligence. And my knowledge of Trevits is that it fell under the division of the State Security Council. I cannot recall the name now, I think it was the Co-ordinating Information Target Group. This was a more senior group with more senior officers.

MR HUGO: Very well. Did you at any stage have sitting in these Trevits meetings?

MR DE KOCK: No, I was never a member and I was never invited to any of their sittings.

MR HUGO: And did you have any input or insight into some of the documentation of Trevits?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HUGO: If Mr Labuschagne says that Jabu was identified as a target by Trevits, can you tell the Honourable Committee if you know if Mr Labuschagne had sitting in the Trevits meetings?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I know he did.

MR HUGO: Very well. Then Mr Labuschagne continues and says that he was part of the group of terrorists who planted landmines in the Eastern Transvaal. Their activities were very effective, a lot of landmines exploded during that time or were found by Security Forces. Does it also correlate with your information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: And is this also information that he provided to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: Is it also information that was confirmed by the source?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I was not there when the source reported to Mr Labuschagne, but it could be that it was one of the sources' reports. Mr Labuschagne had more than one source and it is a very old custom that if you had one, or that you put one or more source on one target, you can then control the value of the information and the correctness of it.

MR HUGO: Then the next paragraph he says that

"We reported back to Col Schalk Visser concerning the activities of Jabu."

You probably won't be able to comment on this.

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, except that I would not have launched the operation if Schalk Visser did not authorise it. I did not liaise with him directly, I liaised with Schoon, because there was never a good relationship between myself and Col Visser, it could be that it was an ego problem.

MR HUGO: Then he says that he requested the Security Branch to help, or to request Vlakplaas to assist in the elimination of Jabu. Can you just tell the Honourable Committee what was the work ethic concerning the application of Vlakplaas in other divisions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when we work to work in another division, usually the Commander of that division or the Section Commander of the Security Branch would then request that we send in a group of askaris concerning, or depending on the nature of the operation, Security Branch Headquarters would then send people immediately or tell us to go later. The work ethic was that if those members of Vlakplaas arrive at that section they will then fall under the command of that section head. This is for the purposes of discipline, their actions and everything that goes with that.

MR HUGO: Could it have happened that for example, the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch will directly contact you and say that you have to launch an operation in their district without your Commander knowing of it?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, I definitely cleared it up with Brig Schoon.

MR HUGO: And if Mr Labuschagne refers here to the Security Branch Headquarters, to whom is he referring?

MR DE KOCK: I believe that he is referring to Brig Schoon.

MR HUGO: Very well. Then he says

"To assist with the operation in the elimination of Jabu"

What was your understanding when you saw "the elimination "?

MR DE KOCK: It was to kill him.

MR HUGO: Then he says that

"De Kock and his team joined us in the planning of the operation. I cannot recall de Kock's team's names, but there were a few askaris."

Do you agree with this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: Then he says that

"After consideration of all relevant factors, we decided not to continue with the elimination of Jabu, but rather to abduct him in order to get further information from him."

Let us just pause there for a while. What do you say about this?

MR DE KOCK: No, that is not correct, because I did not have enough people to do that. Then we would have discussed it on the South African side if they wanted it to happen in that way, then I would have taken additional people with me with additional vehicles. I had to have taken a bigger group. Can I just explain the comparison. If you abduct somebody you have a physical situation where you will not use less than four. I would have used at least four, whereas you can send one person to kill somebody. So there was no talk of abduction, it was to eliminate him. It does not help if they take me into Swaziland and now they ask me to abduct him, it means that then I have to return to the Eastern Transvaal and get another group of askaris.

MR HUGO: Then he says

"We could have eliminated him at a later stage."

MR DE KOCK: Well Mr Chairperson, that is not impossible and it did happen in the past.

MR HUGO: Then he continues

"The Vlakplaas blacks were sent to abduct Jabu where he was residing in Swaziland."

MR DE KOCK: No, they went to go and shoot him.

MR HUGO

"Myself and de Kock and his team of askaris whose names I cannot recall, entered Swaziland and approximately a kilometre from the residence of Jabu, we dropped off the askaris."

Before I ask your comment on this, you can see that Mr Labuschagne only refers to yourself, himself and the askaris, what is your comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: This is not correct, Mr Chairperson, Capt van Dyk was present too. It was his Land Cruiser, he drove it. He is also knowledgeable concerning Swaziland, he knows the area very well. And then Capt Botha was definitely present too. There's no doubt about that.

MR HUGO: Very well. Then he says that you accompanied Labuschagne and the askaris were dropped off approximately a kilometre from Jabu's house. Was approximately a kilometre according to your recollection?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, Mr Chairperson, we did not drop them off, we worked from this park because we as whites stood out in that area. It is a park where you could drive in, there were trees and we could park there and reasonable in isolation, where we couldn't draw attention to us.

MR HUGO: He continued and said that

"The askaris will grab Jabu and abduct him and afterwards we would hand him over in the Republic for further interrogation."

You just said that the idea was not that he had to be abducted.

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And then he says

"We were all armed."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we had weapons.

MR HUGO: He continues and says

"The askaris entered the house, but shooting started and one of the askaris' weapon was taken."

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR DE KOCK

"Two of the askaris were wounded and the operation had to be postponed because of the fact that there were injuries on both sides."

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I wasn't sure if Jabu was injured, but it was conveyed to me by the askaris. I only found this out later, or it came under my attention yesterday.

MR HUGO: He then concludes where he says

"As far as my knowledge goes, Jabu was also wounded in this operation."

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I heard that yesterday that he was injured.

MR HUGO: Concerning the providing of information by Labuschagne in this affidavit, would you say that complete information was supplied, or that it's very scant information that is supplied in his affidavit? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: It is very scant, Chairperson, because the whole situation revolves around that which they wanted. And secondly, the fact that he did not mention Capt van Dyk, somebody that you cannot miss, and he did not mention Capt Botha, his own Commander, I would say that information is incomplete.

MR HUGO: Then I'd like you to deal with an affidavit that is been made available to us, it is one of Brig Schoon. Mr Chairman, I don't think this forms part of the bundle as such, but I would imagine that you do have a copy of his affidavit.

CHAIRPERSON: It has been made available to us, we have it.

MR HUGO: May I suggest, Mr Chairman, if we just mark this Exhibit A?

CHAIRPERSON: It shall be so marked.

MR HUGO: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I am not going to deal with the whole of his affidavit, except on page 2, paragraph 2.3 he says:

"I see that de Kock made the allegation that I gave the authorisation for the operation in an attempt to kill an ANC in Swaziland and that something went wrong and that two askaris were injured in the operation."

Then he says:

"I deny that I provided him with any authorisation or instruction or that I was involved in the execution of this operation."

What do you say about this?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, it is not true, it's just a sign of a lack of courage and moral fibre to come forward with the truth.

MR HUGO

"All that I know is that Mr de Kock informed me that two of his askaris operated in Swaziland and were injured in the process when they were involved in a shooting incident."

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he would have definitely - if he didn't reprimand me severely, he would have probably removed me from my position. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR HUGO: Concerning your political objective in this operation, can you just tell this Honourable Committee what you wanted to achieve in this operation?

MR DE KOCK: It was a prevention of terror, terrorist acts, this is now on the side of the Republic. I had to act against trained and active members of the MK, the military wing of the ANC and I also saw it within the framework of my duties.

MR HUGO: Then you also ask the Honourable Committee to give you amnesty for attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder and all other offences that I will address the Committee on later.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HUGO: That is the evidence, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hugo. Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, my client has arrived now, I will ask for a short adjournment just to brief on the first part of the evidence and raise other questions with him, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly we would afford you that opportunity, we would adjourn. You will advise you when you're ready.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We adjourn.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Cambanis, have you ...?

MS CAMBANIS ADDRESSES: Thank you, Chair. During the adjournment, for which we thank you, the Evidence Leader facilitated a meeting between the applicant and the family of the victims, as a result of that it is the view of the family that they do not wish me to put any questions whatsoever to the applicant, neither do they wish to oppose his application in any way and to

take the opportunity to thank the Committee for affording us the opportunity to facilitate the meetings and have questions answered. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I have no questions. Thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, before you do, I have one or two questions for Mr de Kock.

Mr de Kock, when you entered Swaziland, which border post did you use?

MR DE KOCK: We used the Nerston border post.

CHAIRPERSON: It's the same as the one where you came back about 800 metres, where you flattened the fence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you said you had intelligence reports other than what you have been told by Labuschagne about Jabu, now did the intelligence report confirm that this name Jabu is his name or was there another name used in the report?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the name Jabu was used. I must just state that the Security Police as well as Military Intelligence and National Intelligence had completely thorough structures according to the layout of positions with names and possible successes, second-in-command, third-in-command and MK names. So it would have been incorporated in the report regarding the position and the whereabouts of the person or where he would have come from.

CHAIRPERSON: But can you recall at the moment what the name was?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have a very vague recollection that there was mention of it in a security report.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Sandi?

ADV SANDI: I've got no questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I've got strong suspicions that you don't have re-exam?

MR HUGO: Your suspicions are confirmed, Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr de Kock.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any further evidence, Mr Hugo?

MR HUGO: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Cambanis, are you going to lead evidence?

MS CAMBANIS: I'm not, but I'm going to beg to change the information I gave this morning regarding who the victims are, I made some errors and I would just like to correct that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS ADDRESSES: Obviously Solly Shoke remains correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: It is Solly Shoke, Charlotte Shoke.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you removing Zacharia? No, I'm saying so because you say now "Solly".

MS CAMBANIS: I am wrong. Solly Zacharia Shoke.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Charlotte Shoke, Lerato Shoke. It was Sepho Shoke and then should be added a Chris Dlamini. And the Cedric to whom I referred to is an error that should be removed, it was a Cedric Dlamini. We do not for Cedric Dlamini.

CHAIRPERSON: Now just for the record, would we refer to Mr Shoke as the Jabu being referred to in the documentation?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, he is Jabu.

CHAIRPERSON: Also known, or alias Jabu? Also known as Jabu or alias Jabu?

MS CAMBANIS: That is correct, Chair.

ADV SANDI: Is he still Jabu today?

MS CAMBANIS: To his friends he is, yes Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: The relationship with Chris Dlamini?

MS CAMBANIS: It is the brother-in-law of Solly Zacharia, the younger brother of Charlotte Shoke.

ADV BOSMAN: And all these people were in the house at the time?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, they were.

CHAIRPERSON: Has he returned the firearm he took from Mbane?

MS CAMBANIS: We would have enjoyed that cross-examination, because it in fact turned up in South Africa after going to the Swazi - but no we haven't. We are curious to know how it got here, but ... Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Was anybody injured from Jabu's side? Because we know, apparently it would appear, if I'm not mistaken, that Mr de Kock added later that he learnt yesterday that Jabu was also injured.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, he was injured in the attack.

ADV BOSMAN: I take it none of the others were injured at all?

MS CAMBANIS: No, not physically injured at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Ms Cambanis. I take it you want to address us shortly?

MR HUGO IN ARGUMENT: Yes, very briefly, Mr Chairman.

First of all just in respect of the offences that we're applying for, the first one is the illegal crossing of an international border, then the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. It might be a bit of a duplication here but we are, just for the sake of braces and a belt, just applying for conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, defeating the ends of justice and then all other offences and delicts that are coloured by the evidence and the facts in this hearing, Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: I hear you say "attempted murder", but were did this - I'm asking myself the question now in terms of the recent decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal, on the question of jurisdiction.

MR HUGO: Yes, I hear what Advocate Sandi is saying. We've been struggling with this particular problem as to whether we should apply for amnesty in respect of offences that occurred outside the borders of this country. We've adopted the attitude that we're applying for that, whether the Amnesty Committee is enjoyed to grant amnesty for those offences is something else, but I mean we're just doing it for completeness sake.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Hugo, if you're asking for something ...(indistinct) a duty to either convince us that we should or not grant it.

ADV SANDI: ...(indistinct) included for the purposes of delictual liability.

MR HUGO: That is in fact one of the reasons why we're doing it, for offences that were committed outside the borders, yes Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman, as far as the evidence is concerned, I don't intend addressing you in detail. We will obviously rely on the fact that Mr de Kock was acting on instructions here, regardless of the fact that Mr Schoon says in his affidavit that the initial instruction didn't come from him. We're saying that Mr de Kock came to testify, he was open to cross-examination. That's really the only evidence before you and Mr Schoon's affidavit, we submit should be ignored for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether Mr de Kock had authority and orders to execute this particular operation.

Mr Chairman, on this score, Mr de Kock's version is in fact to a large extent corroborated by Mr Labuschagne's affidavit, where he also makes mention of the fact that he liaised with Brig Schalk Visser and he in turn then liaised with Head Office. So it clearly corroborates Mr de Kock's evidence that Jabu's situation had been discussed at the higher echelons, or via the higher echelons in the Security Police.

Mr Chairman, maybe the other thing that needs to be address quickly, is whether this was aimed at a political opponent. I don't think there should be any doubt about that. The source indicated that Jabu was involved in political activities. Mr Labuschagne, his version is also to that effect. Mr Labuschagne sat in on Trevits meetings where Mr Labuschagne says that Jabu was targeted as a person to be eliminated. And then obviously the last thing, which is very important, is the fact that the family, the victims itself hasn't denied that at all and that gives corroboration to Mr de Kock's averment and allegation that he was involved in political activities and an MK Commander.

Honourable Members of the Committee, as far as disclosure is concerned, I think Mr de Kock has done his utmost to give the details that he can. He is the first one to - well, not the first, he's really the only applicant, but in stark contrast to his evidence today, we see for instance, Labuschagne's affidavit which purported to be an application for amnesty, where he sadly neglects to mention all the other names, he just refers to askaris. He neglects to mention the name of Botha, which was obviously, we submit, done on purpose to protect Botha who was his erstwhile Commander and most probably still is. Mr de Kock gives precise details as to the planning of this operation etcetera. We submit that there's nothing else that he could have told you that is being withheld.

The fact that this was certainly decided upon by the higher echelons and that they knew about this is also borne out by the fact that this operation was ratified ex post facto when Mr de Kock reported to Brig Schoon and he wasn't reprimanded, no steps were taken against him whatsoever, save for the fact that Brig Schoon was apparently bitterly disappointed about the fact that Jabu survived this particular attack.

Mr Chairman, those are really the submissions that we want to make. I don't know whether there's anything else that you need us to address.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hugo. Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair. We have no submissions.

NO SUBMISSIONS BY MS CAMBANIS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: Same here, thank you Honourable Chairperson.

NO SUBMISSIONS BY MS PATEL

CHAIRPERSON: This brings us to the conclusion of the application of Mr Eugene Alexander de Kock, in the incident of the attack on a transit house in Mbabane, Swaziland and in respect of MK Jabu.

I must thank you legal representatives and direct this Mr Shoke, who after deliberations with the legal representative, obviously accompanied by his own legal representative, this being facilitated by the Amnesty Committee Evidence Leader, that it curtailed the proceedings. We must thank you very much. This is the first encounter I have had of this nature, that it could be short-circuited in the manner it has been. I know it hasn't been easy on your side, but the courage you have shown that even as an ANC member you had the courage to disclose a few things, we must thank you for that. And we thank you very much for your participation in these proceedings, because as an ANC member and the ANC being in the majority in Parliament, they are bound to bring reconciliation in this country and your participation shows your party's willingness to bring a reconciliation of the sad conflict we had in the past when we were supposed to be one nation, but that nation being polarised in different directions. I hope I'm echoing the sentiments of my Committee here. Thank you very much, Mr Shoke.

I must thank the legal representatives profusely that again we have had courage where there was no splitting of hairs, that people could speak. That is very encouraging because it is the legal system that has to facilitate this kind of reconciliation. I thank you very much. Thank you, Ms Patel.

As it is customary that we are enjoyed by the Act that brought is into existence, that our decision should be in writing. I would assure you that this would be done. Within the next three weeks, you will get that decision in writing. The decision is therefore reserved.

Ms Patel, do we have anything on the plate?

MS PATEL: Unfortunately Honourable Chairperson, I see it's only quarter to twelve, I'd arranged with the legal representatives to be here at 12 o'clock for the next matter, so I request that we stand down for the next few minutes till they arrive.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Cambanis, you are excused.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We will stand down for a short while. You will advise us when you're ready. Thank you.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS